Australian Strategic Imaginaries
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Australian Strategic Imaginaries Samuel Murdoch Webster Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences The University of Sydney A thesis submitted to fulfil requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2021 Samuel Webster Australian Strategic Imaginaries I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged. 2 Samuel Webster Australian Strategic Imaginaries Abstract This thesis looks at the foreign and defence policies of the Australian Commonwealth from 1901 to 2020, with closest attention being paid to the period between 1942 and 1996. It argues that the thinking of Australian policymakers has been undergirded by a ‘strategic imagination’, a concept which provided a way of imagining Australia’s place in the world and situated Australian national identity in regional and international geo-politics. Since federation, the strategic imagination has itself undergone changes that were largely in reaction to external events. The history of Australian foreign and defence policy can thus be broken up into three broad and overlapping periods corresponding to three distinctive and shifting ways in which policymakers have imagined the geo-strategic landscape in which the national community resides. The first period, from the late nineteenth century to 1967, was greatly influenced by conceptions of Australia as a proud custodian of the British racial ideal in a world dominated by European empires. The second, from the mid-1940s to the early 1990s, was marked by the waning of empire and a developing Australian familiarity with emerging post-colonial states in Asia. At the same time, Australia’s strategic alignment with the United States in the overarching Cold War bi- polar rivalry with the Soviet Union strengthened conceptions of Australia as a ‘western’ country. The third period, commencing with the end of the Cold War, saw Australian policymakers rely on American strategic pre-eminence as a firm foundation for deep integration of the Australian and Asian economies. 3 Samuel Webster Australian Strategic Imaginaries Acknowledgements I have been the beneficiary of much support and incurred countless intellectual debts during the preparation of this thesis. The first thank you goes to my supervisor Professor James Curran for his help and support over the past four years. James, you have been an expert guide through the historical content, a generous interlocutor, and a patient reader of my drafts. Your suggestions and reassurances were both insightful and timely. I know it’s a tried expression, but I could not have done it without you and you have certainly helped me ‘keep the faith’. Acknowledgement and appreciation should also go to Professor Mark McKenna for his enthusiasm and time in the early stages of this project. All errors and deficiencies in this work are my own. Many thanks to all of the research assistants that I have met along the way. The knowledge of your respective databases and finding-aids are always impressive. Even if the various archives and libraries you work for do arrive at the unsmiling utopia of complete digitisation, I’m sure the laity will still require specialist advice to access what they are looking for. I am indebted to my family – in-laws included! – for providing support and welcome distraction. Special thanks go to my Mum and Dad for teaching me the value of education and backing me to aim high. The Sydney University Evangelical Union has been a much-appreciated source of teaching, encouragement, and community over my entire time at university. It’s been a joy to take part in the various activities of the Post-Graduate and Staff faculty, and to discuss history, philosophy, theology, and ‘fine leather goods’ with our book club. My only disappointment is that I have not been able to embody as much of Matthew Moffit’s serenity and thoughtfulness as I would have hoped. Thanks to Luke Tucker for all the coffees, Thai food, exercise, and conversation. From the second row in the under 13s to these past final months of our PhDs, it’s been great work alongside a friend. Finally, to my wife Laura, thank you for your love, support, and gracious forbearance with me. I really could not have got this far without you and look forward to having a greater capacity to love and support you on your endeavours now that this is done. 4 Samuel Webster Australian Strategic Imaginaries Contents Abstract 3 Acknowledgements 4 Introduction – A Strategic Imagination 6 1 Eggleston’s ‘Two Ocean Dilemma’, 20 2 Shocks to the Imperial Imaginary, 1942-1970 32 3 ‘Burdens of Security’: Forward Defence 1967-1971 63 4 Contrasting ‘New Realities’ with ‘Old Fears, Shibboleths and Suspicions’, 1972-1975 86 5 ‘Western with a Difference’, 1976-1981 118 6 ‘International Economics and International Strategy’, 1983-1987 151 7 Australia, Asia, and the New World Order, 1989-1995 182 Conclusion 217 Bibliography 233 5 Samuel Webster Australian Strategic Imaginaries Introduction – A Strategic Imagination On the 14th of October 1968, Australian Prime Minister John Gorton went beyond the usual remarks on the nation’s foreign and defence policy expected from one of his office. It was just over a year since Britain had announced a drastic reduction in its military presence in Asia. Australia for the first time, barring perhaps a few frightful years after 1942, had to come to grips with the end of the military shield of the British Empire. Rather than lament the passing of what had been nothing less than a totemic presence in Australian strategic thinking, Gorton struck a more measured tone. It was time to confront strategic realities: ‘we have come to a watershed in Australian affairs. No longer can we say, “we are Australian. We are protected by the British Navy. We do not need to protect ourselves… So that now, besides the efforts we ourselves can make, we are, for our own security, dependent more than ever before on the United States Government providing the protection understood to be provided under the ANZUS pact.”’1 Whether or not this was in fact a watershed in Australian history, what is striking about Gorton’s language is the connection that he made between national identity and national defence. This was not a common occurrence. Prime Ministers rarely peer under the bonnet of the nation’s foreign and defence policy and lay bare where different components lie, where they are connected, and what assumptions they rest on. Even if they are not always explicitly spoken of, there always are linkages between what a nation thinks about itself and how it structures its foreign and defence policy. One of the central arguments of this thesis is that this can be identified in the history of the Commonwealth of Australia’s foreign and defence policy, and can be expressed through the concept of a ‘strategic imagination’ or ‘strategic imaginary’. Two scholars can help in the sketching out of some sort of conceptual picture for the idea of a ‘strategic imagination.’ The philosopher Charles Taylor provides the beginnings of a definition of an imagination, as opposed to other conceptual frameworks that provide the basis for action such as ‘theory’ or ‘ideology’. In his magisterial, A Secular Age, Taylor considers the: ‘ways in which [people] imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations which are 1 John Gorton, ‘Flinders Electorate Liberal Party Luncheon’, 14 October 1968, http://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-1938. p. 2. 6 Samuel Webster Australian Strategic Imaginaries normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images which underlie these expectations.’ In doing so, he puts forward the concept of a ‘social imaginary’, as: ‘(i) the way ordinary people “imagine” their social surroundings… often not expressed in theoretical terms… [but] carried in images, stories, legends, etc… (ii) that it is shared by large groups of people, if not the whole society… (iii) That common understanding which makes possible common practices, and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.’2 Shifting from the conceptual processes of an individual situating itself in a community, to that of a community situating itself amongst other communities, a strategic imagination refers to how a national community imagines itself in its geo-political surroundings. This can be expressed in many ways, from national mythologies to political rhetoric. It also delineates the contours of policy potential in proving an imaginative precursor to action. Gorton, for example, voiced how being Australian carried the necessary connotations of being defended by the Royal Navy, and implicitly commented on a defunct belief in the commonality of strategic interests between Britain and Australia. Michael Hunt has used a similar concept in his thematic study of the American history of foreign and defence policy. Quoting the historian Geoffrey Eley, Hunt argues that American attempts to come to grips with their: ‘place in the world, should be seen as a form of… “imaginative ideological labour” … clarifying the idea of the nation and giving it concrete expression by creating historical myths, propagating values, and constructing institutions.’ This would, in turn: ‘[determine] “the possible forms of political activity and belief.”’3 The fact that Hunt groups these beliefs under the term ‘ideology’ and not as an ‘imagination’ is unimportant. His account is helpful in shedding light on how a national community can undergo the process of ‘imagining’ its place among other nations and people groups, and in doing so provide a basis for policy as action. 2 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007). pp. 171-172. 3 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S.