View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE Galley: Article - 00167 provided by Caltech Authors - Main UNCORRECTED PROOFS . Published with minor changes as 'Innateness – Philosophical Issues about,’ in D. Chalmers (ed.) Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Macmillan Publishing Co., 2003. Level 2 Innateness, Philosophical Issues about

Fiona Cowie, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, USA

CONTENTS Introduction Impact of cognitive science on issues about Central philosophical issues about innateness innateness Theories of innateness

Philosophical problems about innateness cover banner: Chomsky defending the notion that our conceptual and empirical issues regarding the claim knowledge of language is substantially innate, that concepts or beliefs are innate, inborn, or gen- and Fodor arguing that the vast majority of our etically determined. concepts are innate (e.g. Chomsky, 1986 and 1990; Fodor, 1981 and 1998).Notable critics of these vari- INTRODUCTION ous `innateness hypotheses' have included the his- torical figures Aristotle (384±322 bc), John Locke 0167.001 Many different kinds of traits are claimed to be (1632±1704), and David Hume (1711±1776). innate in us and other animals.We speak of a termite's innate nest-building behavior, a llama's innate hairiness, a German Shepherd dog's innate CENTRAL PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES tendency to hip dysplasia, a person's innate beauty. ABOUT INNATENESS Philosophical interest in innateness, however, has The central philosophical question ± indeed, the 0167.003 centered around the innateness or not of various central question about innateness is: what, if any- mental properties.Probably because of the issue's thing, is innate? To aid in answering this question, traditional connections with epistemological prob- philosophers have asked a prior question: what is lems like justification and a priori knowledge, innateness and why should we care about it? Then, philosophical attention has focused on the innate- to help in answering this question, they have fur- ness (or not) of our `ideas' or representations (e.g. ther inquired: what do particular nativists (i.e. de- concepts and beliefs) and, to a lesser extent, our fenders of an innateness hypothesis) mean when cognitive abilities (e.g. mechanisms of learning). they call some idea or capacity `innate'? Thus, the This article, too, will focus on the innateness of three main philosophical issues about innateness mental items (ideas or capacities) rather than phys- are: ical features or behaviors. 0167.002 The first known philosophical claims about the 1.the interpretive issue: what do nativists mean by the innateness of concepts and beliefs were made by claim that such and such mental item is innate? Plato (428±348 bc) in his dialogues Phaedo (74b±75e) 2.the explanatory issue: what is innateness, and what and Meno (80d±e).(See Grube, 1997.)He argues (in does an idea's being innate enable us to explain? 3.the factual issue: which ideas (concepts, beliefs, know- the voice of Socrates) that since some of the con- ledge) and cognitive or behavioral capacities are cepts and knowledge we possess could not have innate? entered the mind through sense experience or as a result of teaching, they must be innate, that is ac- The interpretive issue arises because it is frequently 0167.004 quired by our souls prior to our birth.So-called very difficult to tell exactly what a person means learning, he argues, is really a process of recollec- when she claims that certain ideas are innate. tion: our experience reminds us of things we al- People often appeal to metaphors and analogies in ready know but have forgotten.Later defenders of explaining what innateness is, and these often sup- the view that certain ideas are innate include the port conflicting interpretations.For example, Des- philosophers Rene Descartes (1596±1650), Gottfried cartes sometimes says that concepts or beliefs are Leibniz (1646±1716), and Immanuel Kant (1724± innate in the same way that certain diseases (like 1804).Most recently, two cognitive scientists, the gout) are innate in certain families (Descartes, linguist and the philosopher Jerry 1985).This argument, together with the fact that Fodor, have taken up arms under the nativist many of the concepts and beliefs he discusses are Galley: Article - 00167 2 Innateness, Philosophical Issues about

