Afghan Narcotrafficking A Joint Policy Assessment Afghan Narcotrafficking A Joint Policy Assessment

Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking

August 2017 Sunrise over a poppy field in Maiwand District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. Acknowledgements

As the work of the EastWest Institute’s Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking draws to a close, we would like to extend our sincerest thanks and appreciation to all of our working group members who generously gave their time and talents to ensure the success of this multi-year endeavor. We look forward to more opportunities for collaboration with you in the future.

We would also like to thank the many experts and officials in Russia, the United States, Afghanistan and other key regional stakeholders as well as international organizations who shared their invaluable insights and feedback on our work, includingi:

Senyo Agbohlah United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Mustafa Aria Ministry of Finance of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Andrey Avetisyan United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Victor Dostov Russian Electronic Money and Remittance Association

Mikhail Gabrilyants Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation

Andrey Kazantsev Moscow State Institute of International Relations

Mikhail Konarovsky Moscow State Institute of International Relations

Natalya Kovaleva Eurasian Economic Commission A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT Esther Lofgren SGI Global, LLC 4 Valery Lopatin National Council of the Financial Market Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation

i Organizational affiliations as of the sixth meeting of the Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking in October 2015. A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 5 Enayat Qasimi Enayat David Mansfield David Brian A. Brian A. Morales Sultana Parvanta Sardor Rustambayev Sardor Ekaterina Stepanova Ekaterina Independent Consultant Independent Consultant U.S. Department of State State of Department U.S. Vladislav Ponamorenko Vladislav Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Shanghai Cooperation Eurasian Center for Comparative Research Comparative for Center Eurasian Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan of the Islamic Republic of Government partnership with the Corporation over these past years. past these over with the Corporation partnership Institute of the World Economy and International Relations International and Economy World the of Institute Natalie Kaplan and Kathleen Shea for their editorial support. their editorial for Shea and Kathleen Natalie Kaplan Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation the Russian of under the Government Financial University Corporation has enabled this project to withstand the many geopolitical changes in the U.S.-Russia in the U.S.-Russia changes geopolitical the many withstand to this project has enabled Corporation contributions in preparing the working group meeting notes; Anna Renard-Koktysh for her assistance her assistance for Anna Renard-Koktysh meeting notes; group the working in preparing contributions the entire editorial and publication process. Additional thanks go to Craig Moorhead for his invaluable his invaluable for Moorhead Craig to go thanks Additional process. and publication editorial the entire relationship that have transpired since the working group was formed, and we are truly grateful for our for truly grateful are and we formed, was group the working since transpired that have relationship Afghan Narcotrafficking from the genesis of this body of work until now. The generosity of the Carnegie generosity The now. work until of of this body genesis from the Narcotrafficking Afghan support, this report and project would not have been possible. We would especially like to recognize the recognize to like especially would We been possible. not have would and project this report support, Carnegie Corporation for its unfailing and unfaltering support of the Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Group Working Joint U.S.-Russia the support of and unfaltering unfailing its for Carnegie Corporation Shelby Cullom Davis Charitable Fund and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Without their generous their generous Without York. New of and the Carnegie Corporation Charitable Fund Cullom Davis Shelby Last but certainly not least, we would like to express our deepest gratitude to our financial sponsors: the our financial sponsors: to gratitude our deepest express to like would we not least, but certainly Last with meeting logistics and as a liaison with the Russian contributors; and Dorcas Cheung, Katherine Chin, Chin, Katherine Cheung, and Dorcas contributors; with the Russian and as a liaison with meeting logistics We would like to recognize several individuals at the EastWest Institute for their efforts in helping drive this in helping drive their efforts for Institute individuals at the EastWest several recognize to like would We and his impeccable notetaking during the convenings and to Teresa Val for her significant efforts in guiding efforts her significant for Val Teresa and to during the convenings notetaking and his impeccable report to its completion. Special thanks go to Andi Zhou for his coordination of the working group meetings meetings group the working of his coordination Zhou for Andi to go Special thanks completion. its to report Principal Author:

Yuri Tsarik Co-Founder and Head of Russian Studies Programme, Center for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies (CSFPS)

Contributors:

Ilnur Batyrshin Former Head, Scientific Research Center, Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation (FSKN)

George Gavrilis Author of The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries

Vladimir Ivanov Director, Branch in the Russian Federation, EastWest Institute

Oleg V. Kulakov Professor of Area Studies, Military University, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation

Austin Long Associate Professor, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University

Ivan Safranchuk Associate Professor, Moscow State Institute of International Relations Editor in Chief of Great Game: Politics, Business, Security in Central Asia

Konstantin Sorokin Adviser, Department of Education and Science, International Training and Methodology Centre for Financial Monitoring (ITMCFM) Adviser, State Civil Service of the Russian Federation, Third Class

H. Douglas Wankel Former Assistant Administrator and Chief of Operations, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration Former Director, Kabul Counter-Narcotics Task Force, Embassy of the United States in Afghanistan

Project Director:

David Firestein Perot Fellow and Senior Vice President, Strategic Trust-Building Initiative and Track 2 Diplomacy, EastWest Institute

Expert Group Coordinators:

Vladimir Ivanov Director, Branch in the Russian Federation, EastWest Institute A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT Euhwa Tran 6 Senior Associate, Strategic Trust-Building Initiative, EastWest Institute _

This publication was made possible in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors and contributors. A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 7 8 9 14 14 21 12 21 31 16 18 19 37 27 25 24 23 32 42 28 28 34 38 44 48 46 50 30 CONTENTS V. Borders and the Neighborhood Borders V. Cooperation Multilateral VI. Cooperation U.S.-Russia Bilateral VII. I. Prioritizing Counternarcotics for All Stakeholders for Counternarcotics Prioritizing I. Policies Development Revising II. Illicit Financial Flows III. Reduction Demand IV. Domestic Market Domestic Narcotrafficking Afghan of Relevance Update: Threat and Russia States the United to Opium, Non-Opium Economy and Failures of Development Policies Development of and Failures Economy Non-Opium Opium, Violence Political and Drugs Between The Nexus and Drugs Security Governance, Corruption, Post-2014 Scenarios and Developments in Afghanistan: Afghanistan: in and Developments Scenarios Post-2014 Stalemate Not-So-Stable A Threat of the Scope The Narcotrafficking: Afghan U.S.-Russia Relations U.S.-Russia Security to Drugs From Shift in Priorities: A Fatigue” “Afghanistan Overcoming Dynamics Regional Endnotes Acronyms Conclusion Policy Recommendations Policy Afghan Narcotrafficking: The Threat and Its Evolution and Its Threat The Narcotrafficking: Afghan Evolution of the Strategic Environment the Strategic of Evolution Introduction Foreword Summary Executive Foreword

ince its inception, the EastWest Institute’s (EWI) Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Af- ghan Narcotrafficking has endeavored to build greater trust between the United States Sand Russia. Established in 2011 at the height of the “reset,” the group aimed to tackle the mutual security threat posed by the Afghan narcotics trade with the same cooperative out- look that characterized prospects for the overall bilateral relationship at that time.

Of course, for a variety of reasons, the U.S.-Russia relationship has deteriorated dramatically in recent years. In particular, the situation in eastern Ukraine in 2014 and the sharp U.S. pol- icy response that generated, along with the bitter, ongoing and multifaceted dispute as to whether Russia interfered in the U.S. presidential election of 2016 and the massive political reverberations relating to this issue in the United States, have created a vastly more challeng- ing and indeed prohibitive climate for U.S.-Russia cooperation, even with respect to issues where there appears to be substantial commonality of interest. To its great credit, the U.S.- Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking sustained productive dialogue throughout this enormously difficult period.

As regards Afghanistan, the prospects for enduring stability are bleak. Following the 2014 drawdown of coalition troops from the country, the overall security situation has deteriorated appreciably. Weak governance, significant levels of corruption and continued economic devel- opment challenges exacerbate an already difficult set of national circumstances. Moreover, as a long-term trend, U.S. (and global) “Afghanistan fatigue,” as well as the real possibility of sharp cuts to U.S. foreign assistance budget, increasingly constrains U.S. and other external responses to events in Afghanistan.

Given the current state of U.S.-Russia relations and conditions in Afghanistan, many of the policy recommendations in this report will seem far more ambitious and less attainable than they did at the outset of this project or even a mere three or four years ago. That said, we continue to believe that, notwithstanding massive and perhaps unbridgeable U.S.-Russia dif- ferences on a number of matters of principle and policy and very difficult conditions in -Af ghanistan, there is still value to U.S.-Russia cooperation on matters of common interest such as Afghanistan. With a clear-eyed recognition of the limits of our work in the present environ- ment, but also with a continued deep institutional commitment to doing what we can to build trust and surface innovative and actionable ideas, we are proud to present this report. A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT

8 A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 9 ------Afghan narcotrafficking Afghan narcotrafficking Record-high levels of drug of levels Record-high

In addition to poor governance, poor governance, In addition to

The nexus between drugs and health drugs between The nexus issues: care of percent 11 (an estimated consumption drugs) population consumes Afghan the such of consequences and the negative re disaster a healthcare create could use manage to quiring enormous resources ac limited Furthermore, alleviate. and healthcare of and the poor quality to cess of impact augment the negative services among the popula drug consumption tion. and region drugs between The nexus al insecurity: security the to challenge growing a poses and transit neighboring, of and stability nurturing by states—directly, consumer and corruption and crime transnational and indirectly, health public undermining insta Afghanistan’s to contributing by the same At violence. and political bility self-interest, acting in their own by time, ex powers extra-regional and regional Af issue in the narcotrafficking acerbate country’s the to contributing ghanistan, insecurity. overall The nexus between drugs and cor drugs between The nexus ruption: for opportunities which undermines the and strips grow to the licit economy and hope, dignity justice, population of in drug involvement officials’ government businesses— drug-related and trafficking participation, direct whether through or other practices—report patronage Afghan of edly has been the driving force of source as a In turn, narcotrafficking. financial illicit national and transnational of forms breeds all narcotrafficking flows, corruption. The current state of U.S.-Russia relations is relations U.S.-Russia of state The current 2. and confrontation by generally characterized over interests competitive in rooted rivalry region- of pursuit Russia’s regions. several the Asia includes Central in specific interests following: • • • ------As a cash crop, opi crop, a cash As

In recent years, the Taliban has Taliban the years, In recent

his Joint Policy Assessment, the sixth Assessment, Joint Policy his East by the produced report final and Joint U.S.-Russia (EWI) Institute’s West involvement of Taliban commanders in commanders Taliban of involvement insurgents Meanwhile, drugs). trafficking and trafficking drug production favor their future safeguard to both as a means en and to taxation) (through proceeds the population. of the loyalty sure The nexus between drugs and political drugs between The nexus violence: on narcotraf reliant increasingly grown and legiti income of source ficking as a areas and contested in controlled macy the direct to (including but not limited competition from other crops; however, however, other crops; from competition traffick and processing cultivation, its resources human and financial ing draw and under businesses legal from away nurturing by mine them institutionally crime and insurgency. corruption, The nexus between drugs and the drugs between The nexus economy: shadow and relative has an accessible um poppy the only avail It is often market. ly stable Afghanistan’s for source able income faces rarely population and thus, rural

The trafficking of narcotics from Afghani from narcotics of trafficking The • ing feeds into these multiple threats includ multiple threats these into ing feeds ing: • which has steadily grown in past years and years in past grown steadily which has endless of a vicious cycle of at the core lies Narcotraffick attempts. state-building failed continue to impede the country’s prospects prospects country’s the impede to continue this con to Added and security. stability for trade, narcotics the is factors of fluence facing the international community and Af and community the international facing rule weak governance, Poor itself. ghanistan economy and a struggling corruption law, of 1. threats many only one of constitutes stan might be able to play in countering narcotraf in countering play might be able to sugges to specific policy in addition ficking, curtail the flow to stakeholders key tions for Afghanistan. from opiates of Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking, Narcotrafficking, Afghan on Group Working Afghan of the assessment updated an offers both countries that the role and drug trade

Executive Summary T • Reaffirming its regional political and secu- 5. In their national and Afghanistan-specific rity leadership and consolidating its sup- agendas, both the United States and Russia port among Central Asian states; have recently shifted away from counter- • Balancing the influence of other great narcotics toward “hard security.” However, powers involved in the region; despite their differing and often conflicting • Preventing the overflow of violence and regional interests as well as the asymmetry crime (including drug trafficking) from -Af of the threat and how it is perceived by each ghanistan into Central Asia and Russia, as country, Afghan narcotrafficking remains an well as deteriorating levels of security that important issue of mutual strategic concern would necessitate Russia’s direct involve- for both the Russian and U.S. administra- ment in regional conflicts; and tions. Both countries have found common • Further strengthening and developing ground, particularly in terms of the following: Russia-led integration frameworks, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organiza- • The global impact of Afghan narcotraf- tion (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic ficking, which remains the largest trans- Union (EEU). national crime threat and accounts for a large share of global narcotics trafficking 3. Meanwhile, the United States is pursuing and markets; its own agenda in Afghanistan, which includes • The link between Afghan narcotrafficking the following: and other transnational threats such as money laundering and trafficking in pre- • Promoting its security interests in the re- cursor chemicals, humans and arms; and gion, namely, to eliminate and prevent ex- • The link between narcotrafficking, cor- isting and emerging breeding grounds and ruption, dysfunctional governance and safe havens of extremism—including ter- organized armed violence, including ter- rorist groups and extremist movements— rorism, which constitutes an important within Afghanistan and the region; factor in a number of countries whose • Promoting the stability and security of Af- territories are part of the transit routes ghanistan as the major non-North Atlantic for Afghan narcotrafficking. Treaty Organization (NATO) U.S. ally in the region; and Moreover, the United States and Russia share • Preventing any regional hegemony that common positions on drugs as a global issue. would undermine regional security and/ or the political independence of regional 6. Taking into consideration the current state states, including Afghanistan itself and the of U.S.-Russia relations and the present real- Central Asian nations. ity in Afghanistan, the working group propos- es a number of policy recommendations, sev- 4. The interests of the United States and Rus- eral of which are feasible under the current sia in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and conditions. The recommendations should the surrounding region are different but not generally be seen as a wide-ranging “toolkit” inherently incompatible. The same holds true suggesting various options for broadening for the interests of other important regional and deepening potential cooperation and stakeholders such as China, Iran, Pakistan and possible steps that could be taken to counter India. Owing to the current state of the U.S.- Afghan narcotrafficking, if and when the state A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT Russia relationship and the complicated rela- of U.S.-Russia relations permits. Recommen- tionship between other involved major actors, dations include the following: 10 the overall climate in and around Afghanistan seemingly favors competition rather than co- • All stakeholders, including nations operation. That said, it also favors instrumen- and international and regional organi- tal, pragmatic cooperation on regional issues zations, should prioritize counternar- (including Afghan narcotrafficking) that fur- cotics, both politically and institution- ther each party’s respective national interests. ally, including providing the necessary A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 11

------The The continued priate to establish a Track 2 mechanism mechanism 2 Track a establish to priate the two dialogue between help sustain to re the bilateral monitoring by countries po of warning early providing lationship, to attention and drawing conflicts tential cooperation. for opportunities possible when full-fledged U.S.-Russia bilat U.S.-Russia when full-fledged impossible. seems cooperation eral of issue the prioritize should Countries Na in the United narcotrafficking Afghan Security for tions (UN) and Organization and (OSCE) in Europe and Co-operation Drugs on Nations Office support United initiatives and OSCE and Crime (UNODC) Af in efforts counternarcotics to related member EEU Asia. and Central ghanistan regional as other relevant as well states, a should undertake and bodies, states drug-related of assessment thorough economic interstate from stemming risks integration. governments and Russian The U.S. relation the bilateral should manage of sort any that prevents ship in a way undermine counter rivalry that would in and efforts commitments narcotics and Afghanistan. around relation the U.S.-Russia of deterioration of reduction a significant ship has led to of at the and engagement cooperation counternarcotics including in ficial level, be appro also would it As such, efforts. be established as a key security con security as a key be established stakeholders. all regional for cern with together Russia and States United contribute to Pakistan China should push and counternarcot counterterrorism to particularly in Afghanistan, in efforts ics The control. border improved of terms embrace and China should Russia U.S., co counternarcotics for opportunities Iran- promoting by Iran with operation issue. on the cooperation Afghanistan also should Russia and States United The pol counternarcotics consistent push for the from practices and compliance icies Asian states. Central should and Russia The United States cooperation multilateral push for • •

------Given Given The United States and States The United ing the financial flows stemming from the stemming ing the financial flows drug trade. Afghan coun all bordering and Afghanistan their borders should strengthen tries Af to tackle cooperation and regional which should ghan narcotrafficking, ism. Information regarding drug-related drug-related regarding Information ism. well is insufficient and not financial flows com a more generate To documented. traffick the opiate of analysis prehensive involved stakeholders all economy, ing research in their efforts should increase wala and other value transfer systems, systems, transfer and other value wala as well additional research, of in terms should Stakeholders oversight. as official this in intelligence-sharing intensify also on migration-related and focus sphere well as the as flows, and financial drugs funding terror for drug proceeds of use traction of U.S. development aid. development U.S. of traction to stem should work All stakeholders to particularly flows, financial illicit and interna countries destination Dubai. such as tional financial hubs, ha to should be paid Special attention ensure that aid is delivered in the most in the most that aid is delivered ensure for development aim and way effective “counternarcotics line with in strategies should Stakeholders mainstreaming.” donor sup more mobilize to work also con the possible given especially port, ternarcotics is fully integrated into is fully integrated ternarcotics both of frameworks the development and international donors. GIRoA devel alternative of shortcomings the donors years, in past opment programs measure performance should review to instruments and evaluation ments their commitment to counternarcotics counternarcotics to their commitment from the same for and call Afghanistan in maximize to in order other stakeholders issue. on this critical cooperation at all levels, policies, Development that coun to ensure should be revised tance for counternarcotics, support counternarcotics, for tance the Government of role ing the leading Afghanistan of Republic the Islamic of counternar and introducing (GIRoA) in de conditionality cotics-related aid. velopment in should be uncompromising Russia financial support and technical assis support and technical financial • • • Introduction

The Project and Its Evolution ghanistan with the participation of Russian FSKN special forces.1 Counternarcotics co- In 2011, the EastWest Institute (EWI) estab- operation in this period could be seen as rare lished a Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on sectoral cooperation taking place amid oth- Afghan Narcotrafficking, comprising U.S. and erwise deteriorating bilateral relations. Russian technical and policy experts, to help sustain bilateral cooperative engagement on It was during this period of cooperation that Afghan narcotrafficking. Their aim is to share the working group released its first consen- knowledge, make consensus assessments sus report, Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint of the situation on the ground and deliver in- Threat Assessment.2 The report outlines the novative and concrete policy solutions that threats that Afghan opiates pose to Russia, could have traction in both countries, as well the United States and the international com- as in the larger relevant policy communities. munity.

From the start of the project, the purposes of The working group’s next consensus report, the working group’s efforts have been two- Afghan Narcotrafficking: Post-2014 Sce- fold: to generate solutions to mitigate the narios,3 presents scenarios for the security, severity of the Afghan drug problem and to economic and political environment in Af- build trust between the United States and ghanistan after the end of the International Russia. The ultimate goal was for the working Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mandate group’s ideas to gain traction in policymak- and drawdown of U.S. and NATO troops from ing communities and help improve the overall the country at the end of 2014. It also high- tonality of the relationship, irrespective of its lights how the possible developments could starting baseline. In a sense, building rapport influence the fight against Afghan opiates. and trust within the group itself—as well as Post-2014 Scenarios was released on the eve between the two nations—was also a pre- of the Group of Eight (G8) Summit in Sochi, requisite for fulfilling its overall mandate. which had been expected to focus on Afghan narcotrafficking as a core issue. Given sub- Although U.S.-Russia relations have been stantial U.S.-Russia collaboration on coun- deteriorating since late 2011, working group ternarcotics, it was thought that cooperation members have been able to build mutual on this issue could have served as a turning trust with each other and produce six con- point for the relationship, reversing, in part, sensus-based reports. This was mainly due some negative developments that had oc- to understanding the severity of the threat curred to date. that Afghan narcotrafficking posed to Russia and the international community, as well as Prospects for improved U.S.-Russia relations the ways it contributes to state dysfunction- changed radically following the tumultuous ality and a rising insurgency in Afghanistan, events of 2014: the overthrow of Viktor Yanu- which also constitute serious challenges for kovych’s government in Ukraine, the disrup- the United States. These positive dynam- tion of Ukraine’s national unity and territorial ics had been reinforced by the constructive, integrity4 and the resulting outbreak of con- professional cooperation between Russia’s flict in eastern Ukraine. The confrontation

