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VPC-DI System Administration Guide, Release 21.22 VPC-DI System Administration Guide, Release 21.22 First Published: 2020-12-17 Americas Headquarters Cisco Systems, Inc. 170 West Tasman Drive San Jose, CA 95134-1706 USA http://www.cisco.com Tel: 408 526-4000 800 553-NETS (6387) Fax: 408 527-0883 THE SPECIFICATIONS AND INFORMATION REGARDING THE PRODUCTS IN THIS MANUAL ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE. ALL STATEMENTS, INFORMATION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS MANUAL ARE BELIEVED TO BE ACCURATE BUT ARE PRESENTED WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. USERS MUST TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR APPLICATION OF ANY PRODUCTS. THE SOFTWARE LICENSE AND LIMITED WARRANTY FOR THE ACCOMPANYING PRODUCT ARE SET FORTH IN THE INFORMATION PACKET THAT SHIPPED WITH THE PRODUCT AND ARE INCORPORATED HEREIN BY THIS REFERENCE. IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO LOCATE THE SOFTWARE LICENSE OR LIMITED WARRANTY, CONTACT YOUR CISCO REPRESENTATIVE FOR A COPY. The Cisco implementation of TCP header compression is an adaptation of a program developed by the University of California, Berkeley (UCB) as part of UCB's public domain version of the UNIX operating system. All rights reserved. Copyright © 1981, Regents of the University of California. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER WARRANTY HEREIN, ALL DOCUMENT FILES AND SOFTWARE OF THESE SUPPLIERS ARE PROVIDED “AS IS" WITH ALL FAULTS. CISCO AND THE ABOVE-NAMED SUPPLIERS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THOSE OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OR ARISING FROM A COURSE OF DEALING, USAGE, OR TRADE PRACTICE. IN NO EVENT SHALL CISCO OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY INDIRECT, SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, LOST PROFITS OR LOSS OR DAMAGE TO DATA ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THIS MANUAL, EVEN IF CISCO OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. Any Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and phone numbers used in this document are not intended to be actual addresses and phone numbers. Any examples, command display output, network topology diagrams, and other figures included in the document are shown for illustrative purposes only. Any use of actual IP addresses or phone numbers in illustrative content is unintentional and coincidental. All printed copies and duplicate soft copies of this document are considered uncontrolled. See the current online version for the latest version. Cisco has more than 200 offices worldwide. Addresses and phone numbers are listed on the Cisco website at www.cisco.com/go/offices. Cisco and the Cisco logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Cisco and/or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries. To view a list of Cisco trademarks, go to this URL: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/legal/trademarks.html. Third-party trademarks mentioned are the property of their respective owners. The use of the word partner does not imply a partnership relationship between Cisco and any other company. (1721R) © 2020 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. CONTENTS PREFACE About this Guide xxxi Conventions Used xxxi Related Documentation xxxiii Contacting Customer Support xxxiii CHAPTER 1 Introduction to VPC-DI 1 Product Description 1 Underlying Infrastructure for the System 1 Control Function (CF) VMs 3 Service Function (SF) VMs 4 DI Network 5 Network Requirements 6 Jumbo Frames 7 Record Storage 8 Packet Flows 8 Packets Received on SF Demux VM 8 Packets Received on SF Session VM 8 Feature Set 9 Interfaces and Addressing 9 Encryption 10 Security 10 Redundancy and Availability 10 Platform Requirements 10 CF Redundancy 11 SF Redundancy 11 ICSR Support 11 VPC-DI System Administration Guide, Release 21.22 iii Contents Hypervisor Requirements 12 CF VM Configuration 12 SF VM Configuration 13 vCPU and vRAM Options 13 vNIC Options 14 Support for vhost-net and vhost-user 14 Hard Drive Storage 14 DPDK Internal Forwarder 15 Orchestration 16 Provisioning 16 Boot Sequence 17 CF Boot Sequence 17 SF Boot Sequence 18 Bandwidth Requirements 18 Capacity, CEPS and Throughput 18 Diagnostics and Monitoring 18 Cisco Prime Analytics 19 StarOS VPC-DI Build Components 19 Software Installation and Network Deployment 19 CHAPTER 2 VPC-DI Installation Notes 21 Creating a Boot Parameters File 21 Format of the Boot Parameters File 21 Network Interface Roles 22 Network Interface Identification 22 Configuring Boot Parameters 27 Configuring Network Interface Bonding 28 Configuring a VNFM Interface 30 VNFM Interface Options 30 Configuring the DI Network VLAN 32 Configuring IFTASK Tunable Parameters 32 Increased Maximum IFtask Thread Support 34 Configure MTU Size 35 Configure Support for Traffic Above Supported