not possessed by babies or very small children, about concept acquisition, because it is quite con- suggests that in his view, innate concepts or beliefs sistent with the typical empiricist's view that are not present at birth but exist as potentialities or concepts are learned.(`Empiricist' is the name dispositions to acquire ideas during the course of given to opponents of innate ideas.) development.(See Stich, 1975.)Chomsky, by con- The explanatory issue thus arises in part because 0167.006 trast, claims that principles of the interpretive issues are not clear.In discussing (UG) are innately represented in the human `lan- the innateness of various concepts, beliefs, or cap- guage organ' and are crucially implicated in the acities we need to be explicit about what notion of process of .This assertion sug- innateness we are invoking.We also need to be gests that, for Chomsky, innate knowledge of UG is clear about why that notion is important: we need no mere disposition but is encoded in the brain at to understand what innateness, so understood, ex- birth in a robust and causally efficacious form. plains.For too often it is assumed that the innate- Fodor (1981), to take another example, has likened ness of a trait has implications which, upon innate concepts to imprinted behaviors, suggesting examination, it does not have.Herrnstein and that for him, innate ideas are not learned but are Murray (1994), for instance, argue that IQ is sub- merely `triggered' by some appropriate releasing stantially innate and that certain ethnic groups are stimulus.It is unclear that the same or even a simi- inherently deficient in intelligence, concluding lar notion of innateness is at work in these three thence that social and educational programs authors, and the interpretive problem only in- aimed at those groups are ineffective.But as Block creases as the work of additional nativists is exam- (1995) has responded, since `innate' for Herrnstein ined.(See Cowie, 1999, ch.1, for more on the and Murray means something like `highly herit- interpretive issue.) able', this conclusion does not follow even if the

0167.005 While it is, of course, important to understand facts are as they claim.For the heritability of a trait what theorists (past or present) have thought is a measure of the extent to which variance in the about innateness, the interpretive issue is primarily trait in a population is correlated with genetic (as of interest to cognitive science because it bears opposed to environmental) variation, and high her- on (2), the explanatory issue.Innateness is most itability does not imply imperviousness to (or even commonly invoked to explain how an idea was difficulty of) change by means of environmental acquired: Meno's untutored slave knows Pythagor- manipulations.In the next section of this article, as's theorem because it is innate; we know that we will look at a number of different notions of 2 ‡ 2 ˆ 4 because we have innate knowledge of innateness used in the contemporary and historical mathematics; people believe in God because of an literatures and examine their explanatory abilities.

innate concept of the deity.The fact that innate Once one has clarified one's explanatory goals 0167.007 ideas are often contrasted with those that are and chosen an appropriate notion of innateness, learned or otherwise acquired as a result of experi- the question arises: what traits, if any, are innate ence has led to the notorious `nature versus nurture' (in that sense)? This is the third, the factual issue, debate about whether our genes or our experience about innateness with which philosophers have are responsible for our mental lives.This debate is been concerned.In the final section, we will look generally fruitless for two reasons.First, everyone at what sorts of evidence bear on this factual ques- knows that both experience and the genes are im- tion, focusing in particular on the ways in which plicated in cognitive development: the opposition cognitive science plays a role in determining which between nature and nurture is overstated.Second, of our ideas are innate. participants in nature versus nurture debates often talk past one another, simply because there are so THEORIES OF INNATENESS many different understandings of innateness at

play in the literature.In order to avoid such unpro- Philosophical investigations of innateness have 0167.008 ductive arguments, therefore, is vital to be very revealed that there are about as many different clear about what notion of innateness is being things meant by the claim that an idea is innate as used in a specific discussion.For example, it there are theorists making such claims.In this would be a serious mistake to read Fodor's claim section, we will survey some of these different that most concepts are innate as asserting (in Carte- notions of innateness and see what sorts of explan- sian vein) merely that we have dispositions to ations they figure in. acquire concepts during the course of development. The latter claim, while true enough, trivializes what is meant to be a substantive ± indeed, radical ± claim Galley: Article - 00167 Innateness, Philosophical Issues about 3

`Innate'means `built in'or `inborn' by the genes), then its meaning changes as the class of relevant environments does.And if genetic de- When the person in the street talks of hearts or 0167.009 termination requires that there be particular genes hands or hemophilia being innate, what she often which are `the cause of' or are `responsible for' a means to indicate is that those features are `built in' given trait, then it is at least unclear that many traits or present at birth, the intended contrast being with ± especially those of interest to cognitive science ± traits that are acquired as a result of our postnatal would be candidates for innateness.First, many experiences in the world.Arguably, some mental genes are implicated in the development of many (e.g. some perceptual and inferential abilities) must different traits ± regulatory genes are one example; be innate in this sense, or we would have no mental certain hox genes, which are expressed in both the lives at all.However, there is room for considerable fore- and hindlimbs of tetrapods are another. controversy about what else may be inborn.For Second, the development of most traits requires example, Locke (1975) famously argued (contra the coordinated activity of many different genes. Leibniz, 1981) that no beliefs are inborn, since So while development can certainly be disrupted infants are not conscious of them and cannot by `knocking out' one or more of these genes (as, make use of them but must learn them as a result e.g. deletion of the ultrabithorax gene in fruitflies of experience.Currently, cognitive scientists are causes two copies of the second thoracic segment, debating the extent to which knowledge of lan- including wings, to develop), it cannot be inferred guage is inborn (see Pinker, 1994; cf.Cowie, 1999), from this that those genes are the `causes of' the and neuroscientists are debating the extent to trait in any more robust sense than ambient oxygen which the organization of the brain is inborn rather is `the cause of' a wildfire.(See Davidson, 2001; than being fixed by experience (e.g. Quartz, 2002.) Block, 1995; Kitcher, 1985 for more on genetics and genetic determination.) `INNATE'MEANS `GENETICALLY DETERMINED' `Innate'means `has a flat norm of

