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Home , Practical reason, Pragmatism

1

Handbook on , ed. Michael Festl (Stuttgart: Metzler).

KANT

Sami Pihlström

University of Helsinki, Finland

E-mail: [email protected]

Introduction

It may be argued that it is, to a significant extent, the “Kantian” of pragmatism, as well as the ability of pragmatism to critically reinterpret, transform, and further develop some key Kantian , that makes pragmatism a highly relevant philosophical approach today – in, e.g., metaphysical and epistemological discussions of realism and , and , the of , and many other fields. This entry articulates some central aspects in which pragmatism, early and late, can be regarded as a Kantian philosophy, focusing on the nature of , the relation between and , and religion. The charge (by some pragmatists) that pragmatism is essentially anti-Kantian is also briefly examined. Clearly, the towering figure of (1724-1804) cannot be neglected in serious pragmatism scholarship.

William James (1898, 138-139) saw philosophical as going “round” Kant instead of going “through” him. Undeniably, pragmatists have defended non- or even anti-Kantian views regarding various philosophical problems: contrary to Kant’s universalism and apriorism, pragmatism tends to emphasize the contingent practice-embeddedness of , , and value. However, pragmatism – even James’s – also shares crucial assumptions with Kant’s critical philosophy, to the extent that Murray Murphey (1966) aptly called the classical Cambridge pragmatists “Kant’s children”. Recent scholarship has extensively covered the Kantian background of pragmatism and the affinities between pragmatism and transcendental philosophical (see several essays in Gava and Stern 2016; cf. Pihlström 2006, 2010, 2013, 2015).

In this entry, one cannot do to the richness of the question concerning the pragmatists’ relation to Kant – either historically or systematically. One may, however, shed light on this topic by exploring this relation through the threefold structure of Kant’s critical philosophy. Kant summarized his three Critiques in terms of three questions: (1) What can I know? (2) What ought I to do? (3) What may I hope? These questions open up Kant’s critical philosophy with respect to (1) and metaphysics (i.e., the core areas of “”), (2) ethics (i.e., “”), and (3) . Both classical pragmatists – especially Peirce, James, and Dewey – and 20th century neopragmatists – e.g., and – have significantly contributed to all these fields of philosophy. While this entry focuses on these areas, pragmatist reinterpretations of Kant (and versa) have also been presented in other fields, including (see McMahon 2014).

As is well known, Kant transformed and transcended various philosophical controversies and dichotomies of his , critically synthesizing, e.g., and , realism and idealism, and freedom, as well as nature and morality. Similarly, pragmatism has often been defended as a critical middle ground option. For James (1907), pragmatism mediates between extreme positions, in particular the conflicting temperaments of the “tough-minded” and the “tender-minded”. Even the conflict between pragmatism and Kant’s apriorism can be mediated, as in C.I. Lewis’s (1923) theory of the pragmatic a priori. It is in this reconciliatory yet critical that one may also undertake the task of finding common ground between Kant and the pragmatists. 2

Epistemology and metaphysics

Analogously to Kant’s combination of empirical realism and , virtually all the classical pragmatists attempted to walk the middle path between realism and idealism (or what is now often called constructivism) in epistemology and metaphysics. One cannot reach any speculative metaphysical about the world as it is in itself. The objects of and are not “ready-made” but are structured through conceptualization and inquiry. Neopragmatists like Putnam have made this point by attacking metaphysical realism and aiming at “internal” or “pragmatic” realism instead. A deep, essentially Kantian tension between realism and idealism (constructivism) thus seems to characterize the pragmatist .

The view that is a pragmatic “construction” faces a dilemma, however: it may seem to be either exciting but obviously false (if causally, empirically, or factually interpreted), or true but trivial and unexciting (if it merely amounts to the thesis that human the used for categorizing reality). This problem is considerably enriched and nuanced when articulated in a Kantian way, distinguishing between the transcendental and the empirical levels – though this distinction itself must eventually be softened (“naturalized”) according to pragmatist Kantians.

