Religious Lives of Image-Things, Avodah Zarah, and Rabbis in Late

Rachel Neis Religious LivesofImage-Things, Avodah Zarah,and Rabbis in LateAntique Palestine

Abstract: Drawing on rabbinic sources redacted in the earlythird and late fourth/ earlyfifth centuries, this paper tracks the intertwined livesofdivineimage-things and rabbis living in late Roman and Byzantine period Palestine. The paper argues that the religious image-thingsofothers (or avodah zarah,inrabbinic terms) pressed in different ways on rabbinic notionsofanimation, materiality,agency, and representation, as well as on the boundaries between the thing,the human, and the divine. Additionally, the paper argues that while rabbis attempted to neutralize the claims of such image-things, in part by exposing their materiality,their excess nonetheless es- caped such rabbinicefforts. Finally, the paper argues that in the fourth century, along with the “material turn” in the Roman world inspired by Christian engage- ment,wefind not onlyagreater sense of the excess in the thingsofavodah zarah, but also aconcomitant thingification of the rabbinicsage.

Introduction

Among the population of those thingsinantiquity associated with what we call religion, wereimages. Religious images, especiallythoseofdivinities, presented aparticular conundrum for ancient Jewishsages, writers, and thinkers living in Palestine, Egypt,Rome, and Mesopotamia. This was partlydue to the legacyofthe second commandment in which the biblical God inveighed against the making of various artifacts for the purposes of worship. Manyscholars have explored rabbinic ideas about images and “idols.”¹ However,insights from “thing theory” will allow me to

My thankstoIan Moyer and Celia Schultz, organizers of the Midwest ConsortiumonAncient Reli- gions conferenceheld in Ann Arbor,2013, and editors of thissection, fortheir helpful comments and corrections. My appreciation also to the participantsinthe conferencefor their comments and questions,aswellastoShiraSchwartzand HarryKashdan fortheir assistance. Ialso thank the anonymous reviewer forhelpfulcomments and bibliographical references.—Forthe purposes of this essay Iciterabbinic texts in the following manner: ForMishnah and Tosefta: aprefixed m. or t. followed by chapter and paragraph. For the Palestinian Talmud: aprefixed y. followed by tractate, chapter,paragraph, folio, and side; for the Babylonian Talmud: aprefixed b. followed by the tractate, folio and side. Icitethe Palestinian Talmud according to the Leiden manuscript (Sussman ed. 2001); the Babylonian Talmud according to the Vilnaedition, the Toseftaaccording to the Lieber- manedition (1955–73), and the Mishnahaccording to the Albeck edition (1957–59).

 See recentarticles by Binder 2012,Friedheim 2009,Zohar 2009,Furstenberg2009,Rosen-Zvi 2009 and respective bibliographies. The terms “idol” (eidolon,image) and “idolatry” (eidōlon and latreia, worship) have complicated histories. Eidōlon is used in anegativesense in the Septuagint; the com-

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press in different ways on notions of animation, agency,and representation, as well as on the fuzzy boundaries between “thing,” human, and divinity that lie at the heart of religious image-things.² To do this, Ifocus on Palestinian rabbis and their literarysources, namelyTan- naitic texts redacted in the third century and containingthe teachingsofthe Tan- naim who livedbetween the first and third centuries CE; and later Amoraic texts redacted at the end of the fourth century or the earlyfifth century CE. My concern is to track some of the ways in which rabbis,living in Palestine in the late Roman and Byzantine periods, interacted with the stuff and thingsofother religions. Put differently, Iwillask what happens in the encounter between religious images and rabbis in rabbinic discourse, the discourse of aminoritygroup within aminoritypopulation living under achangingimperial regime.³ Iuse the languageofencounter between images and rabbis rather than the com- monlydeployed “rabbinic attitudes towardx”because Iwish to expand the common ground of inquiry in which rabbinic subjects are summoned for their views or con- structionsofvarious and usually non-rabbinic or non-Jewish objects or concepts (material, human, or otherwise). In this respect,evenasIadmit the partial (in all senses) perspective and creative hand of rabbinic authors, Iamacknowledging (some would saygranting) the agency of those thingsthat appear in their discourse. Iamindebtedtotheorists who have madethe casefor the agency of thingsbeyond human projects for them and projections onto them, and who are still debating the terms of this recognition. Bill Brown highlights the “thingness of objects,” which he argues becomes manifest in twoways: when something happens to break the flow of habitual encounter or use, such as when the object literallybreaks (Brown, 2001, 4), or when thereissome kind of excess (“sensuous,”“metaphysical” or affective)inthe objects that “exceeds their mere materialization” (Brown 2001, 5).⁴ To differing de-

pound eidōlatria is first used in the New Testament and then in Christian texts (Ellenbogenand Tu- gendhaft,2011:3–4; Büchsel 1964;Schwartz 2001:165). See Neis 2013:170 – 201.  Iuse the terms “image” and “image-thing” interchangeablyinorder to emphasizethe ways in which images areatype of material artifact belongingtothe broader class of things.Images make particular types of claims,among them representational ones (see below), that maynot be shared with other types of things.  Idonot want to simplify the demographicsofhumans or things herebyarguingthat image-things of others need onlybeunderstood in local Jewish versus Roman imperial terms.Therewere avariety of different ethnic and religious groups livinginPalestine besides rabbis, other Jews,and Romans.At the same time, the biblical mandatetoclear the land of other gods, and the rabbinic term avodah zarah or “foreign worship” (discussedbelow), signifies the extent to which religious things of others werebound up with territorial claims.  Iuse the term “thing” as opposed to “object” in order to avoid an apriori opposition between (usu- allyhuman) subjects and (usuallynonhuman) objects that privileges the subject as the bearer of agency; Webb 2006:197,201–202. Bill Brown uses the term “thing” in some oppositionto“object” (although he softens this opposition when he refers to the “thingness of objects;” Brown 2001:4). Iamnot committed to this terminological distinction,though its underlyingHeideggerian-inspired ideas areinsightful.

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grees and in different fashions Latour and Keane make the casefor astrongagency for things(Latour 2005;Keane 2006a and 2006b). Appadurai and Gell allow for a type of agency for thingsbut ultimatelycenter theirinquiries on the meaningand role of thingsinhuman lives(Appadurai 1986 and 2006;Gell 1998).⁵ Similarly, those who traditionallystudy image-things, or what might be called practitioners of the newer art history,seek to liberate the particularthing that is the image from its framing by producers,patrons,and consumers and, in the recent attention to materiality,evenfrom the strictures of formal art historical methods.⁶ Iproceed from amodulated position thatattends to how image-thingsfare when they enter human discursive space. Rather than suggesting aradical agencyfor these image- things(about which Iamagnostic), Ilook at how they interact with other entities, such as humans: human relations and meaning-making will not be absent from my analysis. Within this framework, Itrace how humans (in this case, rabbis)soughttotame and neutralize certain image-things, with mixed success, and,conversely, Isuggest ways in which these thingsescaped or exceeded rabbinic discursiveattempts at their containment.This is noticeable particularlyinthe case of thoseimage-things that are treated as, or thatclaim to be, sacred or divine. Iargue that ultimately the boundary between the rabbiand the image-thing falters, with thingsbecoming humanized and rabbis becoming “thingified.”⁷ This secondary process of rabbinic “thingification,” Iargue, is particularlypronounced in the later, Amoraic material and needstobeunderstood as part of abroader materialization of religion in Pales- tine and the Romanworld more generallyinthe fourth century and onward.

1The Tannaim and Avodah Zarah

The sacred images of others entered into discourses of different kinds, pictorial and textual. In terms of the former,wemight think of the depiction of such images in the paintingsofDuraEuropos.Aparticularlyvivid example is the painting depicting the captureofthe Arkbythe Philistines(1Samuel 5: 1– 5; Goodenough 1964).The biblical narrative describes how the Philistines placed the captured Ark in the shrine

 Latour’s “actor network theory” eschews the division of humans and things intosubjects with agencyand objects without,instead, allowingfor action and agencyonthe part of both humans and things.Appadurai traces the “social life of things.”  Osborne and Tanner 2007;Pantcheva2006;Friedberg1991;Elkins 1996;Gell 1998;Mitchell 1996 cf. Kumler and Lakey2012. Keane 2006:199,observes that things defined as “art” have been analyzed in moreabstract and formal ways than those defined in functional terms: “their sheer materiality is often overlooked in favour of their representational character…”  Iuse the term “thingification” rather than “reification” (or “objectification”)soasnot to invoke Marxist resonances regarding capitalism, commodification, alienation, production, and consump- tion.

