US Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan in Post 9/11 Era: A Comparison of Bush and Obama Regimes (2001-2014)
By ASMA RASHID
School of Politics and International Relations Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad 2019
US Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan in Post 9/11 Era: A Comparison of Bush and Obama Regimes (2001-2014)
A dissertation submitted to the School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR), Quaid-i-Azam University (QAU), Islamabad
In partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations
By ASMA RASHID
School of Politics and International Relations Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad 2019
DEDICATION
TO MY PARENTS, WAQAR AND MY CHILDREN ASHHAD AND EMAN
CONTENTS Abstract ...... i Acknowledgements ...... ii Abbreviations ...... iii INTRODUCTION...... 1 CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 25 1.1-Neoclassicalrealism: An Overview ...... 25 1.2-Foreign Policy traditions of the US ...... 34 1.3-Foreign Policy Decision Making FPDM ...... 38 CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: US POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN ...... 49 2.1-US-Afghan Relations: a Historical Background ...... 49 2.2-US Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan during Cold War (1945-1990) ...... 52 2.3-Post Cold War era and Afghanistan in 1989-1992 ...... 63 2.4-9/11 and Afghanistan ...... 74 2.5- Conclusion ...... 75 CHAPTER 3: US POLICIES TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN (2001-2008): AN ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENT BUSH POLICIES ...... 77 3.1- An Overview of President Bush’s Foreign Policy Doctrine ...... 77 3.2- US policy towards Afghanistan under President Bush ...... 82 3.3- Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM) under Bush ...... 108 3.4-Systemic Constraints 2001 under Bush Administration: ...... 110 3.5-Role of Domestic Variables during Bush Administration ...... 116 3.6-Weaknesses of Bush’s Approach ...... 119 3.7-Conclusion ...... 122 CHAPTER 4: CHAPTER 4: US POLICIES TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN (2009-2014): AN ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENT OBAMA POLICIES ...... 127 4.1-An Overview of President Obama’s Foreign Policy Doctrine ...... 127 4.2-US policy towards Afghanistan (2009-2014): A Critical Analysis ...... 129 4.3-Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM) under Obama ...... 149 4.4-Systemic Constraints 2001 under Obama Administration: ...... 152 4.5-Role of Domestic Variables during Obama Administration ...... 157 4.6-Weaknesses of Obama’s Approach ...... 159
4.7-Conclusion ...... 161 CHAPTER 5: PRESIDENT BUSH VS. PRESIDENT OBAMA’S AFGHAN POLICIES: A COMPARISON ...... 165 5.1-Comparison of Bush and Obama Foreign Policy Approaches ...... 166 5.2: President Bush and President Obama’s approaches in Afghanistan: A Comparison ...... 174 5.3-Conclusion ...... 188 CONCLUSION: ...... 190 ANALYSIS: A WAY FORWARD FOR AFGHANISTAN ...... 199 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 204
FIGURES Figure 1.1: Determinants of Foreign Policy Decisions ...... 41 Figure 1.2: Policy Power Cluster and National Security System ...... 45 Figure 4.1: AfPak Strategy and Key Actors ...... 136
TABLES Table 1.1: Biases in Decision-Making ...... 43 Table 1.2: Three Models of Decision-Making ...... 47 Table 2.1: Afghan Mujahideen Groups, Leaders and Supporters ...... 65 Table 2.2: Timeline Global War on Terrorism: Historical Overview ...... 73 Table 3.1: US and Allied Forces Military Fatalities in Afghanistan 2001-2008 ...... 107 Table 3.2: Afghanistan’s Rank CPI under Bush ...... 108 Table 3.3:U.S. Trade in goods with Afghanistan under Bush Administration ...... 112 Table 4.1: US and Allied Forces Military Fatalities in Afghanistan 2009-2014 ...... 147 Table 4.2: Afghanistan’s Rank in CPI under Obama ...... 149 Table 4.3: US Trade in Goods with Afghanistan under Obama Administration ...... 153 Table 5.2: Obama’s War on terror in Afghanistan ...... 175 Table 5.3: Economic Cost of War on Terror: Bush vs. Obama ...... 178 Table 5.4: Estimated Total War Deaths and Injuries in Afghanistan, 2001-2014 ...... 179 Table 5.5:Year-wise Detail of Coalition Military Fatalities 2001-2014 ...... 180
GRAPHS Graph 3.1-Civilians Killed in Afghanistan under Bush Administration ...... 106 Graph 4.1: Afghan Civilian War Deaths 2009-2014 ...... 146 Graph 4.2: Percentage of respondents who viewed Corruption as a major problem of Afghanistan ...... 149 Graph 5.1: Afghanistan Direct Civilian War Deaths 2001-2014 ...... 180 Graph 5.2: Afghanistan’s Rank in CPI (2001-2014) ...... 188
ABSTRACT This dissertation has addressed a central question of what were the foreign policy doctrines of Bush and Obama and how did they manage to implement their foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan in the post 9/11 era. This all was intended to explore the patterns of continuity or change in the policies of Bush and Obama in Afghanistan. Both the administrations applied their own means and interests to attain its objectives somehow or the other. However, the neglect of Afghanistan and inconsistent and faulty policies had been the basic reasons that the U.S. could not achieve its objectives or to make an outright victory and the war still continued and is not yet completely lost. This dissertation also spelled out the other systemic and domestic factors due to which Afghanistan could not get the concerted attention, resources and unified policy actions. The closer analysis of the U.S. policy and Afghanistan’s situation revealed that despite differences in rhetoric and somewhat in actions the main U.S. approach towards Afghanistan had remained more or less the same and suffered from inconsistency and neglect regardless of the leader. Many observers characterized the U.S. attempts to control terrorism had rather worked to breed more terrorism in Afghanistan. Afghanistan had become the center stage of international politics where indigenous people did not have the power while the outsiders enjoyed the power to play politics over this geo-politically important state. Underlying assumptions of neoclassical realism (NCR), and Foreign Policy Decision-Making (FPDM) formed the basis of this study. Based on the findings of this dissertation and foregoing analysis it has been concluded that despite different rhetoric and talking a lot of change, the Obama administration had continued the Bush approaches at his policy level and his grand strategy had shown a great degree of continuity in case of Afghanistan. A great body of literature had proved this continuity particularly in his counterterrorism and national security policy. Though he introduced significant changes in his overall approach by using different means but those were meant to attain similar ends. Obama wanted to end the war but his generals did not let him do so. So, the continuity has proven to be more striking and rewarding than the changes he had proposed.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My gratitude goes to Dr. Lubna Abid Ali for her patient guidance, insightful comments and continued support. Her invaluable patronage and incessant encouragement has made this possible. I am deeply thankful for the amount of time she has invested in my work and the care with which she has gone through each chapter of my dissertation.
I owe special thanks to the staff of the University of North Carolina, Wilmington, where I have spent a month as a visiting scholar and interacted with the faculty members of the international security and international relations department, who helped me in clarifying my research objectives. Dr. Daniel Masters and Dr. Andreescu Folerntina with diverse expertise and knowledge helped me in crafting my research hypothesis. The words have not been enough to express my thanks to my dear friend Jeremy Jer. who always offered his support whenever I needed it.
I owe my gratitude to Dr. Mavara Inayat who has been my guide and mentor since I joined QAU in 2009 and has been a great intellectual support over the years. My special gratitude to my mentor and a dearest friend Dr. Sadaf Farooq, who has been my guide and support during the long years of my dissertation writing. I would like to express thanks to my friends especially Ms. Waheeda Rana, Ms. Anjum Mughal for their encouragement and intellectual support in completing the work. To my co-workers, Dr. Amna Mehmood, Dr. Noor Fatima, Dr. Nasreen Akhtar, Ms. Nadia Awan for encouraging me, for sharing their ideas with me and for their support during this period, while demonstrating an interest in the subject I was studying.
On a personal note, my special gratitude to my parents who believed in me and encouraged me in every situation. They have been a constant support throughout the period of my dissertation writing and prayed for my success. The untiring and unconditional help of my spouse Waqar Azeem is really commendable. The giggles of my children Ashhad and Eman, whenever I entered my home always took me to a new world of amusement, pleasure, and happiness. Mention must be made of my sisters Mehak, Aqsa, and Maryam who encouraged me to complete the dissertation soon. Long hours that I have spent in my laborious research work, detached from their needs made it as much my achievement as theirs. My family has been a continuous source of strength for me.
Asma Rashid
ABBREVIATIONS
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ADB Asian Development Bank AIA Afghan Interim Authority ANA Afghan National Army ANDSF Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ANP Afghan National Police ANSF Afghan National Security Forces APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Form ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations AQ Al-Qaeda BSA Bilateral Security Agreement BUA Battlefield Update assessment CENTO Central Treaty Organization CEO Chief Executive Officer CIA Central Intelligence Agency CJCS Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff CNAS Centre for New American Security COIN Counterinsurgency COMISAF Commander International Security Assistance Force CRS Congressional Research Service CT Counter-Terrorism CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty DCI Director of Central Intelligence DFID UK Department for International Development DNA Deoxy Ribonucleic Acid DoD Department of Defense DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea EAS East Asia Summit FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FDI Foreign Direct Investment FPA Foreign Policy analysis FPDM Foreign-Policy Decision Making FY Fiscal Year GIRoA Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan GWOT Global War on Terror IAEA International Atomic Energy agency ICG International Crisis Group IDP Internally Displaced people IEDs Improvised explosive devices
IMF International Monetary Funds INM Iraqi National Movement (INM) IR International Relations IS Islamic State ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISI Inter-Services Intelligence ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant KSA Kingdom of Saudi Arabia MAD Mutually Assured Destruction MOSSAD The Israeli Foreign Intelligence NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NATO North Atlantic treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental organizations NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty NRCs National Role Conceptions NSC National Security Council NSS National Security Strategy NUG National Unity Government NWFP Northwest Frontier Province OBL Osama Bin Laden OCO Overseas Contingency Operations OEF Operation Enduring Freedom OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom PDPA People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan PEPFAR President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief PM Prime Minister PNAC Project for the New American Century PRC People's Republic of China PRT Provincial Reconstruction Teams SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SEATO Southeast Asian Treaty Organization SLC State of Law Coalition SOFA Status of Forces Agreement SPA Strategic Partnership Agreement SU Soviet Union TA Transitional Administration TIFA Trade and Investment Framework Agreement TV Television U.S. United States UAE United Arab Emirates UAVs Unmanned Aerial Vehicles UN United Nation UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNDP United Nations Development Program UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolutions USD United States Dollar USSR United Socialist Soviet Republic VCAs Vulnerabilities to Corruption Assessments WMDs Weapons of Mass Destruction WOT War on Terror WTO World Trade Organization
1
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, Afghanistan had remained less important in the US in foreign policy formulation in Southwest Asia as compared to other countries of the region. The shocking terrorist attacks of 9/11 gave a serious blow to the US. These attacks were seriously condemned by the whole world and thus US-led war against terrorism was started with the invasion of Afghanistan. President Bush immediately responded to these attacks with a preemptive Doctrine. This doctrine had been based on three principles, known as the Bush Doctrine. US could invade any other sovereign state and topple any government if it posed any threat to US security. The spectrum of security threats included terrorism and WMDs along with other traditional security threats. Secondly, this policy was justified by the administration as a way of implanting democracy in a non-democratic world, particularly in the Middle East. Thirdly, President Bush resorted to a unilateralism a punitive gesture to take actions, even without the sanction of international institutions like UNSC with its allies.1 Before starting GWOT, President Bush sought the approval of both the UNSC and NATO council. On getting the approval he turned his tide from multilateralism towards unilateralism. The war against AQ and the Taliban in Afghanistan was “neither a UN nor a NATO operation; it was a US operation. Other countries were asked to join in the war, but on US terms and under US command.”2 Bush pre-emptive doctrine was further emboldened by the National Security Strategy (NSS) Paper issued a year later on September 17, 2002. A legal basis was provided to this doctrine, that though the US would not stay idle in a globalized and technologically advanced world. This doctrine made a shift in US foreign policy which was based on two pillars of deterrence and containment prevalent in the Cold War era. This policy posture continued in the post-Cold War era. The post 9/11 policy shifts were ascribed to the disastrous 9/11 attacks and being engineered by President Bush.
The military invasion of Afghanistan was meant to remove the Taliban from power, to avert further attacks on the US and to eliminate terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan. This war was multifaceted, it involved many nation-building projects and military campaigns, these
1 Ana Dresner, “Policy of Preemption or the Bush Doctrine” (M.Phill diss, Isles Internationale Universite, 2008) www.iiuedu.eu/press/journals/sds/sds1_july_2008/18_SECC_14.pdf. (accessed on June 15, 2016) 2 Louis Delvoie, "Multilateralism or unilateralism-whither American foreign policy?" Policy Options Montreal, Vol. 23, no. 8 (2002) pp. 12-16. 2 campaigns were supported by NATO forces. Civilian projects were meant to end the threat posed by the insurgents to the Afghan administration. While the US continued its mission and stayed in Afghanistan to strategically monitor the rise of China and its rising partnership with the nuclearized Pakistan. The common people of Afghanistan were required to come forward and play their role in bringing stability and prosperity to their homeland.
The history of U.S-Afghan relations was evident in the US‟s broken promises and abandoned commitments with Afghanistan. In the post-world war II period, America started many agricultural projects in Afghanistan. These projects were given up in 1978 owing to the communist control of Afghanistan. During the Cold War, Afghanistan was ignored due to its ideological competition between American capitalism and communism. Throughout, the 1980‟s American backing of Afghanistan was directed to pull out Soviet forces from Afghanistan rather than to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan. In 1990 after the end of the Cold War, Afghanistan was again abandoned and entangled in civil wars. Then, 9/11 happened and the US had to take serious policy action to deal with Afghanistan and handle terrorism. The lack of consistent policies and constant neglect of Afghanistan resulted in instability in the Afghanistan situation. Now again the US got inclined towards Afghanistan due to its strategic interests and the war against terrorism.
After 9/11, the Bush government invaded Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban government. Yet, these efforts did not prove to be decisive and exposed the policy to make only short-term gains while the long term goals the policy did not work. President Bush and his team failed to attain their stated objectives, like the elimination of Taliban and Al-Qaeda in his consecutive two terms in office. The major reason being the fact that the Bush administration prioritized Iraq over the Afghanistan issue. According to many observers of the Bush administration, Afghanistan took a back seat.3 Some of the reasons behind the continuation of this war were the lack of sufficient resources, inadequate leadership attention, and a limited number of troops. President Bush did not formulate a single coherent strategy to deal with the Afghan issue. During 2002-2005, the US under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
3 Catherine Dale, “War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress." Library of Congress Washington DC Congressional Research Service, 2011.p.7. 3 attempted to stabilize and strengthen Afghan state institutions but could not attain much due to greater focus on the Iraq war. Meanwhile, the Taliban continued their efforts to re-unite and resist the US. It appeared as a surprise to the US when the Taliban started attacks in 2005. Bush‟s September 2008 speech at the National Defense University and the announcement of a “quiet surge” with the 3500 US Marines, and additional troops by NATO represented his multi-faceted approach. This came as a surprise that why towards concluding his second term Bush talked about efforts in Afghanistan yet kept quiet regarding US goals there.
As far as President Obama‟s policies, to continue U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan were concerned, he proceeded out of necessity. He continued the counterinsurgency doctrine that was started in 2008 in President Bush‟s final year of his last term. On taking the charge, President Obama vowed to give more time and attention to the Afghan issue. After a review of the previous policies led by Bruce Riedel, he announced the surge of 17,000 additional troops for Afghanistan. In March 2009 he mentioned core areas of US policy towards Afghanistan. It was to break the influence and monopoly of AQ in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, stopping their reoccurrence in either state in the future. In December 2009, AfPak an updated and revised plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan under President Obama was announced. Under this policy, he announced the resurgence in troops to effectively tackle the Afghan problem as the disclosed exit plan. Troop surge was meant to protect the Afghan civilians encouraged the militants to end their support of the Taliban and to be a part of a peaceful Afghan society. Taliban and be a part of Afghan society to live in peace with each other. The American exit was to start by July 2011, with the gradual shifting of security responsibilities to ANSF, and to be completed by the end of 2014. However, this policy also did not work well, and the war could not be concluded.
Operation Enduring Freedom ended in December 2014. A new mission entitled Operation Freedom Sentinel was launched on Jan 1, 2015. It limited the spectrum of US activity in Afghanistan to let the Afghan people stand on their own feet. The situation in Afghanistan remained bleak and did not ensure any bright prospects for their future. Through this period the Taliban enjoyed popularity and strength. In the past Taliban had been making tactical victories against the coalition. The years 2006, 2009 and 2015 saw the BOP shifting towards the Taliban. In 2009 alone, the International coalition forces were more hunted than could kill the hunters.4
4 Gilles Dorronsoro, Fixing a failed strategy in Afghanistan. Carnegie endowment for international peace, 2009. 4
The US expended $685.6 billion on the war in between FY 2001-FY 2014.5 Additionally, non- military funds such as medical funds, reconstruction money, and this war had proved to be one of the expensive along with Iraq and the longest in American history. Despite, the spending and continuous physical presence in Afghanistan territory, the US had not been able to make a success story in Afghanistan. Afghanistan presented a bleak picture for its future due to the presence of weaker institutions, such as rampant corruption, drug economy, ethnic issues and above all continued insurgency and persistence of Taliban strongholds particularly in the south of the country. These issues had been imposing a constant resistance in the path of prosperous, peaceful, and stable Afghanistan. How was that the sole superpower US with global supremacy, gigantic military power, largest economic resources, had not been able to attain its objectives in Afghanistan? „Preemptive war was the rocket, democracy was the fuel, and terrorism was the target.‟6 Despite the largest spending in the form of US aid7 in any foreign country to date, most of the Afghans still feel more secure under the Taliban than the ISAF and the Afghan government. Afghanistan received $4,533.51 million in US foreign aid which translated to $148 aid per person8. Why do many of the Afghans particularly in the South feel more secure and protected under the Taliban? This all was due to the inconsistency in the US approach, and the constant neglect of the development of the Afghan people and Afghanistan.
Many things went wrong in Afghanistan. One reason behind the lack of a single coherent strategy was the unawareness in the severity of the crisis. Karl Eikenberry Commander of US forces in Afghanistan and later on as an ambassador to Afghanistan admitted the fact that when they entered Afghanistan all of the entities including the US, international community and the Afghans were not fully aware of the resistance to their stated objectives.9 The US strategy of taking simpler actions to fix complex challenges did not work. Another difficulty was the non- familiarity with the Afghan culture and language. The advocates of counterinsurgency asserted the importance of a cultural approach based on the understanding of the people and their culture to fight effectively in an enemy state. This lack of understanding had cost billions of dollars and
5 Mark Thompson, “The True Cost of Afghan War May Surprise You”, Time Magazine (Jan. 1, 2015). 6 Maria Helena de Castro Santos & Ulysses Tavares Texeira, “The essential role of democracy in the Bush Doctrine: the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan”, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 56, no. 2 (2013) pp. 131-156. 7 “Which countries Received the Most Aid from the United States”, World Atlas, accessed from
This study attempted to highlight the gaps and inconsistences found in US foreign policy under the Bush and Obama administrations. It spelled out the other systemic factors due to which Afghanistan could not get the concerted attention, resources and unified policy actions on the basis of clearly defined objectives. The closer analysis of the US policy and Afghanistan‟s situation revealed that despite differences in rhetoric and somewhat in actions the main US approach towards Afghanistan had remained more or less the same and suffered from inconsistency and neglect regardless of the leader. Many observers regarded the US attempts to control terrorism had rather worked to breed more terrorism in Afghanistan. Afghanistan had become the center stage of international politics where indigenous people did not have the power while the outsiders enjoyed the power to play politics over this geo-politically important state.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
It highlighted how the two administrations have fought WoT in Afghanistan similarly or differently. It provided an analysis that how the US moved from its previously practiced deterrence and containment to preemption and WoT in the post 9/11 era. The traditional objectives of US foreign policy remained consistent, however, policy modification was the consequence of the 9/11 attacks to address the new threats. The study might yield important findings for foreign policy decision-making in such a kind of war. It also makes a case for the policy deviations embarked upon by the leader of the state from their stated policies to make their move successful. Students of International Relations, scholars researching on South Asia and particularly US-Afghan relations might find it useful.
10 Joshua Foust, Five Lessons We Should Have Learned In Afghanistan: Strategic Issues in Policy Planning, American Security Project (2012) p.9. 6
OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
The major objective of this study was to explore US foreign policy in Afghanistan in the context of the war on terror in the post 9/11 world. Within this context, this study has covered the period 2001-2014 within which Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was conducted. Most importantly, the aim of the study has been to understand the patterns of continuity and change in the US foreign policy under Bush and Obama‟s administrations. While doing this it has also attempted to highlight what went wrong due to which this mission has become the most indecisive and the longest in US history.
RESEARCH QUERIES
This study addresses the following questions:
1. What were the foreign policy doctrines of Bush and Obama and how did they manage to implement their foreign policy objectives? 2. How in the light of systemic opportunities and restraints, President Bush and his successor President Obama executed their foreign policies towards Afghanistan in a similar or different fashion? 3. How systemic and domestic factors offered opportunities and constraints to President Bush and the Obama administration in their dealing with Afghanistan? 4. Why US-Afghan policymaking proved ineffective in achieving its goals during Bush and Obama administrations?
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research has been qualitative, explanatory, and exploratory in nature. For data collection, primary and secondary sources were consulted. Concerning primary resources and literature, the study was built on the main speeches and public statement uttered by the two presidents as well as the NSS documents which shaped the particular presidential doctrines of these Presidents. The secondary sources included books, journals, newspaper, and websites which dealt with the US foreign policy towards Afghanistan. The study has utilized books on Foreign Policy, History, IR, and International Politics. Articles from Pakistani Journals such as IPRI, ISSI, and IRS were also used. This study methodology also relied on focused group 7 discussion to discuss the US foreign policy towards Afghanistan under Bush and Obama‟s period. It highlighted the group member‟s insights, perceptions, views, judgement and thoughts over US-Afghan policy, which helped in framing the conceptual basis of the study.
Besides using primary and secondary sources of author conducted semi-structured and unstructured interviews which targeted retired diplomats, policymakers working in different think tanks, journalists and academicians such as Ambassador Ayaz Wazir, Ambassador Aizaz Chaudhary, Tariq Mehmood, Dr. Khan, Dr. Sadaf Farooq, Ms. Amina Khan.
For data analysis, discourse analysis technique has been utilized. The research strategy of this study has been based on a mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches. Qualitative tools like published content, relevant literature, and historical perspectives have been used. In order to obtain scientific objectives, quantitative approaches such as graphs and tables have been utilized to supplement the qualitative approach. To maintain the validity of the research a deductive approach has been utilized.
The researcher also had an opportunity to visit the USA and collaborate with the distinguished faculty of the University of North Carolina, Wilmington, which was of enormous help vis-à-vis the collection of data and having fruitful communications with the scholars of a diverse background which helped to refine the research questions for the study and selection of appropriate theory.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Plenty of literature existed on the US Foreign Policy in Afghanistan under Bush and Obama‟s era. However, limited literature was available which compared Bush‟s Afghan policy with Obama‟s Afghan policy under Neoclassical Realism and Foreign Policy Decision-Making Approaches. The comparison had been a major focus of this study. To address key questions diverse literature concerning various aspects of Bush and Obama‟s policy in Afghanistan was consulted.
The dissertation used various sources of data to find important areas of study that required focus. Besides books, research reports, journal articles, and policy papers, the author also interacted with scholars, media and members of civil society to get first-hand information. For 8 this study, available literature could be categorized into three sections, thematically. The literature related to IR Theory, US Foreign Policy, US Foreign Policy in Afghanistan under Bush and Obama. This study reviewed previous works of authors of varied standpoints about issues discussed in this dissertation.
The first classification of literature dealt with the theoretical framework of the study grounded on the models Neoclassical Realism (NCR) and Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM). With a view to build a theoretical basis of the study, it was vital to understand various academic debates by various IR theorists on NCR and FPDM. So, the work of noted scholars on NCR and Foreign Policy Decision-Making have been studied to craft a theoretical framework of the dissertation.
Hans. J. Morganthau in his book Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace11 explained six basic principles of Classical Realism. Classical realism states that man is selfish, aggressive and egoistic in nature and his ultimate goal had been to pursue his self- interest. This book served as an important source to understand realism and its off-shoot theory of Neorealism.
Kenneth Waltz in his book Theory of International Politics stood as a major book on Neorealism by Kenneth Waltz. This book opened a major debate in the field of IR. Waltz asserted that war existed due to the prevalence of anarchy at the international system‟s level. That‟s why states wanted to increase or maintained their power in order to survive. Anarchy and power remained at the center of this theory, which attempted to elucidate the structure of an international system and how this affected the behavior of states, which were considered as the main actors in the international system.
Theories of International Relations by Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater12 has been found to be very useful to grasp and understand the changing nature of international politics through different theoretical perspectives. This book has taken into consideration current developments in world politics and has provided a wide range of IR theories. It has explained not
11 Hans. J. Morganthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace fifth edition, revised. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1978. 12 Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Terry Nardin, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True. Theories of international relations. Macmillan International Higher Education, 2013. 9 only mainstream IR theories but has also emphasized the importance of critical and post- modernist theories. This book has been found as an important source to understand and write the theoretical basis of the study. International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction by Cnthia Weber13 has been an innovative book on the main IR theories. It provides an explanation and analysis of each theory. It has also discussed the myths and assumptions behind each theory. Each theory is clarified using the example of a popular film. It enables the students to get an idea of how theories work in real life scenarios. It helped to understand and reconsider the link between politics and other sides of people i.e. economic, culture, ideology, etc.
Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction by Marijke Breuning presented a well-crafted and comprehensive analysis of foreign policy decision-making process. It put a lot of emphasis on the role of a leader who takes final decisions. It also analyses the role of organizational, domestic and systemic variables upon FPDM. The author has cited various historical examples to explain theoretical assumptions by linking it with practical examples.14
Walter Russel Mead in his book Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and how it changed the World explained the different political and foreign policy traditions that continued to form the US Foreign Policy since the revolution.15 The author stated that pure types had been scarce and even when a certain president belonged to one school, but in the overall decision- making process as was composed of a myriad of hierarchal officials and congressmen, etc. who all work behind the scene, all who might possess opposing and divergent views.16 As a result, presidents had been prone to take pluralistic Foreign policy decisions to manage in the light of systemic constraints and domestic requirements.
Ole Holsti, in his book Making American Foreign Policy,17 examined the interplay of complex factors operated behind decision-making. He explained the psychological factors of the leaders like the role of his beliefs and cognitions and also the impact of a popular brief on
13 Cynthia Weber, International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction. Routledge, 2013. 14 Marijke Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction (Springer, 2007). 15 Walter Russel Mead, Special providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World, (Routledge, 2013) p.8. 16 Ibid. 17 Ole R. Holsti, Making American foreign Policy, Tailor & Francis, 2006. 10
Foreign policy. This book contained the essays that were theoretically, empirically well embedded and historically very rich. It explained the historical Foreign Policy of the US like in Vietnam and had also given public opinion and American Foreign Policy in post 9/11 world.
Anthony Burke in his book Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War against the other18 had adopted an interdisciplinary and philosophical approach and further elucidated the role and concept of security given by postmodernists like Derrida, Levinas, and Foucault in the contemporary world. To him, security had been taken as a power particularly a political one that establishes a link between the individual and his state. Basically, it questioned the basis from which security concerns arose. It admitted the existence of fear, violence and other threats and encouraged a full-fledged response by the state over the factors responsible for them.
Juliet Kaarbo in her article “A Foreign Policy Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory”19 revisited the reasons for the disconnect and gap between International Relations Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). She emphasized the importance of the FPA perspectives as complementary to IR theory by integrating it with IR theories that focused on various aspects of domestic politics and decision-making.
The book Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making20 offered an explanation of how and why foreign policy decisions have been made. It took into consideration the major environmental, domestic, international and psychological elements that worked behind FPDM. This book found to be useful for this case analysis as it offered theories, models and concepts of FPDM and clarified them through examples.
The book US National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics21 reflected the strategic landscape that had evolved after the disastrous 9/11 terrorist attacks. The authors had explained national security matters and processes and how it had gone under transformation due to the changed international scenario. US missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the focus on
18 Anthony Burke, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War against the Other (Routledge, 2007). 19 Juliet Kaarbo, “A Foreign Policy Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory”, International Studies Review 17, no.2 (2015) pp.189-216. 20 Alex Mintz, & Karl DeRouen, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 21 Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala, US National Security: Policymakers, Processes & Politics (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995). 11 homeland security, the substantial structural modifications in the intelligence bureaucracy, and the impact of the Bush Doctrine had been comprehensively presented.
The edited book US Foreign Policy” by Michael Cox and Doug Stocks (eds.)22 provided a comprehensive account of the U.S. role in international politics. It presented the historical background, institutions, regional relations, and contemporary issues that enabled its readers to understand the complexity and the interplay of underlying factors involved in the policymaking process. The particular chapters on US post 9/11 policy in Afghanistan under President Bush and President Obama had proven really helpful for this study.
New Directions in US Foreign Policy an edited book by Inderjeet Parmer, Linda B. Miller, and Mark Ledwidge23 provided an excellent understanding of US foreign policy from different lenses of IR theories. It gave an understanding of how different approaches looked at one happening with different angles.
The second category of literature would deal with US Foreign Policy in Afghanistan under Bush and Obama. The review of this literature enabled the researcher to form and substantiate the main argument of the study that revolved around tracing out continuity and changes in Bush and Obama‟s policy in Afghanistan.
David Milne in his Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy24 (2015) surveyed the turn of the twentieth century to Barack Obama‟s presidency. The central idea of the book revolves around that Ideas conceived at distinct historical moments have impacted and continue to impact, U.S.‟s interaction with the world. The author began with a biographical narrative that provides an effective foundation for working into the subject‟s approach to diplomacy, his achievements, and his failures. Milne‟s study had been well grounded in primary sources, the papers of these prominent diplomatists and some of their associates, as well as an impressive bibliography of secondary works and his conclusions, were prudent and defensible. This book proved helpful in analyzing President Obama‟s way of handling foreign policy challenges.
22 Michael Cox and Dr. Doug Stokes (ed.) US Foreign Policy Second Edition (Oxford University Press, 2012). 23 Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller, and Mark Ledwidge (eds.) New Directions in US foreign policy (Routledge, 2009). 24 David Milne, Worldmaking: The art and science of American diplomacy (Macmillan, 2015). 12
Polythink Syndrome: US Foreign Policy Decisions on 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and ISIS by Alex Mintz and Carley Wayne had addressed the question of the President‟s decision-making processes regarding peace and conflict via military invasion, escalation, de- escalation, and conclusion of conflicts. This book analyzed various decisions like the pre-9/11 national security choices, the decisions related to invade and exit from Afghanistan and Iraq. The crises of the Iranian nuclear program was critical to national security and foreign policy issues. All the chapters were found to be useful to understand the logic behind the Foreign policy decision of the US. It demonstrated how smart and skillful leaders could make faulty decisions that proved unfruitful for their state at the end. It spelled out the ways how Presidents and their cabinets could transform Destructive Polythink into Productive Polythink to avoid bad or unwanted outcomes of their decisions.
Dan Caldwell in his book Vortex of Conflict: US Policy towards Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq25 has proven to be really useful for the subject under study. He had provided an analysis of US national security struggles, explained the events, strategic choices and unanticipated consequences that led the US to undertake military and political commitments of unprecedented proportions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. He stated that the US government had struggled to develop and implement the right tactics and strategies for the conflicts it had been engaged; some of those tactics and strategies had worked relatively well and others had not. He admitted, from a military perspective the war and the effects of the war were similar to Vietnam War, and the war in Afghanistan supplanted Vietnam as “America‟s longest wars” and imposed such demands on the military that it was at the breaking point by the end of 2010.
America’s War on Terror26 presented the theoretical and historical underpinnings of terrorism and WOT. It provided an understanding of fundamental forces that shaped international terrorism and the US efforts to counter it. This book attempted to present a timely calculation of the reasons for and consequences of the war on terror. It presented broadest views regarding war and terrorism. Its chapters related to the Foreign policy of Bush and Obama were really helpful for this study.
25 Dan Caldwell, “Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States”, Vortex of Conflict: US Policy towards Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). 26 Tom Lansford, A.P. Jack and Jack Covarrubias (eds.) America’s War on Terror (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013). 13
Descent into Chaos: The US and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia27 by Ahmad Rashid offered historical events till the happening of 9/11 and then he criticized the US policies towards Afghanistan and characterized it a failure of America to successful nation-building in Afghanistan.
In his book, Obama's Wars, Bob Woodward wrote about the detailed discussions, disagreements, and debates in the White House. The book highlighted, how there was a difference of opinion between the White House and the Pentagon over the troop number, timetable and the tactical priorities. It illustrated that sometimes the disagreements among the team became highly personal. The Obama administration took 18 months to announce its Afghanistan Strategy. President Obama was reluctant to send a huge number of troops to Afghanistan, but the military wanted to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan and they favored the proposal of General McChrystal to send the 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan.28 Apart from the lesser number of troops level, President Obama wanted a quick withdrawal from Afghanistan. He announced the policy in 2009 and announced that the US would start to thin down its forces from Afghanistan from July 2011.29 However, after the discussion and disagreement with the military, President Obama announced the policy of surge and agreed to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan, and the Pentagon agreed to the policy. The number of troop was increased to protect the population in Afghanistan. Overall, it had been a COIN strategy.
Bob Woodward in his book, Bush at War, wrote about the post 9/11 scenario of the White House. A detailed picture of the discussions and meetings has been portrayed in the book. The terror attacks of 9/11 created a wave of fear and terror in the US and everyone felt so vulnerable as there could be more attacks by the terrorist. National Security Council (NSC) of the US conducted a lot of meetings to execute their plan to respond to the unfortunate attacks of 9/11. According to the author, the CIA played an important role in planning the response and in waging the global war on terrorism in Afghanistan. However, the role of the defense department and the military remained passive to some extent in this regard.30 The access of the US in
27 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The US and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (2009). 28 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster, 2011) p.311. 29 Ibid., p.122. 30 Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (Simon & Schuster, 2002). 14
Afghanistan was limited in the initial phase because of the difficult political and geographic terrain.
In his book, Bush's War, Terry Anderson wrote about the two wars of the Bush administration. The book illustrated the inaccurate estimates of the Bush administration regarding Iraq's invasion and advocated that the Bush administration got relative success in Afghanistan at least in the early phase of the war. The US and NATO forces remained successful in defeating the Taliban in 78 days. Taliban were defeated and they scattered in the different areas of Afghanistan and their leadership got an escape from the battlefield, though for a short period of time. However, the troop number was not enough to secure the country from the terrorist. There were only 5,000 American troops on the ground when the Bush administration turned the eyes towards Iraq. 31
Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay in their book America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy32 had comprehensively explained the American Foreign Policy during President Bush administration. It discussed in detail the transition in the US Foreign Policy been brought by the advent of terrorism. This book provided a good understanding of US Foreign policy actions and decisions taken by President Bush.
Erika G King in her book Obama, the Media, and Framing the US Exit from Iraq and Afghanistan33 had positioned Obama‟s end of war discourse in a historical manner. He started by presenting a contrast of Bush‟s security narrative with Obama and then proceeded to explore the convergence and divergence in post 9/11 rhetoric. The author had chosen two principal cases of war on terror to explore the media‟s role in offering presidential accounts of war and pointed out an interpretive divide among the media and a president in order to give a more distinctive line to keep US safe. This book evolved a relationship between political and media discourses.
31 Terry H. Anderson, Bush’s Wars. (Oxford University Press, 2011) p.282. 32 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Wiley, 2005). 33 Erika G. King, “Obama, the Media, and Framing the US Exit from Iraq and Afghanistan” (USA: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2014). 15
Alex Roberto Hybel wrote a book US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Kennedy to Obama: Responses to International Challenges (2014).34 This book revealed the facts about the methodology of decision making of different presidents of the US It talked about the definition and formulation of their respective foreign policymaking. Their analytical approach had also been discussed in a detailed manner. Influential elements such as advisors and Washington insiders were also noteworthy. The study has found this book very effective as the conclusion of each analysis has been identified by a model. It also pointed out the ways US presidents made policies during unrest periods.
Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen in their book Understanding American Foreign Policy Decision-Making had explained decision-making approach to FPA. It enabled the readers not only to predict the outcome of a decision but also explained the processes that work behind the finalization of a decision. This book had incorporated real life case studies to give a practical view of theoretical approaches. It explained how decisions were made and affected by information processing and various biases prevalent at various levels.
The book A Bitter Harvest: US Foreign Policy and Afghanistan35 by Tom Lansford explained how the 9/11 terrorist attacks on US homeland became the part of larger legacy of US relations with Afghanistan. The role of US became paramount during the cold war era and super power rivalry with USSR. It offered a historical legacy of Afghan‟s domestic conflict among different ethnic and religious groups, its causes, and the role of external actors particularly the super powers like US and USSR during cold war era. It explored the US Afghan relations, assessed it and concluded with policy recommendations.
The book Zone of Crisis: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq36 by Amin Saikal had proved really helpful in analyzing the US foreign policy in Afghanistan in a historical manner. The author had skillfully provided an inclusive picture of the multifaceted contemporary social and political disorder prevalent in this region. He had investigated how these four countries were invaded or encroached upon by one or all the major powers of the last two centuries Tsarist
34 Alex Roberto Hybel, “US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Kennedy to Obama: Responses to International Challenges (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 35 Tom Lansford, A bitter harvest: US Foreign Policy and Afghanistan. (Routledge, 2017). 36 Amin Saikal, Zone of Crisis: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014). 16
Russia, Great Britain and the US and how their competing interests to pursue their domestic and foreign policy interests had created crisis in this region. The author had also suggested ways to ensure security in this region.
The book 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide37 by Tom Lansford explored all the causes and impacts of 9/11 over the US and on the world at large. It traced the development of terrorism between 1970s and 1990s and the US counterterrorism efforts to effectively deal with them. Further, it explored the links between the US GWOT and domestic politics.
Richard Jackson in his book Writing the War on Terrorism said that the WOT is a famous discourse in America. It remains successful in getting the patronage for the US military actions in the WOT. In the book, the author explains the foreign policy debate of the WOT. According to him, terrorist acts are barbarian and the 9/11 attacks victimized America against these terrorist attacks. Therefore, the war against terrorism is a “Just war”.38 The discourse of the WOT introduced many changes at domestic as well as the foreign policy front. At a domestic level, the Patriot Act was introduced and at the foreign front, military-based operations were launched in Afghanistan and in Iraq. The leaders and policymakers are responsible to promote such narrative among the citizens of the USA to win the support for the military operations.
In his book, after 9/11; The Ripples of Global Violence, Arshin Adib Moghaddam says that the 9/11 attacks targeted only the US but they had a global impact. The biggest impact of the 9/11 attacks, is that it had globalized violence. These attacks cannot be viewed only in the context of the US, but these were equally destructive for Afghanistan and Iraq, and recently for Pakistan as well. The administration of the US adopted foreign policy accordingly in the context of such attacks. The citizens of the US were dissatisfied with the policy of President Bush and it helped Obama to assume the office of the president in the US.39 These attacks globalized violence and the US administration designed the foreign policy to counter-terrorism. At the
37 Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide (California, ABC- CLIO, LLC, 2012). 38 Richard Jackson , Writing the War on Terrorism, (Manchester; University of Manchester press, 2005). 39 Arhsin Adib Moghaddam, After 9/11; The Ripples of Global Violence, http://www.opendemocracy.net/en/after- 9/11-ripples-of-global-violence/ (Accessed March 9, 2019). 17 domestic level, the foreign policy of President Bush faced criticism and brought President Obama into the office because his policy outlook was different from President Bush.
Andrew Bacevich in his book, Washington Rules; America's Path to Permanent War, wrote that the US is responsible for bringing harmony and stability in the world and the political, as well as military structures, are significant in this regard.40 The US is projecting itself as a superpower by its foreign policy designs. Power projections and military presence are the strategies used by the US. Such policies are visible in the foreign policies of all the presidents from President Eisenhower to President Obama.
The book, The Long War; A New History of the US National Security Policy since World War II, claimed that the Bush administration attempted a different approach in dealing with the war against terrorism, which was fundamentally different from the US approach of the War. According to writers, the Bush administration broke all the post-WWII consensus about the national sovereignty and the treatment of the prisoner of wars.41 During the Bush administration, civil-military relations were smooth and the civilian administration had an influential role in making and execution of the war policies during the Bush administration.
Anthony Junta in his article “Lost and Forgotten: How American Foreign Policy: Lost its Way in Afghanistan 2013”42 argued that despite more than a decade of insatiability the US invasion of Afghanistan was still shaky and unstable. He stated that the Bush administration had missed an opportunity due to his President Bush‟s personal mentality towards Afghanistan. The widespread belief that Afghanistan did not warrant continued US attention led the Bush and his team to negligence Afghanistan. The mistakes that were also committed by the predecessors in the past as they also missed the opportunities that came their way to stabilize Afghanistan in 1978 and 1992. All this ignorance in the past and present resulted in the conflict, poverty, and insecurity in Afghanistan. US failure to nation-building in Afghanistan enabled the Taliban to rise to power and establish their rule to practice their rigid ideology.
40 Andrew Bacevich, Washington Rules; America's path to permanent war, (Metropolitan books; New York, 2011). 41 Andrew J. Bacevich, ed. The Long War; A New History of the US National Security Policy since World War II, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 42 Anthony Junta, “Lost and Forgotten: How American Policy Lost its Way in Afghanistan” (Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 391, 2013). 18
Ishtiaq Ahmed 2010 in his article “The US Af-Pak Strategy: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan43” pointed out that Af-Pak policy had increased the chances of cordiality among Pakistan and Afghanistan. He emphasized that Pak-Afghan relations were getting improved which would pave the way to improve Pakistan‟s relations with India. Eventually, Pak-US divergence of interests would be eroded.
Daniel Markey 2009 in his article “From AfPak to PakAf: A Response to new US Strategy for South Asia”44 said that the US had given roughly $400 million for the training of Pakistan‟s paramilitary Frontier Corps and urged to grant $3 billion over next five years. It had also mentioned that all this aid should only be used to counter terrorism and must not be used against India. His argument had been that nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan from US would be beneficial for Pak-US relations. The author stated that most of the sectarian and extremists groups in Pakistan were cultivated by the national government to project its influence in India. It strengthened the view that Pakistan‟s threat perception had been India-centric.
Ayesha R. Khan 2010 in her article “Conceptualizing AfPak: The Prospects and Perils45” said that AfPak had been literally the merger of ethnic Pushtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It intensified the call for Pushtunistan naturally because in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations Pushtun community had been the victim. AfPak policy implementation in the form of these operations would give them a realization of being a separate nation from Afghanistan and Pakistan. This realization would threaten Pakistan‟s national security.
Dr Wahabuddin Raees in his article, Obama's Afghanistan Strategy; A Policy of Balancing the Reality with Practice, argues that President Obama promised to bring peace and harmony in Afghanistan and announced the Af-Pak policy in 2009.46 In the author's opinion, the foreign policy of President Bush as well as President Obama remained failed to satisfy the local Afghan people. President Bush, in his foreign policy towards Afghan, remained focused to introduce the western -style democracy in the country. Though he remained successful in
43 Ishtiaq Ahmad, "The US Af-Pak strategy: challenges and opportunities for Pakistan." Asian Affairs: An American Review37, no. 4 (2010) pp.191-209. 44 Daniel Markey, From AfPak to PakAf: A response to the new US strategy for south Asia. Council on Foreign Relations (2009). 45 Ayesha R Khan, Conceptualizing AfPak: The prospects and perils (2010). 46 Wahabuddin Raees, “Obama's Afghanistan Strategy; A Policy of Balancing the Reality with Practice”, Journal of Politics and Law 3, no. 2 (2010) p.3. 19 bringing democracy as the country had a constitution in 2003 and held elections in 2004, but it remained failed to satisfy the local population.47 The democratic institutions created by the US were not empowering the local population. President Obama assumed the office, announced the Af-Pak strategy in 2009, it was a comprehensive policy and have different components. President Obama announced troops surge, training of the military forces, Military and economic support for Afghanistan and engagement with Pakistan to win against the Taliban.48 The aim of the policy was to defeat, dismantle and disrupt the Taliban and AQ. But it remained failed because it was focused on the military means and for success, the focus on the non-military means, was equally important. The announcement about the withdrawal of the US troops also strengthened the resolve of the terrorist groups to resist them because they knew that the US forces will withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014.49 Therefore the foreign policies of both President Bush and President Obama did not satisfy the local population of Afghanistan.
Sana Qamar 2009 in her article “Obama‟s AfPak Strategy: Indian Response50” said that the Indian government officially started showing its concerns even before the official announcement of AfPak policy by President Barrack Obama on March 23, 2009. The point of anxiety for Indians was a regional approach of this strategy. The new government of Obama had proposed a regional framework to tackle the source of terrorism in Afghanistan and neighboring areas. This had been disliked by Indians because they never wanted the Kashmir issue to be solved which had been the main concern of Pakistan‟s national security policy ever. The US demanded Pakistan to have peace with India which had not been possible without resolving the Kashmir issue. The US due to Indian diplomacy tactics agreed to put Kashmir issue aside and asked Pakistan to maintain peace with India. Indians believed and claimed that Pakistan infiltrated terrorists in Kashmir even then were against to make it the part of the AfPak strategy, such a big project to counterterrorism. Pakistan had not been allowed to use US aid to secure its western border against India.
47 Ibid., pp.5-6. 48 Wahabuddin Raees, “Obama's Afghanistan Strategy; A Policy of Balancing the Reality with Practice”, Journal of Politics and Law 3, no. 2 (2010) p.6. 49 Ibid. 50 Sana Qamar, "Obama‟s Afpak Strategy: Indian Response." Reflections (2009). 20
Malik Zafar Iqbal 2010 in his article “An Appraisal of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy to Counter Terrorism51” said that the US and Pakistan despite all the differences were having common interests in countering sources of terrorism in South Asia. He further stated that the US committed to establishing a trustful relationship with Pakistan. The US then promised to support Pakistan in its personal interest of long term security and prosperity.
The third category of literature addressed the issues prevalent in Afghanistan. Thomas Barfield in his book Afghanistan: A Political and Cultural History 52 traced the history of struggles taken place from the Afghanistan 16th century till the recent. He made an interesting case by revealing that many of the current problems that Afghanistan had faced today were also prevalent during the British rule of Afghanistan. Barfield stated that this land had remained under foreign invasions for thousands of years but no one had been able to secure a victory over here and it became a “graveyard of Empires”. The Americans needed to learn from the mistakes of the British and Soviets, so as not to commit these mistakes to avoid such a disastrous doom. Afghans became entangled in the network of problems (insurgencies) that they created to expel out foreign countries, this strategy worked to pull out foreigners but could not save Afghans from becoming a victim of it. He had explained how armed factions had taken their state to a civil war which gave rise to the Taliban and led to the isolation of Afghanistan from external world. Then, after the Taliban removal, the false estimation of the US that they could win so easily. The book has been found to be really helpful in understanding the complexities of the war to suggest the right course of action.
The edited book “The Taliban and the crisis of Afghanistan”53 by Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi has addressed that how had a diversified group of extremists namely the Taliban succeeded to regain a position in the fight for Afghanistan's future. This book explained that the Taliban had not revived a medieval theocracy and they became a vibrant and adaptive force entrenched in the history of Afghanistan and had been formed by global politics.
51 Malik Zafar Iqbal, "An appraisal of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy to counter terrorism." Parameters 40, no. 2 (2010). 52Thomas Barfield. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton University Press, 2010). 53Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi (eds.) The Taliban and the crisis of Afghanistan (Harvard University Press, 2008). 21
In an article, A Case for Pragmatic Minimalist Approaches to the Afghanistan War, Jeong Lee analyzed Obama's Afghan policy. President Obama announced the COIN policy to defeat Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Taliban in Afghanistan and sent 30,000 additional troops. But after 2011, he emphasized on targeted operations against AQ and Taliban and he was reluctant to continue the costly COIN policy.54 There was a change in President Obama‟s Afghan policy, from the COIN policy to the targeted operations against the terrorist groups. There were different factors behind the policy shift. First, As General Bolger argued that the COIN operation was a costly business and the US does not want to continue it as it had already announced its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. Second, and the most important reason, according to General Bolger was that the US could not get full support from Pakistan to use its territory in operations.55 The author of the article suggests certain policy recommendations for the US administration to deal with the issue of Afghanistan. The minimal US troop presence in the region is vital to maintain peace and stability in Afghanistan.56 The Afghan people have their own way of living and they do not accept any other culture. Therefore, the writer suggests that the US administration to not to interfere in how the Afghan people live. For peace and harmony in the region, the author suggests peace negotiations with the Taliban and AQ.57
The reviewed literature suggested that an enormous amount of literature existed on US Foreign Policy in Afghanistan in the historic context particularly regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, most of the literature in this regard belonged either to Western or India‟s or Pakistan‟s standpoint. This study analyzed the US foreign policy in Afghanistan in the post 9/11 era objectively. Although US Foreign policy in Afghanistan was explored in the above- mentioned literature, no comprehensive study existed which compared Bush and Obama‟s policy in a manner that this study did. Therefore, it attempted to bridge the existing literature gap in this field and would contribute to knowledge in a healthy manner.
