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An Analysis of the National Responses to the Covid-19 Pandemic Through the Lens of Medical Military Support Requirements

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An Analysis of the National Responses to the Covid-19 Pandemic Through the Lens of Medical Military Support Requirements AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC THROUGH THE LENS OF MEDICAL MILITARY SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OPEN Publications Volume 4 Number 5 | Fall 2020 NATO ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION Authors Primary Investigator Professor Martin CM Bricknell CB PhD DM Professor in Conflict, Health and Military Medicine Conflict and Health Research Group ORCID - 0000-0002-5080-0095 Research Co-ordinator Dr Zenobia S Homan, PhD MPhil BA Project Coordinator & Research Associate, Centre for Science & Security Studies ORCID - 0000-0002-5080-0095 Faculty of Social Science & Public Policy, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, Strand Campus, Strand, London, WC2R 2LS External Collaborators Dr Adrian Gheorghe, PhD Senior Health Economist ORCID - 0000-0002-0517-8807 Dr Mohamed Gad Technical Analyst (Health Economics) ORCID - 0000-0002-5603-597X Mr Joseph Kazibwe Assistant Technical Analyst (Health Economics) ORCID - 0000-0002-8315-1503 Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Global Health and Development Imperial College London, St Mary’s Campus, Norfolk Place, London W2 1PG Ms Emily Quirk BSc Imperial College School of Medicine, Kensington, London SW7 2DD ORCID - 0000-0002-1969-8117 1 Disclaimer 1. OPEN publications are produced by Allied Command Transformation/Strategic Plans and Policy; however OPEN publications are not formal NATO documents and do not represent the official opinions or positions of NATO or individual nations. OPEN is an information and knowledge management network, focused on improving the understanding of complex issues, facilitating information sharing and enhancing situational awareness. OPEN products are based upon and link to open-source information from a wide variety of organizations, research centers and media sources. However, OPEN does not endorse and cannot guarantee the accuracy or objectivity of these sources. The intellectual property rights reside with NATO and absent specific permission OPEN publications cannot be sold or reproduced for commercial purposes. Neither NATO or any NATO command, organization, or agency, nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for the use, which may be made of the information contained therein. Disclaimer 2. This report represents the publically distributed information and the potential opinion available in open source and represents the perception of military activity in the public domain. It is based entirely on open sources and all referred documentation is freely available to the general public. The OPEN Editorial Board validated the author’s research methodology. Organisations and agents with access to confidential, internal and classified information may, however, have different knowledge on the activities of their Defence Organisations during this pandemic and therefore may derive a different perception of these activities. All rights reserved by NATO Allied Command Transformation Open Perspectives Exchange Network (OPEN). The products and articles may not be copied, reproduced, distributed, or publically displayed without reference to OPEN. Cover picture: Image Library, CDC www.cdc.gov. All other pictures are from open access www.dvidshub.net 2 Table of Contents Authors ................................................................................................................................................ 1 Disclaimer. ....................................................................................................................................... 2 Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................ 3 List of Tables ....................................................................................................................................... 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................ 6 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 9 BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................... 10 APPROACH AND METHOD .................................................................................................................. 123 COMPONENTS OF ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................. 13 Scope, Constraints and Limitations. .......................................................................................... 14 RESULTS .............................................................................................................................................. 167 1. COMEDS SURVEY AND VIDEO-TELECONFERENCE – APRIL 2020............................... 17 2. EUROPEAN CASE STUDIES - ANALYSIS ...................................................................... 19 Comparison across European case studies. .................................................................................. 19 BEL – Belgium. ............................................................................................................................... 20 ESP – Spain. ................................................................................................................................... 21 FRA – France. ................................................................................................................................ 21 GBR - United Kingdom. ................................................................................................................. 22 ITA – Italy. ..................................................................................................................................... 22 SWE – Sweden. ............................................................................................................................. 22 3. NON-EUROPEAN CASE STUDIES - ANALYSIS ............................................................. 23 United States. ................................................................................................................................ 24 China. ............................................................................................................................................ 25 Russia. ........................................................................................................................................... 25 Brazil. ............................................................................................................................................. 26 4. MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS - ANALYSIS ........................................................... 26 United Nations. ............................................................................................................................. 27 European Union. ........................................................................................................................... 28 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. .............................................................................................. 28 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 30 Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 30 Limitations..................................................................................................................................... 30 Perspectives ...................................................................................................................................... 30 Threat to international security. ...................................................................................... 30 3 Further research questions: ...................................................................................................... 31 Threat to internal security. .............................................................................................. 31 Further research questions: ............................................................................................. 31 Impact on health security. ............................................................................................... 31 Further research questions: ...................................................................................................... 32 Impact on defence and security operations. ................................................................... 32 Further research questions: ...................................................................................................... 32 Contribution of Armed Forces to national responses to COVID-19. ................................ 32 Further research questions: ...................................................................................................... 33 Contribution of military medical services to national responses to COVID-19. .............. 33 Further research questions: ...................................................................................................... 34 ‘Critical Questions’ ........................................................................................................... 35 Acknowledgements: ...........................................................................................................
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