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of their godDagon, and how it caused the godtobedismembered, along with other deleterious consequences. The paintingsshow the sacred image’storso and severed limbs, along with displaced and broken cultic implements (and possiblyanother sacred image). The religious images of the “other” are displayed, but their impropriety is equallyvisibleintheir disfigurement.Bearing witness to this is the Ark—a “good” religious thing—standingtall and victorious over its fallen enemies. Through the device of pictorial representation, the Durapainting tells astory about good and bad sacred things, or to put it differently, about religious and irreligious images and things(Wharton 1994).Scholars have sought to understand Dura’ssynagogue paint- ingsinvarious ways,for example as amessianic message, or as competitive polemic with local religious groups,orasresistancetoRome.⁸ Most readings of the paintings take into account the multi-ethnic, religious population of the city,situated on the border of the Roman and Persian empires. Agood textual example of the entry of the cultic images of non-Jews into Jewish discourse is the third-century redacted rabbinic tractate of m. Avodah Zarah. Here too, the regional, religious, and ethnic politics of the Mishnah’sauthors, residing in Palestine, must be considered in anyanalysis. As mentioned, Jews, and rabbis among them, considered themselvesheirs to biblical traditions that inveighed against the images and worship of deitieswho werenot the God of Israel. In theirpentateuchal incarnations, these traditions man- dated the systematic destruction of statues, sculptures, effigies,stone pillars (matse- vot), sacredtrees (asherim and asherot), and altars associated with the gods of Can- aan.⁹ The Israelite conquest of Canaan is foundedonrelated rhetoric of an exclusive and iconoclastic loyalty to Yahweh. Just as the Jews of Duramight have expressed acertain type of iconoclastic desire in their paintingsrather thaninaction, so, too, werethe Tannaiticrabbis in no position to follow biblical mandates to destroy the sacredimages of otherreligio-eth- nicitiesinthe Land of Israel. The rabbis formedascholastic elite within the Jewish minority. By the mid-second century they had witnessed asecond failed Jewish revolt with attendant upheaval and displacement; they livedinaPalestine with aheavy Roman military presence.¹⁰ Rabbis living and moving across Palestine would have encountered avariety of things, images, and buildingswhose liveswerereligious but directed at the wronggod(s). Some of these thingswould have been perceived as symbols of imperial power;mostobviouslythosethingsspecificallyrelated to the imperial cult,but probablyalso broader manifestations of Romanand Greek re-

 Wischnitzer 1948;Kessler and Weitzman 1990;Elsner 2007.For recentworkonDurasee Brodyand Hoffman 2011.  E.g. Exodus 20:2– 4; Exodus 23:14; Exodus 34:13 – 17;Numbers 33:52; Deuteronomy 5:6– 8; Deu- teronomy 7:5, 25,26; Deuteronomy12:1–4; Judges 2:2; 2Kings 11:18, 19:18.  Baker 2002;Schwarz 2006:10–15,41–48.

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ligion (Furstenberg2010). Nonetheless,rabbinic theological and political unease would have been temperedbypragmatism.¹¹ The Mishnah,acompilation redactedinearlythird-century Palestine, consists of legal teachings, cases, and anecdotes of rabbis who livedbetween the first and late second centuries. It givesussome insight into how the rabbis perceivedthe sacred image-thingsofothers which were embedded in the landscape. The Mishnahdedi- cates an entire tractate to this topic, and coins the term avodah zarah,aphrase hith- erto unattested. Translatable as “idolatry,” the term literallymeans “strange” or “foreign worship,” and designates the worshipped entity or thing,aswellasthe various acts and expressions (or “worship”)directed to it (Zohar 2001–2).Fromthe rather messy invective and inconsistent terminologyofthe bible (asherah, pesel, matseva, etc.), the rabbis invented acategory. The rabbiniclawsofavodah zarah massaged the uncompromising iconoclastic imperativesofthe bible into proscriptions against benefitingfrom the stuff of idolatry even indirectly. Perhaps most strategically, rabbinic laws of avodah zarah created ataxonomythatsought to distinguish usable thingsfrom forbidden things, and “mere” images from problematic ones, or avodah zarah (“idols”), as in the two selec- tions thatfollow:

All images (tselamim)are prohibited because they areworshipped onceayear—the words of R. Meir. And the sages say: onlythat [image]which has astaff, abird, or aglobeinits hand is forbidden. Rabban Shimon son of Gamliel says:any [image] that has anythingwhatsoever in its hand [is forbidden]. m. Avodah Zarah 3:1

One whofinds vessels upon which is afigure (tsurah)ofthe sun, or afigure of the moon, or a figure of adragon—he shall cast them intothe Dead Sea. Rabban Shimon son of Gamliel says:ifthese areonfancy [vessels] they areforbidden, but if they areonworthless ones they arepermitted. Rabbi Yose says:One grinds them and throwsthem to the wind or deposits them in the sea. They said to him: Even so (in the case of grindingand throwingtothe wind) it is made into man- ure (which is forbidden),asitsays: “And not abit of the proscribed things shall stick to your hand” (Deut.13:18). [In other words, grinding and throwing to the wind is forbidden as benefit mayaccrue.] m. Avodah Zarah 3:3

In m. Avodah Zarah 3:1thereisdisagreement. R. Meir classifies all images as avodah zarah. On this view all images are presumptively and minimallyworshipped (once a

 CertainlyscholarshaveanalyzedsomeofJosephus’sdescription of Jewish iconoclasticactsinpolit- ical terms, e.g. Baumgarten 2011: 7– 21,and Fine 2005:72–77.The conquest context in pentateuchal iconoclasticdenunciationsofthe religiousthingsofnon-Israelite others allows forapoliticalbasis in anti-idolatryrhetoricwhich need notbeinopposition to politicalunderstandingsofthe second commandment. Thus oneneednot contrast religious(i.e. biblical heritage)withpolitical factors as explan- ationsfor negative perceptionsofthe religious things of others by laterJews. SeeNeis2013: 196–201.

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year)and thus forbidden. The sagesand Rabbi Shimon the son of Gamliel object to such abroad net of prohibition; for them onlyspecific images are presumptively worshipped and thus forbidden. The sagesand Rabbi Shimon distinguish presumptively worshipped images on the basis of their iconography. But here they differ: while both partiesclear the field for avariety of usable and therefore non-idolatrous images, the sages, in onlybanning images thathold specific objects, cast aslightlynarrower net of forbidden things. The problem of idolatry and benefiting therefrom is alsoplayedout in m. Avodah Zarah 3:4 in which Rabban Gamliel answers anon-Jew’schallengewhile bathing in Aphrodite’sbath, and implicitlyinthe presenceofthe statue of the goddess herself.¹² The rabbiisasked how he can do such athing giventhe biblical prohibition. Rabban Gamliel (or possiblythe anonymous redactor)distinguishesbetween astatue of Aph- roditethat is agod and one that is an ornament (noy): “they do not say, ‘Let us make abath as an ornament for Aphrodite,’ but, ‘Let us make an Aphroditeasanornament for the bath.’”¹³ Accordingtosome Tannaitic rabbis,sometimes an imageofthe god-

 See m. Avodah Zarah 3:4: “Peraclos the son of Pelaslos questionedRabban GamlielinAccowhile he was bathinginthe Bath of Aphrodite. He said to him: ‘It is written in your Torah: “Letnone of the proscribed things stick to your hand” (Deuteronomy13:18). Whyare youbathinginthe Bath of Aph- rodite? He (the rabbi) said to him: ‘One maynot answer in the bathhouse,’ and when he came out he said: ‘Idid not come into her domain,she came intomydomain.They do not say, “Letusmakeabath for Aphrodite,” but, “LetusmakeanAphroditeasanornamentfor the bath.” Furthermore, if you weregiven alarge sum of money,would youenter the presenceofyour idol (avodah zarah)while youwere naked or had aseminal emission, and would youurinatebefore her?But this one stands by asewer and all people urinatebeforeher! It onlysays, ‘Their gods (eloheihen)’ (Deuteronomy12:3) —that which is treated as agod (eloha)isprohibited; what is not treated as agod is permitted.’” The Mishnah uses the term “Aphrodite” to describe the statue of the god(see below [21] on the identity of godand image) and the terms avodah zarah,and “god” (eloha), to designate the type of statue that is worshipped as adivinity.  Scholars have questioned whether the two sets of distinction made here—between (1) abuilding revolvingaround astatue of agod versus astatue as ornament and (2)between adivine statue of the godversus non-divine statue—areaccuratereflections of Greco-Roman religion (Schwartz 2004:162– 176). Thereisreason to think that therewas aclear distinction between sacredand non-sacredimages of gods (Ando 2009,esp., 24–25;Lipka2009:13–15). Forexample,Suet., Tib. 26.1 seems to make a distinction between the likenesses of the gods (simulacradeorum)and the ornaments (ornamenta)of temples.Yet,S.Estienne (2010) notes that this (and other sources) concerns adistinctionbetween statues of the gods versus imperial statues.Furthermore, Estienne points out that though simulacra deorum refers to adistinct group it nonetheless does not mean “cultimage” in anarrow technical sense. In addition,while the technical sanctity of images in temples mayhavehad significant legal implications,thereisevidenceofmorefluid categories of imagesinother spaces. Forexample, the images of Fortuna in toilets undermine an easy distinctionbetween sacredimages of gods versus merely ornamental images, in that Fortuna clearlyisinvokedasadeity to protect the human user of the space(Moorman et al 2011;Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus 4.44). So too, imagesofdeities in bathhousesspecificallydonot necessarilyfall intothe category of the ornament.Onthe function of such images, includingthose of Aphrodite, see Dunbabin 1989;onAphroditesee esp. 23–25;onthe religious dimensions of baths and their images, see 32. Thereisthus reason to question ahard and fast distinction,inpractice,between sacred and non-sacredimagesofgods.Finally, regardless of

