OP/R4.1/OBJ11

THE MIDLAND METRO ( CITY CENTRE EXTENSION LAND ACQUISITION AND VARIATION) ORDER TRANSPORT AND WORKS ACT 1992

Simon Tucker Rebuttal

on behalf of the

Freehold Owners Of Victoria Square House, Victoria Square, Birmingham

Contents

1.0 Introduction Page 1 2.0 Impact on Pinfold Street Page 1 3.0 Impact on Victoria Square Page 3 4.0 Consideration of Alternatives Page 4 5.0 Conclusions Page 10

Appendix 1 Page 12 Appendix 2 Page 13

The Midland Metro (Birmingham City Centre Extension Land Acquisition and Variation) Order Rebuttal Proof of Evidence of Simon Tucker OP/R4.1/OBJ11

1.0 Introduction

1.1 This rebuttal proof of evidence has been prepared in response to issues raised in the various proofs of evidence as submitted by Centro.

1.2 Centro have submitted a number of different proofs which provide overlapping, and in places contradictory, evidence and for ease of referencing, the issues are covered by topic in line with my original proof of evidence.

2.0 Impact on Pinfold Street

2.1 My evidence referred (Para 4.3.2) to the fact that the width of the footway on Pinfold Street would be reduced to around 1.6m. Until evidence was exchanged, Ardstone had been provided with no scaled plans to allow this distance to be checked. This information has now been provided in the form of an autocad drawing and the sections shown at Exhibit 13 of Mr Adams Proof (CEN/P1.3/SCH).

2.2 Paragraph 5.4.3.3 of Mr Last’s evidence suggests that there will be a minimum width of 1.98m (Section EE). However, sections BB, CC and DD show 1.4m, 1.8m and 2.0m respectively. The sections also miss the pinch point adjacent to the Post Office vaults where the building steps out and the footway will be 1.6m as stated in my evidence. The 1.6m adopted in my evidence is also consistent with Mr Parkhouse’s (CEN/P6.1/TRA) assertion at Para 45 of his Proof that a width of 1.6m should be adopted. I had further allowed a reduction of 0.1m to allow for the affect that the buildings with various openings, downpipes and build outs will have on effective width.

2.3 The Tfl Guidance suggests a reduction of 0.2m for this affect and therefore it remains the case that the assessment should be based on a minimum width of no more than 1.5m.

2.4 It is noted that Mr Parkhouse adopts the same assessment methodology as I do, in making reference to the TfL Guidance. However, he incorrectly infers from the original (Centro) 2002 surveys that sufficient capacity exists. As can be seen from our own survey at Appendix 5 of the David Tucker Associates main Proof, peak flows across the

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hour are some 1,275 two way person movements. This equates to an average of 21 pedestrians per minute (not the 12 – 14 pedestrians per minute quoted by Mr Parkhouse) and a likely peak of around 30 pedestrians per minute.

2.5 On this basis, the route needs to cater for a peak demand of 20 pedestrian movements per minute per metre. With reference to the TfL Guidance, Figure 8, this puts the score at C+ as confirmed in my Proof of Evidence. Figure 9 of the TfL Guidance confirms this to be “unacceptable or uncomfortable”.

2.6 The evidence submitted by Centro is further confused by conflicting references to the use of Pinfold Street by pedestrians. Paragraph 4.3.1 (Bullet A) of Mr Last’s evidence suggests that Pinfold Street will allow pedestrian access across the tracks whereas Para 4.9.4 says it will be “Tram Only”.

2.7 In either case, given the high level of flows on this identified pedestrian route, it is clear that inadequate pedestrian provision has been made, and would necessitate significant numbers of pedestrian walking along the tram tracks to use that route. It represents a deficiency in highway safety terms.

2.8 In all other cases on the route of the tramway currently under construction where pedestrian width is restricted to this level, Centro have made significant changes to the existing infrastructure or adjacent buildings to provide alternative routes. These are evidenced by the changes at the building occupied by Waterstones on Stephenson Street, where significant changes have been made to the listed building to accommodate tram movement and at (as referred to at Paragraph 5.4.3.8 of Mr Last's Proof) where the route has been designed to provide an alternative pedestrian desire line through an existing pedestrian walkway.