ORIGINIAL CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE
54 Jeong Lee, “A Case for Pragmatic Minimalist Approaches to the Afghanistan War”, Small War Journal, Aug 25, no. 5 (2015) pp.1-7. 55 Ibid., p.4. 56 Ibid., p.5. 57 Ibid., p.6. 22
So far many studies have probed and explained US foreign policy in Afghanistan however this study is unique in the sense that it offered a comprehensive analysis of the case under two frameworks i.e. Neoclassical Realism (NCR) and Foreign Policy Decision-Making (FPDM). NCR provides a deep explanation of the role of systemic and domestic factors which play their role behind policymaking. While FPDM analyses the personal tendencies of both presidents behind their foreign policies in Afghanistan in an analytical manner. In this way, it made an original contribution to the body of knowledge.
ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
For the discussion of US Foreign Policy in Afghanistan in the post 9/11 era: A Comparative Analysis of President Bush and Obama‟s administrations (2001-2014), the dissertation has been divided into five chapters along with an introduction at the beginning and a conclusion at the end. The introduction discussed the goals and significance of the study. It included the research questions and described the main argument of the study. It spelled the research methodology in detail to give an understanding of the study for the reader. It also offered information about the organization of the project. It presented a rationale for the general research framework and how each chapter fitted into and contributed to this framework. It found out the gaps in the already available literature and proposes the framework to plug and bridge these gaps. It has also presented the relevant literature that has been reviewed.
The first chapter spelled out a theoretical framework for the study and have explored the case under neoclassical realism (NCR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Under FPA, foreign policy decision-making approaches have proven to be helpful in this case analysis. It has also provided the reasons why NCR and FPDM appeared persuasive in this case analysis.
The second chapter provided a historical overview of US foreign policy posture towards Afghanistan particularly during the Soviet incursion to Afghanistan. It reviewed the previous level of interaction of the US towards Afghanistan and how the US had shaped its policies to advance its interests during the cold war. It also presented a section to examine the continuation of deterrence and containment, the two pillars of US foreign policy in the post-cold war era. Then, it also discussed how 9/11 happened and how it shocked the world and the international community. 23
The third chapter covered the post 9/11 US Afghan policy, the preemptive or the Bush Doctrine towards Afghanistan under the two consecutive terms of the Bush administration. It has been divided into two major sections. The first section presented the developments of President Bush‟s initial invasion and consequent situation of Afghanistan while the second section looked into the factors or the shortcomings of the initial strategy which enabled the Taliban to regain their lost strength to become capable enough to challenge the US, ISAF and Afghan government particularly by the year 2006. Practically, the first phase ended within the initial two months with the breaking down of the Taliban rule and after that US policy was focused on defeating the Taliban militarily and reconstructing the Afghan institutions that were destroyed due to the US invasion. This chapter highlighted the strengths of the US strategy that worked well to overthrow the Taliban and it also pointed out the weakness and shortcomings of the policy that soon became visible and led to the retrieval of strength by the Taliban. Then, it presented a section over other systemic challenges and domestic pressures faced by the Bush administration that diverted his attention from Afghanistan.
The fourth chapter focused on the continuation of counterinsurgency doctrine under President Obama‟s presidency that was started in the concluding year of President Bush‟s second term. On taking charge, President Obama announced a surge in troops in which to effectively tackle the Afghan problem as well as disclosed the exit plan. Troops surge was meant to protect the Afghan civilians from insurgent brutal attacks and to encourage the militants to give up their support to the Taliban and be a part of Afghan society who live at peace with each other. The exit was started by July 2011, with the gradual shifting of security responsibilities to ANSF, and to be completed with the ending of 2014. However, this policy also did not work well, and the war could not be concluded. This chapter provided a detailed analysis of Obama‟s policy, its strengths and weaknesses followed by a section over the systemic challenges and domestic pressures faced by the Obama administration.
The fifth chapter presented a comparison of Bush and Obama‟s approaches to measure who had been able to accomplish what and how? What had been their management styles to execute their individual foreign policy in general in towards Afghanistan in particular? It spelled out an analysis of what went in a similar fashion and continued Bush policy in Obama‟s era and what changes and differences in policy actions President Obama had been able to accomplish? 24
The last chapter comprises of the gist of the whole thesis. It summed up the main argument that how the US had shaped its foreign policy towards Afghanistan to accommodate its interests with global realities in the post 9/11 world. As the goals of traditional US foreign policy remained unchanged, that is why both the administrations under Presidents Bush and Obama had pursued more or less the same policy goals, despite different rhetoric and reliance on opposite policy means and measures. So, US Foreign policy had not been marked by a significant change from its traditional approach despite the change of leader from Bush to Obama who belonged to two different parties.
Inconsistent policies and actions under the Global War on terrorism towards Afghanistan by both Presidents in their two terms had neither eliminated terrorism nor completed their mission rather it had served to provide a conducive environment to breed terrorism and Afghanistan (despite the US involvement and all support) still failed to present a gloomy picture for the future. President Bush and President Obama took the actions to complete this mission in Afghanistan, but the matter of the fact had been that Bush was more interested in its war against Iraq, so he could not rightly assess the intensity of the situation that in turn provided the opportunity to the Taliban to reorient and reemerge. However, President Obama showed firm determination to conclude this war in Afghanistan, took much time to develop his policy goals, successfully accomplished some of its stated goals but the menace of terrorism could not be controlled rather had grown-up. Despite all the means utilized by both presidents, their policies had proven to be more similar.
25
CHAPTER 1
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
For its theoretical basis, this study uses Neorealism and Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM). It would attempt to explain the framework of underlying theoretical assumptions and epistemological basis of the study. The construct of this study has been two dimensional: first explained the US Foreign policy in Afghanistan under Presidents Bush and Obama and second referred to other systemic and domestic challenges to US foreign policy under Presidents Bush and Obama. FPDM would explain the respective President‟s policies in Afghanistan whereas Neorealism would explain the other systemic challenges faced by the Presidents which diverted their attention from Afghanistan. This chapter would seek to explain the basics or assumptions of the aforementioned theoretical paradigms. The details describing the behavior pattern of both Presidents in Afghanistan and related core issues raised in this study would be explained in the succeeding chapters.
Eminent advocates of Realism included Thomas Hobbes, Hans J. Morganthau, Gideon Rose Kenneth Waltz, John J. Mearsheimer and Henry Kissinger for FPDM this study relied on the literature belonged to Alex Mintz, Karl De. Rouen, Jonathan Renshon, Stanley A. Rehnshon, Ole R. Holsti, etc. to name a few. Before connecting these paradigms to the key questions of this study, it would be better to get an insight into these schools of thought.
1.1-Neoclassical-Realism (NCR): An Overview
Realism and its off-shoot neo-realism occupied an important place for the study of IR as these schools of thought provided a good start for a student to advance a systematic inquiry of the happening of the world from a political analyst opinion. It enabled them to develop a coherent analysis of a state‟s conduct at the international system‟s level. The essential feature of 26 these approaches had been on the attainment of national interests of the state that stood above all and hence considered supreme. To pursue the national interest, states employed the national power of a state that had been best understood in military means.
Since the post WWII period, Realism had dominated the spectrum of International Relations. Though, it was developed in the inter-war period as a reaction to the failure of Liberalism to successfully address the issues spelled out during the First World War. It had been originally articulated by Thucydides “Peloponnesian Wars” E.H.Carr‟s “The Twenty Years Crisis” and Hans. J. Morganthau‟s “Politics among Nations” helped to develop and enrich this tradition of IR. Previously the conduct of IR and State‟s Foreign Policy was considered to be the duty of soldiers and was not supposed to be the duty of party politics.58 International politics became popularized in the native English countries as an agitation against secret treaties, which were criticized, on insufficient evidence, as one of the causes of the war.59
Realism became dominant in international politics during the Cold War era that reflected a constant struggle among nation-states to acquire and maintain power. Its main argument during this period had been the explanation of state relations on the basis of military competitions between them and the blocs they formed part of.60 Realism supported the idea that war could not be eliminated, and it could not be renounced as an instrument of state policy. Throughout the Cold War, the focus of international politics had been to attain power, to embark on war if deemed necessary and to conclude alliances to achieve the end goals. Stephen Walt supported and substantiated Hans J. Morganthau and Reinhold Niebuhr, in views that like human beings, the state had an intrinsic longing to dominate others that led them to wage wars.61
The theoretical beginning of this thesis follows Neoclassical Realism (NCR). It, as a paradigm, explains the foreign policy of the states. The roots of NCR can be traced in the post- cold war era in the 1990s from the US when literature about the IR emerged that provided other than structural explanations of the foreign policy and IR. The theory of NCR has been based on the following assumptions:
58 Edward Hallett Carr, Michael Cox, and Michael Cox. The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1946) p.1. 59 Ibid., p.2. 60 Richard Saull, Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War: The State, Military Power and Social Revolution, (Psychology Press, 2001), p.7. 61 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories”, Foreign policy, (1998), pp.29-46. 27
The first and most important assumption of the theory is that the states are the power maximizers but they do so in the competitive international environment. Each state wants to maximize its sphere of influence in the anarchic system, where other states are in a relative power position to each other.
The second assumption of the NCR is that the combination of subjective and objective factors are the essence of the foreign policy of the state. NCR assumes that states are not blind in the anarchic international structure and they consider their domestic variables as well while designing the foreign policy. The theory took the middle ground between the classical and neorealism. "NCR occupies the middle ground... neoclassical realists assume that there is something like an objective reality of relative power...They do not assume, however, that states necessarily apprehend that reality accurately...The states of the world end up inhabiting, therefore part of their own making."62
The theory emerged from the two debates of realism. The first was classical realism and according to Hans J. Morganthau, power was embedded in human nature while second was neo- realism and according to Waltz anarchy prevailing at the system‟s level compelled the states to accumulate power to attain a better position than their competitors.63 Waltz asserted that more power would afford wider safety specifically safety against less powerful and weak and great power would give bigger stakes to the one who possessed it and the ability to act his convenience.64 So, power had been the decider of state stature in international politics. Neorealism regarded rationality as a behavior performed by actors within an anarchic political system.65 It negated that internal features of a state explain its foreign policies. It downed the idea that characterized foreign policy either to human behavior or the idiosyncratic factor of the ultimate policymakers without observing the fact that sovereign states acted differently in different circumstances and that the exigency of conditions compelled them to take uniform decisions regardless of the fact that every state was led by the different decision-maker and owned a different internal system. The third approach emerged and it is the combination of
62 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy ", World Politics 51, no.1 (1998) pp.152-153. 63 Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, Theories of International Relations (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1996). 64 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Long Grove (1979) p.102. 65 Barry Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism”, International Theory: positivism and beyond (1996) pp.47-65. 28 external systematic variables and the internal unit-level variables to understand the state behavior and foreign policy.
As Gideon Rose says, NCR incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from the classical realist insights. Its adherents argue that “the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy are driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. That is why they are considered to be a realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.”66
Another renowned author Farid Zakria writes about the NCR and states that good foreign policy must consider the impact of the international system on the national behavior of a state because the relative position of the state in the international system is an important factor in making of state's foreign policy. He is of the opinion that a sound foreign policy must not ignore the internal factors of the state, its strategic culture and its individual decision-makers.67 Kenneth Waltz was just focused on the system level of approach in the analysis of state relations and foreign policies. Waltz explained three levels of Analysis: the systemic, the state and the individual. The systemic level explained the characteristics of the system prevalent at the international level to examine the behavior of the units. Under neorealism, this level had been considered as the topmost to examine and explain the state‟s behavior as it limited the choices available to a state due to its constraints. If there occurred any changes in the international system‟s level, there would be changes at the state‟s level too. It looked into the external realities and pressures that affected the state‟s policies.68 But with the passage of time and changing world dynamics, researchers understand that it is not only the system level of analyses that play an important role in foreign policy determination but internal factors, decision-makers, and bureaucratic systems are equally important.
66 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy", World Politics 51, no.1 (1998) pp.144-172. 67 Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics- a Review Essay”, International Security 17, no.1, (1992) pp.177- 198. 68 John T. Rourke & Mark A. Boyer, “Level of Analysis and Foreign policy”, International Politics on the World Stage (2009) p.55. 29
NCR, being a part of the realist school of thought, endorse many realist assumptions. Like all the other realist schools of thought, neoclassical realists agree that the system is anarchic and there is no supreme sovereign at the global level. It means there is no world government who has been capable of regulating and controlling the state‟s behavior at the system‟s level while at the state‟s level there existed hierarchy and everything has been structured. Locke argues anarchy could lead to a state of war where the force would serve as the only means of arbitration and where there would be no agreed and universal standards of justice.69 As in anarchic order, states or the units felt insecure, here jumped in the concept of capability. In order to guard themselves, states needed to be capable enough militarily. The capabilities of a state could be calculated by five criteria; natural resources of a state, its demography, economic strength, military might and technological ability. These five parameters determined the relative capability of a state. It varies from one state to another on the basis of these five criteria. An estimation of the distribution of capabilities enabled to measure the distribution of power of a state. The polarity of the system‟s level would be determined by observing the distribution of capabilities across units and the neoclassical realists emphasized on the distribution of these capabilities and relative power in this anarchic system.
Neoclassical realists are of the opinion that anarchy is not the sole influencing factor, they returned to the classical realist thinking that states anarchy is a permissive condition and not an independent causal force. In an anarchic world, where there is no sovereign at the global level that could dictate what states do, unit-level forces within the states affect the foreign policy of the state. Therefore, the domestic politics of any state is an important influencing factor in the foreign policy of any state. However, there are certain limits to this internal factor. The framework set by the system level and BOP put constraints to the internal factor.70 According to Waltz, the world "hanged together" in a BOP among states. The complex international system constrained the choices of the states. Waltz asserts the primacy and supremacy of the systemic level of analysis while he ignored the internal structure of the states. He attempts to shift the focus from the human psyche to the different influences and impacts of a competitive system. These factors defined the basic parameters of security and situation of insecurity for states. Every state works for its survival and enhancement of its security. They must be cautious enough while
69 Anthony Burke,"Aporias of Security" Alternatives 27, no. 1 (2002) pp. 1-27. 70 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Long Grove (1979) pp. 62-70. 30 interacting with the other states. Neorealism asserted that states under anarchy do not seek boundless security, and on fulfilling their security requirements other states usually accept their status-quo so conflict gets avoided. And the states who become over-ambitious in accumulating power would be contained through the BOP system prevalent at the system‟s level. NCR took this notion that states are bound by the international anarchic system, relative power position, and the internal variables. According to NCR, shifts in the BOP provide many threats and opportunities for the statesman to choose a suitable course of action in their foreign policy.
According to NCR, there are two important determinants of foreign policy; relative power and the domestic policy. They put more weight on the relative power in determining the foreign policy than domestic policy. The basic factor that shapes the foreign policy of the states is their relative power in the international system in comparison with other states. The domestic policy is of secondary value. However, a good foreign policy is designed after considering all these factors. There are numerous internal factors in the state that influence the foreign policymaking process. NCR realism incorporates the administration type, state capabilities and domestic leaders in such domestic variables.71
The relative power position of a state is viewed differently by different domestic leaders. Therefore, the states may act differently in a similar power position. It is up to the state that it may pay more attention to the domestic variables than the system level. Resources that contribute to the relative power of the state are not static, but they evolve and change over time. Therefore, the relative power position brings in different threats and opportunities for the decision-makers of the states. As Gideon Rose rightly said,
“NCR realists... argue that the notion of a smoothly functioning mechanical transmission belt is inaccurate and misleading. The international distribution of power can drive a country's behavior only by influencing the decision of flesh and blood officials...and would be analyst of foreign policy thus have no alternative but to explore in detail how each country's policymakers actually understand their situation...the transmission of capabilities into national behavior is often rough and capricious over the short and medium-term.”72
71 Stephen M. Walt, "The Enduring Relevance of The Realist Tradition "in Ira Katzenlson & Helen V. Milner (ed.) Political Science : The State of the Discipline, (WW Norton Company, 2002) p. 211. 72Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and the theories of Policy", World Politics 51, no.1 (1998), p. 158. 31
Realism characterized the state as a unitary rational actor under anarchy. Rationality meant in order to pursue their goals, states would think about other state's decisions and their decision making-behaviors and would pay attention to their “international environment.”73 States were characterized as similar to firms, anarchic structure to market and power to the utility.74 It further emboldened Waltz‟s positivist views of IR. Burke cited Foucault‟s view that a rational government “could ensure that the state would be infinitely extended in time.”75 Rationality assumption had been equally paramount in politics as well as in economics. The spectrum of power politics was based on rationality, yet rationality needed to be defined as good decision making might get hampered by the incomplete and wrong information and the constant expectations of good decision making related to internal and external matters by the state leader.76 That‟s why power politics entailed the leaders to take the following steps:
1. Keep observing and monitoring the shifting distribution of power
2. Keep assessing the power distribution in ways to judge how it is threatening its own national interest and survival.
3. Take policy decisions in the light of their available resources and policy options to lessen their vulnerability and maximize their benefits.77
Why NCR Realism appears to be persuasive in this Case-Analysis? This study has chosen NCR realism to test its validity over the US post 9/11 Foreign policy towards Afghanistan to check the continuity and changes of President Bush and President Obama‟s policies in it across a wide range of issues. Realism asserts that the Foreign policy of the states pursues national interest with pragmatic consideration of power rather than idealistic and lofty goals, therefore, lacks morality.78 NCR realism appears to be sound and persuasive for this study on the basis of the following reasons:
73 James D. Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations”, Annual Review of Political Science, No 1 (1998) p.298. 74Barry Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism”, International Theory: positivism and beyond, In Steve Smith, Ken Booth, Marysia Zalewski (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p.54. 75 Anthony Burke, “Aporias of Security”, Alternatives 27, no. 1 (2002) pp.11-13. 76Anthony Burke, “Aporias of Security”, Alternatives 27, no. 1 (2002) pp.17-18. 77Ibid., p. 23. 78 Marc Genest, Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations (Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2004) pp.135-138. 32
It explains the state‟s foreign policy behavior with reference to its power position. States through their foreign policy seek to gain autonomy and influence in their external setting. It is based on two notions over “how the states weigh up the goals of autonomy and influence when the two are in conflict. a. States feeling high security pressures prefer autonomy over influence and relatively strong power position; and therefore, refused to be a part of an international institution which takes some of the autonomy of its members.
b. States feeling low-security hazards, would like to be a part of some international institution by sacrificing some of its autonomy to gain more influence in return.79
Both of these notions focus on the impact of the state‟s power position on its foreign policy. The US has opted for the first notion as being the sole superpower and has sought to enhance its autonomy by resorting to every means, particularly military means. Furthermore, the US is making use of existing international laws and institutions to its advantage to increase its influence by means of those institutions through its powerful position.
Another reason for using NCR realism is the fact that this paradigm is so profound and best explains the issues of international politics. This argument gets justified by the fact that all comparatively new and modern frameworks of international politics like interdependency, democratic peace theory, constructivism, and neoliberal institutionalism all take as their starting point, a critique of realism.80 Robert Keohane regards this critique as further emboldening of the significance of realism in IR.81
President Bush‟s statement after the 9/11 attacks “Every nation, region has a decision to make, either you are with us or you are with the terrorist” marked a clear indication of the fact that the US had been determined and firm in its stance to deal not only with those who commit terrorist activities but also who support or nourish them. This policy action confirmed two of the basic principles of NCR realism, one that each state designed its foreign policy according to its
79 Rainer Baumann, Volker Rittberger, Wagner Wolfgang, “Neorealist foreign policy theory, in Rittberger, V. (ed), German foreign policy since unification: theories and case studies (Manchester University Press, 2001) pp.311-315. 80 David Allen Baldwin, Neo-Realism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (Columbia University Press, 1993) pp.56-66. 81 Earnest R. May, “Michael Joseph Smith. Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987) p. 20.The American Historical Review 94, no. 3 (1989) p. 719. 33 relative power position in the world and second that the internal variables and interests play an important role in this regard. The US first, being the sole superpower took the decision and stationed troops to Afghanistan to fight the Taliban then used preemptive doctrine to confront the potential aggressor before they attack the US, then the use of drones all confirms the relevance of NCR realism that the two Presidents took the decision on the basis of their country's relative supreme power position in the world, and utilized every possible means to pursue their national interest.
After the happening of devastating 9/11 events, the US realized the importance of international support for launching a successful campaign to fight terrorism. The military operations required access to foreign territory and air space, thus the US relied on its allies to get the support of Afghanistan‟s immediate neighbors, particularly Pakistan to strike the landlocked enemy bases but on its own terms. It has been found that major powers restructure their policy actions in the light of systemic demands and their national interest. The scenario again created the relevance of NCR realism as the relative power position of the allies and the anarchic system put constrained on the allies to join with the US and its global war against terrorism. The US highlighted the insecurity and fear prevailing in the world and aggressively motivated others to be with the US highlighted the importance of coalition and alliances also confirms realism.
The sudden military attack on Afghanistan in response to disastrous 9/11 attacks, was to eliminate AQ and its bases from the world and to replace the Taliban government of Afghanistan with a democratic one, to stop the occurrence of such events in the future. The US utilized “deterrence, coercive diplomacy and direct military invasion against all prospective enemies in an anarchic world, to firstly defend itself and keep the balance of power by preventing reckless leaders from developing nuclear weapons which represent the core concept of the realist school.”82
The relative power position of the US in an anarchic world gave it an advantage to regard the global war against terrorism as the war between good and evil and the US took benefit of its power position and used military means to fight the war and other states were bound to be on the
82Ahmed A.K. Aljoofy, “Terrorism and the War on Afghanistan-Realist Perspective” Paper presented at 17th annual Illinois State University Conference for Students of Political Science, Illinois State University, March 20, 2009) Retrieved https://pol.illinoisstate.edu/studentlife/conferences/archive/2009/ on June 7, 2017, p.6 34 side of the US because of their relatively weak power position. As soon as the US invaded Afghanistan, it started to threaten all other governments that might support or sympathize with AQ and also labeled some countries as an axis of evil like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.83 The whole international environment turned its tide against terrorism and adopted an NCR realist stance.
The US adopted a military-focused foreign policy that best serves its national interest. The role of internal variables was equally important in this regard. The decision-makers and leaders opted for the same military-focused policy. President Obama, who was once the critique of the Bush policy, adopted the same policy of the surge and counterinsurgency because it was considered to be the best serving policy tool by the domestic decision-makers. This notion verifies the assumptions of NCR realism.
NCR realism provides a persuasive and logical account of why states resort to military means for the fulfillment of their interest. It is a military centered approach. In a unipolar world, the US being the sole superpower shapes the world order on the basis of its power position. It attempts to institutionalize the world order whenever and wherever required by it. It strengthens NATO by adding new countries to it. All these steps are intended to strengthen its area of influence. The actions like invading and replacing of repressive regimes particularly in the Middle East, promotion of capitalism, exporting its ideological hegemony, all these confirm US NCR realist Foreign Policy disposition.
According to the assumption of NCR realists, states are the power maximizers in the international anarchic world and the assumption creates its relevance of US foreign policy in the post 9/11 era. The attacks challenged the interests of the US on its soil as well as around the world and they posed a clear threat to the power of the US around the world. Therefore, the US designed the military-based foreign policy to root out the threat to its growing power around the world.
1.2-Foreign Policy Traditions of the US
The foreign policy traditions provided a competing, overlapping and sometimes intermingling interpretations of the past and present policies. These traditions were often
83 Ibid., p.7. 35 associated with intellectuals and policy practitioners.84 It stood for something actor-specific, it was historically informed and explained how a particular person would be inclined toward one or more traditions in his time to get the national interest fulfilled. To understand the Foreign Policy approach, one needed to have an understanding of the US constitution, efficiency of Congress, regionalism, the role of missionary traditions, feminism in America, democracy and nationalism. The multiple impacts coming out of these concepts had shaped the foreign policy traditions of the US. Due to these varying traditions, US Foreign policy did not appear consistent however it had proved to be successful since the last two centuries. Along with it, the US had also pursued isolationism, moralism, and Pragmatism in the conduct of its Foreign policy. Broadly, following four political traditions in the US included: (i) Hamiltonianism had been economically driven, named after Alexander Hamilton. He was not only a Secretary of the Treasury but also an adviser to George Washington. It established the promotion of the health of American enterprise within and outside the US” as the primary duty of the government. They considered that a basic connection among the two the government and big business had been a key to the persistent endurance and would bring victory to their state. IMF, World Bank, NAFTA, and the WTO were the legacies of this tradition. They asserted that the US should integrate itself into the global economy on the terms that served its interests and contributed towards the success of its system.85
(ii) Jeffersonianism had been related to the protection of American values within its territory more than the promotion of democracy abroad. They believed that foreign entanglements surely damage the American democratic system. They treated the US as better from other states as well as different. They often protested against international agreements. Libertarian party had been an example of a Jeffersonian organization.
(iii) Jacksonianism The focus of the US in both its internal and external policies should be to secure and work for the economic well-being of the Americans. It asserted that the US should participate in the wars where its national interest had been at stake. This tradition prevailed in the post 9/11 world. Mead claimed that the strategic actions taken by the US in Afghanistan and Iraq
84 Brendon O‟Connor (ed.) American Foreign policy Traditions, (Sage Publications, 2010) pp. 2-4. 85 Walter Russel Meads, “Walter Russel Meads Interesting Foreign Policy Spectrum”, Liberty Circle, October 5, 2013. Retrieved from
This foreign policy tradition of the US had often seen as an illiberal, populist ideological system that stemmed from the early modern inter-civilizational conflict between European settlers and Native Americans. It imaginatively constructed the U.S. as “a folk society connected together through deep cultural and ethnic ties,” as Mead described, and there had long been “a strong sense of being white and unfriendly behavior to other races” at its kernel, to use the words of political scientist Anatol Lieven.86Jacksonians had been motivated by threat rather than by opportunity.87 Jacksonians generally had not been interested in foreign affairs but when their people faced an attack from the outside, they would take it as a matter of right to respond to give a serious blowback to their foe.88 Jacksonianism focused on the isolationism and showed little interest in external affairs, however, if they found their national interest at stake they ruthlessly resort to military means to resolve international conflicts. They ignored the law of wars vis-à-vis “dishonorable” (usually colored) enemies, such as the Native Americans before the twentieth century, the Japanese in the Second World War, and Muslim terrorists in today‟s world.89 Further, they also advocated the economic nationalism and anti-immigrant policy in order to secure the economic well-being and social cohesion among the US public. Walter Russel Mead commented, “The United States cannot start a huge international war without Jacksonian help, it became very difficult for the political leaders to end the war once it started except on Jacksonian terms.”90 Currently, Jacksonians wanted their government to protect them from evil happenings of the world like terrorism, illegal immigration, unfair competitions, etc.
86 Taeshu Cha, "The Return of Jacksonianism: the International Implications of the Trump Phenomenon" The Washington Quarterly 39, no. 4 (2016) pp. 83-97. 87 Walter Russell Mead, “Walter Russell Mead On Jacksonianism, Foreign Policy, And American Elites”, The Federalist, December 22, 2016.Retrieved from < http://thefederalist.com/2016/12/22/walter-russell-mead- jacksonianism-foreign-policy-american-elites/> (accessed June5, 2016) 88 Michael Barone, “Obama Stands Aloof from America's Four Foreign Policy Traditions” (September 30, 2014), Retrieved from
(iv) Wilsonianism is named after Woodrow Wilson. It asserted as being the moral responsibility as well as the national interest of the US to spread democratic ideals and American societal norms across the world to create a pacific global society that adhered to the rule of law. George W. Bush had most often characterized as a Wilsonian. However, he has generally left liberalism that is linked with Wilsonianism. It made a case that democracy in the world creates better and worthy partners than autocracies. Democracy appeared to be an instrument of American power when it ordered who should resort to democratic ideals and in what sense and who should not.
(v) How These Traditions Have Been Used by US Presidents Walter Russel Mead in his book “Special Providence" had described the political and cultural influential effects that shaped the ways that how the U.S. and its Presidents, approached world affairs. He stated that pure types were scarce and even when a certain president belonged to one school, most often he might go with the foreign policy which would not be much appreciated by his coworkers and party members. They might have a different opinion.91 As Andrew Bacevich mentioned that the US political and military structure is responsible for maintaining peace in the world. The US by its foreign policy is playing a vital role in global peace. It indulges itself in global power projection, global military presence, and global interventions to maintain world peace. Such policies are present in the policy designs of all presidents starting from Eisenhower to Obama.92 The Presidents at times would take diverse and pluralistic Foreign policy decisions to manage in the light of systemic constraints and domestic requirements. Like Bill Clinton balanced Hamiltonianism with Wilsonianism. Bush junior combined Jacksonianism with Wilsonianism while Carter tried to balance Wilsonianism and Jeffersonianism, which had also been reflected in the inclinations of Barack Obama, whose foreign policy, showed a bit similarity with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. All the heads of the state should know their respective priorities. They should also know how their respective policy instinct at times help and other times hurt their expectations. It would bring the cool rationality on which they would pride themselves into play.93
91 Walter Russel Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World, (Routledge 2013) pp.3-28. 92 Andrew Bacevich, Washington Rules; America's Path to Permanent War, (New York, Metropolitan books, 2011) pp.224-229. 93 “Seven Questions for Walter Russel Mead: Democracy in America”, The Economist, Jan 16th 2010. 38
During the Bush administration, the conservatives lost their ability to connect commendably with Jacksonians. The wider gap of the difference of opinion between liberal elites and Jacksonians was quite evident. On the other hand, conservatives and Jacksonians did not have many different views. The Republicans had many, many easier roads back than the Democrats did.94
As far as the US invasion of Afghanistan had been concerned it came under Jacksonianism. The goals of the invasion were to hunt down AQ and Taliban government of Afghanistan and to remove the probability of future attacks on American people at home. It was intended to give more physical security to its people, which complemented another trait of Jacksonianism. Another major trait of Jacksonianism had been the economic well-being of American people because huge defense spending due to invasion deprived the people of the funds that could potentially be specified to good use at home. After the invasion, the policy goals followed the Wilsonian path as the spread of US democratic and social values became the policy goals. In 2008 President Bush‟s goal in Afghanistan was to defeat the insurgency that fell under Jacksonianism and to rebuild a democratic Afghanistan that was Wilsonianism. While under President Obama the decision to deploy more troops came under Jacksonianism and rebuilding a democratic Afghanistan again followed the Wilsonian path. So, US foreign policy goals in Afghanistan showed Jacksonian and Wilsonian tendencies.
1.3-Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM)
States being complex entities, their inside policies, and actions affected their external actions. Foreign policies are made by states to achieve and promote their interests outside their territories. The national interest of a state had been based on the desire to exist and sustain its status quo in an anarchic world. In Foreign policy making, decision making procedure, as well as the personality (idiosyncratic factor) of a decision maker, also play a key role. Therefore, foreign policy has not been all about the state‟s external policy, but also about comprehending human behavior, how a decision-maker had been acting, and taking decisions. In order to scrutinize foreign policy, one needed to study certain actors. It had been widely believed that the human
94 Barron YoungSmith, “The TNR Q&A: Walter Russell Mead”, New Republic, Aug 1, 2008, Retrieved from
39 factor remained involved behind the state‟s actions. Whatever states do, reflected the decisions taken by a single person or a group.95
The personalities of the leaders have a great influence on the foreign policymaking process. It plays an essential role in shaping a good foreign policy and making its goal achievable. Leaders make certain foreign policy choices based on many personal and political factors. Decisions, finalized by the leaders, usually passed through various though inconsistent filters that included their psychological beliefs, values, norms, emotions, idiosyncrasies, and cognitive limitations. In addition to all these factors, it also involves the analysis of the available data on the basis of the past. Through the analyses of the past, the decision-makers identify the available options for their future course of action.96 That‟s why the process of decision-making remained highly uncertain, sensitive and involved high stakes and risks.
The influence of the leadership in foreign policymaking is highly a subjective process because it involves the norms and values of the leaders. Jensen rightly described it by saying that society assumes that the foreign policy decision making is the result of "human organization" because these are the individuals and not the states, who make the decisions.97 Therefore, personality remains an important factor in shaping the foreign policy, but the personality gets influenced by the world order, the structure of the world and by the domestic conditions and the legislature as well.
Alexander George questioned the possibility of reaching “high-quality” decisions in the face of psychological and emotional forces that worked behind the finalization of every decision. The state‟s policies during a crisis situation or war became understandable with its reference to FPDM of that particular leader. Decisions once decided by a leader became affected more by his perceptions than the objective circumstances. Due to these psychological forces and cognitive limits sometimes, the intensity of threat gets overestimated and other times under-estimated. Decisions, in a crisis situation, required to be taken in a short span of time and the complex
95 Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign policy analysis: actor‐specific theory and the ground of international relations." Foreign policy analysis 1, no. 1 (2005) pp. 1-30. 96 B. Raman, Decision-making in Foreign Policy, Research Note No. 86, South Asia Analysis Group. Accessed from
To influence the foreign policy decision-making process, the leaders must involve themselves with international affairs and possess high decisional independence.100 However, the role of personality does not remain consistent over different foreign policy choices and sometimes the bureaucracy and politicians may involve in conflict and bureaucracy overlapped the politicians in some foreign policy choices and ultimately decision-making.
The state‟s foreign policies were not independent of its state level or national policies. It had been shaped by multiple actors that contain political executive, bureaucracy, legislature, opposition groups, interest groups, and to some extent the general public. The internal harmony or the differences among these internal actors shaped the internal foreign policymaking process. According to Hans. J. Morganthau, that Foreign Policy objectives should necessarily be based on the national interest of the state and be supported by adequate power to attain them.101 He listed three types of interests that included primary, secondary and general and specific interest. He emphasized the importance of the level of national power that multiplies or limits Foreign policy.
FPDM pointed out the options listed by individuals, groups, and coalitions that influences a nation‟s actions at the international level.102 Bureaucracy and the personality of the politicians remain the important factors in the FPDM. At the international level, the state‟s and leader‟s actions would matter a lot. It remained important to understand the decision-making process to analyze the rationale behind every action of the state and its leaders. Decision-making process usually determines the choices made by a leader and explains why this decision had been made. A leader could finally reach various outcomes subjected to his decision making. Cognitive factors played an important role in the finalization of the decision. Some decisions would be thoughtfully taken after rendering cost and benefit analysis while others would be more intuitive. It had been rightly said by Mintz and DeRouen that world politics are shaped by the decision of
98 Jonathan Renshon & Stanley A. Rehnshon, “The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making”, Political Psychology, 29 no.4 (2008) pp.509-536. 99 Ibid., p.532. 100 Lloyd Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy (London; Prentice Hall, 1982) p.106. 101 Hans J Morganthau, “Politics among Nation: The Struggle for Power and Peace fifth edition, revised (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc.” (1963) p.143. 102 Alex Mintz& Karl DeRouen, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making (Cambridge University Press, 2010) p. 3. 41 the leaders.103 The uncertainties came due to the opponent‟s interests, beliefs, intentions, and calculations, etc. In order to predict the results of the foreign policy decision of any state one needed to understand its FPDM process. The following figure explained the key determinants of FPDM.
Figure 1.1Determinants of Foreign Policy Decisions
Decision environment
Psychological factor
Foreign policy decisions
International factors
Domestic factors
Source: Alex Mintz & Karl DeRouen, “Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making”, Cambridge University Press, UK: 2010.
FPDM comprised of four components.
Identification of decision problem Search for alternative options Selection of the most suited option Execution of the chosen alternative
A careful analysis of foreign policy decision making discovered the importance of the cognitive factors of the leader behind a particular decision. It has pointed out that the decision- making styles of the leader cannot be assessed by analyzing only systemic factors of foreign
103Ibid., p. 4. 42 policy. FPDM attempt to explain the biases, motivations and perceptions and misperceptions of the leader and his decisions. In this way, it made an important contribution to the study of IR. The FPDM involves three different levels of analyses such as individual-level decision making, Group level decision making, and Coalition level decision making. According to the first level, the leaders matter in FPDM by providing the definitions of the international happenings according to their own insight. Therefore, the decisions taken by these individuals aggregated into the behavior of the groups and states. However, such type of FPDM can be seen in the states where the leaders have immense power and generally the consensus from the other stakeholders is not that much important.104 The second level of analysis involves the Group decision making and it takes into consideration the whole group, rather than a single individual in the decision making. The group discusses the matter and takes a decision after the consensus within the group. However, the group level decision making does not involve consultation with the other actors outside the group.105The decisions that are taken within the agencies and the presidential cabinets come under group level decision-making. The third and the last level of analysis is the coalition decision making, in this level of FPDM, no single actor unilaterally takes the final decision but it involves different actors and groups in final decision making. However, it does not involve more parties than necessary.106 To sum up, just like human beings, patterns of the foreign policy gets modified and restructured in the light of the demands of the situation, systemic pressures, domestic needs, and decision maker‟s perception. So, FPDM proved to be „guided, influenced, determined‟107 due to sometimes visible and sometimes invisible factors. Though, usually, it is thought to be a result of the policies taken in the light of the state‟s goals and tendencies of Leader. The foreign policy environment involved uncertainty, huge risk, partial information, and decisions have to be taken and implemented in an uncertain and unfamiliar situation. Foreign policy decisions bring in consequences for the state, their allied states, and opponent states. Furthermore, it also brings in the challenges for the survivability of leaders in power.
104 Alex Mintz& Karl DeRouen, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making (Cambridge University Press, 2010) p. 19. 105 Ibid., p. 20. 106 Ibid., p. 21. 107 B. Raman, Decision-making in Foreign Policy, Research Note No. 86, South Asia Analysis Group. Accessed from
(i) Biases/Syndrome in Decision Making: Groupthink vs. Polythink
Leaders being human beings could take a decision that does not necessarily result in the expected outcome, because of their tendency to get biased and commit errors in the light of cognitive factors. The decision making had been related to critical foreign policy matters under constraints of information-processing limitations. Biases would result in the misperception of the leaders. Leaders would decide in the light of information available to them that had been then subconsciously filtered under their beliefs and experiences and their idiosyncrasies. Robert Jervis stated that leaders could not perceive the world accurately and one could detect the causes of misperception in that policy decision.108 This study explains Groupthink and polythink as the foreign policy of concerned Presidents had suffered from these biases, which would be explored in detail in the subsequent chapters.
Table1.1-: Biases in Decision Making
Focusing on short-term benefits rather than long-term problems Preference over preference Looking on one alternative Wishful thinking Post-hoc \rationalization Relying on the past Focusing on a narrow range of policy options rather than on a wide range of options Groupthink Overconfidence; over-estimating one‟s capabilities and underestimating rivals capabilities Ignoring critical information; denial and avoidance Focusing on only part of the decision problem Turf battles leading to suboptimal decisions Lack of tracking and auditing of prior decisions and plans Poliheuristic Bias Shooting from the hip Polythink Group polarization effect
Source: Alex Mintz & Karl DeRouen, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making (Cambridge University Press, 2010) p. 39.
108Alex Mintz & Karl DeRouen, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making (Cambridge University Press, 2010) p. 38.
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(ii) Groupthink: This concept was originated by Irving Janis in 1982. It explained how a group affected the information processing and ultimately the decisions. The structure, cohesion (or lack of cohesion), internal processes and dynamics, and management of the group, affected decisions. The group aimed to develop a consensus and unanimity of opinion and it would not tolerate contrary viewpoints. It obtained when participants of the group did not believe in information that does not conform to the majority position. Greg Cashman noted that groupthink situations might have certain hallmarks. The syndrome had usually been linked to groups in which members were of similar background and age.109
Groupthink would likely occur if the leader had been partial or did not want to hear conflicting views and opinions and also when the group had been confined and did not take input from outside. It might also occur during decision-making the absence of norms and procedures for taking a particular decision. It offered protection and security for the decision-makers in times of crisis, or if there was a recent policy failure. During the crisis the decision-maker relied on the group in order to get support and validation for his decisions, it became more likely that the decision might suffer from groupthink. Janis further viewed that it could be disastrous for the FPDM because the search for information and alternatives would not adequately be carried out. Outside experts were not consulted that‟s why decision-making would develop consent. Once, the decision had been finalized it would not be scrutinized further for identifying possible shortcomings in it. The group expected this decision to be the best that‟s why they would not formulate any backup plan or contingency plans in case of failure. (iii) Polythink: Polythink defined by Alex Mintz, Shaul Mishal, and Nadav Morag as a variety of ideas, views, and perceptions of team members. It had been described as diverse and multiple views, opinions, and perceptions of the same goals and alternatives among group members. Polythink means “poly” (many) ways of observing a single issue, objectives and way outs. It reflected group heterogeneity. It could be contrasted with the homogenous, uniform, the monolithic worldview of team associates that characterized groupthink. It indicated the freedom of thought and the existence of contradictory interests within group members. It might cause a situation
109 Alex Mintz & Karl DeRouen, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making (Cambridge University Press, 2010) p. 45. 45
where group members fail to reach a common interpretation of reality and common policy goals.110 Polythink had been measured by comparing the content of the responses and by differing views and alternatives given by group members.
(iv) Foreign Policy Decision Making In US
The National Security Council (NSC) stood as the highest decision-making organ for the development of Foreign Policy in the US. The President held the topmost and the principal position in the NSC. Then came the importance of Secretary of state (principal advisor on Foreign policy issues), the National Security Advisor to the president, the secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), all gave the classified information on every international event.111
Figure1.2: Power Clusters and National-Security System
Power Clusters
President
National Intelligence White House Staff Director, Chairman of the JCSC Secretary of Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Homeland Security National Security Advisor
Remainder of the system
Congress Government bureaucracies The media (Key members)
110 Ibid., pp.21-25. 111 “US Foreign Policy Agenda”, The Making of US Foreign policy, An Electronic Journal of The US Department of State, Volume 5, no. 1 (March 2000) pp.7-8. 46
Special- interest groups
Allies The public Adversaries
(Opinion leaders)
Source: Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala, US National Security: Policymakers, Processes & Politics (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008) P.20.
(V) Decision-Making Models
Realists considered the state as a unitary rational actor that regarded internal factors as the need to explain its international behavior however, the decision-making analyst found it necessary to analyze internal processes to judge the behavior of decision-makers at the international arena.112 The core concept like national interest could not be defined exclusively by the systemic level but with the elements of the domestic political system.113 Decision makers played the most prominent role in formulating and implementing country‟s foreign policies towards each other. In order to better grasp states foreign policy, it needed to be looked through the eyes of decision maker and the group and bureaucratic-organizational contexts under which they acted.114 The size of a group, its membership, and the role structure of the presidential advisory group also affected the policy-making as well as the quality of that policy decision.
The assumptions of the cybernetic model and organizational model had been common. Both of the assumptions were based on the agreement and considered it an organization‟s duty to address any international issue. It had been very rare that a problem needed to be addressed on multiple levels and/or needed to be analyzed on a rational model. The Organizational model proved to be very convenient. Members of the organizational model took old examples and attempted to find out a solution for their results by using standard operating procedures (SOPs).
Bureaucratic Politics Organizations being ranked as institutes attempted to guard the decision-making process that fell in their field of expertise and that extended their decision- making authority. It contended that policies were formulated as a result of the negotiations within a smaller, high ranking group of governmental functionaries. These functionaries might
112 Ole R. Holsti, Making American Foreign Policy (Routledge, 2006) p.327. 113 Ibid., p.327. 114 Ibid., p.328. 47 possess different preferences, abilities, and positions of power. They chose the best possible option that best served their organizational and personal interests. Bargaining would take place on the basis of a pluralist process of giving and take.115 The policy decision, however, did not guarantee to fulfill the objectives for which it had been formulated.
TABLE 1.2- Models of Decision-Making
Bureaucratic Politics Group Dynamics Individual Decision Making
Decision making as the result Decision making as the Decision making as the result of bargaining within product of group of individual choice bureaucratic interaction
Central Organizational values Most decisions are made are imperfectly internalized by small elite groups Importance of subjective Conceptualization of appraisal (definition of the Decision Making Organizational behavior in Group is different than the situation) and cognitive Promises political behavior sum of its members processes (information processing etc.) Structure and SOPs affect Group dynamics affect substance and quality of substance and quality decisions decisions
Imperfect information, resulting from: centralization, hierarchy, and specialization Group may be more Cognitive limits on effective for some tasks, rationality Organizational inertia less others Information processing Constraints on Rational Conflict between individual and Pressures for Conformity distorted by cognitive decision making organizational utilities consistency dynamics Risk-taking propensity of (unmotivated biases) Bureaucratic politics and groups (controversial) bargaining dominates decision Systemic and motivated making and implementation of Quality leadership biases in causal analysis decisions “Groupthink” Individual differences in abilities related to decision making(e.g. problem solving ability, tolerance of ambiguity, defensiveness and anxiety, information seeking)
Sources of Theory, Organizational Theory Social Psychology Cognitive dissonance Insights, and Evidence Sociology of bureaucracies Sociology of small groups Cognitive psychology
Bureaucratic Politics Dynamic psychology
115 Alex Roberto Hybel, US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Kennedy to Obama: Responses to International Challenges (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) p.12. 48
Source: Ole R. Holsti, Making American Foreign Policy (Routledge, 2006) p.329.
These models were also helpful to grasp the slippage between the decisions finalized by the executive and the foreign policy actions that might arise during their execution. However, they fell short of explaining the decisions themselves. The dynamics of foreign policy had been changing with the changing interests of the state in light of new threats. This study explores the US foreign policy in Afghanistan under Bush and Obama comparatively, the coming chapters would present a review of past US policies in Afghanistan.
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: US POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN
This chapter argued that Afghanistan has remained a neglected country in the realm of American foreign policy which resulted in a plethora of problems for the US Foreign Policy. US Foreign Policy had proven to be ad-hoc and reactive towards Afghanistan. Because once developed and executed Foreign policy to support Islamic freedom fighters in Afghanistan during the Cold War to contain Soviet communism became a liability and seemingly an uncontrollable menace for the US in the coming years and resulted in the attack on the US territory by Islamic fanatics. US direct and indirect involvement had a major impact on the varying circumstances of Afghanistan. The first section of this chapter propels into the beginning of historical relations of the US and Afghanistan till the World War II era. The second section locates the US cold war policy in Afghanistan under four subsections namely, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter Doctrine, the Reagan Doctrine, 1980‟s and the onward US policy towards Afghanistan. The third section looks into the period of post-cold war, the ensuing civil war in Afghanistan, rise and the rule of the Taliban as well as Taliban links with AQ. The fourth section presents how 9/11 happened and how the event transformed the US policy towards Afghanistan. 2.1-US-Afghan Relations: A Historical Background
Geographical and historical considerations had always occupied an important place in shaping the US Foreign policy towards other states. The US used its power position (economic strength, military might, political power, etc.) to influence and mold the world politics as well as the policies of other states. The twentieth century witnessed US policies as a combination of cooperation and isolation. It considered Afghanistan, a country under British influence, which is why the US avoided any meaningful relationship with it. Furthermore, in the absence of any commercial interest in Afghanistan, Afghanistan could not get attention in the US policies. 50
Afghanistan had witnessed many foreign invasions in its past. In 329 B.C. Afghanistan, Central Asia, and India were captured by Alexander the Great. In 645 A.D. Arabs entered from Persia and introduced Islam by displacing Buddhism within this region. From 847-999 it had remained under the control of Persia. In 1219 Genghis Khan, along with his Mongol Army attacked and established his rule by 1222, Khan controlled Herat that is known as the cradle of Afghanistan‟s history and civilization. He eventually created an empire that had stretched from China to the Caucasus Mountains. By 1383, this area came under the control of Timur (also known as Tamerlane in the west). In 1504 Mughal King Babur invaded from Iran and first captured Kabul and Kandahar and gave Persian culture to Afghanistan and established the Mughal Empire. In short, the geographical location of Afghanistan had served as a gateway for invaders spilling out of Iran or Central Asia into India. All of these conquests were brutal but eventually let the invaders realize that „Afghans were a fiercely independent people who resisted foreign conquests and eventually overcame their invaders, for centuries the rugged terrain had been called the Graveyard of Empires.‟116 In the 17th and 18th centuries, the Pashtun tribes accumulated power and got concentrated in the south of the country while Tajiks settled in the North and some Uzbeks and Hazaras in the northwest.