0167.010 Since the discovery of genes as the mechanisms of reaction' inheritance, talk of innateness has sometimes been One way of making more precise the idea that code for the genetic determination of traits.When 0167.011 innate traits are those which are genetically deter- we say that a tendency to violence, or dyslexia, or mined is by invoking the notion of a norm of reac- the capacity for shared attention is innate, we may tion.A norm of reaction is a function which mean that it is under the control of one or more describes how a phenotypical property, P, varies specific genes.Here, the aim is to explain such facts in response to environmental variation in organ- as why some traits seem to run in families, and/or isms with a given genotype, G.P is said to have a why they seem to develop reliably under many `flat' norm of reaction when there is little or no different circumstances, and/or why they seem change in P across different environments, and independent of other cognitive capacities, and/or this is of interest because the traits we call `genetic- why they seem impervious to ordinary environ- ally determined' or `innate' often display this fea- mental interventions (e.g. coaching or therapy). A ture.Thus, for instance, hair is both innate and major problem with the use of `innate' in this sense, (pretty much) inevitable in mammalian genotypes, whether in cognitive science or elsewhere, is that as are feathers in avian ones, and backbones in the concept of genetic determination on which it is vertebrate ones.It is not clear, however, that this based is itself extremely unclear.If, for instance, a is a useful sense of innateness when speaking of trait counts as genetically determined so long as ideas.There are many ideas which are inevitable, there are genetic necessary conditions for its de- yet not innate, being a result rather of ubiquitous velopment, then arguably all traits are genetically features of the environment.For instance, over- determined, hence innate.If, instead, genetic de- whelmingly, most people who survive at all have termination requires that there be genetically suffi- the concept `water' and the belief that night follows cient conditions for the trait, then arguably nothing day. is genetically determined, since the survival of any organism requires certain environmental condi- tions to obtain.If genetic determination is relativ- `Innate'means `canalized' ized to a certain class of environments (by saying, A related, highly precise view of innateness in- e.g. that a trait is genetically determined if, given a 0167.012 volves the biological concept of canalization.A normal environment, its development is controlled Galley: Article - 00167 4 Innateness, Philosophical Issues about