2.9 In all cases the widths provided are significantly below the recommended widths in Appendix B of the TfL Guidance.

2.10 In order to allow safety of movement by the mobility impaired, a width of at least 2m needs to be provided as confirmed by the DfT Guidance as set out in Manual for Streets. Furthermore, the level of flows on Pinfold Street represent “high flow” as

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identified in Appendix B of the Guidance. Assuming no street furniture and no interruption in flow (such as a busy pedestrian crossing) the width can be reduced to 3.3m from the recommended minimum width of 5.3m. On this basis, it is clear that at least 3.3m of clear width should be provided for pedestrian movement along Pinfold Street.

3.0 Impact on Victoria Square

3.1 The Centro evidence makes no specific comment on the impact of the proposed scheme in Victoria Square in terms of pedestrian movements or safety. My own assessment at Section 4.2.1 of the main David Tucker Associates Proof of Evidence assumed that the width for pedestrians would reduce from 17m to 3.2m. In fact, and having now received the more detailed plans in Centro's evidence, it is clear that the width will be reduced to 3.4m from the edge of the DKE (swept path of the tram to the Victoria Square Wall – Section HH). However, the detailed plans show the provision of bollards along the edge of the tram track at this location which reduces the width to 2.6m.

3.2 In the context of the TfL Guidance, this puts the average movements to a B- (50% restricted) and the peak to a C (69% restriction), which represents either “at Risk “or “unacceptable / uncomfortable” level.

3.3 In order to allow safety of movement by the mobility impaired, at least 2m needs to be provided as confirmed by the DfT Guidance as set out in Manual for Streets. Furthermore, the level of flows on Pinfold Street represent “high flow” as identified in Appendix B of the TfL Guidance. Assuming no street furniture and no interruption in flow (such as a busy pedestrian crossing) the width can be reduced to 3.3m from the recommended minimum width of 5.3m. On this basis, it is clear that at least 3.3m of clear width should be provided for pedestrian movement along Pinfold Street.

3.4 Furthermore, as identified in the Transport Assessment (Appendix C.2), the scheme will require cyclists to dismount through Victoria Square. The impact of this has not been properly assessed.

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4.0 Consideration of Alternatives

4.1 Introduction

4.1.1 There is a significant amount of additional information now provided with respect to the alternative routes proposed in the Ardstone Statement of Case. These are principally provided in Mr Last’s evidence (Exhibit 16 for Option A and Exhibits 18 and 19 for Option B). These details have not been previously provided to Ardstone, nor have the wider public been formally consulted on them as part of the current proposed Order promotion.

4.1.2 Overall, the Centro submissions include no evidence which suggest the alternative routes are not feasible and, ultimately, the alternatives are only discounted for reasons of cost. No evidence has been provided to support Centro’s cost estimates for the alternative routes which are considered excessive. There is no evidence to explain why the alternative routes would be any different in scale from the Centro proposed route.

4.2 Engineering Issues

4.2.1 In the case of both Option A and Option B, the detailed designs provided by Centro provide proof of concept, in that they have demonstrated such a route could be engineered. They have however raised a number of constraints to providing such routes and these are discussed below:

Option A

4.2.2 Although, for the reasons set out in 5.2.2 of the main David Tucker Associates Proof of Evidence, this is not the preferred alternative route it remains the case that it should form part of the ongoing consideration of alternatives as required by the TAG process.

4.2.3 The main constraints suggested for this route relate to structural issues on Hill Street, which are dealt with by Mr Parsons.

4.2.4 Mr Last suggests at para 5.4.1.4 that significant changes are required to the bridge

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structure to accommodate visibility splays (as shown at Adams Exhibit 16). This is clearly introduced in an effort to increase the capital cost of this option. In reality there is no constraint to moving the junction stop lines forward to overcome this, or if necessary, the highway authority could apply (to themselves) for a departure from standard in this case.

4.2.5 Paragraph 5.4.1.10 states that levels at the top of Hill Street would require the tram stop to be located away from the Town Hall. As discussed by Dr Meile, further separation from the Town Hall would have a significant benefit in terms of heritage impacts.

Option B

4.2.6 Other than the structural issues relating to the Navigation Street structures (see Mr Parsons rebuttal which confirm there is no such constraint), the principal engineering issues raised by Centro for Option B relate to the underpass of Suffolk Street Queensway and vertical alignment.