Many – not only pragmatists – have argued that the and/or of things (entities, ) is in a way or another relative to, or dependent on, the human , linguistic frameworks, conceptual schemes, practices, language-, forms of life, , points of view, or something similar. Among influential advocates of key variations of this “dependence thesis” are, in addition to Kant himself (for whom the empirical world is constituted by the transcendental faculties of the mind, i.e., the pure forms of and the pure concepts or of the ), pragmatists like James (whatever we may call a “thing” depends on our purposes and selective interests), Dewey (the objects of inquiry are constructed in and through inquiry), Putnam (there is no “ready-made world” but only scheme-internal objects), and Rorty (our “vocabularies” constitute the ways the world is). (See James 1907, Dewey 1929, Putnam 1981, Rorty 1991.)

In their distinctive ways, these and many other philosophers have suggested that there is no world an sich that could be conceptualized or cognized; if there even is such a world, as Kant held, it is a mere limit of human thought and experience, a problematic Grenzbegriff (cf. Kant 1781/1787, B306-309). What there is for us is a world continuously structured relative to schemes of categorization and inquiry, which are analogous to the Kantian categories. Pragmatists, however, generally follow Kant in embracing something like empirical realism within a broader pragmatist position comparable to Kantian transcendental idealism. Pragmatism does not simply opt for antirealism or radical constructivism and but seeks a pragmatic realism compatible with .

Instead of understanding metaphysics as an inquiry into qua Being, pragmatists may understand it as an essentially Kantian inquiry into the fundamental – pace Kant, not but historically changing and reinterpretable – features of the human world, as it emerges in and through purposive practices (including the practices of inquiry itself). Pragmatists thus join, implicitly, Kantians like Henry Allison (2004) in insisting (with Kant) that one cannot know, or perhaps even form a coherent conception of, the world as it is in itself, independently of the conditions of and . Metaphysics as pursued by metaphysical realists, assuming what Putnam calls the “God’s-Eye View” on the absolute structure of the world, is impossible, according to both pragmatists and Kantians. However, this approach does not renounce the possibility of an ontological inquiry into the structure of the (human) world, as there is room for a critical conception of metaphysics reconceived as an examination of the basic features of a humanly categorized reality, of the practice-embedded conditions necessary for us to be able to experience an objective, structured world.

Pragmatism, when developed as an inquiry into the structure of the “human world”, may be seen as a naturalized form of Kantian transcendental philosophy. Pragmatism reinterprets and further develops 3

Kantian ideas by formulating a perspectival approach to and inquiry generally, highly critical of metaphysical realism (and antirealism), yet affirming the seriousness of rational inquiry into the ways the world must be taken to be from within human practices. Such an ontologically serious Kantian pragmatism cannot be reduced to a merely methodological perspective or constraint; it is a method of inquiring into the way(s) the world (for us) is. The pragmatic method, developed by Peirce and James in their different ways (see Peirce 1992-98, vol. 1; James 1907, ch. 2), seeks to determine the core of metaphysical disputes and theories by examining their objects’ conceivable practical effects. According to pragmatist metaphysics, objects – and ontological categories generally – emerge from human categorizing practices, just as they are in traditional Kantian transcendental philosophy constitutively based upon the necessary conditions of possible experience.

Accordingly, it is primarily in the of the realism debate – the on-going dispute concerning , , and reality – that pragmatism and the Kantian transcendental approach are natural companions, critically integrating a moderate form of realism with a full acknowledgment of the human constructive contribution in shaping the world into what it is for rational -users and inquirers.

Ethics and value

Pragmatists generally avoid Kant’s (1788) rigorist and universalist ethics based on the as a of pure practical . Most pragmatists have been consequentialists of some kind. However, in a more general sense, a pragmatist to the relation between ethics and metaphysics is “Kantian”. Insofar as the notion of reality is a function of human ways of constituting reality, and insofar as this view invokes, pragmatically, historically transformable categories instead of fixed a priori structures of cognition, a crucial question is to what extent world-categorizing practices involve not only conceptual and epistemic but also ethical and other valuational elements.