A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) and the that followed, including Russia’s expulsion U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) from the G8 and the United States’ placement 12 from the start of the U.S.-Russia “reset” until of FSKN chief Viktor Ivanov on its sanctions early 2014. DEA-FSKN cooperation included list, buried hopes for deeper U.S.-Russia co- not only bilateral visits and intelligence- and operation in Afghanistan, as well as in many experience-sharing on Afghan narcotraffick- other areas. Relations between Russia and ing, but also conducting U.S.-led operations the West deteriorated so fundamentally that against drug processing laboratories in Af- the commonplace characterization of the sit- uation as a new Cold War seemed to become A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 13 ------Post-2014 contains contains and provides an update an update provides reports and highlights how the how and highlights reports outlines major international de major international outlines Scenarios remains narcotrafficking Afghan of issue and Russia. States the United to relevant Recommendations Policy recommendations group’s the working narcotrafficking. Afghan addressing for all recommendations comprise These reports, thematic in previous outlined Each as supplemental proposals. as well is preceded recommendations of group out to that seeks background a brief by initiatives implemented line previously their effectiveness. and assess Evolution of the Strategic Environ the Strategic of Evolution ment thought, for the stage set to velopments nar Afghan action on and discussion cotrafficking. The Threat Afghan Narcotrafficking: and Its Evolution Afghan the of on the interdependence with other critical threat narcotrafficking such as political Afghanistan, in issues healthcare decline, economic violence, and corruption poor governance issues, This chap the drawdown. of in the wake group’s builds on the working also ter Joint Threat Assessment the Afghan narcotrafficking issue per se and issue per narcotrafficking Afghan the this Thus, on this issue. cooperation fostering relevant, delineate aims to ultimately report man for crucial recommendations practical issue in the narcotrafficking Afghan aging the nation-build Afghanistan’s of wider context the need stressing security, ing and regional coopera U.S.-Russia for and opportunities tion on the matter. • aimed group the working of The members dis drafting, of process the in realistic be to and finalizing this and all previous cussing acted also members group However, reports. the criti that solving convictions on personal requires narcotrafficking Afghan of issue cal De all parties. of commitment the resolute in the national differences numerous spite respective their of interests and priorities it agree members group working countries, and Rus States both the United for is critical managing and mitigating to contribute sia to understanding of the nature and dynamics of of dynamics and the nature of understanding poses narcotrafficking Afghan that the threat Af the addressing for and recommendations participa the with or by issue drug ghanistan and Russia. States the United tion of as follows: is structured The report • • ------also also 6 This was the This was 5 . Afghan Narcotraf —also focus on the on focus —also 8 Afghan Narcotrafficking: Afghan Narcotrafficking: The and 7 of the evolving international environment, an environment, international the evolving of Report Overview assessments combines this report core, its At overall dynamic of mutual respect and trust and trust respect mutual dynamic of overall members. among its countering Afghan narcotrafficking. Although Afghan narcotrafficking. countering dramati deteriorated have relations bilateral up to able been has group working the cally, and an mandate consensus-based hold its Illicit Financial be that can measures and technical practical Flows in cooperation U.S.-Russia further to taken quent thematic reports— ficking: FindingDevelopment an Alternative to Alternative strategic communication. strategic subse group’s the working Building on this, to Washington, D.C. and the U.S. Central In Central and the U.S. D.C. Washington, to Moscow to chief (CIA) Agency telligence public confrontation, of in spite that, show for opportunities preserved countries the two were still capable of managing high-priority, managing high-priority, of capable still were the of visits Reported together. issues critical chief (FSB) Service Security Federal Russian imposition of sanctions on North Korea and on North Korea sanctions of imposition dem dialogue in Syria political the push for Russia and States United the that onstrated er areas. U.S.-Russia cooperation on chemical on chemical cooperation U.S.-Russia er areas. to 2013 from in Syria disarmament weapons deal, nuclear the Iran over negotiations 2014, sible. in oth further exemplified was This approach provided a viable approach with positive, al with positive, approach a viable provided counternar for implications though limited, during a time Afghanistan in efforts cotics impos alignment was political when open, despite the existing unfavorable political cli political unfavorable existing the despite cooperation; U.S.-Russia developing for mate cooperation and technical practical pursuing that corresponds to the changing nature of of the changing nature to that corresponds narcotrafficking Afghan relations. U.S.-Russia Moscow, for issue a high-priority remained sensus report, report, sensus State of Afghanistan’s cooperation sectoral focus on to report first Borders portant issues. portant issues. the crisis forged the Ukraine of The fallout con third group’s the working for context vis-à-vis Russia. This created numerous po numerous This created Russia. vis-à-vis for impediments and legal ideological litical, on mutually im cooperation further practical increasingly applicable as the United States States United as the applicable increasingly policies containment new toward gravitated Evolution of the Strategic Environment

n recent years, heated developments in in- “assertive Russia,” instead, focusing on freez- ternational relations have created a new set ing cooperation or excluding Russia from in- Iof conditions under which international co- ternational organizations that previously in- operation has had to evolve, including those cluded Russia as a strategic partner. related to the issue of Afghan narcotraffick- ing. The present chapter aims to outline the Neither the current U.S. nor Russian admin- major changes that took place since the in- istration can afford an all-out confrontation. ception of working group in 2011, as well as Washington, D.C. needs Moscow’s coopera- their impact on how the issue of Afghan nar- tion in addressing such global issues as inter- cotrafficking should be approached. national terrorism and nuclear proliferation. In turn, Russia needs these cooperative op- portunities to legitimize its new international U.S.-Russia Relations role and advance its view of national and in- ternational security. At the writing of this report, the United States and Russia still find themselves at odds over Russia’s interventions in Ukraine and Syria the Ukraine crisis. Confrontation between in 2014 to 2015, respectively, bore significant Russia and the West, in addition to other implications for U.S.-Russia cooperative en- major events that have unfolded since early gagement. Previously, both Ukraine and Syria 2014, has fundamentally transformed U.S.- had been relatively low-ranking in terms of Russia cooperation. the U.S. administration’s foreign policy and security priorities. Moscow’s involvement Although it would be inaccurate to call the consequently raised Russia’s profile as a sig- present situation a “new Cold War,” as many nificant strategic player, from the perspec- media outlets have done, tensions between tives of both the U.S. and global community, Russia and Western nations have been insti- and as a major stakeholder, both in Eastern tutionalized. Russia adopted a new military Europe and the Middle East. doctrine,9 national security strategy10 and foreign policy concept,11 all of which stress The situation in Afghanistan presents a simi- Russian leadership’s long-term commitment lar opportunity for Moscow. The ongoing dis- to a multipolar world order. The West has also engagement of the United States, de-prioriti- taken steps to institutionalize this confronta- zation of Afghanistan as a critical issue during tion through military and strategic decisions, the 2016 presidential election and Russia’s such as those made at the NATO Wales and extensive military and political capabilities in Warsaw Summits, as well as threat assess- the region all favor a proactive approach by ments made by the United States12 and A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT Moscow in Afghanistan, both because of re- Germany13 in which Russia was framed as a gional security and the creation of one more major challenge. Both Russia and NATO also venue for U.S.-Russia cooperation that im- 14 accused each other of breaching arms con- plicitly legitimizes Russia’s post-2014 inter- trol treaties, which brought confrontation to national posture. In fact, this intensification the previously unaffected domain of nuclear of Moscow’s activities in the region is already security. Thus far, the United States and its taking place. In the first half of 2016, infor- allies have failed to elaborate a comprehen- mation regarding the signing of a Russia-Af- sive institutional framework for managing an A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 15 ------), Russia pursues pursues Russia ), 23 engagement by the United States and Russia, and Russia, States the United by engagement powers. and regional as other global as well with Russia, the path towards normalizing towards the path with Russia, nor quick neither be will relations bilateral negotiat of framework in the Even simple. White the deal, U.S.-Russia ing a strategic against sanctions existing might view House partners Russian its over as leverage Russia In this situation, concessions. more who seek strengthen to ways seek to is poised Moscow In this context, position. bargaining own its the U.S. Afghanistan—where on cooperation vulnerabil of sort some displays government influ exert potentially could and Russia ity relevant. appear ence—might concerning relations U.S.-Russia present, At and mistrust by dominated are Afghanistan States Although the United instrumentality. as a pre stabilization Afghanistan’s regards (the the region from disengaging for requisite administration) the Obama of perspective military-political a strategic as serving for or of perspective (a possible in the region asset administration the Trump estab and is goals region-specific own its stake as an important security lishing itself widens the options for This approach holder. toral victory of Donald Trump, who repeatedly repeatedly who Trump, Donald of victory toral U.S.-Russia of normalization on swift insisted in the tensions numerous created relations, tensions These establishment. political U.S. escala the rapid for reason might be the key D.C. Washington, bias in anti-Russian tion of a for has called Trump Although President relations developing to approach pragmatic ------and 16 18 Since Since 15 The issue 17 21 However, these these However, 22 However, further However, despite the lack of of the lack despite 20 14 19 vice on the sanctions list. on the sanctions vice not might be rooted developments negative in the but also dynamics only in U.S.-Russia The elec politics. domestic U.S. of dynamics riod marked by an accelerating deterioration deterioration an accelerating by riod marked including—among other relations, bilateral of Ser Security Federal the measures—putting These developments illustrate the trajec illustrate developments These the at the end of relations U.S.-Russia of tory a pe term, second Administration’s Obama sia declined to assist in the maintenance of of the maintenance in assist sia declined to in service. already Mi-17s those developments in this area have been am have in this area developments decided to States the United biguous: after Hawks of UH-60 Black acquisitions finance Rus GIRoA, for helicopters Mi-17 replace to ronexport, permitting the company to imple to permitting the company ronexport, main helicopter on Mi-17 projects ment its tenance in Afghanistan. In November 2015, the United States also also States the United 2015, In November Rosobo against sanctions its lifted partially Ambassador Alexander Grushko, declared declared Grushko, Alexander Ambassador in cooperation more for is ready that Moscow this area. of Afghanistan was discussed at the Russia- discussed was Afghanistan of 2016, July 13, meeting on Council NATO NATO, to Representative Permanent Russia’s With Russia’s more active stance on Afghani on stance active more Russia’s With States the United for be possible may it stan, more. together work to and Russia larly active in holding a series of international international of in holding a series larly active aimed at reportedly Afghanistan, on talks to the crisis. solution finding an internal Russia’s Mi-35 helicopters and other possible and other possible helicopters Mi-35 Russia’s Afghanistan. to military aid delivery has been particu Moscow 2017, of the start circulating in the media, circulating held a countries two The confirmation. official including issues, on security talks number of ghanistan security cooperation treaty began began treaty cooperation security ghanistan A Shift in Priorities: From velopments effectively undermined Russia’s readiness and ability to implement develop- Drugs to Security ment-oriented policies in Central Asia and Af- ghanistan. The concept of “security through Separate from the escalation of Russia-West development” outlined by the leadership of tensions, the issue of drugs has been depri- Russia’s FSKN,25 irrespective of how real- oritized in the United States and Russia, as istic it had been prior to the Ukraine crisis, well as on the multilateral agenda. The 2016 has become largely irrelevant in the context United Nations General Assembly Special of Russia’s new economic reality. Now, deci- Session (UNGASS) gathered world leaders to sions are formulated within the constraints of assess global drug priorities, but it ultimately tightening resources and regional priorities failed to live up to the expectations of both increasingly more pragmatic than those pre- supporters of liberal reform and advocates viously outlined by FSKN leadership. for more stringent, prohibitionist measures against drug production and trafficking. At its This trend was further confirmed by the liqui- conclusion, UNGASS released a joint resolu- dation of the FSKN itself, announced on April 24 tion reasserting conservative consensus 5, 2016. As outlined in a presidential decree,26 and making some concessions to human drug control responsibilities were transferred rights- and public health-oriented advoca- to the Ministry of the Interior (MVD), where cies, but the resolution did not propose any the relevant work is now carried out by the strategies to increase the effectiveness of General Administration for Drug Control drug-related policies. (GADC). According to its statutes, the GADC is required to cooperate with law enforce- The outcomes of UNGASS did not play a sig- ment agencies of foreign states and inter- nificant role in forging mutual understanding national law enforcement organizations. It is between the United States and Russia. Addi- also authorized with the necessary powers tionally, the session did not become a forum to draft international agreements to organize for Russia’s vigorous push for a comprehen- or participate in the exposure of drug-related sive zero-based, development-oriented sup- transnational and intra-regional crimes.27 ply reduction effort in Afghanistan—as had been expected—due to influences from de- The transfer of powers and resources from velopments inside Russia itself. FSKN to MVD, whose chief is not listed on the U.S. sanctions list, seems to be a positive These developments included, first and pri- change that could reinvigorate U.S.-Russia marily, the economic crisis and subsequent cooperation in counternarcotics. Neverthe- cuts in state spending. Since the onset of the less, this transfer also led to several develop- Ukraine crisis, negative economic dynamics ments that could impede cooperation. further deteriorated following a drastic drop A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT in oil and gas prices; sanctions introduced First, the liquidation of the FSKN led to a con- against several Russian individuals and legal siderable decentralization of counternarcot- 16 entities; Russian counter-sanctions against ics efforts. Despite MVD’s mandate for in- European Union (EU) states; the fractur- ternational cooperation, it remains primarily ing of numerous cooperative ties between focused on law enforcement inside Russia, Russian and foreign economies (including while the role of the Ministry of Foreign Af- Ukraine, Turkey and the EU); and substan- fairs (and specifically, its Department for New tially increased military spending. These de- Challenges and Threats) increasingly involves A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 17 ------32 Outmanned, overbur Outmanned, 34 ) and international, connected connected international, and ) 33 the drug control agenda is likely is likely agenda the drug control 35 GIRoA, as it might entail further division and further as it might entail GIRoA, establishment. Afghan infighting within the policies drug control adequate advance To needs States the United Afghanistan, inside community, the international the support of be a key to who is striving including Russia, Afghanistan. in stakeholder security sues in Afghanistan, which are both domestic both domestic which are Afghanistan, in sues and the ris heroin of use as the growing (such wider by only contained toll death related ing use naloxone Although the deteriorat security. regional to the U.S. prompts Afghanistan ing situation in and strategy its reconsider to government provides it also in the country, intervention factors, various reconsidering for grounds se threaten that narcotrafficking, including and stability. curity Advise and Assist Commands dened Train, by and missions and counterterrorism (TAAC) as forces, and NATO U.S. cuts, budget facing the and personnel civil international as well both consider to have government, Afghan needed strategy fighting and wider the acute United the this, Given the country. stabilize to positioned be better may government States nar Afghan on the policy an active have to issue. cotrafficking Af number of as an increasing Conversely, production from drug profit ghan officials and trade, for attractive less increasingly become to ternational terrorism, lingering tensions with with tensions lingering terrorism, ternational and others) turbulence economic West, the (including transformations and institutional creation the and the FSKN the liquidation of and trafficking drug Guard), National the of cur not are reality, in crime, transnational leader Russian of the primary focus rently period. 2000-2015 the to compared as ship has growing meanwhile, States, The United is drug-related prioritizing for incentives ------31 Indeed, it Indeed, 30 28 In early 2016, then FSKN Chief Vik Chief then FSKN 2016, In early 29 given numerous other challenges (such as in (such other challenges numerous given this light, it appears that drugs and specifi drugs that it appears this light, remain high pri narcotrafficking Afghan cally time, the same At agenda. on Russia’s orities foreign policy concept also features trans features also concept policy foreign as including drug trafficking, national crime, In agenda. security international the of part of transnational crime, specifically arms and specifically crime, transnational of ma country’s among the drug trafficking, new Russia’s dangers. military jor external al security strategy lists transnational crime transnational lists strategy al security as a major nation (including drug trafficking) new Russia’s threat. al and public security scale the growing military doctrine identifies cotics has not yet been reflected in actual been reflected not yet has cotics the impor stress to which continues policy, new nation Russia’s drug trafficking. of tance consumption, among other results. among consumption, counternar from away This shift in priority is highly likely that lower incomes led to shifts shifts led to incomes that lower is highly likely citizens, among Russian use in substance opiate Afghan in a drop to lead which could statistics, stating that the number of drug us of the number that stating statistics, million over 1.2 by had declined in Russia ers million in 2013 8.5 (from years two the past 2015). million at the end of 7.3 to capacity of its consumer market for narcotic narcotic for market consumer its of capacity drugs. 2015 on Putin President briefed Ivanov tor and often have differing interests. It is also also It is interests. differing have and often economic that the ongoing note important to the undermined substantially crisis in Russia substantial amount of drug control authority authority drug control amount of substantial Border (and its the FSB between is shared different very are the two and MVD, Service) and its Border Service. The impact of this of The impact Service. Border and its cooperation U.S.-Russia for on the potential Although a is uncertain. in counternarcotics It is also noteworthy that part of FSKN’s func FSKN’s of that part noteworthy It is also at interdiction concerning particularly tions, as was level, international and national the the FSB by MVD but also sumed not only by international counternarcotics cooperation, cooperation, counternarcotics international level. at the political especially Overcoming political awareness of the situation in Afghan- istan. The likely prospect of a failed state al- “Afghanistan Fatigue” lowed for some conditionality in U.S. policies towards Afghanistan, prompting Washington Since the first decade of the 21st century, Af- to decrease the pace of troops withdrawal,38 ghanistan has dropped as a top policy prior- which is critical at least for slowing down the ity for both the United States and the larger pace of the Taliban’s advance. international community. The U.S. military, politicians and aid donors—as well as the The NATO Warsaw Summit in July 2016 was American public—have been increasingly also crucial in reiterating participating coun- reluctant to prolong involvement in Afghani- tries’ commitment to the Resolute Support stan and bear responsibility for the strategic mission and extending the timeframe of outcomes of the U.S.-led intervention in the their financial support to 2020.39 Develop- country. By mid-2013, two-thirds of Ameri- ment support was confirmed at the Brussels cans agreed that the war in Afghanistan had Conference on Afghanistan in October 2016, not been worth fighting, and half felt that the where participants endorsed the ambitious war had failed to contribute to the country’s reform agenda presented by the Afghan gov- 36 long-term security. ernment. Conference participants also un- dertook to ensure continued international The drawdown of ISAF forces greatly con- political and financial support for Afghanistan tributed to this “Afghanistan fatigue.” Against over the next four years. The total sum com- rigid and unconditional deadlines, numerous mitted by the international community is 15.2 actors planned for the withdrawal, cessation billion USD, from 2017 to 2020.40 Regional or reduction of activities mirroring the draw- stakeholders and the international commu- down of troops, which affected investment, nity also reaffirmed their commitment to a foreign spending and future plans, as well political process towards lasting peace and as the quality and scope of reporting on the reconciliation. country. The negative influences of the de- crease in troops were exacerbated further by However, “Afghanistan fatigue,” especially on the security situation, which quickly deterio- the part of donors, has not vanished, and con- rated following the drawdown. tinues to influence any policy decisions and recommendations regarding Afghanistan. As U.S. priorities shifted even more following the such, a realistic approach toward the issue of rise of ISIS in Iraq and its expansion into Syria. Afghan narcotrafficking should envisage, at Listed as a top priority of the Obama adminis- best, the same or slightly lower levels of inter- tration, the task of containing, degrading and national aid in years to come and should not disrupting ISIS overshadowed any remaining anticipate any substantial rise in those levels. concerns about the rapidly deteriorating se- curity situation in Afghanistan. It also influ- For the most part, this approach holds true enced spending by the United States and its for the Trump Administration, as well. As the allies, making the Middle East (and to some administration gravitates toward “hard se- extent, Central and Eastern Europe) a matter curity,” the U.S. Department of State budget of high budgetary priority.

A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT might lead to further underfinancing of de- velopment efforts, including in Afghanistan. However, the rise of ISIS in Iraq; the Taliban’s 18 However, this also creates an opportunity for advancements in 2015 and 2016 (includ- the prospect of a limited, conditional U.S./ ing successful assaults on Kunduz City); the NATO troop surge in Afghanistan. emergence of the Kandahar-based Al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Qaeda in the Indian subconti- After a call for the NATO troop surge was 37 nent; and the creation of the Islamic State in issued by Resolute Support mission com- Khorasan Province all helped raise public and mander General John W. Nicholson, Jr. to A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 19 ------It is also ob It is also 49 In early 2017, 2017, In early 48 Russia seeks to to seeks Russia 46 —have a multidimensional —have 47 Initiative also makes China a stakeholder that stakeholder a China makes also Initiative and in Afghanistan in involved is increasingly coun the stabilizing in interested creasingly without solving be achieved which cannot try, 2016, In narcotrafficking. Afghan of the issue talks direct of one round China held at least representatives. with Taliban in the northeastern seen were troops Chinese Afghanistan. of districts border Since the launch of the Belt and Road Ini Road Belt and the of launch the Since has been strategy Russia’s in 2013, tiative which vision, regional China’s by challenged Asian with Central building an FTZ includes Kyrgyz integrate decision to Russia’s states. the established in 2015, the EEU, into stan as a regional framework integration Russian par by be considered that needed to reality strategy. Belt and Road China’s of ticipants poli Beijing’s of an adjustment This led to an of formulation and the subsequent cies or “conflux” Initiative and Belt and Road EEU by established which was “co-engagement,” 9, on May joint declaration a Russia-China 2015. Uzbeki included Such developments—which in the FTZ Asia blocking a China-Central stan Or Cooperation Shanghai the of framework (SCO) ganisation First, Afghanistan. on the situation in effect re China’s of the stakes raised clearly they and Iran Tajikistan Afghanistan, lations with and Road the Belt of framework within the the Belt and Road Consequently, Initiative. China-centered Belt and Road Initiative. This Initiative. Belt and Road China-centered (FTZ) zone a free-trade of idea the includes trans a number of states; Asian with Central economic and accompanying port corridors resource-ex and (mainly logistics projects Coop the Quadrilateral later, and tracting); a spe Mechanism, and Coordination eration coordination “security cial counterterrorism Tajikistan, China, that includes mechanism” and Pakistan. Afghanistan that Asia vision in Central own implement its framing institutionally of on the idea focuses coopera Asia Russia-Central longstanding but it is the EEU, of expansion tion through mecha other integration considering open to nisms. ------Additionally, Additionally, Nevertheless, Nevertheless, 43 44 Although Afghan Although Afghan 41 45 42 necessary for successfully executing the executing successfully for necessary China’s Central Asia policy goal is to create create is to goal policy Asia Central China’s conditions and legal political the economic, and other actors’ regional interests is of top top is of interests regional and other actors’ China’s and Russia’s shaping for importance and priorities. interests regional surrounding region and will continue to do so do so to and will continue region surrounding the importantly, More come. to in the years initiatives two these between relationship two major integration initiatives: the Russia- the initiatives: integration major two Union and China’s Economic led Eurasian have they date, To Initiative. Belt and Road Afghanistan’s on impact made a profound the strategic environment around Afghani around environment the strategic developments. regional from come have stan by marked was 2016 to 2011 The period from Regional Dynamics in fundamental changes the most Perhaps, criticized for their lack of performance mea performance their lack of for criticized surements. with more money going to an economic sup an economic to going money with more trans less spending is even port fund whose widely programs USAID of that than parent budget may diminish the level of develop of diminish the level may budget may It also Afghanistan. to ment assistance assistance of structure the further change a noteworthy 27 percent reduction in the reduction percent 27 a noteworthy for Agency States Department/United State 2018 FY (USAID) Development International Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. and Iraq Syria, in the DoD increase USD the 54 billion of part af positively likely most will budget 2018 FY Afghanistan. spending in fect 1.1 billion USD of extraordinary costs, primar costs, extraordinary of USD billion 1.1 Operations Contingency Overseas DoD ily for like war areas in 2017 (FY) year in the fiscal According to an Office of Management and of Management an Office to According requested the administration letter, Budget administration’s approach toward Afghani toward approach administration’s is not approach this new of the essence stan, yet. clear fense (DoD) is reportedly considering this considering is reportedly (DoD) fense option. as a realistic move U.S. the in change the praised have officials “break the stalemate” between GIRoA and GIRoA between stalemate” the “break De of Department the U.S. the insurgency, vious, however, that China is reluctant to take eral million Afghan refugees and economic on full responsibility for the security situation migrants whose communities have become in Afghanistan, as this might yield numerous breeding grounds for an opiate epidemic negative side effects for China’s own security. striking both Iran and Afghanistan.55 China also regards India as a competitor in Afghanistan that could limit Beijing’s influ- In 2014, Iran contributed to the political set- ence on GIRoA. tlement in Afghanistan and expressed sup- port for the National Unity Government. For Second, together with the ISAF drawdown a number of years, however, Iran also main- and the deterioration of security in Afghani- tained relations with Quetta Shura and other stan, recent developments in Central Asia Taliban groups, relationships that might have have also decreased regional states’ incen- improved following the quick deterioration tives for implementing open-door policies in of the security situation in Afghanistan, with relation to Afghanistan.50 The drawdown not the Iranian government trying both to influ- only suppressed economic growth oppor- ence the Taliban and to hedge against risks to tunities in Afghanistan, it also destroyed the Iran’s security in the event of further Taliban economic rationale for Central Asian states advancements.56 A major splinter group of to cooperate with Afghanistan, as multiple the Taliban that aligned with Mullah Moham- security threats emanate from Afghanistan’s mad Rasul is reported to be at least some- territory. Meanwhile, neither the Belt and what influenced by Iran.57 Road Initiative nor the EEU provide Central Asian states with enough incentives for more Iran’s stakes in Afghanistan are increasing as active cooperation with Afghanistan. Tehran becomes involved in two major proj- ects. First, Iran will become a benefactor of Third, the outlined developments demon- a major transport project financed by India strate that Afghan stability dropped in Rus- and will link the western Afghan city of Herat sia’s list of priorities. Although Russia is cer- to the southeastern Iranian port of Chabahar. tainly interested in avoiding a major breakout This project might alter Afghanistan’s eco- of violence in Central Asia, it also has no rea- nomic prospects, but it could also exacerbate son to commit too many resources to the sur- the drug issue by creating a convenient new vival and success of what it perceives to be a channel for Afghan exports. U.S.-designed political regime in Kabul, which is also a major non-NATO U.S. ally. Russia has Second, following the visit of Chinese Presi- built up working relations with the Taliban49 dent Xi Jinping to Tehran the day after the while also maintaining direct contacts with lifting of official sanctions, China and Iran -an key figures in Afghanistan’s National Unity nounced an expansive program of bilateral Government (NUG). Furthermore, Russian cooperation. The core outcome of these ne- officials remain in close contact with former gotiations was that Iran would become an im- President Hamid Karzai,52 who has been par- portant component in the Belt and Road Ini- ticularly active in Afghan politics since the tiative. Again, this initiative’s potential impact beginning of 2016. Russia also intensified re- on Afghanistan remains uncertain. It could lations with Pakistan, including intelligence- promote the country’s development, but it sharing between Pakistan’s Inter-Services In- may also facilitate drug trafficking along the telligence (ISI) and its Russian counterparts major routes. from 2014 to 2016.53 In light of this, Russia has several avenues for furthering its inter- As the United States decreases its presence ests in Afghanistan’s political and security in the region and Russia lacks the resources environment while also remaining focused on and incentives for taking the lead in Afghani- consolidating its influence in Central Asia. stan’s stabilization, Iran—as well as China— A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT might become one of the major contributors Another major regional development was the to regional peace and stability. Consequently, 20 signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Iran could also become increasingly interest- Action and the lifting of UN sanctions against ed in counternarcotics efforts as a prerequi- Iran. Iran is well known as a major transit site for restoring the region’s stability. Tehran, country for Afghan opiates54 and a major con- however, has yet to demonstrate its willing- tributor to regional and global counternarcot- ness and ability to deal successfully with the ics efforts. Iran is also a host country for sev- drug-dominated environment in Afghanistan. A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 21 ------The 65 Current projec Current 66 which reveals external external which reveals 63 and 4.787 billion USD (63 USD billion and 4.787 62 The amount of aid did grow about aid did grow The amount of 64 budget approved in January 2016, ex 2016, January in approved budget 61 21.1 percent, but still was below initial targets. targets. initial below was but still 21.1 percent, than half (40 less covered revenues Domestic budget operating Afghanistan’s of percent) donor in 2015; 4 billion USD of expenditures made up the difference. contributions similar. was in 2016 ratio percent 20 of gap financing a anticipate tions in 2025, (GDP) product domestic the gross of in is able to that the government assuming namely, the possibility of a takeover by ex by a takeover of the possibility namely, Iraq of ISIS in parts that of similar to tremists, further commitment and Syria—encouraged support to community the international by re military and post-conflict Afghanistan’s the U.S.-support This allowed construction. and the in Government ed National Unity slow substantially to community ternational opposition, armed the of advance the down scenario. stalemate stable a kind of creating situation has de as the security However, political both of terms in further, teriorated the situation aid, and international cohesion the FY to According critical. to close remains 1395 of at the level expected were resources ternal budget), the of percent (69 USD billion 4.494 the of (71 percent billion USD 5.311 from down 1394 FY in budget) 1393, in FY percent) domestic of share be a considerable aid to revenues.

