First-Past-The-Post BC-Single Transferable Vote BC-STV Is
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Are Condorcet and Minimax Voting Systems the Best?1
1 Are Condorcet and Minimax Voting Systems the Best?1 Richard B. Darlington Cornell University Abstract For decades, the minimax voting system was well known to experts on voting systems, but was not widely considered to be one of the best systems. But in recent years, two important experts, Nicolaus Tideman and Andrew Myers, have both recognized minimax as one of the best systems. I agree with that. This paper presents my own reasons for preferring minimax. The paper explicitly discusses about 20 systems. Comments invited. [email protected] Copyright Richard B. Darlington May be distributed free for non-commercial purposes Keywords Voting system Condorcet Minimax 1. Many thanks to Nicolaus Tideman, Andrew Myers, Sharon Weinberg, Eduardo Marchena, my wife Betsy Darlington, and my daughter Lois Darlington, all of whom contributed many valuable suggestions. 2 Table of Contents 1. Introduction and summary 3 2. The variety of voting systems 4 3. Some electoral criteria violated by minimax’s competitors 6 Monotonicity 7 Strategic voting 7 Completeness 7 Simplicity 8 Ease of voting 8 Resistance to vote-splitting and spoiling 8 Straddling 8 Condorcet consistency (CC) 8 4. Dismissing eight criteria violated by minimax 9 4.1 The absolute loser, Condorcet loser, and preference inversion criteria 9 4.2 Three anti-manipulation criteria 10 4.3 SCC/IIA 11 4.4 Multiple districts 12 5. Simulation studies on voting systems 13 5.1. Why our computer simulations use spatial models of voter behavior 13 5.2 Four computer simulations 15 5.2.1 Features and purposes of the studies 15 5.2.2 Further description of the studies 16 5.2.3 Results and discussion 18 6. -
Single-Winner Voting Method Comparison Chart
Single-winner Voting Method Comparison Chart This chart compares the most widely discussed voting methods for electing a single winner (and thus does not deal with multi-seat or proportional representation methods). There are countless possible evaluation criteria. The Criteria at the top of the list are those we believe are most important to U.S. voters. Plurality Two- Instant Approval4 Range5 Condorcet Borda (FPTP)1 Round Runoff methods6 Count7 Runoff2 (IRV)3 resistance to low9 medium high11 medium12 medium high14 low15 spoilers8 10 13 later-no-harm yes17 yes18 yes19 no20 no21 no22 no23 criterion16 resistance to low25 high26 high27 low28 low29 high30 low31 strategic voting24 majority-favorite yes33 yes34 yes35 no36 no37 yes38 no39 criterion32 mutual-majority no41 no42 yes43 no44 no45 yes/no 46 no47 criterion40 prospects for high49 high50 high51 medium52 low53 low54 low55 U.S. adoption48 Condorcet-loser no57 yes58 yes59 no60 no61 yes/no 62 yes63 criterion56 Condorcet- no65 no66 no67 no68 no69 yes70 no71 winner criterion64 independence of no73 no74 yes75 yes/no 76 yes/no 77 yes/no 78 no79 clones criterion72 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 monotonicity yes no no yes yes yes/no yes criterion80 prepared by FairVote: The Center for voting and Democracy (April 2009). References Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey Banks (1991). “Monotonicity in Electoral Systems”. American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 2 (June): 531-537. Brewer, Albert P. (1993). “First- and Secon-Choice Votes in Alabama”. The Alabama Review, A Quarterly Review of Alabama History, Vol. ?? (April): ?? - ?? Burgin, Maggie (1931). The Direct Primary System in Alabama. -
Legislature by Lot: Envisioning Sortition Within a Bicameral System
PASXXX10.1177/0032329218789886Politics & SocietyGastil and Wright 789886research-article2018 Special Issue Article Politics & Society 2018, Vol. 46(3) 303 –330 Legislature by Lot: Envisioning © The Author(s) 2018 Article reuse guidelines: Sortition within a Bicameral sagepub.com/journals-permissions https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329218789886DOI: 10.1177/0032329218789886 System* journals.sagepub.com/home/pas John Gastil Pennsylvania State University Erik Olin Wright University of Wisconsin–Madison Abstract In this article, we review the intrinsic democratic flaws in electoral representation, lay out a set of principles that should guide the construction of a sortition chamber, and argue for the virtue of a bicameral system that combines sortition and elections. We show how sortition could prove inclusive, give citizens greater control of the political agenda, and make their participation more deliberative and influential. We consider various design challenges, such as the sampling method, legislative training, and deliberative procedures. We explain why pairing sortition with an elected chamber could enhance its virtues while dampening its potential vices. In our conclusion, we identify ideal settings for experimenting with sortition. Keywords bicameral legislatures, deliberation, democratic theory, elections, minipublics, participation, political equality, sortition Corresponding Author: John Gastil, Department of Communication Arts & Sciences, Pennsylvania State University, 232 Sparks Bldg., University Park, PA 16802, USA. Email: [email protected] *This special issue of Politics & Society titled “Legislature by Lot: Transformative Designs for Deliberative Governance” features a preface, an introductory anchor essay and postscript, and six articles that were presented as part of a workshop held at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, September 2017, organized by John Gastil and Erik Olin Wright. -