In the nineteenth century, Britain attempted thrice to establish its control over Afghanistan and to curtail the expanding Russian influence in the region. The first war of this series fought in 1839-1842 and ended in a humiliating defeat for Britain, their forces retreated were reduced from 16,000 to only 1. Following the war, the Viceroy of India, John Lawrence recommended to Britain to follow a policy of “masterful inactivity” for Afghanistan and in 1867 he warned that “try to control such people is to court misfortune and calamity.” The Afghan people will bear poverty, insecurity of Life; but will not tolerate foreign rule. The moment has a chance, Afghan will rebel.”117 In 1873, with the signing of an agreement among Russia and Britain, Afghanistan became a buffer state between their controlled domains. However, this agreement was violated by Russia when it sent its missionaries to Kabul. To reciprocate, Britain deployed its 33,000 force to secure an important place in the mountainous area of Afghanistan in 1878, followed by tribal revolts and insurgencies. Both continued fighting for several years with mixed results and
116 Terry H. Anderson, Bush's Wars (Oxford University Press, 2011) p.10. 117 Dan Caldwell, “Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States”, Vortex of Conflict: US Policy towards Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) pp.35-36. 51 finally, Britain withdrew in 1880. After years of continued violence, Afghans felt exhausted and temporarily subdued and their land was placed under the diplomatic influence and they drew the borders of eastern Afghanistan. In 1893, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand drew the border between British India which would become Pakistan and Afghanistan.118 Following the conclusion of the First World War (1914-1918) and the breakdown of the Romanov dynasty in Russia, Britain once again attacked Afghanistan on May 6, 1919, that marked the third Anglo War. Within a year, the British Empire gave-up and on August 8, 1919, Britain and Afghanistan signed the Treaty of Rawalpindi, which granted independence to Afghanistan.119 The failure of three British attempts to control and occupy this land led them to realize that the intractable Afghans could be bought much easily than fought.120
After its independence, Afghanistan was ruled by Pashtun King Amanullah Khan (1919- 1929) for a whole decade. Afghanistan under his rule took many efforts to establish relations with the US, but all those efforts were not responded positively. In 1921, Afghan missionaries visited the US to offer business opportunities for Americans to invest in Afghanistan, yet this offer was also declined due to two reasons. First, Afghanistan was under British guardianship and secondly, during World War I Afghanistan supported Germany. In 1929 Habibullah Kalakani a Tajik took control of the government. After nine months he was overthrown by King Nadir Shah who ruled till 1933 and then he was killed and replaced by King Mohammad Zahir Shah who belonged to the Musahiban121 family and ruled for forty years i.e. 1933-73. Meanwhile, the US was coming out of its isolationist policy and was getting engaged in world affairs by seeking alliances with other states to promote a world order that supports and promotes American interests. In 1933, US categorically refused Afghanistan to establish relation due to the absence of enough resources and of well-managed system in Afghanistan to provide a security guarantee to foreigners particularly Americans. So, Afghanistan appeared as the least important country for America to interact with.
118 Terry H. Anderson, Bush's wars (Oxford University Press, 2011) pp.10-12. 119Dan Caldwell, “Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States”, Vortex of Conflict: US Policy towards Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) pp. 35-37. 120 Ibid., p.35. 121 The Musahiban (mus-hi-been) derived from Persian word Musahib, meaning "courtier". They belonged to a Mohammadzai family who founded an Afghan dynasty which ruled from 1929 to 1978. They were the descendants of Sultan Mohammad Khan Telai and were the last Pashtun dynasty being overthrown by the Communists. 52
Post-World War II US-Afghan Relations:
Afghanistan stayed neutral during the Second World War, notwithstanding enjoying good ties with Germany, Italy, and Japan. However, it could not avoid the spill-over effects of the war. All of its exports to the western countries became limited and the US became a market of only Karakul skin and fruits and it continued for more than a decade till the time karakul skin became outdated. In 1942, the US came with a proposal to construct a motorable road that would pass through India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union to reach China. However, this plan could not be implemented due to the Soviet Union‟s refusal.122 The US continued its economic assistance and support to Afghanistan.
In the post-World War II world, the US moved from isolationism towards interventionism. Then, Afghanistan‟s next ruler, King Zahir Shah gave a new spark to the efforts and wrote a letter to President Roosevelt, to accelerate US-Afghan ties. Though the US accorded recognition to Afghanistan on July 26, 1921, however, their diplomatic relations were established in 1935, when William H. Hornibrook presented his credentials to the Afghan government. Under the Presidency of Franklin American Legation at Kabul was established on June 6, 1942, and after six years legation was upgraded to Embassy status on June 5, 1948123. This step resulted in the opening of other cooperation avenues between both states. During this time, the US appeared as an alternative in place Britain in Afghanistan. Afghan Prime Minister Shah Masood Khan welcomed the U.S. role for peace and democracy in the world. The US reciprocated by characterizing Afghanistan as strategically important for US policies in the Middle East. However, the US did not pay due attention to Afghanistan because of its diminutive interest in it.
2.2- US Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan during the Cold War (1945-1990):
122 Mussarat Jabeen, Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, and Naheed S. Goraya. "US Afghan Relations: A Historical Perspective of Events of 9/11." South Asian Studies 25, no. 1 (2010) pp.143-173. 123 “A Guide to the United States‟ History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Afghanistan”, Office of the Historian, Accessed from
During the Cold War, the whole focus of US foreign policy was to “contain the spread of communist influence throughout the world”124 as the “communists were bad” and “anti- communists were good”. To attain this goal the US concluded bilateral and multilateral alliances with non-communist countries i.e. NATO. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was advancing towards Europe and Asia. Afghanistan, being bordering the Soviet Union, continued to get economic assistance from the US. Afghanistan made many attempts to expand the spectrum of its relations with the US but the later never took it seriously. Afghanistan remained ignored and poor. It was classified as a small and unimportant country possessing a few natural resources.125 After World War II, the US and Iran ties grew closer due to the successful pulling out of the Soviets from the northern part of Iran. With the British departure from “East of Suez” and in 1947 formation of the sovereign states of India and Pakistan, the US pursued to take India and Pakistan into its containment camp.126 India sought for non-alignment and did not become a part of the US or USSR either while Pakistan chose the US due to its defense purposes. Having the support of Iran and Pakistan, US did not found Afghanistan as an important state. Indeed, it seemed difficult to manage closer ties, mainly military ties with Afghanistan and Pakistan simultaneously pertaining to the persistent boundary issue among them emanating from the colonial era Durand Line.
Though the Durand Line agreement was signed cordially among Amir Abdur Rehman and Mortimer Durand, however Afghan dissension continued over this demarcation from the very beginning. Afghans have not considered the Durand Line as a legitimate boundary line among Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghan officials including King‟s Zahir‟s cousin and P.M. Prince Daoud (1953-63), began a program for the creation of a “Pashtunistan” by merging all the traditional areas of the Pashtun people and its subsequent unification into Afghanistan. Pakistan viewed this with suspicion as an attempt to subjugate its territory. This is why these two Islamic neighbors could not cultivate good ties with each other. While Pakistan became an important US ally in its containment strategy, Afghanistan appeared least relevant to US interest. This created a natural ground for Afghanistan to get aligned with USSR to fulfill its military and non-military needs.
124 Dan Caldwell, “Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States”, Vortex of Conflict: US Policy towards Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) p.4. 125 Jabeen, Mazhar, & Goraya, “US Afghan Relations: A Historical Perspective of Events of 9/11”, pp.143-173. 126Mark A. Burrough, A Historical Case Study of US Strategy towards Afghanistan (Army war Coll Carlisle Barracks pa, 2009) pp.5-6. 54
During the Cold War, the US realized that like Britain during the Great Game of 19th century, the Soviet Union might expand its influence in Afghanistan to access warm waters. However, it ignored any option related to the supply of arms to Afghanistan. While Afghanistan kept on signaling that a pro-US Afghanistan would stand against the Soviet Union. The continuous ignorance by the US finally led the Afghan officials in 1949 to convey this message to the US that “unless the US give Afghanistan more assistance Afghanistan might turn to USSR.” In 1952 the US pulled out its technical and economic aid from Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan continued to cultivate its ties with the Soviet Union on firm grounds. In 1953 John Dulles became the US Secretary of State, he gave a new impulse to the development of alliances with the pro-American countries, to curtail the influence of communism, yet Afghanistan was not welcomed. In September 1953, the Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Marshal Shah Mahmud Khan Gazi, resigned on the grounds of “indisposition and bad health.” He had been a supporter of the West. The new Premier, General Mohammad Daoud Khan on taking the charge took up a more independent line.
In 1950 an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan to exchange oil, textiles and industrial goods for Afghan wool and cotton. It also offered its aid for constructing petroleum exchange facilities, exploring oil and gas in northern Afghanistan. It also sought permission for free transit of goods to Afghanistan across the soviet territory.127 On January 27, 1954, another agreement was signed between them under which the Soviet Union provided Afghanistan a loan of 31 million dollars for the construction of two grain mills and two large silos. It also agreed to provide technical experts, while agreed Afghanistan exported cotton, wool, and sheepskins to USSR.128 In 1954, the US massively supported Pakistan via economic and military assistance and also added Pakistan in SEATO and CENTO. It generated a desire in Afghanistan to get the weapons from the US, as supplying arms to Pakistan disturbed the balance of power (BOP) of South Asia tilted towards Pakistan. The Afghan ambassador to Washington urged America to supply arms to Afghanistan too. This desire was further emboldened by the Foreign Minister Prince Naim who emphasized the importance of American arms for
127 Hamid Wahed Alikuzai, A Concise History of Afghanistan in 25 Volumes. Vol. 1 (Trafford Publishing, 2013) p.496. 128 “Afghanistan, on Soviet Border, is new US Target”, New Age, May 12, 1955. 55
Afghanistan in the threat of Soviet invasion. However, this request and desire was refused by the US.
Getting constantly ignored by the US, Afghanistan tilted more towards USSR. Prime Minister Daoud sought development aid along with the military support from the Soviet Union to preserve a balance in the region as the US continued its support to two immediate neighbors of Afghanistan i.e. Iran and Pakistan. By 1955 the USSR significantly increased the amount of aid that continued throughout the 1960‟s. However, soon Afghan officials realized that more aid and support would put Afghanistan under Soviet dependency. It created a ground for military coups in Afghanistan. King Zahir Shah finally emerged in his own right after he dismissed Daoud in 1963 and began to rule directly.129 In the same year, he embarked on democracy and provided more freedom, open elections, political parties, right to vote, etc. This period dubbed as the "New Democracy," the then Prime Minister Mohammed Yousuf and other Western-educated intellectuals in Kabul adopted a new constitution in 1964.130 The King convened a Loya Jirga, a meeting of the members of the National assembly, the Senate, the Supreme Court, and the constitutional commissions.131 However, this experiment did not succeed and the King began to lose his control. All the deteriorating conditions gave rise to Islamic parties on the right and the communist People‟s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) on the left. The Parliament became lethargic and deadlocked in 1969-73. In 1973 the monarchy and its experiment in democracy abruptly came to an end132 when the former PM Daoud took advantage of the situation, he declared a disaster of establishing a democratic Afghanistan experiment. Along with the military at the backend, Daoud implemented a coup d'état and declared himself as President, while the ruling king was out of the country. Though President Daoud belonged to the royal family, however, the Musahiban grip on power remained unchanged. Nadir Shah and Zahir Shah were Musahiban Monarchs (1929-73) and wanted to preserve the internal stability of Afghanistan, which they defined as maintaining their own rule over the country.133
129 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton University Press, 2010) p. 170. 130 Afghanistan Without Warlords, Frontline Worlds, Oct 2004, Retrieved from
Though Daoud got the presidency through its good relations with the military, however his actions to remove communist leaning military officers perturbed the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union being powerful and influential utilized its good relations to unite the two factions of the communist PDPA, the Khalqis and the Parchams finally staged a bloody coup in April 1978 to end the Daoud‟s rule and installed a friendly government under the Presidency of Noor Mohammad Tarakai. Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal became the Deputy Prime Ministers under the new administration. In March 1979, Hafizullah Amin became the only PM accumulated more power, he was suppressed with the opposition from the rightist and leftist group, and he indulged in a dialogue with the US... Soviet Union then became conscious of Amin‟s intentions, started its efforts for a regime change. In September 1979, Amin murdered and replaced the President Tarakai on discovering his involvement in a Soviet-backed coup attempt. All this resulted in the division of Khalqis between pro-Amin and Pro-Tarakai factions. Every group including tribes, communists, and Islamists indulged in fighting for power. The situation created a revolt within the Afghan military. In an effort to bring stability to Afghanistan, the Soviet Union finally invaded the country on December 1979.134 Soviet leader Brezhnev said that “it will be over in three or four weeks.”
During the decade of 60‟s and 70‟s the partnership between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan grew stronger and the former became the leading source of foreign aid towards the later. On December 5, 1978, both countries signed a treaty of Friendship and Cooperation under which the USSR provided over $1billion to the Afghan government to give Afghanistan a stand economically and militarily and of course to expand its influence. US was least interested in Afghanistan until Daoud‟s attempt of improving ties with the USSR. US struggled against communist expansion in Korea from 1950-1953 and remained involved in the same during the 1960s in Southeast so the growing relations between USSR and Afghanistan raised concerns in the US. The country got entangled in insurgencies and the Soviet support became inevitable for the survival of the Afghan government. US did not give any importance to Afghanistan and downed any speculations related to the use of Afghanistan against US interests by the Soviet Union. In November 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini took control of Iran and strongly opposed Soviet meddling in the domestic affairs of Iran. Within the same month a group of radical
134 Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and political History, p.171. 57
Islamist took control of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, a mob attacked and burnt the US embassy in Islamabad and US embassy in Libya was also attacked and burnt.135 Although these attacks were not directed against the Soviet Union, yet it created fear among Soviet leaders about the hostile actions of radical Muslims against them. US policy during the Cold War had been to avert an excessive Soviet influence in the world. US administration started recognizing the importance of Afghanistan after 1978 in terms of security concerns. Practically the CIA began to help mujahidin in 1980 to stop Soviet invasion and get rid of Soviet occupation.136
1979 Soviet Invasion & US approach towards Afghanistan:
The conditions of Afghanistan worsened in 1979, though the USSR did not want to invade Afghanistan, Leonid Brezhnev considered the use of force in Afghanistan a propaganda defeat for the Soviet Union. Yet, the constantly deteriorating situation of Afghanistan made it inevitable for the USSR to invade and occupy Afghanistan. The Soviet Union did not want to lose Afghanistan as a buffer state, and they speculated that Afghanistan would fall into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. Meanwhile, the US increased covert aid to the Islamic Freedom Fighters in 1979 to increase the likelihood of Soviet intervention. Zbigniew Brzezinski informed the US President that this aid would tempt a Soviet military incursion. He disclosed in an interview “We didn‟t push the Russians to intervene, but we intentionally increased the probability that they would”. This covert action for the Soviet Union was intended to create a trap for them that would ultimately become their Vietnam.137
Finally, on December 24, 1979, some 80,000 Soviets invaded Afghanistan, killed Hafizullah Amin, and installed a puppet government led by Babrak Karmal which remained unable to expand its control beyond Kabul. It eventually committed almost 100,000 troops to combat the Muslim “guerillas.” The Mujahideen party leaders based themselves in Pakistan and
135 Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict, p.37. 136 Ibid. 137 Andrew Hartman, “The Red Template: US Policy in Soviet- Occupied Afghanistan”, Third World Quarterly 23, no.3 (2002) pp. 467-489. 58 received their funds from the US and Saudi Arabia.138 This created serious internal conflict that weakened the PDPA to the extent that half of its members were killed, purged or left the party in the 20 months before it collapsed.139 PDPA launched a series of social and economic reforms. However, Soviet advisors opposed the rapid reformation of socially conservative and economically underdeveloped Afghanistan. In 1980, PDPA controlled 5,500 out of 35, 500 villages.140 The tactics of Mujahideen made it impossible for the government to maintain its hegemony in the rural areas. Many areas of Afghanistan were not in control of the government. Communist control of the country remained unacceptable to most of the Afghans. The Soviet troops captured key cities and highways. The revolt was swift and had far-reaching implications, the Soviet fighters dealt harshly with the Mujahideen rebels, and their supporters knocked down the possibility to give safe havens to their opponent. Regional countries like Iran, Pakistan, China, and the US also supported various groups for their interests.
The 1979 situation of the whole region shifted the balance of power against the US, as with the relinquishing of power by Shah of Iran (US client partner) in January 1979 and his replacement by anti-American, Islamic administration, Iran no longer remained under US influence. Then, the deployment of 10,000 troops to Afghanistan by the USSR led the US to conclude that the Soviet policies posed a “gravest threat to world peace since World War II.”141 The US viewed and propagated the USSR‟s military invasion as a culmination of its 1970s expansionary policy in the Third World. It regarded the Soviet intervention and use of force a serious abuse of international law, which directly threatened American policy and posed dangers to its oil interests and vital sea lanes.142 The US perceived its national security at risk and viewed the BOP in favor of the USSR. In January 1980, the US along with Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, started providing covert military and non-military support to Afghan Mujahideen. This gave rise to a perception in the Soviet Union that the US was dismantling Détente, intensifying the arms race to strengthen
138 Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and political History, p.171. 139 Ibid., p.171. 140 Ibid., p.171-172. 141 Steve Galster, “Afghanistan: the making of US Policy, 1973-1990”, Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War, The National Security Archive 9 (2001). 142 Lisa Reynolds Wolfe, “Afghanistan and American Policy”, Cold War, July 27, 2010. Retrieved from < https://coldwarstudies.com/2010/07/27/afghanistan-and-american-policy/> accessed April 14, 2015. 59
American influence and control of the Persian Gulf.143 Iran also played its role by supporting Shi‟a Mujahideen factions exclusively and asked for Soviet withdrawal. Initially, they were not properly armed, while by 1984 Mujahideen started getting weaponry and technical assistance from the US and Pakistan, funded by Saudi Arabia. After 1980, armed conflict and social disruptions became a norm in Afghanistan and the situation became out of control due to the supply of arms and money to each rival faction from their international patron.144 This war took the lives of ten lac innocent civilians, ninety thousand Islamic freedom fighters, eighteen thousand Afghan forces, and fourteen thousand five hundred Soviet soldiers.145
Carter Doctrine: 1977-1981
On taking charge, President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) announced his policy‟s focus on the promotion of international human rights and in pursuance of détente with the USSR. This policy of détente had resulted in the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II treaty between the US and the SU in 1979 to control the nuclear arms race. But after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he shifted his policy and stated to use military force against any state that tried to expand its control over the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union‟s invasion was apparently intended to support the communist government of Afghanistan which was in conflict with the Afghan Guerillas or Mujahideen supported by the US, President Carter‟s team perceived that the Soviet incursion of Afghanistan its first move in to control the Middle East‟s enormous oil resources. President Carter‟s State of the Union Speech delivered on January 23, 1980, came to be known as the Carter Doctrine and it set the stage for an even greater strategic response to the foreign conflict.146 The American people were disturbed by the overall happenings of 1979 and characterized Carter‟s government as weak and indecisive, and showed their reaction against SALT II Treaty. In order to secure his second term, President Carter resorted to a more-confrontational approach
143 Ibid. 144 Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and political History, p.165. 145 Alan Taylor, “The Soviet War in Afghanistan, 1979 - 1989”, The Atlantic, Retrieved from < https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/08/the-soviet-war-in-afghanistan-1979-1989/100786/ > (accessed July 15, 2016). 146 Kyle Tadman, “An American Provocation: US Foreign Policy during the Soviet-Afghanistan War”, Western Illinois Historical Review 5 (2013) pp.33-34. 60 towards USSR. He announced the withdrawal of the US from Summer Olympic Games in USSR, suspended the sale of grain, withdrew the unratified SALT II treaty from Senate and sanctioned a new program of draft registration, he suggested a six percent increase in the US defense spending for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force trained to react quickly to Third World crises. Carter also issued a directive to develop smaller nuclear weapons to strike highly specific targets. This command envisioned the possibility of a “limited” nuclear war, eliminated American reliance on the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), which had previously (from the 1960s) governed the nuclear strategy of both the superpowers US and USSR. All these steps, however, did not bring the desired results. When Ronald Reagan became the President of the US. Reagan proclaimed the end of the era of “self-doubt” and on his inauguration day in Jan 1981, Iran released American hostages.147 Though, he supported the new doctrine promulgated by Carter, yet stated the failure of his overall foreign policy.
Reagan Doctrine (1982-1989):
President Ronald Reagan, in his foreign policy unconditionally supported and completely endorsed Islamic Mujahideen to pull out Soviet forces from Afghanistan and to forward the American cause, known as a Reagan Doctrine. The Soviet incursion of Afghanistan marked the largest ever Soviet military operation in the cold war era, while the US provided support for the anti-Soviet struggle, there was still the major paramilitary action of the Reagan Doctrine.148 He offered open military backing to anti-communist agitators to contain communism. Casey DCI and the Reagan administration were determined to do everything to damage the Soviet Union during this war. Casey said to “grow the war and create for the Soviet Union their Vietnam.”149
Before 1980, Afghanistan was receiving $30 million by the US under aid, after shifting the Presidency to Reagan, this amount significantly increased and reached to $650 million per annum.150 Critics argued that the Reagan administration claimed Reagan Doctrine was a cause of
147 Terry H. Anderson, Bush's Wars (Oxford University Press, 2011) p.25. 148 David N. Gibbs, “Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Retrospect‟, Review Essays, International Politics 37 (June 2000) pp. 233-246. 149 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001) p.262. 150 Julian Viret, “The Reagan Doctrine: No De Facto Effect on America‟s Intervention in Afghanistan” (Spring 2013) p.13. 61
American victory but in reality, he continued the policies enunciated under Carter‟s administration. US aid towards Afghanistan during Soviet occupation was clandestine and irregular, which was dissimilar to the open aid designated by President Reagan due to their varied relationship with Saudi Arabia and Iran.151 Apparently, the Reagan Doctrine and the US policies to supply the Mujahideen with a massive amount of sophisticated weaponry worked well to pull out Soviet forces from Afghanistan. However, the American support of the Mujahideen had proven to be self-destructive in the longer run,152 as it created Islamic terrorists which were previously supported as freedom fighters.153
Between 1981 and 1983, the US provided $60 million to Mujahideen, an amount that Saudi administration matched. It was to gain an edge over the USSR. On the advice of the CIA, Islamic freedom fighters mobilized and recruited radical Muslims from all over the world who came to Pakistan and joined Jihad against the USSR. In 1982-1992 around 35,000 Muslim radicals from 43 states came to Pakistan and Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet Union. Bill Casey DCI approved attacks by Islamic fighters against Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and at one time secretly went to Pakistan to meet with Mujahideen groups.154 To inculcate Islamic values, Saudi Arabia financed the setting up of Madrassah with the support of the US in Pakistan.
The US provided Mujahideen with the Soviet styled weaponry to fight against communists. It purchased these arms from Egypt, China, etc. and delivered them to Pakistan to be supplied to Mujahideen. All these armaments including AK-47 rifles and SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles were provided before 1980. This covert arms procurement and provision not only kept the US hidden but also helped the Mujahideen to counter back with the arms that were compatible with Soviet weaponry.155 In 1985, the US acquired British-made Blowpipe anti- aircraft missiles to further give an edge to Mujahideen. With the deepening of Jihad against the Soviets, Mujahideen and CIA started targeting military installations, factories, and storage depots within Soviet territory. It reflects the soul of training that the Mujahideen got from their CIA
151 Ibid. 152 Ibid., pp.13-15. 153 Prof Michel Chossudovsky, “9/11 Analysis: From Ronald Reagan and the Soviet-Afghan War to George W Bush and September 11, 2001”, Global Research, September 9, 2010. Retrieved from < http://www.globalresearch.ca/9- 11-analysis-from-ronald-reagan-and-the-soviet-afghan-war-to-george-w-bush-and-september-11-2001/20958 > (accessed May14, 2017). 154 Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict, p.41. 155 Steve Galster, Afghanistan: the making of US Policy, 1973-1990, Vol. 1. Chadwyck-Healey, Inc., 1991. 62 mentors. Simultaneously, there were efforts between the Soviet Union and the US for reaching a negotiated settlement to resolve this Afghan issue.
Despite enjoying the support of the US, both KSA and the Pakistani people were not optimistic for Mujahideen, due to the air-power superiority enjoyed by USSR. Then, in February 1986 a momentous decision to supply Stingers (surface to air anti-aircraft missiles) to Afghan Mujahideen, was taken.US via Pakistan provided Stingers. It marked the first time entry of „made in US‟ arms to the Mujahidin to support their operation in Afghanistan156, and the legislative branch was mainly responsible. As a congressional staffer later put it: "We finally broke the Agency‟s virginity.”157 On 25 September 1986, Afghan Engineer Ghaffar ordered his team to take aim and fire on Soviet helicopters based at Jalalabad airfield. The US provided 2000-2500 Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen and a total of 270 aircraft were shot down with Stingers. While the US kept on supporting the Mujahideen via Pakistan‟s ISI to defeat the USSR and this desire of the US superseded all other concerns which later on reversed to the US in the form of terrorism.
In March 1985, after the death of three General Secretaries, office Mikhail Gorbachev took the lead of the communist party. At that time the Afghan war was essentially over.158 He announced a radical reform program based on four initiatives: Glasnost (openness), Perestroika (economic restructuring), democratization and a new approach to Foreign policy. On analyzing the whole situation and failing of military mission in Afghanistan, he reached to the same conclusion that the British had reached a century earlier that problems of Afghanistan could not be sorted out through the use of force as it brought few benefits at a high cost.159 He considered it a bad idea to implement foreign solutions to an outside country without considering the wishes and aspirations of its own people. In May 1986, when the Mujahideen refused the negotiations with Babrak Karmal, the Soviet Union installed Najibullah as President. On taking the charge, President Najibullah realized that his government would not conquer Mujahideen, he referred to
156 Alan J. Kuperman, "The Stinger missile and US intervention in Afghanistan." Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 2 (1999) p.219. 157 Ibid., pp.219-220. 158 Geoffrey Wawro, “Afghanistan: the end is near, and We‟ve Been There Before”, Huffingtonpost.com, July 28, 2010. Retrieved from
In 1986 Gorbachev on failing to persuade the US, that defeat of Soviet Union would also give a blow to US interests in the region, he protested against the continuing American aid to Afghan Mujahideen by saying “The US has set itself the goal of disrupting a settlement in Afghanistan by any means.”161 In February 1988, he announced a withdrawal plan of the Soviets from Afghanistan within the period of the next ten months. After nine years and fifty days of long fighting, the last troops of the Soviet army left Afghanistan on Feb 15, 1989, on the basis of Geneva Accords signed by the US, USSR, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. By that time 620,000 troops had remained stationed in Afghanistan, out of which 14,453 died, 53753 were wounded and 415,932 suffered a serious illness.162
However, none of the superpowers left the military assistance to their supporter groups in Afghanistan, despite agreeing on the terms UN-sponsored withdrawal agreement.163 The Soviet Union continued its support to Najibullah‟s administration and the US kept on providing covert aid to Mujahideen against the Najibullah‟s government, yet the US interest continued to be against the Soviet Union and not for Afghanistan.164 With the departure of Soviet forces, the international players lost their interest to continue to pay for it. The, US paid to contain the Soviet influence that had fulfilled. Then Saudi Arabia had financed to expel an infidel occupier, who had now gone.165 Only Pakistan was left to cope up with the whole situation, who desperately wanted to have a friendly administration in Afghanistan and to gain strategic depth against India.
This war cost the Soviet Union $ 96 Billion according to Eduard Shevardnadze, while the human losses of Afghans recorded to be between 1-1.5 million, 5 million left their country and
160 Muhammad Najibullah, History in an Hour, Sep 28, 2011,
2.3-Post-Cold War Era and Afghanistan: 1989-1992
After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, it was expected that Soviet-sponsored communist administration led by Najibullah would crumble within a few weeks if not a few days, however, it continued to work for the next three years due to the beginning of the civil war with the Mujahideen factions along ethnic lines. The war divided the country into seven military zones, which had more internal cohesion than the unwieldy provincial structure. More often the open fighting was recorded within the Mujahideen faction rather than against the communist government.166 Both superpowers started taking accommodative measures to bring an end to this war with the help of the UN in December 1990. Finally, Najibullah failed to balance the disparate factions that now made up his power base with the dissolving of SU in December 1991 as financing to his administration had stopped.167 Supply of assistance had sharply declined in the aftermath of a failed coup attempt against Gorbachev. Corruption was so rampant in Afghanistan that the government officials absorbed 85-90 percent of the Soviet assistance planned for the population as a whole. Najibullah was continuing his administration by redistributing the soviet aid, the stoppage of aid resulted in termination of his government. He accepted the transition process for the creation of a new government through a UN-brokered conference. The PDPA dissolved itself in April 1992, and its internal groups got united with the competing mujahideen parties. It created a realignment of all factions including Mujahideen and Kabul administration. The new alliances were formed on the basis of their ethnicity and region. The Radical socialist Khalqis joined Hekmatyar‟s Radical Islamist Party to integrate Pashtuns. Dostum‟s Uzbeks and Kayani‟s Ismaili‟s after fighting Najibullah‟s force allied with Masud‟s Tajiks, who had been overrunning the northeast. The Shia Hazara Hizb-i-Wahat party also linked with them. When Ahmad Shah Masood found that Hekmatyar and Khalqis planned to take Kabul
166 Tom Lansford, A Bitter Harvest: US Foreign Policy and Afghanistan (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2003) pp.141-143. 167 Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and political History, p.248. 65 in April 1992, he occupied the Kabul. Najibullah pursued an asylum from UN and ran away.168 Finally, an interim government was established but instantly faced serious opposition from the radical Islamic mujahedeen forces commanded by Hekmatyar and hostility continued sporadically for the next four years in the form of civil war.169 This civil war characterized by a bewildering and constantly shifting set of alliances and betrayal, made it difficult for any faction to win.170 Each faction dominated at least one region, none was capable enough to expand its control over major parts of the country.
TABLE 2.1: AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN GROUPS, LEADERS, AND SUPPORTERS GROUP LEADERS ETHNICITY SUPPORTERS Islamic Party Pashtun Muslim Brotherhood Jamat-e-Islami Office of Support ISI (Pakistan) Services Gulbuddin Hekmatyar GID (Saudi Arabia) CIA Osama Bin Laden Muslim Brotherhood Tajik MI-6 (UK) Northern Alliance Burhanuddin Rabbani CIA (1984 and After) Ahmed Shah Massoud Rafsanjani (Iran)
Northern Alliance Abdurrashid Dostum Uzbek CIA (until late 1980s) Hizb-e-Wahadat Karim Khalili Hazaraa Abdul Haq Pashtun Hamid Karzai Pashtun
168 Ibid., pp. 248-249. 169 Mark A. Burrough, A Historical Case Study of US Strategy towards Afghanistan. Army War Coll Carlisle Barracks PA, 2009, pp. 13-14. 170 Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and political History, p.171. 66
ISI (Pakistan) Haqqani Network Jalaluddin Haqqani Pashtun GID (Saudi Arabia) CIA Muslim Brotherhood
Hezb-e-Islami Yunis Khalis Hazara ISI (Pakistan) (Yunis) Pahlawan Malik GID (Saudi Arabia) Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf Muslim Brotherhood
Source: Dan Caldwell, “Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States”, Vortex of Conflict: US Policy towards Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
Miller stated that the demise of the USSR, demolished the central point around which the US foreign policy had long been defined.171 So, with the ending of the Cold War academics and policy analysts scrambled and contested with one another to develop a new paradigm for explaining and prescribing the next US policy to deal with the world to further embolden its power and supremacy as being the sole superpower. Here, “the history was found to be at turning point.”172 The new ideas culminated into Francis Fukuyama‟s “End of History”, Samuel P. Huntington‟s “Clash of Civilizations”, and Kenneth Waltz “Neo-realism,” Robert Keohane‟s and Joseph Nye‟s neo-liberalism, etc.173 But, none of these approaches got the overwhelming majority despite having their supporters. So in the post-cold war era, America continued to be dominated by a single strain of grand strategy thinking that is sometimes called primacy, deep engagement or liberal hegemony.174
By April 1992, with the termination of Najibullah‟s government in Afghanistan, the US declared its victory and then disengaged itself. From 1988-2000 US governments either by Senior Bush or Clinton were not interested in the nation-building of Afghanistan.175 So, Afghanistan got attention during the cold war era only due to power politics and not for itself.
171 L.B. Miller (1994) “The Clinton years: Reinventing US Foreign Policy”, International Affairs, 70, no.4 (1994) pp.621-634. 172 Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire (Harvard University Press, 2009) pp.123-135. 173 Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict, p.5. 174 John Glaser & Trevor Thrall, “Obama‟s Foreign Policy Legacy and the Myth of Retrenchment”, CATO Working Paper n.43. (US: CATO, April 24, 2017) p.4. 175 Mark. A. Borough, A historical case study of U.S. Strategy towards Afghanistan, p.13. 67
From the time of the Soviet invasion till the end of the Cold War (1980-1992) the US spent around $4 billion to $5 Billion an amount that was matched by European and Islamic countries. Islamic Freedom fighters got around $10 billion in total from various sources. However, with the crumbling of the USSR, the US lost its strategic interest in Afghanistan and consequently sharply reduced its aid. In a single year Oct 1989- Oct 1990, aid declined by sixty percent. By 1992, the US stopped all kind of military assistance to the post-war country.
In 1991, when CIA official gave a briefing to George H. Bush about US covert aid to Afghanistan that was supplied via Pakistan‟s ISI. President reacted by saying “Is that things still going on.”176 It reflected that US policy focused on reinforcing Pakistan‟s ISI support for mujahideen leaders. During the 1992 election campaign neither the Republicans nor the Democrats even mentioned Afghanistan. After the ending of the Cold War Afghanistan again lost its significance in the eyes of the US.
In 1991, the Gulf War gave a spark to anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. In 1995, CIA labeled OBL‟s headquarter in Sudan as the “Ford Foundation of Sunni Islamic terrorism” and characterized it a source of funding for violent operations.”177 There were some concerns related that these groups might use the leftover Stingers which were supplied by the US to Mujahideen during Soviet-Afghan war. The US provided 2000-2500 Stingers, at the end of the war around 350-600 Stingers were leftover. Senior Bush and Clinton during their reign authorized a clandestine CIA program to buy back Stingers at a growing rate of $70,000 to $ 150,000 per missile.
In September 1996 CIA Director Schroen met with Ahmad Shah Masood to get his support in getting back the leftover Stingers and to control the activities of OBL and Arab terrorists in Afghanistan.178 Though Masood was perturbed over the US abandoning Afghanistan after the end of Cold War, however, he was facing resistance by the Taliban, due to which he offered the US with all of his possible support. This meeting, however, proved fruitful for establishing ties with the Northern Alliance that continued and revived after 9/11. Masood was the most successful leader against the Soviets and established his control in Kabul in 1992, but
176 Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict, p. 51. 177 Daniel Benjamin and Steve Stimson, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002) p. 242. 178 Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict, p. 52. 68 he refused to compete for the top job. He was driven back in Panjshir valley by the Taliban in 1995 where he was assassinated in 2001.179
Emergence and Governance of the Taliban:
The Taliban (the Seekers) movement originated in Kandahar, a city located in southern Afghanistan. In the 1980s, mujahideen intensified their efforts to take hold of Afghanistan but they failed to unite different factions and groups. After the Soviet withdrawal in the mid-1990s different parts of Afghanistan came under the control of different groups. This created a conducive ground for the Taliban who gained full control of Afghanistan by 1996.180 They hanged former President Najibullah. They wanted to eliminate the prevalent political turmoil since the departure of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and to enact a Sharia Law.181 Before taking over of power by the Taliban, years of war had ruined the state structures, forced millions of its people into exile, and brought its economy to a standstill.182
In October 1994 Taliban started controlling the country since the departure of Soviet troops from South and took over Spin Boldak and after a month occupied Kandahar and then moved further and captured Herat and Kabul in September 1996 and by 1999 controlled all of Afghanistan, except the northeast.183 They wanted to restore peace in the name of Islam. By 1998 they had been able to control 90% of the country with the only resistance from the Tajiks who were in the northeast and Panjshir valley. Taliban were supported through logistic support by the CIA. This support was delivered through Pakistan‟s ISI. Saudi Arabia also financed the Taliban movement. Further, the Taliban also generated revenue through opium production and illicit trafficking of opiates to forward their cause to expel Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Though the use of drugs was prohibited by Islam however, the head of Taliban narcotic force Abdul Rashid stated opium was permitted because it is used by non-believers (Kafirs) in the west and not by
179 Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and political History, p.30 180 “Timeline: Taliban in Afghanistan: Key events and developments related to Taliban”, July 4, 2009, Retrieved from < http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2009/03/2009389217640837.html> on March 10, 2017. 181 Alexandra Poolos, “Afghanistan: The Taliban's Rise to Power”, September 18, 2001, Radio free Europe radio liberty, Retrieved from http://www.rferl.org/a/1097442.html on March 10, 2017. 182 “Afghanistan in the Post-Cold War World”, retrieved from < www.ubcpress.ca/books/pdf/chapters/afghan/chapter1.pdf> on May 18, 2017. 183 Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and political History, p. 171. 69
Afghans.184 By 1997 almost whole of the poppy production came under the control of the Taliban. They were getting $75 million from drug smuggling between Pakistan and Afghanistan. According to Afghan intelligence officials estimates approximately 30 percent of Taliban‟s whole revenue generated from drug trafficking.185 The significant increase in poppy production and trafficking has fueled „instability, insurgency and increase funding to terrorist groups in Afghanistan‟186. To halt the financing to the militants, some upgraded anti-narcotic measures were needed so that drug money would not reach to the militants.
On taking over of power, the Taliban chose Kabul as their capital and chose ministers, however, the central command continued to be in Kandahar with Mullah Omar. Their rule was accepted as legitimate by only three states: Pakistan, U.A.E, and KSA. However, U.A.E and Saudi Arabia established only limited diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. The US and UN sustained the supply of aid to Afghan people, but Afghanistan‟s seat at the UN and most embassies overseas were continued to be represented by the people of Rabbani‟s government instead of the Taliban.187 Taliban got strengthened due to their promises of bringing stability, security and order and an end to warlordism that continued for the last four years 1992-96, and bringing back a decentralized system of government alike traditional Pashtun village government system. Initially, they conducted raids against unpopular former mujahedeen warlords who were charging tolls and collecting bribes for use of the local highways. The Taliban exploited this internal weakness of Mujahideen to their advantage and blamed them for the Afghan situation.188They implemented the strict version of Islam in Afghanistan and enforced their version of justice on consolidating territorial control. Women were strictly required to do veil while coming out of their houses. They banned music and prohibited TV and punished the
184 Ahmad Rashid, Decent into Chaos: the United States and the failure of nation building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008) p.317. 185 Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict, p. 47. 186 “Last year's record opium production in Afghanistan threatens sustainable development, latest survey reveals”, United Nation Office on Drug and Crime (UNODOC), last modified May 21, 2018. Retrieved from < https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2018/May/last-years-record-opium-production-in-afghanistan-threatens- sustainable-development--latest-survey-reveals.html> (accessed August 1, 2019).
187 Joseph Collins, Understanding war in Afghanistan (NDU Press, 2011) p.38. 188 Mark A. Burrough, A Historical Case Study of US Strategy towards Afghanistan (Army War Coll Carlisle Barracks PA, 2009) pp.13-32 70 people with a short beard. They were following Wahabism.189 Public executions and punishments and beatings turn out to be regular activities at Afghan soccer stadiums. Frivolous activities, like kite-flying, were outlawed.190 People were required to follow the specific dress code and many of their liberties were taken away. They also granted training bases to various international jihadist groups with whom they shared common values such as AQ. Yet, the Taliban had to pay a heavy price for this cooperation as it proved fatal when AQ operatives attacked the US on September 11, 2001.191 Taliban were hard on the Hazaras who belonged to the Shia sect that fueled conflict between the Taliban and Iran. To counter this issue Iran supported Northern Alliance who were against Taliban.192 From mid-1990 to the late 90‟s the US lacked any framework to deal with the Taliban. Though there were some positives for the US to support Taliban like President Clinton recognized the stability the Taliban brought to Afghanistan. Two principal US partners Pakistan and KSA supported Taliban administration of Afghanistan and the US business community was interested in engaging the Taliban to set up an oil and gas pipeline via Afghanistan by connecting it to Turkmenistan to an Indian Ocean port. Taliban were against Russia and Iran, one reason behind the mild behavior of the US towards them. The US did not officially accept the Taliban rule of Afghanistan when they rose in 1994, however, did not place them on the list of countries that supported extremism and terrorism. It was not until 1999 that the US along with U.N enforced economic sanctions on the Taliban government only for protecting OBL, and ignored their earlier support for international terrorism. However, Taliban treatment of women and disrespect for standard human rights produced opposition However, the US did not evolve any activist policy or military operations against them.193 Al-Qaeda’s connections with the Taliban and their Activities Mullah Omar was the Chief Taliban leader who commanded Afghanistan from 1996- 2001 as Amir ul-Mu'mineen (commander of the faithful). Al-Qaeda (AQ) seniors and the
189Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan”, Council on Foreign Relations 7, no. 4 (2014) pp.1-9. 190 Laura Hayes, Borgna Brunner, and Beth Rowen, “Who Are the Taliban? Their history and their resurgence”, Retrieved from < http://www.infoplease.com/spot/taliban.html > on March 18, 2017. 191 Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, p.171. 192 Mary Anne Weaver, “Blowback: In a perverse twist, the" freedom fighters" trained by the United States in Afghanistan in the 1980s have turned out to be the fount of international terrorism in the 1990s." Atlantic-Boston- 277 (1996) pp. 24-39. 193 Mark A. Burrough, A Historical Case Study of US Strategy towards Afghanistan (Army War Coll Carlisle Barracks PA, 2009) pp.13-32. 71
Pakistani Taliban had always greatly respected Mullah Omar and recognized him with his self- awarded title.194The Taliban provided sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden (OBL) and his AQ organization, from 1994 to 2001. The association among the Taliban and OBL was very close and familial, OBL struggled with the mujahideen, sponsored the Taliban, and one of his daughters was reportedly wedded to Mullah Omar. He allowed refuge to AQ on the condition that it did not provoke the US. To reciprocate, OBL provided capital, guidance, trained cadres, for the Taliban war machine.195But the OBL backed off his words in 1998 when he conducted bombing of Kenya and Tanzania. Initially, Taliban were parochial and AQ‟s goals were global in nature. The UNSC conceded two resolutions, UNSCR 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), which asked the Taliban to break their backing-up terrorism and handover OBL for trial.
The Taliban wanted to establish and maintain foreign relations, which is why the opium production was cut by July 2000. They proved themselves very non-cooperative when they ignored all international requests to not demolish the 2000year-old Buddhist statues of Bamian. They also did not end the terrorist activities within Afghanistan, a policy that eventually led to their downfall.196 OBL, AQ's chief who supported and struggled with Mujahedeen groups to pull out Soviet troops returned to Afghanistan in 1996, where he founded training bases for AQ and Taliban recruits. Around 20,000 Afghans and overseas recruits might have passed through the camps. The trainees received major training to combat the Northern Alliance and up-graded AQ‟s value in the eyes of the Taliban leadership. All this characterized Afghanistan as a key destination for international terrorists.197 In March 1996, the CIA was entrusted with a task to hunt OBL. Despite the constant US and Saudi pressure to expel OBL for legal measures, the Taliban declined to hand him over to them. The matter of the fact was the Taliban had never disavowed AQ or OBL. In August 1996 OBL issued a declaration of Jihad: that carried a message from him for the entire Muslim community in the entire world and particularly in the Arabian Peninsula, known as the “Declaration of Jihad against Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques” (1996); intended to oust the heretics from the Arabian Peninsula.198 It
194 Joseph J. Collins, Understanding War in Afghanistan (NDU Press, 2011) p.38. 195 Ibid., p.38. 196 Hayes, Brunner &Rowen, “Who Are the Taliban? Their history and their resurgence”, Retrieved from < http://www.infoplease.com/spot/taliban.html > on March 18, 2017. 197 Collins, Understanding war in Afghanistan, p.38. 198 Osama bin Laden, Declaration of Jihad Against Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places (1996), Retrieved from < http://historymuse.net/readings/OsamabinLadenDeclarationofJihad.htm> 72 was the first call by him for jihad against the US.199 On June 25, 1996, there was an attack on the “Khobar Towers” residence at a US military base in KSA200 that killed 19 Americans and injured more than 300 people,201 which marked the second attack against the US interest in Saudi Arabia in less than a year. These attacks were associated with OBL, and the US started clandestine maneuvers to track him and the other AQ leaders. By February 5, 1998, OBL declared his war against the US from his safe haven in Afghanistan. He accused the US of occupying Saudi Arabia, sacking its treasures, degraded its leaders, and for attacking Iraq. Further, he stated that the US had been at war with Islam and Muslims. On August 7, 1998, AQ bombarded US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania where over 200 people were killed while more than 5000 were wounded. On Aug 20, 1998, US launched cruise missiles at alleged OBL bases in Sudan and Afghanistan to retaliate for bombing US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, hitherto he escaped.202 These actions were taken to associate the Taliban with AQ as partners in crime and to put pressure on Pakistan to get its support for US interests.
By 1999, the necessary force for conducting the 9/11 attacks were trained inside Afghanistan. AQ provided the necessary guidance, concepts, and detailed plans and funded the whole activity in Afghanistan. On Oct 12, 2000, a motor-powered rubber ship loaded with explosives blew a 40-by-40-foot hole in the port side of the USS Cole, a US Navy destroyer that was refueling at Aden, Yemen.203 It was carried out by two suicide bombers who allegedly belonged to AQ‟s terrorist network. However, the Clinton government could not develop consensus over the reliance upon military option against OBL and issue remained unresolved. While during this time OBL kept on supporting the Taliban with an estimated amount of $184 million for the years prior to 9/11.204 George W. Bush took the charge of Presidency in 2000. However, neither under Presidents Clinton nor under Bush Sr., any effort made to hunt Bin Laden had not been made. The US policy appeared to focus more on external influences than the
199 Brian Bonhomme, and Cathleen Boivin, eds. Milestone Documents in World History: 1942-2000. Vol. 4. Schlager Group Inc, 2010. 200 Ken Dilanian, “Suspect in 1996 bombing at US military residence in Saudi Arabia arrested”, World News, August 26, 2015. 201 “Truck Bomb Kills 19 Americans at an Air Base in Saudi Arabia”, Los Angeles Times, June 26, 1996. 202 “1998 US Embassies in Africa Bombings Fast Facts”, CNN Library, updated Aug 3, 2016. Retrieved from < http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/06/world/africa/africa-embassy-bombings-fast-facts/> on March 10, 2017. 203 “USS Cole attacked by terrorists”, Retrieved from < http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/uss-cole- attacked-by-terrorists> on March 22, 2017. 204 Mark A. Burrough, A Historical Case Study of US Strategy towards Afghanistan (Army War Coll Carlisle Barracks PA, 2009) p.17. 73 entire context of Afghanistan itself.205 By 2001, AQ appeared as a terrorist group with its own state and system. Arabs supplied money, hospitality, ideology, or self-interest, as well as ignoring their harsh activities that‟s why Mullah Omar and the Taliban did not interfere in their activities.206
Table 2.2: Timeline Global War on Terrorism: Historical Overview
Timeline Global War on Terrorism: Historical Overview Years Events 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran (Shah forced into exile in January) Nov.1979 Seizure of US Embassy and personnel in Tehran Dec.1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; Jihad begins against Soviets in Afghanistan, eventually assisted by US Oct 1983 US marine barracks bombing, Beirut, Lebanon 1991 Founding of Al Qaeda, following Gulf War February 1993 World Trade Centre Bombing June 1996 Khobar Towers Bombing Aug 1996 Bin Laden declares war on US Feb 1998 Bin Laden Issues fatwa on Jihad against “Jews and Crusaders” Aug 1998 US embassies in East Africa bombed Oct 2000 Bombing of USS. Cole September 11, 2001 Attack on World Trade Centre and Pentagon; downing of United Airlines flight 93
205 Ibid. 206 Joseph Collins, Understanding war in Afghanistan (NDU Press, 2011) p.43.
74
Source: Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism (Harper Collins, 2008) p.503.