------59 , This 58 . Afghan Nar 60 A Joint Threat Assessment

between Ashraf Ashraf Ghani between and Abdullah Abdul foun durable yet a problematic created lah structure. political the country’s dation for Afghanistan— in failure of the fear Meanwhile, Developments in 2015 proved these predic these proved in 2015 Developments the 2014 Despite correct. largely be tions to deal political the U.S.-backed crisis, political threaten Russia, the United States and the States the United Russia, threaten the world.” of rest environments will not be good under almost under almost will not be good environments problem The circumstances. conceivable all to continue will likewise narcotics Afghan of pointed at two major factors crucial for de for crucial major factors at two pointed cohesion political the outcome: termining “the that stated It also aid. and international and economic political security, post-2014 and outlined four major scenarios for the the for scenarios major and outlined four Afghani in situation security the of evolution The report drawdown. the 2014 after stan cotrafficking: pre group’s built on the working publication Post-2014 vious report, Scenarios In February 2015, the EastWest Institute re Institute the EastWest 2015, In February Joint U.S.- the of report a consensus leased entitled Group Working Russia Developments in Afghanistan: in Afghanistan: Developments A Not-So-Stable Stalemate Post-2014 ScenariosPost-2014 and Its Evolution The Threat and and The Threat Narcotrafficking: Narcotrafficking: Afghan Afghan crease domestic revenue to 17 percent (from Although U.S. involvement appeared neces- the current 10 percent).67 The Afghanistan sary to resolving the initial political crisis, it National Peace and Development Framework also empowered critics of the NUG. A num- (ANPDF) presented and approved at the ber of former high-level Afghan officials con- Brussels Conference on Afghanistan set the demned then Secretary of State John Kerry’s goal for domestic revenue increases at up to intervention as a move that allegedly “vio- 12 percent annually and domestic revenues lates Afghanistan’s sovereignty.”72 This also as a share of GDP at 14 percent by 2020.68 coincided with a reinvigoration of activities of Afghanistan’s government revenue grew rap- former President Hamid Karzai, who seems idly for the second year in a row in 2016, by to be looking for an opportunity to return offi- more than 18 percent, following the impres- cially to national politics.73 U.S. involvement in sive 22 percent increase in 2015. As a share decision-making on further political develop- of Afghanistan’s GDP, government revenue ments also gave momentum to anti-U.S. pro- grew from a low of 8.7 percent in 2014 to 10.3 paganda by the Taliban and former Afghan percent in 2015 and to well over 11 percent officials.74 These developments unfolded in 2016.69 Despite this, Afghanistan’s depen- against the backdrop of the start of the new dence on international aid will persist for fighting season in early April 2016. years to come. Ghani-Abdullah contradictions continued No less challenging is the political situation to affect Afghanistan’s political system for in Afghanistan. After the 2014 presidential most of 2016, greatly diminishing the over- elections, which involved numerous cases all effectiveness of the government. A seri- of fraud and led to a dangerous confronta- ous attempt to mend ties came only in early tion between the Ashraf Ghani and Abdul- September 2016, in the wake of the Brussels lah Abdullah coalitions, a U.S.-brokered deal Conference on Afghanistan. helped forge the structure of the Afghan NUG. With Ghani as president and Abdullah as chief Despite many concerns, the end of 2016 executive officer (CEO), a newly-created -po also saw some positive developments. Af- sition, the parties assumed responsibility for ghanistan’s National Unity Government man- enacting political reform. However, by the end aged to overcome numerous differences and of 2016, most obligations were unfulfilled. launch a long anticipated electoral reform. Several ministerial and provincial positions In September 2016, the government finally still remain vacant as acting officials man- passed a new electoral law and in November age the respective agencies. Although some 2016, the president appointed and inaugurat- positions were filled in 2016, the overall po- ed a new Independent Election Commission litical situation hardly improved. In November and Independent Electoral Complaints Com- 2016, a conflict between the Parliament and mission.75 The government, however, failed to the president led to the dismissal of seven make a decision on a core issue—the elec- ministers. However, the dismissals were not toral system and the way in which constitu- recognized by the president and CEO,70 and encies are formed.76 Major differences persist these ministers continued their work while with regard to this issue, bearing the potential their case was to be decided by the Supreme for conflict. These conditions render Afghani- Court.71 stan’s political outlook in 2017 rather bleak and create preconditions for continued low The most important political reforms—includ- effectiveness on counternarcotics efforts. ing reform of electoral mechanisms, the con- A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT vening of provincial council elections and the The year 2016 was also marked by rising re- convening of Loya Jirga—have not been fulfilled, gional tensions, especially in northwestern 22 fueling conflict between the president, the CEO Afghanistan, where political parties and other and their respective supporters. Thus, the par- support groups for Atta Mohammad Noor, ties failed to meet the deadline for holding elec- the acting governor of northern Balkh prov- tions and, consequently, were unable to imple- ince, and Vice President Abdul Rashid Dos- ment an agreement on the structure of the tum clashed with one another.77 Other con- National Unity Government in 2014. flicts included Hazara minority riots over the A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 23 ------92 before before 90 Afghani 87 89 The decrease in 2015 in 2015 The decrease 91 The total global opiate mar opiate global The total The impressive 36 percent 36 percent The impressive 88 93 ed results, they do not invalidate the overall the overall do not invalidate they ed results, in 2016 increased levels Cultivation estimate. improved. conditions as weather opium the total the UNODC, to According 4,800 was in 2016 Afghanistan in harvest historical highest the second from down tons, 3,300 and up from in 2014 tons 6,400 of level in 2015. tons number of opiate users in 2014 was as high was in 2014 users opiate number of of majority the vast million people, as 17.4 opiates. Afghan whom consumed opium global the of 85 percent produced stan output in 2014. 68 billion be worth to estimated last was ket com 60 billion USD with approximately USD, opiates. Afghan ing from has been the threat of and intensity The scale with a years, several the past over growing in 2016. increase and an in 2015 decrease Afghani in cultivation under poppy The area hect 224,000 high of a historic reached stan over increase percent a seven in 2014, ares 19 percent by but decreased level, the 2013 hectares, 183,000 to down in 2015 (a 2016 in hectares 201,000 to rising again increase). percent 10 blight poor rainfall, of as the result came of the exhaustion describe, as experts and, in the lands arable of potential production (i.e., regions cultivation poppy traditional provinces). and eastern western southern, the to introduced changes Although some methodology impact UNODC measurement Afghan Narcotrafficking: Narcotrafficking: Afghan The Scope of the Threat in of drugs and trafficking The production the to threat growing a poses Afghanistan Afghanistan, of and stability security peace, Drug world. the and Asia South and Central and extremism corruption, feeds trafficking routes, crime along the transit organized the Asia, Central Pakistan, in Iran, specifically and eastern and the Balkans Iraq, Caucasus, states as in consumer as well Africa, western and Chi Iran Russia, the EU, like and regions opi Afghan-originated in trade the fact, In na. touching affair a truly global has become ates the world. of region virtually every the global estimates, UNODC to According ------and more. and more. 80 These These devel 84 81 An order to arrest arrest to An order 82 Another key figure figure Another key 83 Thus, President Ghani may Ghani may President Thus, 85 Tajik-Uzbek clashes (which also also (which clashes Tajik-Uzbek disputes on the historical role of of role historical on the disputes After the United Nations lifted Nations lifted the United After 78 79 86 tions. This development has the potential to to has the potential This development tions. or the NUG of the position either strengthen further infighting. incite participants in the political process, which process, in the political participants politics, Afghanistan’s affect will certainly elec Parliamentary including the upcoming opment. all Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin against sanctions legitimate Islami became Hezb-e of branches signed by the Afghan government and the government Afghan the signed by Septem in party political Islami Hezb-e devel crucial political another is 2016 ber field in Afghanistan. fieldAfghanistan. in agreement the peace Implementation of and, reportedly, may support incumbent may reportedly, and, presiden Ghani as his vice Ashraf President tial candidate. political the consolidating to way be on his ing Balkh governor Atta Mohammad Noor, Mohammad Noor, Atta ing Balkh governor take to his intention announced who already elections presidential in the approaching part opments garnered concern over possible possible over concern garnered opments the in imbalance ethnic from resulting fallout act favor greatly they however, government; special representative on reforms and good and good on reforms special representative later Massoud—was Zia Ahmad governance, position. his from terminated which was viewed as a pivotal opportunity opportunity as a pivotal viewed which was politi hold its to government Afghan the for accountable. elites cal president’s administration—the in Ghani’s and rape of a political rival, former provincial provincial former rival, a political of and rape Ahmad Eshchi. governor issued, was bodyguards Dostum’s nine of nessed further infighting between key po key further infighting between nessed President Vice Afghanistan. in figures litical the kidnap ordering of accused was Dostum and vibrant Herat province. Herat and vibrant wit 2017 of beginning and 2016 of end The President Mohammad Najibullah, Mohammad President security underline deteriorating also Experts stable in the previously stability and political to Kabul, to over Kabul in supporters) Dostum’s involved King Habibullah of the remains the burial of Kalakani, route of the energy line from Turkmenistan Turkmenistan from line the energy of route decline in production in 2015 is attributed the potential net value likely increased pro- to a decrease in cultivation levels, as well as portionate to that of an increase in farm-gate in opium poppy yields (e.g., the yields were value (40 to 50 percent), which would bring it down by 45 percent in the southern region to levels slightly higher than in 2014 (over 10 while the area under poppy cultivation there percent of the GDP). decreased by only 20 percent).94 Economically, illegal opium poppy cultivation The regional breakdown of cultivation in 2015 is well suited to the challenging socio-eco- and 2016 remained roughly the same, with nomic political and ecological terrain of rural the eastern, southern and western provinces Afghanistan. For landed farmers, opium pop- hosting more than 90 percent of cultivation.95 py offers relatively high returns on one of the Levels of cultivation in the northern and cen- country’s scarcest resources: irrigated land. tral regions increased dramatically: by 154 It also yields a high-value, low-weight prod- percent in 2015 and by 324 percent in 2016 uct, ideal for the limited road network and in the northern regions and by 38 percent for which there is proven demand within the in 2015 and 24 percent in 2016 in central re- country, region and world. The market net- gions.96 As a result of these shifts, the num- work is such that traders will often purchase ber of poppy-free provinces decreased to 14 at the farm-gate, mitigating the challenges to in 2015 (with Balkh province losing this sta- farmers of transporting goods across, what tus) and to 13 in 2016 (with Jowzjan province can sometimes be, violent and contested losing this status).97 territory and reducing costs for transac- tions and transportation that are incurred Recently, Afghanistan has also become home when taking agricultural goods to market. For to a prosperous methamphetamine busi- those farmers with insufficient land to meet ness. In the first 10 months of 2015, some 17 their basic needs, the labor intensity of the kilograms of methamphetamine were seized opium crop creates significant off-farm -em in 14 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. This busi- ployment through opportunities to work as ness allegedly was previously concentrated a sharecropper, itinerant harvester or—for in Iran but has taken root in Afghanistan, add- those with more capital—tenant farmer, leas- ing to the gravity of the country’s drug prob- ing others’ land.103 lems.98 Poppy remains, economically, the most at- tractive cash crop, providing five times more Opium, Non-Opium Economy net income than wheat.104 Other key factors and Failures of Development pushing the rural population to grow poppy include the ease of obtaining credit to pro- Policies cure agricultural necessities, equipment and fertilizers; an opportunity to rely on a higher The production, trafficking and consump- level of security provided by insurgents or tion of narcotics in Afghanistan are becom- criminal groups in return for growing opium; ing an increasingly significant part of Afghan and intimidation to grow poppy by the insur- economy, given the diminishing volume of gency and criminal groups. international aid, especially for development. The farm-gate value of all poppy grown in Af- For those with access to the right patronage ghanistan was 570 million USD in 2015 (down networks, there are further opportunities for from 850 million USD in 2014), equal to three employment and income generation in the percent of the GDP.99 In 2016, due to higher opium economy, including in the transporta- yields and higher prices, the farm-gate value tion of both drugs and precursor chemicals was estimated at 898 million USD.100 The within the country and across its borders; the potential net value of opiates produced in conversion of opium to morphine base and A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 2015 was 1.49 billion USD (down by 45 per- heroin; the sale of agricultural inputs and ser- cent from the 2014 level of 2.68 billion USD), vices; and the provision of security through 24 equal to 7.1 percent of the GDP.101 The major- each of the stages in the value chain. ity of this was destined for exports, while the amount of opiates consumed in the domestic Consequently, as many as 400,000 people market was estimated at 80 million USD.102 In were employed in the industry in 2014, al- 2016, assessments of potential net value and though assessments differ and this figure was the domestic market were not available, but definitely lower in 2015 but likely the same in A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 25 ------115 114 implying that they have not been not have they that implying 113 Taliban commanders. From 2013 to 2016, he 2016, to 2013 From commanders. Taliban Afghanistan in southern areas volatile visited been likely most have he and his son where network. running the drug trafficking in involvement Taliban of Such instances commenta prompted have trafficking drug them groups that insurgent state to tors and trying drug cartels becoming are selves trafficking, 1.5 of an approximately the main beneficiaries figures). on 2015 (based business billion USD oth proven have years in recent reports But, a media 2016, in early example, For erwise. Abdul that Mullah the role described report governor shadow Taliban a Baluch, Rashid province’s in the played in Nimruz province, This high- and trade. thriving drug production the region’s was commander Taliban ranking escorting personally drug trafficker, foremost one such During opium. of major shipments National Afghan by captured he was mission, 2014. July 12, on forces (ANP) Police Tali the between connection Another close a after revealed was and drug traffickers ban was Agha Mohammad major opium trafficker in province Nangarhar in eastern arrested known was Jan, Haji Lal His father, 2016. early insurgency; the to donor financial major a as but mysteriously in 2012 imprisoned he was Afghani of in the wake 2014, in May freed Jan is known Haji Lal presidency. new stan’s he alleg where Pakistan, in Quetta, live to with high-ranking contact in close edly stays ditional opportunities for the insurgency in the insurgency for opportunities ditional in growth economy poppy The vibrant 2016. the anemic esti to contrast in stark was 2016 growth. economic overall percent two mated drug- of capacities the increased This further groups. extremist criminal and related Drugs Between The Nexus Violence and Political were and the insurgency drugs 2014, After stability the security, to the primary threats The state. Afghan the of existence and very major threats two these between interaction the to but not limited including continues, and other Taliban the of involvement direct pro drug taxing and running in groups armed duction and trade. Afghanistan in groups The major insurgent earned have “Taliban”) the as to (referred drug from 300 million USD to only about 100

------107 Conse Although 108 112 This was due This was 111 109 This influence is reinforced reinforced is influence This 106 The level of agricultural pro agricultural of The level 110 The influence of narco-economics on of narco-economics influence The 105 the government’s legitimacy and created ad and created legitimacy the government’s join the ranks of the Taliban or other extrem Taliban the of join the ranks poor yields both In fact, or criminal groups. ist further undermined and licit crops in poppy ly further augmented. As the population lost a lost population the As augmented. further ly they revenues, their poppy-related portion of and radicalized become to highly likely were ic to insurgents than urban areas. than urban insurgents ic to diminish for up make to failed opium poppy the pro-in in 2015, earnings ing agriculture like were areas rural inclinations of surgency Polls clearly show that rural areas that have that have areas that rural show clearly Polls armed oppo of domain natural long been the sympathet be more to continue sition groups tors led to considerable cuts in opium poppy poppy opium in cuts considerable to led tors and yields. cultivation tered a two percent recession. percent a two tered and the prices product lower poor yields, to fac The same land. cultivated of contraction population. major the of one be to continues ductivity dy the national economy’s of determinants en agriculture Afghanistan’s In 2015, namics. Although agriculture constitutes around one around constitutes agriculture Although in provides it GDP, Afghanistan’s of quarter country’s the of percent 50 about for come The economic downturn had a specifically had a specifically downturn The economic that host areas on rural impact profound cultivation. and poppy both the insurgency percent, and the economy entered deflation deflation entered and the economy percent, inflation). percent (-1.5 sectors, following a 36 percent drop in 2013, in 2013, drop a 36 percent following sectors, in 2015. level that at remained and under two to down was growth GDP quently, ties registered in 2014 also persisted in 2015, in 2015, persisted also in 2014 registered ties Afghanistan’s for undermining prospects registrations new In 2014, growth. economic economic all across percent 26 down were U.S. troops and cuts in military spending cost cost spending military in cuts and troops U.S. 2015. in jobs 500,000 about Afghanistan activi investment of The quick contraction gered by the drawdown and respective cuts cuts and respective the drawdown by gered Ac aid. and international in military spending of the withdrawal estimates, some to cording in line with the country’s overall economic economic overall in line with the country’s a further un saw 2015 The year performance. trig trends economic the negative of folding by the continuing decrease of international international of decrease the continuing by development. aid for was in opium production decrease The 2015 panding, as income from this illegal business business this illegal from as income panding, in the growth of a major driver has become economy. legal 2016. is ex life political and economic the country’s to exert their control or influence up the value • The use of drug trafficking channels to chain. These statements have support from smuggle arms and other materials nec- the United Nations ISIL (Da’esh) & Al-Qaida essary for insurgency operations; Sanctions Committee Analytical Support and • The limiting of government control over Sanctions Monitoring Team, which suggest- certain territories, which favors drug pro- ed that in 2014, opiate financing was about duction and trafficking. to become the leading source of income for the Afghan Taliban, thus, creating a major The years 2015 and 2016 saw a major dete- threat to Afghanistan’s national security and rioration of the security situation in Afghani- to broader regional stability.116 According to a stan. For the first time in many years, Afghan number of former DEA directors of financial National Security Forces (ANSF) came un- operations, intelligence indicates that terror- der well-planned, coordinated and resource- ist financing in Afghanistan from drug traf- backed insurgency offensives, which at ficking proceeds has risen significantly from specific moments included up to 10 simulta- 2012 to 2015; there is major concern and a neous major attacks in different parts of the strong possibility that the relationship be- country. According to ANSF members, they tween drug criminal organizations and ter- are fighting “a more sophisticated and well- rorist groups has grown closer and in some armed insurgency than they have seen in instances might have merged.117 ye a r s .” 121 Insecurity has become the matter of top concern for the local population, far ex- The contested nature of power in rural Af- ceeding economic concerns, although 2015 ghanistan and the fragmented nature of the was a fairly bad year for the Afghan econo- insurgency makes the creation of centralized, my.122 hierarchical organizations highly unlikely. Drug trafficking, as well as other criminal -ac In the past few years, the Taliban also ex- tivities in Afghanistan, operates through the panded the territory under its control or, at horizontal interactions between actors and least, managed to reduce the territory un- networks.118 It is also worth noting that cor- der government control. In early 2016, the rupt officials (both in the police force and armed opposition controlled eight out of 407 provincial governments) are often identified district centers and had influence in 18 more as being involved in organizing, covering and districts.123 An additional 94 districts were es- taxing drug production, which makes the pic- timated as being “at risk.”124 This means that ture even more complicated.119 the majority—approximately 70 percent—of the inhabited parts of Afghanistan were un- Despite the ambiguity, what is known is that der either government influence or control.125 the relationship between drug trafficking and the insurgency includes the following ele- The situation deteriorated somewhat in 2016, ments: with the Taliban seizing control of a number of districts throughout the country. As of Sep- • The direct involvement of insurgents in tember 2016, the NATO-led Resolute Support organizing and running narcotrafficking mission assessed that the Taliban had con- operations, especially in Afghanistan’s trol or influence over approximately 10 per- southern provinces, such as Helmand; cent of the population and was challenging • Intimidation and coercion of the local the Afghan government for control of at least population by insurgents into growing another 20 percent.126 However, insurgents opium poppy;120 did not manage to seize permanent control • Taxation of the poppy crop by insurgents, of any provincial capitals. Moreover, in late in addition to taxes on other legal crops February 2017, U.S. forces managed to elimi- A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT and businesses; nate Mullah Abdul Salam Akhund, the Taliban • Charging of fees by insurgents for the shadow governor of Kunduz province. As U.S. 26 protection of drug production and trade; Defense Secretary Jim Mattis stated, “The Af- • The corruption of officials related to drug ghan Security Forces paid a very heavy price production and trafficking, which under- to keep the Taliban on their back foot, but mines their capabilities and functionality they paid it, they’ve held, and the Taliban is in and ensures their neutrality and loyalty a worse position today, even though I do not toward the insurgency; equate that to success on our side.”127 A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 27

