play a key role in winning or los- reports ing seats.

Lessons for the future Turning to the future, Curtice The 2010 election in historical perspective said that he did not expect future Conference fringe meeting, 19 September 2010, with TV debates to have anything like the same impact as they did Professor John Curtice, Professor Dennis Kavanagh and in 2010. Lack of novelty in the James Gurling. Chair: Tony Little. future will probably see their audiences decline, and the advan- Report by Dr Mark Pack tage Clegg gained by getting the technique right whilst the others did not can only be won once. t has become a Liberal Demo- which did not transfer strongly As for future strategy, Cur- crat History Group tradition at to other views of the party. The tice said the Liberal Democrat Ithe first Liberal Democrat con- surge was dominated by peo- plan had always been a choice ference after each general election ple who were less likely to vote between realignment (usually of to hold a fringe meeting looking and more likely to change their the left) – with the implication back on the results and placing minds. He also suggested that that the party is closer to one of them in historical perspective. the weighting rules used by poll- the other two main parties – and sters may have exaggerated the equidistance. As he pointed Liberal Democrat position in the out, the party’s power does not The historical context polls, though even the raw data depend to that great an extent on Psephologist John Curtice from showed more Lib Dems than John Curtice’s the number of seats it wins. Influ- Strathclyde, a long-term Liberal turned out to vote. ence depends on having a hung Democrat watcher, started by Finally, there was a body of look at the parliament, and the appeal of the asking Liberal Democrats in the voters who usually voted Labour equidistance strategy is that to audience to think back to the and were not happy with their 2010 election maximise that influence the Lib Friday after polling day, pointing party in 2010, but in the end held Dems have to be willing to do a out how few people’s immediate their nose and voted for their concluded deal with either of the other two reaction was that it was a great traditional party. Despite these main parties. result for the party. He therefore explanations, Curtice said that he with a warn- With the changing way in went on to reverse the usual roles thought they did not add up to ing: beware which first past the post works of party members talking up the full story and further research in the UK already having made the party’s position and outsid- would be needed to tell the full of short-term hung parliaments more likely, ers talking it down by arguing story. Curtice did not see defeat in the instead that the general election As to why the Liberal Demo- surges in the AV referendum in May 2011 as result was, in historical perspec- crats went up in votes but down necessarily dealing a large blow tive, highly impressive. in seats, Curtice put this down campaign. to the party’s future influence – Not only had the party ended to a large number of seats where though, if introduced, AV would up in government for the first incumbent MPs were standing Support probably strengthen the Liberal time since 1945, but it secured the down (6 of these 10 were lost), Democrat position in Parliament. second highest share of the vote some fallout from the expenses is built up Either way, equidistance would for the party or its predecessors scandal, the fading of the very give the party greater negotiat- since 1923 and the second largest positive circumstances of 2005 through the ing muscle than a strategy of number of seats since 1929. Had (particularly the Iraq war and its realignment. expectations not been raised so effect on Labour support in Mus- five years of Under AV Curtice said he high during the campaign, this lim communities) and Labour’s expected many non-Liberal would have been seen as a much strength in Scotland. In addition, the Parlia- Democrats who had voted tacti- more promising result than the in six of the nine Labour seats cally for the party to switch their immediate post-election reac- which would have fallen to the ment, espe- first preference to the party of tions painted it. Lib Dems on the national swing their real choice, reducing the but did not, there had been a cially as local number of first preferences the relatively low increase in unem- campaigning Lib Dems would win. In addi- The gap between the polls and ployment. Economic and political tion, being in coalition may the result geography combined in a way and organi- deter Labour voters from listing Looking at the gap between the favourable to Labour. the Liberal Democrats even as campaign’s opinion polls and John Curtice’s look at the 2010 sation play their second preference – though the actual result, Curtice sug- election concluded with a warn- since in Scotland the Lib Dem gested that the explanation was ing: beware of short-term surges a key role in coalition with Labour had not that the poll surge after the first in the campaign. Support is built stopped many Tories still putting TV debate had been a brittle up through the five years of the winning or Lib Dems second Curtice did phenomenon, fuelled by the per- Parliament, especially as local not expect this impact to be too sonal popularity of Nick Clegg, campaigning and organisation losing seats. large.