James, in particular, seems to make the relatively radical claim that metaphysics might not be possible at all without a connection to, or entanglement with, ethics. One cannot arrive at any understanding of reality as human beings are able to experience it without paying attention to the ways in which moral valuations are constituents of that reality, insofar as it is humanly experienceable at all (see, e.g., James 1907, chs. 3-4, 7). The (Jamesian) pragmatist maintains that, when dealing with the world in any manner whatsoever (however theoretical), one is always, at least implicitly, engaging in moral valuations, formulating one’s categorizations of reality from perspectives laden with ethical ideals and assumptions; hence, reality is inevitably value-laden.

In contemporary pragmatism, this topic is approached in terms of the fact-value entanglement. There are, according to Putnam (1990, 2002), no value-independent facts (nor, for that , fact-independent values); facts and values are deeply entangled. The Kantian pragmatist retaining metaphysics in a reinterpreted form may join Putnam’s defense of the fact-value entanglement, while rejecting his antimetaphysics. Metaphysics itself is a deeply valuational activity. Like the empirical world in general, metaphysical problems and concepts are laden with values. It is not just a value-neutral matter whether there are, say, human or cultural entities like (or values, for that matter) in the world. Such metaphysical issues are valuational, inviting an active interplay of theoretical and practical philosophy. Indeed, a reinterpretation of the Kantian distinction between theoretical philosophy, including , metaphysics, epistemology, , etc., and practical philosophy, including ethics as well as social and , is a key pragmatist contribution to 20th (and 21st) century .

The fact-value entanglement does not exhaust the pragmatist contribution to a (naturalized) Kantian understanding of the nature of morality and values. Pragmatism is, among other things, an attempt to understand both scientific and non-scientific as parts of human, inevitably ethically problematic existence. It adopts an agent’s perspective on experience, thinking, and reason-use, maintaining that it is only through purposive practices that one may fully appreciate human cognitive and rational capacities. Thought – or 4 language, or the mind – is not a “mirror of nature”, as Rorty (1979) put it, but arises out of thinkers’ and inquirers’ worldly engagements with their natural surroundings, being constantly in the service of human interests and needs.

This irreducibly practical starting point not only makes pragmatism a most significant framework for contemporary discussions of rationality, knowledge, morality, and value, but also again reconnects it with Kant’s critical project of understanding humanity’s relation to the world through the distinction between the perspectives of and moral reasoning. Thus, the problem of how scientific and ethical perspectives on the world can or should be reconciled is, again, both a Kantian problem and a pragmatist one. Kant (1781/1787, BXXX) maintained that we must limit the scope of knowledge in order to make room for . In a manner strikingly similar to the pragmatists, he wished to make sense of both scientific experience and moral experience. Kant demonstrated how to appreciate empirical cognition of an objective world without giving up the objectivity (or at least rationally binding intersubjectivity) of ethical value judgments; while rejecting Kant’s , pragmatists have continued this project. Like Kant, many pragmatists insist on viewing human beings in a “double light”, both (empirically) as naturally emerging creatures of the natural world and (quasi-transcendentally) as free, autonomous, normatively self-guiding agents, whose , however, arises from that same nature while continuously structuring it.

In sum, while hardly any pragmatist subscribes to Kant’s deontology, there are deeply Kantian aspects in pragmatist ethical reflection, including James’s continuous concern with the and value of life and even Dewey’s (1925) project of overcoming the nature vs. dualism. No pragmatist has been a proper Kantian in moral philosophy, but many of them have attempted to acknowledge the seriousness of our moral perspectives on the world in a manner not dissimilar from Kant’s, while endorsing and further developing the Kantian double vision of human beings as both natural (i.e., parts of the causal structure of the natural world) and free and autonomous (i.e., morally responsible denizens in the “kingdom of ends”).

Religion and

In the philosophy of religion, one may also find Kantian aspects of pragmatic approaches in, e.g., the problems of theism vs. and evidentialism vs. (Pihlström 2013). For virtually no pragmatist can religious faith be said to be a strictly evidential issue on a par with scientific hypotheses. plays only a marginal role in religion, as religion has to do with the way in which one understands and relates to one’s life as a whole. According to Kant as well as pragmatism, religion must be intimately connected with the ethical life. We can pursue moral , no theological ethics: religion cannot be the ground of ethics but must itself be grounded in the requirements of morality.