------131 132 133 Joint Threat Assessment curity sectors and a challenging environ sectors curity enable organised civil society ment for military by power of crime and the abuse time, the same At personnel. and security has significantly government the current procurement over up oversight stepped anti- of and the development contracts personnel. select for training corruption remain. risks But serious multiple overlapping or conflicting pa or conflicting multiple overlapping strong various run by systems tronage and national levels. men at both the local involves corruption While large-scale strata–bureaucrats social narrow very patronage kind of and other elites–some practices “bakshish”-type and system from of the population, part every affect from taxi drivers, to professors university farmers. to officers police Defence GI [Government Afghanistan’s in Band ranking Index] Anti-Corruption risk for of category highest to E [second the high it in one of places corruption] in the corruption for risk categories est The highest sector. and security defense in Band F which fell is Finance, risk area au Ineffective corruption). risk of (critical a lack of authorities, dit and prosecutorial and se the defense over civilian oversight each year. Corruption and uneven gover and uneven Corruption year. each role a significant play to continued nance influence exert to Taliban the allowing in in the southern, areas some and control provinces, northern some and eastern, areas. in remote particularly modern its in “corruption” The term mix the complex not capture sense…does entrenched practices corruption-style of including nepotism and Afghanistan, in Corruption also involves large-scale illicit op large-scale involves also Corruption in budgetary abuses to connected erations Trans As spending. government and affairs in 2015: reported International parency The most worrisome feature is the Afghan Afghan the is feature worrisome most The prac in corrupt involvement government’s insurgents, to attributed traditionally tices imprison growers, poppy including taxing and demanding road by traveling ing those in ex bribes and paying release, for ransom As checkpoints. through passage for change group’s the working states: ------these ac these 129 128 Much of this corrup Much of 130 acerbate the problem. Reports indicated indicated Reports the problem. acerbate the government believed citizens many cor combating in had not been effective indi reporting foreign Credible ruption. millions of of tens of equivalent the cated the country out of smuggled was dollars Reports indicated corruption was en was corruption indicated Reports of and flows society, demic throughout do international the military, from money ex to continued drug trade and the nors, The U.S. Department of State released the released State of Department The U.S. of the nature concerning statement following Afghanistan: in corruption narcotics-related Narcotics-related corruption in Afghanistan Afghanistan in corruption Narcotics-related and diverse. numerous is deeply embedded, Transparency International’s 2016 list of of list 2016 International’s Transparency states. corrupt most tion is drug-related. Corruption in Afghanistan is rampant, as il is rampant, Afghanistan in Corruption on 176 out of 169 of ranking its by lustrated Corruption, Governance, Security and Drugs decreasing amount of opium seizures and opium seizures amount of decreasing the illustrate operations counternarcotics reach. the government’s of limits are often not accompanied by respective respective by not accompanied often are GLE Consequently, measures. development The in 2016. 355 hectares only to tenfold fell from 2,692 to 3,760 hectares, 3,760 to 2,692 from poppy influence substantially to failed tivities they because in part, in general, cultivation economic situation, fundamentally under situation, economic efforts. counternarcotics the state’s mines a substantial by marked was Although 2015 (GLE) eradication in government-led growth and can reliably access. reliably and can the grave with combined stability, The lack of the state, undermines the territorial integrity integrity the territorial undermines the state, a further to and contributes Afghanistan of controls that the state territory of reduction ity among the various groups, this does not does this groups, various among the ity The growing government. Afghan the benefit delegitimizes power stable lack of and chaos ral regions to the insurgency’s advantage. advantage. insurgency’s the to regions ral is character itself Although the insurgency and hostil fragmentation recurring by ized Despite the relative successes in the provin in successes the relative Despite the period Kunduz province, and cial capitals an overall by marked was 2016 to 2014 from ru over control diminishing state of trend Much of Afghanistan’s corruption is driven cessful state-building in Afghanistan and up- by drug production, trade and respective fi- rooting drug production and trafficking. nancial flows. Transgressing various divid- ing lines, these illicit financial flows bring to- gether in a single network state officials and Domestic Market insurgents, poor farmers and rich landlords, An important aspect of Afghanistan’s drug the fighters of competing insurgent groups problem is the level of domestic opiate and and representatives of competing regional cannabis consumption, which is the highest and non-regional states.134 in the world. A 2015 study indicates that there

are 1.9 to 2.4 million adult drug users and Afghanistan’s brokerage system is an illustra- 2.9 to 3.6 million people testing positive for tive example of corruption practices closely drugs in the country.139 Although differences linked to drugs. Officials buying various posts in methodologies, sample sizes, target popu- must pay regular duties to their patrons and lation and geography do not allow for direct use their authority to establish a network of or accurate comparisons, it is estimated that their own duty-paying protégés. This directly Afghanistan has seen a dramatic increase in favors the drug trade, as poppy growing and drug use from 940,000 adult drug users in processing often is the only revenue source 2009 to the current level of between 1.9 and for corrupt officials who, therefore, become 2.6 million.140 involved in taxing it. A recent study undertaken by the U.S. De- Brokerage also leads to greater incompe- partment of State and SGI Global found high tence. Military estimates reveal a direct re- levels of drug use among children (nine per- lationship between poor leadership and at- cent).139 The study showed that 11 percent trition levels in the Afghan National Army of all urban households and 38 percent of all (ANA).135 Together with underfinancing, cor- rural households tested positive for at least ruption also plays a crucial role in undermin- one drug. Nationally, the figure is 30 percent, ing the capacities of the Afghan local police, which means that one-third of Afghan house- which has become part of the problem rather holds consume at least one drug.141 than part of the solution. The influence of economic migration aggra- Corruption also remains the core reason for vates the problem of drug abuse in Afghani- the Afghan state’s waning legitimacy, and the stan. Afghan migrants working in Iran and Afghan people have expressed increasing returning to their homeland often are cited as weariness of endemic corruption. Accord- the major source of the opiate epidemic. ing to a 2015 survey, about two-thirds (66 percent) of respondents who had contact with the municipality admitted to having paid Threat Update: Relevance bribes some, most or all of the time—up from 55.1 percent in 2014 and above the previous of Afghan Narcotrafficking to high of 58.2 percent in 2011.136 Over half (53.3 the United States and Russia percent) of Afghans reported that they paid

A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT bribes to the police, up from 45.1 percent in Russia remains one of the single largest mar- 2014, almost equal to the previous high of kets for Afghan heroin. Consequently, Russia 28 53.7 percent in 2011.137 The overall trend since faces some of the gravest health, socio-eco- 2007 has been a steady increase in reported nomic and law enforcement challenges posed corruption.138 by Afghan narcotrafficking.142 As estimated by the UNODC, the prevalence of opioid use All of this undermines the state’s legitimacy in Russia stands at 2.29 percent.143 Reports and constitutes a major impediment to suc- of drug-related deaths in Russia, mainly re- A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 29 ------Afghan narcotrafficking is linked to other is linked narcotrafficking Afghan such as money threats transnational precursors, in laundering and trafficking humans and arms. dysfunc corruption, Narcotrafficking, armed and organized tional governance all terrorism—are violence—including in which is an important factor linked, are territories whose countries several transit narcotrafficking Afghan of part routes. tions. It can also provide considerable space space considerable provide also It can tions. and mul steps technical neutral politically for the improve that could cooperation tilateral of the benefit to situation in the region overall States including the United all stakeholders, and Russia. and terrorism, as well as the threat of state state of as the threat as well and terrorism, narcotraffick Afghan to relating failure—all with these grapples States The United ing. which is a major Afghanistan, within issues reasons, political for ally and, U.S. non-NATO Russia be lost. that cannot a battleground in Afghanistan’s of the repercussions sees threat core as a and narcotrafficking stability security own and its allies Asian Central its to Afghan itself, and of In in the region. interests a direct represent not does narcotrafficking States the United to threat national security different of but it is the interplay or Russia, the greatest that poses and factors threats Cen of and security the stability to challenge Asia. and South tral narcotraf Afghan of the issue a final point, As consoli to an opportunity ficking provides when even positions and Russian U.S. date in of or convergence is no consensus there for avenue an provide can issue This terests. within a topical matters regional negotiating co to negotiators that motivates framework inten their respective of regardless operate, 2. 3. United the both to matter implications These in Although their regional and Russia. States face countries both differ, increasingly terests extremism crime networks, transnational

------147 145 145 - This 144 points points 146 149 Joint Threat Assessment counternarcotics cooperation in general, in general, cooperation counternarcotics specific internation in the more but also opiate aimed at reducing al initiatives in a markets opiate and global trafficking manner.” coordinated Afghan narcotrafficking has a global has a global narcotrafficking Afghan transna the largest it remains impact; a for and accounts tional crime threat trafficking narcotics global of share large and States Both the United and markets. not only in interest strong “have Russia and drug control international promoting 1. ing group’s ing group’s common that create major concerns at three and Rus States the United between ground issue: narcotrafficking Afghan sia on the and Moscow do not in any way diminish the diminish way any not in do Moscow and to poses narcotrafficking Afghan that threat work The stability. and security international Thus, the nominal asymmetry of the threat the threat of nominal asymmetry the Thus, D.C. Washington, in and the shifting priorities is compelled to look more closely at Afghan Afghan at closely look more to is compelled of element as an important narcotrafficking country. situation in the security the overall public health or national security. Neverthe or national security. public health Afghanistan’s in interested as an actor less, States the United and resilience, stabilization United States’ immediate neighbor, Canada, Canada, neighbor, immediate States’ United reported are opiates of the majority where opi Afghan Afghanistan. from come have to U.S. to threat direct a minimal pose ates majority of them supplied by South America America South by supplied them of majority problem The and Colombia). (mainly Mexico the for acute is much more opiates Afghan of creased opioid use (and an increased death death (and an increased opioid use creased sub these of share only a miniscule toll), with the Afghanistan, from originate stances The United States is minimally affected by is minimally affected States The United in Although it has seen opiates. Afghan According to FSKN estimates, the negative the negative estimates, FSKN to According or opiate of implications and economic social up of losses economic cause other drug use GDP. Russia’s of percent three to deaths per million of the population. per million of deaths per (24.6 rates high HIV by is accompanied who inject opioids. among people cent) sulting from opioid overdose, are high, at 80 high, are opioid overdose, sulting from Policy Recommendations

s discussed earlier in the report, Af- national institutions as well as foreign states’ ghan narcotrafficking poses a multidi- abilities to leave their differences behind for Amensional threat to Afghanistan’s se- the sake of tackling drug production and traf- curity and stability, as well as a challenge to ficking in Afghanistan. Recommendations regional and global security and stability. The that require a preliminary improvement of complex nature of this threat, in addition to the status of U.S.-Russia relations are also in- its integration in all key aspects of life in Af- cluded and marked, respectively. ghanistan and the surrounding region, makes it particularly difficult to address. In each of Throughout the project, the working group the sectors reviewed—governance, devel- has focused on such spheres of sectoral co- opment and security—drug production and operation as border management, alternative trafficking are both the reason and result for development and countering drug-related il- the state’s low effectiveness. licit financial flows. This approach stemmed from the consensus view that U.S.-Russia Drug-related assets are a cause of disagree- cooperation in these spheres was crucial to ment for numerous ethnic, tribal, religious, managing the Afghan narcotrafficking issue. political, economic, criminal and other groups Another area of sectoral cooperation, drug whose interaction and competition consti- demand reduction, was also discussed re- tute daily life in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the peatedly in the course of the project. Howev- scope and dynamics of the threat that Afghan er, the group did not write a consensus report narcotrafficking poses, as well as other ma- on demand reduction, given the contentious- jor threats to security in the country, reflect ness of the topic, and this report therefore the ongoing and, thus, unfinished and highly does not contain any recommendations problematic condition of state-building in Af- on the issue. Recommendations on other ghanistan. relevant issues that were discussed at the group’s meetings but fall outside the scope of As the working group seeks to contribute to the group’s thematic reports have also been countering Afghan narcotrafficking via U.S.- included in the present report. Russia cooperation, the recommendations in the present report focus on realistic steps In the context of U.S.-Russia relations, the that can be undertaken and that may yield majority of the outlined recommendations positive results in the current institutional, may be deemed feasible and relevant in the economic and security environment and un- event that bilateral relations become more der current or slightly diminishing levels of in- normalized. Some of the recommendations, A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT ternational aid. The working group has aimed however, may be feasible and relevant at pres- to put forth recommendations that might ent (or even worse) conditions. Overall, the 30 help to break the “vicious circle” between Af- set of recommendations should be viewed ghan narcotrafficking and dysfunctionalities as a “toolkit,” marking areas of potential co- in state-building, governance, development operation and possible steps that should be and security. The group also sought to be re- taken to tackle Afghan narcotrafficking when alistic and not overly optimistic in its expecta- the state of U.S.-Russia relations allows. tions about the performance of Afghanistan’s A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 31 ------CEO or one of the vice presidents to address address to presidents the vice or one of CEO The president drug problem. the country’s the co-heading should consider and CEO underline the government’s to commission the drug issue. of prioritization to and other donors, States The United 3. inter should review with the GIRoA, gether to guidelines national aid and budgeting Recommendations Counternarcotics Prioritizing of the Islamic Republic of The Government 1. counternarcot should prioritize Afghanistan and institutionally and legally politically, ics The United policies. its all of it into integrate way a find should donors other and States including mak prioritization, encourage to the GIRoA to aid international ing portions of in coun on performance based conditional, regional as an important Russia, ternarcotics. encour to best do its should also stakeholder, counternarcotics up its step to the GIRoA age for those support relevant and provide efforts efforts. and Capacity- Supporting Institution Building in Counternarcotics as as well and Russia, States The United 2. Na Afghanistan’s should push other donors, plans its actualize to Government tional Unity the by headed a High Commission create to ing security and economic conditions. Such conditions. economic and ing security actors, foreign prompted developments “hedge” to governments, including various in with contact direct seek and risks their hamper which may Afghanistan, in surgents coun and state-building Afghanistan’s both efforts. ternarcotics ------rated after the drawdown, with the National the with drawdown, the after rated out differ work unable to Government Unity the president of supporters between ences deteriorat faced the country while CEO and further undermine GIRoA’s legitimacy. further undermine GIRoA’s deterio further legitimacy The government’s of the major factors delegitimizing the Kabul the Kabul delegitimizing the major factors of military involvement this foreign government; to armed opposition by has been used also mize itself as the single representative of Af of as the single representative itself mize military involvement Foreign interests. ghans’ one has been itself, of and in Afghanistan, in try overwhelmed by divisions and infightings divisions and infightings by try overwhelmed is and economic corruption by exacerbated legiti to failed largely the government sues, ness of their efforts. of ness of the deficiencies has been Another factor the coun With Afghanistan. in state-building ternarcotics by international donors, security security donors, international by ternarcotics two been have itself and the GIRoA providers undermining the effective factors the core of sub-optimal consequences as those funds as those sub-optimal consequences Lack scarcer. become and other resources coun to commitment and prioritization of NATO surge in Afghanistan when there was was there when Afghanistan in surge NATO resources. funds and other of an abundance have to continues prioritization The lack of technical solutions but instead, requires wide requires but instead, solutions technical all stake from and commitment consensus counternarcot prioritize to Failure holders. U.S.- the during results disastrous to led ics Over 15 years of the international communi the international of 15 years Over has illustrat Afghanistan in involvement ty’s issue with no is an ed that narcotrafficking Background I. Prioritizing Counternarcotics Counternarcotics I. Prioritizing All Stakeholders for prevent suspension and/or lack of financing approach of UN-led counternarcotics efforts of counternarcotics efforts, including those in Afghanistan prior to 2001. by the Ministry of Counter Narcotics and the Ministry of Interior Affairs Counter Narcotics The pre-2001 UN efforts were insufficiently Police. funded, dispersed both geographically and among numerous implementing organiza- 4. The United States, Russia and other donors tions and subcontractors and burdened with should continue to invest in training Afghan unrealistic goals and timeframes. The reli- counternarcotics and security staff (such as ance on working with power-holders led to an those programs run by the DEA, the OSCE ineffective distribution of aid, the bulk of aid Border Management Staff College, etc.). channeled to power-holders’ clients rather than equally distributed among a wider popu- 5. The United States, other donors and the lation. GIRoA should encourage new stakeholders to contribute to increasing Afghanistan’s The failures of the alternative development counternarcotics capacities. Specifically, approach and drastic changes in the institu- consider encouraging Russia, China and Iran tional environment after the fall of the Taliban to contribute to training Afghanistan’s coun- led to a substantial evolution of development- ternarcotics and security staff and providing oriented counternarcotics efforts. Counter- relevant aid to the GIRoA. narcotics measures were now built on two realities: the presence of an internationally Supporting the GIRoA’s Central Role recognized and presumably legitimate cen- tral government in Kabul and the perceived 6. The United States, Russia and other for- abundance of development funds from do- eign stakeholders that might have their own nors. It was recognized that “no single project direct contacts with different actors inside or program…could address the multiple fac- Afghanistan should avoid making decisions tors that have led to the expansion of opium and statements that undermine or question poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, and that a the legitimacy of the GIRoA. more concerted and comprehensive effort was required.”151 Henceforth, the emerging 7. The United States, Russia and other for- “mainstream” approach underlying the al- eign stakeholders should also not make any ternative livelihood concept aimed “to inte- decisions, statements and agreements with grate efforts to address the causes of opium actors in Afghanistan that compromise coun- poppy cultivation in the wider policies and ternarcotics for other considerations. programs of international, national and non- governmental organizations working in rural Afghanistan” (including the Asian Develop- II. Revising ment Bank, the European Commission, the Development Policies150 World Bank and others).152

Background However, despite those moves, counternar- cotics efforts lacked support and owner- Attempts to tackle drug production in Af- ship from either international donors (who, ghanistan through development interven- among other reasons, were disinclined to as- tions have gone through a number of trans- sume any sort of responsibility for the drug formations. From its very inception, the first issue) or from an Afghan government that approach—alternative development—was was reluctant to cooperate on the matter. dominated by the concept of conditional- In this context, USAID’s role was unhelpful; ity, also known as the “carrot and stick” ap- it emphasized bilateral interaction with Af- proach. ghanistan rather than multilateral coordina- A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT tion. Furthermore, the international commu- Functionally, the idea of conditionality was nity treated counternarcotics as a secondary 32 intended to replace efforts to root out the issue behind state-building, security and eco- causes of poppy cultivation with a deal be- nomic development. Those spheres ended up tween the implementing agencies and na- competing for resources and attention from tional or local power-holders that provides senior political leaders rather than interact- aid in return for eradication efforts or a ban ing and becoming mutually reinforcing. on growing poppy. This has been the flagship A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 33 ------156 crop and income diversification. Empirical Empirical diversification. and income crop opium pop that replacing shows research a is typically or other staples with wheat py and that coercion to response short-term opium production. resume will soon farmers that enduring re demonstrates Experience live of function a are cultivation in ductions high- into movement diversification, lihood in and reductions crops horticultural value Program (CHAMP). USAID is also designing designing is also USAID (CHAMP). Program Agri Regional the east, for another program All (RADP-East). East Development cultural see to be reviewed need to programs these of in their design practices build on best if they the multifunctional address and adequately the of in the livelihoods opium poppy of role in their target population groups different areas. geographic of conducted be should review similar A 5. in to program wider development USAID’s growth, in economic interventions clude its Invest and education. health governance, either could sectors these of in each ments impact the negative reduce to support efforts opiates, of and use trade the production, of USAID worse. matters make could or they adopt a po programs that its should ensure sition “do-no-harm.” of Measurement Performance Reviewing Instruments and Evaluation Afghani in measurement Performance 6. of the assessment prioritize needs to stan that they also ensure their programs in Af in their programs ensure also they that as a cross-cutting drugs include ghanistan issue. Russia and States the United In particular, 3. high at the Bank World the should approach as a issue on the drugs reengage to level est Bank has both World The urgency. of matter and credentials development the necessary counternar with experience considerable is and Afghanistan in mainstreaming cotics other and GIRoA the support to served best national devel into drugs factor to agencies and planning. opment policy has a USAID perspective, a bilateral From 4. that programs development rural number of the address to designed claims are it currently such as the cultivation drug crop of causes Agricul Regional (KFZ), Zone Food Kandahar (RADP)-South, Program Development tural Commer the and RADP-West RADP-North, Marketing Agricultural and cial Horticulture ------