Clinton’s Concerns over AQ & downgrading of AQ threat by G.W. Bush: In December of 2000, Clinton communicated it to Bush that the gravest threat to the US came from terrorist activities of Al- Qaeda, and OBL. In January 2001 the upcoming Vice President Dick Cheney met with the NSC team to discuss the gravity of the Iraq situation. The Pentagon reported that Iraq did no longer pose a security threat to the US as Saddam Hussein was contained and isolated. They issued a warning that in case of acting violently could “immediately engender strong opposition in the region and throughout the world.” Still, the Bush government did not take it seriously and showed its keen interest in Iraq and downgraded the AQ threat. Richard Clarke, who served as national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism in Clinton‟s presidency was chosen as a special advisor to the NSC by President Bush. He articulated to his team that the terrorist organization was “clearly planning a major series of attacks on us” and that it was required to act actively decisively and quickly. However, it all was ignored by Bush and his team. In the summer of 2001, the CIA issued warnings regarding forthcoming attacks on the US land by OBL and AQ. On May 1, June 22, 23 and 25, the CIA issued intelligence briefs regarding forthcoming attacks. In May 2001, Cofer Black, then chief of the CIA‟s counterterrorism center stated, “it was very evident that we were going to be struck, we were gonna be struck hard and lots of Americans were going to die.”207 However, Bush disregarded all these warnings and kept on highlighting the security threats emanating from Iraq. In the spring of 2001, Tenet and Black initiated a plan “the Blue Sky Paper” to deal with this threat. It insisted on a secret CIA and military campaign to curtail AQ threat, “getting into the Afghan sanctuary, launching a paramilitary operation, creating a bridge with Uzbekistan.” And the word back,” says Tenet, “„was „we‟re not quite ready to consider this. We don‟t want the clock to start ticking.”208 That proposal was rejected in May 2001 to avoid creating a paper trail to express that they had been warned. Numerous warnings were issued to Bush and his NSC teams, but the gravity of the threat was somewhat underestimated by Bush administration.
207 Chris Whiple, “What the CIA knew before 9/11: New details”, Politico, http://www.politico.eu/article/attacks- will-be-spectacular-cia-war-on-terror-bush-bin-laden/ on 13-11-15 Accessed September 16, 2017. 208 Ibid. 75
2.4- 9/11 and Afghanistan:
The dawn of September 11, 2001, saw the US under attack. Between 8:47 a.m. and 10:03 a.m. four aerial attacks first in the North Tower of the World Trade Center, second into the south tower, third into the western wall of the Pentagon in Washington D.C. and fourth in Pittsburgh,209 shook the foundations of the sole superpower, the US. In this incident civilian deaths reached to 2,750 while the economic damages were estimated to billions of dollars. According to reports, these civilians belonged to 90 different countries. They all were employees in the World Trade Centre. AQ a fundamentalist Islamic terrorist network founded by a former ally of the US in Afghanistan in the war against Soviets claimed responsibility. That moment the US entered Jacksonian moment that called for a fight to the ultimate end and enemies were deemed not worthy, so in a classic unilateralist mode the US ignored all proposals or reservations that came from its allies and moved to dispense justice in its own way.210 Within two days Collin Powell secretary of state put the blame on OBL as the mastermind of these attacks. September 16, 2001, was the day when the President of the US launched a war against Osama Bin Laden and other terrorist‟s elements. Based on the report published in Washington Times many of the Israelis were also arrested. It was considered that MOSSAD also has the capability to attack US was also suspected to be involved in these attacks.
9/11 provided a conducive ground for the US in waging a war in Afghanistan, though it was planned earlier after negotiations with the Taliban for a pipeline had broken down. The Taliban initially negotiated with the Unocal consortium, but then preferred Bridas Corporation of Argentina for the development of a pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan. During the negotiations-which occurred before 9/11, US officials clearly communicated to the Taliban that they would have to accept their conditions otherwise they would have to face severe consequences.”211 With all these happenings the continued liberal international tradition of US foreign policy that was practiced under senior Bush and Clinton, the conduct of US Foreign policy altered dramatically. Finally, on Oct 7, 2001, the US officially invaded Afghanistan. The US got engaged in two wars under the war on terror i.e. Afghanistan and Iraq. Some observers
209 Enver Masud, 9/11 unveiled, (USA: The wisdom Fund, 2008) p.1. 210 Akis Kalaitzidis and Gregory W.Streich, “American Foreign Policy: The Theoretical Landscape” US Foreign Policy: A Documentary and Reference Guide, (USA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2011) p.xix. 211 Masud, 9/11 unveiled, p.3. 76 characterized this moment of unipolarity as a “liberal Empire” while others called it as an empire or hyper-power.212 2.5-Conclusion
The conduct of US foreign policy in any region particularly South Asia depended upon the level of continuity of its interest, the attention, amount and quality of information available at various levels of government, the constraints existing at state and system‟s level and the type of influence and number of NGO with an interest in the region. US interests in Afghanistan were not direct or economically motivated during the cold war rather motivated by strategic calculation with the Soviet Union and the impulse of sustaining its hegemony within the world. The entire focus of the US during this time was to terminate the communist rule and Soviet influence. However, no attempt had been made to deal with post-communist Afghanistan to preserve the US interests. Before getting involved in any third world country the superpower should have calculated the probable immediate and ultimate cost and consequences of their actions before jumping in unprepared for the outcome. During the cold war era, the US strategic doctrine was based on containment, deterrence, and BOP. In the post-Cold War era, Clinton administration pursued globalization and economic integration of the world. However, he had not given due attention to control terrorism and WMDs issues.
The US supported the Mujahideen against Soviet invasion, then marked the US retaliation for its support to North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. Yet, it was not cost-free. Broadly the US strategy during the Cold War did not focus only on the containment of Soviet influence but also created a trap to crumble the Soviet empire by itself. It had been evident from the fact that the US started its covert support before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The US also got allied firmly with Pakistan and neglected the issue of nuclear proliferation on the part of Pakistan. All this was to ensure the Soviet withdrawal from Afghan land. Even if it was not attainable; we should make Soviet involvement as costly as possible.
As far as Afghanistan was concerned, all the rulers through the use of state power had tried to change Afghan society but failed due to the non-consideration of Afghan‟s societal aspirations. Afghanistan had witnessed a series of interventions from foreign powers. Afghans
212 Kalaitzidis & W.Streich, “American Foreign Policy: The Theoretical Landscape” US Foreign Policy: A Documentary and Reference Guide. ABC-CLIO, 2011, p.xix. 77 had sought other groups of foreigners to pull out one group, though it was not something desirable for the Afghan people, but was something that remained beyond their capacity to manage. Afghans perceived that the most dangerous threat to their sovereignty from their contiguous powers like Czarist Russia, the Soviet Union in the north and the British Raj /Pakistan in the southeast. Since these states had viewed Afghanistan as a territory that could be annexed to those, they already ruled. Germany and the US being located far away were assumed to have no expansionist designs and thus made safer allies. That‟s why Mujahideen supported US cause during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The next chapter would explore US Foreign Policy in Afghanistan under President Bush (2001-2008).
CHAPTER 3
US POLICIES TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN (2001-2008): AN ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENT BUSH POLICIES
This chapter attempts to look at the post 9/11 US-Afghan policy to analyze President Bush‟s approach towards handling this war. Section I presents an overview of the Bush Foreign policy, in general, to figure out the changes that came to his Foreign policy gesture after 9/11. The second section specifically looks into the US policy towards Afghanistan in the post 9/11 world. It offers an examination of how US policy implicated Afghanistan and what had it been able to accomplish during the Bush administration and what had been transferred to the next administration to deal with. Section three presents the FPDM approach of Bush and then section 78 four looks into the other systemic challenges faced Bush‟s team due to which it could not prioritize Afghanistan. Section five presents the weaknesses of the Bush administration while the last section concludes the whole chapter. This chapter argues that the US started this war to hunt down AQ and Taliban in 2001, but the policy actions had not resulted in the accomplishment of stated objectives due to the divergence of attention towards other foreign policy issues. It resulted in the neglect of the Afghan war and suffered from limited resources, limited troops, leadership attention, etc. This had come as an opportunity to Taliban who re-grouped, re- organized and re-gained their lost strength and continued to challenge the superpower US. In short, President Bush despite enjoying unprecedented power had not been able either to secure a victory or institute greater changes to the situation of Afghanistan due to his focus towards other systemic factors and the enduring structure of the international system.
3.1-An Overview of President Bush’s Foreign Policy Doctrine
Throughout his presidential campaign and after assuming presidency before 9/11, President G.W. Bush presented a comprehensive and modest agenda for his foreign policy. He prioritized domestic issues like tax cuts and improvement of education via the No Child Left behind Act of 2001. His foreign policy goals focused on developing good ties with Russia and Rising China. Incursion in other states was viewed as being an unwanted diversion from domestic policy priorities. As Moisi stated “Under Bill Clinton, the US wanted to save the world from itself, albeit with reluctance. Under Bush, they intended to protect themselves from the world or even withdraw from it.‟213 Daalder and Lindsey put it that Bush‟s foreign policy goals were thoroughly conventional. Ironically, the period between assuming office and 9/11, there was nothing new about foreign affairs, though Bush spoke a lot about reversing Clinton‟s policies. In fact, the US was enjoying the undisputed global superiority through its robust soft power and its overriding military strength, which confirms the basic principle of NCR Realism. President Bush embraced some basic principles of the Clinton administration and favored an open world economy, he emphasized the importance of energy and other global corporations and gave importance to the defense spending. He continued Clinton‟s policy of the U.S. leading role in free-Trade, NATO‟s expansion towards east, high military expenditure due to the use of high tech precision weapons, control of Middle East Diplomacy, and global democratization.
213 D. Moisi (2001), “The Real Crisis over the Atlantic”, Foreign affairs, Volume 80, number 4 (2001) p.150. 79
President Bush and his team also took a number of new initiatives to mark a difference from previous administration policies. These initiatives included the opposition of Kyoto Protocol, un- signing of a treaty on International Criminal Court (it happened very first time in the US history), the administration‟s decision not to participate in a protocol to 1972 Biological weapons Convention on establishing verification Procedure for the agreement, refusal to reintroduce the CTBT to the Senate for ratification, in the Middle East he retreated from the senior Bush and Clinton administration‟s peace process. Despite these policy measures, till September10, 2001, he was not on his way to a very successful presidency.214 Then, 9/11 happened and the transformed spectrum of global politics upgraded the status of President Bush as one of the most popular presidents of the US.
President Bush‟s foreign Policy team comprised primarily of pragmatic problem-solvers rather than strategic, conceptual thinkers with the sole exception of Wolfowitz (who developed the strategy for overthrowing the Saddam Hussain). Ivo Daalder and Lindsay had identified three groups of advisors within his team, first consisted of Pragmatic Internationalists headed by Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, and Richard Haas, who favored cooperation with allies and international administrations like UN for the pursuance of their national interest. The second group included the assertive nationalists that included Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who showed their willingness to use American military might to put down any security dangers and showed their reluctance to use its primacy to remake the world in its image. The third group consisted of Neocons that included Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Lewis Scooter Libby, Elliot Abrams, and Richard Perle.215 Following the break-up of the SU, neocons attempted to develop a new doctrine to put the world under US influence. They (1992- 2000) came forward with their radical ideas to capitalize on the lost opportunity for the US and to take the world matters in its hands. Charles Krauthammer, a leading neocon asserted that the US should formulate and implement the rules and regulations to shape new world order. It should export US values throughout the world. They wanted to carry the US flag throughout the world. For them this was the right time for seeking the control of everything in the world in the exportation of US values. This version matched with the PNAC Project for the New American Century that was laid in 1997 to promote the neocon‟s ideas, which had been called as “hard-
214 David Frum, The Right Man: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush (Random House, 2003) p.272. 215 Caldwell, “Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States”, Vortex of Conflict, Pp.94-96. 80 headed internationalism.”216 This group favored increased military spending, a robust pursuit of US interests to sustain the American hegemony throughout the world. The victory of President Bush in 2000 assured that PNAC‟s nationalist realist agenda would be incorporated in the NSS of the US.
After suffering the terrorist assaults of 9/11, The President gave up its previously practiced approach of engaging the states of the world. According to Charles Walts President used <9/11> to mark a switch from the pre-9/11 days of peace to the post 9/11 days of the war.”217 The Bush administration explicitly declared that the US could no longer continue its strategic concept of deterrence and containment to encounter the “new deadly challenges” due to the character of its undetectable opponents, terrorist groups and rogue states. Consequently, the US under Bush and his National Security team moved from containment and deterrence to administration change218 and came up with a goal to prevent another such attack. President Bush sought to use Afghanistan as a precedent to convey a message to other terrorist groups that the US would continue the WOT until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.219 This war was “certain to be ugly, costly and protracted, lasting for years if not decades.”220
To wage the global war on terrorism a political discourse was created. As Richard Jackson in his book writing the war on terrorism wrote that the "War on Terrorism" was an important political discourse in the US foreign policy. The discourse remained highly successful in justifying US military campaigns and in creating consent to launch the war against terrorism.221 The narrative of "war on terrorism" was strategically planned, in order to provide protection to human rights. It portrayed the terrorists as barbarian and inferior and on the other
216 Mel Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade: The Bush doctrine in US foreign policy. Vol.35. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers (2006) p.186. 217 Charles L. Walts, Ideographs and the War on Terror: A Criticism of George W. Bush’s Post 9/11 Discourse, (ProQuest, 2006) p. 61. 218 Robert Litwak, “US Strategy Towards Rouge States”, in Seyom Brown and Robert H. Scales (eds.) US Policy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Lessons and Legacies (US: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2013) pp.17-30. 219 Haley Stauss, "United States' Strategy in Afghanistan from 2001 to Today," Pepperdine Policy Review 5, no. 1 (2012): 3. Retrieved from: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/ppr/vol5/iss1/3.(accessed September 20, 2017). 220 Andrew J. Bacevich, “War for Imporium”, American Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Pres, 2002) p.225. 221 Richard Jackson, “Writing the War on Terrorism: Language” Politics, and Counter Terrorism (Manchester; University of Manchester press, 2005) p.2. 81 hand, it claims aggression against militant organizations as "Just War."222 It created political consent for domestic policies such as "patriotic act" and foreign policies such as the invasion of Afghanistan.223
With the emergence of new kinds of threats emanating from non-state actors, terrorists and extremists, WMDs (weapons of mass destruction) a new policy was needed, Bush found it out that the best possible way to deal with these challenges effectively, the state needs to come out of the constraints imposed by allies, partners and international organizations (systemic constraints). It needed to act solely to protect and promote its national interests regardless of whether other countries follow or not224 confirmed Bush‟s NCR realist approach. President Bush came-up with a preemptive Doctrine to respond to the 9/11 attacks. This doctrine was based on three principles and also known as the Bush Doctrine i.e. First, the US could invade any other state and topple any government if they posed a security threat to the US. The nature of the threat does not necessarily be instant. The spectrum of the security threat included all kinds of threats to US security either emanating from terrorism or the WMDs. Second, this policy was justified by the administration as a way of implanting democracy in the non-democratic world, particularly in the Middle East. Third, President Bush resorted to unilateralism a gesture to take actions without the sanction of international institutions like UNSC with its allies.225 This doctrine was further emboldened by the National Security Strategy Paper issued a year later on Sep17, 2002 that gave a legal basis to this doctrine, but it clarified that the US would not always use military option to respond to emerging security threats, yet it could not avoid staying idle in a globalized and technologically advanced world. Renshon hold that Bush Doctrine had five strategic elements, American primacy, assertive realism, stand apart alliances, a new internationalism and democratic transformation.226
222 Ibid., p.122. 223 Ibid., p.181. 224 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, “The Bush Revolution: The Remaking of America‟s Foreign Policy”, The Brooking Institution, (2003). 225 Ana Dresner, “Policy of Preemption or the Bush Doctrine”,
Jacob Weisberg contended that there had been five Bush Doctrines: unipolar realism, with or against us, preemption, democracy in the Middle East, and freedom everywhere.227 He also stated that from November 2006 on, there was the absence of any functioning doctrine at all. The Bush doctrine made a shift in US foreign policy posture based on two pillars of deterrence and containment prevalent in the cold war era. The NSS document (also known as Bush Doctrine) of 2002 declared previously practiced deterrence and containment tools of foreign policy as insufficient in the light of terrorism threat with its global outreach and rogue states such as Iraq and North Korea.228 Though, the previous policy posture continued even after the Cold War, the emergence of a unilateral world order dominated by the US, under the two consecutive administrations led by Senior Bush and Clinton. The policy shift was due to the 9/11 attacks and was taken by George W. Bush.
To attain his ends, President Bush crystalized his foreign policy for the two expansive strategic objectives winning the GWOT (to counter-terrorism), and undermining rogue states (Iraq) that possessed or might possess WMDs due to the feeling of vulnerability. It moved President Bush from the domestic-oriented President who was interested in understanding and undertaking domestic reforms to a war President. It gave a thrust to the neocon thinking that was previously limited, became dominant to pursue US ideals. President Bush emphasized Offensive Approach that focused on the preemptive and preventive military operation to protect the US from future terrorist attacks. Simultaneously, attention was paid towards facilitating democracy in the world specifically in the Middle East to bring stability in the world.
3.2 - US Policy towards Afghanistan under President Bush:
War Plan/US Strategy:
227 Jacob Weisberg, The Bush Tragedy (Random House, 2008) p.304. 228 ETH Zurich, “US Foreign Policy under Bush: Balance Sheet and Outlook”, CSS Analyses in Security Policy 3, no. 41(2008) p.2. 83
US policy had never been consistent or comprehensive for making a strategic plan for the Afghan region, as it remained a less important area for US interests. The policy builders had resorted to ad hoc and reactionary approach towards Afghanistan and made policy responses to events after analyzing their relevance to their national interest.229 US developed the concept of evolving a comprehensive plan for Afghanistan after facing and realizing the fact that the US had been under attack by an unforeseen enemy.230 It started the Global war on Terrorism (GWOT) and decided to invade Afghanistan. Previously, the US never treated Afghanistan as a national security threat nor given it strategic importance.
President Bush signaled a firm resolve and commitment to fight this war against terror and to continue their mission till the attainment of their goals and securing the victory. While the Bush neo-cons diligently avoided any meaningful debate of the real threat originating from Afghanistan. Actually, the US lacked a military strategy to deal with Afghanistan after the 9/11 incident. On September 17, 2001, President Bush assigned the roles to his team. The FBI and CIA were given the charge for protecting the US from future assaults, Secretary Rumsfeld was entrusted to protect the US forces and installations outside the US and Colin Powell to warn the Taliban to hand over OBL and AQ deputies, dismantle terrorist camps operative in Afghanistan and offer full access to the US to eradicate terrorist camps.231 Mullah Omar the Taliban Chief refused to comply with these demands. At that time Bush and many of his team wanted to consider Iraq as well, but they lacked sufficient evidence to move against Saddam Hussain. However, on September 26, 2001, President Bush ordered Rumsfeld to seriously consider for options on Iraq.232 It showed President Bush and his team were interested in waging a war in Iraq.
The US military neglected Afghanistan to the extent that it had not drawn up any contingency plan for attacking it. It was stated by General Frank to take at least six months to
229 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, “The United States and the War on Terrorism”, Recovering the Frontier State War, Ethnicity, and State in Afghanistan, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) p.88. 230 Maria Luisa Kobek and Mariana Gonzalez Rodriguez. "The American Way of War: Afghanistan and Iraq." Revista Enfoques 11, no. 18 (2014) pp. 77-101. 231 The New York Times, 21 September 2001. 232 Hybel, US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Kennedy to Obama: Responses to International Challenges, p.126. 84 draft a battle plan and make it functional. Secretary of State said, “You don‟t have months.”233 Then, the President moved to Congress for support, which approved the President to use the necessary force against those states and organizations who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to save America from future acts of terrorism.234 On September 21, 2001, General Franks handed over, the first draft of a battle plan after incorporating President‟s guidelines, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to Donald Rumsfeld, to execute. This war plan towards Afghanistan focused on the removal of the Taliban government of Afghanistan firstly and then incapacitate AQ cells operating in Afghanistan and in other countries of the world. The focus was on conquering the Taliban, yet it lacked any reconstruction plan for the country. The US wanted to have a quicker and decisive move without much involvement of the US ground forces. The US expected the Taliban could be defeated easily, quickly, and decisively due to US military might, unmatched superiority in terms of weaponry and a strong determination to topple Taliban.235 This approach revolved around maintaining American primacy as an end through Pre-emptive War.236 The objective behind this plan was to eliminate the threat of terrorism to the American people and was directed not only against the culprits but also towards the foreign entities who supported terrorist activities and terrorist organizations and provided them safe havens. All this was projected as the right of the US the sole superpower to launch a preemptive war in its self-defense.
On 25th September 2001 a CIA team under the leadership of Gary Schroen as Afghan liaison landed in the Panjsher valley. This team was known as Jawbreaker. The team met General Fahim (Tajik) leading Northern Alliance, Abdur Rashid Dostum (Uzbek), and bought their loyalties. The US officials used cash bribes, weapons, and other equipment as an incentive to convince tribal leaders to support US Coalition. Several senior anti-Taliban leaders including Rashid Dostum and Abdul Sayyaf were given more than $1 million to support the American
233 Hybel, US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Kennedy to Obama: Responses to International Challenges, p.126 234 Joseph J. Collins, “9/11 and the War Against the Taliban and the Struggle to Rebuild Afghanistan”, Understanding War in Afghanistan, NDU Press, 2011. p.46 235 R.B.Rais, Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008) p.109. 236 Sara M. Birkenthal,"Grand Strategy in US Foreign Policy: The Carter, Bush, and Obama Doctrines." (2013) pp.130-135. 85 cause.237 They landed and decided to work with anti-Taliban allies to execute a plan to eradicate Taliban rule and to incite a broad anti-Taliban uprising.238 This invasion was started with special operation forces and the CIA paramilitary. It was due to President Bush and his neocon team members not being in favor of a large US ground presence and thus, wanted to wage this war by using Afghans against the Taliban, with the minimum involvement of American forces. They looked for alternative plans to avoid the risk to the life of Americans. That is why they planned to utilize the Northern Alliance who were anti-Taliban along with their air supremacy to oust the Taliban reign of Afghanistan. Fahim and Amrollah Saleh from the northern alliance, remained intelligence director from 2001 to 2010 and they worked to weaken the Taliban's defense on Shomali plain, north of Kabul and Bagram airfield.239
Taliban and AQ: Strength and Motives:
At the time of the US invasion, the number of Taliban forces was not very high. It was about 45,000-50,000 troops and about 10,000 allied militia troops, along with 650 tanks, more than 1000 artillery pieces, and 76 aircraft.240 The weapon technology was not modernized. AQ and their allied troops were around 5,000. The majority of the Taliban forces were engaged in fighting in northern areas with the northern alliance for the past six years. Many of the Taliban fighters were former Mujahedeen who possessed the lengthy combat experience. The Taliban and AQ forces composed of the Afghan Taliban and also contained a significant number of non- native Afghans. This caused resentment among the Afghan people particularly towards AQ fighters. The morale among the Taliban and AQ was very high. They believed their fight as a holy war for a holy cause against the US, and they expected the same fate for the US as the Soviet Union.
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
On October 5, 2001, in an NSC meeting President Bush enquired from General Tommy Franks regarding the forces prepared to launch an attack. General replied that he was. “Tommy
237 Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide (US: ABC- CLIO: 2011) pp.43-44. 238 Griff Witte, “Afghanistan: anti-Taliban Fighters”, Britannica.com, Retrieved < https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War > (accessed on March 15, 2018) 239 Ibid. 240 Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, p.44. 86
War Plan” in the president‟s own words was later code-named Operation Enduring Freedom.241It was realized by the senior officials of the Bush administration that for a successful campaign in Afghanistan, it needed a strong coalition force. That‟s why, officially the US launched its military operation in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, under two missions conducted by international forces. One was Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) conducted jointly by the US, UK, and Afghanistan, operated mostly in the southern and eastern parts of the country to hunt down AQ and Taliban, while the second was International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) conducted separately by NATO, was confined to Kabul only to secure it and to support Karzai‟s government. The initial deployment of US troops to Afghanistan comprised just 10,000 soldiers while NATO countries under ISAF contributed 5000 troops. NATO countries extended their support by sending troops, general aid, air space, search and rescue equipment, medical facilities in short, physical and financial support needed for winning this war. US and UK also contributed to ISAF.
OEF was implemented in four phases. In the first phase the US and allied forces were stationed in Afghanistan and then was followed by rigorous airstrikes to clear the area for conventional troops to follow, under the second phase, special targeted operations were carried out to hit the key figures of AQ and Taliban and to conduct humanitarian airdrops which to bring relief to Afghan population, the ground invasion was started under the third phase by the US and coalition forces to chase and kill left-overs of AQ and Taliban. The final phase focused on military along with civilian operations meant for bringing security and stability to Afghanistan and helping the Afghan people build a free society.242 However, there were doubts and suspicion regarding the nature of Afghan operation among the president‟s team. Yet, they kept quiet, with the fear of being sidelined. Air bombing targeted Afghan training camps and Taliban air defenses in and around Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. Within a period of two weeks Taliban air defense system collapsed and by then Afghanistan began to be described as a “Quagmire.”243
On November 5, 2001, The Northern alliance along with the support of the US gained the control of Mazar-i-Sharif. Taliban control of Afghanistan began to collapse by November 9,
241 Hybel, US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Kennedy to Obama: Responses to International Challenges, p.128. 242 Ibid., pp.128-129. 243 Ibid., p.129. 87
2001, and then they attempted to retreat south to the Kandahar region.244 Due to the destruction of command and communication channels of Taliban retreat became a failure. Then, a series of successful strikes by US and northern alliance at Taloquan, Bamiyan, Herat, Jalalabad, and Kabul (November 13) led to the complete surrender of Taliban on December 9, 2001.245 With this Colin Powell announced that AQ in Afghanistan had been destroyed.246 In a winner-take-all move, the Northern Alliance occupied the prominent government positions and excluded the Pashtuns (the largest ethnic group) and a minority Shi‟a Hazaras.247 This replacement of the Taliban government with the northern Alliance created an image of Afghanistan that resembled a pre-Taliban era. President Bush and his team were feeling great and contented for fulfilling their objectives in just two months and eighteen days. It assured their victory, yet strategic errors followed.248 The Taliban‟s removal from power was probably due to three reasons. 1. Collaboration between US aerial attacks and United Front‟s ground offensives, 2. The Taliban was a coalition loosely connected to each other that remained unsuccessful to spread out its regional roots, 3. The Taliban did not take the resort to guerrilla warfare as was characterized by them against the Soviets.249 The US and allied forces along with the northern Alliance destroyed the Taliban base and their military capability and removed them from power to stop the usage of Afghanistan as a terrorist base. To Rumsfeld, the US success vindicated his ideas about the efficacy of the transformation of military affairs, namely making US forces lighter, more agile and more rapidly deployable.250
Bonn Agreement & Afghan Government 2001:
In December 2001, several opposition groups of Afghanistan including the Northern Alliance and a group representing the King ousted in 1970s along with the US, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, India and various European countries signed an agreement (Bonn Agreement) at Bonn,
244 Dr. Imtiaz Gul Khan, “Afghanistan: US Policy and Post 9/11 Afghan War Scenario”, International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications 2, Issue 4 (April 2012) p.3. 245 J.D. Carruthers, “Operation Enduring Freedom”, Retrieved from < http://www.nunncenter.org/c2ky/operation- enduring-freedom/ > on December 8, 2016. 246 Geoffrey Wawro, Quicksand: America’s Pursuit of Power in the Middle East, (Penguin Press 2010) pp.120-122. 247 S. Frederick Starr, US Afghanistan Policy: It's Working. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (2004) p.2. 248 Bing West, The wrong war: Grit, strategy, and the way out of Afghanistan. Random House Incorporated, 2012) pp.52-55. 249 Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Rethinking the nature of war (Psychology Press, 2005) p.118. 250 Dan Caldwell, “Military Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq”, US Policy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Lessons and Legacies, Vol.1 (USA, Lynne Rienner Publishers: 2013) pp.57-88. 88
Germany under the auspices of the UN and established the base for the new interim government of Afghanistan. They established a procedure for scripting a constitution and nominating a government. Resultantly, a new Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) led by Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun from the Kandahar region was established for a period of six months. After its expiration, Loya Jirga was convened in which various leaders from the entire country participated to establish an Afghan Transitional authority to run the country for the next eighteen months and Hamid Karzai was chosen as its interim President. Then, a second Loya Jirga vetted the constitution and the election took place. The new government brought back Afghanistan to a pre-Taliban era when Northern Alliance was ruling, with a difference that now it was governed under UN-US brokered Bonn agreement to bring all warring factions on the same page.251 The Taliban exploited this opportunity well and persuaded Pashtuns, who were excluded from the executive to get their support to move back to Afghanistan.
The Bonn agreement also laid the plan and procedure for the international troop presence in Afghanistan to help newly elected Afghan government. This force was called the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). While, the US victory and the confirmation by the ISAF to take over operation in Afghanistan, persuaded the Bush team that lesser US troops would be required to preserve stability. At the same time, the Bush government diverted its attention towards Iraq considering that the elected government would do its best to bring order and stability to Afghanistan. Originally, the northern alliance was not interested in the stationing of international troops in their country, however, if so the number and mandate were supposed to be much smaller like in Bosnia and Kosovo.252 The goal of this force was to distribute the aid, stabilize Kabul, and train ANDSF.
OBL Hunt:
After chasing its initial objectives, US focused its attention on funding and hunting OBL, while Afghan affairs were left to the warlords, by paying them money to run it according to US interests. To hunt OBL, coalition air and ground units were supported by anti-Taliban militia attacked the main AQ headquarters in Tora Bora in the northeast of Afghanistan. AQ forces
251 Dr. Imtiaz Gul Khan, “Afghanistan: US Policy and Post 9/11 Afghan War Scenario”, International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications 2, Issue 4 (2012) p.114. 252 Haley Stauss, "United States' Strategy in Afghanistan from 2001 to Today." Pepperdine Policy Review 5, no. 1 (2012) p. 3. 89 numbered somewhere 1000-1500 while the combatant US and coalition forces composed of about 100 Americans, British and German Special operation forces and about 2,000 Northern Alliance and anti-Taliban militia troops supported by a large number of helicopters and aircraft. The offensive began on December 2, 2001. By December 17, they captured the area and killed 400-600 Taliban and AQ fighters, but OBL and several hundred supporters escaped into Pakistan where they took refuge and continued operations. Coalition force instead of US was blamed for this failure but they justified and argued that they expected Pakistan to do a better job of sealing their border to stop cross border infiltration.253
Operation Anaconda (March 2, 2002- March 19, 2002):
On March 2, 2002, Operation Anaconda, to eliminate Taliban and AQ hiding in the rocky area, the eastern province of Paktia was launched. It was intended to improve the security situation and to bring stability to Afghanistan and involved 2000 US soldiers and 1000 Afghan forces to fight around 800 AQ and Taliban fighters. This operation was fraught with tactical difficulties because it was an unprepared operation in view of the enemy‟s strength and strategy. Although it also suffered losses, yet it ruined the main Taliban and AQ headquarters in the Shahi Kot Valley, the northwest of Khost.254 This operation marked the entry of the troop‟s contribution into special operation forces from Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, and Norway.255 This operation highlighted the lack of unity in command which was later fixed. Although it was claimed to be successful in reality, AQ and Taliban had not only survived but continued to pose challenges to the west by operating from other countries.
Post-Taliban Afghanistan & National Security Strategy of Bush 2002:
After gaining control from the Taliban, the US policy towards Afghanistan focused on the attainment of a viable, strong and democratic Afghanistan, securing its borders to make it a peaceful state internally and help it to strengthen its economy to rejoin its position as an interregional trade corridor, protection of women and minorities by giving them rights and
253 Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide (US: ABC- CLIO: 2011) p.48. 254 Olivier Roy, “A Different Kind of War: The US Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, Oct 2001-2005” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, May 2010) p.19. 255 Griff Witte, “Afghanistan War: 2001-2014”, Encyclopedia Britannica, Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War on May 18, 2016. 90 removal of religious fanaticism, control drug production. However, the US foreign policy should have prioritized its goals to reintegrate Afghanistan back into world politics and have taken steps to revive Afghanistan‟s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political system.256 After the Taliban removal, most parts of Afghanistan arrived a phase of post-conflict reconstruction. For the US mission sustained, but with a focus to locate and destroy remnants of Taliban and AQ in Tora Bora, south of Jalalabad and at other places.
Nevertheless, all this did not result in what was expected. The period October 2001- March 2002 involved conventional, network-centric military operations along with the enemy centric approach to deal with the situation. Yet, all these techniques resulted in only tactical gains like network-centric warfare helped in destroying the communication lines of the Taliban and their training bases, but it did not work in the long run. While the enemy centric method focused on the enemy but ignored the population, badly needed institution-building, infrastructures, and service for local communities were not focused.
In September 2002, the Bush doctrine came forward with the issuing of his National Security Strategy (NSS) which explained the purpose of continued US mission in Afghanistan after the attainment of their initial goals. The preamble spoke of the supremacy of democracy and the values of freedom. Bush declared: “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”257It asked the “freedom-loving people across the globe” to protect “these values against their enemies,” and declared that the US will defend, preserve, and extend the peace.
According to NSS 2002, US being the leader of the world owned this responsibility of creating freedom in the world by empowering the weak states to get stable, secure and democratized. Weaker states posed a threat and should be supported to get strong. A bond was also urged with the great powers on the basis of common interests to create a free world. The primary responsibility of a state had been to offer a common defense to its people by defeating its enemies which in NSS 2002 defined as terrorists, tyrants, and technology.
256 Wahabuddin Raees, “Obama‟s Afghanistan Strategy: A Policy of Balancing the Reality with the Practice”, Journal of Politics and Law, Vol.3, no.2 (2010) p.80. 257 George W. Bush, The national security strategy of the United States of America (Executive Office of the President Washington DC, 2002) p.1. 91
9/11 had shown to the world that these terrorists were dangerous and could bring “chaos and suffering to our shores”. Oppressors in some states had turned their countries into rogues. They abuse their own population, disobeyed international law, wanted to attain WMDs, supported terrorist activities throughout the world and rejected basic human rights and values and hated the US.258 To hunt down terrorists and despots, the strategy emphasized prevention, preemption, defense, and consequence management. This strategy called for that the US had the responsibility to take “anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remained as to the time and place of the enemy‟s attack.” Finally, it called for greater defenses (particularly missile defense), other counter-proliferation measures, and active incident management to lessen the fallout of a chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons attack. Reducing attacks and decreasing their effects “would help deter those who retain such weapons and discourage those who seek to obtain them by persuading enemies that they cannot accomplish their anticipated ends.”259
This NSS 2002 sets forth aspiring, and impressive goals for the US that it had stimulated freedom and liberty to eliminate the threat of terrorism and rogue states. It should get aligned with the great powers to chase the same ends. Poverty is a moral and strategic challenge, should be effectively dealt with. Apparently, it appeared as an attractive approach, but it failed to provide a comprehensive and realistic way forward to attain these lofty objectives.
Role of Northern Alliance: Afghan United Front:
The northern alliance (Afghan United Front) in Afghanistan effectively forwarded the US interests by indulging in ground operation to remove the Taliban from power while the US utilized its air superiority to hit its targets. By this strategy, the US worked well with Afghans (through Northern Alliance that comprises of non-Pashtun ethnic minorities) against the Taliban and AQ with minimum risk to American lives. The Front had remained engaged in fighting against the Taliban for the past several years.260 Although the front was not so powerful due to the killing of their influential leader Ahmed Shah Masood, yet it was very active in mobilizing
258 Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, and James Steinberg. The Bush National Security Strategy: An Evaluation. (Brookings Institution, 2002) p.1. 259 Ibid. 260 Rasul Bakhsh Rais. Recovering the frontier state: war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan (Lexington Books, 2008) p.97. 92 and getting the support of the people of its community against the Taliban. Here, the interest of the US and the Northern Alliance converged, they found a common end against a common enemy, Taliban,261 that‟s why got agreed to work together. The US found the Northern alliance support as convenient, feasible, and strategically necessary for operational purposes. For a successful mission, the US required local supporters from Afghanistan with secure back and firm positions on the front. Further, the Northern Alliance possessed good intelligence assets, experienced enough to deal with the Taliban, and above all, they had the will to indulge in a war to abandon the Taliban rule. All this made US and Northern Alliance a perfect match to forward their interest and attain a collective end. However, at times the US and northern alliance faced divergence in their goals as the US kept its search for OBL while the northern alliance was more interested in bringing stability to Afghanistan with increased support of the US to get rid of the Taliban.
The relationship between the US and the Northern Alliance marked a key difference between the US and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. By cultivating Afghan allies the US ensured its support during its operation. The US utilized these anti-Taliban forces because they did not want to appear as foreign occupiers or conquerors because the Taliban could use nationalism to rally the people against the US. On the other hand, the northern alliance on the front would create the impression that US and allied forces were supporting a popular uprising against a brutal administration.262 By this, the US sought to minimize coalition casualties and would make it easier for American troops to withdraw from the country once the Taliban have been removed from power.
By mid-2002-03 the CIA and special forces got involved in developing trust and closer ties with the key tribal leaders, as they were packing up to move towards Iraq.263 This strength of the policy was the fact that it offered a more rapid initialization of the operation, while it was also expected that the neighboring countries like Russia, Pakistan, and Iran would not feel threatened due to the presence of smaller and specialized US forces. Resorting to other choices like splitting up the Taliban or nurturing Pashtun group leaders would have taken more time,
261 Ibid., p.97-99. 262 Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, P.42 263 Hybel, US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Kennedy to Obama: Responses to International Challenges, p.143. 93 effort and resources. On the other hand, the weakness was, the smaller force was not sufficient enough to control and manage effectively the local tribes. The tribal leaders could pursue their own objectives and also could not necessarily attain the expected objectives, which could be problematic for the US in the longer run. However, by this light-footprint strategy, the US had been successful to remove the Taliban from power but had not been successful to attain its broader objectives.
NATO’s mission in Afghanistan:
On September 12, 2001, NATO invoked article 5 on collective defense for the first time in its history. This was done to get international legitimacy by the US for its invasion. However, the US military decided not to conduct the assault as a NATO operation. Instead, the coalition forces were under US command, and it shaped the direction and tactics of operation.264 On August 11, 2003, ISAF came under NATO‟s command on getting the approval from the NATO countries for the creation of NATO force called ISAF International Security Assistance Force to participate in the war in Afghanistan but the mission continued to operate under the auspices of UN. Then, in October 2003 it expanded its military operations under UNSC Resolution 1510 from just Kabul to Afghanistan‟s 9 provinces by 2004. It marked NATO‟s first-ever military operation, outside Europe. Meanwhile, the efficacy of the Taliban‟s limited institutes and their brutality and revenge against traitors neutralized much of the Afghan people. It was thought that only the effective political union of NATO and allied military conquests could revive the confidence of Afghan masses over their government.265
Taliban &Al-Qaeda’s Resurgence, and Uprising in Afghanistan:
On 1st May 2003 secretary of Defense announced the end of “major combat.”266 By 2003, there emerged two main groups who were against the Karzai‟s government and US coalition against terrorism. One was a loose alliance between AQ and Taliban who were based in Pakistan while the second was a growing number of regional warlords who were against the Karzai‟s administration. Both of these groups were getting a major share of finances from the
264 Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide (US: ABC- CLIO, 2011) p.43. 265 Ibid., pp.43-44. 266 Ibid., p.44. 94 drug trade through which they established bases and networks in Pakistan where they got a safe haven. They started a guerilla war against Karzai administration and US mission in Afghanistan. This insurgency was also spilled in Pakistan, as the Taliban started a joint movement against the governments of both countries. Pakistani Taliban also started fighting in Afghanistan which resulted in increased violence after 2004.
The US invasion of Iraq annoyed many Muslims belonging to Sunni and Shiite sects around the region. Many fighters came to fight to promote Taliban cause in Afghanistan got trained in Pakistan and some went to Iraq to fight against the US and international mission in Iraq. Then, some ethnic rivalries were also going on between the Pashtun population who were in majority and other minor groups like Uzbeks, Turkmen, Hazaras, etc. Regional warlords were also against Karzai. The reemergence of drug trade and its suppression by the government and the International coalition increased further the tensions between the Karzai government and the warlords. Afghan people remained divided along religious and ethnic lines however the matter of the fact had been that they were very nationalistic and would get united for a national cause against foreign invaders like against the Soviet Union they got united under mujahedeen.267 The majority of Afghans initially supported the US invasion but started viewing it a foreign occupation. In 2002 due to the killing of civilian population caused by drone strikes. All this created a space for the re-emergence of the Taliban.
By 2003, the limited number of deployed troops by the US became exposed and opened the field for Taliban and other groups to recover and regain strength. In some parts of the country, the Taliban effectively re-managed their control, local people started moving back towards Taliban led courts which they believed to be more just and fair than the corrupt system run by the government. The Bush administration was more concerned about the mission in Iraq. The absence of proper planning and long-term policy on the part of the US further buoyed the Taliban who continued their efforts to regain their power. By May 2003, it became clear that resurgence efforts of the Taliban against the US and the Afghan government were going not only in eastern but also in the southern part of the country too. In fact, the US needed a counterinsurgency policy to control the resurgence of the Taliban and to gain the support of the public. It required a population-centric warfare rather than network-centric policy to wipe out the
267 Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, p.140. 95 public support for Taliban and AQ, establish a strong and credible government, and secure the population.
The whole pessimistic situation gave rise to anti-American and anti-western emotions in the Afghan people. This was due to the very slow rebuilding efforts the allegation of prisoner abuse at US imprisonment, rampant corruption at every level of the Afghan government, and killing of an innocent civilian caused by US and NATO bombing.268 In May 2006, a US military vehicle crashed and killed several Afghans caused severe anti-American and anti-government riots in Kabul. In the summer, British and Canadian troops deployed to Helmand and Kandahar confronted a well-armed and full-blown insurgency led by a reinvigorated Taliban.
With the exposing of the weaknesses of the interim government of Afghanistan, President Bush left aside the cautious approach and became determined to reconstruct Afghanistan to let it become a capable state. The goal was set to turn Afghanistan into a strong democratic state who could govern its affairs on its own and give its citizens the right to live their lives as free citizens, a state where they feel protected, where they can choose their way of living, etc. These goals were lofty and attractive, and their attainment demanded time, enough resources, and focused efforts yet, Bush was more interested in his mission in Iraq. Swift changes began to take place in US policy by the end of 2003, it invoked a counterinsurgency approach to diminish the public support to the Taliban to weaken them. In 2004, Coalition forces decided to boost its troop deployment and expanded their operation, in fact, they opted for a safe and incremental troops build-up. The US realized that in order to dwindle the Taliban winning of people‟s support is a requisite. The new approach treated Afghan people as its center of gravity. The underlying goal was to break the support of the Afghan people to the Taliban. For ensuring success US increased the number of its ground forces and experts on Afghan arts and traditions. These experts became engaged in the activities for reconstructing Afghanistan and established good ties with the local Afghans and to bridge the trust deficit between Afghan people and the government. This policy decreased the number of death casualties caused by aerial attacks that were the main reason for local Afghans protest against US forces. While the increased number of ground forces played their role and engaged the population in ways to weaken the Taliban‟s support.
268 Griff Witte, "Afghanistan war 2001-2014" Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved from < https://www. Britannica. com/event/Afghanistan-War> (2018) (accessed on May 18, 2016). 96
The US announcement for withdrawing 2500 combat troops and shifting of major responsibility to NATO resulted in the increased strengthening of the Taliban. The Taliban worked well to fill this power vacuum created by US shifting of priority and the ineffective Afghan government. They effectively convinced the Afghans to join them as they were fighting against the foreign forces who were occupying their state and manipulating Afghan government.269 During the spring of 2007 in the Helmand province, NATO and ISAF troops retorted attacks against the anticipated Taliban offensive.270 Then throughout in 2008 Taliban continued their offensives and expanded their attacks in other parts of the country previously held by the coalition, including Kabul. The increased Taliban offensives and widespread ferocity shifted the attention of the US back to Afghanistan. The war rather than leading to its conclusion resulted in the increased vigor of the Taliban.
US-Afghan Partnership: Bush vs. Karzai
The Task Force Report was published in May 2003 that provided certain policy guidelines to the Bush administration for Afghanistan. To create a democratic Afghanistan, capable of defeating terrorism, it was suggested to support Karzai in diplomatic, economic and political reconstruction. It urged President Bush to work in collaboration with the Karzai government for the development of the Afghan National Army and emphasized a transformation all verbal promises and commitments into reality. To end the regional and political militia in the country. However, without US support Karzai was unable to crackdown the warlords. Until 2005, the situation was fine for the US as the Taliban were removed from power and Karzai was the President of Afghanistan.
On May 23rd, 2005 strategic partnership was established between the US and Afghanistan under which leaders of both states agreed to increase cooperation between them. It resulted in the opening of Afghan military facilities to be used by US and ISAF troops. Coalition partners also got agreed to expand their training for ANDSF. However, soon this cooperative environment was spoiled due to the revelations of prisoners‟ abuse in 2005 by US forces and intelligence
269 Valentina Teddeo, "US Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan Campaign." Journal of Strategic Security 3, no. 2 (2010) p. 27. 270 Maria Luisa & Mariana Gonzalez Rodriguez, “The American Way of War: Afghanistan and Iraq”, Revista Enfoques, Vol Xi, No. 18 (2013) p. 92. 97 operatives at Afghan detention centers.271 It resulted in the countrywide protest against the US invasion. US soldiers were also found culprits of assault to detainee abuse to making false statements. While the security and political environment of Afghanistan was not encouraging. Political institutions were weak and the writ of Karzai government was only limited to the Kabul and urban areas. That is why President Bush took a unilateral decision to continue a military campaign and ignored the Karzai‟s concern about civilian casualties.
Other than the warlords, Karzai‟s government also faced resistance from a democratic opposition. It emerged by the union of 11 anti-government political parties under the National United Front in 2005 led by Muhammad Yunos Qanuni who was a presidential competitor of Karzai in 2004 elections. The Front was superseded in 2007 by a new union called the United National Front (UNF) led by former President Rabbani. This front called for national reconciliation and advocated negotiations with the Taliban to end the insurgency. Former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah was chosen as the UNF‟s presidential candidate for 2009 elections.272
After the 2005 legislative elections, Karzai also faced a divide between him and the legislature. The President appointed a new cabinet on Dec 23, 2006. Five of Karzai‟s appointees were rejected by the assembly because of the opposition by Islamic conservatives. In 2007, the Assembly impeached two ministers after Iran pressurized Afghan refugees to return to their homeland. However, the Supreme Court characterized those impeachments as unconstitutional. The same year, the legislature approved a restrictive media law, but the President refused to sign the measure.273 In short, there was a rift between a moderate president and conservative lawmakers.
The National Security Strategy of Bush 2006:
The NSS of 2006 endorsed the preemptive doctrine for self-defense of the state as vital in the WOT. However, it failed to give thorough consideration of preemption.274 It also did not refer
271 Tom Lansford, “9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide” (California, ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2012) p.145. 272 Ibid., p.145 273 Ibid., p.147 274 Christine Gray; The Bush Doctrine Revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy of the USA, Chinese Journal of International Law, Volume 5, Issue 3 (1 January 2006) pp. 555-578. 98 to international law or UNSC for this purpose for its use of force policy. The strategy also focused on promoting democracy but failed to proclaim any legal right to use force for this drive, and it made only a slight reference to humanitarian intervention. It appeared too that democracy could not be established in the short time it not have prior experience with it marked a shift from the initial understanding at the start of WOT in Afghanistan. Yet, it claimed to have achieved a democracy there, although it differed on what an effective democracy is.275 In 2003 EU‟s security strategy marked a sharp difference from this approach however other states of the world embraced the Bush Doctrine. This document reaffirmed the new threats coming from international terrorists and WMDs proliferation, however, World Summit held in 2005 exposed that pre-emptive action had not been accepted generally. It also reaffirmed the doctrines of the NSS 2002 but previously, Iraq and North Korea were focused and that was then diverted to Iran and Syria, suspected of being State supporters of terror by Hezbollah and AQ.276 It also reinforced the importance of international community, due to the global problem affects every country across, so best solution could be thought out collectively. It also sustained the US role as a world leader, who showed openness and willingness to work with the international community.277 However, this document talked less about Afghanistan and more about the Iraq war.