trait is said to be canalized when its development is `Innate'means `developmentally buffered against certain environmental and genetic constrained' variations (Waddington, 1942).Brains, for example, have this feature: most mutations and most envir- Elman et al.(1996) have proposed that innateness 0167.015 onmental changes do not prevent their develop- be understood in terms of the notion of develop- ment.The philosopher Andre Ariew (1996, 1999) mental constraints.In their view, ideas and behav- has argued that the best account of innateness iors count as innate to the extent that there are holds a trait to be innate (in a given range of envir- constraints on (i) the representational systems onments) to the extent that its development is can- they involve, and/or (ii) the architectures that alized (in that range).Innateness in this sense, as he implement them, and/or (iii) the timing of their notes, enables us to explain why certain traits development.The more constraints there are oper- appear so reliably in a population.What is prob- ating at any of these levels, the more the trait counts lematic for this proposal, however, especially as an as innate.Elman et al.maintain that their notion of account of what `innate' might mean for cognitive innateness is of interest to cognitive science because scientists, is that many ideas seem to be canalized it recognizes the complex interplay of genome and without being plausibly called innate.Again, the environment during development, thus avoiding belief that night follows day and the concept spurious arguments about `nature versus nurture'. `mother' are examples. However, it is difficult to see what innateness, so understood, explains.Since the development of every trait is multiconstrained, not just by environ- `Innate'means `genetically entrenched' mental conditions and genes of various sorts but also by myriad other factors (such as the laws of 0167.013 Another philosophical account of innateness is due to the philosopher William Wimsatt.He argues (e.g. physics and chemistry, the plasticity of the relevant 1986, 1999) that innate traits are the ones that are portion of the genome, the existence and fitness of highly `generatively entrenched'.Generative en- alternative phenotypes), all traits would appear to trenchment is a measure of what one might call be to some extent innate, in this view. `ontogenetic necessity'.The more entrenched a property or process is, the more disruptive to sub- `Innate'means `triggered'or `not sequent development is its absence or modification: learned' to be innate is to be deeply generatively entrenched in The philosopher and cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor 0167.016 the design of an adaptive structure ± to be a functional seeks to import the notion of triggering (Lorenz, part of the causal expression of that system¼upon which the proper operation of a number of other adap- 1965) into discussions of innate ideas.He argues tive features depends.(Wimsatt, 1999, 153) (1981, 1998) that most concepts are innate in us in the same way as imprinting is innate in ducklings: 0167.014 Thus, having a brain is in his view a deeply en- just as a duckling's attachment to its mother is trenched or innate property: modifications to that triggered by its first visual and auditory experi- organ cause a cascade of other developmental ences of her, our concepts are triggered by our effects.Some problems with this account of innate- experiences of their instances.Here, the intended ness are (i) it does not capture the opposition with contrast is with learning: just as ducklings don't learning that is so crucial to many discussions of learn to love their mothers, we don't learn concepts innate ideas, since learned ideas can be highly en- ± even concepts like `train' and `rose' are un- trenched precursors to the acquisition of other learned, in Fodor's view.A problem with this pro- adaptive cognitive structures; (ii) it apparently posal is that triggering is in most cases a poor counts environmental features as innate if it turns model for the process of concept acquisition.First, out that they are necessary to further development. the connections between releasing stimuli and trig- (E.g. having edges or lines of different orientations gered behaviors are set up by natural selection, but in the visual environment would be an innate trait natural selection has not had time to set up connec- of Hubel and Wiesel's famous kittens, since normal tions between many concepts (e.g. train) and the visual development was found to be contingent on world.Second, whereas there is typically a critical experience of those stimuli.) period for the development of triggered responses, there appears to be no critical period for the acqui- sition of concepts like train.Finally, and because behaviors and releasing stimuli are paired by nat- ural selection, the stimuli for triggered behaviors Galley: Article - 00167 Innateness, Philosophical Issues about 5

are arbitrary in a way that the experiences leading particular, he argues, a representation of Universal to acquisition of a concept are not.There is no Grammar, a theory describing the features shared intrinsic connection between red spots and sex, by all human languages, is an inborn feature of the yet natural selection has recruited red spots as a `language acquisition device'.(e.g.Chomsky, 1965 trigger for mating behavior in stickleback fish.In and 1993.) arguments relies contrast, there is an intrinsic connection between on four crucial empirical premisses: (i) people do in concepts and the experiences that cause their ac- fact possess the idea in question (e.g. people have quisition: `rose' is acquired as a result of seeing, or knowledge of a ); (ii) the avail- hearing talk about, or reading about roses. able information is of such and such kinds (e.g. children do not get evidence about what not to IMPACT OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE ON say); (iii) the available learning mechanisms are of such and such types (e.g. language learning pro- ISSUES ABOUT INNATENESS ceeds by hypothesis testing); (iv) the available in-