One may, then, employ both Kantian and pragmatist insights in order to argue that the theism vs. atheism issue is not exhausted by the narrowly (evidentialist) considerations one might advance in favor of either theism or atheism. This is because one needs the resources of Kantian – the kind of ethically driven use of reason that pragmatists arguably see as pervading human reason-use generally – in order to arrive at any humanly adequate reaction to this problem. Theism might, the Kantian pragmatist may argue, be rationally acceptable in terms of practical reason, or more generally from the standpoint of the vital human needs and interests embedded in practices of life; nevertheless, this is very different from the kind of justification standardly aimed at in evidentialist philosophy of religion. Moreover, justification in terms of practical reason might, as Kant insisted, be the only rational justification available for the religious believer. From a Kantian and pragmatist point of view, faith in God need not be made scientifically acceptable, or warranted in terms of religiously neutral criteria of reason (that is, either empirically verifiable or epistemically justified in a broader sense), because it is ultimately not a matter of science or theoretical reason; the crucial task is to make it ethically acceptable. 5

Pragmatist philosophy of religion (especially James’s) can be seen as reinterpreting and further developing Kant’s (1788) postulates of practical reason, i.e., the freedom of the , the , and the immortality of the . It is, in particular, from the perspective of the pragmatist proposal to (re-)entangle ethics and metaphysics that this Kantian topic deserves scrutiny. One may ask whether the defense of the postulates in the of Kant’s second Critique leads to a metaphysical position according to which God exists. Here the pragmatist may suggest that Kant’s postulates are, again, both metaphysical and ethical – with metaphysical and ethical aspects inextricably intertwined.

Although this is not Kant’s own way of putting the matter, one may say that the postulates presuppose that the world is not absolutely independent of human perspectives but is responsive to human ethical (or more generally valuational) needs and interests, or “in the making” through such needs and interests (cf. James 1907). Human beings structure reality, including religious reality, in terms of what their commitment to morality requires; there is no pre-structured, “ready-made” world that could be meaningfully engaged with. It remains an open question whether, or to what extent, this structuring is really metaphysical. Some interpreters prefer a purely ethical, “merely pragmatic”, account of the Kantian postulates. Is there “really” a God, or is one just entitled to act “as if” there were one? This question needs to be pursued by pragmatists as much as Kantians.

Kant constructs his moral for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in the “Canon of Pure Reason” (Kant 1781/1787, A795/B823ff.) and the Dialectics of the second Critique (Kant 1788, A223ff.). As mere ideas of pure reason (“transcendental ideas”), the concepts of freedom, God, and the soul lack “objective reality”. At best, they can be employed regulatively, not constitutively. This, however, is only the point of view that theoretical, offers to the matter. From the perspective of practical reason – which, famously, is ultimately “prior to” theoretical reason in Kant’s system (Kant 1788, A215ff.) – there is a kind of “reality” corresponding to these concepts. Their epistemic status, when transformed into postulates of practical reason, differs from the status of the constitutive, transcendental conditions of any humanly possible experience, i.e., the categories and the forms of pure intuition, explored in the “Transcendental Analytic” and the “Transcendental Aesthetic” (Kant 1781/1787). The latter kind of conditions necessarily structure, according to Kant, the (or any) humanly cognizable world, that is, any objects or events that may be conceivably encountered in experience. However, the postulates of practical reason also structure – in an analogical albeit not identical manner – the human world as a world of ethical concern, deliberation, and . Yet, this “structuring” is not “merely ethical” but also metaphysical.

From a pragmatist point of view, as much as from the Kantian one, ethics and metaphysics are again entangled here. Religion, or theism, is pragmatically legitimated as a postulate needed for morality, for ethical life and practices. Yet, no theological ethics in the of, say, divine command theory can be accepted. What is needed, according to both Kant and pragmatists like James, is moral theology. Any attempt to base ethics on theology, or religion, would (in Kantian terms) be an example of heteronomy instead of , but the only critical and rational way to provide a basis for theology is the ethical way.

