Preliminary Findings Regarding the Market Events of May 6, 2010
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The Design of Financial Exchanges: Some Open Questions at the Intersection of Econ and CS
The Design of Financial Exchanges: Some Open Questions at the Intersection of Econ and CS Eric Budish, University of Chicago Simons Institute Conference: Algorithmic Game Theory and Practice Nov 2015 Overview 1. The economic case for discrete-time trading I Financial exchange design that is predominant around the world continuous limit order book is economically awed I Flaw: treats time as a continuous variable (serial processing) I Solution: treat time as a discrete variable, batch process using an auction. Frequent batch auctions. I Eric Budish, Peter Cramton and John Shim (BCS) 2015, Quarterly Journal of Economics 2. The computational case for discrete-time trading I Discrete time respects the limits of computers and communications technology. Not innitely fast. I Benets for exchanges, algo traders, regulators I Qualitative/informal argument in BCS 2015, would benet greatly from Econ/CS research 3. Other Econ/CS Questions about the Design of Financial Exchanges I Flash crashes I Speed vs. Smarts Tradeo I Circuit Breakers Overview 1. The economic case for discrete-time trading I Financial exchange design that is predominant around the world continuous limit order book is economically awed I Flaw: treats time as a continuous variable (serial processing) I Solution: treat time as a discrete variable, batch process using an auction. Frequent batch auctions. I Eric Budish, Peter Cramton and John Shim (BCS) 2015, Quarterly Journal of Economics 2. The computational case for discrete-time trading I Discrete time respects the limits of computers and communications technology. Not innitely fast. I Benets for exchanges, algo traders, regulators I Qualitative/informal argument in BCS 2015, would benet greatly from Econ/CS research 3. -
The Future of Computer Trading in Financial Markets an International Perspective
The Future of Computer Trading in Financial Markets An International Perspective FINAL PROJECT REPORT This Report should be cited as: Foresight: The Future of Computer Trading in Financial Markets (2012) Final Project Report The Government Office for Science, London The Future of Computer Trading in Financial Markets An International Perspective This Report is intended for: Policy makers, legislators, regulators and a wide range of professionals and researchers whose interest relate to computer trading within financial markets. This Report focuses on computer trading from an international perspective, and is not limited to one particular market. Foreword Well functioning financial markets are vital for everyone. They support businesses and growth across the world. They provide important services for investors, from large pension funds to the smallest investors. And they can even affect the long-term security of entire countries. Financial markets are evolving ever faster through interacting forces such as globalisation, changes in geopolitics, competition, evolving regulation and demographic shifts. However, the development of new technology is arguably driving the fastest changes. Technological developments are undoubtedly fuelling many new products and services, and are contributing to the dynamism of financial markets. In particular, high frequency computer-based trading (HFT) has grown in recent years to represent about 30% of equity trading in the UK and possible over 60% in the USA. HFT has many proponents. Its roll-out is contributing to fundamental shifts in market structures being seen across the world and, in turn, these are significantly affecting the fortunes of many market participants. But the relentless rise of HFT and algorithmic trading (AT) has also attracted considerable controversy and opposition. -
Certain Issues Affecting Customers in the Current Equity Market Structure
MEMORANDUM TO: Equity Market Structure Advisory Committee FROM: Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Trading and Markets1 DATE: January 26, 2016 SUBJECT: Certain Issues Affecting Customers in the Current Equity Market Structure I. INTRODUCTION This memorandum is intended to facilitate consideration by the Committee of certain issues affecting customers—particularly retail customers—in the current equity market structure, namely: (1) the risks of using certain order types, (2) the potential conflicts presented by payment-for-order-flow arrangements, and (3) the development of more meaningful execution- quality reports. The memorandum first discusses the use of certain order types (market orders and stop orders) by retail investors, risks that have been identified with the use of those order types, and potential ways to address them. The memorandum then discusses payment for order flow, laying out the history and current status of payment-for-order-flow arrangements, the potential conflicts of interest and market-structure issues they can create, and possible solutions. Finally, the memorandum discusses execution-quality reports currently available to customers, laying out the current disclosures required by Rules 605 and 606 of Regulation NMS under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), the significant ways in which the equity markets have changed since those requirements were adopted, and enhancements to these disclosures that have been suggested by market participants. II. RISKS OF MARKET ORDERS AND STOP ORDERS Although exchanges and other trading centers today offer market participants a wide variety of complex order types, retail investors generally tend to rely upon a small set of relatively straightforward order types: market orders, limit orders, stop orders, and time-in-force orders. -