0167.017 It remains to consider the factual issue about in- formation is not sufficient to enable the idea to be nateness, and this is where the various branches of learned by that learning method.Cognitive science cognitive science play a crucial role.There are three will be critical in verifying all these premisses.For main types of argument used in support of innate- example, psycholinguistic theories of the processes ness hypotheses.These are: of language production and comprehension will be the ultimate arbiters of Chomsky's claim that lan- . Transcendental arguments. . Poverty of the stimulus arguments guage use and understanding involve knowledge . Impossibility arguments. of a generative grammar; developmental psych- ology will tell us what information, as a matter of 0167.018 The soundness of these arguments clearly depends fact, children learning language have access to; and on what sense of `innate' is being invoked.Tran- or cognitive neuroscience, scendental arguments (Antony, 1999) concern in- perhaps, will tell us what are the learning methods nateness in the sense of `inborn' or `present at available to them.Only then will it be clear whether birth'.They point out that in order for learning innate knowledge of UG is required for language from experience to be possible at all, something acquisition. must be there already.Even the most extreme em- A third kind of argument for innate ideas claims 0167.020 piricists accept the conclusion of transcendental that since learning a certain idea is literally impos- arguments; where they differ from nativists is in sible, that idea must be innate.Fodor is the their accounts of what is inborn.Empiricists like contemporary champion of this form of argument, the behaviorist B.F.Skinner think that all that is contending that since concept learning is impos- innate are dispositions to emit certain behaviors as sible, concepts must be innate.Fodor's impossibility a result of certain environmental stimuli, together argument starts with a transcendental point.Since with a disposition to modify the strength of these learning a concept involves formulating and testing stimulus-response connections in response to re- hypotheses about what it means, we must already inforcement.In contrast, a nativist like Chomsky have some representations available to use in thinks that knowledge of UG is inborn.This is a stating our initial semantic hypotheses: unless much stronger innateness hypothesis than Skin- some concepts are innate, concept learning could ner's, since it requires that there be inborn syntactic never get off the ground at all.Fodor's impossibil- representations.Cognitive science contributes to ity argument then continues as follows.Successful this debate primarily by clarifying the processes learning of a concept involves finding the correct of cognitive development.For only when we hypothesis about what it means.This requires that know what the mechanisms of learning and devel- we find, in effect, the definition of the concept: we opment are will we be in a position to identify their have learned the concept `dog' when we know that inborn precursors. dog applies to a thing if and only if that thing is F, 0167.019 Poverty of the stimulus arguments contends that where F specifies the necessary and sufficient con- a given idea (a belief or a concept) must be innate ditions for doghood.However, Fodor contends (again in the sense of `inborn') because because the that, since most concepts don't have definitions environment does not provide enough information (in the sense that we cannot specify their necessary to enable it to be learned.For example, Chomsky and sufficient conditions, except circularly, by has argued that since the information about using the very concepts at issue), most concepts language available to children is so meager, know- could not be learned.Concept learning is (in most ledge of language must be substantially innate ± in cases) impossible, so most concepts must be innate. Galley: Article - 00167 6 Innateness, Philosophical Issues about

0167.021 It is still unclear exactly what `innate' means in Chomsky N (1993) Language and Thought.Wakefield, RI the context of Fodor's impossibility argument ± and London: Moyer Bell. there is still a serious interpretive issue here (see Cowie F (1999) What's Within: Nativism Reconsidered New Cowie, 1999, ch.4).However it is clear, whatever York: Oxford University Press. `innate' turns out to mean for Fodor, that cognitive Davidson ER (2001) Genomic Regulatory Systems: Development and Evolution.San Diego: Academic Press. science has an important role to play in establishing Descartes R (1985) Comments on a certain broadsheet.In: the soundness this argument.First, by developing Cottingham J, Stoothoff R and Murdoch D (eds and alternatives to the hypothesis-testing model of con- trans.) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol.I, cept acquisition, cognitive science may undermine Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. the transcendental argument with which Fodor's Elman JL, Bates EA, Johnson MH, Karmiloff-Smith A, argument begins: maybe concept learning does Parisi D and Plunkett K (1996) Rethinking Innateness: A not require that we already have representations Connectionist Perspective on Development.Cambridge, (though it may require that we have, say, a neural MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press. network with a certain kind of distribution of initial Fodor JA (1981) The present status of the innateness weights and a certain learning algorithm).Second, controversy.In: RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the development of alternatives to Fodor's account the Foundations of Cognitive science, pp.257±316. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books. of concept possession may undermine his argu- Fodor JA (1998) Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went ment from the indefinability of concepts to their Wrong.New York: Oxford University Press. unlearnability.If having a concept is not necessar- Grube GMA (1997) (trans.): Meno and Phaedo.In: Cooper ily a matter of knowing the necessary and sufficient JM and Hutchinson DS (eds) Plato: Complete Works. conditions for its application (as, e.g. Prinz, 2002, Indianapolis: Hackett. argues), then the indefinability of concepts is no bar Herrnstein RJ and Murray C (1994) The Bell Curve.New to their being learned. York: Free Press.

