Nicole Oresme and William Ockham

chapter 8 Nicole Oresme and William Ockham

Stefano Caroti

1 Introduction

The inclusion of his name in a list of nominalist philosophers1 notwithstanding, Oresme has been considered one of Ockham’s opponents for his unwavering con- sent in explaining through species both natural changes and cognitive acts.2 Oresme’s attitude toward the Venerabilis Inceptor is, however, more complex. He sometimes seems to blame Ockham for not being reductionist enough, particu- larly after having criticized Ockham’s solution to a particular problem, as we shall see below. In order to have a more complete and document ed view of this complex attitude, I shall rely on his Physics commentary,3 where—contrary to other

1 Published by Edmond Faral, “Jean Buridan, maître ès arts de l’Université de Paris,” Histoire littéraire de la France 38 (1949), 462–605, here: 488. I quote from Bert Hansen, Nicole Oresme and the Marvels of Nature. The “De causis Mirabilium,” (Studies and Texts) 68 (Toronto, 1985), 105, note 26. Cf. Claude Panaccio, Ivan Bendwell, “Le nominalisme d’Oresme et la sémantique de la connotation dans les Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima,” in “Ad Ingenii Acuitionem.” Studies in Honour of Alfonso Maierù, (eds.) Stefano Caroti, Ruedi Imbach, Zénon Kaluza, Giorgio Stabile and Loris Sturlese (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge) 38 (Louvain-La-Neuve, 2006), 281–301. On the dissemination of Ockham’s works in Paris: William J. Courtenay, Ockham and Ockhamism. Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 99 (Leiden, 2008); Katherine H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 22 (Leiden, 1988). 2 See the conclusions of Peter Marshall, the former editor of Oresme’s De anima commentary in Nicholas Oresme’s “Questiones super libros Aristotelis De anima.” A Critical Edition with Introduction and Commentary, Unp. PhD Diss. (Cornell University, 1980), 44, 76. See also Benoît Patar, Nicolai Oresme Expositio et Quaestiones in Aristotelis “De anima.” Études doctri- nales en collaboration avec Claude Gagnon, Docteur en Philosophie (Philosophes Médiévaux) 32 (Louvain-La-Neuve, 1995), 159* (C. Gagnon). 3 Nicole Oresme, Questiones super Physicam (Books i–vii), (eds.) Stefano Caroti, Jean Celeyrette, Stefan Kirschner, Edmond Mazet (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 112 (Leiden, 2013). Partial editions: Stefano Caroti, “La position de Nicole Oresme sur la nature du mouvement (“Questiones super Physicam,” iii, 1–8): problèmes gno- séologiques, ontologiques et sémantiques,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 61 (1994), 303–385 (for book iii, questions 1–8); Stefan Kirschner, Nicolaus Oresmes Kommentar zur Physik des Aristoteles. Kommentar mit Edition der Quaestionen zu Buch 3 und

226 Caroti works4—Ockham is explicitly quoted,5 and where his position is more recogniz- able, indeed so much that the anonymous annotator of the Seville manuscript was able to ascribe it to him. In what follows, I will address four topics: the relationship between substance and accidents; condensation and rarefaction; priva- tion motion.

2 The Great Distinction: Substance and Accidents

In Question 5 of the first book, Oresme tackles a very important problem: whether the term “being” can be predicated univocally of substance as well as of accidents.6 Ockham’s quest in reducing the ontological commitment of Aristotle’s categories is well known, being a central aspect of his philosophical struggle against a perfect isomorphism between words and things on the basis of parsimonious semantics. The relationship between substance and accidents is also a very important element of Oresme’s strategy to propose a new ontol- ogy in which accidents are considered modi rerum,7 a proposal that had to be

4 der aristotelischen Physik sowie von vier Quaestionen zu Buch 5 (Sudhoffs Archiv Beihefte) 39 (Stuttgart, 1977) (for books iii, iv and v, questions 6–9). Stefan Kirschner proposes 1347 as the terminus ante quem of Oresme’s Physics commentary’s redaction, Kirschner, Nicolaus Oresmes Kommentar, 28–37. According to W.J. Courtenay the early diffusion of Ockham’s philosophy in Paris concerns mainly natural philosophy. On this, see: Courtenay, Ockham, 267–286, 329–346. For the recent bibliography on Oresme’s Physics commentary, in addition to the articles quoted in note 7, see: E. Mazet, “Pierre Ceffons et Oresme. Leur relation revisi- tée,” in “Quia inter doctores est magna dissensio.” Les débats de philosophie naturelle à Paris au XIVe siècle, (eds.) Stefano Caroti and Jean Celeyrette (Florence, 2004), 175–194; Stefan Kirschner, “Oresme’s Concepts of Place, Space and Time in his Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Physics,’” Oriens-Occidens. Cahiers du Centre d’histoire des sciences et de philosophies arabes et médiévales 3 (2000), 145–179; id., “Nicole Oresme on the Void in his Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Physics,’” in La nature et le vide dans la physique médiévale. Études dédiées à Edward Grant, (eds.) Joël Biard, Sabine Rommevaux (Studia Artistarum) 32 (Turnhout, 2012), 247–268. 4 Stefano Caroti, “Les modi rerum…encore une fois. Une source possible de Nicole Oresme: le commentaire sur le Livre 1er des Sentences de Jean de Mirecourt,” in “Quia inter doctores est magna dissensio,” 195–222. 5 Some remarks on Oresme’s Ockham quotations are also in my paper presented in the confer- ence for the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of L.M. De Rijk’s Logica modernorum held in Amsterdam in 1997, see Stefano Caroti, Nicole Oresme and Modi Rerum, “Noctua” 1 (2014), 1-27. 6 “Utrum ens sit univocum ad substantiam et ad accidens.” Oresme, Questiones super Phys. 1.5, 31. 7 On modi rerum: Stefano Caroti, “Modi rerum e res artificiales in alcuni commenti parigini alla Physica del secolo xiv,” in “Ob rogatum meorum sociorum.” Studi in memoria di Lorenzo Pozzi,