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The TV debates Preparing for a hung Looking to number of marginal seats makes a Dennis Kavanagh, the co-author parliament single-party winner increasingly since February 1974 of the Nuff- One thing the party did get the future, unlikely. The traditional idea of ield series of general election right was its preparation for a general elections being a simple studies, started by emphasising possible hung parliament. Clegg Kavanagh choice between two parties, one the impact of the TV debates. He had a detailed plan, drawn up of which then has a mandate to pointed out that the parties had with Danny Alexander and oth- suggested govern according to its manifesto, prepared for traditional election ers. By comparison, Labour had cannot survive in this new form campaigns, with press confer- done almost no preparation and that a new of politics. ences, major TV interviews, Oliver Letwin’s work for the At the next election the Liberal poster launches and so on. When Conservatives only started very political Democrats will, for the first time, it came to it, however, much of late in the day. Helped by this era is com- have to fight an election based on this went by the board because superior preparation, Clegg kept a judgement of what they have of the dominance of the TV his nerve during the negotia- ing, with TV done. The ‘plague on all your debates. The idea of each party tions and wisely made efforts to houses’ vote, concluded Kavan- holding an early morning press take the party with him during debates an agh, will no longer gravitate conference each day died with the talks. towards them. this campaign. One factor in favour of a established For the TV debates, Kavan- Cameron / Clegg deal, Kavanagh agh revealed that Clegg put in argued, was that they are both of presence The party’s post-election more preparation over longer the same generation, part of the review periods than either Cameron shift currently under way in Brit- further per- James Gurling, Chair of the or Brown, who relied more on ish politics. Gordon Brown was Liberal Democrat Campaigns expensive advisers from the US. old politics from a different age. sonalising & Communications Commit- Despite what has been said in The people with Brown on tee, then talked about the review public about the debates, based the road during the election and presi- the party had carried out of the on his numerous interviews with thought that Labour would win election campaign. He said that senior campaign insiders, Kavan- the most seats right until the end, dentialising all three parties failed at the last agh believed that Cameron and and Brown was confident that he election – Labour lost power, Osborne were pleased with their would be able to do a deal with politics. the Tories failed to win an impact. Rather than being a the Liberal Democrats. He never overall majority and the Liberal problem for giving a profile to considered the question of per- Democrats lost seats and failed to Nick Clegg, they benefited the sonal chemistry; it was always a increase the Parliamentary Party’s Tories, in their eyes, by reduc- huge blind spot of his, fostered by diversity. ing the amount of attention paid his failure to grasp the change of He praised the TV debates for to policy issues such as taxes and generation in the Liberal Demo- giving party leaders direct access cuts. Kavanagh also pointed out crat leadership from the likes of to the public, presenting policies how the instant polls cut the legs Menzies Campbell and Paddy directly in their own words. A from under the post-debate spin Ashdown to Nick Clegg, Chris TV debate bounce for Clegg had doctoring. Huhne and others. been expected, as it would be his Kavanagh did, though, ques- first major media exposure to the tion how real the debate surge public, but in the end the bounce was, pointing to how the other The changing nature of British greatly exceeded expectations. two main parties observed that politics That gave people huge enthusi- their canvassing returns and Looking to the future, Kavanagh asm and also – as it turned out – other feedback did not pick it up. suggested that a new political false hope. Kavanagh went on to com- era is coming, with TV debates This meant that the campaign ment that, ironically, Cameron an established presence further plan was knocked off message, has been able to change the personalising and presidential- and at the grassroots it diverged political landscape since the elec- ising politics. This may be to from the party’s targeting strat- tion because he failed to win long-term Liberal Democrat and egy. Just 4,000 votes going the it – comparing that with Blair’s Labour benefit, as it reduces the wrong way cost the party no less inability to change the landscape important of money and the tra- than ten seats, showing how close after 1997 because he succeeded. ditional Conservative advantage the result had been between los- Success does not always beget there. ing and gaining. Lessons should success. Westminster has now joined be drawn from that about the As with Curtice, Kavanagh Scotland, Wales and Northern importance of targeting for the put some of the explanation as Ireland in not having one-party party’s future. to why the Liberal Democrats majority government; there are The campaign’s other failure did not do better in 2010 down now ten political parties exercis- was that not all of the party’s to the conditions in 2005 hav- ing executive rule in the UK. policies survived the scrutiny of ing been so good. Since then Hung parliaments and assemblies the campaign, particularly on the party had had three leaders are the norm – and in turn coali- immigration. This echoed a point in two years, with poll ratings tions are likely to be the norm as made earlier by Kavanagh about below the 2005 election for the growth in strength of other the post-election private poll- nearly the entire Parliament. parties and the decline in the ing for the Liberal Democrats.