This 155 153 Development, as an area as an area Development, 154 velopment Programme (UNDP)—to request request (UNDP)—to Programme velopment vocacy efforts with international financial international with efforts vocacy development and multilateral institutions Nations De as the United institutions—such 2. Through their delegations, the United the United their delegations, Through 2. should mount similar ad and Russia States ensure that it takes full account of its impact impact its of account full takes it that ensure and that this assistance, on counternarcotics “do-no-harm” with conforms at a minimum, principles. the U.S. should request that the Ministry of of that the Ministry should request the U.S. a manda introduce the GIRoA of Finance to assistance all development of review tory jointly and individually press the GIRoA to to GIRoA the press individually and jointly national develop into the drug issue factor and Russia this, achieve To planning. ment the National and International Level should and Russia States The United 1. Recommendations on Counternarcotics Mainstreaming cooperation between the United States and States the United between cooperation despite stakeholders, as other as well Russia, differences. political international political repercussions char repercussions political international Thus, issues. security-related of acteristic building for venue an attractive it remains what is an increasingly insecure space in ru space insecure what is an increasingly Afghanistan.” ral the complex lacks cooperation, sectoral of given the reduction in development funds in development the reduction given associated challenges and the significant in programs with implementing development Despite historical failures, counternarcot failures, historical Despite vi only the remains still mainstreaming ics “particularly Afghanistan, in forward able way tion rather than constraining it (like the Hel it (like constraining than tion rather substi to attempt project’s Zone Food mand poppy). for wheat tute became the basic assumption of the devel of assumption the basic became a number of and led to opment community cultiva poppy favoring that ended up efforts assume that an intervention that promotes that promotes an intervention that assume a to lead would economy in the legal growth economy.” opium the in contraction to address the needs of rural Afghanistan. Afghanistan. rural the needs of address to sce “the default conditions, Under those to was organizations development nario for specific conditions in drug affected areas. areas. affected in drug conditions specific NGOs and agencies implementing Donors, that failed programs Kabul-centric designed Another constraint on the alternative liveli alternative on the constraint Another consider to the failure was hoods approach staples like wheat and maize, as well as non- nors and development stakeholders should farm income. There is a need to move away seek cumulative effects from their respective from measuring the success and failure of efforts. counternarcotics efforts based on the hect- ares of opium poppy grown. It has proven to 10. A move for better coordination should not be unhelpful and has distorted policy discus- lead to the exclusion of any partners for po- sions. litical reasons. Both U.S. and other agencies should not seek to prevent relevant Afghan 7. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems bodies from cooperating with Iranian, Rus- need to be more effective, capturing both de- sian or any other partners, as has often been velopment and counternarcotics outcomes, the case before. including the use of geospatial imagery and crop mapping. Current methods of assess- ing the performance of rural development III. Illicit Financial Flows programs rely on attitudinal surveys. These Background are unreliable and do not provide verifiable data concerning what is actually happening Afghanistan is listed as one of the most cor- on the ground. Geographic information sys- rupt states in the world;158 its efforts to coun- tems (GIS) and high-resolution imagery pro- ter money laundering and combat the fi- vide robust data on livelihood diversification nancing of terrorism frequently are cited as that is invaluable to assessing the results of insufficient. both rural development investments and ef- forts to reduce farmer dependency on opium In 2004, Afghanistan passed the Anti-Mon- production. USAID already has a monitoring ey Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Law, support program but needs to greater pri- which established the country’s Financial oritize the use of crop mapping. Both Russia Intelligence Unit (FIU), the Financial Trans- and the United States—through their Vienna actions and Reports Analysis Center of Af- missions—should press UNODC to improve ghanistan (FinTRACA). Afghanistan made a its analytical and GIS capacity to support the high-level political commitment in June 2012 GIRoA in the development of M&E systems. to work with the Financial Action Task Force These systems should both measure the (FATF) and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money changing amount of poppy and assess the Laundering (APG) to address its strategic type of replacement crops, thereby helping anti-money laundering and combating the fi- the UNODC deduce if reductions in cultiva- nancing of terrorism (AML/CFT) deficiencies. tion are sustainable. Accordingly, in 2014, Afghanistan passed new AML/CFT laws, which made notable progress Mobilizing Donor Support for in criminalizing money laundering and estab- Afghanistan’s Development157 lishing adequate provisions regarding the sei- zure and confiscation of crime proceeds.159 8. The United States should encourage Rus- In 2015, a newly enacted banking law is ex- sia, China and India to become major stake- pected “to strengthen bank reporting and holders in Afghanistan’s counternarcotics-re- governance while also incorporating a frame- lated development efforts. Although Russian work for the declaration of cross-border cash leadership is not in a position to devote exten- transactions and bearer instruments.”160 sive economic resources, any opportunity to Since February 2016, Afghanistan has taken contribute could help Russia meet its explicit additional steps to improve its AML/CFT re- desire to become an increasingly important gime, including implementing the freezing of stakeholder in Afghanistan. terrorist asset requirements. However, none of these measures have been implemented 9. The United States urgently needs to pro- A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT to the necessary level for substantially under- mote increased coordination among devel- cutting the flow of drug-related illicit finances opment donors working in Afghanistan. This 34 from, to and within Afghanistan. increased coordination could come from USAID’s openness to cooperating with inter- In January 2014, FATF identified Afghani- national donors and non-government organi- stan as a jurisdiction “not making sufficient zations (NGOs), with a proper focus on drug progress.”161 In 2016, FATF determined that production and trafficking in development specific, strategic deficiencies remain in im- programs as the basis for cooperation. Do- A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 35 ------174 In 2014, the In 2014, 173 176 175 the National Level United the (e.g. countries affected All 2. India and China, Afghanistan, Russia, States, and systemat a focused should start others) drug trafficking Afghan-related ic inquiry into sys banking Western financials—including (IVTS) systems transfer value informal tems, as systems—to fund transfer and informal Afghanistan, as well as worldwide (covering (covering as worldwide as well Afghanistan, detail centers), and financial all continents drug Afghan from the flows financial ing how used channels are what generated, are trade (including import/export transmission for the final des and determining transactions) place This would tination and investment. context, in the proper challenge Afghan the fi with the global it interfaces how showing Af environment. nancial and commercial the typical should describe ghan authorities of behaviors financial and patterns financial narcotraf Afghan in involved actors different flags red raising in assist would which ficking, for ISIS and (e.g., risk profiles and producing gatekeepers, hawaladars, fighters, Taliban com The international etc.). intermediaries, Russia States, the United munity—especially Independent of other Commonwealth and and China, Pakistan Iran, countries, States such organizations as international as well such support for as UNODC—should provide that activities and risk management research development. policy benefit in turn, could, at Illicit Finances Targeting and the Afghan MVTS markets. MVTS Afghan and the primary of “jurisdiction deemed a was UAE State; of Department the U.S. by concern” high-risk FATF’s make to it has failed thus far, list. jurisdiction an noted have countries several Recently, import-export by activities illicit in increase Concerns in China. registered companies trading that these the fact over risen have Afghani funds into transfer can companies Afghani in hawaladars many Further, stan. in an interest have or control reportedly stan to money which transfer companies, these China. in recipients Recommendations Research Further Conducting should undertake countries All involved 1. comprehen and systematic an updated, around in and flows financial of study sive

------170 168 168 Reports Reports 169 165 however, no ha however, 166 As a consequence of of a consequence As 167

The Afghan government in 2014 in 2014 government Afghan The The U.S. Department of State’s Bu State’s of Department The U.S. 172 171 162 Additionally, money transfer services services transfer money Additionally, 163 164 duction and trafficking of Afghan opiates” Afghan opiates” of duction and trafficking Pakistan and the UAE are the main transac are and the UAE Pakistan pro to linked flows “financial for tion centers all hawala centers and other cash-collecting and other cash-collecting centers all hawala imple effectively never was this but entities, mented. gional hawaladars averaged 500,000 USD USD 500,000 averaged gional hawaladars a poverty-stricken sum in a huge in 2015, country. to applicable obligation a reporting imposed provinces of Kandahar and Helmand are in are and Helmand Kandahar of provinces financial flows. in narcotics-related volved re for that the daily turnover state Reports cifically Dubai—and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Dubai—and cifically percent 90 to 80 between that indicate also the in brokers) (hawala hawaladars the of estimates) of Afghanistan-originated drug Afghanistan-originated of estimates) Pakistan, to hawala through is moved money (UAE)—spe Emirates Arab the United Iran, Consequently, both the FATF and the World World and the both the FATF Consequently, (a percentage that a huge Bank estimate the different to according percent, 70 of mean goods are unmonitored and unchecked. Even Even and unchecked. unmonitored are goods not have airport does international Kabul’s all passengers. for in place controls proper customs rules concerning suspicious trans concerning rules customs bor international Afghanistan’s actions, of and other flows cash porous; remain ders yers, accountants and real estate agents also also agents estate real and accountants yers, unsupervised. remain vague and constraints resource geography, waladar has submitted a suspicious transac has submitted waladar time, same the At FinTRACA. to tion report law stones, metals and precious of dealers clusively via the hawala system. via the hawala clusively for hawala use often Afghanistan in Banks transactions; their own population using the formal banking sys banking the formal population using tem. ex almost conducted are Afghanistan within all financial transactions are conducted via conducted are all financial transactions (MVTS), services transfer or value money Afghanistan’s of percent than 10 with less Despite continuous multi-stakeholder efforts efforts multi-stakeholder continuous Despite formal country’s the and develop establish to of 90 percent an estimated system, banking Afghanistan as a “major money laundering” laundering” “major money as a Afghanistan con primary of “jurisdiction a and country cern.” assets. En Law and Narcotics International of reau to list continues also (INL) Affairs forcement plementing Afghanistan’s legal framework framework legal Afghanistan’s plementing terrorist and freezing tracing identifying, of sess vulnerabilities, volumes, routes, involved Strengthening Control of actors and beneficiaries and employed modi Finances and Goods Flows operandi. Each country’s investigators legally should be able to build investigations leading 6. All international financial centers that cur- to successful prosecutions within their own rently serve as major transit points and hubs country, including the ability to seize illicit for cash and other assets flowing out of Af- funds and assets, to combat narcotrafficking ghanistan, including Dubai, should imple- and terrorist groups and to provide resources ment policies to enable their own, other for the additional funding of counternarcotics countries’ and/or international regulating financial investigations. bodies’ counternarcotics financial investiga- tors to audit cash and assets and the indi- 3. Afghan authorities should prioritize drug viduals conducting these transactions in a trafficking and related legal and illegal finan- manner consistent with international AML/ cial flows and flows of goods (opium, etc.) as CFT standards (e.g. FATF recommendations an important part of the national assessment and best practices guidance). of AML/CFT risks. The private sector (na- tional and international, including the local 7. All countries with active hawala networks branches of international companies in Af- should implement policies to identify and ghanistan) as well as all government bodies study such financial intermediaries to assess should take an active part in an Afghan AML/ the possibility of enhancing their transparen- CFT national risk assessment. cy and traceability and seek to develop more collaborative relations between authorities Managing Seized Assets and financial operators. FATF, in concert with research institutions and the international 4. A special development fund should be development community, could expand and established—if possible, under the United support its best practices aimed at making Nations Security Council, the UN Develop- positive contributions to the financial inclu- ment Programme (UNDP) or another UN sion and support of livelihoods, small busi- agency—where all narcotrafficking-related nesses and other legitimate customers, while assets seized and confiscated in Afghanistan being instrumental in countering illegal fi- will be managed by an international, super- nancial flows within hawala networks. Afghan visory and transparent UN-affiliated body authorities should promote and encourage (including strong U.S. and Russian bilateral best practices to identify intermediate and control). All such funds should be dedicated ultimate beneficiaries of money transfer ser- to financing alternative farming, education, vice operators (owners), as well as general rehabilitation programs for local drug ad- compliance with know-your-customer (KYC) dicts and healthcare in Afghanistan or in policies and due diligence requirements, es- other countries identified as recipients, un- pecially for cross-border operations. der a regulatory framework, such as the Ital- ian regulation framework on organized crime 8. Customs, transit and port authorities in asset seizures and re-utilization.177 This could Pakistan, Iran and the UAE should develop be created pursuant to a UN Security Council stronger cooperation with each other, as well Resolution, making it mandatory for all State as other involved actors, to gather documen- parties. tation on goods to and from Afghanistan and to assemble high-quality trade data on vol- 5. Leading countries (the United States, umes, types of goods and services, values, Russia, etc.) should jointly develop a con- end use and destination, etc. This would help sensus-based international approach to the furnish good information about Afghanistan’s management and use of confiscated assets, trade partners and would facilitate the identi- via a special UN convention on the distribu- fication of payment routes and types. A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT tion and disposal of seized assets (related to narcotrafficking). This convention should be Increasing Regional and 36 mandatory for all UN members. International Cooperation

9. The United States and Russia should sup- port tri-partite cooperation and information sharing between Afghan, Pakistani and Iranian drug law enforcement, in order to gather data A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 37 ------180 178 These programs offer a full offer programs These 179 paid, not only to treatment, but also to preven to but also treatment, not only to paid, tion. and U.S. in differences persistent of Because strategi for approaches government Russian report this present drug demand, reducing cally onrecommendations specific not contain does the issue. 30,000 people. 30,000 adult men and women, for services of range In and children. and females males adolescent their and monitor staff train donors ternational performance. a have programs supported Internationally on tracking that is based evaluation of system and treatment following one year for clients (including drug use, their behavior assessing three-year A on). and so history criminal justice supported that internationally shows evaluation de percent a 31 generate centers treatment de percent a 45 overall; in opium use crease a 40 per among women; in opium use crease percent 48 a crime; serious in reduction cent percent crime; a 73 in non-serious reduction and a 64 per arrests; in self-reported decrease women. by in suicide attempts reduction cent ef of levels corresponding and efforts, These environment an In enough. not are fectiveness, and some accessible easily are drugs where to order free—in for disseminated even times should be attention users—more more create wala. Governments all over the world should should world the all over Governments wala. global in the actors transfer money all engage financing, ISIS prevent to regime AML/CFT rebels and of other as the financing as well worldwide. and Afghanistan in insurgents IV. Demand Reduction Background the is one of use drug domestic Afghanistan’s an INL to According problems. gravest country’s Afghani in all households of 31 percent survey, as a whole the population of percent and 11 stan which enables and abuse, in drug use is involved pro drug of and expansion the sustainability duction and trafficking. programs treatment 97 years, seven In the last Afghanistan in established were drug users for bring States, the United with the support of country in the facilities of number the total ing to maximum capacity and their yearly 113 to ------support—legal and illegal, including via ha including via and illegal, support—legal Because ISIS enjoys support from individu support from ISIS enjoys Because it will also world, of the parts als in different financial of forms various receive to continue ry previously under its control; however, ISIS however, control; under its ry previously Afghani within a threat pose to will continue important actor. a more as it becomes stan 13. Governments must account for current current for account must Governments 13. activities Afghanistan, Outside trends. global territo lose it to caused ISIS have counter to vide potential channels for drug and financial drug for channels potential vide coun to can be used data resulting The flows. views. populist of the growth ter works. New research and reports based on based and reports research New works. refu how should illustrate sources legitimate pro Afghanistan of in and out flowing gees awareness of Afghan drug trafficking and drug trafficking Afghan of awareness and their nega laundering activities money and net businesses on legitimate effects tive Related Financial Flows Related le migrants, Afghan hosting All countries 12. and raise monitor should closely or illegal, gal CFT rules. CFT Migration- and Terrorism- Following cial sector (formal and informal, including ha and informal, (formal cial sector community a spirit of promote to waladars), AML/ with compliance policing and effective and technical assistance for all Afghan AML/ Afghan all for assistance and technical and (governmental participants system CFT in the finan especially non-governmental), establish quality controls and context-reflec and controls quality establish with local practices best results-oriented tive, educational of as a wide range as well buy-in, vision of international development aid proj development international vision of Afghanistan out in carried and programs ects corrup of be a source to cease they that so should community The international tion. 11. The international community should en community The international 11. and super transparency coordination, hance reaching national, regional and international and international regional national, reaching of the flows stem and to worldwide markets groups. and terrorist criminal to illicit assets as with Afghanistan’s neighboring countries, neighboring countries, Afghanistan’s as with to challenges, diplomatic other of regardless and opium from heroin Afghan-origin prevent 10. U.S., Russian and Chinese counternarcot Chinese and Russian U.S., 10. internation should increase investigators ics well as other each with efforts cooperative al three countries’ common interests and con interests common countries’ three problems, drug-related the against sensus high. are cooperation tri-partite of chances and identify routes, actors and means directly directly and means actors routes, and identify the Given drug trafficking. with connected V. Borders and the Afghanistan’s border control is highly hetero- geneous with some provinces demonstrating Neighborhood consistent activity (such as Herat and Kunar) and others showing virtually none (such as Background Farah, Badghis and Faryab).

Afghanistan is proving, at best, unable and, Pakistan at worst, unwilling to police its borders; this shifts the onus to measures that can be taken The 2,430-kilometer-long border shared by to stem the flow of Russia-bound narcotics in Afghanistan and Pakistan presents particu- and along the borders of Central Asia. lar challenges for counternarcotics efforts.185 The cross-border movement between the Afghanistan shares 5,453 kilometers of its two countries is intensive, estimated at over border with Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Turk- 100,000 daily crossings, which reflect the menistan, Uzbekistan and China. Each of Af- ethnic and social character of the region that ghanistan’s neighbors is affected by Afghan is home to numerous Pashtun tribes.186 narcotrafficking, and each of them plays a role in aggravating or alleviating the country’s The situation is complicated further by in- drug problem as well as security, develop- tensive insurgency activity along the border. ment and other issues. Different branches of the Taliban, other mili- tant and terrorist groups, as well as drug traf- Afghan administration of these borders has fickers and other criminals, use the region to long been dominated by warlords and au- their benefit, taking advantage of limited and thorities who establish their own methods competing jurisdictions and distrust between of border control, collecting customs duties Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s law enforce- and policing stretches of frontiers as they see ment agencies. It was on the border with 181 fit. This arrangement along the Afghan bor- Pakistan that the Islamic State in Khorasan der often facilitates rather than impedes drug province was declared in 2015, as reported trafficking. by several Orakzai tribe members who previ- ously resided in Pakistan.187 Although ISAF forces had been in place since 2001, a major effort to create an effective The security situation is exacerbated by per- border control service in Afghanistan was sisting distrust and hostility between Kabul conducted as late as 2009 when the United and Islamabad.188 In fact, the U.S.-funded States took a lead role in training Afghan Torkham and Wesh-Chaman border cross- Border Police (ABP) and funding state-of- ings are the only locations along the border the-art, well-equipped border infrastructure where the two sides interact regularly. Even along the border with Pakistan and the Cen- at these locations, Pakistani officials devote 182 tral Asian states. As a result of those efforts, little attention to counternarcotics measures, ABP comprised 23,900 service members by focusing instead on counterinsurgency. 2014, with 4,000 stationed at headquarters and approximately 15,500 posted to posi- The vulnerabilities of the border control re- tions along the so-called “green” border, gime between Afghanistan and Pakistan where the crossing of goods and people is make this location a virtually safe corridor 183 generally not permitted. for drug trafficking. According to UNODC -es timates, approximately 40 percent of Afghan During the period 2013 to 2014, ABP was un- opiates are destined for or transit through derstaffed, faced funding and procurement Pakistan.189 As such, it is the world’s highest shortfalls, lacked key competencies (such volume transit corridor for opiates and, along as formal intelligence training, fighting skills, with India, is the main source of acetic an- A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT etc.) and was overstretched (especially on hydride, a precursor chemical agent used to the Afghan-Pakistan border). Corruption process opium into heroin.190 38 among the ABP and Afghan Customs Police has also been a huge problem, with numer- Iran ous posts bought and sold and many officials involved in drug trafficking. Consequently, Afghanistan and Iran share a border of 936 ABP was responsible for only four percent of kilometers—a critical juncture in the battle 184 the country’s drug seizures. against drug trafficking and related transna- A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 39 ------However, in recent years the eco years recent in However, 196 It is well fortified and virtually impenetrable by and virtually impenetrable fortified It is well well- less use the who instead drug traffickers, and Tajikistan- Afghanistan-Tajikistan guarded Since the country. enter to borders Uzbekistan drugs traffic to used commonly are railroads and Kazakhstan via Uzbekistan Tajikistan from au Uzbek of been reports have there Russia, to levels. various at in trafficking collusion thorities’ reluctant remains Uzbekistan Nevertheless, fees to power-brokers and important actors and important actors power-brokers to fees and disinclination their neutrality ensure to also This approach Turkmenistan. attack to Turkmen attitude among “loyal” included a was a which drug trafficking, to authorities transit the western sustaining major factor route. ended when the security This relationship deterio Afghanistan situation in northern Af on the in violence rise a rapid After rated. Ashgabat 2015, in early border ghan-Turkmen military its reinforce to enact a draft had to Ac military groups. incoming the counter to re the situation media reports, to cording mili Turkmen the when 2016 in early peated from in a fight with insurgents tary engaged specifical reports media Earlier Afghanistan. by overthrown fighters Taliban that ly stated Dos Abdul Rashid by army—led Afghan the of territory the border to tum—had retreated insurgents. for a haven Turkmenistan, Af 137-kilometer on the affairs of The state differ quite is border ghanistan-Uzbekistan borders. Asian Central the other two from ent butions enabled the construction of consid of the construction enabled butions infrastruc control border of numbers erable and training and equipment, facilities ture enforcement law Tajik funding for additional agencies. trends, political and domestic nomic crisis moderate local of the prosecution including pre created Tajikistan, in opposition Islamist youth its of the radicalization for conditions In this con elites. regional its of and some own country’s the of combination the text, security Afghan-related and vulnerabilities could (including narcotrafficking) challenges Tajiki not only to threat a major security pose as a whole. region the but to stan with border 744-kilometer-long Afghanistan’s Turk problematic. is no less Turkmenistan and on engagement relied long had menistan players, political Afghan with negotiations main for management, than border rather Afghan-originated against security its taining regular paying included Tactics challenges. ------The 194 which as of 2014 accounted accounted 2014 of which as 192 193 191 195 for Migration (IOM) and others. These contri These (IOM) and others. Migration for border aid in Central Asia, with donors in with donors Asia, aid in Central border the EU, States, the United cluding Russia, Organization International the OSCE, UNDP, lice services. lice of has been the major recipient Tajikistan involving the smuggling of drugs in small- drugs the smuggling of involving some to and—according quantities), batch collusion in official of the site observers—is and po elites government by drug trafficking cent of Afghanistan’s exported heroin. exported Afghanistan’s of cent crossing is a high-traffic border Afghan-Tajik (also trade trans-border of a result as area, lometer-long porous border that constitutes that constitutes border porous lometer-long along the opiates of the primary conduit 25 per some for accounting northern route, states, however, are quite different. quite are however, states, 1,207-ki a share Afghanistan and Tajikistan Afghanistan borders three post-Soviet Cen post-Soviet three borders Afghanistan of area an which constitute states, Asian tral national Russia’s of in terms high sensitivity three those of with each The borders interest. Central Asia Central the major obstacle preventing Tehran from from Tehran preventing the major obstacle Af in the fight against role a greater having ghan narcotrafficking. well as sanctions against Iran and the result Iran against sanctions as well coun U.S.-led any from Iran of ing exclusion has been region, in the efforts ternarcotics has not taken major steps to utilize the huge the huge utilize to major steps has not taken agen with Iranian cooperation for potential as This, with drug trafficking. in dealing cies tive with Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan. and with Pakistan tive under (especially years in recent However, government Afghanistan’s Hamid Karzai), Iran is also an active participant in UN-led in in UN-led participant an active is also Iran aimed at countering initiatives and stitutions Initia Trilateral including the drug trafficking, trafficking along its borders with Afghanistan Afghanistan with borders its along trafficking and Pakistan. close to one billion USD each year on counter year each USD one billion to close con army deploys and also efforts narcotics in countering guards border assist to scripts phine seizures. is well- Afghanistan with border Iran’s expends Iran equipped and well-fortified. der into Iran, der into opium seizures the world’s of percent 75 for and mor heroin the world’s of and 26 percent tional crime. An estimated 31 percent of Af of percent 31 estimated An crime. tional the bor crosses heroin exported ghanistan’s to participate in multilateral international narcotics operations at the border difficult. A counternarcotics initiatives, particularly settled boundary is a long-term and difficult when they require training and institutional process, but Moscow and Washington should reforms that Uzbek authorities consider to not lose any opportunity to call for Afghani- be their own exclusive national security pur- stan and Pakistan to mutually recognize and view.197 affix their frontier. Previous attempts at po- litical resolution failed, in part, because they Recommendations198 did not involve enough international stake- holders or material incentives. Together, the Pakistan199 United States and Russia may have sufficient heft to open a dialogue towards resolution. A 1. The United States, Russia and China pledge to expand border security assistance should use their influence to encourage Paki- can further nudge Afghanistan and Paki- stan—the major transit country for Afghan- stan into dialogue. Russia should also use its produced opiates—to build up its counter- greatly improved relations with Pakistan to narcotics efforts. It is clear that the years of cajole the country to do more on the counter- policies that compromised counternarcotics narcotics front, particularly along the border. for counterterrorism did not lead to greater security in Pakistan nor Afghanistan. Re- Iran202 gional and global stakeholders should can- didly discuss ways to strengthen and support 5. The United States and Russia should en- counternarcotics efforts in and by Pakistan. courage Afghanistan to cooperate more ac- The United States and Russia should both tively with Iran to improve interdiction along push for such a discussion on the matter, as the Afghan-Iranian border. Although Iran has well as make available broader technical sup- mounted an impressive fight against narcot- port for Pakistan’s counternarcotics efforts. ics, it is not enough to stem the massive opi- um and heroin tide that moves across Iran to- 2. Both the United States and Russia should wards Europe and across the Caspian to the suggest that counternarcotics become an Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). integral part of China’s security-related poli- The United States does not have a relation- cies in the China-Pakistan economic corridor ship with the Iranian government or law en- project, which assumes deployment of the forcement counterparts as the Russian Fed- People’s Liberation Army troops to protect eration does. Nonetheless, U.S. officials can future infrastructure assets in Pakistan. encourage Afghan officials to deepen their cooperation with their Iranian counterparts In the Event U.S.-Russia Relations and play a great role in interdiction along the Improve200 common border. For many years, the United States discouraged Afghan-Iranian coop- 3. The United States and Russia should en- eration, particularly where U.S. funds and courage Pakistan to step up its counterter- initiatives were in play, a position that made rorism efforts on the ground and in policy- it easier for Afghan officials to neglect truly making. The lack of policy consensus among deep counternarcotics cooperation with Iran. Pakistan’s security agencies continues to Joint U.S.-Russian calls for enhanced Afghan- undermine counterterrorism and counterin- Iranian cooperation can go a long way in en- surgency efforts in the region, which entail couraging Afghanistan to pick up the slack. high costs for Afghanistan. The United States and Russia should discuss steps to promote 6. The United States could consider encour- Islamabad’s more resolute stance in deny- aging Iran to play a more active role in coun- ing terrorists havens and any form of state or ternarcotics on the Afghanistan-Iran border, state-related support.201 both in Afghanistan and within the Afghan A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT community in Iran, by providing technical aid 4. The United States and Russia should jointly and building direct cooperation between U.S. 40 push Afghanistan and Pakistan to finalize the agencies—DEA and the State Department’s status of their frontier. The Durand Line re- INL—and their Iranian counterparts.203 mains formally unrecognized and is a source of dispute and escalation between Kabul and 7. The United States and Russia could also Islamabad. This is not conducive to cross- encourage Iran to play a more active role border cooperation and makes joint counter- in Afghan-related counternarcotics efforts A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 41 ------211 212