Afghan National Compact 2006:
On January 31- February 1, 2006, United Nations in collaboration with British and Afghan governments co-hosted a conference in London to discuss future aid for Afghanistan. It included more than 70 countries and international donor institutions who negotiated a five-year agreement, known as Afghan Compact, which promised $10.5 billion in aid to Afghanistan in exchange for political and economic reforms. It was also recognized by the UNSC in February 2006 via Resolution 1659. This agreement and conference marked a new era of international support for Afghanistan, in which Afghanistan was asked to set its reconstruction and
275 Haley. Stauss, "United States' Strategy in Afghanistan from 2001 to Today." Pepperdine Policy Review 5, no. 1 (2012) p. 3. 276 Christine Gray; The Bush Doctrine Revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy of the USA, Chinese Journal of International Law, Volume 5, Issue 3, 1 January 2006, Pages 555-578. 277 Haley Stauss, “United States' Strategy in Afghanistan from 2001 to Today." Pepperdine Policy Review 5, no. 1 (2012) p. 3. 99 development preferences and international allies would provide funds and support.278 This Conference endorsed the Afghanistan Compact, which sets out an aspiring program for Afghan development over the period of the next five years. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) showed its determination to attain the explicit and feasible goals in security, governance, economic and social development, and counter-narcotics with the moral and financial support of the international community. However, in reality, the compact could not be implemented in its true letter and spirit due to numerous institutional, political and security factors.279
The US along with the international community stood up with Karzai and the newly elected Afghan Parliament to play their part for establishing a prosperous, stable and democratic Afghanistan. The US also committed expanding the private sector‟s support in the Afghan economy, a step that would be fruitful for Afghanistan as well as the whole region. In return, the Afghan president Karzai promised to make reforms to end regional militias, reduce the power of the warlords, and abolish the drug trade. He also promised to increase the size of ANA to 70,000 by 2009 to increase the nation‟s security and combat the insurgency.280 He also promised to enact economic, judicial and series of other reforms suggested by donor countries. However, he could not effectively implement these reforms due to legislative opposition. Drug trade could not be abolished, the power of warlords could not be constrained, the insurgency continued to rise.
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Efforts &Assistance:
The US increased the war budget for Afghanistan from US$ 19 billion in 2006 to US$ 39 billion in 2007, however it was well short of $131 billion specified for Iraq. In fact, the US and its allies were not very keen to bring progress in the field of reconstruction. That‟s why initially, mixed responses were noted in this regard. Like September 25, 2001 statement of President Bush that “he was not into nation-building in Afghanistan.”281 However, in April 2002 in a speech at the Virginia Military Institute he declared that “We know that true peace will only be achieved
278 "The Afghanistan compact." In Building on Success: The London Conference (2006) pp.1-2. 279 “Implementation of the Afghanistan Compact”, Bi-Annual JCMB Report November 2006, http: http://www.afghanembassyjp.com/pdf/JCMBBi-AnnualReportNov12,2006%28English%29.pdf (accessed September 19, 2017). 280 Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide (US: ABC- CLIO: 2011) p.147. 281 Amin Sailkal, Zone of Crisis, p.30 100 when we give the Afghan people the means to achieve their own aspirations. Peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan develop its own government.”282 That‟s why he became interested in nation-building in Afghanistan. Colin Powell (Secretary of State) cited reconstruction and Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense) insisted on humanitarian aid. Overall, during 2001-2009 US Congress appropriated over $38 in humanitarian and reconstruction support for Afghanistan out of which more than 50 percent spent to train and equip Afghan Security forces. The rest of the money was apportioned for the development of this poor country which stood at the bottom of Global HDI. The development was further hindered by the lack of clarity over who would take the lead for leading service sectors like health, education, agriculture, and other developmental plans either the civilian or the military authorities.
President Bush in April 2002, during his speech at Virginia Military Institute, promised to the Afghan population to undertake a Marshal plan like efforts to reconstruct the war-affected country.283 With the taking over of power from Taliban & AQ, the US with international coalition shifted to reconstruction and nation-building, but with very little or no achievement. Though the US actively engaged itself towards building democratic institutions, which would ultimately be responsible for providing security to its citizens, yet substantial progress or meaningful achievements could not be made in this regard due to insufficient funds, leadership attention, and priorities.
In 2004, US troops were 18,300 that grew and reached to 48,250 in 2008 to counter growing violence. While ISAF troops contributed by NATO were only 6,500 in 2004 and touched 51,350 in 2008. ANA was composed of 10,000 soldiers in 2004 with an additional 20,000 police officers and this army was increased to 60,000 in 2008. However, ANDSF was not strong and effective enough to take control of the country. This force also suffered from desertions as only in 2004 1/3rd of the original force recruits left off. To retain the recruits‟ intact
282 Paul D. Miller, “Bush on Nation-building and Afghanistan”, (https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/11/17/bush-on- nation-building-and-afghanistan/) accessed on July 19, 2019. 283 Wahabuddin Raees, “Obama‟s Afghanistan Strategy: A Policy of Balancing the Reality with the Practice”, Journal of Politics and Law, Vol. 3, no.2 (2010) p.80. 101 monthly remuneration was raised from $50 to $70 in 2004. However, Taliban and AQ numbers reached to 25,000 in 2008 from approximately 7,000-12,000 in 2004.284
Taliban and Al-Qaeda Tactics in Afghanistan:
After getting ousted from power, Taliban Chief Mullah Omar restructured and reformed the Taliban‟s management and established a 10-member governing council. He declared Jihad against all foreign troops in Afghanistan. However, the Taliban were not unified, as there were divisions among them. One group was having a moderated stance and were in favor of negotiations with the government. It was because, in 2005, legislative elections Karzai offered them participation and also set free few Taliban who were arrested after the 2001 invasion. While there was also a rigid group who was not in favor of any proposals coming from the government. In 2007, Karzai went a step further and offered cabinet positions to the senior members of the Taliban, but Mullah Omar strictly declined. By 2007, the divisions within the Taliban became apparent. One extreme faction, the Haqqani group functioned from bases in Pakistan and undertook attacks in southeastern Afghanistan. They enjoyed the support of the Pakistani Taliban and were closely associated with AQ. The smaller groups were loosely connected with the central command and operated in other parts of Afghanistan. By 2008, moderate and flexible Taliban got ready to negotiate with Afghan and Pakistan‟s government.
The moderate Taliban were against the terrorist strikes that targeted the civilian population. They were in favor of military action to expel out US and coalition forces troops, but not against the civilian population and rather characterized it antithetical to Pashtunwali code. This group was often referred to as neo-Taliban were in favor of a negotiated settlement with the government to end the US invasion and wanted to have the due representation of the Taliban in the Afghan government and forces positions.
284 Tom Lansford, “9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide” (California, ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2012) pp.145-150. 102
By 2004, the Taliban resorted to new tactics that relied on suicide bombing against the US, ISAF and Afghan government to pursue their agenda. Previously, this practice was found in Iraq. By January 2004, they announced suicide attacks would continue until the foreign forces withdrew from Afghanistan. The year 2005 saw a significant increase in attacks by the Taliban against the allied forces in Afghanistan. The Taliban reiterated its existence and employed new tactics to challenge the US and international forces. Earlier they engaged in battles with the US and the ISAF in open combat, which did not work significantly. By 2005, they started using the means and techniques applied by the insurgents in Iraq like suicide bombing, the use of IEDs (Improvised explosive devices) proved much more effective and caused huge casualties.285 Suicide bombing also augmented by more than 400 percent from 27 to 139, the use of IEDs more than doubled from 783 to 1677 and armed attacks nearly tripled from 1558 to 4542.286 The year 2005 noted the number of violent incidents increased by 90 percent since 2003.287 More than 4000 deaths were recorded in this year comprising civilian and foreign soldiers. In the period 2005-2006 Afghanistan witnessed an increase in violence, and Afghans reacted against the government and the ISAF for their inability to offer the basic needs and security to their lives. The signs of American victory began to vanish and the Taliban regained hold of the south and fastened their efforts to spread in other regions. The tactic of suicide bombing was new and had not taken place in the history of Afghanistan. Initially, these attacks caused fewer killings, but with time this technique matured with the training and availability of high-powered explosives to cause more casualties. In November 2007, a brutal attack killed more than 70 people when the parliamentary delegation went to the northern town of Baghlan. Then, in an attack on the Indian embassy recorded 50 casualties. All this happened due to a number of issues, such as the alleged support of some factions of Pakistan‟s security apparatus to Taliban, lack of sufficient resources, insufficient troops, local fighting and lack of unity, weak, corrupt and ineffective Afghan government, poor governance, and mediocre security situation, etc.
The Taliban offensive in the south was based on the assumption that NATO forces were covering up the US exit from their state, as indicated via troops cut announcement of 2005. They
285 Griff Witte, "Afghanistan war 2001-2014" Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved from < https://www. Britannica. com/event/Afghanistan-War> (2018) (accessed on May 18, 2016). 286 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton University Press, 2010) p. 319. 287 Hybel, US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Kennedy to Obama: Responses to International Challenges, p.144. 103 engaged in battles with NATO forces, thus considering it to be a less-committed force than the US military. The Taliban wanted to take control of Qandahar, however, it could not happen. NATO forces acted against their expectations despite the unwillingness of allied countries to send more troops into battle zones. The US decidedly increased its troop commitments and the allied governments did not withdraw from Afghanistan.288 This declining scenario was attributed to faulty policies that were never amended to adjust the altering situations. However, not only a single approach was responsible for triggering crises rather, together they produced a situation that led to the US losing control. The Taliban exploited the loopholes in the US policies to regenerate their networks. In fact, they “knew whom to contact and whom to avoid.”289 They along, with AQ, kept on attacking coalition bases, convoys and patrols using guerilla-style hit and run tactics.
2006-2008 Bush & US Policy: Situation of Afghanistan
In December 2006, Mullah Akhtar Osmani was killed, he was number four senior Taliban leader. By 2007, AQ was revived in Pakistan and appeared to be resolute in carrying out operations worldwide.290 Until this year, the US had achieved only limited success as the top AQ and notable leadership was still alive and hidden. In early 2007, Mullah Ubaidullah Akhund Taliban‟s number three leader was caught in Pakistan and after a few months, Mullah Dadullah Taliban‟s top military commander was executed in a battle with US Special forces in Helmand province. The US utilized its air superiority to vanish Taliban and Al-Qaeda gangs and individual leaders. His brother, Mansur Dadullah took the military command but was dismissed in December 2007 by Mullah Omar due to their differences over plans and policies.291
Most of the leadership of the Taliban and AQ were supposedly located in tribal zones of Pakistan. All this led the US to take actions against those insurgents who had escaped to Pakistan through UAVs (remotely piloted drones). President Bush persuaded President Musharraf to permit Special Forces to go after the Taliban, AQ leaders, and their forces in Pakistan but
288 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A cultural and political history, p.319. 289 Bing West, The Wrong War: Grit, strategy, and the way out of Afghanistan (Random House Incorporated, 2012) pp.25-30. 290 Alex Roberto Hybel, “US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Kennedy to Obama: Responses to International Challenges (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) p.144. 291 Tom Lansford, “9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide” (California, ABC-CLIO, 2012) p.145. 104
Musharraf responded that such an act would be a violation of Pakistan‟s sovereignty.292 The CIA publicly denied this approach, but it was privately accredited. Pakistan publicly protested against these strikes, but it was believed that Pakistan‟s government allowed these strikes as long as the civilian casualties were low. The US constantly pressurized Pakistan to cooperate and do more with the US to tackle and defeat the Taliban. The US also threatened to increase the use of drones beyond FATA towards Baluchistan.293 By mid-2008, General David McKiernan made a request for additional 30,000 troops, as the war was not finished, and the second term of President Bush was to expire. Thus, the challenging war was transferred to the new administration with its difficulties.
Following the disastrous attacks on the Indian embassy on July 7, 2008, President Bush approved the use of the Special Forces to carry out operations in Pakistan without the permission of Pakistani government. In early September 2008, the US Navy SEALs launched an assault against AQ members in Pakistan that was followed by other US attacks. Pakistan criticized the US government for these actions.294 The summer of 2008 witnessed a well-executed Taliban assault on a Kandahar prison which freed 1200 prisoners including 350 Taliban fellows. Violence increased by 40% in 2008 from the previous year. Ambushes, suicide bombing, and targeted attacks rapidly increased. NATO reported that the Taliban were increasingly strong in the Helmand, Kandahar, Zabol, and the Oruzgan provinces in southern Afghanistan and is either active or visible in the Paktia, Khowst, Nangarhar, Konar, and Nuristan provinces in eastern Afghanistan. In many of these areas, the Taliban had assumed the traditional functions of a sovereign state like a collection of taxes, maintenance of law and order, and provision of basic services.295 In Sep 2008, President Bush while moving towards completing his second term, in a speech he announced additional troops, 3500 additional US Marines, additional troops by NATO countries and all this was labeled as a “quiet surge.”296 The additional troops were meant for
292 Hybel, US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Kennedy to Obama: Responses to International Challenges, p.144. 293 Griff Witte, “Afghanistan War: 2001-2014”, Encyclopedia Britannica, Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War on May 18, 2016. 294 Hybel, US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Kennedy to Obama: Responses to International Challenges, p.145. 295 Dr. Imtiaz Gul Khan, “Afghanistan: US Policy and Post 9/11 Afghan War Scenario”, International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications 2, Issue 4 (2012) p.114. 296 Catherine Dale, "War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress." Library of Congress (Washington DC Congressional Research Service, 2011) p.7. 105 securing the Afghans, protection of Afghan institutions, infrastructure, and helped to provide Afghans freer access to basic services of life. Moreover, US civilian agencies would also be stationed at Afghanistan to bring governance and law and order in to give a start to its economy. The Bush government showed a resolve for increased support to Pakistan for defeating Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements who had taken refuge in Afghanistan. All this showed the efforts taken by the US to stabilize Afghanistan under the Bush administration, yet he avoided giving any statement regarding the US objectives in Afghanistan. The UK was quite pessimistic, in September 2008, when its ambassador to Afghanistan Sherard Cowper-Coles cautioned that the US war strategy would lead to failure.297 In 2008 it was realized by the CJCS that the policy was not working. “I‟m not convinced we‟re winning in Afghanistan. I am convinced we can. That is why I… am looking at a new, more comprehensive strategy for the region.”298 By the end of 2008, the Taliban retained control of 10 percent of Afghanistan, the Karzai administration- controlled 30 percent, while 60 percent of the country was under the control of warlords. Among the positives was the fact that in 2008, IMF announced that Afghanistan had qualified for the criteria for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) which eliminated 96 percent of Afghanistan‟s 1.6 Billion budget.299
ANDSF, US Policy and worsening Situation of Afghanistan 2008
In 2008, the overall situation of Afghanistan was very bleak and far from stable. However, the positive development was the launching of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), against which international donors vowed some $20 billion at the Paris donor conference in June. It was meant to develop a strong bond between Afghanistan and the international community to assist Afghanistan in obtaining viable economic stability. To support ANDS, UNSC extended the mandate of the UNAMA in Afghanistan and coordinated between GoIRA and the international community. Symbolically, ANDS took security charge of Kabul in August 2008, which was to expand eventually throughout Afghanistan for their own control and leadership. Large counter-narcotics efforts, scarcity, and low prices due to huge stocks, the area under opium cultivation finally marked a 20 percent decrease in 2008 the first decline since
297 Nasser Shaghafi Ameri, Prospects for peace and stability in Afghanistan. SIPRI (2012) p.2. 298 Bing West, The wrong war: Grit, strategy, and the way out of Afghanistan (Random House Incorporated, 2012) pp.26-27. 299 Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide (US: ABC- CLIO: 2011) p.154. 106
2005.300 However, the robust insurgency and increased poppy cultivation in the south could not mark a decline in poppy cultivation from 2007‟s record 8,200 metric tons. The constant declining security situation, rising number of military and civilian fatalities, as well as the terrorist attacks all touched their apex since the Taliban ouster. The rising number of casualties of humanitarian workers significantly limited humanitarian related assistance. As of October 2008, 31 humanitarian workers were killed while in 2007 this number was 15. This year insurgents appeared very bold and mature, the insurgents were also coordinated and supplied by their international backers in launching high profile attacks. In February 2008, according to US intelligence estimates, the GoIRA controlled only 30 percent of Afghanistan‟s districts; a more conservative estimate by the UN cited 36 of 376 districts as largely no-go Afghan officials and aid workers. Summarizing the situation, the US CJCS Admiral Michael Mullen, stated on 10 September 2008, “Frankly, we are running out of time.”301 The year 2008 was regarded as the deadliest year that took the lives of 2,118 civilians. The increased civilian killings due to US and allied forces military invasion irritated Afghans to the extent that their relations with the US and UN got strained.302
Negotiations with the Taliban under Bush:
For most of the tenure of the Bush administration, the US was not willing to start talks with the Taliban without their surrender and abandonment of violence and terrorism. In 2002, former foreign minister of Taliban Maulvi Wakil Ahmad Mutawakkil attempted to negotiate with the US. However, he was arrested and sent to Guantanamo Bay, was kept for four years.303 Though there were secret attempts to persuade individual Taliban leaders to defect and join the Afghan central government. All this did not result in meaningful progress. Moreover, in the summers of 2008, under constant pressure from the Afghan central government, President Bush agreed to talk with the moderate Taliban leaders. This idea came from General Petraeus who stressed to apply the approach that was practiced in Iraq and reduced violence over there. He
300 Center on International Cooperation (New York University). Annual Review of Global Peace Operations (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009) p.55. 301 Robert Burns, “Defense Chiefs: Afghan Fighting Is Getting Harder,” Associated Press News, 10 September 2008, http://wiredispatch.com/news/?id=340000.(accessed September 20, 2017). 302 Center on International Cooperation (New York University). Annual Review of Global Peace Operations. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009.http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp- content/uploads/2014/08/2009_afghanistan_mission_reviews.pdf (accessed September 20, 2017) p.55. 303 Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide (US: ABC- CLIO: 2011) p.155. 107 asked to win the support of regional and local warlords and use them against the Taliban to weaken and ultimately end the extremist, Al-Qaeda, and warlords. However, US vigorously opposed Pakistan‟s series of negotiations with Pakistani Taliban groups and their affiliates.304 While Britain embraced this idea of negotiated settlement as a key to resolve the Afghan issue by 2005 but the US did not.
Casualties under Bush:
With every passing year, the casualty rate went higher. In a single year (2004-05), it rose from 61 to 132 (that included 52 American in 2004 and 99 in 2005). In 2006 the ISAF casualty rate was recorded to be 191 that included 99 Americans. Then in 2007, it rose to 232 including 117 Americans and 295 in 2008 that included 155 Americans.305 As far as Afghan casualties of Afghan civilians were concerned, it was recorded to be 2,118 in 2008. In the initial year of war in 2001, it was 2,375 then there was a significant decline and reached to 400 in 2002, then 450 in 2003, further declined till 230 in 2004, 929 in 2006, 1,528 in 2007.306 These numbers showed the casualties who died as a result of violence. As far as the Taliban rate of killing was concerned it could not be said with certainty, however, their number of deaths was slower in the period 2002- 2008. According to Neta C. Crawford, the total number of Taliban killed might be as little as 5000 which is certainly an underestimate, or as high as 10,000 to 15,000.307
Graph 3.1 Civilians Killed in Afghanistan under Bush Administration
304 Vanda Felbab Brown, “The Predicament in Afghanistan”, US Policy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Lessons and Legacies (eds.) (New Delhi: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2013) p.152. 305 Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide (US: ABC- CLIO: 2011) p.154. 306 Neta C. Crawford, “War-related Death, Injury and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014”, Watson Institute for International Studies (Brown University, 2015) p.1. 307 Ibid., p.10. 108
Civilians killed in Afghanistan under Bush Administration 2500 2375 2118 2000 1582 1500
929 1000 Series1 Civilians Civilians Killed 400 450 413 500 230
0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Years
Source: Neta C. Crawford, War-related Death, Injury, and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2015.
US and Allied Forces Military Fatalities in Afghanistan 2001-2008
Between 2001 - 2008, US military casualties were recorded 630 and Allied forces were 419. The year-wise detail of US and Allied forces military casualties during Bush‟s years is provided in the following table.
Table 3.1: US and Allied Forces Military Fatalities in Afghanistan 2001-2008
Year US UK Other Total 2001 12 0 0 12 2002 49 3 18 70 2003 48 0 10 58 2004 52 1 7 60 2005 99 1 31 131 2006 98 39 54 191 2007 117 42 73 232 2008 155 51 89 295 109
Source: “Operation Enduring Freedom”, http://icasualties.org/oef/ (accessed October 3, 2017) Control of Afghan Corruption under Bush:
Corruption had been rampant in Afghanistan. A majority of Afghans believed that without bribes they could not get jobs. In fact, corruption in Afghanistan had become organized and entrenched, it involved a network that included people at all levels especially and who had been sitting on top position and who reaped larger rewards.308
In 2004, to control the Afghan corruption, the General Independent Administration for Anti-Corruption GIAAC was formed, but it could not function properly as an implementation of anti-corruption measures had always remained unimplemented. Systematic check and balance had been lacking in almost every field of life. Corruption was rampant in government offices, law enforcement agencies, police, justice system, municipalities, and the customs department while the responsible institutions lacked the will and the capacity to effectively implement anti- corruption policies.309 In 2008, Afghanistan took several legislative measures that included the ratification of the U.N. Convention against Corruption. President Karzai issued a decision establishing the High Office for Oversight and Anti-Corruption or HOO. The office was responsible for coordinating and monitoring the execution of Afghanistan‟s anti-corruption strategy, as well as the administrative procedural reform in the country. However, only legislation and ratification of treaties have been done so far. The focus was needed on the implementation of decisions and enforcement of laws.310 The US has put in millions of dollars into USAID and State Department projects which were planned to fight corruption, but there had been dismal results. Under the President Bush-era, no high-level corruption action had taken place in Afghanistan.311
Table 3.2: Afghanistan’s Rank in CPI under Bush
308 “Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan”, The World Bank (May 2009) p.1. 309 Ibid., p.2. 310 Mary Beth Goodman and Trevor Sutton, “Tackling Corruption in Afghanistan: It‟s Now or Never”, Centre for American Progress, March 17, 2015, Retrieved < https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2015/03/17/108613/tackling-corruption-in-afghanistan-its- now-or-never/ > (accessed October 8, 2017). 311 Inge Fryklund, “Curbing Corruption in Afghanistan: Afghanistan can‟t prosecute its way out of rampant corruption”, Foreign Policy in Focus, September 14, 2012. Retrieved http://fpif.org/curbing_corruption_in_afghanistan/ (accessed October 8, 2017). 110
Year Afghanistan’s Afghanistan’s Score in CPI Rank in CPI 2005 2.5 117 2007 1.8 172 2008 1.5 176 Source: Compiled by author whereas data taken from CPI index.
3.3-Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM) Of Bush:
FPDM of President Bush has been affected by his idiosyncrasies as a leader and the team he formed. His personality greatly affected his FPDM structure. His team had experience in foreign policy decision making while he had not. He made it sure that no one would seize his role.312 His self-confidence on his instinct, anger, impatience and the need to act quickly and aggressively resulted in an aggressive foreign policy stance in Afghanistan and Iraq. He showed firm confidence over his decisions, he was not in favor of indulging in thoughtful debates on available information. He refused to take multiple perceptions to interpret an issue to resolve it. He created a decision-making structure that implemented his decisions. He was not in favor of unnecessary delays; he acted decisively and intuitively. “I just think it‟s instinctive. I‟m not a textbook player. I‟m a gut player.” He felt that one part of his role as president was “to force decisions, and to make sure it‟s in everybody‟s mind where we‟re headed.”313 His overemphasis on his instinct rather than ground realities might have resisted to objectively evaluate the information available to him while forming and implementing his foreign policy.314 He expressed impatience over the implementation of his plan in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks. When the National Security Advisor explained to the president that the military is not yet ready to implement the plan the president reacted and said: "That's not acceptable."315
The personality of President Bush led him towards certainty, rather inward-looking, reflecting, introspecting, or self-criticism. Due to this personality attribute, he might have
312 Alex Hybel, US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Kennedy to Obama: Responses to International Challenges, (Springer, 2014) p.146. 313James P. Pfiffner, “The Constitutional Legacy of George W. Bush." Presidential Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2015) pp. 727-741. 314 Victoria Neely, “Presidential Personality and Foreign Policymaking.”, Retrieved from
“Bush‟s lack of cognitive complexity, the capacity to view groups, policies, and ideas in differentiated terms and disinclination to monolithic views and interpretations and his personal history as a former alcoholic turned evangelical, may also have predisposed him to think and behave in ways that enhanced the attractiveness of war as a policy option.”316
President Bush had never encouraged policy dissent or analysis, he solely focused himself on waging war, and he left out the queries related to whether he should go to war or not. His priority for war was on the basis of the information that he got from his advisory team. It could also be the possibility that his disinclination towards constructive criticism for his policy actions might have resisted his team from asking alternative questions related to the decision of going to war. “Had he been less personally invested in the conflict and more willing to measure facts which either supported or refuted his inclinations, it is possible that he would have developed different means to reach the unclearly specified ends.”317 President Bush felt proud that he allowed his top officials to access him in an easier manner, but it was not true. According to Christopher DeMuth, the President‟s senior decision- making group was “a too tightly managed decision-making process.”318 When the decisions were finalized, a very small number of people were allowed in the room to limit a range of options being offered.319 Usually, the NSC advisor had been responsible to create an open FPDM structure to ensure the systematic consideration of all alternative policy options. The Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice could not effectively do this duty. Davis Kay, who was President Bush‟s weapon inspector in Iraq for a short time, called Sec. Rice “the dog that did not bark.”320 Sec. Rice was conscious of her role and duties to provide the quality intelligence and a range of alternatives, yet she was aware that President Bush who was instinctive decision-maker viewed
316 Daniel Lieberfeld, “Theories of Conflict and the Iraq War”, International Journal of Peace Studies10, no. 2, (2005) p.15. 317 Victoria Neely, “Presidential Personality and Foreign Policymaking.”, Retrieved from
321 Ibid., pp.157-173. 322 Lee Ann Pingel, “Security Policy: International terrorism”, Nuclear weapons, and Instability in Developing Countries,” in American Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis, ed. William O. Chittick (CQ Press, 2006) p. 204. 113 acted on the notions of preventive war and democracy promotion to attain its foreign policy objectives. He endorsed the missile defense shield like his predecessor republican Presidents, but unlike President Clinton, he withdrew from the ABM Treaty due to the cold US-Russia relations. The new missile defense posture was to show to the states who wanted to acquire nuclear weapons or delivery means that they would not be allowed to deter US as the missile defense system would minimize the deterrent value of a limited arsenal. According to Andrew Bacevich, “U.S. military actions were poorly conceived, poorly enacted, poorly explained and produced clearly negative results both overseas and domestically.”323
In order to link the role of the systemic level of analysis in the case of the US invasion of Afghanistan, the study has expounded into the objective explanation of US geostrategic and economic interest in it.
Table 3.3-U.S. Trade in goods with Afghanistan under Bush Administration
Year Exports in Millions Imports in Millions Balance of US Dollars of US Dollars
2001 6.0 0.8 5.2 2002 80.0 3.1 76.9 2003 60.8 56.1 4.7 2004 150.4 24.9 125.5 2005 262.2 67.3 194.8 2006 417.4 45.3 372.1 2007 495.3 74.4 420.9 2008 481.6 84.7 397.0
Source: compiled by the author while data has been taken from
323Andrew J. Bacevich, Twilight of the American Century (University of Notre Dame Press, 2018) pp.302-303. 114
U.S. and Afghanistan have been cooperating with each other to get rid of terrorism. For economic prosperity, they both signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) forum to discuss bilateral trade issues in 2004. Exports were noted to be $6.0 million in 2001 to $481.6 million in 2008 at the closing year of the second term of President Bush. It had reflected the fact that both countries attempted working towards economic development. Economic relations have usually been based on the premise that each state would maximize its gains through “bilateral trade, capital assistance, and repayment rates and schedule.”324 These economic facts and figures that systemic factors have supported the US invasion of Afghanistan positively, as the level of exports and exports have marked a constant increase in Afghanistan after the invasion.
States foreign policy choices had also been affected by the existing balance of power at the international system‟s level. In 2001, after the horrific attacks of 9/11, the world, in general, stood on the side of the US in its fight against terrorism. Yet a successful mission in Afghanistan would have resulted in a pro-US balance of power, which would have further pacify US trade and energy interest within the entire region. Due to these reasons Bush administration objectively found it the best in its interest to invade Afghanistan. However, in order to assess foreign policy outcomes, the influence of the intervening effects of domestic factors remained equally important. Following part explains how the Bush administration tackled other international and regional issues like the Iraq war, the rise of China, acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran, etc., to keep the balance of power in favor of the US.
As far as the energy interests of the US towards Afghanistan have been concerned, this region has been full of natural resources particularly oil and gas reserves and mineral resources. Its location between central and South Asia further added to the importance of this area. The major energy-rich countries namely Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan some are sharing the border with Afghanistan to its west and north. Tapping the untapped resources and securing influence over this region would bring in benefits for US as it would reduce US dependence over Middle Eastern energy resources. That‟s why US got interested in this area under Bush administration. Other foreign policy challenges faced by Bush administration included:
324 M. Siddieq Noorzoy, "Long-Term Economic Relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union: An Interpretive Study." International Journal of Middle East Studies 17, no. 2 (1985) pp. 151-174. 115
Iraq:
With the start of the global WoT in Afghanistan October 2001, the US Congress and the Senate passed resolution 1441 (which was approved by UNSC on Nov 8, 2002) which approved military action in Iraq if it failed to comply with the UN mandate.325 This law empowered the President to launch a war without obtaining UNSC approval. Thus, by October 2002, the President Bush team had successfully developed the unanimity of opinion over foreign policy matters, and they decided to open a new war theatre in Iraq along with its ongoing operation in Afghanistan. During his speech in Oct 2002, President Bush said, “We‟ve learned that Iraq has trained Al-Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and gases.” The US was having two goals in Iraq one was to eliminate the (alleged) WMDs and the other to overthrow Iraqi Administration.326
In March 2003, the US invaded Iraq under Operation Iraqi Freedom. On April 9, the US- occupied Baghdad and Saddam Hussain was captured on December 13, 2003, while hiding in a cellar in the outskirts of Tikrit.327 This war was justified as being against a ruthless dictator, who had not relinquished WMDs and had also enjoyed links with 9/11 culprits.328 It took eight years to withdraw all the troops of the US from Iraq and marked the costliest war of the US. Previously, the US had given support to Saddam Hussain, strongly backed Iraqi administration during the Iran-Iraq war. During the war, “western governments authorized major arms sales to the police-dictatorship of Saddam Hussain.”329 Later on, it was proved that there were “no weapons of mass destruction, no “mushroom cloud” on the horizon and no al Qaeda tie to Saddam Hussein.”330 Practically, the US invaded Iraq due to its vast oil resources and to get a
325 Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide (US: ABC- CLIO: 2011) p.147. 326 Tor G. Jakobsen, “Why Did the United States Invade Iraq in 2003?” Popular Social Science Blog, Oct 25, 2012. Retrieved
The US on the basis of its initial victory in Afghanistan miscalculated the level of support from their allies. However, its international support and repute recorded a significant decline when it invaded Iraq to the non-availability of solid evidence of Iraq‟s possession of WMDs and links between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussain.
North Korea:
The Bush administration faced another challenge in North Korea who was working on the development of its nuclear program despite being a member of NPT. It first joined NPT in 1985. By 1992, it accepted a safeguard agreement while at the same time was suspected of having extracted enough plutonium from its research reactor at Yongbyon to produce one or two nuclear weapons. IAEA could not verify North Korea‟s status, the US directly intervened in North Korea which resulted in the signing of the US-North Korea Agreed Framework on Oct.21, 1994, which stopped North Korea‟s plutonium-based nuclear power program. It ended an 18 months crisis during which DPRK committed not to develop nuclear weapons.332
However, DPRK violated the agreement and initiated a Uranium Enrichment Program which was discovered by the US in October 2002 and proclaimed by North Korea in 2003. On January 10, 2003, DPRK announced its withdrawal from NPT333 and it severed its cooperation with IAEA, the first nation ever to do so.334 In order to exert pressure and prevent North Korea from its nuclear ambition the US employed a multilateral approach of talks and started six-party talks in August 2003. Yet, all the efforts, talks, negotiations ended in dismay. Then, in the initial months of 2005, before the NPT Review Conference, North Korea for the very first time stated clearly that it possessed nuclear weapons.335 It conducted its first underground nuclear test on
331 Daniel Raphael, “The Failure of Iraq War”, HuffPost, July 22, 2014. 332 Kelsey Davenport, “The US- North Korean Agreed Framework at a Glance”, Arms Control Association, from http://www.armscontrol.org/fact (accessed Aug 19, 2017). 333 “North Korea and the NPT”, International Peace Institute, https://www.ipinst.org/wp- content/uploads/2010/04/pdfs_koreachapt2.pdf 334 Jonathan D. Pollack, “The United States and Asia in 2003: All Quiet on the Eastern Front?” Asian Survey 44, no. 1 (2004) p.3. 335 Wade L. Huntley and October Gershman, “North Korea & the NPT”, Foreign Policy in Focus, October 2 (2004). Retrieved from < http://fpif.org/north_korea_the_npt/> on Dec 22, 2016. 117
Oct 6, 2006. All this marked a blow to the US non-proliferation policy regarding North Korea‟s nuclear program.
US and Iran’s Nuclear Program:
American foreign policy towards Iran has observed as highly confrontational. President Bush appreciated Iran‟s role and support in removing the Taliban from power in 2001, and then he labeled Iran as a part of the axis of evil in early 2002.336 Neocons in and outside the government favored a regime change on charges of nuclear threats emanating from Iran.
In 2001, Iran took it as an opportunity to cooperate with the US against the Taliban as they were on the verge of war with the Taliban in 1998. They held quite deliberations under the auspices of the UN in Geneva to attack the Taliban. The Geneva Contact Group was initially comprised of Italians, Germans, Iranians, and Americans, but then reduced only to Iranian and American counterparts, who met various times in Europe to discuss the strategies of the war and to decide about the future of Afghanistan.337 President Bush‟s 2002 address raised alarms in Iran and reminded them of their historical record. Then, Iran decided to withdraw from Geneva‟s discussions. At the time of operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003, Iran supported the US militarily reluctantly. Yet, the two governments could not succeed in figuring out their previously running differences as well as the newer and the most critical one regarding nuclear technology.338
US-China Relationship:
China remained committed to the US in the WoT, which culminated in a smoother partnership in the post 9/11 world. With time, this partnership had grown significantly complex and became multifaceted, and intertwined. Under President Bush, both countries made high profile visits towards each other and also exchanged working-level officials. They worked
336 Ali Fathollah-Nejad, “From Bush to Obama: US Policy towards Iran”, in War, US NATO, and War Crimes. Global Research, Retrieved from <, http://www.globalresearch.ca/from-bush-to-obama-us-policy-towards- iran/26669> on Jan 1, 2017. 337 Javad Asgharirad, “US public diplomacy towards Iran during the George W. Bush Era”, PhD diss., Freie Universität Berlin, 2012. p.28. 338 Javad Asgharirad, “US public diplomacy towards Iran during the George W. Bush Era” PhD diss., Freie Universität Berlin, 2012) p.28. 118 towards the resumption of their military relations, and initiatives were taken for dealing with terrorism. China worked closely on 6 party talks to detain and eradicate North Korea‟s activities towards attaining nuclear weapons.
Despite these varying avenues of cooperation, their relationship continued to suffer from challenges. These challenges included “the status and well-being of Taiwan, ongoing disputes over China‟s failure to protect US intellectual property rights, China‟s economic and trade policies, and growing concerns about the quality and safety of exported PRC products. The PRC‟s more assertive foreign policy and continued military development also had significant long-term implications for US global power and influence and had been of concern to US policymakers.”339
3.5-Role of Domestic Variables during Bush Administration
This section presents the influence of domestic factors that under the NCR which affects the foreign policy outcomes of the state in the light of systemic constraints. Under the domestic factors, three points remain important. First, it has been the role of domestic interest groups, resulting in the popularity of the ruling President at the time of election and alternate leader‟s own perception about the developing situation. Suggested by Moravcsik and Putnam, at the domestic level it remains important to see what domestic interest groups want the states to do.340 It is either the foreign policy or the security policy of the US, or the role of the domestic political environment, economic resources, and President‟s current popularity and standing in the polls. “In the case of wars, it is even more sensitive. War requires resources such as money, troops, and equipment and in a democracy, resources require continued public support.”341 The head of the state has to manage domestic factors and foreign policy to give maximum output. He takes foreign policy decisions to make domestic gains and he tries to ascertain that his foreign policy decisions do not interfere with his domestic agenda.342
339 Kerry Dumbaugh,"China-US relations: Current issues and implications for US policy." Congressional Research Service (March 2008) (2009) p.1. 340 Michiel Foulon, Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and Bridging Identities. International Studies Review. Vol 17, no.4 (2015) p. 635. 341 Zaara Zain Hussain, “The effect of domestic politics on foreign policy decision making”, E-International Relations Students,< https://www.e-ir.info/2011/02/07/the-effect-of-domestic-politics-on-foreign-policy-decision- making/> (accessed Feb,7,2011) pp.1-2. 342 Ibid. 119
The Role of Public Opinion
According to the Neo-Classical Realism, Public opinion is an important factor in designing foreign policy. There was a change in the foreign policy of the US after the unfortunate incident of 9/11. The Bush administration had to take the quick decision to respond to the incident. Retrospective analyses of the public opinion over US foreign policy has been evident that public opinion remained against the military operations during the Vietnam War and the Afghan war in 1979, however people strongly supported Bush‟s war in Afghanistan after 9/11. On 6-7 December, a survey report in Newsweek showed that 88 percent of people were supporting the military action of the Bush administration.343 The survey results suggest that public opinion was shifted in support of the military operations in Afghanistan to fight against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
The domestic factor plays a significant role in finalizing foreign and security policies, because that cost of mistakes in security policies could cause high-level threats and therefore, the state leaders do not take chances on real-time security issues.344 The Bush administration formed the "war cabinet" and they analyzed different policy options. The first option was a strike with a cruise missile, but there were chances to miss the target. The second option was the cruise missile along with airstrikes. The third option was the combination of the first two along with "Boots on Ground". President Bush decided to send troops on the ground, as it showed the American commitment against the threat.345 So, public opinion in the US supported the military operation in Afghanistan after the attacks of 9/11. In the light of circumstances, international requirements and domestic needs, President Bush resorted to the use of the military option.
Sensitivity of the US Government
According to the NCR realism; the second important domestic factor in determining the foreign policy is the sensitivity of the government. The term of President Bush started in January 2001. Prior to the incident of 9/11, it was clear that the staff of the White House would dominate
343 Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn, eds, global Response To Terrorism; 9/11 Afghanistan and Beyond, (London, Routledge, 2003) p.55. 344 Norrion M, Rimpson, "Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups", in Neoclassical Realism, the State and the Foreign policy, ed, Steven E. Lobell et al., (Cambridge, Cambridge university press, 2009) pp.181-182. 345 James, P. Pfiffner, "President George W Bush and His War Cabniet", http://users.clas.ufl.edu/rconley/conferencepapers/pfiffner.pdf (Accessed on March 11, 2019). 120 the decisions at domestic as well as the foreign policy front. The Bush administration faced challenges when the Democrats took over the senate and made difficulties for the Republicans in decision making. The tragedy of 9/11 has transformed the world as well as the Bush administration. The first political effect of 9/11 was an increase in public approval of President Bush. According to the 7-10 September, Gallop poll, the public approval of the President was 51percent, but it raised to 86 percent during the poll of 14-15 September.346 The broad political support for the President provided the political backing to the administration to wage a global war on terrorism in Afghanistan. However, the political support has been declining after the relative defeat in Afghanistan, and according to the Gallup poll, at the start of the second term public approval of President Bush was declined to 37%.347
Moghaddam noted that the war against terrorism has many various effects. It has globalized violence and created a divide between "us" and "them". It has political effects as well. The policy of President Bush was not politically popular at the end of his presidency. It resulted into the protest vote against him and resulted in the winning of President Obama.348
Decision Maker's Perceptions
The role of the perceptions of decision-makers also stands vital in determining the foreign policy of any state. President Bush and his cabinet along with other stakeholders played an important role in making a policy to deal with the post 9/11 threat. President Bush made a speech on 20th September 2001, in congress and announced to wage a war against terrorism. During his speech, he addressed the international community and said; “Every nation in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us or with terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the US as a hostile administration.”349 President Bush perceived the Taliban and Al-Qaeda as a threat to the US and its interests in the world and made a clear divide between the allies and the hostile states.
346 Ibid. 347 Presidential Approval Ratings -- George W. Bush, Gallup Historical Trends https://news.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx (Accessed on March 11, 2019). 348 Arshin Adib Moghaddam, “After 9/11; The Ripples of Global Violence”, http://www.opendemocracy.net/en/after-9/11-ripples-of-global-violence/ (Accessed March 9, 2019). 349 President Bush Address to the Nation, The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html (Accessed on March 11, 2019). 121
Along with the political stakeholders, other stakeholders perceived the enemy as a direct threat to US security and as an indirect threat to the US interests at the global level. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), George Tenet, was also the member of the President's "war cabinet". Immediately after the September 11 attacks, Tenet prepared the memorandum and it gave the CIA the new authority to deal with the terrorists especially with Taliban and Al- Qaeda.350 Therefore, the consensus of all decision-makers played an important role in determining and influencing the foreign policy of the US in the post 9/11 scenario during the Bush presidency.
3.6-Weaknesses of Bush Strategy
The biggest weakness of President Bush‟s Afghan strategy was that it was developed to serve only the US interest rather than to consider the Afghan needs in accordance with realities on the ground.351 Despite the initial accomplishments, the shortcomings of the strategy became visible. Above all, the highest-valued target of Al-Qaeda, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks could not be found in the initial months of OEF and victory was claimed too soon. The US used Afghan warlords to make these accomplishments, however, this became somewhat challenging for itself. As the US had to pay to these warlords for the next two years to maintain peace in Afghanistan and this money was not meant for democracy or for the establishment or to build the nation. The money given to the war lords neither controlled corruption nor established good governance and failed to address the deep-rooted problems of Afghanistan. Senator Joe Biden warned and showed his concern over this US policy by these words: “America has replaced Taliban with warlords who have not brought a cessation in hostilities. We are making them the centerpiece of our strategy. Why does America resist the expansion of ISAF when everyone calls for its expansion.”352 The US attained its short-term objectives like the overthrow of the Taliban administration of Afghanistan while its long-term goals like the elimination of AQ and bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan strategically failed to work. This strategy operated on the foes only and fell short of giving policy measures in the long run that later on paved the way for the
350 Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (Simon and Schuster, New York, 2003) pp.77-78. 351 Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan: Turbulent and on the Brink”, Zone of Crisis: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014) p.30. 352 Barnett Rubin, “Saving Afghanistan”, Foreign Affairs (2006) Retrieved
US and International forces pledged a gloomy picture of a secured Afghanistan, but the reality presented a precarious situation of insurgency and civil war in the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan. It was partly due to the shifting of the US focus from Afghanistan to Iraq. Though the Taliban were removed from power, an interim government led by Hamid Karzai was also established but still, the country continued to be a breeding ground for terrorist activities. It was suspected and often blamed that many of the influential Taliban leaders fled to Pakistan through the porous border where they found safe havens.
President Bush and his team, in fact, lacked a coherent strategy and was facing an internal split and a disagreement over national security matters. In 2007, Gates and Mullen shuffled through four generals and three strategies in Afghanistan, this showed the US
353 Valentina Teddeo, “US response to terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghan Campaign”, Journal of Strategic Security 3, no. 2 (2010) pp. 27-34. 354 Seyom Brown & Robert H. Scales (eds.), “Reassessing Priorities”, US Policy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Lessons and Legacies, (US: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013) p.51. 355 Nasser Shaghafi Ameri, Prospects for peace and stability in Afghanistan (SIPRI, 2012) p.2. 356 Dan Caldwell, “Military Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq”, in Brown, Seyom, and Robert H. Scales, (eds.) US Policy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Lessons and Legacies. Vol. 1 (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012) pp.57-88. 123 unwillingness to admit the enormity of the task.357 The forces confronted the problems just as the coalition‟s force size was inadequate for the 31 million population of Afghanistan which spoke four different languages. The generals applied conventional war thinking which previously worked well during Iraq‟s invasion of Kuwait 1991 and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, and in 2001ousting of Taliban from power in Afghanistan, but fell short of success in the ensuing insurgent warfare. Between 2001-2010 the opponent showed a greater knowledge of IEDs than did the US military did, this technological discrepancy changed the balance of the war.
There were serious technical gaps as the US military was unable to identify the guerillas in the insurgency. In Afghanistan, the US forces failed to develop any user-friendly device to quickly fingerprint and record or trace the location of the male population and to take a consensus. This failure had marked the most disgraceful technical defect of the war.358 Good interpreters who could interpret the recorded radio conversations were also missing in this war.359 The Counterinsurgency Doctrine was essential to eliminate attacks from the enemy but had not proven accurate as it consumed resources and diverted the senior leaders from their core duties of war fighting and ANDSF training. Another problem faced by generals was the rise of BUA (Battlefield Update Assessment) culture that convened daily. In operation centers across Afghanistan, mid-level officers sat in front of laptop screens to present the report on personnel, operations, logistics, electric power, fuel, news, weather and latest engagements in the north to a bomb explosion in the south to their higher authorities. This data however measured only activities rather than an assessment of who was winning and what needed to be done.360
3.7-Conclusion:
After 8 years of the US invasion of Afghanistan under President Bush, the country had some positives. Like the invasion of US and coalition forces along with the aid from external countries which terminated the civil war which lasted for many years. Millions of refugees had returned to their homeland after their exile from Pakistan and Iran. The smooth-running process of constitution-making and ratification and the election of a national leader for the first time in
357 Bing West, The wrong war: Grit, strategy, and the way out of Afghanistan (Random House Incorporated, 2012) p.174. 358 Ibid., p.176. 359 Ibid. 360 Ibid., p.178 124
Afghan history had been a great achievement. The other side of the picture found that the allocated resources for the military and non-military purposes were not sufficient enough to provide security to the lives of the people either or to improve their living standard. The promises and pledges of large aid raised the expectations of Afghans to new heights but with the passing of years, no or little accomplishments ended their hopes in dismay. Funds were specified by the donors themselves and not by Afghans, who questioned the importance of building schools and hospitals, but lacked the staff to run them. The Afghans resulted in the hiring of foreign labor while the local people stayed unemployed. In this situation, the Taliban again emerged as a ray of hope for their followers particularly Pashtuns. The Taliban still lacked the power to overthrow the government, yet they continued to challenge its writ through the issuance of threats of violence which raised questions about the government‟s performance and legitimacy. The Afghan people needed to display patience and tolerance in dealing with the foreigners who did not understand Afghan culture.
The US incursion and the removal of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda created unusual conditions. Afghans did not want foreigners on their land and remained engaged in pulling out foreign forces. Yet this time they still wanted to ensure an American presence as a security guarantee to their life and well-being and for the progress of their country. They needed stability after facing a decade long civil war of factions within Afghanistan as well as from the neighboring countries who exploited Afghan weaknesses for their interests. However, it did not at all mean that they would continue to accept foreign intervention. In order to succeed foreign military assistance must have been self-liquidating and must have been directed towards improving the well-being of state and society.
The US under President Bush could not deliver what was expected and thus, pledged to restore Afghanistan in terms of rebuilding, governance, security, and stability to this war-ravaged country. Implementing a light footprint strategy and leaving the burden of reconstruction upon Afghans had not been fair enough as the requisites of the nation-building lacked in Afghanistan. This light footprint strategy also held responsible for the failure countrywide to provide basic security, allowing for a political vacuum that was quickly filled by predatory warlords. After the failure of the neocon‟s agenda in attaining their objectives, the President improved his foreign policy by replacing some of his neoconservative players from his team like Wolfowitz, Feith, 125
Bolton, and Rumsfeld with the pragmatists Zoellick, Burns, Gates. He also shifted his foreign policy conducting style and reinvigorated the importance of the diplomacy, alliance building, deterrence and containment in US foreign policy.
After removing the Taliban from power, the American feeling of victory had been robust. At that time the international community wanted to rebuild Afghanistan, but the Bush administration resisted the deployment of large numbers of peacekeeping forces, on the basis that great powers should not participate in nation-building. The top C.I.A. specialists and elite Special Forces units apparently succeeded in Afghanistan had long since moved on to the next mission, in Iraq. At serious juncture, President Bush distracted towards Iraq and moved intelligence and reconstruction resources including elite C.I.A. teams and Special Forces units to Iraq that resulted in a considerable decline in the resources required for Afghanistan. As sophisticated predator spy planes rolled off assembly lines in the US, they were shipped to Iraq, denying search for Taliban and terrorist leaders, as per senior military and intelligence officials.
As far as the reconstruction of Afghanistan was concerned, bigger goals were announced, and bigger projects were identified. Though President Bush pledged a Marshal Plan for Afghanistan, yet the matter of fact was that Afghanistan got less assistance per capita than reconstruction funds allocated for Bosnia and Kosovo or Haiti. In fact, Bush failed to include a request for reconstruction funding in his 2002 budget to Congress. The US had disbursed an average of $3.4 billion a year on Afghanistan‟s reconstruction, which stood less than half of what it disbursed in Iraq. The, US and coalition forces failed to attain their objectives like to hunt OBL and to bring back a democratic Afghanistan towards stability. The efforts towards democratization and stability were hindered by the scarcity of military forces and financial means required for bringing peace to Afghanistan.