Single Transferable Vote Resists Strategic Voting
Single Transferable Vote Resists Strategic Voting John J. Bartholdi, III School of Industrial and Systems Engineering Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332 James B. Orlin Sloan School of Management Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 November 13, 1990; revised April 4, 2003 Abstract We give evidence that Single Tranferable Vote (STV) is computation- ally resistant to manipulation: It is NP-complete to determine whether there exists a (possibly insincere) preference that will elect a favored can- didate, even in an election for a single seat. Thus strategic voting under STV is qualitatively more difficult than under other commonly-used vot- ing schemes. Furthermore, this resistance to manipulation is inherent to STV and does not depend on hopeful extraneous assumptions like the presumed difficulty of learning the preferences of the other voters. We also prove that it is NP-complete to recognize when an STV elec- tion violates monotonicity. This suggests that non-monotonicity in STV elections might be perceived as less threatening since it is in effect “hid- den” and hard to exploit for strategic advantage. 1 1 Strategic voting For strategic voting the fundamental problem for any would-be manipulator is to decide what preference to claim. We will show that this modest task can be impractically difficult under the voting scheme known as Single Transferable Vote (STV). Furthermore this difficulty pertains even in the ideal situation in which the manipulator knows the preferences of all other voters and knows that they will vote their complete and sincere preferences. Thus STV is apparently unique among voting schemes in actual use today in that it is computationally resistant to manipulation. -
Appendix A: Electoral Rules
Appendix A: Electoral Rules Table A.1 Electoral Rules for Italy’s Lower House, 1948–present Time Period 1948–1993 1993–2005 2005–present Plurality PR with seat Valle d’Aosta “Overseas” Tier PR Tier bonus national tier SMD Constituencies No. of seats / 6301 / 32 475/475 155/26 617/1 1/1 12/4 districts Election rule PR2 Plurality PR3 PR with seat Plurality PR (FPTP) bonus4 (FPTP) District Size 1–54 1 1–11 617 1 1–6 (mean = 20) (mean = 6) (mean = 4) Note that the acronym FPTP refers to First Past the Post plurality electoral system. 1The number of seats became 630 after the 1962 constitutional reform. Note the period of office is always 5 years or less if the parliament is dissolved. 2Imperiali quota and LR; preferential vote; threshold: one quota and 300,000 votes at national level. 3Hare Quota and LR; closed list; threshold: 4% of valid votes at national level. 4Hare Quota and LR; closed list; thresholds: 4% for lists running independently; 10% for coalitions; 2% for lists joining a pre-electoral coalition, except for the best loser. Ballot structure • Under the PR system (1948–1993), each voter cast one vote for a party list and could express a variable number of preferential votes among candidates of that list. • Under the MMM system (1993–2005), each voter received two separate ballots (the plurality ballot and the PR one) and cast two votes: one for an individual candidate in a single-member district; one for a party in a multi-member PR district. • Under the PR-with-seat-bonus system (2005–present), each voter cast one vote for a party list. -
Canvasser's Manual
STV MESSAGE TESTING: CANVASSER’S MANUAL CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 2 1.1 BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................................... 2 1.2 CASELOAD SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................. 2 1.3 CONTACTS ................................................................................................................................................ 2 2 THE “TREATMENTS” ................................................................................................................................ 3 2.1 THE MESSAGES .......................................................................................................................................... 3 2.2 THE ENDORSERS ........................................................................................................................................ 4 2.3 THE PLACEBO TREATMENT ........................................................................................................................... 4 3 DAILY DOCUMENTS ................................................................................................................................. 5 3.1 DAILY SHEETS ........................................................................................................................................... -
Another Consideration in Minority Vote Dilution Remedies: Rent