210 trafficking and political violence in the region in the violence and political trafficking country’s with each in a manner consistent should countries All three national interests. not com that does an approach negotiate and counter security their shared promise re for other exchange in efforts narcotics dimension The counternarcotics gional goals. of both within the scope should be expanded the SCO (like initiatives China-led integration improvements in border management and management in border improvements Af of stretches key along rates interdiction Afghani the instance, for border, ghanistan’s and States United The border. stan-Tajikistan part making at least should be open to Russia assistance and security their economic of partners’ Asian on their Central conditional in counternarcotics. performance should con and Russia States The United 14. on counter- positions joint sider establishing at international control and border narcotics discussed. are issues these where bodies and Multilateral Other Bilateral Cooperation and China Russia States, The United 15. dialogue on coun trilateral should establish at efforts and counterterrorism ternarcotics par The levels. both the official and unofficial the esca prevent to should do their best ties should They Asia. in Central tensions lation of en that would venue a trust-building create sensitivities discuss candidly able them to drug countering for measures and available In the Event U.S.-RussiaImprove Relations work should and Russia States The United 12. that borders of stretches improve to together and Mos Washington well. do not function to Russia allow to Tajikistan on call can cow of Tajik help to contribution a greater make with of the border their side strengthen ficials mentors providing whether by Uzbekistan, up ramping contingents, guard border for technical more providing or simply training reduce This may equipment. and operational build and along that border drug trafficking In the Borders spirit of on the cooperative also It would in Dushanbe. Group ternational Uz of the Tajik side along the security benefit ask to States the United and allow bek border closure of policy its reconsider to Uzbekistan and militarization. come up officials should and Russian U.S. 13. measure which to by standards with common ------There There 208 206

209 204 205 207 in terms of counternarcotics. of in terms with the UN office in Ashgabat and to discuss to discuss and Ashgabat in with the UN office the manage improve to necessary the steps border Afghanistan-Turkmenistan the ment of to ensure greater transparency and com transparency greater ensure to Turkmenistan counternarcotics. mitment to information share to should be encouraged border control and counternarcotics. control border should use and Russia States The United 11. government Turkmen on the their influence signal that the international community is not community signal that the international Asian Central its and Afghanistan abandoning of in matters devices their own to neighbors tional organizations. While capacity and train While capacity tional organizations. impediments, political will not resolve ing gaps an important will send programs such training ited numbers of border authorities and could authorities border of numbers ited or bilaterally either extensively, be expanded interna of under the auspices multilaterally and the United States set a quiet precedent of precedent quiet a set States the United and to fashion, albeit in a limited together, working U.S.- Joint officials. border Asian Central train lim reached have initiatives training Russian Central Asian and Afghan border police, cus police, border Afghan and Asian Central offi and counternarcotics authorities toms Russia relations, their in crisis the Before cers. 10. The United States and Russia should joint and Russia States The United 10. of training and multilateral bilateral ly expand by countries neighboring Afghanistan that Afghanistan neighboring countries by in the drug busi their interest compromises ness. pressure Tajik officials to take a more con a more take to officials Tajik pressure trafficking. fighting in stance certed decision-making for tolerance zero be should that they have received. Washington and Mos Washington received. have that they Central to their messages should convey cow In the fashion. in a coordinated leaders Asian should relentlessly they Tajikistan, of case South Asia and demand that Central Asian of Asian that Central and demand Asia South counter of the to the obligations up ficials live assistance management and border narcotics 9. The United States and Russia should speak and Russia States The United 9. counter of matters in voice with a common and in Central security and border narcotics Central Asia Central and cooperation on tackling local production production local on tackling and cooperation stimu in amphetamine-type and trafficking re and worrying be a new to that seem lants gional issue. 8. The United States and Russia should also also should Russia and States United The 8. discussion Afghanistan-Iran wider encourage through increased Iranian participation in participation Iranian increased through and bodies. fora multilateral and the quadrilateral regional counterterror- DC-backed regional mechanism: the Central ism alliance), as well as in Afghanistan-China Asian Regional Information and Coordination bilateral relations. Centre (CARICC), which combats the illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, psychotropic 16. The United States, Russia and China substances and their precursors. should work together with key international organizations operating in Afghanistan and It is crucial for U.S. and Russian officials to bordering regions to enhance coordination maximize cooperation in these multilateral on stemming the tide of precursors flowing venues. In a sense, preventing the current into Afghanistan from Pakistan, India, China state of U.S.-Russia relations from disrupt- as well as Central Asia and elsewhere. ing cooperation in those multilateral venues has also become an important political task. Moreover, a number of new issues are arising VI. Multilateral Cooperation from the changing institutional environment that now includes the Eurasian Economic Background Union. Throughout the project, the working group Recommendations emphasized that cooperation in multilateral venues might be particularly fruitful in pro- UN moting mutually beneficial decisions or mu- tually desirable developments, particularly 1. The United States and Russia should work when U.S.-Russia relations are at a standstill. together to ensure that the international It is also worth noting that U.S.-Russia coop- community sees Afghan narcotrafficking eration in the UN, UNODC and other multilat- as a top-priority issue. Prioritizing counter- eral mechanisms has a good track record. narcotics efforts in and around Afghanistan remains an important component in ad- For example, the UNODC remains a major in- dressing Afghan narcotrafficking and, more ternational institutional contributor to coun- generally, the overall security situation in Af- ternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. It runs ghanistan. Therefore, the United States and the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Russia should speak with a common voice Neighbouring Countries that encompasses at the United Nations, including in the United four sub-programs on law enforcement; legal Nations Security Council. Although there are cooperation; drug prevention; and treatment, not many consensus-based opportunities to analysis and evaluation. The program is sup- discuss Russia’s long-standing proposal to ported by both the United States and Rus- categorize drug production in Afghanistan as sia—as well as other participating countries a threat to international peace and security including all Central Asian states, Iran and under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Wash- Pakistan—and complements the UNODC-led ington and Moscow should do their best to regional program for Central Asia. This insti- ensure that the situation in Afghanistan and tutional framework is designed to encourage its drug-related issues remain a focus of the cooperation among those countries by cre- Security Council, the Secretary General and ating networks of law enforcement, justice the United Nations as a whole. and alternative development players, among others, in the region. It also includes smaller 2. The United States and Russia should con- projects and initiatives, like the Afghanistan, tinue to speak with a common voice on the Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (AKT) initiative on inadmissibility of legalizing drugs and dis- border cooperation and support for liaison rupting international control regimes under offices and cooperation among these offices. the respective UN conventions.

A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT The UNODC also supports the Afghanistan, UNODC Iran and Pakistan Triangular Initiative de- 42 signed to foster cooperation and coordinate 3. The United States and Russia should fully the three countries’ interdiction efforts. The embrace the capabilities of and opportunities initiative has a Joint Planning Cell (JPC) in presented by the UNODC and its cooperation Tehran responsible for planning and leading frameworks in addressing Afghan narcotraf- joint counternarcotics operations. The JPC ficking. They should increase their support of maintains cooperation with another UNO- the UNODC’s role in regional counternarcot- A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 43 ------issues in Afghanistan. Russia has extensive has extensive Russia Afghanistan. in issues CSTO of shape the agendas to opportunities and SCO. Cooperation CSTO-NATO of Viability “rec ensure to sought Russia 2014, Before 9. collec as an international CSTO of ognition” CSTO mechanism and establish security tive ghan-originated opiates, the EU is interested is interested the EU opiates, ghan-originated Afghan to tackle policies effective in more re and capabilities and has narcotrafficking in this sphere. offer to sources and SCO NATO CSTO, should China and Russia States, United The 8. efforts that counternarcotics ensure to strive coopera security regional of a focus remain are Asia and South Central tion frameworks. security major regional a number of home to including CSTO, and frameworks, initiatives and the Afghanistan in presence a NATO SCO, co counterterrorism China-led quadrilateral frame cooperation numerous These alition. varying national the greatly reflect works which do not countries, several of interests counternar of coordination easy for allow and Rus States The United activities. cotics to and should do their best can however, sia, remain efforts counternarcotics that ensure frame cooperation security those of focus a influence to able is States United The works. impor the embrace fully to agenda NATO the the security in light of at least drugs, of tance various member states could also be fruitful be fruitful also could states member various Russia. to and appealing for the with together partners EEU its Russia, 6. and other stake States the United UNODC, on study an expert undertake should holders and other zones trade free unions, customs and in the region regimes trade preferential study This on narcotrafficking. their impact and experiences international should analyze both for solutions security alternative explore unions and within customs national borders bor external the as well as zones, trade free security of and the role entities these of ders compa private forces, police interior agents, etc. nies, EU should and the GIRoA States The United 7. Eu the of involvement the expand to seek efforts Union in counternarcotics ropean Af of consumer major a As Afghanistan. in ------UNODC-EEU-CSTO cooperation involving the involving cooperation UNODC-EEU-CSTO Nations as a whole. Given extensive Collective Collective extensive Given a whole. as Nations involve (CSTO) Organization Treaty Security trilateral efforts, ment in counternarcotics UNODC-led cooperation on the matter with on the matter UNODC-led cooperation work good which have all of states, involved and the United with the UNODC ing relations effects that such regional economic integra economic regional that such effects this Although trafficking. drug has on tion can States United the sensitive, is very issue by supporting efforts these to contribute still and Kazakhstan and Belarus on the other. and Kazakhstan the side- limit important to It is therefore gering contradictions between the three Fer the three between contradictions gering bor of the absence and by states Valley gana on the one hand Russia between der control Central Asian states, they can also facilitate facilitate also can they states, Asian Central exacerbated is reality This drug trafficking. lin and management border poor by further Uzbekistan (since late 2013) are also par also are 2013) late (since Uzbekistan agreement. Zone Trade the CIS Free to ties frame integration economic Although these for opportunities beneficial new create works customs territory comprising the territories the territories comprising territory customs and Kazakhstan Belarus, Armenia, Russia, of and 2015) late (since Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan. The emergence and further expansion of the of and further expansion The emergence and united zone trade a free created EEU 5. The Russian Federation and its partners partners and its Federation The Russian 5. within drug control enhance to should strive zones. trade and CIS free the EEU EEU vices. The United States and Russia should and Russia States The United vices. for area as a potential activities OSCE view ir cooperation, counternarcotics promoting divides. political of respective stan, the OSCE is one of the major contribu is one of the OSCE stan, Asian Central of capacity-building to tors ser control border Afghanistan’s and states’ 4. The United States and Russia should fully should Russia and States United The 4. its With in the region. activities support OSCE Tajiki in College Staff Management Border OSCE governments to improve compliance and compliance improve to governments operations, in counternarcotics transparency with the actively more as cooperate as well UNODC. The two countries’ explicit support for the support for explicit countries’ The two counternar in regional role leading UNODC’s regional incentivize should also efforts cotics ics efforts and all UNODC-led or UNODC-fa or all UNODC-led and efforts ics in the region. initiatives and formats cilitated cooperation with NATO on several issues, es between the United States and Russia stem including counternarcotics. These attempts, not only from the overall state of U.S.-Russia however, were effectively ignored by NATO. relations, but also from the two countries’ dif- Although the director of the Russian Ministry ferent and often conflicting national interests of Foreign Affairs Second Asia Department, in the region. This is best illustrated by Rus- Zamir Kabulov, declared cooperation be- sia’s initiative to hold talks on Afghanistan in tween CSTO and NATO as “a closed topic,”213 Moscow that excluded the United States (as the possibility still has some potential from well as Afghanistan itself at the first stage).215 three points of view: A clash of interests, however, does not neces- 1. A mere declaration of common assess- sarily preclude bilateral cooperation, but in- ments on the issue of Afghan narcotraf- stead raises its importance. Both countries are ficking between the CSTO and NATO interested in tackling Afghan narcotrafficking, could be an important signal for the although Russia’s interest is much more lim- whole region. ited, focused mainly on drug trafficking along 2. Practical cooperation between NATO (in the northern route. Finally, both Washington the event it embraces the drug issue as and Moscow have additional—although dif- security-related) and CSTO could be a fering—incentives for cooperation on Afghan viable alternative to the now essentially narcotrafficking. To strengthen its bargaining non-existent U.S.-Russia cooperation on position, Russia is interested in cooperation the issue of Afghan narcotrafficking. As as a way to highlight the futility of Western U.S. counternarcotics agencies lost their nations’ attempts to isolate it and to have an primary Russian institutional partner additional instrument of influence in a region with the liquidation of FSKN, it could be where the U.S. government displays vulner- practical to press for counternarcotics ability. The United States seeks Russia’s coop- cooperation in the multilateral dimen- eration—or, at the very least, friendly neutral- sion. Such a proposal initiated by either ity—in its attempt to stabilize Afghanistan and the United States or Russia could be fight international terrorism, including ISIS an important move towards prioritizing and Al-Qaeda. counternarcotics over political divisions. 3. In the event of future U.S.-Russia rap- The Trump administration’s decisive, hard ap- prochement, NATO-CSTO cooperation proach to security and stability, as illustrated in counternarcotics could be a safe first by budget proposals that prioritized the De- step that allows the two sides to move partment of Defense over the Department of quickly from verbal declarations to prac- State and USAID, might create the illusion that tical, constructive and fruitful coopera- the U.S. can solve the problems in Afghani- tive efforts.214 stan through military involvement, irrespec- tive of Russia’s position. However, a unilateral U.S.-NATO strategy (especially one involving a VII. Bilateral U.S.-Russia troop surge) might provoke growing hostility Cooperation from Russia, as well as China, Iran and Paki- stan, which would entail further costs for the Background United States and its allies and undermine sta- bilization efforts in Afghanistan. Although the U.S.-Russia tensions have dramatically influ- administration may be successful in achieving A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT enced the level of cooperation between the its short-term goal of breaking the current GI- two countries, greatly limiting the scope of RoA-Taliban stalemate, the lack of regional co- 44 what Washington and Moscow are able to do operation would undermine attempts to solve together. Moreover, Afghanistan is not a poli- the country’s growing narcotrafficking issue. tics- and security-neutral issue for Russia be- Thus, it would be both pragmatic and politi- cause of the impact of the situation in Afghani- cally wise for Washington to involve Russia in a stan on Central Asia, which is seen by Russia cooperative effort aimed at stemming Afghan as part of its sphere of interests. The differenc- narcotrafficking. A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 45 ------9. The United States and Russia should also con should also and Russia States The United 9. 2 mecha Track a permanent sider establishing Asia in Central issues sensitive discuss nism to such trust, and respect fosters that setting a in report. this that produced group as the working on international drug control issues (empha issues drug control on international and the disruption of sizing opium and heroin) financial flows. international drug-related should jointly and Russia States The United 7. Both money. dirty of flow the reduce to work their own have and Russia States the United is emphasizing the financial flows for reasons in the unconditional is interested Russia sue. may States the United while sanctions lifting of with struggling increasingly be preoccupied that emerged money of dirty the flow against This sanctions. introduced newly of as a result albeit complicated, candid, for be a topic could dialogue. 2 Cooperation Track Fostering should support and Russia States The United 8. re and analysts experts, between cooperation of on issues countries the two from searchers The parties Asia. in Central mutual importance their respec that ensure to best their do should under well are and intentions positions tive the other side. by stood 5. The United States and Russia should discuss and Russia States The United 5. have might Moscow although that, and agree relations with its regarding priorities different Afghan and different in Kabul the government opposi the armed actors—including political avoid should government Russian tion—the that might undermine counternarcotics steps region or might the and Afghanistan in efforts The means. any by drug trafficking facilitate maintain the same should itself States United posture. coordi should Russia and States United The 6. the of aspects on various their positions nate the like frameworks in institutional drug issue Narcotic for Nations and Commission United coun two the differences, many Despite Drugs. leastat voice common with a speak could tries ------important that the United States demonstrate demonstrate States important that the United matter. sensitive dialogue on this to openness trust-building measures necessary for alleviat for necessary measures trust-building U.S./NATO the with preoccupation Russia’s ing surge conditional (and a likely military presence It is Afghanistan. in 2017) in that presence of Commitment to Counternarcotics Commitment should discuss and Russia States The United 4. formation related to Afghan narcotrafficking. narcotrafficking. Afghan to related formation Reiterating a and Differences Recognizing establishing formal intelligence-sharing chan intelligence-sharing formal establishing aspects the critical other of each inform nels to including in situation, security the evolving of respective activities. respective consider officials should and Russian U.S. 3. counternarcotics efforts along Afghanistan’s Afghanistan’s along efforts counternarcotics agencies border countries’ the two borders, with one another formally more interact must their other of each and inform and informally starting with the Ministry of the Interior, but the Interior, of with the Ministry starting Service’s Security Federal the including also effective mount more To service). border 2. The United States and Russia should estab and Russia States The United 2. between cooperation and informal lish formal (likely in Russia counterparts and its the DEA In the Event U.S.-Russia Relations Improve such cooperation would be quite limited. This limited. be quite would such cooperation drug- countering in relevant particularly is region and in the illicit financial flows related beyond. to let the overall deterioration in bilateral rela in bilateral deterioration the overall let to their agen between cooperation tions affect if even Asia, and South Central across cies Russian Agencies Russian not officials should agree and Russian U.S. 1. Cooperation and Information- Cooperation and U.S. Relevant Sharing Between other’s regional interests. regional other’s Recommendations In the present situation, there are several ac several are there situation, In the present should consider countries tions that the two to future, or in the near enacting immediately, each without undermining their goals advance Conclusion

ecent years have seen a dramatic trans- This complicated multi-dimensional chal- formation of the international environ- lenge has implications for both the United Rment, national agendas, regional mat- States and Russia. Both nations remain ters and conditions on the ground relevant deeply interested in solving the Afghan drug to the issue of Afghan narcotrafficking. None issue, and the United States may have be- of those, however, contributed to decreasing come even more so recently. Given the pres- the severity of the problem itself. ent strategic environment, however, there is little chance of this issue becoming a game- Afghan narcotrafficking remains a serious changer for deteriorating bilateral relations. challenge to international security and re- gional and global stability. It has also become On one hand, the United States is interested one of the major factors sustaining Afghani- in stabilizing Afghanistan under its current stan’s insecurity, state dysfunctionality and U.S.-friendly government and, thus, must economic decline. Its role as a funding source seek a fundamental solution to the drug is- for the insurgency is perhaps less devastat- sue in the country. On the other hand, Rus- ing for Afghanistan’s statehood than its pro- sia is interested in minimizing the devastat- pensity to bring together officials, insurgents ing effects of Afghan narcotrafficking on its and other criminals and common Afghans healthcare, demography, law and order and seeking lucrative assets and livelihoods, thus economy, as well as its strategic posture in undermining the government’s legitimacy. Central Asia. Both countries are interested Transgressing the lines between legality and in cutting the ties between drugs and terror- illegality, what favors Afghanistan’s state- ism. However, Russia has little incentive and hood and what undermines it, what helps the lacks the resources to be directly involved in

A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT Afghan people survive and what hurts them, the complicated process of state-building in Afghan narcotrafficking precludes successful Afghanistan. It risks being dragged into the 46 state-building and sustainable development Afghan controversy against its own will in the in the country. Meanwhile, the insurgency, event of a major failure of the current Kabul despite its declared Islamic dogmatism, has regime and the subsequent, eventual desta- effectively integrated drug production and bilization in the region. trafficking into its warfighting, imposing an alternative normative order that challenges The real dynamics of U.S.-Russia coopera- the official government. tion on Afghan narcotrafficking will largely be A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 47 - - - the chief mission of the Joint U.S.-Russia U.S.-Russia Joint the of mission chief the Narcotrafficking. Afghan on Group Working United States and Russia seem poised to co to poised seem and Russia States United the persisting of in spite in the region operate than more This, in their interests. differences of a detailed analysis requires else, anything and activities methods strategies, various the address to be implemented that could U.S.-Russia As issue. narcotrafficking Afghan the prevent it is crucial to persist, tensions narcotraf Afghan on interaction states’ two Both competition. turning into ficking from own their of be conscious need to countries and and goals intentions other’s and each Afghan the solve effectively act smartly to while managing the issue, narcotrafficking of consequences and unintended intended their steps. consider requires task challenging a Such as strategic as well analysis and able research to efforts and trust-building communications substantively, proceed to both parties allow of out way and find their confrontation avoid has been efforts Undertaking those deadlock. ------disengage completely from Afghanistan, the Afghanistan, from completely disengage ners. to decides House White the unless Thus, ability of such developments, Washington Washington such developments, of ability sup need additional instruments—with may and China— as Iran as well Russia, port from part Afghan its of the compliance ensure to commitment for their own benefit rather than benefit their own for commitment meeting by accomplishment its to contribute prob high the Given imposed. conditions the lematic. If Washington reiterates its high-pro its reiterates Washington If lematic. Afghanistan, stabilizing to commitment file this exploit to elites Afghan this might push present report. present be prob could however, this scenario, Even is in Syria), but eventually, it could help lessen help lessen it could but eventually, is in Syria), is narcotrafficking Afghan the of the severity implement for scenario basic the is This sue. outlined in the ing the recommendations eral cooperation. Such cooperation would be would cooperation Such cooperation. eral specific national in promoting instrumental (as it parties involved and visions of interests hood in its present form, Afghan narcotraf Afghan form, present hood in its in issues security well as other ficking—as bilat a point of become the country—could Washington sets aside its plans for an un plans for aside its sets Washington to itself and commits drawdown conditional state Afghanistan’s of survival the ensuring defined by realities on the ground and U.S. U.S. and ground on the realities by defined In case priorities. policy and security foreign ACRONYMS