0167.022 In sum: claims about the innateness of ideas are Kitcher P (1985) Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the often ambiguous.In order to assess such claims, Quest forHuman Nature .Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. then, it is necessary to understand what sense of Leibniz WG (1981) New Essays on Human Understanding, `innate' is being used and to be clear about what translated by P Remnant and J Bennett.Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. innateness, so construed, can explain.Claims about Locke J (1975) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the innateness of ideas are also subject to empirical edited by PH Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University test, and this is where cognitive science comes in. Press. When the processes of learning and development Lorenz KZ (1965) Evolution and the Modification of Behavior are better understood, we will be in a better pos- Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ition to know what is innate, and what this might Pinker S (1994) The Language Instinct: How the Mind mean. Creates Language.New York: Harper. Prinz JJ (2002) Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their References Perceptual Basis.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Quartz SR (2002) Learning and brain development: a Antony LM (2001) Empty heads. Mind and Language, 16. neural constructivist perspective.In: Quinlan P (ed.) Ariew A (1996) Innateness and canalization. Philosophy of Connectionist Models of Development.New York: Science 63: S19±S27. Psychology Press. Ariew A (1999) Innateness is canalization: in defense of a Stich SP (1975) Introduction.In: Stich SP (ed.) Innate Ideas, developmental account of innateness.In: Hardcastle V. Berkeley: University of California Press. (ed.) Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Waddington CH (1942) Canalization of development and Essays, pp.117±138.Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/ the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Nature 150: MIT Press. 563. Block N (1995) How heritability misleads about race. Wimsatt WC (1986) Developmental constraints, Cognition 56: 99±128. generative entrenchment and the innate-acquired Chomsky N (1965) Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, distinction.In: Bechtel W (ed.) Integrating Scientific Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. Disciplines, pp.185±208, Dordrecht: Martinus-Nijhoff. Chomsky N (1986) Knowledge of Language, Its Nature, Wimsatt WC (1999) Generativity, entrenchment, Origin and Use.New York: Praeger. evolution and innateness: philosophy, evolutionary Chomsky N (1988) Language and Problems of Knowledge, biology, and conceptual foundations of science.In: The Managua Lectures.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hardcastle V (ed.) Where Biology Meets Psychology: Chomsky N (1990) On the nature, use and acquisition of Philosophical Essays, pp.139±179, Cambridge, MA: language.In: Lycan WG (ed.) Mind and Cognition: A Bradford Books/MIT Press. Reader, pp.627±45.Oxford: Blackwell. Galley: Article - 00167 Innateness, Philosophical Issues about 7

Further Reading Glossary Barkow JH, Cosmides L and Tooby J (1992) The Adapted Empiricists Those who deny innateness hypotheses. Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Genetic Entrenchment The extent to which subsequent Culture.New York: Oxford University Press. development depends on a given developmental pro- Chomsky N (1988) Language and Problems of Knowledge, cess or result. The Managua Lectures.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Heritability The ratio of the total genetic variance to the Cowie F (1999) What's Within? Innateness Reconsidered. total phenotypic variance. New York: Oxford University Press. Ideas A somewhat archaic term for mental representa- Elman JL, Bates EA, Johnson MH, Karmiloff-Smith A, tions, e.g. concepts or beliefs, commonly used in the Parisi D and Plunkett K (1996) Rethinking Innateness: A innateness literature, as in `innate ideas'. Connectionist Perspective on Development.Cambridge, Innateness hypothesis An hypothesis about what ideas MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press. or capacities are innate. Fodor JA (1998) Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Imprinting The process by which some animals form an Wrong.New York: Oxford University Press. attachment to other animals. Griffiths P (2002) What is innateness? Monist 85: 70±85. Nativists Defenders of innateness hypotheses. Kitcher P (1985) Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Nature versus nurture controversy The debate about Quest forHuman Nature .Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. whether our genes or our experience are responsible Pinker S (1994) The Language Instinct: How the Mind for our mental lives. Creates Language.New York: Harper. Norm of reaction The range of phenotypes expressed Pinker S (1997) How the Mind Works.New York: W.W. by a given genotype across different environmental Norton. conditions. Prinz JJ (2002) Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Triggering A relatively automatic and stimulus-driven Perceptual Basis.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. process, to be contrasted with that of learning, by which Quartz SR and Sejnowski TJ (1997) The neural basis of ideas or behaviors may be acquired from experience. cognitive development: a constructivist manifesto. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 20: 537±596. Stich SP (ed.) (1975) Innate Ideas, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Keywords: ECSarticle167

1. Impossibility arguments, para 1, Antony 1999 but 2001 in refs

2.References – Antony, need page nos.

3. Fodor 1981 – name of editor?

4. Can you supply five keywords characterizing your article?