Dow Jones Industrial Average Futures and Options
EQUITY PRODUCTS Dow Jones Industrial Average Futures and Options E-mini Dow ($5), DJIA ($10) and Big Dow DJIA ($25) contracts offer flexible opportunities to trade the large-cap U.S. Equity market. About the Dow Jones Industrial Average Benefits The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) is a price-weighted index of 30 blue chip U.S. companies • Transparent, deep liquid markets representing nine economic sectors including financial service, technology, retail, entertainment and consumer goods. The leadership position of the component stocks in The Dow tends to result in an • Global access virtually 24 hours a day to extremely high correlation of the DJIA to broader U.S. indexes, such as the S&P 500 Index. the speed and efficiency of electronically traded contracts Trading Platform • Simplified benchmarking with broad U.S. These index contracts are now available on CME Globex – a robust electronic trading platform stock market exposure through 30 delivering fast, efficient and anonymous trading. For more information on CME Globex, representative blue-chip stocks visit www.cmegroup.com. • Centralized source to manage all your global equity exposure needs E-mini Dow ($5) Futures Average Daily Volume by Month • Favorable performance bond (margin) 250,000 requirements vs. alternative trading instruments 200,000 • Central clearing and counterparty guarantee of CME Clearing 150,000 100,000 www.cmegroup.com/equityindexresearch Learn how to take advantage of 50,000 opportunities from a popular S&P 500 vs DJIA spread using CME Group Equity 0 Index contract 07 07 07 b − 03 b − 05 b − 06 eb − 04 eb − 07 Apr − 02Jun − Aug02 − 02Oct − 02Dec − 02Fe Apr − 03Jun − Aug03 − 03Oct − 03Dec − 03F Apr − 04Jun − Aug04 − 04Oct − 04Dec − 04Fe Apr − 05Jun − Aug05 − Oct05 − 05Dec − 05Fe Apr − 06Jun − Aug06 − Oct06 − 06Dec− 06F Apr − 07Jun − Aug07 − Oct − Dec − For more information, visit www.cmegroup.com/dow. -
Capital Markets
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities Capital Markets OCTOBER 2017 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities Capital Markets Report to President Donald J. Trump Executive Order 13772 on Core Principles for Regulating the United States Financial System Steven T. Mnuchin Secretary Craig S. Phillips Counselor to the Secretary Staff Acknowledgments Secretary Mnuchin and Counselor Phillips would like to thank Treasury staff members for their contributions to this report. The staff’s work on the report was led by Brian Smith and Amyn Moolji, and included contributions from Chloe Cabot, John Dolan, Rebekah Goshorn, Alexander Jackson, W. Moses Kim, John McGrail, Mark Nelson, Peter Nickoloff, Bill Pelton, Fred Pietrangeli, Frank Ragusa, Jessica Renier, Lori Santamorena, Christopher Siderys, James Sonne, Nicholas Steele, Mark Uyeda, and Darren Vieira. iii A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities • Capital Markets Table of Contents Executive Summary 1 Introduction 3 Scope of This Report 3 Review of the Process for This Report 4 The U.S. Capital Markets 4 Summary of Issues and Recommendations 6 Capital Markets Overview 11 Introduction 13 Key Asset Classes 13 Key Regulators 18 Access to Capital 19 Overview and Regulatory Landscape 21 Issues and Recommendations 25 Equity Market Structure 47 Overview and Regulatory Landscape 49 Issues and Recommendations 59 The Treasury Market 69 Overview and Regulatory Landscape 71 Issues and Recommendations 79 -
California Department of Corporations
FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR THE AMENDMENT OF RULES UNDER THE CORPORATE SECURITIES LAW OF 1968 As required by Section 11346.2 of the Government Code, the California Corporations Commissioner (Commissioner) sets forth below the reasons for the amendment of Sections 260.101.2, 260.103.4, 260.105.7, 260.105.17, 260.105.33, 260.105.34, 260.211.1, 260.217, 260.230, 260.241.4, and 260.242; and repeal of Sections 260.105.37 and 260.204.11 of Title 10 of the California Code of Regulations (10 C.C.R. Sections 260.101.2, 260.103.4, 260.105.7, 260.105.17, 260.105.33, 260.105.34, 260.105.37, 260.204.11, 260.211.1, 260.217, 260.230, 260.241.4, and 260.242). The Department of Corporations (Department) regulates the offer and sale of securities under the Corporate Securities Law of 1968, as amended (commencing with Corporations Code Section 25000). This rulemaking action is based on a request by the Corporations Committee of the Business Law Section of the State Bar of California (“Committee”). By letter dated June 5, 2008, the Committee notified the Commissioner of the need to make various amendments to several sections of the Code of Regulations administered by the Commissioner. The Committee explained the need for the changes and provided sample language to implement the changes, which the Commissioner has incorporated into this rulemaking action. These amendments are reasonably necessary to reflect changes in the names and function of certain national security exchanges, stock exchanges, markets and related entities. -