ABP Afghan Border Police AKT Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan AML/CFT Anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism ANA Afghan National Army ANP Afghan National Police ANPDF Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework ANSF Afghan National Security Forces APG Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering CARICC Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre CEO Chief Executive Officer CHAMP Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program CIA United States Central Intelligence Agency CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization DEA United States Drug Enforcement Administration DoD United States Department of Defense EEU Eurasian Economic Union EU European Union FATF Financial Action Task Force FinTRACA Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Afghanistan FIU Financial Intelligence Unit FSB Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation FSKN Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation FTZ Free trade zone FY Fiscal year GADC General Administration for Drug Control, Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation GDP Gross domestic product A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT GI Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index GIS Geographic information systems 48 GLE Government-led eradication GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan G8 Group of Eight INL United States Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 49 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Drugs on Nations Office United Development International for Agency States United dollar States United Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Shanghai Cooperation Arab United Emirates Nations United Programme Nations Development United Special Session Assembly Nations General United North Atlantic Treaty Organization Treaty North Atlantic organization Non-governmental Afghanistan of Government National Unity in Europe and Co-operation Security for Organization Program Development Agricultural Regional Advise and Assist Command Train, Joint Planning Cell Zone Kandahar Food Know-your-customer and evaluation Monitoring Federation the Russian of the Interior of Ministry service transfer or value Money International Organization for Migration for Organization International Force Assistance Security International Pakistan of Intelligence Inter-Services Levant and the Iraq of Islamic State and Syria Iraq of Islamic State Informal value transfer systems transfer value Informal

USD UNGASS UNODC USAID UAE UN UNDP RADP TAAC SCO NGO NUG OSCE MVD MVTS NATO KYC M&E IVTS JPC KFZ ISI ISIL ISIS IOM ISAF ENDNOTES

1. Михаил Гуткин, “РФ и США проводят антинаркотические операции в Афганистане,” Голос Америки, June 23, 2011, http://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/us-russia-drugs-2011-06-23-124455984/237235.html. 2. Ekaterina Stepanova et al., Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment, EastWest Institute, April 2013, https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/afghan-narcotrafficking-joint-threat-assessment. 3. Austin Long et al., Afghan Narcotrafficking: Post-2014 Scenarios, EastWest Institute, February 2015, https://www. eastwest.ngo/idea/post-2014-scenarios-afghan-narcotrafficking. 4. UNGA Resolution 68/262 refers to the “alteration of the status” of Crimea and Sebastopol and “disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine.” See http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/ RES/68/262. 5. George Gavrilis et al., Afghan Narcotrafficking: The State of Afghanistan’s Borders, EastWest Institute, April 2015, https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/afghan-narcotrafficking-state-afghanistans-borders. 6. “Бортников: визит в США носил профессиональный и политический характер,” РИА Новости, February 20, 2015, https://ria.ru/world/20150220/1048709122.html; “В МИД России рассказали о визите главы ЦРУ в Москву,” о “Русская служба,” ВВС, March 28, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/russian/news/2016/03/160328_brennan_moscow_visit. 7. David Mansfield et al., Afghan Narcotrafficking: Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development, EastWest In- stitute, July 2016, https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/afghan-narcotrafficking-finding-alternative-alternative-develop- ment. 8. Nikos Passas and Nicolas Giannakopoulos et al., Afghan Narcotrafficking: Illicit Financial Flows, EastWest Institute, June 2017, https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/afghan-narcotrafficking-illicit-financial-flows. 9. “Военная доктрина Российской Федерации,” Российская газета – Федеральный выпуск 6570 (298), December 30, 2014, https://rg.ru/2014/12/30/doktrina-dok.html. 10. “Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 31 декабря 2015 года N 683 ‘О Стратегии национальной безопасности Российской Федерации,’” Российская газета, December 31, 2015, http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_ LAW_191669/. 11. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016),” December 1, 2016, http://www.mid. ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2542248. 12. Lisa Ferdinando, “Carter Outlines Security Challenges, Warns Against Sequestration,” U.S. Department of De- fense, March 17, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/696449/carter-outlines-security-challenges- warns-against-sequestration. 13. See Federal Ministry of Defense, “White paper on German security policy and the future of Bundeswehr,” July 13, 2016, https://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzIzMDMwMzA- zMDMwMzAzMDY5NzE3MzM0Nzc2YzYyMzcyMDIwMjAyMDIw/Weissbuch2016_barrierefrei.pdf. 14. “Российско-афганское соглашение по безопасности – новый шаг в развитии сотрудничества,” Afghanistan.ru, May 18, 2016, http://afghanistan.ru/doc/97904.html. 15. “Ханиф Атмар и Николай Патрушев обсудили вопросы безопасности,” Afghanistan.ru, July 26, 2016, http://afghani- stan.ru/doc/100350.html. 16. “Russia To Host Meeting On Afghanistan Conflict, Push To Include Taliban,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 8, 2017, http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-host-meeting-afghanistan-conflict-including-taliban-lavrov-mos- cow/28297143.html. 17. For the Trump administration, one feasible option for cooperation could be to send a surge of troops and resourc- es to increase the capacities of the Ghani-Abdullah administration in Kabul. 18. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council,” July 13, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_134102.htm. 19. “Александр Грушко: Россия будет готова принять предложение НАТО о сотрудничестве по Афганистану,” A fghanistan. ru, August 19, 2016, http://afghanistan.ru/doc/101163.html. 20. Tatyana Rusakova, “U.S. partially lifts sanctions on Russian state arms exporter,” Russia Beyond The Headlines, December 8, 2015, http://rbth.com/defence/2015/12/08/us-partially-lifts-sanctions-on-russian-state-arms-ex- porter_548709.

A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 21. Richard Sisk, “US struggles to Keep Russian Helos Flying for Afghans,” Defense Tech, December 6, 2016, http:// defensetech.org/2016/12/06/mi-17-rusisan-flying-afghanistan/. 22. These were later eased by the Trump administration. See Kevin Liptak, “Treasury allowing for some transactions 50 with Russian intelligence agency,” CNN, February 2, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/02/politics/treasury- sanctions-russian-intelligence-agency/. 23. For more on this, please see the section “Overcoming ‘Afghanistan Fatigue.’” 24. General Assembly resolution S-30/1, Our joint commitment to effectively addressing and countering the world drug problem, A/RES/S-30/1, May 4, 2016, https://www.incb.org/documents/PRECURSORS/Resolutions-Precur- sors/GA-UNGASS-Res_S-30-1_2016.pdf. 25. See “Russian anti-drug chief urges new plan to counter Afghanistan drug threat,” RT, March 25, 2014, https:// A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 51 - - - - - The Dip The New York , July 26, 2013, 2013, July 26, , 9 (9): 21-7, September September 9 (9): 21-7, , March 4, 2016, http:// 2016, 4, March , IRIN ABCNews.com , February 22, 2016, https://www. 2016, 22, February , CTCSentinel The Nation , October 19, 2015, http://www.tolonews.com/node/11662. 2015, 19, October , , March 11, 2017, http://ijr.com/2017/03/822619-i-had-dinner- 2017, 11, March , , May 5, 2016, http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/05/05/ 2016, 5, May , TOLOnews , June 23, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-drugs-usa-heroin- 2016, June 23, , Reuters Military.com , April 5, 2016, http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_196285/. 2016, 5, April , Independent Journal Review Российская газета , July 27, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/us/naloxone-eases-pain-of-heroin-epidemic-but-not- 2016, July 27, , , October 28, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/how-opium-fuels-the-talibans-war-machine-in-afghan 2016, 28, October , Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 5 апреля 2016 г. N 156 г. Москва ‘О совершенствовании государственного Москва ‘О государственного совершенствовании N 156 г. 2016 г. 5 апреля от Федерации Российской Президента Указ European Council, “Brussels Conference on Afghanistan: main results,” October 5, 2016, http://www.consilium. 2016, 5, October main results,” Afghanistan: on Conference “Brussels Council, European “Working meeting with Federal Drug Control Service Director Viktor Ivanov,” President of Russia, January 13, January 13, Russia, of President Ivanov,” Viktor Director Service Control Drug meeting with Federal “Working The White House Office of Management and Budget, “America First: A Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Great America to Make Blueprint A Budget First: “America and Budget, of Management Office House White The Benny Johnson, “I Had Dinner With the Afghan Ambassador. What He Said About the Differences Between Trump, Trump, Between About the Differences What He Said Ambassador. Afghan the With “I Had Dinner Johnson, Benny The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on Afghanistan,” July 6, 2016, 2016, 6, July Afghanistan,” on President by the “Statement Secretary, Press of the Office House White The In recent years, a reassessment of drug trafficking as the main source of finance for the insurgency has been prev has been for the insurgency of finance source as the main drug trafficking of a reassessment years, In recent “Since the Interior Ministry has taken over the functions of the Federal Drug Control Service, we ought to quali ought to we Service, Control Drug the Federal the functions of over has taken Ministry the Interior “Since After liquidation of the FSKN, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in fact the only institution preparing Russia’s Russia’s preparing only institution fact the was in Affairs Foreign of the Ministry the FSKN, of liquidation After Greg Holyk, “Afghan War Fatigue Hits New High, Matching Levels Last Seen in Iraq,” in Iraq,” Seen Last Levels Matching High, New Hits Fatigue War “Afghan Holyk, Greg “ Adva Saldinger, “Budget cuts target development assistance, hint at organizational change,” Devex, April 25, 2017, 2017, April 25, Devex, change,” hint at organizational assistance, development target cuts “Budget Saldinger, Adva See The White House Office of Management and Budget, “Estimate #1—FY 2017 Appropriations Request: De Request: Appropriations 2017 #1—FY “Estimate Budget, and Management of Office House White The See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Warsaw Summit Declaration on Afghanistan,” July 9, 2016, http://www.nato. 2016, 9, July Afghanistan,” on Declaration Summit “Warsaw Organization, Treaty Atlantic North Per capita income in Russia went down by 0.7% in 2014, by 3.2% in 2015 and by 5.9% in 2016. These decreases decreases These in 2016. 5.9% and by in 2015 3.2% by in 2014, 0.7% by down went in Russia income capita Per See Hanne Coudere, “Opium bounces back, enriching Taliban and Afghan officials,” officials,” Afghan and Taliban enriching back, bounces “Opium Hanne Coudere, See See Nora D. Volkow, M.D. “What Science tells us About Opioid Abuse and Addiction,” presented to the Senate the Senate to presented Addiction,” and Abuse About Opioid us tells “What Science M.D. Volkow, D. Nora See Ferdinando, “Mattis: Assessment on Afghanistan Coming Soon,” U.S. Department of Defense, February 20, 2017, 2017, 20, February Defense, of Department U.S. Soon,” Coming Afghanistan on Assessment “Mattis: Ferdinando, The year 2015 also saw the drug-related death toll in Russia decrease from 5,625 deaths in 2014 to 4,039 deaths. 4,039 to 2014 in deaths 5,625 from decrease Russia in toll death drug-related the saw also 2015 year The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Statutes of the General Administration for Drug Control of Control Drug for Administration of the General “Statutes Federation, Russian of the Affairs Internal of Ministry Anne Stenersen, “Al-Qa`ida’s Comeback in Afghanistan and its Implications,” Implications,” and its Afghanistan in Comeback “Al-Qa`ida’s Anne Stenersen, 45. 44. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/2018_blueprint. 2017, March Again,” pdf. 43. Iraq of the Islamic State defeat to the campaign and accelerate Armed Forces the U.S. rebuild to Defense of partment https:// 2017, 16, March activities,” protection border urgent for Homeland Security of and Department and Syria, www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/amendment_03_16_18.pdf. source/DEFCONNews/utm_medium/Website/. 42. Is Stunning,” Obama with-the-afghanistan-ambassador-what-he-said-about-the-differences-between-trump-obama-is-stunning/. 40. europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/10/05-bca-main-results/. 41. https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1088391/mattis-assessment-on-afghanistan-coming-soon/utm_ 38. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/06/statement-president-afghanistan. 39. int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133171.htm. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/afghanistan-war-fatigue-hits-new-highs-now-matching-levels-last- seen-in-iraq/. 37. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss93.pdf. 2016, 35. And “Health www.irinnews.org/feature/2016/03/04/opium-bounces-back-enriching-taliban-and-afghan-officials. Drugs,” Dealing in of Officials Accuses Minister 36. istan/. And Alfred McCoy, “The Drug That Makes the Taliban Possible,” Possible,” Taliban the That Makes “The Drug McCoy, Alfred And istan/. from ‘Windfall’ Gets “Taliban Sisk, And Richard thenation.com/article/the-drug-that-makes-the-taliban-possible/. Offensives,” Fund to Harvest Poppy taliban-gets-windfall-from-poppy-harvest-to-fund-offensives.html. without-consequences.html. 34. Afghanistan,” Machine in War Taliban’s the Fuels Opium “How Wahdatyar, Hashim See alent among experts. lomat congress/2016/what-science-tells-us-about-opioid-abuse-addiction. And Shadia Nasralla, “Heroin use at 20-year at 20-year use “Heroin And Shadia Nasralla, congress/2016/what-science-tells-us-about-opioid-abuse-addiction. says,” U.N. ‘epidemic’, drug high in U.S. Epidemic,” in Heroin but Is No Cure Lives, Saves “Naloxone Seelye, Q. And Katharine idUSKCN0Z90UX. Times civil society institutions.” Statement by President Vladimir Putin at a special meeting of the Security Council on April April on Council the Security at a special meeting of Vladimir Putin President by Statement institutions.” civil society at http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/keywords/5/events/54401. accessible 2017, 28, 33. https://www.drugabuse.gov/about-nida/legislative-activities/testimony-to- 2016, January 27, Judiciary Committee, 2016, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51164. 2016, 31. 32. and government local bodies, state by performed activities anti-drug trafficking of the coordination improve tatively 29. market. drugs illegal country’s the affected 30. 27. https://media.mvd.ru/files/embed/795035. 2016, April 23, Federation,” the Russian of Interior of the Ministry 28. 2016. for the UNGASS agenda official www.rt.com/politics/russia-drugs-afghanistan-threat-069/. 26. управления в сфере контроля за оборотом наркотических средств, психотропных веществ миграции,’” и их прекурсоров и в сфере https://www.devex.com/news/budget-cuts-target-development-assistance-hint-at-organizational-change-90132. 46. Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, “Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, Tajikistan issue joint statement on anti-terrorism,” August 4, 2016, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2016-08/04/content_4707451. htm. 47. “Rustam Azimov: Uzbekistan not ready for creation of SCO free trade zone,” UzDaily, December 15, 2015, https:// www.uzdaily.com/articles-id-34580.htm. 48. Wang Jin, “What to Make of China’s Latest Meeting With the Taliban,” The Diplomat, August 5, 2016, http://the- diplomat.com/2016/08/what-to-make-of-chinas-latest-meeting-with-the-taliban/. 49. Shawn Snow, “Chinese troops appear to be operating in Afghanistan, and the Pentagon is OK with it,” Military Times, March 5, 2017, http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/chinese-troops-afghanistan. 50. Ivan Safranchuk, Olga Oliker and Jeffrey Mankoff, “Afghanistan and Central Asia: Shared Security or Divided Insecurity?” Panel discussion at Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 19, 2016, https://www.csis.org/ events/afghanistan-and-central-asia. 51. There have been a number of Russian diplomats’ statements on Moscow’s relations with the Taliban. See “Заявление Кабулова вызвало жесткую реакцию Кабула, Радио Озоди, November 17, 2016, http://rus.ozodi.org/a/28123719.html. And Sami Yousafzai, “A Taliban-Russia Team-Up Against ISIS?” The Daily Beast, October 26, 2015, http://www.thedai- lybeast.com/articles/2015/10/26/a-taliban-russia-team-up-against-isis.html. 52. “Хамид Карзай: Россия играет важную роль для обеспечения стабильности в Афганистане,” Afghanistan.ru, June 25, 2015, http://afghanistan.ru/doc/86787.html. 53. Information provided by a participant at a meeting of the EastWest Institute’s Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking. 54. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,World Drug Report 2015 (Vienna: UNODC, 2015), https://www. unodc.org/documents/wdr2015/World_Drug_Report_2015.pdf. 55. Zahra Alam Mehrjerdi, “Afghan Refugees in Iran and Drug Use Problem,” The Middle East and North Africa Harm Reduction Association (MENAHRA), April 1, 2013, http://www.menahra.org/fr/menahra-resources/external- publications/283-afghan-refugees-iran-drug-use. And Roya Noori and Abbas Deylamizade, “Drugs, HIV Treatment and Harm Reduction Services for Afghan Refugees in Iran,” International Journal of High Risk Behaviors and Addiction 6 (1): 1-3, August 10, 2016, http://jhrba.com/?page=article&article_id=29340. 56. Reports on this are numerous. See Barbara Slavin, “Iran’s ‘marriage of convenience’ with Taliban,” Al-Monitor, May 31, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/iran-marriage-convenience-taliban-isis.html. 57. Antonio Giustozzi and Silab Mangal, “An Interview with Mullah Rasool on Reconciliation between the Taliban and the Afghan Government,” RUSI, March 16, 2016, https://rusi.org/commentary/interview-mullah-rasool-reconcilia- tion-between-taliban-and-afghan-government. 58. Long, Afghan Narcotrafficking: Post-2014 Scenarios. 59. Stepanova, Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment. 60. Long, Afghan Narcotrafficking: Post-2014 Scenarios: 26. 61. Solar year corresponding roughly to calendar year 2016. 62. Solar year corresponding roughly to calendar year 2015. 63. Solar year corresponding roughly to calendar year 2014. 64. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, “National Budget Document Fiscal Year 1395,” http://www. budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/1395%20Budget/National%20Budget%20 1395_%20English%20Version%20.pdf: 5. 65. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, “National Budget Document Fiscal Year 1394,” http://www. budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/1394/1394%20National%20Budget_Eng- lish%20Version.pdf: 66. 66. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, “National Budget Document Fiscal Year 1395”: 78. 67. The World Bank South Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit (SASEP), Islamic State of Afghanistan: Pathways to Inclusive Growth, March 2014, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/808461467993737379/pdf/ACS82280ENGLIS0ew000English000Final.pdf. 68. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF) 2017 to 2021 (Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2016), http://mfa.gov.af/Content/Media/Docu- ments/anpdf26102016112634175553325325.pdf: 12. 69. William Byrd and M. Khalid Payenda, “Revenue Growth in Afghanistan Continues Strong but Future Uncertain,” United States Institute of Peace, February 21, 2017, https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/02/revenue-growth- afghanistan-continues-strong-future-uncertain: 1. 70. Mujib Mashal, “Afghanistan Fires 7 From Cabinet in Intensifying Political Crisis,” The New York Times, November 15, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/world/asia/afghanistan-ashraf-ghani-cabinet.html. 71. Abdul Wali Arian, “Supreme Court Should Rule On Issue Of Dismissed Ministers: CEO,” TOLOnews, January 14, 2017, http://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/supreme-court-should-rule-issue-dismissed-ministers-ceo. 72. Tahir Khan, “Kerry’s interference stirs up angry reaction,” The Express Tribune, April 16, 2016, http://tribune.com. A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT pk/story/1085536/kerrys-interference-stirs-up-angry-reaction/. 73. Ali Yawar Adili, “Post-Presidential Karzai: Still a challenge to the NUG?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, November 52 21, 2016, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/post-presidential-karzai-still-a-challenge-to-the-nug/. 74. Ali M. Latifi, “Kerry’s comments in Afghanistan on unity government spur anger, charges of U.S. interference,” Los Angeles Times, April 11, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-afghanistan-kerry-20160411-story. html. 75. Adili and Martine van Bijlert, “Update on Afghanistan’s Electoral Process: Electoral deadlock broken—for now,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, December 18, 2016, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/update-on-afghanistans- electoral-process-electoral-deadlock-broken-for-now/. 76. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of Afghanistan announced that the parliamentary elections will A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 53 , , ------The Diplomat (UNODC, 2016), 2016), (UNODC, The New York Times , April 17, 2016, https:// 2016, 17, April , (Arlington: SIGAR: July SIGAR: (Arlington: , March 24, 2016, http:// 2016, 24, March , Afghanistan Opium Survey Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016: , September 1, 2016, http://www. 2016, 1, September , Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: , December 14, 2016, http://www. 2016, 14, December , Khaama Press Khaama Press , July 23, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/ 2016, July 23, , Fox News : 13. Khaama Press Quarterly Report to Congress Al Jazeera , April 22, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/sacked- 2017, 22, April , (UNODC, 2016), https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-moni 2016), (UNODC, : 6. : 7. The Diplomat (Vienna: UNODC, 2016), http://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_ 2016), UNODC, (Vienna: (Vienna: UNODC, 2011), https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analy 2011), UNODC, (Vienna: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016: Cultivation and Production (UNODC, 2016): 42. 2016): (UNODC, (UNODC, 2015), https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/_Af 2015), (UNODC, (UNODC, 2015): 13, 30. 13, 2015): (UNODC, (UNODC, 2016), https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Af 2016), (UNODC, : 3, 14. World Drug Report 2016 World Drug Report 2011 Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Cultivation and Production UNODC and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Narcotics, Counter of Ministry Afghanistan of Republic the Islamic UNODC and UNODC and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Narcotics, Counter of Ministry Afghanistan of UNODC and the Islamic Republic UNODC and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Narcotics, Counter of Ministry Afghanistan of UNODC and the Islamic Republic “Ismail Khan says Dr. Najibullah’s posters should not be used in vehicles,” in vehicles,” should not be used posters Najibullah’s Dr. Khan says “Ismail See Jelena Bjelica, “Afghanistan Breaking Bad: Crystal meth, a new drug on the market,” Afghanistan Analysts Analysts Afghanistan market,” on the drug a new meth, Crystal Bad: Breaking “Afghanistan Jelena Bjelica, See UNODC and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Narcotics, Counter of Ministry Afghanistan of UNODC and the Islamic Republic Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Reconstruction, Afghanistan for General Special Inspector Bismellah Alizada, “Sacked Afghan Minister Symbolizes the Government’s Precarious Position,” Position,” Precarious the Government’s Symbolizes Minister Afghan “Sacked Alizada, Bismellah “Afghan VP accused of ordering kidnapping, rape of political rival,” rival,” political of rape kidnapping, ordering of accused VP “Afghan For 2016 data, see ibid: 5. For 2015 data, see UNODC and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Counter of Ministry Afghanistan of Islamic Republic the UNODC and see data, 2015 For ibid: 5. see data, 2016 For Ruttig, “Hekmatyar taken off UN sanctions list: Paving the way for his return –and Hezb-e Islami’s reunification?” reunification?” Islami’s Hezb-e –and return his for way the Paving list: sanctions UN off taken “Hekmatyar Ruttig, “Opium poppy cultivation thus may have reached a ‘natural exploitation’ peak in the main poppy cultivating cultivating main poppy in the peak exploitation’ ‘natural a reached have thus may cultivation poppy “Opium UNODC and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Narcotics, Counter of Ministry Afghanistan of UNODC and the Islamic Republic UNODC and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Narcotics, Counter of Ministry Afghanistan of UNODC and the Islamic Republic Thomas Ruttig, “‘Atta for President’ Again? The struggle for the Afghan presidency and Jamiat’s leadership,” leadership,” Jamiat’s and presidency Afghan the for The struggle Again? President’ for “‘Atta Thomas Ruttig, Mashal, “Afghanistan Orders Arrest of Vice President’s Guards in Rape and Torture Case,” Case,” Torture and in Rape Guards President’s Vice of Arrest Orders “Afghanistan Mashal, UNODC, UNODC, UNODC and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Narcotics, Counter of Ministry Afghanistan of UNODC and the Islamic Republic “Afghan Hazara minority protest in Kabul over power line,” line,” power over in Kabul protest minority Hazara “Afghan “Kalakani’s reburial in Kabul erupts clashes, at least 5 wounded,” wounded,” 5 at least clashes, erupts Kabul in reburial “Kalakani’s UNODC and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Narcotics, Counter of Ministry Afghanistan of Republic Islamic the and UNODC S. Reza Kazemi, “The Battle between Law and Force: Scattered political power and deteriorating security test test security and deteriorating power political Scattered and Force: Law “The Battle between Kazemi, Reza S. UNODC, UNODC, Before the end of 2013 there had been 17 poppy-free provinces. See UNODC and the Islamic Republic of Afghani of UNODC and the Islamic Republic See provinces. poppy-free had been 17 there 2013 the end of Before “1 killed, 5 wounded as Dostum and Noor supporters clash in Faryab,” in Faryab,” clash and Noor supporters as Dostum 5 wounded “1 killed, 101. 101. 99. Socio-economic100. analysis 2016: Cultivation and Production production.pdf: 15. production.pdf: 98. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghanistan-breaking-bad-crystal-meth-a-new- 2015, 7, December Network, drug-on-the-market/. Narcotics, Narcotics, 97. Narcotics, Counter of Ministry stan https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2016_cultivation_ 95. Cultivation and96. Production Executive Summary 93. Cultivation and94. Production ExecutiveCultivation Summary and Production in the Southern and Western regions. With this assumption, there is a risk of an inner Afghan shift of cultivation.” See See cultivation.” shift of Afghan an inner is a risk of there this assumption, With regions. Western and in the Southern Narcotics, Counter of Ministry Afghanistan of UNODC and the Islamic Republic Cultivation and 7. ghan_opium_survey_2015_web.pdf: Production monitoring%7C/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan%7C/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/AfghanistanOpiumSurvey2016_ 5. ExSum.pdf: 92. decrease cultivation the poppy for explanation a possible providing it, exceeded even have or may in 2014 provinces ghanistan_opium_survey_2015_socioeconomic.pdf: 6. ghanistan_opium_survey_2015_socioeconomic.pdf: 91. Cultivation andtoring/Afghanistan/AfghanistanOpiumSurvey2016_ExSum.pdf#yuiHis=1%7Cuploads%7Cdocuments%7C/crop- Production Executive Summary 89. 45. sis/WDR2011/World_Drug_Report_2011_ebook.pdf: 90. Socio-economic analysis 87. xii. DRUG_REPORT_2016_web.pdf: 88. 123. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-07-30qr.pdf: 2015), 30, struggle-for-the-afghan-presidency-and-jamiats-leadership/. 86. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/hekmatyar-taken-off-un- 2017, 11, February Network, Analysts Afghanistan sanctions-list-paving-the-way-for-his-return-and-hezb-e-islamis-reunification/. April 22, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/sacked-afghan-minister-symbolizes-the-governments-precarious- 2017, 22, April position/. 85. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/atta-for-president-again-the- 2017, April 10, Network, Analysts Afghanistan 83. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/world/asia/afghanistan-vice-president-dostum-warrant. 2017, January 24, html?_r=0. 84. Herat’s dynamism,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 11, 2017, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-bat 2017, 11, January Network, Analysts Afghanistan dynamism,” Herat’s tle-between-law-and-force-scattered-political-power-and-deteriorating-security-test-herats-dynamism/. 82. foxnews.com/world/2016/12/14/afghan-vp-accused-ordering-kidnapping-rape-political-rival.html. 80. www.khaama.com/ismail-khan-says-dr-najibullahs-posters-should-not-be-used-in-vehicles-0689. 81. 78. 78. news/2016/07/afghan-hazara-minority-protest-kabul-power-line-160723064233800.html. 79. khaama.com/kalakanis-reburial-in-kabul-erupts-clashes-at-least-5-wounded-01819. izes the Government’s Precarious Position,” Position,” Precarious Government’s the izes afghan-minister-symbolizes-the-governments-precarious-position/. 7 7. www.khaama.com/1-killed-5-wounded-as-dostum-and-noor-supporters-clash-in-faryab-0438. be held with current identification cards (instead of the computerized national identification cards that should have have that should cards identification national computerized of the (instead cards identification with current be held create also would This agreement. political 2014 a of major violation a which constitutes voters), to distributed been Symbol Minister Afghan “Sacked Alizada, Bismellah See elections. undermine upcoming and fraud voter for grounds Socio-economic analysis: 9. 102. Ibid. 103. Mansfield,Afghan Narcotrafficking: Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development. 104. UNODC and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Socio-economic analysis: 19. 105. In 2016, more than 600,000 Afghan refugees returned to the country from Pakistan. The majority of them were forcefully pushed out of Pakistan as a reaction to developing Afghanistan-Indian relations. This development surely adds to the grievances of the local population and to the economic challenges facing the country. 106. Vanda Felbab-Brown, “High and low politics in Afghanistan: The terrorism-drugs nexus and what can be done about it,” The Brookings Institution, April 29, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/high-and-low-politics-in- afghanistan-the-terrorism-drugs-nexus-and-what-can-be-done-about-it/. 107. Anthony H. Cordesman, “Afghanistan: The Uncertain Impact of a Year of Transition,” Center for Strategic & Inter- national Studies, February 22, 2016, https://www.csis.org/analysis/afghanistan-uncertain-impact-year-transition-0. 108. The World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update (The World Bank, 2015), http://documents.worldbank.org/ curated/en/508611468001509553/pdf/96045-REVISED-WP-PUBLIC-Box391453B-AFG-Economic-Update- April-2015.pdf: 7. 109. Ibid: 6. 110. The World Bank South Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit (SASEP), Islamic State of Af- ghanistan: Pathways to Inclusive Growth. 111. The World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2016), http://docu- ments.worldbank.org/curated/en/953921468196145402/pdf/104871-WP-P158556-PUBLIC-AFG-Development- Update-April-2016-final.pdf: 3. 112. Sayed Masood Sadat et al., ed. Zachary Warren and Nancy Hopkins, Afghanistan in 2015: A Survey of the Afghan People, The Asia Foundation, November 2015, http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/1558: 49. 113. Stepanova, Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment: 40. 114. Azam Ahmed, “Penetrating Every Stage of Afghan Opium Chain, Taliban Become a Cartel,” The New York Times, February 16, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/world/asia/afghanistan-opium-taliban-drug-cartel.html. 115. “King Pin Drug Trafficker Arrested In Nangarhar,”TOLOnews , April 10, 2016, http://www.tolonews.com/ node/13364. 116. FATF and OECD, Financial flows linked to the production and trafficking of Afghan opiates (Paris: FATF, 2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financial-flows-linked-to-production-and-trafficking-of- afghan-opiates.pdf: 3. 1 17. Passas and Giannakopoulos, Afghan Narcotrafficking: Illicit Financial Flows: 22-3. 118. Field research indicates that the Taliban would often refuse to accept raw opium in place of cash as payment for taxes owed by farmers living in territories under their control. 119. Ahmed, “Tasked With Combating Opium, Afghan Officials Profit From It,”The New York Times, February 15, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/16/world/asia/afghanistan-opium-heroin-taliban-helmand.html. 120. According to a RAND report, “Night letters, or shabnameh, are a tool that the Taliban has used in the past, although not recently, to coerce poppy cultivation.” Victoria Greenfield et al., Reducing the Cultivation of Opium Pop- pies in Southern Afghanistan, RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), http://www.rand. org/pubs/research_reports/RR1075.html. 121. Sudarsan Raghavan, “A year of Taliban gains shows that ‘we haven’t delivered,’ top Afghan official says,” The Washington Post, December 27, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/a-year-of-taliban-gains- shows-that-we-havent-delivered-top-afghan-official-says/2015/12/27/172213e8-9cfb-11e5-9ad2-568d814bbf3b_ story.html. 122. See U.S. Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2015, https:// www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/1225_Report_Dec_2015_-_Final_20151210.pdf. 123. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to Congress (Arlington: SIGAR: April 30, 2016), https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2016-04-30qr.pdf: 92. 124. Ibid: 95. 125. Ibid. 126. U.S. Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, https://www. defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Afghanistan-1225-Report-December-2016.pdf: 21. 1 27. Ferninando, “Mattis: Assessment on Afghanistan Coming Soon.” 128. UNODC and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, 2015 Afghanistan Drug Report, December 9, 2015, https://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/UNODC-DRUG-REPORT15-ONLINE-270116_1. pdf: 28. 129. Ibid: 6. 130. Transparency International, “Afghanistan,” https://www.transparency.org/country/AFG.