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dess Aphroditeisnot sacredand thereforeJews maybenefit from it,and be in its vicinity.¹⁴ There is adistinction between the referent of the visual representation and its status. An additional argument giventojustify the notion that the gentiles themselves are not relatingtothe Aphroditesculpture as asacred artifact is that(non-Jewish) people are comingbefore the goddess in ways inappropriate in acontext of worship or sanctity,for example they urinate before the deity.¹⁵ Thus, this empirical observa-

whether therewas asharp distinction between sacredand non-sacredimages of gods in Greco- Roman religion, the terminology used in m. Avodah Zarah 3:4itself should give us pause before we conclude that it appliessuch adistinction between sancta and ornamenta to Aphrodite. The equivalent rabbinic terminology for sanctity or consecration is kedushah or hekdesh,not the languageof divinity (elohut)actuallyused. That the Tannaim did applysuch languagetoavodah zarah is evi- denced in their statement elsewherethat thereisnoeffective consecration (hekdesh)with avodah zarah (t. Avodah Zarah 5:10)—astatement that clearlyspeaks moretoanimposition of rabbinic ideas onto avodah zarah than to actual polytheistic norms and rules of consecratio. This is to say that the Tannaim do not determine the status of things as avodah zarah solelyupon emic grounds but often impose their own ideas thereon. Another example of this in m. Avodah Zarah 3:4, elaborated in the next footnote, concerns the imposition of rabbinic categories of impurity (the ba’al keri)onavo- dah zarah.  The notion of “ornament” for the rabbis indicates adifferingvalue than that imposedupon a properly(accordingthe rabbis,see next footnote) divine image.Inline with the remainder of the tractate, especiallyChapter 3, the image as “ornament” versus the imageas“their god” opposes aesthe- ticism and functionality with the (somewhat paradoxically) properlyidolatrous image,manifesting the shiftingordifferingregimes of value of athing(whether according to the rabbis or to Rabban Gamliel’squestioner). Ithank the reviewerfor raisingthe issue of shiftingvalues of athingper Ap- padurai. Appadurai’sobservations about the ritual, aesthetic, and economic diversions of things,and especiallythe suspension of ritual objects from commodization, might be useful in consideringthe rabbinic project of (re)usingcertain types of idolatrous things. On the complexities of assigningstat- ues as being “religious” or “decorative” see Stewart 2011:227–229.  “That which is treated as agod (eloha)isforbidden; what is not treatedasagodispermitted” (m. Avodah Zarah 3:4). The Mishnah claims to care preciselyabout emic points of view,but rabbinic concepts of purity,sanctity,priority,and tertiarity actuallydirect the argument.The rabbis do not neces- sarilygrant us transparent windows onto polytheistic practice in Palestine. While abathhouse may not have functioned as asacredspaceinthe same waythat atemple did, this does not mean that gods encountered in non-sacred spaces werenot gods (eloheihen). An indication that the rabbis areapplyingrabbinic-biblical standards for whatconstitutes asacredspaceisthe inclusion of the ba’al keri (someone whohas had aseminal emission,not necessarilyasaresultofasexual interac- tion) among those whowould not enter beforethe goddess.This is atechnical category of impurity that the rabbis developed from the bible, one that does not have an exact parallel in Roman or Greek religion. Foravariety of sourcesonabstinencefromsexual activity related to ritual or sacred space see Lennon 2012: 43 – 58 and 59–66 respectively.OnGreek sacredlawsabout purity see Parker 1983 and Graf 2008. However,the sourcesdiscussed relate moretosexual activity with another person than to male seminal emission per se (e.g. Herodotus, Histories,2.64). Manythanks to Professor Fritz Graf for his kind help with this topic and for his warningabout generalizing from sources (Greek purification inscriptions) whose contexts arelocal.

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tion of human behavior toward the imagenegates any rabbinic presumption of worship (as in m. Avodah Zarah 3:1).¹⁶ Other laws, such as m. Avodah Zarah 3:3(above) and those cited below, distinguish among different typesoffound things, either rehabilitatingthem for use if they are in fact idolatrous via anullification process (bittul; m. Avodah Zarah 4:4and 4:5) or mandating their destruction (m. Avodah Zarah 3:3):

The idol of agentile is forbidden immediately.¹⁷ And that of the Israeliteisonlyforbidden onceitisworshipped. Agentile can annul his idol and that of his companion. But an Israelitecannot annul the idol of agentile. m. Avodah Zarah 4:4

Howdoes one annul it?Ifhecuts off the tip of its ear,the tip of its nose, the tip of its finger,he bashes it,evenifhedid not takeany of it off—he has annulled it. If he spat at it,urinated beforeit, scratchedit, or threw excrement at it—behold this is not annulment. If he sold it or gave it as apledge for aloan—Rabbi says he annulled (it) and the sagessay he did not annul (it). m. Avodah Zarah 4:5

Those techniques of annulment about which there is consensus involvetargeted defacement or dismemberment; mere insult is insufficient. Annulment strikes (literally) at the sensory organs or limbs of the sacred image.¹⁸ The conceptual question at the heart of such techniquesthattransform areligious image-thing for Jewishuse is whether these particular techniques of partial iconoclasm (after all, the point is to be able to still use the thing) betray asneakingbelief in the sensoryormanual power of the image. In other words—and this is the tease of the iconoclastic act— does the visible and material manifestation of defacement or dismemberment negate power that was resident before, or does it put alie to the representation of physical organs by demonstrating their ineffectual nature? Does it put alie to its false repre- sentationalclaims, or does it negatethe power in the imageand its underlying ref-

 Notethat acts or states that ostensiblycomprise disrespect (e.g., urination) do not sufficefor the purposes of bittul (m. Avodah Zarah 4:5). Both Tertullian and Clement mock the apparentlydisre- spectful behavior of worshippers towardtheir divine images, whoplacethem in spaces like kitchens, laundry,and toilets (Tertullian, Apology,13.1, 4; ClementofAlexandria, Protrepticus 4.44)  The notion that the rabbis are thinkingofavodah zarah in purelyemic (say, Roman) terms found- ers on this Israelite/gentile distinction with regardtodeterminingthe status of an object.Similarly, see t. Avodah Zarah 5:9 – 10 which asserts that somethingisconsecrated from the moment that an act is directed toward it,whereas (verbal) consecration is not effective.  Forthe focus on the sensory features of an imageinstatue violencesee Varner 2004:3and 327. Foranargument that bittul derivesfromsuch practicesasdamnatio see Furstenberg2009:117– 44. Another fruitful wayoflookingatbittul is to understand its function (i.e., to render material reusable) alongside its ideological dimensions.Auseful comparandumwould then be spolia. See recentlyBril- liant and Kinney 2011.See Neis 2013:186–190.

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erent?Hereiswheresome of the tensions around the power of “bad” religious images (or idols)come into playinearlyrabbinic and other sources.

1.1 The Materiality Critique

It bears reemphasis thatinall of these examples it is taken for granted that there is a prohibition against worshipingidols. In the tractate of Avodah Zarah the focus is on how to avoid contact and benefitorenjoyment (hana’ah)from forbidden image- things. As we have seen, in some cases an imagecan be rehabilitatedfor Jewish benefit (by bittul), and this is accomplished by an intervention in the material of the thing.¹⁹ When it cannot be so transformed then the thing must be thrown away and utterlydematerialized (ground into dust).²⁰ Both of these options entail involve- ment,eveninnegation, of the matter of the thing itself. However,explicitlyarticulatedcritique of idolatry in terms of materiality,afre- quent trope in prophetic literature,appears less often than might be expected in Tan- naitic sources. Anotable instance of this type of critique arisesinthe tractate of Mis- hnah Sanhedrin (on court procedure), which includes ashortsection on the capital punishment for idolatry,detailing which actionsconstitutethe transgression of the prohibition against idol worship(m. Sanhedrin 7:6).²¹ It also describes what consti- tutes incitement to idolatry (also acapital offense):

One whoincites others to idolatry… He [the inciter] says to him [a person entrappingthe inciter], “Thereisagodinacertain place, whoeats thus,drinks thus,does good in this way, harms in another”… And then he [person entrapping incitertoidolatry] says, “Now how arewegoingtoabandon our God whoisinheaven, and go and worship sticks and stones (etsim ve-avanim,cf. Deut 4:28)?” m. Sanhedrin 7:10

 In Brown’sterms an object becomes athingwhenitinterrupts the circuit of use (e.g., by break- age) or bears some kind of metaphysical excess (e.g., my grandfather’swristwatch or adivine image- thing). Bittul almost seems to work in the oppositedirection (in Brown’sterms): the excess in the thingisneutralized when its materiality is exposed, so revertingittoautilitarian “object.”  On distinctions between the physical environment and human-made artifacts see m. Avodah Zarah 3:5(par. Sifre Deuteronomy 60,ed. Finkelstein, 125–26), which contrasts hills and mountains with sacred trees (asherot,sing. asherah). The former (hills and mountains) arenot forbidden, whereas the latter areforbidden. The differenceisthat the latter has been interferedwith by human hands (sheyeshbah tefisat yedei adam). Albeck on this mishnah (ed. Albeck, 333) suggests that this refers to atreethat is planted. See m. Nedarim 5:3and m. Eruvin 8:4inwhich tefisat yad refers to usage (or access). The usage in SifraShemini,9:1 (ed. Weiss, 55a) seems to fit with m. Avodah Zarah 3:5(see Mai- monides, Commentaryonthe Mishnah, Tractate Mikvaot,2:7).  Onlyritual acts such as worship, sacrifice, proskynesis,orverbal declarations of “youare my god” qualify as capital crimes for idol-worship. However,acts likehugging, kissing, cleaning, clothing, and bathingare consideredtobelesser transgressions.Onacts like this as renderingathinga“social agent,” see Collins 2003:39(thanks to Ian Moyer for this reference).