MTU 35 VPC-DI System Administration Guide, Release 21.22 iv Contents Boot Parameters File Examples 36 VPC-DI Onboarding using ESC 36 Onboarding the VPC-DI with ESC on OpenStack 36 Customizing the VPC-DI Onboarding with ESC 38 OpenStack Performance Optimizations 39 Configuring CPU Pinning 40 Configuring Huge Pages 43 Configuring PCI Passthrough 43 Onboarding the VPC-DI with Heat Orchestration Templates (HOT) in OpenStack 46 VPC-DI Heat Orchestration Templates 47 VPC-DI HOT Parameter Groups 47 VPC-DI HOT Parameters 48 VPC-DI HOT Resources 53 VPC-DI HOT Outputs 58 VMware Installation Notes 59 CHAPTER 3 System Operation and Configuration 61 Terminology 61 Contexts 61 Logical Interfaces 61 Management Interface 62 Bindings 62 Services 62 AAA Servers 63 Subscribers 63 How the System Selects Contexts 64 Context Selection for Context-level Administrative User Sessions 64 Context Selection for Subscriber Sessions 67 Understanding Configuration Files 67 IP Address Notation 68 IPv4 Dotted-Decimal Notation 68 IPv6 Colon-Separated-Hexadecimal Notation 69 CIDR Notation 69 Alphanumeric Strings 70 VPC-DI System Administration Guide, Release 21.22 v Contents Character Set 70 Quoted Strings 71 CHAPTER 4 Getting Started 73 Initial StarOS Configuration 73 Using the StarOS CLI for Initial Configuration 73 Configuring System Administrative Users 75 Limiting the Number of Concurrent CLI Sessions 75 Automatic Logout of CLI Sessions 76 Configuring the System for Remote Access 77 Configuring SSH Options 79 SSH Host Keys 79 Setting SSH Key Size 79 Configuring SSH Key Generation Wait Time 80 Specifying SSH Encryption Ciphers 80 MAC Algorithm Configuration 81 Generating SSH Keys 83 Setting SSH Key Pair 84 Authorized SSH User Access 84 Authorizing SSH User Access 84 SSH User Login Restrictions 85 Creating an Allowed Users List 85 SSH User Login Authentication 86 Secure Session Logout 86 Changing Default sshd Secure Session Logout Parameters 87 SSH Client Login to External Servers 88 Setting SSH Client Ciphers 88 Setting Preferred Authentication Methods 89 Generating SSH Client Key Pair 89 Pushing an SSH Client Public Key to an External Server 90 Enabling NETCONF 90 Configuring the Management Interface with a Second IP Address 91 Upgrade and Migration of Open SSH to Cisco SSH 91 Feature Summary and Revision History 91 VPC-DI System Administration Guide, Release 21.22 vi Contents Feature Changes 92 VM Hardware Verification 94 CHAPTER 5 System Settings 97 Verifying and Saving Your Interface and Port Configuration 97 Configuring System Timing 98 Setting the System Clock and Time Zone 98 Verifying and Saving Your Clock and Time Zone Configuration 99 Configuring Network Time Protocol Support 99 Configuring NTP Servers with Local Sources 100 Using a Load Balancer 100 Verifying the NTP Configuration 101 Configuring Software RSS 102 DI-Network RSS Encryption 102 Feature Summary and Revision History 102 Feature Changes 103 Command Changes 103 Configuring SF Boot Configuration Pause 103 Enabling CLI Timestamping 104 Configuring CLI Confirmation Prompts 104 Enabling Automatic Confirmation 105 Requiring Confirmation for autoconfirm and configure Commands 105 Requiring Confirmation for Specific Exec Mode Commands 105 Configuring System Administrative Users 106 User Name Character Restrictions 107 Configuring Context-level Administrative Users 107 Configuring Context-level Security Administrators 108 Configuring Context-level Administrators 108 Configuring Context-level Operators 108 Configuring Context-level Inspectors 109 Segregating System and LI Configurations 109 Verifying Context-level Administrative User Configuration 110 Configuring Local-User Administrative Users 111 Verifying Local-User Configuration 111 VPC-DI System Administration Guide, Release 21.22 vii Contents Updating Local-User Database 112 Updating and Downgrading the local-user Database 112 Restricting User Access to a Specified Root Directory 113 Configuring an SFTP root Directory 113 Associating an SFTP root Directory with a Local User 113 Associating an SFTP root Directory with an Administrator 113 Associating an SFTP root Directory with a Config Administrator 114 Configuring TACACS+ for System Administrative Users 114 Operation 114 User Account Requirements 115 TACACS+ User Account Requirements 115 StarOS User Account Requirements 116 Configuring TACACS+ AAA Services 116 Configuring TACACS+ for Non-local VPN Authentication 117 Verifying the TACACS+ Configuration 117 IPv6 Address Support for TACACS+ Server 118 Separating Authentication Methods 118 Disable TACACS+ Authentication for Console 118 Disable AAA-based Authentication for Console 119 Disable TACACS+ Authentication at the Context Level 119 Limit local-user Login on Console/vty Lines 120 Limit Console Access for AAA-based Users 120 Verify Configuration Changes 121 Configuring a Chassis Key 121 Overview 121 Configuring a New
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