Another C onsideration in Minority Vote Dilution Remedies : Rent -Seeking ALAN LOCKARD St. Lawrence University In some areas of the United States, racial and ethnic minorities have been effectively excluded from the democratic process by a variety of means, including electoral laws. In some instances, the Courts have sought to remedy this problem by imposing alternative voting methods, such as cumulative voting. I examine several voting methods with regard to their sensitivity to rent-seeking. Methods which are less sensitive to rent-seeking are preferred because they involve less social waste, and are less likely to be co- opted by special interest groups. I find that proportional representation methods, rather than semi- proportional ones, such as cumulative voting, are relatively insensitive to rent-seeking efforts, and thus preferable. I also suggest that an even less sensitive method, the proportional lottery, may be appropriate for use within deliberative bodies, where proportional representation is inapplicable and minority vote dilution otherwise remains an intractable problem. 1. INTRODUCTION When President Clinton nominated Lani Guinier to serve in the Justice Department as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, an opportunity was created for an extremely valuable public debate on the merits of alternative voting methods as solutions to vote dilution problems in the United States. After Prof. Guinier’s positions were grossly mischaracterized in the press,1 the President withdrew her nomination without permitting such a public debate to take place.2 These issues have been discussed in academic circles,3 however, 1 Bolick (1993) charges Guinier with advocating “a complex racial spoils system.” 2 Guinier (1998) recounts her experiences in this process. -
Political Party Names Used in the Last 10 Years As Of: September 25, 2021
Page 1 of 6 Political Party Names Used in the Last 10 Years As of: September 25, 2021 Party Name Ballot Name Other Names Advocational International Democratic Advocational Party AID Party Party of British Columbia Advocates Advocational Democrats Advocational International Democratic Party Advocational International Democratic Party of BC Advocational Party of BC Advocational Party of British Columbia Democratic Advocates International Advocates B.C. New Republican Party Republican Party B.C. Vision B.C. Vision B.C. Vision Party BCV British Columbia Vision BC Citizens First Party BC Citizens First Party British Columbia Citizens First Party BC Ecosocialists BC Ecosocialists BC Eco-Socialists BC EcoSocialists BC Ecosocialist Alliance BC Ecosocialist Party BC First Party BC First BC Marijuana Party BC Marijuana Party British Columbia Marijuana Party Page 2 of 6 Political Party Names Used in the Last 10 Years As of: September 25, 2021 Party Name Ballot Name Other Names BC NDP BC NDP BC New Democratic Party BC New Democrats British Columbia New Democratic Party Formerly known as: New Democratic Party of B.C. NDP New Democratic Party New Democrats BC Progressive Party Pro BC BC Progressives Progressive Party BC Refederation Party BC Refed Formerly known as: Western Independence Party Formerly known as: Western Refederation Party of BC British Columbia Action Party BC Action Party BCAP British Columbia Direct Democracy British Columbia Direct BC Direct Party Democracy Party BC Direct Democracy Party Direct Democracy British Columbia Excalibur Party BC Excalibur Party British Columbia Liberal Party BC Liberal Party British Columbia Libertarian Party Libertarian Libertarian Party of BC British Columbia Party British Columbia Party BC Party BCP British Columbia Patriot Party B.C. -
If You Like the Alternative Vote (Aka the Instant Runoff)
Electoral Studies 23 (2004) 641–659 www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud If you like the alternative vote (a.k.a. the instant runoff), then you ought to know about the Coombs rule Bernard Grofman a,Ã, Scott L. Feld b a Department of Political Science and Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Science, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-5100, USA b Department of Sociology, Louisiana State University,Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA Received 1 July2003 Abstract We consider four factors relevant to picking a voting rule to be used to select a single candidate from among a set of choices: (1) avoidance of Condorcet losers, (2) choice of Condorcet winners, (3) resistance to manipulabilityvia strategic voting, (4) simplicity. However, we do not tryto evaluate all voting rules that might be used to select a single alternative. Rather, our focus is restricted to a comparison between a rule which, under the name ‘instant runoff,’ has recentlybeen pushed byelectoral reformers in the US to replace plurality-based elections, and which has been advocated for use in plural societies as a means of mitigating ethnic conflict; and another similar rule, the ‘Coombs rule.’ In both rules, voters are required to rank order candidates. Using the instant runoff, the candidate with the fewest first place votes is eliminated; while under the Coombs rule, the candidate with the most last place votes is eliminated. The instant runoff is familiar to electoral sys- tem specialists under the name ‘alternative vote’ (i.e., the single transferable vote restricted to choice of a single candidate). The Coombs rule has gone virtuallyunmentioned in the electoral systems literature (see, however, Chamberlin et al., 1984). -