Nasdaq Trader Manual
Nasdaq Trader Manual Notice: This manual is in no way intended to be a substitution for, or relied upon in lieu of, the rules contained in the NASD Manual. The design and information contained in this manual are owned by The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. (Nasdaq), or one of its affiliates, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), NASD Regulation, Inc. (NASDR), Nasdaq International Ltd., or Nasdaq International Market Initiatives, Ltd. (NIMI). The information contained in the manual may be used and copied for internal business purposes only. All copies must bear this permission notice and the following copyright citation on the first page: “Copyright © 1998, The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. All rights reserved.” The information may not other- wise be used (not copied, performed, distributed, rented, sublicensed, altered, stored for subsequent use, or otherwise used in whole or in part, in any manner) without Nasdaq’s prior written consent except to the extent that such use constitutes “fair use” under the “Copyright Act” of 1976 (17 U.S.C. Section 107), as amended. In addition, the information may not be taken out of context or presented in a unfair, misleading or discriminating manner. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROVIDED ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF PRO- VIDING GENERAL GUIDANCE AS TO THE APPLICATION OF PARTICULAR NASD RULES. ALL USERS, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, MEMBERS, ASSOCIATED PERSONS AND THEIR COUNSEL SHOULD CONSIDER THE NEED FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE AS TO THE APPLICATION OF NASD RULES TO THEIR OWN UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES. NO STATE- MENTS ARE INTENDED AS EXPRESS WARRANTIES. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROVIDED “AS IS” WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. -
Theoretical and Practical Aspects of Algorithmic Trading Dissertation Dipl
Theoretical and Practical Aspects of Algorithmic Trading Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Dr. rer. pol.) von der Fakult¨at fuer Wirtschaftwissenschaften des Karlsruher Instituts fuer Technologie genehmigte Dissertation von Dipl.-Phys. Jan Frankle¨ Tag der m¨undlichen Pr¨ufung: ..........................07.12.2010 Referent: .......................................Prof. Dr. S.T. Rachev Korreferent: ......................................Prof. Dr. M. Feindt Erkl¨arung Ich versichere wahrheitsgem¨aß, die Dissertation bis auf die in der Abhandlung angegebene Hilfe selbst¨andig angefertigt, alle benutzten Hilfsmittel vollst¨andig und genau angegeben und genau kenntlich gemacht zu haben, was aus Arbeiten anderer und aus eigenen Ver¨offentlichungen unver¨andert oder mit Ab¨anderungen entnommen wurde. 2 Contents 1 Introduction 7 1.1 Objective ................................. 7 1.2 Approach ................................. 8 1.3 Outline................................... 9 I Theoretical Background 11 2 Mathematical Methods 12 2.1 MaximumLikelihood ........................... 12 2.1.1 PrincipleoftheMLMethod . 12 2.1.2 ErrorEstimation ......................... 13 2.2 Singular-ValueDecomposition . 14 2.2.1 Theorem.............................. 14 2.2.2 Low-rankApproximation. 15 II Algorthmic Trading 17 3 Algorithmic Trading 18 3 3.1 ChancesandChallenges . 18 3.2 ComponentsofanAutomatedTradingSystem . 19 4 Market Microstructure 22 4.1 NatureoftheMarket........................... 23 4.2 Continuous Trading -
Price Drift Before US Macroeconomic News
Working Paper Series Alexander Kurov, Price drift before U.S. Alessio Sancetta, Georg Strasser macroeconomic news: private and Marketa Halova Wolfe information about public announcements? No 1901 / May 2016 Note: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the European Central Bank (ECB). The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB. Abstract We examine stock index and Treasury futures markets around releases of U.S. macroeconomic announcements. Seven out of 21 market-moving announcements show evidence of substantial informed trading before the official release time. Prices begin to move in the \correct" direction about 30 minutes before the release time. The pre-announcement price drift accounts on average for about half of the to- tal price adjustment. These results imply that some traders have private infor- mation about macroeconomic fundamentals. The evidence suggests that the pre- announcement drift likely comes from a combination of information leakage and superior forecasting based on proprietary data collection and reprocessing of public information. Keywords: Macroeconomic news announcements; financial markets; pre-announcement effect; drift; informed trading JEL classification: E44; G14; G15 ECB Working Paper 1901, May 2016 1 Non-technical Summary Macroeconomic indicators play an important role in business cycle forecasting and are closely watched by financial markets. Some of these indicators appear to influence financial market prices even ahead of their official release time. This paper examines the prevalence of pre-announcement price drift in U.S. stock and bond markets and looks for possible explanations. We study the impact of announcements on second-by-second E-mini S&P 500 stock index and 10-year Treasury note futures from January 2008 to March 2014. -