The Kantian pragmatist needs to consider a problem here, though. Is theism practically legitimated a priori, as in Kant, or does it receive its legitimation empirically or psychologically, as an attitude “energizing” moral life, because we are the kind of beings we are, as in James and perhaps other pragmatists? One possible suggestion is that just as Kantian transcendental (critical) philosophy synthesizes the pre-critically opposed epistemological of empiricism and rationalism, and just as pragmatism bridges the gap between facts and values, one may try to reconcile Kantian (transcendental) and Jamesian (pragmatist, empirical, psychological) ways of justifying theism ethically. The Kantian perspective on theism needs pragmatic rearticulation, and the thus rearticulated pragmatic aspects of theism are not disconnected from the Kantian transcendental work of practical reason.

This picture of Kantian pragmatism in the philosophy of religion would have to be supplemented in many ways, by taking into account, say, Dewey’s naturalized account of religiosity or the concept of hope as elaborated (somewhat differently) by James, Dewey, and Rorty. In addition, Kant’s criticism of as 6 rationalizing attempts to provide for God’s allowing the world to contain evil and can also be reread from the standpoint of pragmatist (especially Jamesian) attacks on theodicies (see Kivistö and Pihlström 2016). It is not an accident that Kant is the starting point for both pragmatist criticisms of metaphysical realism and for pragmatist criticisms of theodicies, as both are crucial in the project of critical philosophy continued by pragmatism. From the pragmatist as well as Kantian perspective, theodicies commit the same mistake as metaphysical realism: they aim at a speculative, absolute account (from a “God’s-Eye- View”) of why an omnipotent, omniscient, and absolutely benevolent God allows, or might allow, the world to contain apparently unnecessary and meaningless evil and suffering. Kantian critical philosophy denies the possibility of such a transcendent account – and this denial is itself, again, both ethical and metaphysical, followed by James’s (1907, ch. 1) firm rejection of any theodicies as insensitive to the irreducibility of other human beings’ suffering.

Anti-Kantian pragmatism?

It must be noted that in many cases pragmatists have not followed Kant’s ideas. This is most obvious in the case of Rorty’s , but also Dewey’s version of classical pragmatism and pragmatic naturalism is in many ways far from Kant. Yet, most pragmatists have shared, if not Kant’s views or doctrines, at least his central problems. In particular, the realism vs. idealism tension at the core of pragmatist metaphysics, with important implications to ethics and philosophy of religion, is profoundly Kantian, and so is the double perspective needed to understand fully natural human life as genuinely ethically committed and responsible.

Some recent contributions to pragmatism scholarship claim pragmatism to be profoundly non-Kantian. From the point of view of the Kantian pragmatism sketched in this entry, it seems that an otherwise highly accurate pragmatism interpreter such as Giovanni Maddalena (2015) makes some rather strong and problematic statements about Kant – and thereby, unavoidably, about the pragmatists’ relation to Kant. His gesture aiming at a total liberation from the Kantian predicament ignores that pragmatism largely gets its significance from the Kantian framework. No pragmatist needs to agree with – or perhaps, strictly speaking, with anything – that Kant actually wrote, but the basic critical approach inherited from Kant cannot be abandoned.

Maddalena’s case is illustrative in this context; characteristically, his statements are too general to be useful in any detailed assessment of the pragmatists’ Kantian influences – just like the classical pragmatists’ own typically brief comments on Kant. For example, when Maddalena (2015, 5) tells us that for Kant “reason is the ‘measure of all things’”, one should note that what Kant, far from claiming reason to be all-powerful, primarily offers is a reflexive critique of reason. Moreover, while it is true that Peirce’s theory of representation differs in important respects from Kant’s and that Peirce, unlike Kant, subscribed to “scholastic realism” postulating the reality of “generals” like habits (Maddalena 2015, 7-8; cf. Peirce 1992- 98, vol. 2), it is not impossible to locate a Kantian strain even in Peirce’s argumentation for scholastic realism as a necessary condition for the possibility of inquiry. Furthermore, in contrast to Peirce, Kant maintained that there is a “gap” between human knowledge (and the phenomena it can reach) and reality as such (the “things-in-themselves”). However, this is a problematic metaphysical gap only for a “two worlds” reading of transcendental idealism. The pragmatist has good reasons to prefer the “one world” (“two aspects”) reading, according to which Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves is not a distinction between two separate metaphysical realms or sets of objects but a distinction between two different ways of considering one and the same reality (Allison 2004).