4.2.7 At Paragraph 5.4.1.12, Mr Last notes that headroom under the Suffolk Street Queensway Bridge is 5.35m and therefore lowering of the carriageway is required to accommodate the OLE. It is noted that this conflicts with the 1997 Route Study which confirmed the height at 5.2m (as referenced in Para 5.2.4 of the main David Tucker Associates Proof). This represents a positive change from that considered at the time of the 1997 study.

4.2.8 The 1997 study confirmed that some minor change in height was required subject to the provision of solid overhead line equipment (Para 3.3.2.2). The description of design principles provided by Mr Last in his sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 does not refer to the ability of the new trams to operate on short sections of tram track without the need of the OLE. This surprises me as the Centro website (within the FAQ section) states:

“Our fleet of trams have been procured with the ability to have the future option of ACR equipment (super capacitors) fitted. This would allow the tram to operate on short sections of the tram track without the need of the overhead electrical infrastructure.” SJT/56528462_1.DOC 5 11th November 2014 The Midland Metro (Birmingham City Centre Extension Land Acquisition and Variation) Order Rebuttal Proof of Evidence of Simon Tucker OP/R4.1/OBJ11

4.2.9 Details from the manufacturer confirms that the current design vehicle (CAF Urbos 3) can run without OLE for relatively long distances (1,400m) and this would also overcome any constraint. The details are provided at Appendix 1 to this Rebuttal.

4.2.10 No reason has been given by Mr Last why he has not considered this feature of the new trams which will enable the trams to pass below the Queensway viaduct without having to lower the highway levels and, therefore, without having to close this route to highway traffic and pedestrians.

4.2.11 On this basis, there is no reason why the tram could not run more or less at grade through the bridge structure. This then overcomes the other two issues raised by Centro.

4.2.12 Firstly, they suggest that the Holliday Street junction would need to be removed to accommodate the vertical alignment of the tram (Last Para 5.4.1.13) and secondly that track “twist” on the bend would exceed standards (Last Para 5.4.1.9).

4.2.13 Adopting the design parameters of a maximum 250m vertical curve (which would commence after the 25m horizontal curve hence removing the need for track twist), would allow the track to rise at a rate of 8% are per the design guidance without the need to close Holliday Street.

Conclusion

4.2.14 In conclusion therefore the additional information provided by Centro confirms that, subject to detailed assessment of design, both alternative routes are entirely feasible in engineering terms.

4.3 Traffic Impact

4.3.1 In terms of Option B, Mr Last (Paragraph 5.4.1.13) suggests that the closure of Holliday Street could have a significant impact on traffic flows. Notwithstanding that this is not necessary, the impact of closing this minor street will be significantly less than the Centro proposed route which requires interaction with all vehicles using the

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Paradise Circus Queensway.

4.3.2 It is also worthy of note that in terms of traffic impact, none of the assessments consider the cumulative impact of BCCs proposal for a new link road from Royal Mail Street to Suffolk Street Queensway (as described in Mr Burley’s Evidence). This is required as a result of the significant traffic implications of closing Hill Street and it not assessed by Centro in relation to the proposed scheme in terms of traffic impact, cost (as discussed below) or indeed the wider planning balance. This represents a fundamental deficiency in the submitted assessments.

4.4 Scheme Costs

4.4.1 Paragraph 5.3.14 of the main David Tucker Associates Proof of Evidence stated that there was no Major Scheme Business Case ('MSBC') submitted for the proposed extension. We therefore provided a summary of likely changes in patronage and cost of the alternative scheme in the evidence.

4.4.2 As part of Mr Chadwick’s evidence (CEN/P2.3/ECO – Exhibit 8), a MSBC has now been prepared. That document is dated October 2014 and was not made available until the exchange of evidence. Whilst it represents a significant piece of work in terms of the proposed scheme, it does not provide the information required to make an informed decision on the merits of the alternative routes in cost terms. It is not a compliant assessment of alternatives.

4.4.3 There remains significant doubt about the accuracy of the assessment in terms of costs for the submitted scheme. For example, Paragraph 2.48 of Mr Chadwick suggests the total capital cost of the scheme is £27.1m. This conflicts with Mr Adams cost of £34.4m (Table 5.1). It further conflicts with the details provided at Appendix C1 (Page 323) which suggests a figure of £37.7m.