The expansionist tendencies were inherent in President Bush‟s foreign policy, it was considered as humanitarian in theory, but imperialist in reality, as it violated the sovereignty of Afghanistan, and Iraq who possessed a unique independent identity. He eliminated the line between national defense and national security and insisted on taking unilateral actions where required as this action was practiced previously in US history. What makes it different from other administrations, included the boundaries of preemptive action to embrace preventive war, rejection of deterrence, the demotion of alliances, and putting of the US on war footing 126 permanently and firm beliefs on the efficacy, necessity, and morality of an absolute military preponderance. In fact, the Bush administration wanted and asserted the US right of global domination. President Bush‟s overall strategy could be summed up as aggressive, hegemonic, and preemptive in nature that advocated for the restoration of security. The US strategy in Afghanistan is not made only to deal with the terrorism issue, but to establish a permanent base in this geostrategically important region to contain China, to control Russia and to face up to the rise of Iran for its specified political, economic and strategic interests.
In fact, President Bush and his team did not design a single focused strategy for Afghanistan which is why utilized multifaceted approaches to attain his objectives. He focused primarily on his political mission in Iraq, and in turn, ignored the war of Afghanistan that was fought for security and economic reasons. Afghanistan had remained at the back seat of the US under the Bush administration in terms of lead time, resources and attention, due to the his mission in Iraq.
The accomplishments of the Bush presidency in his two consecutive terms included the signing of the US-India civil nuclear deal that brought the two countries together and considerably enhanced their nuclear cooperation. He established the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), an AIDS program that committed $15 billion to combat AIDS over five years, especially in Africa. Though the Bush administration successfully implemented his policy in the shorter run yet he had not been successful in attaining its policy objectives in the long run of time. The longer wars he launched in Afghanistan and Iraq damaged the US repute and raised questions about the superior actions and legitimacy. Overall, the US had suffered high damage to its reputation under President Bush. According to a Transatlantic Trends survey, while 64% of Europeans viewed US global leadership as desirable in 2002, only 36 % of Europeans viewed US leadership as desirable in 2008 and 59% viewed it as undesirable. The overall record of President Bush to deal with economic and political challenges remained dismal. US could not improve its global standing in President Bush‟s administration. In fact, it suffered a decline in its relative and material capabilities. When Bush left office in 2009, his approval rating had been marked at 34 percent. These wars had proven so expensive not only in terms of money but also in terms of the loss of human lives. 127
Between 2002-2009, six commanders took the lead of the Afghan mission but none of them pursued a single coherent strategy. In 2003, the focus was on hunting the enemy. In 2004- 05 the focus was shifted to counterinsurgency to get the support of Afghans for the US mission in their homeland. In 2005, the US and NATO coalition pressed Karzai to bring reforms rather than assigning provincial posts based on tribal and crony patronage. In 2006, the battle in the south got intense with the solidification of the Taliban. By 2007, the tide of battle turned in Iraq, however, the US response in Afghanistan was to find and abolish the enemy force. In 2008, the Taliban became stronger. Adm. Michael Mullen stated the necessity of a new and comprehensive policy for the region, which highlighted the failure of seven years of the military as well as political leadership. With the completion of President Bush‟s second term in 2008, the Taliban resurgence had spread widely.
The main reason for this prolonged war was the fact that the US did not focus on the underlying reasons of local insurgencies in Afghanistan and the US kept on making tactical gains in the battlefield and propagated those victories. The drivers of local insurgencies were more economic and security-centric rather than ideological. People needed and wanted a peaceful, stable, corruption-free country where they feel safe, and where the government is capable enough to exercise its authority and provide them the basic necessities of life. The lack of state machinery provided a conducive ground for the resurgence of Taliban, who regained their strength and increased their attacks on US military forces. It was true that the US toppled the Taliban with ease, but it lacked a military follow-up needed to ensure that they would not regain the capacity to mobilize their followers who had returned home after their defeat. It was not thought that they could reorganize and regain the potential to challenge the foreign forces and Afghan government. The objectives that appeared to be comparatively easier to accomplish in 2002 became a paramount challenge in 2006. Some efforts of the Bush administration resulted in the promulgation of a new constitution for Afghanistan in 2003 and laws on political parties and elections in 2004. Presidential elections were held in Afghanistan in 2004, Parliamentary elections were held in October 2005. Nevertheless, the weaker democratic institutions have neither been successful or empowering nor gave the Afghans a sense of legitimacy. The task to rebuild Afghanistan and its administrative infrastructure was handed over to NATO-led ISAF with its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in a non-combatant role as well as other 128 organizations, but this policy also did not work well. The Taliban skillfully exploited this time to their advantage and re-gained their support base in Afghanistan.
In fact, President Bush attempted to isolate his adversary by sometimes relying solely on unilateral and sometimes quasi unilateral attacks, but all this could not accomplish what was expected and resulted merely in changes of power administrations not only in Afghanistan but also in Iraq. Overall, the image of the US suffered a serious setback. President Bush continued to follow his policy agenda, but when the terrorist attacks of 9/11 happened he altered and shifted its focus. Broadly, his policy initially received mixed results as the Taliban were removed from power yet Afghanistan remained unstable. However, overall it was not a success.
CHAPTER 4
US POLICIES TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN (2009-2014): AN ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENT OBAMA’S POLICIES UNDER OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
This chapter aims to find out how President Obama implemented his foreign Policy strategy towards Afghanistan within the existing international opportunities and constraints and 129 how it implicated the situation of Afghanistan differently from the previous administration‟s policies. The first Section spells out an overview of President Obama‟s Foreign Policy Doctrine. The second section presents President Obama‟s policy towards Afghanistan and the third section observed the FPDM approach of Obama. The fourth section looks into the other foreign policy challenges confronted by President Obama and how he dealt with them. The fifth section presents the weaknesses of Obama‟s approach while the last section concludes the whole chapter. This chapter argues that the Obama administration made some policy changes to deal with Afghanistan. President Obama had been able to make some accomplishments like the killing of OBL mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, thus handing over of responsibility to Afghans. Afghans had to take the lead in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan, yet he lacked in taking the appropriate actions that would have had helped Afghanistan to rebuild and came out of conflict state. Despite, all his pledges and determination the war continued, the Taliban continued to control many parts of the country, regardless of completing of OEF and withdrawal of troops. 4.1-An Overview of President Obama’s Foreign Policy Doctrine
President Obama, a Democrat has been under influence of liberal and neoliberal or Wilsonian and practically Jeffersonian traditions of Foreign policy. The Democratic Party most often follows the legacy of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Harry Truman. While the Republican usually follows the legacy of Abraham Lincoln, Teddy Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan. Practically, President Bush “sought to bridge the realist and liberal internationalist foreign policy strands within the Democratic Party.”361 He was the first African-American president, and also the first President who born outside the continental US, in Hawaii in 1961.362 He was elected as the 44th President on November 4, 2008, and took office in January 2009. He promised to reboot the war on terror by withdrawing troops from Iraq and improving the US mission in Afghanistan. During the initial two years, his major focus was on domestic politics and the economy due to the Great Recession and his interest to pass domestic legislation such as comprehensive health
361 Robert S. Singh, “Continuity and Change in Obama‟s foreign Policy,” The Obama Presidency: Appraisals and Prospects, ed. Bert A. Rockman et al. (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2012) p. 273. 362 “History Presents the Obama Years - A Nine-Part Oral History” Jan 12, 2017.Retrieved from
363 Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. p.174. 364 Hybel, US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Kennedy to Obama: Responses to International Challenges, p.157. 365 Robert Ondrejcsak, "American foreign and security policy under Barack Obama: Change and Continuity." Panorama of global security environment (2009) pp. 147-162. 366 David Fitzgerald & David Ryan, “Afghanistan, Escalation and the „Good War”, Obama, US Foreign Policy and the Dilemmas of Intervention (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) pp.52-72. 131 concern for the public good.367 Throughout his election campaign in 2008, Afghanistan was portrayed as a good war, reflected his toughness on Foreign Policy.368 President Obama‟s core foreign policy goals remained restoration of US moral supremacy and legitimacy, winding down the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and he prioritized his broader focus from Asia and the global economy to a nuclear-proliferation administration.369 For these, he decided to investigate the CIA‟s interrogation methods, as well as the prohibition of torture during interrogations, to gain the support of the domestic and international public. These decisions were intended to improve US prestige and soft power image. His Foreign affairs management style was highly deliberative and formalistic.
4.2-US Policy towards Afghanistan (2009-2014): A Critical /Analysis
For the purpose of analysis, this section has been divided into four sub-sections.
2007-2009 A review of US policy towards Afghanistan:
In order to analyze the US policy towards Afghanistan under President Obama needed to know what he inherited from President Bush. In late 2008 it was quite clear that the war in Afghanistan was not moving in the right direction and the then President Bush being conscious of the fact mentioned in his memoir Afghanistan was “unfinished business” and said the project of bringing stability and democracy there “turned out to be more daunting than I anticipated.”370 Before leaving office, President Bush took some actions he doubled the troops number stationed in Afghanistan from 20,000 to 40,000 and enormously increased aid to Afghan police and the Afghan army to get them strong and strengthened. He also ordered a strategy review under the supervision of Deputy National Security Advisor, Doug Lute, which concluded that a „more robust counterinsurgency effort, including more troops and civilian resources, as needed. On November 26, 2008, he told the then President Bush at the NSC forum that there were ten
367 “Campaign Themes, Strategies, and Developments: Barack Obama's campaign themes and strategies” ICPSR, Retrieved from https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/instructors/setups2008/campaign-strategies.jsp on April 19, 2017. 368 David Fitzgerald & David Ryan, “Afghanistan, Escalation and the „Good War”, Obama, US Foreign Policy and the Dilemmas of Intervention (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) pp.52-72. 369 Sara M. Birkenthal, “Grand Strategy in US Foreign Policy: The Carter, Bush and Obama Doctrines” (2013). CMC Senior Theses. Paper 598. 370 Paul D. Miller, “The Long War: Obama‟s Failed Legacy in Afghanistan”, The American Interest 11, no. 5, Feb, 15, 2016. Accessed < http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/02/15/obamas-failed-legacy-in- afghanistan/>(accessed November 4, 2017). 132 distinct but overlapping wars in progress in Afghanistan. He suggested to cut down corruption, improve governance, reduce opium trade and eliminate Pakistan‟s safe havens. This report also provided the base for a transition document for the new successive administration of President Obama. Though at the time, of taking charge President Obama was unfamiliar with the deep complexities of the Afghan war, yet he knew that he would need to take hard decisions. President Obama before his inauguration sent his Vice President Joseph Biden along with Lindsey Graham a South Carolina Republican Senator on a visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan to examine the challenges in Afghanistan. They landed in Pakistan on January 9, 2009, and met with President Asif Ali Zardari, and emphasized the importance of Pakistan to resolve the Afghan issue. President Zardari ensured them his support and made it clear that he has to gain sufficient ground at home due to the rowing anti-Americanism in Pakistan. President Zardari requested economic support to win the people‟s support to work with the US, Senator Graham warned President Zardari that “he had to make sure who his enemies and his allies were, and to act accordingly.”371 Policy Review and First AfPak: On taking the charge of the office on January, 20th 2009, within a short period of just three weeks President Obama called for his own strategy review under the supervision of Bruce Riedel who appointed a team that included Gen (Ret.) James. L. Jones his National Security Advisor (NSA), who took the assistance from Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute (who led the President Bush‟s team on Iraq) and his team to provide continuity on the strategy. Riedel worked with the Under Secretary for Defense, Michelle Flournoy and newly appointed Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, they all worked to define US goals, space and the means through which to attain those goals. The White House demanded a complete report by mid-March 2009, in advance of a NATO summit which was due in early April 2009, would decide about NATO‟s commitment to Afghanistan. According to the remarks released by White House, President Obama announced a comprehensive strategy for AfPak372 on March 27, 2009. President Obama contended the war “is a cause that could not be more just. . . . The world cannot afford the price that will come due if Afghanistan slides back into chaos or al-Qaeda operates
371 Hybel, US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Kennedy to Obama: Responses to International Challenges, p.159. 372 “Obama‟s plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan”, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/text-obamas-plan-for-afghanistan- and-pakistan (accessed on April 25, 2017). 133 unchecked.” He ordered 21,000 more troops (17,000 were announced on February 17, while 4000 by the end of March) in the south and east of Afghanistan to fight with the insurgents,373 he increased the number of American diplomats and aid workers, and amplified civilian assistance by an impressive $2 billion from 2009 to 2010.
On May 11, 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates announced that General McChrystal would take charge as the commander of US forces in Afghanistan by replacing General McKiernan (who lacked an instinctive understanding of COIN approach). General Stanley McChrystal was known for counterinsurgency approach. This change came due to the losing of the tide in the Afghan war. A report from CNAS stated in the COIN campaign if you are not winning, then you are losing. By this standard the US and coalition forces were losing in Afghanistan.374 In August 2009, on taking the charge of International Security Assistance Force, (ISAF), McChrystal, broadly identified rampant corruption, narcotics, external meddling into Afghanistan as hazards associated with Afghanistan‟s future.375 He came up with a military strategy on the basis of objectives stated in his white paper. His judgments of the war were not encouraging. He was unsatisfied with the overall situation of Afghanistan and was concerned about the lack of trust in the Afghans for their leaders and international efforts that undermined US credibility and strengthened extremists. Indeed, the bulk of Afghan policy review focused on three options presented to President Obama by the military: 85,000 additional troops for a full counterinsurgency, 40,000 additional troops as a more fiscally and politically feasible option for counterinsurgency, and 20,000 additional troops would focus mainly on counterterrorism operations. General McChrystal asserted that the troop surge by 80,000 would increase the likelihood of success in this war, an increase of just 40,000 troops would involve medium risk and the deployment of just 20,000 troops and replacement of the counterinsurgency approach with a counterterrorism approach would involve high risk. These demands of more troops mentioned the inadequacy of 17,000 extra troops which were approved in March by President Obama. He pointed towards the two principal threats to ISAF mission that needed the attention of the international community: First, The group of insurgents who were determined and fought
373 “A new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan”, Whitehouse government,
General McChrystal compiled a strategic assessment along with a team comprised of civilian and military advisors that resulted in a multidisciplinary document on August 30, 2009 “COMISAF Initial Assessment” that was leaked to the Washington Post in September 2009; this document mentioned the complexities of the Afghan situation. This assessment criticized US forces and ISAF‟s approach and argued that US forces were obsessed with protecting their own forces and had operated in a manner that had widened the distance between the US forces and Afghan people which they intended to protect. ISAF was criticized for being poorly configured for COIN, inexperienced in local language and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition warfare.376 He stated that resources would not assure success, but under-resourcing could lose it. However, General McChrystal was fired from his post only a year later on June 23, 2010, because he openly criticized Obama. Gen David Petraeus former Commander of US forces in Iraq replaced him. Obama justified his replacement was needed to keep his team united in fighting a war in Afghanistan.377
Engagement with Pakistan:
The most important development on the basis of this review was the acknowledgment of Pakistan‟s role by President Obama and Holbrooke who invented and used the term AfPak region to refer to Afghanistan and Pakistan and put them under one problem.378 He described it as “not just as an effort to save eight syllables, an attempt to indicate and imprint in our DNA the fact that there is one theater of war, straddling an ill-defined border.”379 This Afpak left the nation of India free of the cold war style, which was binary in the US minds and Pakistan, which
376 McChrystal, “Commander‟s Initial Assessment”, sec.1-2, Retrieved
The main problem faced for developing an effective strategy was the lack of knowledge about Afghanistan. President Obama was cautioned about Afghanistan “as the wild frontier of our globalized world”. Even the people who were involved in Afghanistan were not aware of its complexities. Derek Harver the intelligence analyst became surprised at the lack of knowledge about Afghan insurgency and said it appeared as “the blind leading the blind”. He mentioned that the basic questions like who was the enemy? Where were they? How did they see the fight? What were their motivations? Had remained unasked. Without the answers of these questions an effective strategy could not be developed.381 Obama‟s Presidential review of US strategy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan had echoed the same findings that were reached earlier under the President Bush review. On the basis of the findings, five clear goals for Afghanistan and Pakistan were stated that were described as realistic and achievable as well as vital to US national security.382 The major goal was set “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.” President Obama‟s policy openly committed the US to promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan (that could serve its citizens with minimal international support),” and would “execute and resource an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan (against the Taliban and other anti-government elements)” along with a counterterrorism approach (against Al-Qaeda) by developing a self-reliant ANSF.383 This document also emphasized the importance of the international community‟s role for the achievement of these goals, with a significant role for the UN. The whole document focused on what and why, yet it lacked how.384 The goals were narrowed and became security driven while
380 David Fitzgerald and David Ryan, Obama, US Foreign policy and the Dilemmas of Intervention (Springer, 2014) p. 55. 381 Ibid. 382 C. Christine Fair, “Obama's New "Af-Pak" Strategy: Can" Clear, Hold, Build, Transfer" Work?” (Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2010) p.3. 383 Ibid., p.4. 384 Ibid., p.4. 136 the means were still as broad as before.385 By mid-2009 for the very first time, the number of casualties and war costs in Afghanistan exceeded those in Iraq.386
AF PAK Policy December 2009: An Overview
Af-Pak was a strategy invented by President Barack Obama in December 2009 which joined Pakistan and its western neighbor Afghanistan as one theatre of the military operation. The central idea underlying Af-Pak strategy was the merging of the entire Afghanistan-Pakistan region as a single point of a plan for counteracting terrorism and religious fundamentalism. President Obama mentioned this border region as the most dangerous place in the world.387 It resolved to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda in the Pak-Afghan region and to stop their disastrous activities to each country in the future. The year 2011 had been set as the target to develop an Afghan national army (ANA) of 134,000 and a police force (ANP) of 82,000. He announced the troop‟s surge by 30,000. These troops were not only deployed for increasing security of Afghanistan, but they were also entrusted with the task to train Afghan National Police (ANP), army and security forces. In order to build a stable Afghanistan and to win the fight against terrorism, President Obama was committed to build an army of 134,000 soldiers and a police force of 82,000 policemen.388 He showed his firm determination to lead this war towards success under his presidency.
An analysis of the strategy yielded the following five core ideas.
Firstly, President Obama wanted to increase the physical presence of the International forces from 70,000 to 100,000 that‟s why announced troop‟s surge of 30,000 to successfully conclude this war. The troop surge was envisioned to control the Taliban‟s activities and to train and build Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) which was comprised of Afghan people. It had two purposes. One, additional forces would enable them to give a tough time to the Taliban and to develop and train ANDSF that would control Afghanistan after the withdrawal of International forces from
385 David Fitzgerald and David Ryan, Obama, US Foreign policy and the Dilemmas of Intervention (Springer, 2014) p. 56. 386 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton University Press, 2010) p. 333. 387 President Barack Obama, “President Obama's Speech on Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 27, 2009”. Washington, DC: Coun (2009). 388 Kai Eide, “Afghanistan and the US: Between Partnership and Occupation”, Peace Research Institute Oslo, http://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=361&type=publicationfile (Accessed on April 26, 2017). 137
Afghanistan. These additional troops were stationed to control main population centers as a part of a new population-centered COIN approach advocated by Gen. McChrystal. Along with the military component of the strategy, additional forces would also be entrusted with the political task of converging the viewpoints of diverse and divergent parties towards a common objective of kicking out the terrorism and extremism. Under the policy carrot and stick, approach was adopted by inducing the moderate Taliban to join the ANA as foot soldiers as a reward for renouncing terrorist activities. Stick approach for those who were not willing to leave the way of violence. President Obama focused on the need to work with its partners in collaboration with the U.N., NATO and the Afghan people “to pursue a more effective civilian strategy so that the government could take advantage of improved security.” A strategy with two planks based on military operation and a civilian surge supposed to bring the desirous results was adopted. Fourthly, the uniqueness of the strategy revolved around disclosure of the withdrawal plan. It was announced to start the steady withdrawal of International forces from Afghanistan after the passing of 2011. Ultimately, the US and ISAF needed to transfer the responsibility to the Afghan forces which would be trained under International forces. Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense said “some handful or some small number might withdraw, depending upon conditions.”389 Vice President Biden said “In July of 2011 you‟re going to see a whole lot of people moving out. Bet on it.” However, a few months later he reversed his stance and said that the withdrawal could be as few as a couple of thousand troops.390 This deadline, however, did not appear to be a plausible one due to the seriousness of the crisis. Fifthly, this strategy recognized the importance of Pakistan for the resolution of Afghan quagmire and US success as inevitable. “We would act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan had been inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan.”391
389 Bing West, The wrong war: Grit, strategy, and the way out of Afghanistan (Random House Incorporated, 2012) pp.25-26. 390 Ibid. 391 Barack Obama, “The way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan." White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks as prepared for delivery at the United States Military Academy at West Point 1 (2009). 138
The Following figure illustrate the AfPak strategy and the roles of the associated states fighting in Afghanistan.
Figure 4.1: AfPak Strategy and Key Actors ROLE ROLE
Assist in the military efforts Provide financial aid for fighting against the al-Qaeda & the ‘enemy’ as well as extremism. Get its ‘house’ in assistance for development. United Pakistan order and advance Provide a greater military States democratization contribution to fight the enemy
AF-PAK ROLE ROLE
Assist in the military efforts Provide financial aid for fighting against the Taliban. Get its Afghanistan International the ‘enemy’ as well as ‘house ’ in order and promote Community assistance for development. democracy. Continue military contribution to fight the enemy (NATO)
Source: Retrieved from (http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/Brief+51finalised.pdf) on Oct 11, 2014.
US-Afghan Relations Obama vs. Karzi: An unbalanced and unpleasant Relationship
The US and Afghanistan established an unbalanced relationship under Karzai government because the US made use of its power and influence to affect Afghanistan. This unbalanced relationship further suffered a setback under President Obama‟s administration. The US was annoyed over the constant corruption of President Karzai‟s administration, and its increased insurgency, due to a large number of military casualties of both US and Afghan forces, the Afghan population was no longer interested in the extended US and coalition forces in their country.392 As far as the Afghan elections of 2009 were concerned, there was a widespread perception that elections would not be fair and the US would determine the outcomes. Which is
392 Joushua Partlow, “President Hamid Karzai, The Foreign Press, and The Afghan War”, http://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/D-76-Partlow.pdf (accessed on May 26, 2017). 139 why before the elections the US resorted to a policy of impartiality393 towards Afghanistan in 2009.
The Obama administration was interested in holding free and fair elections in Afghanistan and decided not to defend the status quo. Finally, elections took place on August 20, 2009, and resulted in the success of President Hamid Karzai. Though the second round of elections were announced to be held on November 7, 2009. But Abdullah Abdullah‟s refusal to participate in cemented Karzai be the Afghan President for the period of the next five years. Due to President Karzai‟s previous record, Obama engaged with him in a limited manner. President Obama communicated it to Afghanistan that the US would support only those who were willing to rule out corruption and to deliver to the nation. Under this strategy, the US worked with the local tribal leaders and provincial governors who were determined to work for the betterment of their people. Then, President Karzai made a visit to the US to mend US behavior towards President Karzai and Afghanistan. However, the impaired relations could not be smoothened between Presidents‟ Karzai and Obama and the distrust continued till the end of Presidents Karzai‟s term in 2014.
The happenings of 2009 raised serious doubts about the credibility of this new strategy. The situation of Afghanistan moved from bad to worse with the considerable increase in violence, the summer of 2009 saw a shocking increase of insurgent-launched attacks in comparison to the summer of 2008, including the suicide attacks on NATO headquarters in Kabul and CIA base in Khowst in August and December respectively. In the same year 355, American soldiers were killed that doubled the statistics of the year 2008. The end of 2009 recorded over “7200 IED attacks compared to 80 in 2003, with much more powerful devices which could flip a heavy armored vehicle like a toy.”394 The US public began losing its hope and became pessimistic and 43 percent of the people believed the things were moving in the wrong direction compared to 54 percent who thought the strategy was bringing up desired results. Within the short period of five months statistics changed dramatically with the 66 per cent started believing the US had been losing war compared to 32 percent who stayed optimistic.
2010-2012 US Policy and Afghan Situation:
393 Ibid. 394 Terry H. Anderson, “Epilogue Obama” Bush's Wars (Oxford University Press, 2011) p.220. 140
London Conference 2010:
The international community met in London in January 2010 to discuss the ways out to resolve the Afghan crisis. Finally, they came up with a security plan along with a reintegration fund to pull out Taliban connections with Al-Qaeda and to bring them back to normal Afghan life. They vowed to provide $550 million for the “Taliban Trust Fund”. The U.K.‟s Foreign Secretary observed that unlike Al-Qaeda, the Taliban do not have a violent global Jihadist agenda as their primary aim. Many donor countries agreed with this observation. The conference also discussed the ways to improve Afghan governance under President Karzai and the ways to pressurize Pakistan and Iran to play their constructive role in bringing long term stability to Afghanistan. The participants also fixed a timeline to shift the security responsibility to Afghan forces within a year, but President Karzai cautioned that ANA‟s training and equipping will take 5-10 years. At this conference, President Karzai got an assurance that at least 50 percent of all economic assistance would be channeled through his government within the period of two years, while the US declared it now believed it had developed a certification process to decide which Afghan ministries were capable to get the US assistance directly.395
Troops Surge and Operations:
In February 2010, the US troop number reached 86,000 with 45,100 in Regional Command South and 24,000 in Regional Command East. Additionally, there were 63,00 in Regional Command Capital, 5,985 in Regional Command North and 46,00 in Regional Command West.396 The Taliban sanctuary of Marja in southern Helmand province (an opium- producing region) became the scene of the largest operation of the Afghan war. It was regarded as a major test of Obama‟s surge strategy. Initially, it worked and then failed and lastly an indeterminate tie.397 The US launched Operation Moshtarak (together) to get clear this area from Taliban control who were 500 in number. The Marines had successfully removed the overt Taliban force while their secret crew stayed there and kept on getting support by farmers. Partnering with the ANA, the Marines reported that the Afghans were becoming more effective.
395 Vanda Felbab Brown, “The Predicament in Afghanistan”, US Policy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Lessons and Legacies (eds.) (New Delhi: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2013) p.160. 396 C. Christine Fair, Obama's New" Af-Pak" Strategy: Can" Clear, Hold, Build, Transfer" Work? Centre for International Governance Innovation, no.6 (2010) p.4. 397 Bing West, The wrong war: Grit, strategy, and the way out of Afghanistan (Random House Incorporated, 2012) p.193. 141
Unlike ANP, ANA soldiers were determined to fight battles and were much more efficient compared with Americans at locating Afghan homes and identifying potential Taliban members. After securing Marjah, the civilian surge to protect the population was started. But the Afghans were skeptic of US activities. A US Col admitted that “trust is earned, not given, we‟ve got to provide”. An ANA General declared that we want to show people that we can deliver police, service, and development.”398 The Americans started engaging Afghan people on short and long- term projects to build schools, markets, and health clinics and to control corruption. Both the US forces and ANA proceeded in Kandahar to implement their clear, hold and build strategy. Meanwhile, the use of drones also increased to kill the insurgent hideouts in Pakistan. The drug dealers also fought back, the use of IEDs and troublesome attacks continued. By March 2011, under transition, the US had been successful in clearing seven districts and provinces which were then handed over to ANDSF. These districts included Bamyan Province, Kabul province excluding Surobi district, Panjshir province, Herat City, Lashkar Gah, Mazar-e-Sharif, Mehtar Lam. This transition was decided to take place in four stages starting from security, governance, development and the rule of law.
The National Security Strategy of 2010: America as the Capacity Builder:
In the NSS of 2010, Obama used words like diplomacy and allies as Bush in his NSS 2006 document and reaffirmed the Bush view that US "reserved the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend our nation and our interests.”399 Its preface called to increase American strength, security, and ability and added that the US should appeal to the desires of people around the world. It discussed Afghanistan clearly and declared the elimination of AQ as the main goal. It broadened the spectrum of war by connecting it to Pakistan. However, it did not list building an Afghan state as a key security aim. It prioritized negotiations and other means of settlement rather than preemptive use of force.400 However, it did not put down the use of force but focused that force will be the last resort. It also emphasized the importance of international partners, the UN would be effective handling of international issues. It outlined how the military
398 Terry H. Anderson, Bush's Wars (Oxford University Press, 2011) p.223. 399 Miles E. Taylor, “Obama's National Security Strategy under the Microscope”, World Politics Review, Tues June 1, 2010, Retrieved from https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/5656/obamas-national-security-strategy- under-the-microscope (accessed September 23, 2017). 400 Haley Stauss, "United States' Strategy in Afghanistan from 2001 to Today." Pepperdine Policy Review 5, no. 1 (2012) p.3. 142 along with ISAF would hit the insurgency, secure population centers, and increase efforts to train Afghan security forces.401
Use of Drones:
The Bush administration also relied on drone strikes to hunt out terrorists, however, the Obama administration not only increased the number of drones but also replaced and upgraded this technology with a bigger, faster, and more heavily armed Reaper. The Obama administration worked with the Pakistan government to take them into confidence for using drones inside Pakistan to hunt out terrorists and their safe havens in Afghanistan. But the Pakistani population was kept ignorant of this fact. They fired drones from a secret base inside Pakistan, while the CIA controlled the attacks on the insurgents. In the first week of January 2010, drones‟ attacks were launched every alternate day. Under President Bush, nine drone strikes were carried out in Pakistan from 2004-2007, while under President Obama in 2010 alone their number was recorded to be 111.402 Overall, 11 strikes killed about 90 suspected militants in North and South Waziristan. These strikes generated fear among militants. The next recorded the arrest of three notable Taliban leaders. All this showed a great Pakistan‟s effort and cooperation to make the US successful in its war against terrorism in Afghanistan “than in the entire eight years of war” stated by Dexter Filkins, a war correspondent. A senior NATO officer added, “The Taliban are feeling a new level of pain.”403 But, soon the shortcomings of this new approach also became exposed.
The troop‟s surge ended up with a host of problems including political instability, increasing violence, rising insecurity, the Taliban regained their strongholds in the south and southwest of the country. However, in June 2011, the US President recognized that his strategy of surging the troops and military incursion has been working well and revealed that the withdrawal of forces would start from a position of strength. He initially announced to remove
401 Ibid. 402 Wali Aslam, "Drones and the Issue of Continuity in America‟s Pakistan Policy under Obama‟." in Bentley, M. and Holland, J. (eds.) Obama’s Foreign Policy: Ending the War on Terror (2013) pp.139-162. 403 Terry H. Anderson, Bush's Wars (Oxford University Press, 2011) p.224. 143
10,000 of the "surge" forces by the end of 2011, and the other 23,000 would leave Afghanistan by September 2012.404 Finally, the process of troop‟s withdrawal would complete in 2014.405
Negotiations with the Taliban under Obama:
By 2010, the US finally agreed on negotiations with the Taliban which resulted in the opening of an Afghan-led process in the summer of 2010. Since then the US assumed a major role in it, which created an impression and fear among Afghanistan and Pakistan. These states resorted to reassert greater control via either arresting Taliban interlocutors like Mullah Baradar under the guise of terrorism or leaking the identity of other interlocutors, like Tayyab Agha.406 The international community such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, U.A.E and Germany played their part in negotiations. All this resulted in the parallel undertaking of many different processes and initiatives, made an already impervious negotiating situation even dimmer.
Further, the negotiation issue had also proven contentious among Afghans who feared that concluding any deal would further put their life and status at risk. Panjshiri Tajiks, in particular, had been against any deal due to their strong memories of Taliban oppression during their rule. This process of Afghan-led and US independent negotiations had amounted mostly to talking about talking.407 For the negotiations to succeed, all key players must be on the same page otherwise it would not work.
Modified Policy of the US and its Outcomes: 2011-2012
Profound changes were noted in Obama‟s foreign policy report in 2011 which included the departure of Robert Gates and other career foreign policy titans. He pressured Congress into steep cuts to the defense budget, while concurrently formulated a new NSS that pledged to defend the nation with substantially fewer resources. Under the new policy, the US would no longer fight large wars of counterinsurgency, as it had in Iraq and Afghanistan, and would
404 CNN Wirestaff, “Obama announces Afghanistan troop withdrawal plan”, June 23, 2016. Retrieved from < http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/06/22/afghanistan.troops.drawdown/> on March 16, 2016. 405 Congressional Research Service, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations and Issues for Congress, March 9, 2011. 406 Vanda Felbab Brown, “The Predicament in Afghanistan”, US Policy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Lessons and Legacies (eds.) (New Delhi: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2013) p.152. 407 Ibid. 144 instead rely on the special operation forces and drones to defeat the remaining terrorists. The US Army and Marine Corps would hence be cut by 100,000 troops.408 In October 2011, DoD reported that the strategy of the surge had really worked as the violence that was rising consecutively began to decrease in May 2011 and continued to decline. This accomplishment was due to the killing of Osama Bin Laden (OBL) mastermind of the 9/11 attacks on May 2, 2011, marked the greatest victory for the US and President Obama on the sole accomplishment which had eluded and frustrated President Bush throughout his two terms. During 2012, this decline continued. Print and electronic media reported that the Taliban had been under pressure due to the troop‟s surge in southern Afghanistan as well as the killing of their leaders. The United Nations also noted a decline in the districts which were previously under insurgent control. President Obama expressed his gains in the following words:
“We‟ll have to do the hard work of keeping the gains that we‟ve made, while we draw down our forces and transition responsibility for security to the Afghan government.” To that end, he promised to “build a partnership with the Afghan people that endures one that ensures that we will be able to continue targeting terrorists and supporting a sovereign Afghan government.”409 The year 2011 marked a decline in US fatalities and the killing of Afghan civilians. Poppy cultivation and opium production also decreased that was all-time high in 2007. The number of ANSF has almost doubled in the period 2009-2011 to down the insurgents. The Afghan public began to be optimistic. All these developments finally led to the convincing of Taliban for peace Talks, when they opened their political office in Doha, Qatar. Taliban also got agreed to a prisoner exchange for US serviceman Bowie Bergdahl. On May 1, 2012 President Obama made a surprise visit of Kabul to start of the end of America's mission in Afghanistan. This visit was meant to get a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) signed with Afghanistan to regain the lost trust of Afghan administration. The SPA agreement outlined the US support for Afghanistan after completing its combat mission by the end of 2014.410
President Obama echoed that “We must give Afghanistan the opportunity to stabilize. Otherwise, our gains could be lost, and Al-Qaeda could establish itself once more.” President
408 Mark Moyar, “Leaving Behind „leading from Behind”, Strategika, Issue 36, October 2016. 409 “Barack Obama makes surprise trip to Afghanistan on anniversary of Osama bin Laden's death”, The Telegraph, May 1, 2012. Retrieved
Obama explained that the agreement, “establishes the basis for our cooperation over the next decade” and laid the groundwork to give the Afghans the “support they need to accomplish two narrow security missions beyond 2014 counter-terrorism and continued training.” The agreement was supplemented by a ten-year Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) to be signed in 2014, which most observers including the Afghans-assumed came with a US military presence on the ground.
Summing up, the period of 2010-2012 was marked by a strange policy of the US towards Afghanistan due to the inconsistencies and differences between the team members of President Obama. President Obama‟s troop‟s surge was meant for the counterterrorism operation but was not enough to launch a vigorous counterinsurgency as was recommended by his commanders. The idea of troops surge worked well initially but was limited till the battlefield and all those signs of progress wiped out with the start of the withdrawal of troops. Initially he vowed to increase his civilian aid every year but in reality, decreased aid meant for civilian purposes every following year. By 2011 President Obama decided to leave Afghanistan without consulting his military advisors and set some fixes regardless of the fact that till that time war was not finished.
2013-2014 Era of Transition and Withdrawal
In early 2013, US officials including President Obama stated US objectives in Afghanistan will remain focused on eliminating the remnants of Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups particularly ISIL (Khorasan Province) so that they could not launch attacks against the US. Training of ANDSF was set as a high priority that would enable Afghanistan to secure itself on its own. Overall, US policy remained focused towards strengthening ANDSF, building a stronger political and security partnership with Afghanistan, supporting the peace process, enhancing Regional cooperation and fostering economic growth.411
The US initiated drawing down its forces in 2012 when it withdrew 30,000 troops that were deployed additionally by President Obama. At the beginning of 2013, the 65,000 US troops were reduced to 40,000 in 2014 and to 9800 in 2015. There were serious divergences between military objectives and political interest due to the mounting domestic pressure for the withdrawal of more troops from Afghanistan to end this unwinnable war that lasted longer than
411 Seth G.Jones, “Strategic Reversal in Afghanistan”, Contingency Planning Memorandum, no.29, (CFR: June 2016) retrieved < https://www.cfr.org/report/strategic-reversal-afghanistan> (accessed April4, 2017). 146
WWII, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.412 Unfortunately, the set targets could not be achieved as ANSF were in a state of infancy and were not capable enough for taking the entire control of the country. Throughout 2013 and 2014, the DoD repeatedly stated that Afghan security forces though were improving, but were facing significant shortfalls in logistics, intelligence, air support, and more and thus were not in a position to go for independent operations with US support and training.
With the leaving of international troops, the Taliban regained their lost strength and started conducting offensives. The situation of Afghanistan was constantly deteriorating. Due to the departure of forces, official data for enemy launched attacks was missing. As stated by the International Crisis Group in 2014, “Unpublished assessments recorded a 15 to 20 percent increase in violence for 2013, in comparison with 2012. The initial months of 2014 recorded an increase in violence. According to the DoD report of 2013, the insurgency has made advances in some rural parts of the country. Civilian casualties which declined in 2012 rose to its peak in 2014. The number of IDPs got almost doubled in the period 2010-2013 from 352,000-631,000.
Signing of SPA and BSA:
Another notable development of 2013 remained the rift between Hamid Karzai and the US regarding the signing of BSA. President Karzai‟s refusal to sign the BSA broadened the differences between the Afghan president and the US, highlighted the strong divergent strategic mindsets: Excluding a scarcely mentioned anti-terrorism (predominantly anti-Al-Qaeda) mission combined with highly-limited assistance to ANSF, the US viewed a military engagement in Afghanistan as a strategic liability. President Karzai, however, continued to be persuaded that the US could not walk away from Afghanistan, as it served as a platform for a New Great Game against Russia and China in Central Asia for the US.413 Finally, the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) was signed on 1 May 2013, but the substantive issues among them remained unresolved. Under the agreement theUS agreed to support Afghanistan militarily, socially and
412 Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan: Turbulent and on the Brink”, Zone of Crisis: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014) p.29. 413 Vanda Felbab Brown, “Afghanistan‟s deep challenges and Transition Opportunities”, Brookings, March 1, 2014.Retrieved < https://www.brookings.edu/articles/afghanistans-deep-challenges-and-transition-opportunities/> 147 economically for the period of the next ten years, however, it did not pledge any specific level of funding or military assistance.414
Afghan Internal Situation:
According to the World Bank estimates, Afghanistan was lagging behind on political stability, rule of law and very little progress on administration efficiency, and corruption control. It showed President Obama‟s unwillingness to invest in Afghan governance. The Afghan economy grew by 3.4 percent in 2013 and 1.7 percent in 2014 reflected a reduced International presence and decreased spending on reconstruction. Poppy cultivation touched the all-time high level in 2013. The most glaring part of US invasion was creation of the ANSF, but underinvestment in governance minimized the effects of this army. However, the economic condition of Afghanistan suffered a serious decline in FDI due to the withdrawal of international forces. Throughout 2013, the whole political potential was towards the 2014 elections which gave a further jolt to the governance efforts. It indicated that Afghanistan‟s economy would continue to be run by the aid money by donor countries.
2014 and Afghan Elections:
The year 2014 was seen as an important year in the history of Afghanistan due to the elections and the completion of OEF. Yet, the election results created another controversy as the two principal candidates did not contend over the results then the US had to intervene that finally led to the establishment of the National Unity Government (NUG) led by Ashraf Ghani as President and Abdullah Abdullah as CEO. The election results were equally important for the US as the new leader decided to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) which was previously declined by President Hamid Karzai. The constant deteriorating situation of Afghanistan let the US take the decision of complete withdrawal that was amended later by the President to keep a small number of ground forces in Afghanistan to avoid a similar fate as in Iraq.
414 Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan: Turbulent and on the Brink”, Zone of Crisis: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014) pp. 29-30.
148
Casualties under Obama:
In 2008 UNAMA started making systematic counts of war-related injuries and deaths in Afghanistan in a detailed and thorough manner. Based on UNAMA data more than 17,700 civilian deaths had been recorded in 2009-2014 or under the President Obama years. In the year 2009, 2412 deaths were recorded while in 2010 2792, in 2011 3133, in 2012 2769, in 2013 2969 and in 2014 3699 415 were killed and 6849 were injured that showed a 22 percent increase in civilian killings and injured as compared to 2013.416 These figures showed a sharp rise in death casualties of civilians except in the years 2012 and 2013 which marked a decline as compared to the previous years. More than 800,000 Afghans were internally displaced by the Afghan war only in 2014
In 2013 Afghan Ministry of Defense reported that 1392 Afghan soldiers had been killed in combat with the Taliban. In 2014 1868 Afghan soldiers and 3720 Afghan policemen had been killed in 2014.
Graph 4.1: Afghan Civilian War Deaths 2009-2014
Civilians killed in Afghanistan Under Obama 4500 4000 3699
3500 3133 2969 2792 2769 3000 2412 2500 2000 1500 Series1
Civilians Civilians Killed 1000 500 0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Years
Source: Neta C. Crawford, War-related Death, Injury and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2015.p.2.
415 Neta C. Crawford, War-related Death, Injury and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001- 2014, Watson Institute for International Studies (Brown University, 2015) p.2. 416 Kate Clark, “The Human Cost of the Afghan War: UN reports sharp rise in the killed and injured”, Feb 18, 2015 Afghanistan Analyst Network, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-human-cost-of-the-afghan-war-un-reports- sharp-rise-in-the-killed-and-injured/> (accessed Oct 3, 2017).
149
US and Allied Forces Military Fatalities in Afghanistan 2009-2014
In 2009-2014 US military casualties were recorded 1726 and Allied forces were 710. The year- wise details of US and Allied forces military casualties is provided in the following table.
Table 4.1: US and Allied Forces Military Fatalities in Afghanistan 2009-2014
Year US UK Other Total 2009 317 108 96 521 2010 499 103 109 711 2011 418 46 102 566 2012 310 44 48 402 2013 127 9 25 161 2014 55 6 14 75 Total 1726 316 394 2436
Source: “Operation Enduring Freedom”, http://icasualties.org/oef/ (accessed October 3, 2017).
Taliban deaths were lower in 2009, however, a report in 2011 as per an Afghan Interior Ministry spokesperson said that 5225 Taliban were killed in 2010.417 In the same year troops surge was started by the US it could be assumed that as many as 5,000 Taliban might have been slaughtered every year from 2011 to 2013 in different operations. Thus an estimated number of insurgent forces, mainly Taliban executed would be around 29,500 and 39,500 or 35,000 a midpoint between the two figures.418
Control of Afghan Corruption under Obama:
As President Obama was about to complete the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan, this gives precedence why they focused on resolving to tackle Afghan corruption. It was treated as a luxury that the US was unable to afford, their continued priority was on achieving stability. The US most often relied on powerbrokers and local warlords in Afghanistan to forward its interest but the absence of a coherent strategy by President Obama was effective dealing with corruption led the problematic powerbrokers to utilize US resources and support for their own benefits. It
417 Neta C. Crawford, War-related Death, Injury and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014 (Watson Institute for International Studies: Brown University, 2015) p.10. 418 Ibid. 150 had been the dilemma of the US that it could not go against the Taliban and powerbrokers simultaneously. Though the powerbrokers violated the given red lines, they effectively got the things done and tasks completed. So, the US prioritized to defeat the Taliban first and once they got defeated, held that the Afghans to tackle these powerbrokers. The Afghans were accustomed to corruption and confronting it had appeared really difficult for the US. The massive supply of billions of dollars that came from the international community in the form of foreign aid also generated its own corruption. Large powerbrokers who got this money prevented others and the population at large from benefitting this aid. The powerbrokers often indulged in fighting to get the contracts to take the money allocated for completing various projects and set up coercive monopolies under the guise of business association to control rents.419 Then. The aid flows had also given rise to Khans that further undermined the traditional institutions and the central government that the international community had struggled to stand up. As per rule, the aid money should be channeled through the government as it would increase the fiscal capacity of the state and create a deeper link between the government and the people which in turn creates accountability. However, the Afghan government had proven to be too corrupt at its various levels to effectively manage and utilize this aid. The passing of aid through NGOs had sometimes proved a bit faster but it was also not without corruption. It, in turn reduced the government‟s authority and capacity and often had strengthened local powerbrokers. As per 2010 UNODC report 59 percent of Afghan citizens see corruption as the prime problem faced by Afghanistan.420 Around 80 percent of Afghan rural inhabitants said that it had increased from 2005-2010.421
419 Vanda Felbab Brown, “The Predicament in Afghanistan”, US Policy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Lessons and Legacies (eds.) (New Delhi: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2013) p.159. 420 Amin Saikal, Zone of Crisis: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014) p.43. 421 Ibid. 151
Graph 4.2: Percentage of respondents who viewed Corruption as a major problem of Afghanistan
Percentage of respondents that believe corruption is a major problem in daily life 63% 62% 62%
61%
60% 59% 58% 57% 56% 56% 56% 56% 55%
Daily Daily Corruption 55% 54% 53% 53% 52% 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Year
Source: Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the Afghan People”, 2014, Retrieved www.asiafoundation.org/resources/pdf/Afghanistanin2014final.pdf (accessed October 8, 2017).
Table 4.2: Afghanistan’s Rank in CPI under Obama
2009 2010/Rank 2011/Rank 2012/Rank 2013/Rank 2014/Rank Region Score/Rank
1.3/179 1.4/176 1.5/180 8/174 8/175 12/172 Asia pacific
Source: Compiled by author whereas data taken from CPI Index.
4.3-Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM) Under Obama
For a successful execution of foreign policy decision, political and military authorities should be on the same page. So, Obama attempted to escalate the war by troops surge to end the hostility by the rigorous use of force that included increased reliance over drones along with more boots on ground and then to de-escalate by gradual withdrawal of forces by 2011 to 152 eventually terminate the war. Termination usually involves risks and misperceptions, uncertainties, Obama‟s policy decision has been based on the objective calculation of continuing the war and the perceived value of ending the war.
President Obama‟s Foreign Policy approach partially captured under Polythink that involved a plurality of opinions, divergent viewpoints, and thoughts by a diversified group of people belonging to different backgrounds. He insisted on a variety of opinions to have more and more information on a particular policy matter throughout his decision-making process, characterized him as an open-minded man who liked to take dissenting views. Obama said, 'I welcome debate among my team, but I won't tolerate division.”422 This openness offered a platform to discuss and share divergent views on a policy matter, however, it also invoked clashes among his team members. The most glaring clash took place among his military and political advisors. “The military was unified supporting General McChrystal‟s request for 40,000 more troops. His political advisors were very skeptical.”423 Emanuel, in particular, got annoyed with Generals‟ Mullen, Petraeus, and McChrystal for trying to persuade the President for a certain decision. Further White House officials often criticized the military‟s usage of press and Congress to make the President decide what they wanted. President Obama perturbed with the military and regardless of their pressures decided to deploy 30,000 troops instead of 40,000 that the Pentagon hoped to get.”424 So, President Obama‟s commitment to debate, often combined with strong internal divisions among diverse members of his team.425
President Obama effectively micro-managed the decision-making process which involved multiple NSC meetings from September 2009 till December 2009. He repeatedly asked for more details on Afghan political and economic developments to advance an effective policy for Afghanistan. On the other hand, it also reflected that General McChrystal and Gates were right in their assessment that they lacked the understanding of Afghanistan.426 That‟s why the President continued to ask for more and more data on Afghanistan. In the words of James T. Kloppenberg,
422Bob Woodward, Quotes, Retrieved
“Obama exhibited a philosophical pragmatism that embraced uncertainty, provisionally and the contiguous testing of hypotheses through experimentation.427”This style of Obama might have frustrated those who favored quick decision-making but appealed to those who considered alternative viewpoints as important before acting decisively without considering multi-views.428
President Obama vowed to collaborate with allies “to a greater extent than Bush, but at the same time served notice that he would act unilaterally when vital US interests were at stake.”429 Obama reflected a calm personality and managed to pursue a pro-active foreign policy where he managed to establish a working relationship even with rogue states. His temperament was cool and deliberative yet “he remains a believer in modern forms of presidential power, especially in foreign affairs. Losing his initial Democratic House and Senate majority seemed to push him even further in the direction of overstretching presidential powers.”430 Leaders represent their state abroad, the charisma, personality, views, management style, and decision- making of President Obama has played its role in improving US image abroad that was constantly getting down under the Bush administration. He believed in Roosevelt‟s ideas that “Americans were not destroyers, but builders, that their power should be directed towards good and annihilation of evil”. Overall his policy approaches looked for the consensus, mediation, and the resolution431.