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The Mishnah’sinciter to idolatry attributes life, bodilyfunctions and agency to the idol in his attempt to lureother Jews to its worship. In its instructions for entrapping such an inciter in order to obtain evidence for conviction, the Mishnahimagines a person respondingtothe inciter’ssuggestions with amateriality critique.The critique is supposed to put alie to the claims about the god’sdigestive and other functions. The idol’sclaims, and thosemade about it,are exposed and in some wayneutralized by pointing towardthe matter of which the idol is constituted. This is acommon enough critique in contemporaneous Christian texts and in earlier prophetic writings—but perhapssurprisingly less common in rabbinic ones.²² Such acritique involves negatingthe representational function of the idol by focusingonits medium. Additional instances of amateriality critique in Tannaitic sources lie in the Me- khilta, arun-along exegetical commentary on Exodus.The Mekhilta engages in a good amount of polytheism-bashing,and afair bit of idol-bashing, too (at least dis- cursively). It is possible, of course,that the Egyptians and the denunciatory references to their practices serveasaplaceholder for Romans. Giventhe underlying biblical plot,Egyptians oftentakethe fall as the “bad guys” with idols. Thus the plagues are said to have punished Egyptian idols as much as their adherents—anotion that raises acertain specter of agency and affect on the part of these things. Their punish- ments are material-specific: wood rots,stone melts, and metal corrodes.Tothis Rabbi Natan adds by describing afourfold process of softening, hollowing,chop- ping,and burning.²³ The punishment for these material thingsistheir unmaking, their dematerialization. In asimilar move,the tenth plague—the death of the firstborn—is said to have not onlycaused death to living firstborns, but also to have resulted in the shattering (and abuse) of funerary images of the dead. Acknowledging or perhaps mockingthe power of ancestor cult and images, the Mekhilta imagines thatthe death of humans and iconoclasm toward funerarycult-images excited equal anguish from Egyptian families.²⁴ The Palestinian Tannaim use the biblical story of the tenth plague as

 On this issue see Ando 2009,esp. 21–41.Ando distinguishes between arepresentational critique, “the impossibility of representinganythinginvisible or incorporeal through matter,” and the materiality critique.  Mekhilta Piskha 7(ed. Horowitz-Rabin, 24): “‘And against all the gods of Egypt Iwill executejudg- ments:Iam the Lord’ (Ex 12:12). Judgments differingfrom one another:the stone idols melted,the wooden ones rotted,the metal ones corroded, as it is said: ‘… (and against their gods God wrought judgment,’ Numbers 33:4). Some say: Those of stone rottedand those of wood melted. R. Nathan said: ‘judgments’—judgment [of]judgesofjudgments.They became soft,they became hollow,they were chopped down, they wereburned. We thus learn that the avodah zarah was struck in four ways and its worshippers in three: by striking, by injury and by plague.” (Cf. Targum Jonathan and Targum Neofiti s.v. Exodus 12:12). See also Mekhilta Shira 8, ed. Horowitz-Rabin, 142, on judgment metedout to Egyptian avodah zarah alongwith the Egyptians.  See Mekhilta Piskha 13 (ed. Horowitz-Rabin, 44) on Exodus 12:29–30 (the plagueofthe killingof Egyptian firstborns): “‘Fortherewas no house in which there was not adead person’ (Exodus12:30). R. Nathan said: And weretherenohouses that did not have afirstborn?Rather,whenthe firstborn of

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an opportunity to imagine divine destruction of avodah zarah. The juxtaposition of these two “deaths”—of human and image—vividlyparallels the termination of human life and the renderingofthe bodyinto alifeless and decomposingthing and the destruction (or maltreatment and abuse)ofancestor images, which are treated as somehow living by the descendants, and hence in need of physical destruction.²⁵ Elsewhereinthe Mekhilta, acritique of the very concept of idolatry finds expres- sion:²⁶

Aphilosopher asked Rabban Gamliel: ‘‘It is written in your Torah[‘Youshall not make for your- self an image(pesel) …]for the Lordyour God is ajealous God’ (Ex 20.5), but is there power (koaḥ)inanidol (avodah zarah)ofwhich to be jealous? Astrongman is jealous of astrongman, asage is jealous of asage, arich man is jealous of a rich man, but is therepowerinanidol of which to be jealous?²⁷ He said to him: ‘‘If aman calls his dogbyhis father’sname, and then takesanoath on the life of the dog, is the father’sanger aimed at the son or the dog?

This form, in which an outsider enters rabbinic discourse with critical questions, is used to entertain questions about the difficulties with the prohibition against idolatry.Does this prohibition signify divine jealousy, which is atacit acknowledgement of the power (koaḥ)and even likeness (as adivinity is surelyonlyjealous of another divinity) of these sacred things? The counter-argument seeks to sever the relationship or likeness implied in arivalry between God and idol by claiming that divine anger is not directed at the idol but at its worshipper.The parable sets up aparallel hierarchy as follows:

God Father

Idolater Son

Idol Dog

one of them died, they would make an icon for him and set it up his house. And on that daythey (the icons) werecrushed, ground, and scattered, and that daywas as hard for them as the dayofthe funeral.” The text continues to describe how they would also bury the firstborn dead at home and how dogs came, draggedthe corpses out of their burial niches,and playedwith them, causing anguish as harsh as the dayofburial.  Brown’sideas about objectsbecomingnoticeable as things when they breakmight be applied to the human bodyorother entities (such as funerary images) whose livesare interrupted.  Mekhilta Bahodesh 6(ed. Horowitz-Rabin, 226).  According to the database of Primary Textual Witnesses to Tannaitic Literature(http://www.biu. ac.il/js/tannaim/ accessed April 28,2014), onlyMss. Munich and Vatican have this line (see also ed. Lauterbach, 245).

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In this analogy, if God >idolater in the waythatfather >son, thereisstill afamily relationship of likeness between them.²⁸ Idols on the other hand belong to an utterly different taxon, in the waythat (implicitly)dogsbelong to ataxon distinct from that of humans. Lookingatthe immediate and broader literarycontext of this dialogue sharpens the sense thatthe issue at stake is about the power of image-thingsasitrelates to their materiality.The dialogue is the first of three between Rabban Gamliel and aphilosopher which form acommentary on the second half of Exodus 20:5, “for the Lord your God is ajealous God,” that follows the prohibition against making images. In the second dialogue the philosopher challenges Rabban Gamliel with the claim that some idols are useful, pointing to acase of an idol that “stood up for itself” by saving its shrine from afire. Idols are not onlyuseful, but they are actors.The rabbi responds with aparable; he argues thatthis is like aking of flesh and blood onlybothering to wagewar against the living (ha-hayim)and not the dead (ha- metim).²⁹ This notion that idols are lifeless (sticks and stones rather than the organic matter of flesh and blood)alsostrikesatthe representational claims of divine images, as well as those madeabout their agency—at least as construed by theirrab- binic opponents. It seeks to designateidolatrous divine images as lifeless, passive things(or “objects”), rather thanasliving things, actors,and agents. In the third dialogue (paralleled in m. Avodah Zarah 3:9), the philosopher makes aconcessionary argument: he asks whyGod himself does not annul (mevatel)idolatry completely. In this case, Rabban Gamliel counters that idolatrous worship is not limited to human-made artifacts but also encompasses the natural world, and even humans (a likelyreferencetoimperial cult or cult of ancestors). On this logic, annul- ling idolatry would mean damaging significant parts of the physical and even human world.

 Some rabbinic sourcesconceive of humans as aclass to be both godlikeand thing-likeinthat they are “in the imageofGod” (betselem elohim): Genesis 1:27.Onthe basis of this principle Mekhilta Bahodesh 8(ed. Horowitz-Rabin, 233) analogizes homicide to atype of deicide. It does so by compar- ing God to an emperorwho sets up icons, statues,and coins in his image(i.e., humans). On this account homicide is likenedtodestroyingthese imagesand to “diminishing the imageofthe king.” The Mekhilta combines the representational logic of the imperial cultand its images, while invokingGen- esis 9:10.Atthe other end of this logic arethe things of avodah zarah,which arefalse images, in that they represent what is not (a god) and makefalse claims (about their own divinity). LaterAmoraic sourcesalso workwith the notion of humans as tselem elohim: e.g.,Leviticus Rabbah 34:3 (ed. Mar- gulies, 775–7) in which Hillel compares his goingtobathe his bodywhich is created in the imageand likeness of God to cleaningand bathingstatues of the emperor; Genesis Rabbah 8:8(ed. Theodor-Al- beck, 62)inwhich “Letusmakeman in our image” (Genesis 1:26)iscompared to an emperor who, seeingaclod of earth near his palace, decides to makeastatue out of it.  The typical openingfor the parable (mashal)inwhich God is analogized to a “kingofflesh and blood (melekh basar ve-dam)” has aparticularlyinteresting resonance herewhenthe point of the parable is to distinguish between the divine versus flesh and blood, as wellasbetween flesh and blood (or living) and dead.

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Thus, this triad of dialogues between arabbi and agentile philosopher articu- lates the problem, even if apparentlynegated, that aprohibition against idolatry takes the banned thingsseriously as powerful entities. The first asks: do idols have power of which God is jealous?The second concerns the apparent indestructi- bility and agency of an idol. The final challengeconcerns the slippery and moving targetofthat which can be potentiallydeified:from human-made thingsto“natural” elements—and even humans. Hencethe challenges, togetherwith the rabbinic responses thereto, constitutemeditations on the fundamental categories of human, divinity,thing,artifact,and material world. In order to think through these categories, determinations about classification, liveness, materiality,and agency are made.The rabbinic counterarguments distinguish human sinners from the specious claims of their images, claim divine indifferencetoidols as lifeless matter,and highlight the expansiverangeofpossible thingsbeyond artifacts that can be “made” into idols. The Mekhilta also incorporates asense of unease about the problems associated with the very category of idolatry in an earlier portion of the commentary (on Ex 20:2). The very term “other gods” in the phrase “youshall not have other gods besides me” is probed: how can “god” even be applied to these things? The various answers attempt to read the “other” (in “other gods”)invarious ways.These includethe idea that it is only others who call these thingsgods and thatthese thingsare “other” (or stranger-like) in terms of theirinability to respond to their worshippers’ entreaty.An- other answer attributes idols’“otherness” to theireasy material replaceability and recyclability:

R. Eliezer says: Other gods—sincethey makethemselvesnew gods every day. Howso? If one has one of gold and then needs the gold, he makes one of silver. If he has one of silverand then needs the silver, he makesone of copper.Ifhehas one of copper and needs the copper,he makes it of iron. And so also with one of tin, and so also with one of lead …³⁰

These responses, as in the three dialogues that appear later on in this section, rebut anysuggestion of agency, life, or divinity attributed to avodah zarah, in part by neg- ating its ability to respond, and in part by focusing on its materiality.Not onlyisthe idol ahuman-made artifact,but alsoitisreplaceable and recyclable. In R. Eliezer’s example, the idol is successivelydegraded materially. Thus even in its entertainment of the threat of divinity or power comingfrom such images, the Mekhilta neutralizes anyallureorglimmer of power by deconstructing them in grosslymaterial terms, whether by argument or anecdote.