4.4.4 Within the documentation, it is clear that Centro have identified a high risk of CPO processes being required for some of the “complementary” works as identified in the MSBC. There is further an identified, and high, likelihood of the budgets being exceeded for these works and these represents “high” risk to the delivery of the

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scheme.

4.4.5 There is no clear inclusion in any of the assessments of the scheme costs of the new Suffolk Street Queensway link road required as a result of the scheme at a cost of £3.6m. There can be no certainty at this stage therefore that the submitted assessment is robust.

4.4.6 The capital costs provided for the alternative route options range from £69.14m (para 3.15 of Mr Chadwicks evidence) for Option A to £70.5m (para 3.19) for Option B. In both cases, no derivation or breakdown is given to justify these figures. Based on the submitted plans as discussed above it is clear that Centro have made no attempt to value engineer the routes to reduce costs.

4.4.7 An example of this is Option B where they have assumed a wholly new structure will be required alongside (at a height of around 3m), which will substantially add to the cost. As shown at Appendix 2 of this Rebuttal, it is feasible to provide a route along the existing highway land at this point and retain the 2 traffic lanes on the approach to the Paradise Circus Queensway. This would be consistent with the level of traffic capacity deemed acceptable as a result of the submitted route alignment, with the added benefit that crossing traffic not need to interact with Tram traffic.

4.4.8 In the absence of any detailed assessment by Centro of the alternative options, my evidence at Section 5.3.17 - 5.3.22 considered the likely change of patronage arising from the alternative metro stops. This concluded that the alternative route could significantly improve patronage.

4.4.9 It is noted that this conclusion is confirmed by Mr Chadwick in his paragraphs 3.15 and 3.17. It is confirmed in Paragraph 3.17 that Option B would result in patronage growth of 8% by 2021 and 13% by 2031. The compares with proposed route of 7% of 2021 and 13% by 2031 (see Paragraph 2.38).

4.4.10 The detailed breakdown of the comparison is also provided at Exhibit 11, which shows annual patronage of 11.55m in 2021 for Option B compared with 11.4m (Table 2.2, page 240 Exhibit 8 or Page 681 Exhibit 9).

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4.4.11 There is clearly no detriment in terms of removing a stop from Victoria Square in the context of the overall network. In practise most of the destinations in the vicinity can be readily accessed from either New Street or Broad Street.

4.5 Need for Orders

4.5.1 The original 2005 order required land take from parcels 11, 26 and 27 (see Exhibit 9 of Last’s evidence). This land is the same as that required for the scheme shown at the alternative route Option B (Exhibit 18 of CEN/P1.3/SCH). Even though, as set out above, the need to take this land is disputed, it remains the case that no change in the land take previously approved is required in the vicinity of Alpha Tower.

5.0 Conclusions

5.1 Having reviewed Centro’s evidence it is clear that a number of issues arise:

i) Centro have submitted a significant amount of additional information at a very late stage in the process and this information, even if it were robust, has not been subject to formal and appropriate consultation.

ii) The case put by Centro to support the impacts on Pinfold Street is not based on appropriate evidence and ultimately the case they seek to make wholly supports the concerns raised by the objector. Centro have completely failed to assess the impact on pedestrian safety on routes through Victoria Square. The scheme therefore fails the tests set out in Para 35 of the NPPF in that it does not:

 Give priority to pedestrian and cycle movements, and have access to high quality public transport facilities;

 create safe and secure layouts which minimise conflicts between traffic and cyclists or pedestrians, avoiding street clutter […]

 consider the needs of people with disabilities by all modes of transport.

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iii) The additional evidence provided demonstrates that the alternative options A and B proposed by Ardstone are feasible in engineering terms.

iv) The additional evidence provided demonstrates that the alternative routes would be more beneficial in terms of patronage and hence it can be concluded they better meet the wider planning policy and accessibility objectives of the plan. This therefore confirms the case put forward by Ardstone in this regard.

v) Notwithstanding this, the reasons given for discounting those alternatives are based on capital costs (for which no justification has been provided) and value for money. The alternative schemes put forward have clearly been over-engineered with the express intention of increasing capital costs and significant cost savings are clearly available to value engineer the project.

vi) Once these refinements are made, a new and full TAG appraisal of the alternative should be prepared so that an informed and proper decision can be made.

David Tucker Associates

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Appendix 1

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Appendix 2

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