The Politics of India's Special Economic Zones Rob Jenkins* Research Colloquium
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The Politics of India’s Special Economic Zones Rob Jenkins* Research Colloquium: ‘India’s Great Transformation?’ Columbia University 14-16 September 2007 WORKSHOP DRAFT – DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE. I. Overview India’s Special Economic Zone Act, 2005 received the President’s assent on June 23, 2005. Well before the detailed regulations that would govern its implementation came into force in February 2006, various government agencies and private-sector actors had begun responding to the Act’s provisions. As of this writing (in August 2007), very little actual construction in those areas officially designated as Special Economic Zones (SEZs) has taken place, and the policy’s economic and political effects are still a matter of conjecture. Even so, there is more than two years of fairly robust policy and implementation history to examine; more than seven years if we include the precursor measures contained within the Exim Policy introduced in 2000. Policy regimes have been formulated in various states pursuant to the central SEZ Act, and these (as well as the Government of India’s own SEZ guidelines) have been revised in several respects on a number of occasions. Moreover, ‘implementation’ (in the form of approvals for the creation of SEZs) has moved forward rapidly. * Professor of Political Science, Birkbeck College, University of London, and Visiting Fellow, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, The Graduate Center, City University of New York. Jenkins Page 1 of 36 This paper assesses the political dynamics that have arisen in the wake of the Act’s passage. Its larger objective is to determine what these might reveal about the politics of economic reform in India more broadly. There are inherent dangers in using a single policy domain to derive generalizations about processes of much broader scope. This is especially true of a policy still in its infancy. On the other hand, if ever a single policy initiative were capable of serving as a microcosm for the politics of reform it would be India’s SEZ Act, which intentionally draws within its ambit such diverse issues as investment (domestic and foreign), trade, taxation, industrial relations, land-use and land reform, environmental sustainability, and others of an even more specialized nature. The Act also affects the policy environment facing state governments; indeed, it requires their active involvement to achieve its objectives. There are implications for the functioning of India’s system of local government as well. The political actors concerned are similarly diverse, including almost all political parties, a huge range of business interests and associations (each concerned with the broad policy framework, and many with an intense interest in rules applicable to their sector), bureaucratic actors with turf to protect, and a staggering array of movement groups spread throughout India. Many of the issues involved in implementing the SEZ policy lend themselves to litigation that will have strong political repercussions, especially where these involve land and taxation. Some cases are likely to be of constitutional significance. Such a multifaceted process – especially one in which the policy regime itself as well as the economic response and political reactions are still a work in progress – militates against the formulation of generalizable findings. Nevertheless, the story of India’s SEZ policy to date would seem to hold at least three important lessons. First, in seeking to manage the process by which the SEZ policy has been introduced, India’s governing elites – indeed its policymaking establishment more generally, which extends beyond those in positions of direct or indirect state authority – have run up against the limits of what can be achieved by practicing ‘reform by stealth’, or by seeking to insulate policymaking from the effects of ‘mass politics’. Second, the political dilemmas that have emerged in the process of trying to implement the SEZ policy highlight an important structural weakness of India’s political system at this stage in the process of India’s economic transformation: the increasing inability of the state to broker accommodations that would advance its preferred policy objectives. This is largely a result of pervasive corruption and a recent history littered with broken promises – both of which, it is worth noting, were integral to the process of reforming by stealth. Jenkins Page 2 of 36 Third, the SEZ policy is more than just another case of businesses seeking to avoid high levels of taxation or to evade onerous regulation. SEZs represent a desire by both political elites and those who aspire to middle-class status to, in a sense, secede from the rest of India – to, in the language of this conference’s framework, escape the consequences of India’s recent ‘democratic upsurge.’ In the eyes of many social elites and middle-class aspirants, the political ascendancy of historically oppressed groups threatens to sabotage the dream of a more prosperous, efficient, and powerful India. That SEZs might offer a way of permitting the inhabitants of this upwardly mobile India to pursue this dream, without the need to emigrate abroad, while simultaneously creating enclaves within which foreign economic influence can be quarantined before spreading to the rest of India, has proven equally appealing to the political wing of India’s Hindu nationalist movement. The paper is organized as follows: Section II overviews the SEZ concept and the policy decisions through which it has taken root in India; Section III outlines the political logic underlying SEZ reform, including how best it might be viewed in the context of existing theories of how India’s reformers have contended with the constraints imposed by democracy; Section IV examines the forms of opposition to which the SEZ policy has given rise; Section V summarizes the government’s response; Section V concludes by elaborating on the three propositions advanced in this introduction. II. India’s SEZ Policy An SEZ is a geographic region within a nation-state in which a distinct legal framework provides for more liberal economic policies and governance arrangements than prevail in the country at large, the intent being to stimulate investment, trade, and employment. Roughly 2,500 SEZs exist worldwide, spread across 120 countries.1 SEZs are, in theory, supposed to attract large volumes of investment by providing world-class infrastructural facilities, a favourable taxation regime, and the benefits of economic clustering. The benefits for the wider economy are, in theory, more exports, particularly in high- value-added sectors, and ultimately an increase in the rate of sustainable economic growth. Employment generation is also often cited as a potential consequence of an SEZ model. In the Indian context, the new SEZ policy can be thought of as ushering in a third generation of economic reforms: while the first two phases were dominated, respectively, by efforts to liberalize the macro policy environment, and by the creation of institutions for regulating a market economy, phase three has a special emphasis on facilitating a global presence for India’s largest private- 1 www.sethassociates.com/special_economic_zones.php Jenkins Page 3 of 36 sector firms and rapidly enhancing the physical infrastructure within which such firms operate.2 Though India did not pass an SEZ Act until 2005, it has been experimenting with the concept since the 1960s. The Kandla Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in Gujarat is said to have been the world’s first. This was followed in the 1970s by the creation of the Santa Cruz Electronics Export Zone (SEEZ), which in the 1980s was expanded to include gems and jewelry. The 1980s also saw the creation of EPZs in Noida, Chennai, Cochin, and Falta (West Bengal), followed by the Vishakhapatnam EPZ in 1994. Immediately thereafter, also in 1994, the policy was revised to permit (in addition to the central government) state governments, autonomous agencies, and private-sector firms to develop and operate EPZs. A private sector EPZ in Surat was the first to emerge under the 1994 EPZ policy.3 But India’s push toward a more comprehensive SEZ policy began in earnest following a visit by then-Commerce Minister Murasoli Maran to China in 2000. Hugely impressed by what he had seen in China’s SEZs – and by discussions with Chinese officials – Maran acted quickly to initiate a change in India’s policy regime. This took the form of new SEZ rules notified in the Commerce Ministry’s Export-Import Policy of April 2000. This produced a precursor of what would later become the 2005 SEZ Act. The 2000 Exim Policy converted the existing EPZs into SEZs. The main difference between EPZs and SEZs concerns comprehensiveness. Whereas EPZs can be thought of as industrial estates, SEZs typically contain the fully array of social facilities – housing, hospitals, schools, retail developments – that make up a small city. Moreover, SEZs are designed to operate on the principle of ‘self-certification’ on tax-exempt transactions, whereas EPZs usually require official attestation. Finally, SEZs tend to be governed by comprehensive legislation, under which far-reaching regulations are authorized, rather than through notifications and orders issued by a range of ministries. Between 2000 and 2005, when the SEZ Act was passed, only three additional EPZs had been established – in Indore (MP), Manikanchan-Salt Lake (West Bengal), and Jaipur. Several states, however, enacted SEZ legislation or developed policy frameworks within the context of existing legal provisions. These included relatively under-industrialized states such as Uttar Pradesh, 2 Second generation reforms is a term sometimes used to denote, in general, all the reform items left over from the first decade or decade and a half of reform. More specifically, it can take on one of three meanings: (1) the politically difficult reforms that have been sidestepped (labour reform, thorough fiscal reform, privatization); (2) reforms that will be more inclusive, reducing the disparities that have given reform an anti-poor image; or (3) reforms to institutions of governance to make the process of continuous policy change more transparent, predictable, and efficient.