 Mekhilta Bahodesh 6(ed. Horowitz-Rabin, 224).Note that this upsets an emic point of view in which, at least technically, sacred images of gods could not be reusedinthis way(see Estienne 2010:264–65). Cf. Tertullian, Apology 13.4 whowrites mockinglyofhow gods arerecycled intohouse- hold implements (Smith 1987: 105–6). See the reverse process (of upgrading rather than downgrad- ing)imagined with the Temple vessels’ materials in b. Menahot 28b(b. RoshHashanah 24b;43a-b).

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1.2 The Tannaim and the Religious Image-Things of Others

What happens,then, whenthe sacredimages of others make their wayinto Tannaitic rabbinic texts?Through the rabbinic classificatory concept of avodah zarah against which these images are assessed, they are overwhelmingly rabbinized.³¹ Scholars have sought to determine whether this rabbinization overlaps or deliberatelymispris- es contemporaneousnon-Jewish Palestinian, Greco-Roman, polytheistic emic notions of the livesofreligious image-things.³² Certainly by the time of the Mishnah’s redaction, rabbis wereliving in aprovincewith aconsiderable Roman presence.³³ The material evidence suggests an abundanceofpagan material not onlyinnon-Jew- ish areas but alsoin“Jewish” cities like Tiberias and Sepphoris, and in the BetShear- im catacombs.Onthe basis of this evidence, Seth Schwartz suggests that Jews at this time were functionallypagan. His argument is based on taking the manifest content of the images seriously and refusing to downplaytheirreligious lives.³⁴ Such an un- derstandingofthe livesofJews (aside from rabbis) in the second and earlythird centuries also complicates an either/or reading of the material evidence as having auni- tary religious and ethnic identity.The evidence demonstrates that manyJews interacted with pagan religious images (perhaps even in “cultic” contexts, narrowly understood) in much the same wayasdid others in Palestine and across the Roman east.³⁵ Tannaitic sources give us an additional complex view of the relationship between certain Jews and images up until the earlythird century.The harshest anti- idolatry rhetoric is in the Mekhilta, in which actual iconoclasm is imagined through the ambiguous artifice of biblical exegesisabout Egyptian cult images (funerary and otherwise). As mentioned, it is possible that Egyptians stand in as aplaceholder for polytheist Romans (or,ifwetake Schwartz seriously,evenJews). It is noteworthythat the rhetoric, even when violent,points the finger at adivine rather thanIsraelite iconoclast.The Mekhilta also stresses the materiality of idols, but at the sametime it entertains, if in the guise of negation, the potential critique of the idolatry prohibition itself as acknowledging the life of image-things. The Mishnah gets closer to amateriality critique in m. Sanhedrin 7:10 (the inciter claims the idol drinks, acts, etc.; the entrapper asks whyheshould abandon God and “worship sticks and stones”). In m. Avodah Zarah,itsets up ataxonomyofavodah

 Neis 2013.  Halbertal1993: 159–172; Schwartz 2004:162– 176  Roll and Isaac 1979:54–66.  Schwartz 2004.Schwartz essentiallypoints out that the scholarship has sufferedfromaversion of m. Avodah Zarah 3:4, in which the evidenceisread as merely ornamental and devoid of anyactual religious life.  Fordiscussions of the varieties of divine and mythological images found in Jewish and other cities in Palestine see the bibliography in Schwartz 2004,Fischer 1998, Schwartz 1998, Segal 1997, Chan- cey2005.

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zarah,seeking to pry apart images from gods, and it at least implicitlyconsiders ways of renderingthe representative function and materiality of image-thingsvisible through the material damagetothe images’ organs in bittul (nullification). Whether in the guise of halakhah (religious law), in the shape of biblical exegesis, or in the form of philosophicalchallengeordialogue, the possibility thatthere is more to these divine images pokes through.The continued enlivening of the biblical polemic against idols also continues to animate their threat,and thus their power.

2Palestinian Amoraim, Icons, and Idols

While Tannaitic sources tell us something about the encounter between rabbis and religious image-thingspriortothe earlythird century, Palestinian Amoraic sources (redacted in the late fourth or earlyfifth centuries), particularlythe Palestinian Tal- mud, alsoinform us about the mid-to-later third centurythrough the fourth century. Three important shifts in rabbinic livesare worth noting.Firstly, rabbis were increas- ingly urbanized. Secondly, Amoraim of the fourth century would have witnessed significant shifts in the material landscape of Palestine. Aprocess thatscholars refer to as christianization was alreadyunderwayinthe first half of the fourth century.Pal- estine was an important siteofimperial Christian attention, beingreconstitutedas the HolyLand. In material terms,this entailedadegreeofremoval and renewal of the material topography,includingimage-things. Christians (or at least those such as Eusebius) presented such transformations as part of aprocess of removing pagan idolatry,aviewpoint perhaps in line with rabbinic thinking.³⁶ At the same time, material manifestations of Christian sanctity appeared, which the rabbis would have viewed as equallydisturbing.³⁷ Afinal observation to make is that the Amoraim were not onlyinheritors of various biblical traditions, but increasinglyunderstood themselvesasadistinctive religious and social group. As part of this process, earlier rabbinic teaching (i.e., thatof the Tannaim), particularlythe Mishnah, was acrucial part of their curriculum. As a major Amoraic work, the Palestinian Talmud, or the Yerushalmi, follows the tractates and chapters of the Mishnahand is something of acommentary thereon. These three points then give us some context within which to then frame the analysis of the following three Amoraic sources that deal with image-things.

 E.g. Eusebius, Vita Constantini,3.54– 57;Stewart 1999.  See especiallyCaseau2001 and Saradi-Mendelovici 1990.

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2.1 Idolizing Sages, Blinding Idols

The first sourceisy. Mo’ed Qatan 3:7, 83c:³⁸ A. R. Yohanan was leaning on R. Yaakov bar Idi, and R. Eleazar sawhim and avoided him.³⁹ B. [Yohanan] said, “Now thereare two thingsthatthatBabylonian [R.Eleazar] has done to me. One is that he did not greet me, and the other is thathedid not cite a teachingofmine in my name.” C. [Yaakov] said to him, “That is the custom over there, thatthe lesser one does not greet the more important one. Forthey carry out the following verse of Scripture: ‘The young men sawmeand withdrew,and the old ones rose and stood”’ (Job 29:8). D. As they walked he showed him acertain house of study. He [Yaakov] said to him [R.Yohanan], “This is whereR.Meir would to go into session and expound the law. He would recitetraditions in the name of R. Ishmael but he did not recite traditions in the name of R. Akiva.” E. He said to him, “Everyone knows that R. Meir is astudent of R. Akiva [so there is no need for him to cite R. Akiva].” F. He [Yaakov] said to him [R.Yohanan], “Everyone knows that R. Eleazar is the student of R. Yohanan.” G. As they were going along,[they passed by aprocession in which an idol was car- ried, and Yaakov asked Yohanan,] “What is [the law] as to passing in front of the imageofAduri?” H. He said to him, “And would yougiveithonor?Rather,gobefore it and blind its eyes.” I. [Yaakov] said to him, “R. Eleazar treated youfinely, for he did not pass in front of you.” J. He [Yohanan] said to him, “Yaakov bar Idi, youknow how to appease.” K. R.Yohanan wanted traditions to be statedinhis name because of David who also prayed for mercysaying, “Let me dwell in your tent forever. [Oh to be safe under the shelter of your wings]” (Ps. 61:4). L. R. Phineas, R. Jeremiah in the name of R. Yohanan:⁴⁰ “And did it enter David’s mind that he would live forever?But this is what he said: ‘MayIhave the merit of having my words repeated in synagogues and study-houses.’” M. And what benefit was this to him?Bar Tira said, “He who recites atradition in the name of the person who originallysaid it ― [the teacher’s] lips whisper in the grave.”

 Par. y. Berakhot 2:1, 4b; y. Sheqalim 2.6, 47a; b. Yevamot 96b-97a.  Ehrlich 2004:23–36.  Notethat R. Yohanan is cited herebyname.

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N. What is the scriptural basis for this statement? “[And your kisses like the best wine thatgoes down smoothly,] glidingoverlips and teeth” (Song 7:9)… like a mass of heatedgrapes thatflows of itself.⁴¹ O. R. Hinenahbar Pappi and R. Simon ― one said, “It is comparable to one who drinks spicedwine,” and the other said, “It is comparable to one who drinks old wine.” That is, even though he has drunk the wine, the taste lingers in his mouth.

The framing plot (A-B) has asenior and junior sage, R. Yohanan and R. Yaakov bar Idi, encountering athird, R. Eleazar.Yohanan is offended by the fact that Eleazar flees upon seeing him. Decrying this behavior,healso notes that Eleazar recites his (Yohanan’s) teachings without attributing them to him. Yaakov bar Idi’srole in the story is that of peacemaker.Hefirst explains Eleazar’sapparent rudeness in cultural terms (C—this is how they do thingsback in Babylonia). Based on biblical exegesis, the mechanics of Babylonian forms of veneration are noteworthy—they see and then flee to show honor. What then follow are tworather staged chance encounters through which Yaa- kov induces Yohanan himself to justify Eleazar’sactions. The first (D-F) has Yohanan conceding thatknown studentsofparticularmasters need not cite their masters’ teachings by name (D-F). The second (G-I) concerns an encounter with an idolatrous image-thing.This latter combination of narrative device and halakhic discussion is found in atriplet of anecdotes elsewhereinthe Palestinian Talmud.⁴² Upon being asked whether they should pass in front of the image, R. Yohanan exclaims: “And would yougiveithonor?Ratherpass in front of it and blind its eyes.” It is thus that Yohanan ends up validatingEleazar’sactions as aworthyform of veneration. If avoiding the idol is to show it honor,then in fact Eleazar honored his teacher by retreating. The passagethen ends with an explanation of what was at stake for R. Yohanan in wishing to be cited properly(M-O). It turnsout that proper citation ensures akind of immortality for the teacher,inthe formofaveritable animationofthe bodyofthe deceased. Thisextended passage(drawing on narrative elements paralleled elsewhere), followed by the anonymous editor’sexplanatory intervention, artfullyjuxta- poses concerns about veneration, idolatry,and animation.