A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 131. U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “Afghanistan 2015 Human Rights Report,” http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253169.pdf: 31. 132. Stepanova, Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment: 25. 54 133. Transparency International, “Afghanistan 2015 Country Summary,” Government Defense Anti-Corruption Index, http://government.defenceindex.org/downloads/docs/afghanistan.pdf. 134. Passas and Giannakopoulos, Afghan Narcotrafficking: Illicit Financial Flows: 10. 135. U.S. Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016: 34. 136. Sadat et al., Afghanistan in 2015: A Survey of the Afghan People, http://asiafoundation.org/publications/ pdf/1558: 99. 1 37. Ibid. A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 55 ------(Paris: FATF, 2014), 2014), FATF, (Paris: . Afghan Narcotraffick : 22. Afghanistan Drug Report 2015: : 30. : 28. : 28. : 12, 14. : 12, : 30-1. : 14. , May 2015, http://photos.state.gov/ 2015, May , Afghan Narcotrafficking: Illicit Financial Afghan Narcotrafficking: Finding an Alter Afghan Narcotrafficking: Finding an Alter : 10. : 44. : 13. 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume I: 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II: (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, March 2016), https://www. 2016), March State, of Department U.S. DC: (Washington, : 47. Afghan Narcotrafficking: Illicit Financial Flows Afghan Narcotrafficking: Illicit Financial Flows Afghan Narcotrafficking: Illicit Financial Flows Afghan Narcotrafficking: Illicit Financial Flows Afghan Narcotrafficking: Illicit Financial Flows : 29-31. : 29-31. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, March 2016), https://www.state.gov/docu 2016), March State, of Department DC: U.S. (Washington, : 32-4. Afghan Narcotrafficking: Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development : 58. Afghanistan National Drug Use Survey: Executive Summary Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: on-going process – 14 February 2014 Afghan Narcotrafficking: Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development World Drug Report 2015 Afghan Narcotrafficking: The State of Afghanistan’s Borders . Information provided by members of the EastWest Institute’s Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Nar Afghan on Group Working Joint U.S.-Russia Institute’s the EastWest of members by provided Information Ibid: 12. The text of the new law is available online at “Legislative Decree of the President of Islamic Republic of of Islamic Republic of the President of Decree “Legislative online at is available law the new of The text Ibid: 12. Ibid: 12. See Mansfield, Mansfield, See Ibid. Ibid. Passas and Giannakopoulos, and Giannakopoulos, Passas FATF, “Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: on-going process – 24 June 2016,” http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ June 2016,” – 24 process on-going Compliance: AML/CFT Global “Improving FATF, Information provided during personal interviews in preparation for for in preparation interviews during personal provided Information Ibid. Ibid. Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index 2016,” https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/ 2016,” Index Perception “Corruption International, Transparency Ibid: 30. Ibid: 18. Ibid: 11. Ibid. Ibid. All policy recommendations in this section can be found in Mansfield, in Mansfield, be found can in this section recommendations All policy U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “Counties/Jurisdic Affairs, Enforcement and Law Narcotics International of Bureau State of Department U.S. Passas and Giannakopoulos, and Giannakopoulos, Passas UNODC and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Narcotics, Counter of Ministry Afghanistan of the Islamic Republic UNODC and Ibid: 13-14. UNODC, UNODC, Ibid. Ibid. All policy recommendations in this section can be found in Mansfield, in Mansfield, found be can in this section recommendations All policy Ibid: 26. Passas and Giannakopoulos, and Giannakopoulos, Passas Ibid: 17. Ibid. Stepanova, Ibid. U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “Counties/Jurisdic Affairs, Enforcement and Law Narcotics International of Bureau State of Department U.S. Ibid: 24, 94. Ibid: 24, All policy recommendations in this section can be found in Passas and Giannakopoulos, and Giannakopoulos, in Passas be found can in this section recommendations All policy Ibid: 29. Ibid: 31. Passas and Giannakopoulos, and Giannakopoulos, Passas Gavrilis, Gavrilis, U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “Countries/Jurisdic Affairs, Enforcement and Law Narcotics International of Bureau State of Department U.S. See FATF, FATF, See Mansfield, Mansfield, SGI Global, Global, SGI Passas and Giannakopoulos, and Giannakopoulos, Passas Additional recommendations produced by EWI’s Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking Narcotrafficking Afghan on Group Working Joint U.S.-Russia EWI’s by produced recommendations Additional Ibid. Ibid. Decreto Legge, no. 4, February 4, 2010; later converted into the Legge, no. 50, March 31, 2010. 31, March 50, no. the Legge, into converted later 2010; 4, February 4, no. Legge, Decreto Stepanova, Stepanova, 185. 185. 181. 181. 182. 183. 184. 179. 180. cotrafficking. 178. 178. Concern—Afghanistan,” Primary tions of Drug and Chemical 23. ments/organization/253655.pdf: Control 175. 176. ing: Illicit Financial17 7. Flows 172. 173. 174. http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol2/222474.htm. Concern—Afghanistan,” Primary tions of 168. 169. 170. 171. 166. Flows 167. Money Launderingstate.gov/documents/organization/253983.pdf. and Financial164. Crimes 165. 162. 162. countries/a-c/afghanistan/documents/fatf-compliance-june-2016.html. 163. Concern—Afghanistan,” Primary tions of Afghanistan: On issuance of Banking Law of Afghanistan,” August 17, 2017, http://dab.gov.af/Content/Media/Docu 2017, 17, August Afghanistan,” of Banking Law of issuance On Afghanistan: ments/BankingLawofAfghanistanEnglishTranslation6122015122139846553325325.pdf. 161. http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/a-c/afghanistan/documents/fatf-compliance-feb-2014.html#Afghanistan. 158. 158. corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table. 159. 160. 156. 156. native to Alternative1 57. Development this report. for 154. 154. 155. native to Alternative Development 150. 150. 151. 152. 153. 146. 147. 148. 149. 142. 142. 143. 144. 145. 140. 141. 5. libraries/afghanistan/941877/Reports/Afghanistan%20Drug%20Use%20survey.pdf: 138. 139. Executive Summary 186. Ibid: 19. 1 87. Mansfield, The Devil is in the Details: Nangarhar’s Continued Decline into Insurgency, Violence and Widespread Drug Production (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, February 2016), https://areu.org.af/wp-content/ uploads/2016/02/1602E-The-Devil-is-in-the-Details-Nangarhar-continued-decline-into-insurgency.pdf: 12. 188. Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan, Afghanistan Return to War of Words,” Voice of America, March 31, 2016, http://www. voanews.com/content/pakistan-afghanistan-return-to-war-of-words/3262828.html. Cases further illustrating bor- der tensions include a clash between the two countries’ border police in late April 2016 which resulted in the death of a Pakistani soldier and the capture of an Afghan border checkpoint in Nangarhar. See “Pakistani forces captures Afghan border checkpoint in Nangarhar,” Daily Times, April 24, 2016, http://dailytimes.com.pk/pakistan/25-Apr-16/ pakistani-forces-captures-afghan-border-checkpoint-in-nangarhar. 189. Gavrilis, Afghan Narcotrafficking: The State of Afghanistan’s Borders: 18. 190. Ibid. 191. Gavrilis, Afghan Narcotrafficking: The State of Afghanistan’s Borders: 16. 192. See UNODC, World Drug Report 2016, “9.3.6. Opiates,” http://www.unodc.org/wdr2016/field/9.3.6._Seizures_ of_illicit_drugs_by_region_and_high_ranking_countries_2014_-_Opiates.pdf. 193. Gavrilis, Afghan Narcotrafficking: The State of Afghanistan’s Borders: 16. 194. Ibid: 20-21. 195. Ibid: 21. 196. Ibid: 22. 1 97. Ibid: 23. 198. Unless otherwise specified, all policy recommendations in this section appear in Gavrilis,Afghan Narcotraffick- ing: The State of Afghanistan’s Borders: 26-8. 199. Additional recommendation produced by EWI’s Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking for this report. 200. Unless otherwise specified, all recommendations in this section appear in Gavrilis,Afghan Narcotrafficking: The State of Afghanistan’s Borders: 26-8. 201. Additional recommendation produced by EWI’s Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking for this report. 202. Unless otherwise specified, all recommendations in this section appear in Gavrilis,Afghan Narcotrafficking: The State of Afghanistan’s Borders: 26-8. 203. Additional recommendation produced by EWI’s Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking for this report. 204. Additional recommendation produced by EWI’s Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking for this report. 205. Additional recommendation produced by EWI’s Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking for this report. 206. Gavrilis, Afghan Narcotrafficking: The State of Afghanistan’s Borders: 27. 207. Additional recommendation produced by EWI’s Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking for this report. 208. Gavrilis, Afghan Narcotrafficking: The State of Afghanistan’s Borders: 28. 209. Additional recommendation produced by EWI’s Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking for this report. 210. Unless otherwise specified, all policy recommendations in this section appear in Gavrilis,Afghan Narcotraffick- ing: The State of Afghanistan’s Borders: 26-8. 211. This recommendation has been expanded by EWI’s Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking for this report. 212. Additional recommendations produced by EWI’s Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking for this report. 213. “МИД: тема сотрудничества НАТО и ОДКБ закрыта, и не по вине РФ,” РИА Новости, August 25, 2015, http://ria.ru/ world/20150825/1206121490.html. 214. The United States should take into consideration the fact that the CSTO is a consensus-based organization where members are able to block decisions that they oppose, in spite of the organization’s label as a means of Rus- sian power projection. 215. Gul, “Russia to Host Wider Regional Conference on Afghanistan,” Voice of America, February 7, 2017, http://www. voanews.com/a/russia-to-host-wider-regional-conference-on-afghanistan/3709818.html. A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT

56

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OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN Mary McInnis Boies (U.S.) Amb. Wolfgang Ischinger Counsel (Germany) Ross Perot, Jr. (U.S.) Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP Chairman Chairman Munich Security Conference EastWest Institute Peter Bonfield (UK) Chairman Chairman Ralph Isham (U.S.) Hillwood Development Co. LLC NXP Semiconductors Founder and Managing Director GH Venture Partners LLC H.E. Dr. Armen Sarkissian (Armenia) Matt Bross (U.S.) Vice-Chairman Chairman and CEO Anurag Jain (U.S.) EastWest Institute Compass-EOS Chairman President Access Healthcare Eurasia House International Robert N. Campbell III (U.S.) Ambassador Founder and CEO Gen. (ret) James L. Jones (U.S.) Embassy of the Republic of Armenia to Campbell Global Services LLC Former U.S. National Security Advisor the United Kingdom Former Supreme Allied Former Prime Minister of Armenia Maria Livanos Cattaui Commander Europe (Switzerland) Former Commandant of the OFFICERS Former Secretary-General Marine Corps International Chamber of Commerce R. 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Russell, Jr. (U.S.) Non-Executive Director Chairman Emeritus Liener Temerlin (U.S.) Yandex Company Russell Investment Group Chairman Founder Temerlin Consulting Amb. Zhou Wenzhong (China) Russell 20-20 Secretary-General John C. Whitehead* (U.S.) Boao Forum for Asia DIRECTORS EMERITI Former Co-Chairman Goldman Sachs NON-BOARD COMMITTEE Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland) Former U.S. Deputy MEMBERS CEO Secretary of State Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A. Laurent Roux (U.S.) Former Prime Minister of Poland Founder Gallatin Wealth Management, LLC Emil Constantinescu (Romania) President Hilton Smith, Jr. (U.S.) Institute for Regional Cooperation and President and CEO Conflict Prevention (INCOR) East Bay Co., LTD Former President of Romania * Deceased Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking

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Afghan Narcotrafficking:Illicit Financial Flows June 2017

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Afghan Narcotrafficking:Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development July 2016

In English: https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/afghan-narcotrafficking-finding-alternative-alternative-development

Afghan Narcotrafficking:The State of Afghanistan’s Borders April 2015

In English: https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/afghan-narcotrafficking-state-afghanistans-borders In Russian: https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/афганский-наркотрафик-состояние-границ-афганистана

Afghan Narcotrafficking:Post-2014 Scenarios February 2015

In English: https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/post-2014-scenarios-afghan-narcotrafficking In Russian: https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/post-2014-scenarios-afghan-narcotrafficking-russian-edition

Afghan Narcotrafficking:A Joint Threat Assessment April 2013

In English: http://www.ewi.info/idea/afghan-narcotrafficking-joint-threat-assessment In Russian: http://www.ewi.info/idea/afghan-narcotrafficking-joint-threat-assessment-russian-edition A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT

60 A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 61 Copyright © 2017 EastWest Institute ISBN: 978-0-9861751-4-5 Photos: Reporters.be On the cover: Sunrise over a poppy field in Maiwand District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan.

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The EastWest Institute works to reduce international conflict, addressing seemingly intractable problems that threaten world security and stability. We forge new connections and build trust among global leaders and influencers, help create practical new ideas and take action through our network of global decision- makers. Independent and nonprofit since our founding in 1980, we have offices in New York, Brussels, Moscow, Washington, D.C., Dallas, San Francisco and Istanbul.

The EastWest Institute 11 East 26th Street, 20th Floor New York, NY 10010 U.S.A. +1-212-824-4100 [email protected] www.eastwest.ngo A JOINT POLICY ASSESSMENT 63 Building Trust Delivering Solutions

The EastWest Institute works to reduce international conflict, addressing seemingly intractable problems that threaten world security and stability. We forge new connections and build trust among global leaders and influencers, help create practical new ideas, and take action through our network of global decision- makers. Independent and nonprofit since our founding in 1980, we have offices in New York, Brussels, Moscow, Washington, D.C., Dallas, San Francisco and Istanbul.

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