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Home , John Chrysostom

chapter three

Church Fathers

The Fathers read the text of 28:11–19 in a way that differs radically to that of their rabbinic contemporaries. For the classical rab- binic authorities the text was speaking of the first man, ; but for the the text speaks of Satan—and the demonic forces under his charge—brought low on account of his hubris. The oracle against the king of Tyre is referred to in a number of works by the Church Fathers: from the period preceding the decisive council of Nicaea it is taken up by , Hippolytus, and ; of the post- Nicene Fathers, , John Chrysostom, , and Augus- tine of Hippo concern us. One similarity to the rabbinic material we reviewed in the previous chapter immediately confronts us from a survey of the Church Fathers: they do not have a lot to say about Ezekiel 28. It was clearly not a well- spring for major theological speculation for the Fathers. As with the rabbis, we find Ezekiel 28 being used to support a point being made, more often than forming the basis for the discussion itself. Only Origen and Jerome provide any extended discussion of chapter 28 as a whole, in the form of a and letter (respectively). Yet in spite of this, what the Fathers draw from Ezekiel 28 has consistency. The most persistent interpretation offered by the Fathers is that Ezekiel 28 describes the fall of Satan. For Hippolytus it centres on the coming , and for Origen it concerns hostile forces more generally. Chrysostom stands alone in reflecting more generally on morality and mortality.

Tertullian

Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus, or simply Tertullian, one of the founding minds of Latin , is the earliest of our writers (c. 160– 225?)1 to take up Ezekiel 28, and to interpret it as referring to the origin of

1 For biography and further bibliography: Siniscalco, ‘Tertullian’; Moreschini and Norelli, Early Christian Greek and Latin Literature, Vol. 1, 332–57; Kannengiesser, Handbook of Patristic Exegesis, 593, 602–3, 606–7. 42 chapter three evil in the world. The passage occurs in Tertullian’s extensive denuncia- tion of Marcion (entitled Against Marcion, composed between 207–208 ce),2 whose views are one of the most well known of all the early here- sies. Of Marcion and his views we known nothing except for that narrated by his detractors. According to (in his Against the Heresies) he taught that the of the was not the same as the father of Jesus Christ, but an inferior god, responsible for the creation of an evil world. On this basis Marcion rejected the Old Testament entirely and expunged from the any reference to the Old that implied that Jesus was related to this evil Demiurge. As an apparently wealthy and powerful man, Marcion’s ideas disseminated rapidly and his school quickly became a serious rival to the Church. Tertullian clearly felt Marcion’s ideas posed enough of a threat that they required a serious, reasoned, response. Tertullian knew Marcion only indirectly, so his Against Marcion is intended to counter the heresy of his followers, threatening the Church in Carthage. The work is envisaged as a case argued in court against Mar- cion, who serves as Tertullian’s rhetorical counterfoil. Tertullian’s purpose in the second volume of his Against Marcion, the volume with which we are concerned, is to provide a systematic of the God of the Old Testament, developing the refutation of the Marcionite opposition between the Old and New Testaments, presented in the first volume, which had been completed a year earlier in 207 ce.3 The first stages of Tertullian’s second book deal with the transgression of Adam and the question of whether or not the God of the Genesis nar- rative is to blame (esp. Against Marcion II.4–6). The granting of the free- dom of decision to mankind is what is implied in Tertullian’s mind by the creation of mankind in God’s image and likeness (Against Marcion II.5.5), a state in which Satan is also initially created (as we will see). Such free- dom of will is necessary according to Tertullian if the created order is to be constituted according to God’s rationality and goodness because “rea- son without goodness is not reason, and goodness without reason is not goodness” (nec ratio enim sine bonitate ratio est, nec bonitas sine ratione bonitas; Against Marcion II.6.2). In other words, goodness is only possible where rationality exists, and rationality exists only where freedom of will

2 Introduction to the work: Braun, Tertullien: Contre Marcion Tome I. Livre I, 31–80; Evans, Tertullian: Adversus Marcionem, I, xvii–xxi. 3 Kannengiesser, Handbook of Patristic Exegesis, 602, 606–607.