A Beginner's Introduction to Sortition
A BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO SORTITION A BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO SORTITION W M Harper Abraham Lincoln once declared that good government was: “… of the people, by the people, for the people” But how can this be put into practice? This guide outlines a method of representative democratic government under which representatives are appointed by adopting Sortition, a technique under which such people are selected at random from the citizen body instead of being selected by voting. This currently seems so novel a political concept (despite being advocated by the very Athenians who introduced us to democracy some twenty-five hundred years ago!) and has so many ramifications that there is a definite need for a ‘Beginner’s Guide’. This is an attempt to provide one. Yet, equally perhaps, it is necessary to start by showing what is at fault with our present system of elections. So first we’ll consider why our method of selecting representatives fails to be democratic, and after that the technique of Sortition is outlined, together with its many ramifications. CONTENTS Section Page PART I: THE PROBLEM 1 Politicians – 2012 1 PART II: GROUND CLEARING 2 Principle of Full Representation 5 3 Representation and Democracy 5 4 The Athenian Model 6 5 Representation 7 6 Citizenship 8 7 Oligarchies 10 8 The Ruling Class 11 9 The Elephant in the Room 13 PART III: SORTITION IN PRACTICE 10 An Illustrative Framework 15 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 11 Appointment to the House 15 12 Service Period and Induction Course 16 13 Function of the House 17 14 Days in the Life of a Sortition -
Elections BC 2003-2004 Annual Report
Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Elections British Columbia. Annual report. — 1997 Annual. Title from cover. ISBN 1480-3100 = Annual report - Elections British Columbia 1. Elections British Columbia - Periodicals. 2. Elections - British Columbia - Periodicals. I. Title. II. Title: Elections BC ... annual report. JL438.E43 353.4’8 C97-960306-4 TABLE OF CONTENTS ANNUAL REPORT January 1, 2003 – March 31, 2004 Message from the Chief Electoral Officer..................................................1 Year-at-a-Glance Highlights........................................................................2 Role of the Chief Electoral Officer.............................................................3 Vision, Mission, Mandate and Goals..........................................................4 Organizational Structure.............................................................................5 Core Program Areas...................................................................................7 Overview of Activities ................................................................................9 Performance Reporting ............................................................................14 Our Finances .............................................................................................21 Resource Summary for the Fiscal Year 2003/04.....................................22 Appendices A – Political Party Registration Information........................................25 B – Constituency Association Registration Information......................26 -
The Youth Vote Why Young Voters Can’T Be Ignored
THE YOUTH VOTE WHY YOUNG VOTERS CAN’T BE IGNORED BRITISH COLUMBIA FEDERATION OF STUDENTS British Columbia Federation of Students The British Columbia Federation of Students represents over 170,000 college and university students from across all regions of the province. The Federation represents full- and part-time students at the college, undergraduate, and graduate levels. Together these students advocate for a well-funded system of post- secondary education in BC that is affordable and accessible for all students. Member Students’ Unions University of British Columbia Students’ Union Okanagan Camosun College Student Society Douglas Students’ Union Emily Carr Students’ Union College of New Caledonia Students’ Union Northern British Columbia Graduate Students’ Society North Island Students’ Union Northwest Community College Students’ Union Okanagan College Students’ Union Selkirk College Students’ Union Thompson Rivers University Students’ Union Students’ Union of Vancouver Community College Vancouver Island University Students’ Union Prospective Member Students’ Union Quest University Students' Association 207-245 East Columbia Street New Westminster, BC V3L 3W4 (604) 733-1880 wearebcstudents.ca @theBCFS Executive Summary In the 2015 federal election, young voters turned out to vote in record numbers. This turnout is more than an anomaly — it is a part of a larger trend of civic engagement amongst young people that is manifesting in electoral participation. Over the last three British Columbia general elections, for example, the turnout of voters aged 18 to 24 has increased steadily. These trends are mirrored with surging Millennial turnout in the 2018 USA midterm election and in the 2017 United Kingdom national election. The recent spike in young voter turnout will undoubtedly have long term implications.