2.1.1 Blinding Eyes: Veneration and ItsOpposite

To unravel how these concerns playout,let us focus on some keyelements of the passage. Perhaps most strikingly,arabbinic sage is opposed to an idol in terms of

 See Jastrow2005:621.  See y. Avodah Zarah 3:8, 43b.

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appropriate veneration and its contrary.Consider the terms of veneration: the pas- sagecontrasts Babylonian-style sage veneration of seeing and fleeing with dishonoring confrontation that “blindsthe eye” of the idol.⁴³ R. Yohanan’sinstruction to approach the imageand blind its eyeshould be read as an affective (rather thanliteral, material) iconoclasm.⁴⁴ The eye-blindinginquestion is the effect of dishonor,not the physical means by which it is accomplished. Besides its aggressive tone, the languageofeye-blinding is enormouslyevoca- tive.Itrecalls iconographic apotropaic techniquesbywhich the evil eye(often just referred to as “the eye” in ancient sources) was apotropaicallynegated—depictions of an eyebeing attacked by spearsoranimals.⁴⁵ The underlying mechanics of the evil eye, and indeed of vision more generally, involved emanations streamingfrom an eye.⁴⁶ If Iamright about all these associations with the phrase, “blind its eye,” this mayimplythe rabbinicattribution of some kind of agency,evenifmalevolent, to the image. We should also consider the propensity in antiquity to strike out the sensoryorgans (particularlyeyes) of images. In representational terms the eye makes aclaim about the visual capacity of an image. To challengeit, to blind it, is to put alie to that claim. Another avenue to understanding this phrase lies in the visual encounter between cult imageand worshipper as the ultimatemoment (in worship). The epiphany of the godand imagewerefused in ancient religious imaginations.⁴⁷ Moreover this encounter was understood as reciprocal, in Verity Platt’swords, “To view acult imagewas to encounter abeing who looked back,” (Platt 2011:78). The Amoraim werethemselvesheirs to earlier Tannaitic traditions that imagined that the Jerusalem Temple pilgrimagetothe deity entailed an ocular encounter of preciselythis recip-

 The supportingexegesis of “the young men saw me and fled” (Job 29:8)picks up on how R. Ele- azar “saw” R. Yohanan and avoided him. This echoes the pericope’sattention to vision’srole in sage veneration (Neis 2013:202– 52). Forarecentaccount of the importanceofvisual, physical encounter with the cult image in Greco-Roman religion see Platt 2011:77–85.  It is not likelythat Yohanan is advocatingthat Yaakovwalk up to the imagethat is beingproc- essed and attack it.Evenonatechnical, halakhic, level the Mishnah states that aJew cannot annul the image of agentile once worshipped. Contrast this with R.Yohanan’sinstructions to BarDerosayto break the images (tsalmayya)inthe bathhouses(y. Avodah Zarah 4:4,43d). See Schäfer 2002:350.  See b. Sukkah 38a; b. Qiddushin 30a, 81a; b. Menahot 62afor casting “an arrowinto the eyeof Satan.” This could be consideredtobeavirtual bittul (annulment).  See, e.g., Bartsch 2006:145 – 47.  Platt 2011:78–85; Gordon 1979.For arather different account of the relationships between presenceofthe godand representation, see Johnston 2008:449,who challengesthe notion of a “single, consistent ancient explanation for the relationship between divinity and representation,” at least in the matter of specific beliefs that the godwas “inside” (or “entering” or “filling) the statue. Most in- terestingly,she shows that such beliefs,concomitant with rituals of animation, surfaceonlyinlater antiquity in Platonist theurgy (cf. CoxMiller 2009:138). It is curious to note that it is in roughly contemporaneous writings (second and third centuries) thereisagreatersense of the agencyofGreek statues (especiallyinerotic and sexual terms;Collins 2003:40).

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rocal nature.⁴⁸ The approach toward the godwas ritualized. Agutsy and disrespect- ful approach would be the gestural equivalent to not onlydisregardingthe sanctity of the image, but also to denying its equivalencetothe goditrepresented, or even worse, to denying the god. The rabbi’sfocus on eye-blinding serves to challenge the image-things’sagencybyquelling the visual exchangeatthe heart of the encounter. Despite or because of these various resonances at play, thereisanambiguity about iconoclastic behavior,evenifsymbolic. We can illuminate this by the example of physical iconoclasm in antiquity as discussed earlier.Perhaps most straightfor- wardly, damagetoanimageserves as amark of disrespect;todefacesomething is to belittle it.Onthe one hand,damaginganimage, particularlyits sensory organs, is away to show up its gross materiality and insensibility:one of the critiquesof idolatry.The very madeness and artefactual nature of the thing is both revealed and negated by its unmaking.Assuggested, the defacement visiblyputs alie to an image’sclaims, particularlythose related to divinity. On the other hand, defacement might also implythat even the iconoclast has a certain faith in the representational claims of an image. In other words, does blinding an image(whether physicallyorsymbolically) mean to show up something that was never there (sight) or does it servetocancel acapacity thatwas there? Surely blinding mayimplythat it originallydid see. To put thingswithin the particulars of our narrative:does behaving rudelyimplythatthe idol sees and registers the insult?The narrative clearlystruggles with this very suggestion when R. Yohanan suggests that running away from an imageaccords it power.This uneasy persistenceof the possibilityoflife and vision in acult image—its “excess” beyond its “mere materialization as objects” or its “mere utilizationasobjects” (Brown 2001, 5)—brings us backtothe potential problem with the very concept of idolatry as hinted at in the Mekhilta. Furthermore, in this later sourceinthe Yerushalmi,itserves as both echo and contrast to asimilar persistenceoflife in the dead sage.⁴⁹

2.1.2 Blind Images Versus Animated Dead Sages

If thereisanuneasy persistenceofthe image-thing’spower,asimilar lingering ani- mationismorehappilyalso applied to the rabbinicsage. As noted, the basicele- ments of this story—asenior Amoraic rabbidirects ajunior rabbitopass in front of an idol and blind its eyes—are repeatedelsewhereinthe Palestinian Talmud as stand alone vignettes (in aseries of three). The deploymentofthese elements here, within the frame of R. Eleazar’sfailuretogreet and to cite R. Yohanan, thor- oughlytransforms their resonances. Specifically, veneration or dishonor to an idol

 Sifre Deuteronomy 143(ed. Finkelstein, 195–96). See Neis 2013:41–81.  On iconoclastic treatment of faces and eyes, see Flood 2002 and Kristensen 2013.

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is contrastedwith, and used to uphold, veneration practices towardthe rabbinic sage. At the sametime, the frame-story also involves the issue of attribution. This additional layer, as enrichedbythe anonymous editor’ssupplemental discussion and set of citations in K-O, enhancesthe uneasy contrast/comparison between aseeing/ blind imageand the death-defying capacity of the sage. While the narrative ostensi- blyresolvesR.Yohanan’sanger at Eleazar’sfailuretocite him by name, the Talmud goes on to ask whythis was even aproblem.

K. R. Yohanan wanted traditions to be stated in his name because of David whoalso prayed for mercy saying, “Letmedwellinyour tent forever. [Oh to be safe under the shelter of your wings]” (Ps. 61:4). L. R. Phineas, R. Jeremiah in the name of R. Yohanan: “And did it enter David’smind that he would live forever?But this is what he said: ‘MayIhave the merit of havingmywords repeated in synagogues and study-houses.’”

At first it appears that the editor is explaining R. Yohanan’supset by virtue of adif- ferent teachingofR.Yohanan’s. That teachingconverts the weight of David’s(and by implication Yohanan’s) concern for posterity into ametaphor.The verse’s “forever” is transformed into the preservation of words. But then the passagecontinues:

M. And what made this importanttohim?Bar Tira said, “He whorecitesatradition in the name of the person whooriginallysaid it ― [the teacher’s] lips whisper in the grave.” N. What is the scriptural basis for this statement? “[And your kisses likethe best wine that goes down smoothly,]glidingoverlips and teeth” (Song 7:9)… likeamass of heatedgrapes that flows of itself.

Thus, the citation of aperson’steaching does not just keep him alive metaphorically; it alsoliterallyanimates him in the grave. It is worth bearing in mind that the largerliterary setting of this narrative concerns the laws of mourning rituals for relativesand rabbinic teachers.⁵⁰ ATannaitic tradition on an earlier folio declares that seeing adead sage is likeseeing aburned Torahscroll.⁵¹ If adead sage is likeadamaged sacred thing (and as the text outlines, requires similar mourning rituals),then here Yohanan is in search of the cureagainst decomposition. Thefigure of the sagestands in sharp contrast to the idolatrous

 Attention to the broader redaction settingsofall parallel versions of this storyare also instructive. In y. Berakhot 2:1, 4b the underlying mishnah is m. Berakhot 2:1oninterruptingone’sprayertogreet out of fear or respect.The passagemoves intothis narrative after determiningthat one oughttogreet one’ssuperior in Torahknowledge.Iny. Sheqalim 2.6, 47athe underlying mishnah concerns building gravemonuments and in y. Mo‘ed Qatan 3:7, 83cthe underlying mishnah concerns laws of ritual mourningfor the deceased.  y. Mo‘ed Qatan3:7,83b. Givenits “excess” the Torahscroll is surelya“thing” in Brown’sterms, yet to understand the dead sage as adamagedTorah scroll (surely another instanceofa“thing”)pushes up against the adequacyBrown’sdualtypology of thingsand/versus objects.