Obama did not want to indulge in unnecessary wars because his focus was on trade and economic. He turned his attention towards the Asia Pacific which fulfills the country‟s economic and trade interests. It marked a shift of focus away from Europe to Asia. However, he could not accomplish in this regard as the US troops continued to fight in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria and limited operations in Yemen and Libya, etc.432
427 Trevor McCrisken, “Ten Years on: Obama‟s War on Terrorism in rhetoric and Practice”, International Affairs, Vol.87, No 4 (July 2011) p.783. 428 Trevor McCrisken, “Ten Years on: Obama‟s War on Terrorism in rhetoric and Practice”, International Affairs, Vol.87, No 4 (July 2011) p.784. 429 Mark Moyar, "Leaving behind “Leading from behind”." Hoover Institution-Strategica 36 (2016).p.3. 430David Unger, "The foreign policy legacy of Barack Obama." The International Spectator 51, no. 4 (2016) pp.1- 16. 431 Joana Ribeiro and Margarida Jacinto. "President Obama vs. President W. Bush: can a president's leadership style be an effective and efficient influence for US diplomacy and foreign policy?" (PhD diss., 2013) p.36. 432 David Unger, "The foreign policy legacy of Barack Obama." The International Spectator 51, no. 4 (2016) p.3. 154
At the domestic front, he confronted varied issues. He faced dissension among his foreign policy team, declining public support, economic issues. These factors sometimes facilitated and other times hindered the effective implementation of his policies. Because sometimes he had to face opposition from congress and sometimes limited economic resources. However, at the international level, he effectively tackled the challenges like he modified Afghan strategy, wind down Iraq issue, increased cooperation with Asian countries to keep a check over China‟s rise, tackled democratic uprising in the Arab world, intervened in Libya with the support of its European allies. To sort out these challenges he applied an “inclusive, deliberative decision - making process and formalistic management style to address the challenges at hand with the help of allies and by means of international institutions.433
4.4-Role of Systemic Constraints under the Obama Administration
A leader takes the decision which he found most compelling for the pursuance of his national interest in the light of systemic requirements, domestic desires, and situational context, etc. However, there cannot be any assurance of the outcomes of that decision. It is because no state can have and get complete information about other state‟s intentions and relative power positions. All this confirms the basic principle of NCR realism. This section attempted to analyze the impact of systemic factors under the Obama administration. Between 2009-2011, the level of US-Afghan Trade relations has further seen a spark. It means systemic factors have continued to be in favor of the US even under the Obama administration and his revised policy for Afghanistan. However, since 2012 exports suffered a constant decline and reached from $2921.9 million to $913.9 million in 2016. The level of imports found to fluctuate as increased from $26.1 million in 2011 and reached $36.8 million in 2012 then continued to decline and touched $33.7million at the closing year of Obama‟s second term.
433 Sara M. Birkenthal,"Grand Strategy in US Foreign Policy: The Carter, Bush, and Obama Doctrines." (2013) pp.95-96. 155
Table 4.3 : US Trade in Goods with Afghanistan under Obama Administration
Year Exports in Millions Imports in Millions Balance of US Dollars of US Dollars
2008 481.6 84.7 397.0 2009 1,508.6 116.1 1,392.5 2010 2,151.4 85.3 2,066.1 2011 2,921.9 26.1 2,895.7 2012 1,521.6 36.8 1,484.8 2013 1,410.1 45.5 1,364.6 2014 812.7 74.5 738.2 2015 478.7 23.6 455.1 2016 913.9 33.7 880.2 Source: compiled by the author while data has been taken from
As far as the balance of power in the region has been concerned. The Middle East uprisings for the establishment of democracy further created a conducive environment for a pro- west balance of power. As it created the opportunities for the US to play its role in the setting up of a pro-US government in their respective countries. However, President Obama made it clear that he would avoid indulgence in unnecessary wars. He started operations in Libya with his European allies with him. He wanted to conclude the Afghan mission by pulling out foreign forces and handing over the responsibility to trained Afghan officials. He concluded his mission in Iraq by pulling out all foreign troops. He started a carrot and stick approach towards Iran to avoid nuclear Iran. Following part explains how the Obama administration tackled other international and regional issues like rise of China, Arab spring, etc., to keep the balance of power in favor of the US.
Nuclear Negotiations with IRAN: 156
In his inaugural speech, President Obama said that the US would "extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.”434 For resolving the Iran issue, he pursued a policy of engagement and showed his willingness to start negotiations without any pre-conditions to avoid the chances of any military confrontation with Iran. All these measures were intended for reaching a mutually acceptable comprehensive settlement over Iran‟s nuclear program. The US offered that if Iran pledged to roll back its nuclear program it would result in the restoration of its diplomatic as well as its economic ties with the US along with its inclusion in the international organizations like the WTO.435However, this strategy did not work and the President had to turn towards its allies to put severe economic sanctions over Iran. Years of sanctions badly damaged Iran‟s economy. The US clearly stated that nuclear Iran is unacceptable. All the negotiation efforts plus sanctions finally worked and on July 14, 2015, between Iran and six major powers including the US, Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia an agreement was signed in which Iran agreed to limit its nuclear program in response to relief from economic sanctions.436
Iraq War:
In the summers of 2008, the situation of Iraq bit improved due to the troop‟s surge by President Bush. But the security situation gains were not significant due to weak government. In November 2008, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA terms for ending US mission in Iraq) was ratified by the Iraqi government that set 2011 as the final date for the US troops to leave Iraq. By January 2009, the Iraqi government had been able to take control of the green zone in Baghdad. “At the political level, the 2010 parliamentary elections proved the vitality of the Iraqi democratic experiment, with a considerable turnout (62%) and increased Sunni participation. This contributed to the narrow victory of Iyad Allawi‟s Iraqi National Movement (INM) over Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki‟s State of Law Coalition (SLC) and the establishment of a broad coalition government under the latter.”437
434 Caren Bohan and Matt Vasilogambros, “7 Pressing Foreign Policy Challenges for Obama's 2nd Term”, The Atlantic, Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/01/7-pressing-foreign-policy-challenges- for-obamas-2nd-term/438366/ , on Jan 3, 2017. 435 John K. Glenn, “Foreign Policy Challenges for the Obama Administration", Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (2009) p.4. 436 “7 Foreign Policy Challenges Rex Tillerson and Trump Will Inherit From Obama”, Haaretz, December 15, 2016, Retrieved from http://www.haaretz.com/us-news/1.759262 accessed April 14, 2017. 437 Luca Tardelli, “Obama‟s Interventions: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya” LSE IDEAS (2011).Retrieved from < http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR009/tardelli.pdf > on April 19, 2017. 157
Rise of China as an Economic Power:
A pressing challenge faced by the Obama administration was how to respond with the rise of China. China‟s fast-moving economy, increased military spending, a network of trade and investment and integration into other economies of the region had led many to believe that China had become the peer competitor of the US.438 On taking the entire stock of the whole situation, President Obama realized that containment or exerting pressure had not been a plausible option for dealing with China and leaving China‟s rise unnoticed could provoke US allies and could serve as a motivation for others to follow the suit. That‟s why he implemented a multi- dimensional approach towards China to avoid bad consequences. First, he attempted to increase US-China engagement by visiting China in November 2009, side by side he increased US involvement in Asian regional organizations and other Asian forums such as ASEAN, APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum), EAS (East Asia Summit). These steps were taken to increase US presence and role to reassert its leading role in Asia. By early 2010, Obama marked a policy shift from strategic engagement towards Strategic Pivot (Pivot to Asia that shifted the focus from the Middle East to East Asia). The new policy aimed at increasing diplomatic, security as well as economic ties with the neighboring countries of China. He also increased the US military existence in the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam, and other states of the region. A historic visit to Myanmar was also paid that was resulted in easing of diplomatic sanctions that were for both rewarding its administration for undertaking democratic reforms and to establish good ties with it to secure another ally.
China responded to these developments mildly to avoid any strains in the US-China relationship so both sides adopted a somehow cautious approach towards each other and kept on increasing their influence in their areas of interest.
Conflict in Syria:
According to the UN estimates, Bashar al-Assad‟s policy to suppress the Syrian dissidents against his administration killed 60,000 people. The Obama team was not in favor of taking military actions due to his advocacy for avoiding indulgence in civil wars unless they pose
438 Sara M. Birkenthal, “Grand Strategy in US Foreign Policy: The Carter, Bush and Obama Doctrines” (2013) pp.93-94. 158 an essential threat to US interests.439 But there was the fear that Assad might use the chemical weapon as Syria had large stockpiles of chemical weapons. Obama pledged if that happened than the US would definitely intervene. However, the US decided to constantly monitor Syrian issue to avoid wider disastrous ramifications for the entire region.440
Russia:
On assuming office in 2009, President Obama vowed to reset US relations with Russia which suffered a decline during the final years of President Bush‟s second term. President Obama established an understanding with the then President Dmitry Medvedev and relations among the two states improved. The changing of the presidency of Russia and shifting it to Vladimir Putin again led to the cooling of relations between the two countries. President Putin banned adoptions of Russian children by American families due to the Magnitsky Act, which called for US sanctions on Russian officials who violated human rights.441
Arab Uprisings:
Crisis in Egypt:
It came as a shock to the US that self-immolation of a fruit seller could act as a catalyst for bringing a revolution for establishing democracy by replacing aristocracy/dictatorship throughout the Arab world. In fact, President Obama was not well prepared to deal with this challenge which is why he responded when it reached Egypt on 26th Jan 2011. On February 1, 2011, the Obama administration decided that Hosni Mubarak the President of Egypt must give up power. He believed that Mubarak‟s removal would be filled in by a Muslim Brotherhood party favorable to the US. That‟s why the US played its role by using the Egyptian military for a peaceful administration change. Finally, Mohammad Morsi, won the elections of June 2012, was recognized as a legitimate administration by the Obama administration. Though previously, US supported Hosni Mubarak‟s administration of Egypt, but in the light of Egyptian people will,
439 Ibid., pp.96-98. 440 Caren Bohan and Matt Vasilogambros, “7 Pressing Foreign Policy Challenges for Obama's 2nd Term”, The Atlantic, Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/01/7-pressing-foreign-policy-challenges- for-obamas-2nd-term/438366/ , on Jan 3, 2017. 441 Ibid. 159 global realities, systemic constraints and the US interest, it switched its position in support of administration change and democracy establishment in Egypt.
Conflict in Libya:
On 28th Feb 2011, Libya was removed from UNHCR. In order to deal with this scenario, President Obama had considered two options, either to set-up a no-fly zone, or as a last resort, implore a military invasion of Libya. For him, the military option was a hard choice to make as he wanted to keep the US apart from unnecessary conflict, particularly in the Middle East. He pursued a UN resolution that permitted US and NATO partners to protect the rebels from Qadafi‟s crackdown by throwing bombs on state machinery. On March 17, 2011, the UNSC authorized the military resolution. On March 19, 2011, a military action named Kinetic Military Action on President Obama‟s directive was started and continued till the time Qaddafi ousted from power.
All this showed that Obama‟s reliance on multilateralism for the resolution of this issue as he sought international support of its allies for launching a military incursion into Libya in contrast to Bush‟s reliance on unilateralism.
4.5.-Role of Domestic variables during Obama Administration
Role of Public opinion
During the Obama administration, Public opinion remained the vital factor in determining the foreign policy towards Afghanistan. Before the assumption of the President's office, Barack Obama was a critique of President Bush's policy towards Afghanistan. But, on assuming the charge in 2009, domestic as well as the international scenario forced him to take the same decision of sending more troops to Afghanistan.
During the start of his term, 60 to 70% of the public supported Obama's decisions at the foreign front. In October 2009, 60% of the US public believed that Obama will increase respect of the US abroad.442 Public opinion was evenly divided on the President's decision to send more
442 Richard C. Eichenberg, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the Obama Era”, https://as.tufts.edu/politicalscience/sites/all/themes/asbase/assets/documents/eichenberg/politiqueAmericaine.pdf (Accessed on March 11, 2019). 160 troops in Afghanistan. 50 to 60% of the population supported the decision.443 When the president announced to send troops to Afghanistan in December 2009, 57% of the population supported the decision.444 The wide political support for the President gave him the confidence to send troops to Afghanistan and to fight against the menace of Terrorism.
Sensitivity of the US Government
The sensitivity of the government is an important factor in designing of the foreign policy of any state, according to the NCR realism. President Obama had to deal with the challenges at domestic as well as the foreign policy front. When he assumed office, the US was involved in two wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq. During his presidential campaign, President Obama criticized the policies of President Bush. On account of his criticism of the foreign policy of President Bush, he had high public approval during his first term campaign. According to a Gallup survey, 67% of the public approved him as president. But, when he assumed office, domestic factors influenced his foreign policy choices and he implemented the policy of his predecessor to deal with Terrorism. The public approval of President Obama touched the lowest percentage of 38% in 2014 when the ISIS released the video of US captured journalists.445 The sensitivity of the Obama government influenced his foreign policy choices. He adopted the policy of surge and at the same time, he announced the framework of withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan.
The Decision Maker's Perceptions
The perception of decision-makers played a vital role in the presidency of President Obama and his foreign policy towards Afghanistan. The president, his cabinet as well as pentagon was equally aware of the level of threat and designed the policy accordingly. The analyses of the situation made it clear that it was not only President Obama, who opted for the policy of "surge" and COIN in Afghanistan, but the role of the Defense Department and the Pentagon was vital in this regard.
443 Ibid. 444 Richard C. Eichenberg, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the Obama Era”, https://as.tufts.edu/politicalscience/sites/all/themes/asbase/assets/documents/eichenberg/politiqueAmericaine.pdf (Accessed on March 11, 2019). 445 Obama Averages 47.9% Job Approval as President, Gallup poll https://news.gallup.com/poll/202742/obama-averages-job-approval-president.aspx.(Accessed on March 11, 2019). 161
On 30th August 2009, a report was presented by General McChrystal, commander of US forces in Afghanistan. The report was a critique of the Afghan government and the ongoing ISAF operations in Afghanistan.446 However, at the end of the report, he proposed the plan to implement the COIN policy in Afghanistan.447 There was another proposed plan of "Counterterrorism plus" by the vice president Biden. The plan was about retaining the massive US and NATO troops at Btagram and Kandahar that this would enable troops to carry operation anywhere in the country.448 CT plus approach was criticized by the military of the US and General McChrystal.
The US military was the supporter of the COIN policy; however, President Obama was reluctant to launch the policy in Afghanistan. On 30th October 2009, President Obama met with the Joint Chiefs and emphasized to speed up the operation and on 11th October, the Plan 2A was presented before the President, and he agreed to launch the COIN in Afghanistan.449 The perception of the decision-makers influenced the foreign policy choice of President Obama and he adopted the policy of "surge” that was adopted by his predecessor.
President Obama assumed office and faced several challenges at the foreign policy front. During his campaign, President Obama criticized the military based policy of his predecessor, but when he assumed office, he opted for the same policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The analyses of the situation made it clear that it was not President Obama, who opted for the policy of "surge" and COIN in Afghanistan, but the role of the Defense Department and the Pentagon was vital in this regard.
4.6-Weaknesses of Obama’s Approach:
Though President Obama modified his approach to deal with Afghanistan but even then, his strategy of troops surge by 60,000 had not proven to be workable for leading this longest war towards the end, because the Taliban continued to control large areas and it seemed endless combat. His actions to counter the upsurge of the IS has not succeeded in Syria, Libya, Egypt,
446 Stanely McChrystal, "Commander's initial Assessment", Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html (Accessed on January 20, 2019). 447 Ibid. 448 Benjmin Patrick McCullough, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: A Last Ditch Efforts to turn around the Failing War” (Master thesis, Wittenberg University, 2009) p.78. 449 Peter Baker, "Woodward Book Says Afghanistan Divided White House", New York Times, September, 21, 2010 162 and Iraq.450 The decision of troop surge in Afghanistan faced domestic opposition that insisted on the reduced presence of America in Afghanistan. The American audience was convinced that an increased presence this action would not revert Afghanistan to its pre-9/11 status of a nation that served as a haven for Islamic extremists with international goals. The Obama administration feared that any attack on the US territory by Afghanistan after the drawdown of forces would jeopardize the life of his political rule.451 Once the drawdown of forces completed than the US would be having little capacity to intervene again that‟s why it decided to keep its direct presence in Afghanistan to deny Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist base for itself and other countries to use it. The situation of Afghanistan had been reflected that the military retreat necessary for the strategy of rebalancing might have been premature. It might have repercussions or prove counterproductive for the country‟s future as it continued to present a bleak picture of insurgents continue to control territory and enjoy public support.
In fact, President Obama made an attempt to learn lessons from Iraq and the Vietnam War and applied them to resolve the Afghan issue. President Obama initially favored counterinsurgency followed by nation-building and democracy promotion, but on reviewing the situation he defined the core aim to disrupt, defeat and dismantle AQ and Taliban and he clearly announced that rebuilding had been the task of Afghans and ultimately, they had to take the lead. The President came-up with Af-Pak policy to label Afghanistan and Pakistan as the two sides of the same coin, here the focus was on military option to defeat the insurgents on both sides of the border. The significant increase in the use of drones as compared to the Bush administration further substantiated this argument. His order of troops surge to conclude the war by narrowing down the goals, yet this surge was intended only for a limited period of time, that‟s why could not embrace success. The US had not designed a clear-cut, objective-based strategy for the whole region particularly for Afghanistan.452 The reemergence of the Taliban and the emergence of IS in Afghanistan, withdrawal of the US and international forces were upset too. That‟s why a decision to keep a smaller force of 9800 until 2016 and then to 5500 to reduce it further to maintain only an embassy level presence with 1000 troops to keep intact and to avoid it from
450 Lee H. Hamilton, “Obama foreign policy: significant success and notable missteps”, HuffPost, Retrieved from < http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lee-h-hamilton/obama-foreign-policy-sign_b_13376732.html> Dated Dec 02, 2016 451 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, pp.202-208. 452 Christian Nünlist, “The Legacy of Obama‟s Foreign Policy”, CSS Analysis in Security Policy, no.188 (2016) p.3. 163 becoming a safe haven for terrorist again. Another weakness had been that the US needed to make adjustments in its policy to deal with this war. It highlighted that their previous policies did not embrace success that‟s why they resorted to new means and came up with revised plans to attain their goals.
4.7- Conclusion
There was a great deal of opposition by his Generals due to which President Obama had not been able to accomplish the whole of his foreign policy in its true letter and spirit. However, he made some notable achievements that his predecessor could not, like the completion of military operation and withdrawal of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, nice handling of Iran‟s nuclear issue that deterred Iran from becoming a nuclear power for at least ten years, and most worthy killing of 9/11 mastermind OBL.
While officially there was no Obama Doctrine to deal with all these challenges, but his foreign policy decisions were reinforced by strategic deliberations. David Milne has rightly called “Obama the most intuitive and averse to ideology”. He had attempted to prioritize the US strategic interests and responded to urgent challenges. By virtue of his policies, the US avoided indulging in civil wars i.e. Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Ukraine as these were of least interest to the US. He wanted to minimize the use of US resources over these complex challenges. He increased American spectrum of war in Afghanistan and Iraq to conclude his mission.
Rather than relying too much on military might, he focused on engagement, discussions, multilateral talks, burden sharing, and collective efforts to sort out global issues. At points, President Obama had the elements of the right approach like the decision of troops surge, more reconstruction support, and a COIN strategy but later, on he could not give them the required time resources and attention to secure victory. On assuming charge President Obama characterized these wars as important which got sidelined under Bush administration, so he pledged to get them on track. Yet President Obama‟s policies right from 2009 suffered from divergence and it remained unclear he ever had a clear strategy for Afghanistan. His deployment of more troops for a narrow counterterrorism operation was much more than needed, but not enough for a broader COIN campaign. He initially enlarged reconstruction funding due to his 164 belief that effective Afghan governance was a prerequisite for success, but quickly second- guessed himself and subsequently reduced civilian aid every year thereafter. In fact, President Obama‟s disclosure of withdrawal plan undermined his idea of troop‟s surge which was later on realized by him and he decided to keep its troops in Afghanistan to give the impression that US forces are still in the field and Taliban have not succeeded. All these policies and actions had been of less morale and spirit than what was hoped and anticipated by him.
President Obama had been successful partially as he improved the US standing and concluded two important wars i.e Iraq and Afghanistan. He improved and restored the standing of the US that was suffering all time low reputation under President Bush. It could be said that he had somehow succeeded in attaining some of his foreign policy goals. His key approach towards dealing with international issues revolved around his renewed relationships, cooperative engagements and leading from behind. His modified strategies proved more fruitful than his earlier policies. Other than Afghanistan he confronted other Foreign policy challenges like China‟s rise, Arab spring in the Middle East. To address these challenges he utilized inclusive, formalistic, highly deliberative decision-making approach and relied on international partners and institutions. At times, President Obama took unconventional, unexpected decisions that were against the suggestions of his foreign policy guides like his policies of troops surge (by 30,000 and ignoring of other suggestions) towards Afghanistan to conclude it, pivot of Asia to tackle China‟s rise, and leadership from behind to deal with the Arab spring etc. His policy action had proven to be logically coherent, though difficult to implement. His doctrine was a well- articulated, yet broad set of national interests. Overall, President Obama‟s foreign policy had not declined and rejected as an overwhelming failure though his policies had not embraced an overwhelming success too.
For successful execution of Foreign Policy, consensus/unanimity of opinion had been required but President Obama faced internal division within his team. The Afghan mission appeared to be an ambiguous and incomprehensive mission as no one including the chairman Joint Chiefs believed was sure of the winning and he declared winning and losing a matter of intellectual debate.
Obama‟s doctrine revolved around engagement. He redefined American leadership in a complex, interdependent and globalized world and put his emphasis on engaging with state and 165 non-state actors like NGOs and other transnational groups. He strongly favored multilateralism and wanted to attain its international goals within the limits and constraints of these institutions to legitimize US actions to pursue and promote its national interest abroad. It did not necessarily mean that President Obama wanted to have a multipolar world, rather a multi-partner world. He often attempted to reset and even transform US foreign policy. He often used the phrase “leading from behind” to talk about his strategy. The idea was the avoidance of US international entanglements unless it became a matter of vital interest to US national security. Overall, the Obama Doctrine advocated the belief that the US dream was threatened by many urgent problems, but by working hard and working together, it could be reclaimed and strengthened.
There were many expectations by Obama‟s administration, however, after completing OEF in Afghanistan the situation exposed that the strategy had not at all worked well and prompted the questions about the US goals in Afghanistan. In 2008, he also vowed to „help Afghans, educate their children, including their girls, provide basic human services to their population, and grow their economy from the bottom up‟. It showed Obama‟s administration efforts to link the security to development. Despite all the determination and pledges, no considerable developments could be made regarding the state-building of Afghanistan.
The AfPak policy had proven to be more military-driven, that employed military invasion, increased drones, sophisticated weaponry, and technology but embraced no or very limited success. Billions of dollars had been wasted in Afghanistan for nothing. The US had played its all cards to defeat the Taliban, in eliminating Al-Qaeda and failed to establish an effective centralized, representative government. The critics of President Obama‟s approach argued that AFPak continued the previous administration‟s policies yet in a mild manner and had not brought any significant changes in the policy. The policy remained to continue an increased stationing of international forces to secure the Afghan population till the time ANA become fully operational to take on the whole responsibility. The policy had revised the troop‟s number from 100,000 to 300,000. The members of ANA who belonged to different ethnic and religious groups had often been found hostile to each other, making it far more difficult.
ANA being composed of people belonging to different ethnic and religious groups created division among themselves that resisted in the path of its smooth working. They also faced training issues, resource scarcity due to which it lacked the required operational capacity. It 166 needed to take help from the US in other words ANA was working as a subordinate of US authorities rather than the Afghan. Finance for equipment and training was another major issue. These issues created a hurdle to hire and recruit Afghani nationals as soldiers. They are threatened not only from these issues but there were some more such as threats from the Taliban, ethnic differences, and most importantly low wages.
The US under President Obama attempted to promote development and reconstruction simultaneously but could not allocate ample resources required for bringing Afghanistan to a normal state. It required a long-term commitment not only by the US but by the international community, to pull out Afghanistan from a war situation. Afghanistan should not be left as an orphan child as happened in 1990‟s after the demise of the Soviet Union. The US needed to be flexible enough and accommodative towards Afghanistan. History had been evident that the US whether ruled under either the republicans or the democrats, remained engaged in changing of others behaviors, rather than compromising or taking a middle ground in challenging conditions. COIN believed in winning the hearts and minds of people, attention must be heeded to this side in order to control anti-American sentiments of the people. Steps must be intensified towards the civilian side in order to provide protection, security, and life facilities to the people of Afghanistan. The general public of Afghanistan had been of the view that US-funded and furthered its interest in Pakistan and Afghanistan but got perturbed by the prevailing lawlessness and corruption over there. Overall, this war had not only affected the US and Afghanistan but also the regional states particularly Pakistan who had become a direct victim of this war.
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CHAPTER 5
PRESIDENT BUSH VS. PRESIDENT OBAMA’S AFGHAN POLICIES: A COMPARISON
This chapter renders a comparative analysis of President Bush and President Obama‟s Foreign Policy in relation to WoT in Afghanistan. First, it analyzes the broader themes of their foreign policies in general by splitting it under subheadings like America‟s Grand Strategy, Leadership Role, Importance of Allies, Ideological Dispositions, and Responses to other systemic challenges. The Second section specifically compares their Foreign Policies in Afghanistan based upon what has been discussed in previous chapters.
President George W. Bush was considered as one of the most conservative and controversial presidents in the recent history of the US. President Barack Obama, the country‟s first black president, was elected on the basis of his liberal values. President Bush was known as the „War President‟ due to his unilateralist and illegitimate military interventions in other states while President Obama used multilateralism and sought international engagements for his missions.453 On the basis of previous chapters findings, this chapter argues that both of the Presidents resorted to different approaches, tones, and rhetoric to attain somewhat similar ends. In turn, broadly their policies had proven to be more or less the same and marked continuity in the traditional foreign policy approach of the US towards the world in general and towards Afghanistan in particular. President Obama‟s actions in the war on terror like in Iraq decreasing of troops and in Afghanistan troops surge marked continuity in the existing Bush policy.454
453 Aneta Hiavsova, “Involved in Middle East: George W Bush versus Barack Obama” (ETH Zurich, Centre for Security Studies, 29 June 2017) p.1. 454 Tom Lansford & Robert P. Watson, and Jack Covarrubias, eds. America's War on Terror (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009) p.262 168
President Obama shifted the tone initially but the underlying assumptions in the WOT remained the same.
5.1-Comparison of Bush and Obama’s Foreign Policy Approaches
Leadership Role of America/ Grand Strategy Design:
Both the Presidents put a lot of emphasis on an American leadership role as a part of their grand strategy. The NSS document of 2006 defined it as a key theme of President Bush‟s policy. In the words of James Lindsay “despite many differences between both administrations, the two shared a common trait: a conviction that other countries both wanted and needed US leadership.”455 US leadership role was not a boast but a reality.
“Peter Feaver and Ionut Popescu argued that the Obama design spelled out in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) was remarkably similar to Bush‟s 2006 NSS. Both NSS‟s emphasized American leadership.456 It depended upon how a leader leads? “The international community is most engaged in such action when the United States leads.” Obama‟s NSS 2010 similarly emphasized America‟s “global leadership” and “steering those currents [of international cooperation] in the direction of liberty and justice” and “shap[ing] an international order” because “global security depends upon strong and responsible American leadership.”457
Foreign Policy Approach & Theoretical Dispositions:
Both the Presidents had exhibited realist leanings.
President Bush made use of unilateral action that clearly showed a realist flavor of American military might. He used fear as an element of foreign policy. He took the decision to withdraw US troops from the Balkans to discontinue Clinton‟s policies and to focus upon the
455 James M. Lindsay, “George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the future of US global leadership, International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011) pp. 765-779. 456 Peter Feaver and Ionut Popescu, “Is Obama‟s Foreign Policy Different From George W. Bush‟s?” E- International Relations, Retrieved from http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/03/is-obamas-foreign-policy-different-to- bushs/ on May 10, 2017. 457 Ibid. 169 pressing threats to US security emanating from Russia and China. Some analysts characterized President Obama as the follower of psychological realism,” due to his intuitive understanding that the US could not impose its own moral and historical narrative on the rest of the world without making them share that narrative”.
The difference between their uses of realism lied in the fact that President Bush relied on hard power based on military and economic might whereas President Obama resorted to smart power that attracted others and made it convenient for the US to lead. Smart power comprises of both hard and soft power.458 President Obama relied on defense and diplomacy and on development aid to pursue and promote his foreign policy objectives.
According to Lynch and Singh, Bush had continued the traditional US foreign policy approach.
“There was no “revolution” in American foreign policy; the Bush Doctrine – the set of ideas and the administration‟s world-view as set out in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) and Bush‟s West Point speech – is viewed by Lynch and Singh as fitting into, rather than departing from a foreign policy tradition that has long borne the hallmarks of unilateralism, the expansive interpretation of presidential power and the promotion of American values.”459
The same continuity had been observed under Obama‟s Presidency.
Bush Doctrine vs. Obama Doctrine:
The Bush administration articulated a series of post 9/11 counter-terror policies, which collectively came to be known as the Bush Doctrine. The NSS document of 2002 gave the legal basis to this Doctrine. It was based on Neoconservative ideology; the main points of the Bush Doctrine are as follows: States involved in supporting or harboring terrorist are terrorist Any aggressive country involved in acquiring WMDs is a threat to the US The US has the right to preemption to use military action unilaterally against any administration that poses a security threat even if it is not immediate
458 A. Dimitrova, “Obama‟s Foreign Policy: Between Pragmatic Realism and Smart Diplomacy?” Institute for Cultural Diplomacy: Cultural Diplomacy Research (2011) p.2. 459 Ellen Hallams, "From Crusader to Exemplar: Bush, Obama and the Reinvigoration of America‟s Soft Power." European journal of American studies 6, no. 1 (2011) p.5. 170
Pre-emption is unlimited, and not accountable to the UN or international law US policy promotes democracy worldwide, especially in the Middle East
However, this policy action resulted in violations of International Law that caused perpetual war and human rights abuses. France, Germany and some other European allies had not joined the US when it invaded Iraq and they viewed it as uncalled-for aggression against a nation not part in 9/11.
President Obama while addressing US strategic approach for enhancing national security, outlined the following strategic objectives:
The security of the US, its citizens, and US allies and partners; A strong innovative, and growing US economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and An international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.”460
President Obama selected Hillary Clinton as the Secretary of State, pressurized human right violators, relied more on soft and smart power and military force as the last option, trusted International institutions like UN to deal with the rogue nations like North Korea and Iran, attempted his best to tackle the erupting wars diplomatically, banned torture pursued law enforcement, but he had failed to close Guantánamo despite his firm resolve, relented on military commission trials, continued CIA‟s rendition of suspect to other nations, invoked state secrets to block lawsuits on disclosure.461
President Obama relied on cooperation and multilateralism while dealing with Foreign policy challenges. His unofficial motto “don‟t do stupid shit” meant that rushing to interfere
460 Barack Obama, "National Security Strategy” (Washington, DC: White House, May 2010) p.7.Accessed
Organizational Capacities:
President Bush possessed a highly qualified cabinet to formulate his policies, yet he could not manage and supervise them effectively. The top-down approach was his choice in terms of governance. This information was considered using already formed options and substitutes.463 The White House adopted this top-down management approach. He could not be able to create a structure system of policy and information. He did not have the ability to anticipate decision making. Therefore, there was lack of decisive means of victory to fight terrorism and liberating people from Saddam Hussain administration.464 There was another problem that was the absence of structured discussions between the Bush administration and his advisors. It was much needed to pay attention to non-military measures. They should have thought of consequences of use of hard power, unfortunately, no such thing happened.465
Methods of Engagement
Kazemzadeh pointed it out that the key difference between Presidents Bush and Obama was their methods of engagement with the rest of the world.466 President Obama kept up multilateral institutions and asserted that the US should get the support of the international
462 Dan Roberts, "Obama on US Foreign Policy: Principled Realist or Failed Isolationist?" The Guardian (2014) pp. 7-9. 463 Victoria Neely, “Presidential Personality And Foreign Policymaking”, Retrieved from < http://www.hofstra.edu/pdf/library/neelyulrawinner2015.pdf> on April 21, 2017. p. 44. 464 Ibid. 465 James P. Pfiffner, “Decision Making in the Obama White House”, Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (2011) pp. 244-262. 466 Masoud Kazemzadeh, “The Emerging Obama Doctrine”, American Foreign Policy Interests 32, no.3 (2010) pp.194-95. 172 community to sort out global issues, while President Bush preferred unilateralism to pursue American goals i.e. invasion of Iraq. President Bush came with the Preemptive Doctrine to wage preventive war against even perceived threats. Obama‟s administration did not follow unilateral action and prioritized American involvement in the world within the parameters of international institutions to develop more cooperation than conquest. President Obama was awarded a Nobel Prize in 2009 and the Norwegian Nobel Committee (2009) stated, “Multilateral diplomacy had regained a central position, with emphasis on the role that the United Nations and other international institutions could play. Dialogue and negotiations were “preferred as instruments for resolving even the most difficult international conflicts.”467
President Bush‟s reliance on unilateral action affected its relationship with the European allies who were against the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Some Foreign policy experts of the US believed that the Bush administration had without any reason annoyed other governments by adopting a series of “go it alone” policies on the situation, in the Middle East, and on the role of international institutions such as the United Nations.468 While behind President Obama‟s, Samantha Power and Anne-Marine Slaughter, as his key Foreign Policy advisors. Feith and Cropsey has pointed it out that Samantha Power encouraged Obama to be apologetic in his Foreign Policy approach and make it clear to the world that he did not endorse the foreign policy strategies of the past presidencies. Slaughter stated that “the more that America is respected and admired in the world, the greater will our diplomatic powers be” and that “it is selfish and unproductive for the US to protect its right and ability to act unilaterally to advance its national interests.”469
Dealing with the Islamic World:
9/11 and consequent invasions of Islamic countries generated the impression that the US is against Islam and Muslims. However, President Bush attempted to nullify this image by his early speeches that the US will not be at war with Islam. Elliot Abrams, who served as deputy
467 Jack Barton, “Critically assess the similarities and differences in foreign policy between the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama”, Retrieved from < https://clumpjack.wordpress.com/2015/01/16/critically- assess-the-similarities-and-differences-in-foreign-policy-between-the-administrations-of-george-w-bush-and-barak- obama/ >, on April 5, 2017. 468 Michael Mastandun, “After Bush: A Return to Multilateralism in US Foreign Policy?” Politics 30 (2008) pp. 33- 46. 469 Douglas D. Feith and Seth Cropsey, “The Obama Doctrine Defined”, Commentary 132, (2011) p.15. 173
National Security Adviser to George W. Bush told Eli Lake, “We were invading two Muslim countries, and we were being accused of being at war with Islam. The administration wanted to make it very clear that we were not at war with Islam and every Muslim in the world.470 President Obama more forcefully described this distinction and sympathized with Muslims who unfairly experienced discriminated after 9/11.He stated that “And when it comes to America and Islam, there is no us and them- there is only us because millions of Muslim Americans are part of the fabric of our country.”471
President Bush‟s invasion of some Islamic countries weakened his power over foreign policy as well as destroyed some countries for many years to come. Although the world stood by the US in its war against terrorism, however inconsistent policies damaged the US image abroad badly, particularly under President Bush. In Iraq, the US launched a war on terror to deal with the threat of WMDs, the same view was developed for Iran but no real measures could be taken. His approach towards Turkey established a troublesome relationship between them in which the US asked for much more than the Turks were willing to give.472
On taking the charge President Obama vowed to bring some changes for the Islamic community and he said, the “US is not and never will be at war with Islam.”473Some of his promises were fulfilled like the withdrawal of forces from Iraq, some could not be accomplished like the resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His decision not to get indulged in rigorous actions during Arab spring while attacking Libya gave the impression that US foreign policy had been more committed to what the rest of the world wanted. He successfully dealt with the Iran
470 Domenico Montanaro, Lisa Desjardins, Rachel Wellford and Simone Pathe, “Who said it? Bush vs. Obama on Islam”, PBS Newshour, February 19, 2015, Retrieved from < http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/said-obama-vs- bush-islam/> on April 14, 2014. 471 President Barrack Obama, “Full text of President Obama‟s 2014 address to the United Nations General Assembly”, September, 24, 2014, New York City, NY ,Retrieved from < https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-2014-address-to-the-united-nations-general- assembly/2014/09/24/88889e46-43f4-11e4-b437-1a7368204804_story.html?utm_term=.73b4494e268c > on April 4, 2017. 472 Joana Margarida Jacinto Ribeiro, “President Obama vs. President W. Bush: Can a President‟s Leadership Style be an Effective and efficient Influence for US Diplomacy and Foreign Policy?” (PhD diss., Universidade Da Beira Interior, Covilha, 2013) p.44. 473 President Barrack Obama, “Full text of President Obama‟s 2014 address to the United Nations General Assembly”, September, 24, 2014, New York City. 174 issue. Towards Turkey, he made his efforts to improve his ties as this country had supported the US since the cold war.474
Leadership Styles and Decision-Making in Foreign Policy:
Under President Bush, his NSC team operated in a closed system, where information was shared within the circle, but differing information was only scarcely allowed inside.475 He resorted to a management style that fit the deep divide that existed among his advisors. He insisted upon group cohesion.476 The insistence on group cohesion led his group members like Colin Powell to reserve their opinions so as to remain within the circle. In this manner, an environment was created in which the dominant group such as the hawks were often preferred over those of the out-group. According to Robert Jervis, President Bush was a pragmatic and consensus-minded individual who saw American leadership as restricted to defending narrow and traditional vital interests. While President Obama‟s choice for foreign policy matters was not only determined by his team also by the way he supervised them. His management style was highly consultative/thoughtful and formalistic. He used to give space to the dissenting views coming from his team over foreign policy matters and made it sure that these different views are not only heard but also considered. His management style asked for a sense of openness to outcomes and processes. Issues and options, not people were at the heart of his decision-making approach.477
President Bush and Obama sharply differed from each other in their decision-making regarding war. President Bush claimed himself to be a gut player rather than an analytical decision-maker. The decision-making under his presidency was often marked by secrecy, a lack of thoughtfulness, and the exclusion of members of his team and the career services who ordinarily would have been consulted on important decisions. While Obama‟s approach was inclusive as well as consistent with scholarly conclusions that “multiple advocacies” would best
474 Joana Margarida Jacinto Ribeiro, “President Obama vs. President W. Bush: Can a President‟s Leadership Style be an Effective and efficient Influence for US Diplomacy and Foreign Policy?. 52. 475 Sara M. Birkenthal, “Grand Strategy in US Foreign Policy: The Carter, Bush and Obama Doctrines” (2013) p.53. 476 Sara M. Birkenthal, “Grand Strategy in US Foreign Policy: The Carter, Bush and Obama Doctrines” (2013) p.53. 477 James P.Pfiffner, "Decision making in the Obama white house." Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (2011) p.249.; Robert Singh, Barack Obama's post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012. 175 inform presidential decision making.478 President Bush created pressure on his team for taking a quick decision and was engrossed with the idea to respond with an attack after 9/11 while President Obama showed his determination to act with strategy and purpose even that took a lot more time to decide about what to do.479
Defense Spending:
Since 1945, it had been the War on terror that had consumed the maximum chunk of US budget under its defense. President Bush launched the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq to retaliate for the 9/11 attacks, cost $1.161 trillion to the US during his administration. President Obama rolled backed both the wars, withdrew troops from Iraq in 2011 and Afghanistan in 2014. He relied more on military intelligence and technological advancement to hunt OBL480 and spent $ 813 billion.
Use of Diplomacy
President Obama emphasized the use of transformational diplomacy as compared to President Bush who relied mostly on coercive diplomacy. President Obama‟s strategy emphasized the promotion rather than an imposition of democracy over other states.481 President Bush had set out narrow plans for the pursuance and promotion of his national interests while President Obama had a strategic vision, but was not dogmatic and had not offered an oversimplified view of the world.482
Popularity of Bush and Obama
The flawed policy responses resulted in the dropping of the rating of President Bush. President Bush had approval ratings that were among both the highest and lowest in US history. At the beginning of 2009, when he left office his overall approval rating was 22 percent.483 It
478 Ibid., pp. 244-262. 479 Emily Dalgo, “Bush and Obama Pre- and Post-9/11: A Comparative Analysis” , Clock Clouds Blog, Feb1, 2016. Retrieved from https://edspace.american.edu/clocksandclouds/2016/02/01/bush-and-obama-pre-and-post-911-a- comparative-analysis/ on May 18, 2017. 480 War on Terror Facts, Costs and Timeline: Whose Spent More on War? Bush or Obama? The Balance, Retrieved from < https://www.thebalance.com/war-on-terror-facts-costs-timeline-3306300>, on April 5, 2017. 481 Sara M. Birkenthal, “Grand Strategy in US Foreign Policy: The Carter, Bush and Obama Doctrines” (2013) p.69. 482 Ibid., p.89. 483 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, p.174. 176 was mainly due to the opening of the Iraq war especially when it was proved that Iraq did not possess WMDs that were the basis of his justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In 2007 a Stern Magazine poll shown to world peace, at two-third of Germans believed the US represented a greater threat than Iran a feeling that was shared in many countries of the world.484 In a poll of best and worst Presidents conducted by the Siena College Research Institute's President Obama secured 15th position while President Bush was positioned among bottom five along with Franklin Pierce, Warren G. Harding, James Buchanan, and Andrew Johnson.485
Use of Drones
Overall, Obama‟s approach had been based on smart power that combines reliance on hard and soft power. As far as the use of drones is concerned, Obama has proven himself to be more hardliner than Bush. President Obama focused on American edge over technology and relied more on the use of UAVs than boots on the ground.486 He conducted airstrikes in seven countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. That added three more countries than George W. Bush who did it in Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan.487 In some instances, President Obama had proven to be more hardliner than President Bush like “in 2010 alone, the US administration had authorized 118 drone strikes compared to the 44 authorized under Bush administration between 2004 and 2008.”488 The use of drones under Obama was reported to be six times more than those which were done under Bush‟s eight years.489 The effective and intense use of drones had proven effective to kill Taliban leaders like Baitullah Mehsud, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor (July 21, 2016), etc., however, it raised moral, ethical and legal issues.
484 John E. Rielly, “The Obama Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis”, CARI the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, July 2013. 485 Mallie Jane Kim, “Survey Ranks Obama 15th Best President, Bush among Worst”, US News, July 2, 2010. Retrieved from < https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/07/02/survey-ranks-obama-15th-best-president-bush- among-worst> on April 13, 2017. 486 “George W Bush and Barak Obama Foreign Policies Politics Essay”, UK Essays, March 23, 2015, retrieved from < https://www.ukessays.com/essays/politics/george-w-bush-and-barak-obama-foreign-policies-politics-essay.php> on April 14, 2017. 487 “Some 2,500 Americans Have Died in Afghanistan and Iraq under Obama”, Rolling Stone, Retrieved from http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/some-2-500-americans-have-died-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-under-obama- 20160530 on April 8, 2017. 488 Luca Tardelli, "Obama‟s Interventions: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya." LSE Ideas (2011). 489“Obama 2013 Pakistan Drone Strikes”, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (2013).Retrieved < https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/obama-2013-pakistan-drone-strikes> (accesses February 6, 2018). 177
5.2-President Bush and President Obama’s Approaches in Afghanistan: A Comparative Analysis
War on Terror in Afghanistan:
Rogers stated, both the Presidents have dealt differently with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq under the WoT.490 Initially President Bush did not station a large number of ground forces to deal with the Afghan issue he stayed contented over his light footprint strategy. However, in the ending months of his second term, President Bush decided to upsurge the forces in Afghanistan in order to attain an absolute conquest over the Taliban and to bring stability to the war-torn region. Obama, on the other, followed the same policy of troops surge on the ground, but that was meant to finally pull out its forces from Afghanistan after negotiations with the Taliban and associated groups. President Bush acted unilaterally, refused to indulge in negotiations, resisted against requests of diplomacy by the international community and stayed independent of others. The officials of the Bush administration perceived that by involving the other countries weaker militaries with them would only increase the time span for achieving their goals and will also reduce the effectiveness of US forces in WOT491 according to Lafeber. However, President Obama‟s administration has relied on increased negotiation for the resolution of the conflict and to eventually withdraw its troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, showed multilateral negotiation as an aspect of his foreign policy.492
The situation of Afghanistan under the two terms of Bush worsened, the Taliban regrouped and reemerged and continued to challenge both the Afghan government as well as the coalition forces along with the US. President Obama deliberated with three changes in his Afghan policy, he decided to escalate the war, changed the approach from defeating to degrading the Taliban and increased the troops by 30,000 in 2010. He carefully considered all the policy options coming from his advisors. His approach towards military decision making towards Afghanistan differed sharply from his predecessor who relied on informal meetings and often
490 Paul Rogers, “Global Terrorism”, in Michael Cox and Dr. Doug Stokes (ed.) US Foreign Policy. 2nd edition. (Oxford University Press, 2012) pp.351-373. 491 W. Lafeber, (2002) „The Bush Doctrine‟, Diplomatic History, 26, no.4 (2002), pp. 543-558. 492 Jack Barton, “Critically assess the similarities and differences in foreign policy between the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama”, Retrieved from < https://clumpjack.wordpress.com/2015/01/16/critically- assess-the-similarities-and-differences-in-foreign-policy-between-the-administrations-of-george-w-bush-and-barak- obama/ >, on April 5, 2017. 178 excluded essential political and career staff from the deliberations.493 Despite all these measures by Presidents Bush and Obama, they both had not been successful to attain their objectives in Afghanistan. Though the US has partially succeeded in instigating physical damage to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, yet they remained relatively failed in completely rooting out them. Table 5.1: Obama’s War on terror in Afghanistan
George W. Bush Barack Obama End Result* Operation Enduring Operation Freedom 2005:11th Afghanistan Freedom 2001 Sentinel 2015 2014:7th UNSC Resolution Resolute Support 2016: 9th most fragile 1373 and 1368 Mission 2015** state in the world *Fragile State Index ** These facts are compiled by the author. Source Aneta Hiavsova, “Involved in Middle East: George W Bush versus Barack Obama” (ETH Zurich, Centre for Security Studies, 29 June 2017) p.5. President Obama made a big break from President Bush by renouncing the torturing techniques like waterboarding and other “enhanced” interrogation techniques and brought reforms in the military-tribunal process. However, he could not close Guantánamo Bay despite firm pledges.494 He expanded the use of drone strikes to further his covert anti-terrorism campaign to target the desired places in other countries like Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan, etc. This change in policy was because Obama “found himself constrained by the realities of the international system; a deeply ingrained mistrust of the United States, resistance to US power, and the rise of emerging power centers.”495
Foreign Policy Biases of Bush and Obama: Groupthink vs. Polythink Approach in case of Afghanistan
The initial decision to invade Afghanistan was considered as profoundly embedded in the Groupthink mentality which had been a product of the shocking and shaking events of 9/11. Whereas the decision to withdraw faced internal divide and dissenting views of NSC decision-
493 James P. Pfiffner, “Decision Making in the Obama White House”." Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (2011) pp. 244-262. 494 John Cassidy, “Obama and the Bush Legacy: A Scorecard”, The New Yorker, May 31, 2012. 495 Ellen Hallams, "From Crusader to Exemplar: Bush, Obama and the Reinvigoration of America‟s Soft Power." European journal of American studies6, no.1 (2011). pp.3-6. 179 making elites marked a polythink process that deeply inhibited the development of a cohesive strategy for the successful conclusion of the war.496 Mintz and Wayne wrote:
“The decision to enter Afghanistan is widely accepted as a necessary policy choice, yet the process by which that decision was made was not necessarily as positive. Indeed, President Bush decision-making team has often been characterized as suffering from a deep Groupthink mentality that harmed the pursuit of crucial foreign policy goals.”497 Bush‟s goals in the Afghan war were to knock down the Taliban from power and incapacitate AQ and in Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein to stop him from developing WMDs and to help it to establish a democratic government. According to Hybel, the policy objectives and then his actions came under the non-compensatory process. Because President Bush immediately after 9/11 decided to respond aggressively. He and his team did not indulge in compensatory analysis to assign values to different possible outcomes498 and avoided planning for contingencies and long-term policy development.