18 Journal of Liberal History 69 Winter 2010–11 reports

It showed that party policy James Gurling also agreed from blanket leafleting. One election. The formation of on immigration and the ‘you with Denis Kavanagh that the example a of change he gave a coalition government is can’t win’ argument were the form of campaigning changed was the traditional Liberal reshaping British politics in two main reasons for people in 2010, with party election Democrat handwritten letter. unpredictable ways. While not to support the Lib Dems; broadcasts largely forgotten This used to be seen as a pow- the lessons from previous the talk about what Clegg during the campaign, being erful way of direct, personal elections were often very would do in a hung parlia- overshadowed by the TV contact with voters. Now, applicable to the next, in 2010 ment also turned out to be debates. Posters too appear to compared with direct person- that is much less likely to be a negative for the party. In be on the way out, helped by alised online communication, the case. addition, the Liberal Demo- the rapid spoofing of posters it looks like just another blunt crats lacked a strong closing online. form of mass contact. Mark Pack ran the Liberal message in the last few days Furthermore, the days of What was notable across Democrat 2001 and 2005 internet of the campaign and below- simply sticking your mes- all three contributions was general election campaign and is the-radar scare tactics from sage on a piece of paper and how many of the issues they now Head of Digital at MHP Labour in urban areas helped putting it through the let- discussed will almost cer- Communications. He also co- them hang on in many key terbox are gone. Technol- tainly feel like old history by edits Liberal Democrat Voice seats. ogy is moving campaigns on the time of the next general (www.LibDemVoice.org). Liberal history quiz 2010 This year’s Liberal history quiz attracted a record level of entries at the History Group’s exhibition stand at the Liberal Democrat conference in Liverpool in September. The winner was Michael Mullaney, with an impressive 18½ marks out of 20; as Michael was last year’s winner too, we may considering barring him from future contests! Below we reprint the questions – the answers are on page 36. 1. Who was voted the greatest-ever Liberal in the poll run by the Lib Dem History Group in 2007? 2. Who holds the record as the shortest-serving Liberal Prime Minister since the party was founded in 1859? 3. Which constituency did Liberal leader Jeremy Thorpe represent from 1959 to 1979? 4. Who, on being elected to Liverpool City Council in 1972 at the age of 21, became the youngest sitting councillor in Britain? 5. Who wrote the book The Strange Death of Liberal England, the classic study of the decline of Liberalism, first published in 1935? 6. On 26 July 1973, the Liberal Party won two by-elections from the Conservatives; in which constituencies? 7. Who served as President of the Liberal Democrats from 1998 to 2000? 8. The Liberal Democrat History Group has raised enough money to have a plaque installed on the building which is now the site of Willis’s Rooms, where the Liberal Party was founded in 1859. Where is the building? 9. Who was elected Liberal MP for Finsbury Central in 1892, becoming the first non-white member of the House of Commons? 10 In which English city was William Ewart Gladstone born on 29 December 1809? 11. Who, as President of the Liberal Party in 1947–48, presented a copy of Milton’s Areopagitica to his successor, inaugurating the tradition of handing on the book as a symbol of the office of President? 12. Who was the SDP/Alliance candidate in the Peckham by-election of 28 October 1982? 13. Who was Gladstone’s Chancellor of the Exchequer in his short-lived administration of February–July 1886? 14. Who served as principal private secretary to David Lloyd George from 1923 to 1945? 15. Whose memoirs, published in 2009, were entitled Free Radical? 16. Who was President of the Liberal Party in 1986–87 and went on to be the party’s Campaign Director during the 1987 general election? 17. Which historian and thinker was the MP for Carlow Borough 1859–65 and for Bridgnorth 1865–66? 18. What was the name of the SDP think tank founded in 1982 by Lord Young of Dartington and wound up after the merger of the SDP with the Liberal Party? 19 Which Liberal cabinet minister had his career ruined by the Crawford divorce scandal of 1885? 20. Who became the first ever female Liberal minister?

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