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image-thing not just in terms of veneration, but also in its resistance to constraints of matter.Ifthe imageistobeblinded, the sage in the graveisneither silenced nor quite dead, despite his dead flesh. Scholars of Christianityhavenoted the fourth century material turn, following on Peter Brown’sinsights about the simultaneous rise of the cult of the dead and the cult of the saints (Brown 1981 and 1989). He writes of the increase in Christian desire for praesentia in terms of “the physical presenceofthe holy” (Brown 1981:88). More recentlyPatricia CoxMiller has argued for amaterial turn in Christian religion between the fourth and seventh centuries, linking the rise of relics and the fixation on the bodyofthe saint to the eventual cult of icons (Cox Miller2009). In the process, CoxMiller has shown us how the specterofidolatry hovered over Christians as they considered what holythingsand bodies did for the relationship between materiality and holiness. CoxMiller’sinstructive consideration of thing-theory to think through the ways in which Christians grappled with the implications of the sanctification of living and dead human bodies and the meaningofsacred images (as opposed to idols) can enrich our understanding of rabbis in fourth-centuryPalestine producing narratives about their rabbinic predecessors.Christians werenot the onlypeople wrestlingwith such issues. As our second Amoraic sourcewill further illuminate, it is important to attend to the material-political context in which the rabbis operat- ed. Their encounters with the populations of thingsinPalestine must also be framed within broader fourth-century transformationsofholymatter.⁵²

2.2 Breaking Idols and the SpecialRabbinic Dead

The second sourcetobeexamined,part of the Palestinian Talmud’scommentary on m. Avodah Zarah 3:1, also contrasts idols with dead rabbis.Let us begin with a glimpse of the top of the passage, which begins with ablend of Amoraic and Tannait- ic determinations related to the underlying mishnah:

“All imagesare forbidden, sincethey areworshipped once ayear.” (m. Avodah Zarah 3:1).

A. Asyan the carpenter in the name of R. Yohanan, “Whyare the images (ikoniyot)forbidden? Because they offer incense beforethem when they go up.” B. R. Yohanan said, “It is permittedtolook at them (liro’tan)when they go down. Why? ‘When the wicked arecut off youshall look (tir’eh)’” (Psalms 37:34)… C. Furthermore, one does not even look at images (ikonot)onweekdays. What is the reason? “Do not turn towardthe idols” (Lev 19:4)—do not turn to worship them. R. Judah says.Do not turn to look at them literally.⁵³

 On Jewish participation in new Christian martyrological materiality,see Boustan 2015.  y. Avodah Zarah 3:1, 42c.

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In A-BRabbi Yohanan—afigurearound which stories and discussions involving idols cluster—features as the originator of teachings about forbidden images. Perhaps most relevant for our purposes is R. Yohanan’steaching about looking at icons when they are taken down. It paints Jews as witnesses to the violence of others to- wards religious image-thingsinPalestine.⁵⁴ From the life and death of icons (the “wicked”), the passagelaunches into alit- anyofrabbis’ funerary processions, most of which are in the vicinity of Tiberias.This funerary list is clearlylinked to what precedes it by the themes (and language) of looking,spectacle,idolatrous images, and iconoclasm:

D. When R. Nahum bar Simaydied, they covered the icons(ikonta)with mats.They said, “Just as he did not look at them when he was alive,soheshould not look at them in death.” Now can they [the dead] recognize anything? R. Simeon b. Levi said: We have nothingincommon with the righteous except the power of speech [i.e., that is all they lose upon death unlikethe rest of us wholose all sensory capacities]… R. Zeira said: The deceased hears words of praise for himself as if in adream… And whywas he called Nahum most holy? Because he never gazed upon the imageofacoin his whole life… E. When R. Hoshaya died, the kalon (lit.rebuke) of Tiberias fell.⁵⁵ F. When R. Hanan died, the statues (andartayya)bent over. G. When R. Yohanan died, the iconsbent over; they said it was because therewas no iconlike him.

The first dead rabbi is R. Nahum bar Simay. We are told that,given his signaturepiety of visual abstinence, when he died they (the rabbis, presumably) covered the icons with mats so that he would not see them. But then the Talmud pauses to ask about the apparent implication thatthis rabbi continued to see afterdeath. The answer is that the righteous (or special dead) do indeedcontinue with theirsenses and capacities intactexceptfor the power of speech. Once again we have anarrative encounter and material opposition between rabbis and idols. Rabbis defytheirmaterial trappings; theirbodies are somehow somewhat alive and sensate, even after death.

 On Christian reuse and neutralization of pagan images see James 1996.Questioningwhether all acts of mutilation and recyclingofimages by Christians ought be consideredideological iconoclasm is Caseau2011.The article includes aconsideration of statuary in Palestine. The Tannaitic laws of bittul in m. Avodah Zarah can be understood as partlymotivated by similarlypragmatic concerns of disposal and reuse. We must also take into account that Christian texts emphasize transformation (or apologeticallyexplain the lack thereof, e.g., Eusebius, Life of Constantine 3.54,57), but that polytheism was far from over in the fourth century.Onthe persistenceofpagan cultureinPalestine, see Belayche 2001.For scholarship that emphasizes the complexity of the process of christianization in Palestine see Mulryan 2011:61–64.  Schwartz and Jastrow take kalon to be a “cacophemistic” referencetoanimage of adeity or its temple; Schwartz notesthat such areadingmakes most sense in this context (Schwartz 2004:342,n. 24;Jastrow 2005:1373).

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The guiding conceit in the series of rabbinic deaths and damagetothingsand built environment that follow,isthe power of rabbis,evenindeath, to somehow show up the material fragilityofidols. As seen in the first case, the rabbinic story- teller dares to imagine that rabbis covered up the statuary adorning the streets of the town.Inanother,the saintlyrabbi causesthe statues to tip over.R.Yohanan also appears:athis funeral, icons bend over,apparentlyout of respect for his supe- rior iconic quality.Roles are reversed—images are covered up from visibility and vision, while the rabbinic dead who oughtnot see or act continue to do so and, in the case of R. Yohanan, become religious icons and spectaclesthemselves(essentially veneratedbyidols). Asimple contrast between the material vulnerability of idols versus the ongoinganimation and agency of dead sagesistobeeschewed however,as images and thingsdoseem to move, even if towardtheir owncomeuppance.Isthe “excess” in the thing thatisthe rabbialsostill present in the idol?What does it mean to account for the icons bowing to R. Yohanan in terms of his superiority as an icon? We sawiny. Mo’ed Qatan,how R. Yohanan wasinsulted by his student’sfailure to greet and cite him, advised “blindingthe eye” of an idol, and worried about his posthumous life and animation. If y. Mo’ed Qatan bringssages, students, and idols together to consider iconoclastic impulses towardidols and the vivifying effects of veneration and citation upon sages, then y. Avodah Zarah here surfaces similar themesthrough legal hypothetical and iconoclastic funerary fantasies. Besides these themes, the y. Avodah Zarah passagegets even more vividlyatthe life and death of idols in the Palestinian landscape. From R. Yohanan’sdescription of the erection and dismantling of areligious imagetoeffects of rabbinic death on idols, we have the sense of alandscapeheaving with symbols of non-Jewish, religious things. Seth Schwartz views the funerary story-collection as “motivated by claims of Christians likeEpiphaniusthatitwas the Christians, not the Jews, who eradicated paganism in Palestine”.⁵⁶ Iwould view this passageasmotivated not just by the wit- nessing of Christian iconoclasm or related claims, but alsoaspartaking in abroader debate about religious image-things, idols, and the sacreddiscussed above. Hereitis crucial to recall that the christianization of Palestine needstobeseen not just as iconoclastic, but alsoasiconic—things(the wrong religious things) werenot onlyde- stroyed but wereoften replacedorre-appropriated.⁵⁷ Astark differencebetween the earlier Tannaitic sources and these later Amoraic ones is how the problematic surplus in image-things, their religious “liveness,” is mirrored by the death-defiance of the rabbinicsage. Like fourth century Christians, rabbis weregrapplingwith the specterofidolatry,while at the sametime considering the material limits and qualities at playinspecial humans in terms of image-things.

 Schwartz 2007:343.See also Schwartz 2004:145 – 47.  CoxMiller 2009;Cameron 1992.

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2.3 Rabbis as SacredThings, NonrabbisasInsensibleIdols

Our third and final Amoraic source, y. Bikkurim 3:3, 65c-d, bears out this idol/rabbi inversion in bold terms. This passagereframes the underlying mishnah about ritual greetingduringaTemple pilgrimageprocession into adiscussion about rituals of intra-rabbinic veneration. The long and sinewypassagelaysout different forms of veneration for various respected figures and things. The basic currencyofveneration involves gazing, risingfrom being seated, and, sometimes, greeting. These ritual elements ground aprocess of sanctification of the rabbiasatype of religious thing.For example, in one section, through aseries of legal and narrative segments, the passageconsiders conflictingobjects of veneration in terms of whether “the Torahrises for her son”—that is, whether people studying Torahought to inter- rupt their studysession in order to rise for asenior rabbi, “the Torah’sson.” These are moves towardthe sanctification and thingification of the sageand the corre- sponding humanization and animation of the Torah. In the samesection, R. Hanina is said to strike people who don’trise for him, crying “would youannul Torah(me- vatlah de’orayta),” both thingifyingand sanctifying himself. In another vignette, a rabbi waits at aparticularspotevery week so thathecan “see his son-in-lawand rise” in veneration towardhim. He refers to the man as “Sinai” and “thatrighteous body” (hahu gufatsadika). Focusing on two anecdotes, both of which contrast veneration with dishonor, will illustrate how the Amoraim find religious things “good for thinkingabout” rabbinic sages:

When the patriarch enters, everybodystands beforehim, and it is not permitted for anyofthem to sit down, until he says to them, “Be seated.” When the head of the courtenters, they set up rows[of disciples] beforehim. If he wants,hepasses through this row,and if he wants,hepasses through that one.When asage enters,one stands up and the one beforesits down, one stands up and the one beforesits down, until he reaches his places and sits.⁵⁸

When R. Meir (a sage) would go up to the assembly-house, everyone would look at him and rise beforehim. When they heardthis Tannaitic teaching (i.e., that preceding, about according a lesser form of veneration for the sage), they wanted to treat him accordingly.Hebecame angry and left.Hesaid to them, “Ihaveheard(in ateaching) that ‘they raise the level but do not lowerthe level of sanctity (ma‘alin baqodeshvelo moridin).’”