On the other hand, President Obama‟s FPDM partially fell under Polythink. This diversified portfolio of President Obama created a conducive environment for independent thought and contradictory interests among the decision-making body.499 Opposite to Groupthink, it stood for independent thoughts and existence of contradictory interest among groups. President Obama listened to the opinions of his advisors and gave them full liberties to present and defend their views at NSC forum, by doing all this he was able to get more information, which helped him to finalize his decision.500 However, Polythink symptoms including intragroup conflict, confusion and lack of communications, limited review of policy options, a failure to reappraise previously rejected alternatives, biased information processing with varying degrees were present in the early years of the Obama team.501
Economic Cost of War on Terror: Bush vs. Obama
496 Alex Mintz & Carly Wayne, The Polythink syndrome: US foreign policy decisions on 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and ISIS (Stanford University Press, 2016) p.67. 497 Ibid., p.68. 498 Hybel, US Foreign Policy Decision-making from Kennedy to Obama: Responses to International Challenges, p.155. 499 Ibid., p.172. 500 Ibid., p.173. 501 Alex Mintz & Carly Wayne, The Polythink syndrome: US foreign policy decisions on 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and ISIS (Stanford University Press, 2016) p.70. 180
President Bush is responsible for the budgets from FY 2002 - FY 2009, also added $31 billion to the FY 2011 budget specified for the War on Terror. The total for those nine years is $1.161 trillion. While, President Obama focused on defense reduction, dropped even using the phrase "War on Terror." He got the Nobel Peace Prize for pulling troops out of Iraq in 2011. But his spending on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars still totaled $825 billion. That's 30 percent less than President Bush's expenditure.502
Table 5.2: Economic Cost of War on Terror: Bush vs. Obama
FY WoT OCO DoD Budget VA(Veterans Affairs) Total Boots on Increase Budget Increase WoT Ground* 2001 $22.9 $6.5 $1.5 $31.0 9,700 2002 $16.9 $40.8 $1.5 $59.1 9,700 2003 $72.5 $36.7 $2.6 $111.9 136,800 2004 $90.8 $11.6 $2.6 $105.0 169,900 2005 $75.6 $23.6 $3.1 $102.3 175,803 2006 $115.8 $10.5 $0.7 $127.0 154,220 2007 $166.3 $20.9 $5.3 $192.5 186,563 2008 $186.9 $47.5 $1.2 $235.6 181,000 2009 $153.1 $34.2 $9.8 $197.1 183,300 2010 $162.4 $14.7 $3.9 $181.0 144,205 2011 $158.8 $0.3 $3.3 $162.4 105,555 2012 $115.1 $2.2 $2.3 $119.6 65,800 2013 $82.0 -$34.9 $2.6 $49.6 43,300 2014 $85.2 $0.8 $2.0 $88.0 32,500 Total 1,504.3 215.4 42.4 1,762.1 ------*Boots on ground is the number of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Source: “War on Terror Facts, Costs and Timeline: Whose Spent More on War? Bush or Obama?” The Balance, Retrieved from < https://www.thebalance.com/war-on-terror-facts-costs- timeline-3306300>, on October 13, 2017. Human Cost of War:
502 “War on Terror Facts, Costs and Timeline: Whose Spent More on War? Bush or Obama?” The Balance, Retrieved from < https://www.thebalance.com/war-on-terror-facts-costs-timeline-3306300>, on April 5, 2017. 181
Since the launch of WoT, about 26,270 civilians had died by direct war-related violence and more than 29,900 civilians had been injured in the Afghan war.503 The rest of the killings including the Afghan military and Police, Taliban and other militants, US and allied forces, civilian contractors, NGO humanitarian workers, Journalists, and Media workers have been mentioned in the following table.
Table 5.3: Estimated Total War Deaths and Injuries in Afghanistan, 2001-2014
Killed Wounded*
Afghan Civilians 26,270 29,970
Afghan Military and Police 23,470 17,000
Taliban and Other Militants 35,000 15,000
US Forces 2,357 20,067
US Allies 1,139 3,800**
Civilian Contractors 3,401 13,480
NGO Humanitarian Workers 331 259
Journalists and Media workers 25 unknown
Total 91,991 99,676
* Incomplete and estimated **Only including UK, Canadian, French and German wounded Source: Neta C. Crawford, War-related Death, Injury and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2015.p.18.
US Military Fatalities in Afghanistan
503 Neta C. Crawford, War-related Death, Injury and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2015.p.1. 182
The US military fatalities under the eight-year of President Bush‟s rule were noted to be 564 which were since then got quadrupled and reached 2,247 under Obama. There were 1,689 US military deaths in Afghanistan under Obama, a figure that marked up more than 75 percent of all US losses since the start of the war in October 2001. The number of US military injuries had witnessed seven times increase from 2,702 under Bush to 20,237. The number of US military injuries under Obama 17535 stood for 90 percent of all injuries since the start of the war in 2001. On shifting the presidency from Bush to Obama violence in Afghanistan significantly increased and touched its apex in 2010 by reportedly killing of 310 US troops in 2009, 499 in 2010, 418 in 2011, 310 in 2012,127 in 2013, and 55 in 2014 respectively. While under President Bush, US military casualties were reported to be 155 at its peak in 2008.
Table 5.4: Year-wise Detail of Coalition Military Fatalities 2001-2014
Total Total Fatalities Fatalities Year US UK Other Year US UK Other under the Obama under Bush administration administration
2001 12 0 0 12 2009 317 108 96 521 2002 49 3 18 70 2010 499 103 109 711 2003 48 0 10 58 2011 418 46 102 566 2004 52 1 7 60 2012 310 44 48 402 2005 99 1 31 131 2013 127 9 25 161 2006 98 39 54 191 2014 55 6 14 75 2007 117 42 73 232 ------2008 155 51 89 295 ------
Source: “Operation Enduring Freedom”, http://icasualties.org/oef/ (accessed October 3, 2017).
Graph 5.1-Afghanistan Direct Civilian War Deaths 2001-2014 183
Afghanistan Direct Civilian War Deaths 2001-2014 4000 3500
3000
2500 2000
1500 Civilians Civilians Killed 1000 500 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Years
Source: Neta C. Crawford, War-related Death, Injury and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2015.p.1.
OBL hunt under Bush and Obama:
Both administrations were anxious to capture OBL either dead or alive to bring him to justice. However, under President Bush‟s term, the efforts to hunt OBL became somewhat marginalized and it could not remain a top priority agenda for the US. In 2001, the Bush administration came close to finding OBL at the battle of Tora Bora, he had not yet fled Afghanistan but had gone deep underground. Unfortunately, the government did not commit enough US ground troops to hunt him and outsourced most of the work to local forces despite it being a crucial objective. The US bombed aggressively but never had more than 100 troops on the ground to cover a huge area.”504 Therefore, OBL escaped. The top officials of the Bush administration declined requests of back-ups from commanders and intelligence officials who were fighting OBL, despite the availability of resources. President Bush admitted himself that “I truly am not that concerned about him. I am deeply concerned about Iraq.” “I really just don‟t
504 Ross Cohen, “Why didn't George W. Bush find and kill Osama bin Laden for 8 years, while Barack Obama took only 3 years to get him?”, Retrieved from < https://www.quora.com/Why-didnt-George-W-Bush-find-and-kill- Osama-bin-Laden-for-8-years-while-Barack-Obama-took-only-3-years-to-get-him> on April 6, 2017. 184 spend that much time on him, to be honest with you,”505 By 2006, “the trail for Bin Laden had gone “stone cold” and Weekly Standard editor Fred Barnes said Bush told him that hunting Bin Laden was “not a top priority use of American resources.”506
On assuming office, President Barack Obama revitalized the US efforts by deciding to end its war in Iraq and putting back the resources to intensify his efforts to hunt OBL. “Shortly after I got into office,” Obama disclosed after OBL killing, “I brought [then-CIA director] Leon Panetta privately into the Oval Office and I said to him, „We need to redouble our efforts in hunting bin Laden down. And I want us to start putting more resources, more focus, and more urgency into that mission.”507 His efforts finally succeeded him on May 2, 2011, when OBL got killed in a drone strike inside Pakistan.
Counter-Terrorism vs. Counterinsurgency
Counterterrorism (CT) was based on “offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.”508 It was designed to counter terrorist activity and was preferred by US Vice President Joe Biden for Afghanistan. AQ, Taliban, and other associated extremist groups were identified as a terrorist, operated in Afghanistan. They aimed to weaken the Afghan government and disrupt the US activities to bring stability and peace to Afghanistan and continued to attack against US and allied forces. CT is based on the intensive intelligence- gathering of small units, including Special Operations forces, implemented to locate and abolish terrorist areas with the reduced US military forces. Successful implementation would result in thwarting a future base for the terrorist groups in Afghanistan.509 This approach was utilized by President Bush and implemented through Operation Enduring Freedom that relied on airstrike,
505 Alex Seitz-Wald, “Analysis: Bush‟s Lackluster Hunt for Bin Laden”, Think Progress, May 3, 2011, Retrieved from https://thinkprogress.org/analysis-bushs-lackluster-hunt-for-bin-laden-8967e74272f6 on April 6, 2017. 506 Ibid. 507 Ben Armbruster, “Bush Credits „The Work That Was Done‟ During „My Presidency‟ For Osama Bin Laden‟s Death”, Think Progress, Sep 9, 2011, Retrieved from < https://thinkprogress.org/bush-credits-the-work- that-was-done-during-my-presidency-for-osama-bin-laden-s-death-8d56b08f07f6> on April 6, 2017. 508 Quoted in the US Army Field Manual, 2006, p. 4. 509 Shahzad Chaudhary, “Counterterrorism vs counterinsurgency: understanding Obama‟s Afghanistan decision” Retrieved from
While COIN was an effort by a government to defeat an insurgency. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal suggested a counterinsurgency approach to President Obama in order to accomplish the Afghan mission. Taliban were the insurgents in Afghanistan while the US and ISAF forces had been attempting to counter that insurgency by undermining their efforts to overthrow the governments. COIN included the deployment of troops to secure the population and to develop trust among the people to provide safety, security; these are aspects that had been given by insurgents. A successful attempt would eliminate the Taliban and would create a stable and trusted Afghan government.510 COIN was applied by President Obama by doing surge along with civilian measures and by developing a Partnership with the local population.
A CT effort focused on stopping the terrorist activities of the Taliban and AQ from organizing an attack against the US from Afghanistan. It did not focus on removing the Taliban due to the fact that the Taliban do not pose a physical threat to the US. COIN focused on removing Taliban leaders and worked for the establishment of a strong Afghan government capable of providing physical and financial securities along with the fair judicial system. For accomplishing these objectives, it relied on increased forces.
The Counter-Terrorism policy of President Bush and President Obama's policy of the COIN remained relatively failed to completely defeat the terrorist organizations in Afghanistan. As Andrew Bacevich argued that despite long military engagements against terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military forces remained relatively failed to defeat them. He argues that the success of the operations lies in the involvement and support of the citizens for the operations against terrorism.511 President Bush and President Obama deal with war against terrorism, during the tenure of both of these presidents, troops remained relatively failed to defeat the terrorist organizations. After the relative failure, both of these presidents, rely upon private mercenary firms along with troops to fight against terrorism.512 Both of these
510 Ibid. 511 Andrew Becavich, Breach of Trust; How Americans Failed their Soldiers and Their Country, (Metropolitan books, 2013) p. 29. 512 Ibid. 186 presidents had a different policy outlook to deal with the threat of terrorism in Afghanistan, but they adopted the military-based foreign policy and ended in relative failure in Afghanistan.
State-Building and Nation-Building under Bush and Obama administration:
Initially Bush administration was not interested in state-building. He has also admitted this fact and stated that in his memoir, “Decision Points, after 9/11, I changed my mind.”513 So, after the invasion of Afghanistan, his team realized the need for building Afghan infrastructure and institutions for bringing stability to this war-torn country. However, it has been evident state- building cannot be achieved at gunpoint by an intervening power. It is an evolutionary and a political process, which requires consistent actions. But, the intervening powers usually mold their policies on the basis of their objectives that‟s why achieving a meaningful success proves difficult. Bush started a state building program that was carried on by Obama. Obama initially enlarged reconstruction funding due to his belief that effective Afghan governance was a prerequisite for success, but quickly second-guessed himself and subsequently reduced civilian aid every year thereafter. In 2015 Obama declared that “We are no longer in nation-building mode.”514
Since 2002, the US has allocated around $ 117 billion to rebuild Afghanistan, to strengthen its armed forces, build state-capacity, support development, and counter drug trafficking. But, its achievement remains negligible in this regard. Because the “US has implemented state-building “in” Afghanistan but not “of” Afghanistan, since the latter seems to be mission impossible”515 and declared every state-building effort as “a long slog.”516
Long War
According to Christi Parsons and W.J. Hennigan President Obama, who aimed to bring peace, rather lead the Afghan nation in war,517 the US has been at war for 2,687 days. This made him the President who had remained under war longer than any other president in the history of
513 Grzegorz Gil, “The Obama Administration‟s State-Building in Afghanistan." TEKA of Political Science and International Relations 12, no. 2 (2018) p.90. 514 Grzegorz Gil, “The Obama Administration‟s State-Building in Afghanistan." TEKA of Political Science and International Relations 12, no. 2 (2018) p.96. 515 Ibid., p.100. 516 Ibid., p.96. 517 Christi Parsons and W.J. Hennigan, “President Obama, who hoped to sow peace, instead led the nation in war”, Los Angeles Times, Jan 13, 2017. 187 the US. Gen. Joseph Dunford said on being chosen by President Obama as Joint Chiefs of Staff “Mr. President, we've been at war throughout your tenure,” “That's a period longer than any other American president.”518 Though he assumed the charge to end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but he remained under a constant state of war in his consecutive two terms.
Negotiations: Bush vs. Obama
Bush administration was not at all interested in opening any talk or negotiation channel with the Taliban. That is why they refuted attempts from Taliban leader in 2002 to negotiate, and the Taliban leader was put in Guantanamo Bay where kept for four years. It took more than seven years by then President Bush to decide when on General Petraeus agreed to negotiate with the moderate Taliban. While President Obama was in favor of talks, but it was not until the summer of 2010 when the Afghan-led talks were formally started. Numerous international countries offered their good offices and played their part to make negotiations likely. Finally, with all these efforts, negotiations were started, however it remained confined till talks for the sake of talks and nothing else.
Systemic constraints/ Attention Deficit towards afghan policymaking: Bush vs. Obama
Some national security challenges were at the top of Obama‟s agenda during his first term. However, during his second term, his foreign policy suffered serious international and domestic challenges. The US people got frustrated with the long war, huge losses of economic resources resulted in severe cuts on the defense budget,519 and crisis in Europe affected NATO‟s international commitment. Obama‟s reputation suffered a decline due to these issues nationally as well as internationally. In areas more traditionally associated with foreign policy, Obama, working with European allies (and Russia) helped build a successful diplomatic drive, backed by multilateral sanctions, which persuaded Iran to freeze its enrichment of bomb-grade uranium. That required a departure from the symbolic but ineffective unilateral maximalism of his predecessors on the Iran nuclear issue. The compromise deal Obama agreed to offers no administration-change, no long-term guarantees and no cost-free concessions from Iran. What it
518 David Welna, “After 8 Years of Unbroken War, Obama Hands Over Conflicts To Trump”, Parallels, Jan 18, 2017.Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/01/18/510447582/after-8-years-of-unbroken-war- obama-hands-over-conflicts-to-trump on April 14, 2014. 519 A. Carati, and A. Nasti. "Definitely Maybe: What's the Real Obama Signature on US Defence Policies?" Analysis 219 (2013) p.1. 188 does offer is much improved short- and medium-term prospects for halting, or at least slowing, Tehran‟s progress toward producing nuclear weapons. Obama focused his efforts on achieving just this kind of deal from the day he took office, spent substantial political capital overcoming congressional resistance to it and deserves considerable credit for getting it done.
Obama revived the ties with European allies and Russia. He successfully dealt with Iran and persuaded Iran to freeze its nuclear program. He sought engagement with China and Russia to promote a softer image of the US. It marked a clear difference in Foreign policy from the stance of President Bush. “The compromise deal President Obama agreed to offers no administration-change, no long-term guarantees and no cost-free concessions from Iran. What it does offer is much improved short- and medium-term prospects for halting, or at least slowing, Tehran‟s progress toward producing nuclear weapons.”520
In most of the policy areas discussed above, President Obama‟s achievements, shortfalls and still uncertain outcomes relate to incremental inflections of US foreign policy. That is how most American presidential legacies are, or should be judged, at least at the point when those presidents are about to leave the office. And, judged in these terms, President Obama‟s overall record and legacy are distinctly positive (especially when compared to that of his immediate predecessor).
Though President Obama‟s stance is a legacy an approach towards dealing with national security issues, these appeared constructive, however, in terms of results it formed a pattern of continuity with then President Bush. As in an interview, Dr. Khan said: “in the US, there has been a set pattern of foreign and security policy and that the President follows belonging either to Republicans or Democrats follows those set patterns to attain their national interests.”521 Though, the President and the executive branch enjoy a significant role in finalizing foreign policy decisions. However, there has been a power hierarchy that plays a role in decision-making. So, the overall objectives of every administration like American supremacy and leadership role remain unchanged.
How Domestic factors influenced President Bush and President Obama's Afghan Policy
520 David Unger, "The Foreign Policy Legacy of Barack Obama." The International Spectator 51, no. 4 (2016) p. 5. 521 Dr. Muhammad Khan, International Islamic University, January 18, 2019. 189
President Bush and President Obama had to deal with the menace of terrorism. Afghanistan remained the first war theater of war on terrorism during the time period of both these Presidents. President Bush had to start the global war on terrorism and President Obama had to continue fighting till the total defeat of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Both of these Presidents designed their foreign policy towards Afghanistan in the context of the global war on terrorism. The NCR Realism provided the theoretical basis for the foreign policy of these two presidents. Anarchy at global level, as well as domestic factors, influenced and shaped the foreign policy of these two presidents.
Anarchy at the global level forced both of these presidents to adopt the military-based foreign policy towards Afghanistan because in the anarchic system states act as power maximizers and wanted to safeguard their interests. The phenomenon of terrorism challenged the security of the US on its soil as well, as on the foreign fronts. Therefore, the anarchic system compelled the US to wage the global war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Apart from the anarchy, there were different domestic factors as well and these domestic factors affected the foreign policy of these presidents differently. The domestic factors remained the same, but they influenced differently the policy decisions of both Presidents.
President Bush assumed the office in January 2001, and his decision to wage the global war on terrorism was supported by 88 percent of the US population.522 But when President Obama assumed office the population was evenly divided on the issue and 50 to 60% of the population supported the policy of the president to send more troops to Afghanistan.523 The government sensitivity remained an important factor during the tenure of both these Presidents. President Bush had the 51percent public approval prior to the tragic incident of 9/11 but the anger, fear and a sense of revenge among the public raised the political support of President Bush to 86%. However, the situation for President Obama was slightly different. He criticized the policies of President Bush and got public approval. But, when he adopted the same policies and remained relatively failed to address the issue of terrorism, his public approval touched the
522 Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn (eds.) Global Response To Terrorism; 9/11 Afghanistan and Beyond (London, Routledge, 2003) p.55. 523 Richard C. Eichenberg, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the Obama Era” https://as.tufts.edu/politicalscience/sites/all/themes/asbase/assets/documents/eichenberg/politiqueAmericaine.pdf (Accessed on March 11, 2019). 190 lowest extreme of 38% during the September 2014 polls.524 The perceptions of decision-makers influenced foreign policy. The decision-makers in both administrations perceived the level of threat and adopted the policies accordingly. The Bush administration identified enemies as Taliban and Al-Qaeda and decided to wage a war against terrorism in Afghanistan. The Obama administration, however, had to continue that policy to deal with terrorism in Afghanistan.
Control of Corruption
Afghanistan‟s rank had been 117th in 2005 under the corruption perception index, which had seen a constant decline since then by swinging around 172-180. All of the US and international community‟s efforts along with the Afghan government had failed to effectively deal with it. Various programs were initiated to control governmental and prevalent corruption in other fields of life, but all ended in vain. Keeping the severity of Afghan corruption, the World Bank and other international partners like ADB, DFID, and UNDP had conducted Vulnerabilities to Corruption Assessments (VCAs) for a number of sectors, agencies, and key government functions.525 However, still much needed to be done to effectively deal with corruption. The following graph showed Afghan‟s constant deteriorating rank in CPI.
Graph 5.2: Afghanistan’s Rank in CPI (2001-2014)
Afghanistan's rank in Corruption Perception Index
200 179 180 172 176 176 174 175 172 180
160 140 117 120 100 80 60
Rank Afghanistan of 40 20 0 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Years
524 Obama Averages 47.9% Job Approval as President, Gallup poll http://news.gallup.com/poll/202742/obama-averages-job-approval-president.aspx.(Accessed on March 11, 2019). 525 “Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan”, the World Bank, (May 2009) p.1. 191
Source: Data were taken from “Corruption Perceptions Index 2014: Results”, Transparency International, Retrieved from
5.3-Conclusion
The US under Barack Obama had proven to be less assertive, less power- minded, less focused on the unilateral action and attempted to operate through multilateralism as compared to Bush administration. During his concluding years, Bush admitted that his strategy initially worked well but in the long run it failed due to the scarcity of resources.
President Bush and President Obama differed a lot in their styles of foreign policy decision-making, however, policies appeared more or less the same. Changes were found in continuity i.e. President Obama never challenged President Bush‟s fundamental assumption that America had to wage a global war on terror. Both Presidents chose the military option along with other means, however, both differed sharply over the question of Iraq. Obama had been able to make some notable accomplishments like narrowing down of mission in Afghanistan, assassination of OBL, operationalization of ANDSF, closing of Iraq mission, tactful handling of Iranian nuclear issue, pivot to Asia and shifted attention from Europe to Asia to keep a check on China‟s rise, supported promotion of democracy rather imposition to tackle Arab spring. However, the other side of the picture had been that the US left its mission incomplete and the removal of US forces would provide a conducive ground to the enemy to regain its lost power. President Bush invaded Iraq, while President Obama characterized it as a grave mistake and a war of choice. President Bush trusted his intuitions, President Obama relied on his analytical skills. President Bush was impatient, President Obama was tolerant. President Bush spoke in decisive terms and took decisive actions while Obama offered proud hesitation. Bush was keen to take risks while President Obama showed ambition to take uncalculated steps. President Bush spent little time reviewing intelligence, President Obama appraised it regularly. President Bush did not allow questions during foreign policy deliberations while President Obama encouraged it. President Bush refused to question his decisions while President Obama took it as a point to reassess his decisions. President Obama avoided rapid decision-making while President Bush did it. To, conclude President Bush demanded little of his cognitive resources while President Obama demanded much. The commonality that both shared has the fact that the two were Presidents and none of them had any prior experience of FPDM. 192
The National Security discourse of both Presidents rested upon the ideals of American national values and character that envisioned freedom, human dignity, human rights, opportunities, commitment to progress that makes it different from the rest of the world. President Obama viewed that these most cherished values were not kept up under President Bush administration however they both were found on the same page on the question of the terrorist threat and considered their battle with terrorists as just.
CONCLUSION
Since the disastrous attacks of 9/11, both the ruling administrations of the US had struggled hard to bring security and stability to war-torn Afghanistan by establishing a democratic government which that be inhospitable for Taliban and AQ, in their own ways. Nevertheless, the goal of a stable Afghanistan has been proven as hard as it hosted a multiethnic and divided society who had their own political agendas and remained engaged in a continuous struggle for power. Afghanistan remained home to social unrest, political instability and economic fragility that added further fuel to fire. Against this background achieving meaningful success in Afghanistan had not been an easier and quicker task for Bush and Obama administrations respectively.
The US war in Afghanistan could also be seen with the prism of changing goals. Under President Bush, it started with the CIA and Special Forces mission to oust the Taliban and eliminate AQ‟s network advanced quickly into a UN-supported mission to build and stabilize Afghanistan. In 2003 on the assumption of ISAF control, NATO further expanded and proliferated the mission. Over the period of the next three years the US focused its shift towards Iraq, the inattention towards Afghanistan along with limited resources enabled the Taliban to re- enter and reemerge in Afghanistan and established their control in some parts of the country. President Obama narrowed down the war goals and increased men (force) and money for the war 193 to conclude it. The Bush administration was initially concerned about the hazards associated with nation-building, however, in 2002 realized its importance and started investing in Afghan nation- building. On the other hand, for Obama administration state-building remained secondary as his focus was on clear, hold and build. So, governance and state-building were dependent upon the military achievement of clear and hold. Initially, he increased civilian aid that was then reduced every year thereafter. At the closing years of war, the US was engaged in battles with the Taliban, training ANDSF, guiding government ministries, running the literacy program and even sponsored youth orchestras and refurbished sports stadium. However, all of this neither resulted in the defeat of the Taliban nor brought stability and peace to it. With the end of 2014, the war became a stalemate, the US handed over the responsibility to Afghans and returned home, with some limited troops of 10,000 to continue the training of Afghan forces and police and to conduct counterterrorism missions. However, it was surprising that in 2014, with the completion of the US mission every player of the war including US, NATO, GoIRA, and Taliban claimed victory. In reality, none of the players had been able to secure victory.
The US policy in Afghanistan under two presidents has espoused diverse methods from counterterrorism (CT) to counterinsurgency (COIN); from enemy-centric to population-centric warfare and from massive usage of aerial attacks to ground operations with more forces. However, all these made little accomplishments. The situation became far more complex and remained far away from being resolved. This all was due to the absence of a trusted government in Afghanistan, local people no more wanted foreigners on their land, regional countries capable of playing a constructive role worked for their own competing and conflicting interests, in turn, neutralized the effects made by the initial overthrow of Taliban and downgrading AQ. The Obama administration came up with a new strategy that moved from nation-building to state- building, worked to gain popular support and bringing stability. He applied counter-insurgency approach to win the hearts and minds of the people that would, in turn, bring long term stability and positive changes than a traditional military approach. However, the situation of Afghanistan demanded a lengthy commitment along with the uninterrupted flow of money, resources, training to thwart the Taliban and AQ to get eliminated. Larry Goodson from the US Army War College stated, "Time is running out in Afghanistan" US policy could have moved in the right direction if it had functioned to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan via trusted Afghan government where all groups including the Taliban were given representation, it should have worked to bring 194 governance in the Afghan state and should have stayed connected with Afghan people to work in the light of their aspirations. Then, it should have regional countries like Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia, and China in a constructive and meaningful role to let Afghanistan on its own feet as an independent and war-free state. The keen analysis of President Bush‟s and Obama‟s foreign policies in Afghanistan revealed that both Presidents had forwarded more or less the same goals and continued to seek and sustain American leadership and supremacy but applied different approaches to attain these goals. Though during the election campaign, President Obama opposed principle points of President Bush‟s policies, on taking the charge he redefined many policies and shifted focus in a number of areas but continued many of Bush policies. In the words of Trevor McChrisken, President Obama had adopted a CT strategy that had been late President Bush rather than the early President Bush. It was not something new or unheard in American politics. Richard Jackson and Trevor McCrisken both endorsed the view that despite altering President Bush‟s WOT language and renouncing his harsh interrogation policies President Obama never rejected President Bush‟s worldview that America was locked in a massive struggle because of the vital principles that nation held most dear. Both presidents wanted to sustain American supremacy and leadership over the world. Even though President Obama had re-labeled and narrowed President Bush‟s open-ended WOT, yet he along with the Congress and the US foreign policy establishment never questioned the ongoing need to wage globalized war against those who were behind 9/11 attacks. In fact, President Obama had endorsed President Bush‟s world view of globalized war and constructed a narrative that repeated President Bush‟s version of what America represented, why it was attacked, and how it had to respond, throughout his public comments on the 9/11. Carafano stated President Obama did not pledge the end of WOT but a new way to fight and confront threats within this war. So, President Bush‟s master terror narrative remained essentially intact and was firmly ingrained in the American psyche. President Obama‟s different approach from the Bush administration reflected his belief that the US has failed to meet the standards of an exemplary nation in its prosecution of the war. Thus, the two leaders differed in the war‟s execution, not its necessity and what it represented.
The Bush administration was unique in the sense when he entered the office, he lacked policy and strategy, and the Bush Doctrine was the direct outcome of the 9/11 attacks. He adopted a closed management style for the execution of his policies where he preferred the 195 people who supported and aligned their views with him while ignored those who opposed him. President Bush was the only president who started an inclusive, global struggle against terrorism, though this struggle was continued in other presidencies, those efforts were not global in nature. President Bush policies focused on military approaches along with law enforcement and intelligence operations. He also supported the spread of democracy, but his CT strategies failed to address the underlying causes of terrorism including economic underdevelopment, less political participation, and the Arab-Israel conflict. After 9/11 President Bush received strong support from the domestic audience in favor of a strong attack against the 9/11 culprits and he also became a strong leader. Yet, being strong at the domestic and the international level did not guarantee the desired outcome. All his policy measures soon became exposed and demanded more troops, resources and leadership attention, hitherto Bush was more interested in Iraq than in Afghanistan.
President Obama narrowed down President Bush‟s broader WoT and focused on AQ who posed a serious security threat to US homeland security. Under President Obama, preemption was removed from the US national security policy. President Obama got involved in Libya by keeping its European allies with him however under the Bush administration, his invasion of Iraq was not supported by European allies and not only faced criticism but also characterized as aggressive. President Obama came forward with a different approach to convince the people inside America and in the outer world that cooperation is the key to success. He emphasized the importance of international administrations to sort out the international crisis. President Bush started the war on terror but then deviated and shifted the whole focus towards Iraq that was later proven fallacious, while President Obama brought back the focus of administration towards War on terror and prioritized Afghan issue to defeat the Taliban, eliminate Al-Qaeda and focused towards training of Afghan national defense and security forces to enable the Afghans themselves to stand on their own feet and to assume their responsibilities. Bush relied on hard power while President Obama made use of smart power which makes use of both hard and soft power. President Obama emphasized international engagement that marked a significant difference from the Bush administration. President Obama promoted a modest form of US policy that supported the spread of democratic values, through a gradual change than coercion policy relied upon under President Bush. Despite the different rhetoric and some policy measures, the development of AfPak, and its focus on military options (troops surge) in Afghanistan along with 196 other measures marked continuity of Bush‟s policy under President Obama. During the election campaign, President Obama emphasized and spoke quite a bit about change but in reality, he could not bring a significant change on the basis of ground realities. Bush administration appeared to be more aggressive, rough and rigid in its approach and use of military power, however, closer analysis revealed that President Obama used more drones than his predecessor. It has not been something new or rare. It has been very usual that the leaders take turns and deviate from their stated policies to give maximum output and to keep the domestic and international circumstances in their control.
The consequences of the Bush approach resulted in worldwide anti-Americanism and developed the US image as a state who could and would do everything to pursue its interest. This approach also clearly communicated to the world that the US would not tolerate any acts that threaten its superiority and supremacy. However, President Obama abandoned the freedom agenda. His approach showed that multilateralism was key to a stable and peaceful world. He strongly believed that the use of military authority was the last option and should be used after failing all pacific means of settlement. His policies resulted in the rise of American repute and restored the faith in US leadership. However, critics argued that President Obama‟s approach would eventually paralyze multilateralism in which shared interest would supersede over American interest. It would create a conducive environment for competitors to step up and question American supremacy. It all depends upon American foreign policy decisions that could either move to unilateralism or multilateralism and then the time will decide its fate. Further, President Obama‟s military pullback was also criticized as it declined US bargaining leverage against Russian aggression and China‟s coercive diplomacy in the East and South China Seas. Arms sales got a boost under President Obama as under President Bush it was recorded to be about $ 1.6 billion per year and reached $ 36 billion per year. It had been evident that the forces withdrawals had not proceeded smoothly and the political and security situation in Afghanistan and Iraq deviated significantly from what was claimed by Obama. The President presented a far sunnier and bright picture while the reality depicted reverse.
No policy could be implemented without paying its cost. The US national credibility had to pay a cost for what had been decided and implemented by a President. With the breakup of the USSR, the US became the world‟s superpower status. Its economy in the last five years of 197 twentieth-century roared, the previous administration run by President Clinton not only balanced the federal budget but also paid down the national debt. Then, after 9/11, President Bush retorted not only with WOT and invaded Afghanistan but also cut taxes and started a war of choice in Iraq and thus became the policeman of the world against terrorism. It consumed trillion dollars and sank the nation deeper in debt; total federal debt doubled during the Bush Presidency and touched $11 trillion from about $5.5 trillion. These economic issues contributed towards the Great Recession of 2008 and the following slow recovery. Other than Iraq, the other two axis of evil Iran and North Korea continued the development of their WMDs and nuclear programs and continued to threaten the US and the rest of the world. Then, the economic position of EU, Japan, India and particularly China vis a vis US steadily improved. By summer 2010 China surpassed Japan and became the second-biggest economy in the world, and some economic experts anticipated that if this situation continued to persist, the Chinese GDP could overtake that of the US by 2020. President Bush along with his team developed a hard response at both domestic and international levels. Though, President Bush, many times had declared that “we don‟t do torture” yet afterward in his memoir, he admitted his approval of waterboarding and claimed that it facilitated the capture of AQ workers and prevented possible attacks. The intelligence agencies like the FBI kept on picking up suspects, detained them for weeks without charging them, and CIA kept on picking up foreigners and put them in black sites or secret prisons. Bush administration moved to the dark side as called by Vice President Cheney and engaged in torture. Vice President Cheney and Karl Rove admitted that these techniques helped them to save lives but were against the law. That‟s why when the legal reasoning behind detention without habeas corpus was challenged in the Supreme Court, it ruled against it. Additionally, the torture techniques utilized under the Bush Presidency created worldwide protests against human rights violations and declined the international standing of the US. A historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. stated that President Bush‟s extralegal counterterrorism program has damaged American repute in the world badly much more than any other thing ever. President Obama with his surge then exit Afghan policy, could tout his success in reconciling his war- related actions with core US values. While the Bush dominant argument and justification of the war was that in a battle of good and evil aggressive action became inevitable. President Obama created his own endgame narrative of Why the US needed to fight this war and what it had achieved in that lengthy conflict. 198
The US under President Bush in order to fight with the Taliban relied on local tribe leaders. All this resulted in the weakening of centralized government because tribes got annoyed with government approaches.US favored local tribal leaders to fight the Taliban to reduce the people‟s support to the Taliban. However, this strategy contradicted with government tactics who was taking steps to reduce the autonomy of local communities. By this US approach everyone was unhappy as local communities objected to the US support of Kabul appointed officials over whom they had no control, the ruling government perturbed by the US efforts who sought to undermine the government by resorting to alternative models of governance that sidelined the formal state structure. The mismanagement of Afghan issue and lack of clear goals and policies for a post-conflict situation, where the US waged the longest war of its history with an international coalition is currently worse off than ever before. The successor presidents have not developed contingency plans to deal with the situation in case of failure of Plan A and they also appeared unprepared for what comes next.
President Obama brought a revised strategy for Afghanistan in December 2009, which shifted its emphasis from counter-terrorism to counter-insurgency from fighting for the Afghan government. Usually, policies underwent changes and got restructured owing to their failure to bring in the desired results. Arrogant powers revised their policies and examine their failures when they wanted to attain their ends more brutally. The US WOT in Afghanistan and Iraq and its failure to achieve its ends had exposed to the world that the US could not do and attain what it desired, regardless of being the sole superpower of the world. In fact, the US had utilized all option like military invasion, economic resources, civilian aid, state-building, negotiations, training of ANDSF for the maintenance of its superiority throughout the world yet it could not succeed in Afghanistan. Obama‟s initiatives like the military surge and withdrawal appeared as cover-up and excuses. The US conviction that its world leadership would ensure peace, well- being, and democracy in the world remained questionable. Their verdict that any substitute to US leadership would create international anarchy did not sound true. War was not an answer to US problems. It needed to calculate the strategic costs of it‟s longest-ever presence in Afghanistan. It required to identify its clear-cut goals, either it was interested in bringing the internal stability in Afghanistan or it just wanted to weaken the Taliban, etc. The rebuilding of Afghanistan would take year‟s long concerted efforts if not decades along with an uninterrupted supply of money. It 199 needed to point out its resources that would be allocated to deal with the Afghan problem, in accordance with its interest.
As far as the role of public opinion has been concerned under the domestic factors of Bush policy-making, the US population had remained against military action in the Vietnam and Afghan war of 1979. However, during the US war on terror in Afghanistan majority of the population weighed in favor of military action in Afghanistan, due to the harsh terrorist attacks of 9/11. This decision raised the public approval of the President that was reported to be at 51% but got increased to 81% during the poll conducted on September 14-15 2001. Bush‟s own perceptions and consensus among his team also provided him conducive ground to invade Afghanistan. However, during his second term, public approval rate declined to 37%. This was because people became wary of this prolonged war without achieving anything significant. This decline also paved the way for the winning of President Obama.
Under the presidency of President Obama, public opinion remained a vital factor in determining foreign policy towards Afghanistan. Though, President Obama has remained critical of Bush policies throughout his election campaign. However, after coming to power, domestic as well as systemic situations compelled him to take similar decisions, which marked the continuity of Bush policy during Obama‟s years in Afghanistan. During his initial years, 60-70 percent of people supported President Obama‟s decisions related to foreign policy. People had remained eager to see a good repute of the US abroad. However, when he decided about troops surge, public opinion remained evenly divided over this decision. In December 2009, 57% of the total population favored troops surge decision. The wide support boosted his confidence to implement troops surge decision. However, in 2014 the public approval rate of President Obama touched the lowest percentage of 38%. It has also been found that it was not only President Obama who was in favor of troops surge, but the whole decision-making hierarchy including DoD and Pentagon were on the same page. The US military was the supporter of the COIN policy; however, President Obama was reluctant to launch the policy in Afghanistan.
On 30th August 2009, a report was presented by General McChrystal, commander of US forces in Afghanistan. The report was a critique of the Afghan government and the ongoing ISAF operations in Afghanistan. However, at the end of the report, he proposed the plan to implement the COIN policy in Afghanistan. There was another proposed plan of 200
"Counterterrorism plus" by Vice President Biden. The plan was about retaining the massive US and NATO troops at Btagram and Kandahar that this would enable troops to carry operations anywhere in the country. The CT plus approach was criticized by the military of the US and General McChrystal. On 30th October 2009, President Obama met with the Joint Chiefs and emphasized to speed up the operation and on 11th October, the Plan 2A was presented before the President, and he agreed to launch the COIN in Afghanistan. President Obama launched the same policy that was adopted by President Bush during his second term.
The government sensitivity remained an important factor during the tenure of both these Presidents. President Bush had the 51% public approval prior to the tragic incident of 9/11 but the anger, fear and a sense of revenge among the public, raised the political support of President Bush to 86%. However, the situation for President Obama was slightly different. He criticized the policies of President Bush and got public approval. But, when he adopted the same policies and remained relatively failed to address the issue of terrorism his public approval touched the lowest extreme of 38% during the September 2014 polls. The decision-makers in both administrations perceived the level of threat and adopted the policies accordingly. The decision makers during the Bush administration identified enemies as Taliban and Al-Qaeda and decided to wage a war against terrorism in Afghanistan. The Obama administration, however, had to continue that policy to deal with terrorism in Afghanistan to take the war to its logical end.
Based on the findings of this dissertation and foregoing analysis it has been concluded that despite different rhetoric and talking a lot of change, the Obama administration had continued President Bush approaches at his policy level and his grand strategy had shown a great degree of continuity in case of Afghanistan. A great body of literature had proved this continuity particularly in his counterterrorism and national security policy. Though, he introduced significant changes in his overall approach by using different means but those were meant to attain similar ends. So, the continuity has proven to be more striking and rewarding than the changes he had proposed. The policy of continuity had enabled him to pursue and achieve the goals that were common in both administrations like protection of American national interest, the maintenance and sustenance of US sole superpower status, focus on the war on terror (President Obama left this phrase and replaced it with transnational global conflict) and AQ, and its affiliates etc. American national and security drivers had continued to shape their foreign policies 201 and justified their exceptionalism interpretation of international law under both administrations. In Afghanistan, President Obama continued the President Bush approach by reinforcing his predecessors resolve to defeat, disrupt and dismantle AQ and Taliban, and he justified that a robust intervention was needed to stop AQ from operating freely in Afghanistan. This was evident from his troop‟s surge decision that showed a similarity with the Bush administration who did the surge in Iraq in 2007 conducted by General Petraeus and in Afghanistan under President Obama, marked a great degree of continuity. Despite shifting the focus of attention from Iraq to Afghanistan, President Obama had continued the course of US post-9/11 defense policy that was initiated by the Bush administration. In the words of Aaronson President Obama surge decision coincided with certain core principles of President Bush‟s foreign policy that included the protection of the US security and defense of its national interest. In order to save America from possible future attacks, President Obama resumed the war originated by President Bush in Afghanistan. President Obama had never rejected the strategic necessity of the war in Afghanistan though the Bush has proven to be more aggressive in his approach. President Obama has intensified the use of drones that was also started by President Bush. John Glaser and Trevor Thrall put it that “with a few important exceptions, the difference between the foreign policies of Obama and Bush were primarily differences in intensity, not in kind”. However, it could not be said that Obama had continued only Bush policies as he had also promoted many changes. These included the way of dealing, a change of focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. As far as his counterterrorism policy was concerned, he had endorsed both by continuing the substance and changing the focus of US foreign policy. Overall, Obama seemed like a restrainer compared to the first term of his predecessor, whose foreign policy was a repetition of primacy and interventionism executed in an intense manner due to the 9/11 attacks. In practice, Obama had also pursued a strategy of primacy and maintained a remarkable level of continuity with the previous administrations.
ANALYSIS: A WAY FORWARD FOR AFGHANISTAN:
President Bush started the war on terror by sending forces. He tried all his means to win this war by force but could not succeed. History has proven that Afghans particularly the Taliban can never be defeated by force. The only way to tie this knot has been through talks and negotiations. In an interview with Former Ambassador Ayaz Wazir that during his talk with a US 202 diplomat suggested indulging in talks with the Taliban. That diplomat replied, “Mr. Wazir you have poured a bucket of cold water over my head”. Then, Ambassador Ayaz Wazir said that “I am keeping the Icey bucket for the years to come.”526 Initially the Bush administration was not willing to talk to Taliban but now the scenario has reversed, the US want Taliban to table talk but Taliban are not willing to talk in a way the US wanted.
During President Obama‟s administration with the killing of OBL, the Taliban were in disarray however the Obama administration could exploit the position of strength to their advantage for bringing the Taliban to the negotiation table for a meaningful solution to this war. President Obama used bombs, drones, destroyed villages, surgical strikes but all those measures failed to bring the Taliban to negotiation table. During President Obama‟s administration, the US should have talked to the Taliban to sort out a solution for this long war. With the assassination of OBL, the US was in a position of strength vis a vis Taliban and the Taliban was in a state of disarray. This golden opportunity was missed, and President Obama‟s policy did not bring in the desired results. All the means employed by President Obama was not a success.
Now the US wanted to find a peaceful policy solution to bringing the Taliban and Afghans to the table. The US is trying to avoid earning the name of a defeat for its nation. It would give a serious blow to the US the supremacy in the world. The only thing they are trying to earn a face-saving formula to get out of Afghanistan. They are looking for a solution that would end up in exiting their forces along with the establishment of peace. That they could project it to the world that they have succeeded in accomplishing their objective and now peace has been established in Afghanistan. In the concluding years of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, they smartly or cleverly played their cards and concluded the Geneva Accords. They realized their weakness, and that they understood that they could lose by continuing their mission in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the US has not been truly assessing the intensity of the situation, so they continued losing.
The future of Afghanistan depends on how the Americans would react? This has been a very crucial time for Afghanistan. On the face of it, America is trying to find a solution, as far as
526 Ayaz Wazir, Former Ambassador of Pakistan to Afghanistan, January 17, 2019. 203
Afghanistan has been concerned. Pakistan has also been trying it‟s best to find a solution which is acceptable to Afghans by their type Taliban‟s first and Afghan government and the other regional countries have also been interested in bringing peace to Afghanistan. Because peace in Afghanistan will bring peace to the entire region. Without peace, we cannot benefit from the riches of this region. The future belongs to this region in terms of population and mineral resources. These two are in abundance in this region. The benefit from these two, the return of peace in Afghanistan, and in the region is the most important fact.
Afghanistan is the graveyard for Afghans themselves. They have unfortunately been used by the foreign powers to fight between themselves, by the British by the Soviets by the US their immediate neighbors and the regional countries including Iran. Every regional country has its own interests. To pursue that they invest on Afghans. They are not fighting the war directly, they are fighting through non-state actors. These non-state actors have other countries behind them. Like in the past Wars in Afghanistan was fought by the powers from behind. So fight among or between the Afghans is basically between the regional countries or the powerful countries. Afghan are basically pawns in their hands. If they were left to themselves they would surely found a solution for themselves. But a different game is going on behind the scene. Who supply arms and material to the Taliban and Northern Alliance for continuing the resistance? They are Indians, Iranians etc.
The Taliban would not be willing to take their share in the present set up. What would they agree depends on their talks with the U.S? Because first, they would ask for pulling out of foreign forces, removal of their leaders from Blacklist, removal of travel bans, etc. Taliban in fact consider Afghan government as puppets of US. They would ask the Afghan government to revamp the constitution and government. After agreement over these contours with the US. Then, the Taliban would agree to sit and settle their issues with the Afghan government. Then they would fight for power and influence in government. Though the current constitution of Afghanistan has not been contrary to Islam however they would indulge in talks to remake or improve it. They might change its name by taking input from both sides. But that would reflect more Taliban thinking than other Afghan government. Taliban enjoy influence over more than half of the country. The US, Pakistan, and Iran would play their role than Russia, Central Asia. 204
A formula which pacifies Afghans and regional countries will be most likely to be durable. Afghan government understands Taliban strength. Taliban controls half if not more parts of Afghanistan. Regional countries are behind the players of the Afghan war.US, Pakistan, and Iran will be primary players for bringing peace to Afghanistan than Russia, Central Asian states, India. Any formula which is acceptable to Afghans, regional countries, will be workable but will take time. A short cut solution to Afghanistan could be in this way that all regional countries came out of Afghanistan and let all the warring groups of Afghanistan sit and decide their future on their own.
The real solution to the problem lies in the hand of the Taliban and not with the US. But Regional countries and the US would not let the Taliban decide. It has yet to be seen who wants what and can get what? Are regional countries and the US more in favor of peace or turmoil? Peace will bring benefits to the immediate neighbor of Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, China, and Central Asia while other regional countries would not get as many benefits as these states. So in that situation why would they follow something which gives a lot of benefits to Pakistan, the US, Iran, and India are not in favor of CPEC. Peace will make the completion of CPEC bit easier but that is not in the interest of the US and India, Iran directly will benefit from Chabahar port. While looking at the other way round, bombs, destruction, turmoil, and militancy will complicate the completion of CPEC. That‟s why these players would be more interested in war. The clash of interest has the main obstacle to peace in Afghanistan. However, if America has really been serious in America‟s first policy. It requires the US to focus more on its economy than everything else. It will exit its forces from Afghanistan. If China demands its loan back from the US, that it has taken somewhere in 2004 and 2008 US would not have been able to pay back. China is economically tackling the US. China does not launch war with the US. If China itself feel threatened than it would demand its money back or it would default. In both scenarios, its superpower status, and world leadership will be in jeopardy, which every administration wants to keep. That‟s why US will not seriously disturb China. The US should focus on its economy by pulling out its forces from Afghanistan and other countries. If the major powers continued their covert actions and power-politics in Afghanistan for their conflicting interests than the chances of peace becomes less likely. It has been evident that the US has extended its hands towards India, Japan, to condemn Russia and China under both administrations. India has never been a hired gun of the US despite conclusion of the strategic agreements between them. The US now 205 can no longer afford to stay in Afghanistan but while leaving Afghanistan dispensation under Bonn agreement should continue to work on in order to run the country. Regional countries should stop meddling in Intra-Afghan matters to find a long term solution for Afghanistan. Taliban in Afghanistan hold around 70 percent of the total land which compelled the US to the negotiation table. Both administration have shown different stance towards negotiations. However, no meaningful success could be made in this regard.
In the US there has always been a set pattern of Foreign Policy, this study has proven that regardless of who is leading the US, the very basis of its foreign policy continued to promote American leadership, sole-supremacy, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, preserving the stability in the world, preservation of its status-quo, discouraging the rise of powers that might challenge existing bop, maintenance of enough combat capability, etc. A leader usually readjusts and restructure his policies in the light of situational demands, systemic opportunities and domestic resources and cognitive assessments to bring in the desired results. The guardian of foreign policy has been the President, however, he has not been the main or the sole man behind the gun, as there has been a complete hierarchy that plays its role in finalizing foreign policy decisions. There has been a consistency in US Foreign Policy as well as security policy to maintain supremacy in the world order. Except that, Bush was offensive in rhetoric. He reacted after 9/11 were consequential. His actions were meant for the consolidation of the US role at the global level. Obama also attempted to solidify US position at the global level but through different means. Ultimately, policy outcomes depends upon the degree to which the president succeeds in tackling public opinion, trample congressional prerogatives, endure support of allies, and uphold its power position at the international level. 204
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