Furthermore, although James does attack Kantian transcendental idealism in conjunction with his attack on the Hegelian Absolute, it does not follow that “the Absolute is intellectualist because it derives from Kant’s intellectualist philosophy” (Maddalena 2015, 15). From the Kantian point of view, the Hegelian idealists’ Absolute – which James indeed criticized – is a speculative metaphysical postulation illegitimately transgressing the bounds of human reason. Far from accepting Maddalena’s (2015, 28) conclusion that “one 7 cannot understand pragmatism if one’s anti- is not supplemented by a profound anti- ”, one may insist, then, that pragmatism completes Kant’s critical , and continues to do so. It is precisely in its deep Kantianism – albeit reconceptualizing and thus moving beyond while critically preserving Kant’s original views – that pragmatism radically departs from, e.g., mainstream . Pragmatism and Kantianism are on the same side in the battle against the kind of metaphysical realism (or what Kant called transcendental realism) that proposes to reveal the fundamental metaphysical structure of the world independently of the conditions of human categorization, representation, and inquiry, and against the various applications of such strong realism in, e.g., the philosophy of religion and the theodicy debate (as spelled out above).

Conclusion

Finally, two metaphilosophical issues need to be raised. First, the intimate relation between metaphysics and ethics should be seen as a unifying feature of pragmatism. In various ways, both classical and recent pragmatists have argued that metaphysical (and epistemological, as well as religious) pursuits must be guided by ethical values: one cannot just settle the metaphysical issues first and then see how the ethical ones fall into their place; on the contrary, ethical perspectives are always already at when one engages in metaphysical (or any) reflection on the place of human beings in the world. This corresponds to Kant’s insistence on the primacy of practical reason in relation to theoretical reason. The ultimate task of human reason is practical, and even when reflecting on and determining whether a given issue belongs to the realm of theoretical reason-use or to the realm of practical reason-use, one is operating at the level of practical reason. This “primacy of practice” – with practice understood in a deeply ethical sense – is a key link between pragmatism and Kantian critical philosophy.

Secondly, Kant believed that his three critical questions can be summarized as one question: “What is man?” In the end, then, there is a sense in which not only the “pragmatic ” (Kant 1798) but Kant’s entire philosophy amounts to philosophical anthropology, an attempt to understand human existence in its various dimensions (theoretical, practical, religious, aesthetic, etc.). In a similar way, pragmatists are “philosophical anthropologists” investigating human life in a human world, from an engaged agent’s perspective embedded in practice. While pragmatists often avoid the Kantian notion of the transcendental subject, the reflexivity characterizing that Kantian subject, manifested in reason’s self-critical turn toward its own activities, possibilities, and limits (ultimately guided by a practical interest), is something that pragmatism again shares with Kant. This reflexivity is itself ethical, a process that real living human beings engage in. This, roughly, is what one may mean by saying that both Kant’s and the pragmatists’ projects ultimately come down to philosophical anthropology.

According to Dewey (1925), philosophy is the “critical method for developing methods of criticism”. One should appreciate the way in which pragmatism is indebted to, or is even a species of, critical philosophy, clearly not exactly in Kant’s original sense of this term but in a developed sense that retains insights from the Kantian of criticism, especially the idea of the reflexivity essential to human reason-use and inquiry. It is through inquiry itself that one can (only) hope to shed light on what it means to inquire. Philosophy is an inquiry into inquiry, and this is a fundamentally Kantian critical point. “Der kritische Weg ist allein noch offen”, Kant wrote (A856/B884), and pragmatists should follow him in this conclusion.

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See also: Peirce, James, Dewey, action, inquiry, nature, culture, pluralism, critique, epistemology, philosophy of religion, anthropology