At first his colleagues would extend avery highform of veneration to R. Meir—atype mentioned elsewhereinthis pericope, consisting of everyone standing and looking at the honoree. They then learn of ateachingthat someone of R. Meir’sstatus (a sage) should be honored in alesser fashion and try to implement it,with each person merelyrising when he passes them and sitting down as soon as he has gone by.R. Meir’sangry rebukethingifies himself by invoking an halakhic (religious-legal) prin-

 Paralleled in t. Sanhedrin 7:8.

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ciple usually applied (elsewhere)tocultic and sacred thingslikeTemple vessels, sac- rifices,and ritual artifacts like Torahscrolls and mezuzot. The principle essentially states that athing,once sanctified, can onlybeaugmented, not diminished, in status or value.⁵⁹ Like asacred thing,R.Meir must not be degraded once elevated in sanctity.⁶⁰ This pericope closes with an even more striking movethat uses the notion of good and bad religious image-things(or icons and idols) and even deification to think about real and pseudo-rabbis:

R. Mana denigrated those whowereappointed for payment of silver(mitmanne bekhesaf). R. Immi recited with regardtothem, “Youshall not makefor yourselvesgods of silver(kesef)or gods of gold” (Exodus 20:20). R. Josiah said, “And the cloak that he wears is likeanass’ssaddle-cloth.” R. Asyan said, “This one whoisappointed in exchange for silver, one should not rise beforehim nor call him rabbi;the cloak that he wears is likeanass’ssaddle-cloth.”

Hereisarabbinic critique of wealthyJewishmen being appointed to communal and judicial positions to which the rabbis felt entitled.⁶¹ These men are pretenders in the rabbis’ eyes. The material wealth—the silver—to which these men owe their appoint- ments, is like the precious metals of which idols are made—gross materiality with no authority.Their material manifestations, their taking up of acloak, is an object of mockery—abeast’ssaddle-cloth.⁶² As idols claim to be deities, so these falsely claim to be “rabbis,” but must not be recognized, venerated, or greeted as such. The critique continues,spicedbyanecdote:

R. Zeira and one of the rabbis were seated. One whohad been appointed in exchange for silver passed by.The rabbi said to R. Zeira, “Letusrecite traditions so as not to rise up beforehim.”

Conspicuous trade in rabbiniccurrency—rabbinic teachings—while not rising is the means of dishonoring the non-rabbinic appointee. But what then follows brings home the idolatry-critique of these faux-rabbis even more forcefully:

JacobofKefar Nevorayya interpreted the followed verse: “Woetohim whosaystoawooden thing, ‘Awake!’ To amutestone, ‘Arise!’ Can this give instruction?[Behold, it is overlaid with gold and silver, but thereisnobreath within it]” (Habakkuk 2:19–20). “Can this give instruction?” (Habakkuk 2:19)—does he (or:it) know how to instruct? “Behold, it is overlaid with gold and silver” (Habakkuk2:19)—was he not appointed for silver

 E.g., m. Menahot 11:7 and t. Sheqalim 6:4, in which the rule is cited as the explanationfor whythe showbread in the Temple is takeninonamarble table and taken out on agold table. See also y. Yoma 3:9,41a, y. Megilah 4:10,75d and y. Shevu’ot 1:5, 33b.  Iamintrigued by the suggestion that this and y. Mo’ed Qatan 3:7, 83cmay evincecritique or am- bivalence about veneration of the rabbis; see Schwartz 2012: 137 and 152.  See Lapin 2006:79; for further references on this pericope see Neis 2013:231–39.  Notethe combination of thingification and animalization—cf. Mekhilta Bahodesh 6(above) in which idols are compared to dogs.

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(kaspayya)? “But thereisnobreath within it” (Habakkuk2:19)—he is not at all knowledgeable (hakkim); woe to those whosay ‘Iwish to be appointed.’ Rather, “God is in his holytemple” (Habakkuk 2:20)—this refers to R. Isaac b. Ele‘azar in the synagogueofMadarta in Caesarea.

Jacob of Nevorayya applies verses of prophetic idol-polemic through exegesis. The nonrabbinic appointee might bear the external trappings of authority and power, but there is nothing inside. He is speechless, insensate, without instructionand learning.The juxtaposition of appropriate veneration to asageversus the dishonor due to idolatry is drawninhighrelief.Ifthe inappropriate object of veneration— the faux-rabbi—is an idol, the rabbi, in this caseR.Isaacb.Eleazar,explicitlybe- comes the deity itself,sitting in its sanctuary. In this final source, the thingification (as an effect of veneration) is even more explicit.Atthe same time, faux-rabbis become negatively thingified or objectified as bad religious thingsoridols. In this blurringofthings, the sacred, and the human, rabbis are promoted as proper religious things, true images. Their represen- tationalclaims of divinity invert thosemade by idols, but in the rabbinic case they ring true; rabbis are the “real thing.” Unlikethe two first sources, the idol/rabbi contrast and its attendant themes of sanctity,materiality,and sensibilityare applied to intra-Jewishrather than Jewish-Gentile relations.

3Conclusion

This article has sought to think through the religious life of image-thingsasplayed out in their encounter with Palestinian rabbis between the second and fourth centuries. As Clifford Ando has noted, divine images are aparticular type of thing,atonce material and representational.⁶³ Perhaps this is no different from non-divine images, except for the claims of worship and ritual that divinities made upon their human subjects. Forrabbis,asfor some other Jews and Christians, religious image-things —or “idols”—presented aparticularproblem. My approaching rabbinic texts with the insights of thing-theory has allowed me to reposition the analytical thrust of “idols” and to consider the ways in which their liveness or “excess” threatened and also (in latersources) resisted and even infused rabbinic religious ideology. Earlier,Tannaitic, sources betray some of this threat,despite the apparentlyneu- tral category of avodah zarah. Whether by the technique of bittul or through philo- sophical or exegetical polemic, the theoretical possibility of idols’ power inhabits these earlier texts.Bythe fourth century,the robust reconfiguration of religion in the Roman world in the form of Christianitygavenew life to questions about divinity, the sacred, materiality,and the human. Whether in Constantinian and post-Constan-

 Ando 2009:21–43.

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tinian building projects,orinthe discursive mappings of material shifts by Epipha- nus and Eusebius, or in the rising cult of saints—religious thingsand holybodies took on bolder colors. Religious images of others thus enjoy multivalent journeys in the Palestinian Tal- mud. In y. Avodah Zarah 3:1, 42c, y. Mo’ed Qatan 3:7, 83cand y. Bikkurim 3:3, 65c-d idols are expresslyopposed by rabbis who simultaneouslytakeupfeatures of religious image-thingsinthe veneration they excite, in their defiance of their own human materiality and mortality,and ultimatelyinamovement toward thingification and deification. At the sametime, idols, even when they movetowardtheir own downfall, do move. Thus:

R. Nahman in the name of R. Mana, ‘In the time to come,the idol will come and spit in the faces of its worshippers and shame them and be nullified (betelah)fromthe world.’ And what is the basis for this? ‘All idol-worshippers will be ashamed’ (Psalms 97:7). R. Nahman in the name of R. Mana, ‘In the time to come, the idol will come and bow down beforethe Holy One, Blessed be He,and then be nullifiedfromthe world.’ And what is the basis for this? ‘All gods will bow beforehim’ (Psalms 97:7).”⁶⁴

Hereidols move to shametheir human worshippers and bow before God before being nullified.⁶⁵ The iconoclastic legacyimparted by the second commandment becomes,inthe mixture of narrative imagination and legal hypothetical, ameans for the Amoraim to restoretheir own agency vis-à-vis the Palestinian landscape full of others’ things. They track the material shifts, uneasilyregister the exit and entry of religious things, and perhaps most cruciallyinstate themselvesinthe urban landscape as thingsworthyofrespect.The story of the agency of thingsand the power of images in Byzantine Palestine is at least in part bound up with stories about the agency and power(lessness) of the scholasticJewishminority.The fluiditybe- tween humans and non-human things, between dynamic agency and senseless materiality,and between proper religion and ‘avodah zarah is not unrelated to the complex position of aminority living in amaterial landscape largely controlled and populatedbythe “religious things” of an imperial order.The rabbis end up tapping into the very excess of the forbidden image-thing.Atthe same time,intranslating the properties of image-thingsinto recognizablyrabbinic terms of teachingand study, and in ensuring their ownposterity,the rabbinic image-thing becomes an icon for the rabbinic project of talmud torah (Torah study) itself.⁶⁶

 y. Avodah Zarah 4:7, 44a; on spittinginthe faces of idols see Eusebius, Historia Ecclesiastica,10:4.  Noticethat in the later sourcesthese idols enterthe texts relatively free of people and compan- ions.These scenes consist of rabbis and sacred images with no gentile characters (and onlyanon- rabbi in one case). This contrasts with the philosophers whoquiz rabbis in both the Mishnah and the Mekhilta.  Astrikingassertion of thingification (as aimage-thinginparticular)isfound in an exegetical play on averse from Psalms in y. Shabbat 1:2, 3a (paralleled in y. Qiddushin 1:7, 61a): “Gidol says, “One who recites atradition in the name of the person whosaid it should see the tradition’sauthor standing

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