Regulating the Sale of Stock Exchange Market Data to High- Frequency Traders
Florida Law Review Volume 71 Issue 5 Article 3 November 2020 Regulating the Sale of Stock Exchange Market Data to High- Frequency Traders Jerry W. Markham Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr Part of the Securities Law Commons Recommended Citation Jerry W. Markham, Regulating the Sale of Stock Exchange Market Data to High-Frequency Traders, 71 Fla. L. Rev. 1209 (2020). Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol71/iss5/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Markham: Regulating the Sale of Stock Exchange Market Data to High-Frequen REGULATING THE SALE OF STOCK EXCHANGE MARKET DATA TO HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADERS Jerry W. Markham* Abstract In 2014, author Michael Lewis published a bestselling book titled Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt, in which he argued that “high- frequency traders” have been able to gain an unfair advantage in the stock market, in part because stock exchanges and “dark pools”—alternative venues for trading stocks—have enabled those traders to obtain and trade on market data faster than other investors. A litany of lawsuits followed in short succession, asserting various theories of liability.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1210 I. EXCHANGE DATA AS A PROPRIETARY ASSET—SOME HISTORY .............................................................................. 1215 A. Stock Markets Become Data Centers .......................... 1215 B. Exchange Market Data Is Deemed Proprietary .......... 1218 C. Stock Exchange Floor Traders and “Specialists” .............................................................. -
Dark Pools and High Frequency Trading for Dummies
Dark Pools & High Frequency Trading by Jay Vaananen Dark Pools & High Frequency Trading For Dummies® Published by: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, www.wiley.com This edition first published 2015 © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, Chichester, West Sussex. Registered office John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, United Kingdom For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or trans- mitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher. Wiley publishes in a variety of print and electronic formats and by print-on-demand. Some material included with standard print versions of this book may not be included in e-books or in print-on-demand. If this book refers to media such as a CD or DVD that is not included in the version you purchased, you may download this material at http://booksupport.wiley.com. For more information about Wiley products, visit www.wiley.com. Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor men- tioned in this book. -
Informational Inequality: How High Frequency Traders Use Premier Access to Information to Prey on Institutional Investors
INFORMATIONAL INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH FREQUENCY TRADERS USE PREMIER ACCESS TO INFORMATION TO PREY ON INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS † JACOB ADRIAN ABSTRACT In recent months, Wall Street has been whipped into a frenzy following the March 31st release of Michael Lewis’ book “Flash Boys.” In the book, Lewis characterizes the stock market as being rigged, which has institutional investors and outside observers alike demanding some sort of SEC action. The vast majority of this criticism is aimed at high-frequency traders, who use complex computer algorithms to execute trades several times faster than the blink of an eye. One of the many complaints against high-frequency traders is over parasitic trading practices, such as front-running. Front-running, in the era of high-frequency trading, is best defined as using the knowledge of a large impending trade to take a favorable position in the market before that trade is executed. Put simply, these traders are able to jump in front of a trade before it can be completed. This Note explains how high-frequency traders are able to front- run trades using superior access to information, and examines several proposed SEC responses. INTRODUCTION If asked to envision what trading looks like on the New York Stock Exchange, most people who do not follow the U.S. securities market would likely picture a bunch of brokers standing around on the trading floor, yelling and waving pieces of paper in the air. Ten years ago they would have been absolutely right, but the stock market has undergone radical changes in the last decade. It has shifted from one dominated by manual trading at a physical location to a vast network of interconnected and automated trading systems.1 Technological advances that simplified how orders are generated, routed, and executed have fostered the changes in market † J.D.