The Mounties and the Origins of Peace in the Canadian Prairies∗

The Mounties and the Origins of Peace in the Canadian Prairies∗ Pascual Restrepo October 2015 Abstract Through a study of the settlement of the Canadian Prairies, I examine if differences in violence across regions reflect the historical ability of the state to centralize authority and monopolize violence. I compare settlements that in the late 1880s were located near Mountie- created forts with those that were not. Data from the 1911 Census reveal that settlements far from the Mounties’ reach had unusually high adult male death rates. Even a century later the violence in these communities continues. In 2014, communities located at least 100 kilometers from former Mountie forts during their settlement had 45% more homicides and 55% more violent crimes per capita than communities located closer to former forts. I argue that these differences may be explained by a violent culture of honor that emerged as an adaptation to the lack of a central authority during the settlement but persisted over time. In line with this interpretation, I find that those who live in once-lawless areas are more likely to hold conservative political views. In addition, I use data for hockey players to uncover the influence of culture on individual behavior. Though players interact in a common environment, those who were born in areas historically outside the reach of the Mounties are penalized for their violent behavior more often than those who were not. Keywords: Culture, Violence, Culture of honor, Monopoly of violence, Institutions. JEL Classification: N32, N42, D72, D74, H40, J15, K14, K42, Z10 ∗I thank Daron Acemoglu, Abhijit Banerjee, Alberto Chong, Pauline Grosjean, Suresh Naidu, Ben Olken and Hans-Joachim Voth for their comments and helpful discussion. 1 Introduction In this paper, I explore how the historical ability of the state to centralize authority and monopolize violence affects past and contemporary violence and shapes culture. Culture refers to internally-held rules of behavior, which manifest as behavioral heuristics or gut- feelings that determine individuals actions and views. I test a hypothesis going back to Norbert Elias (1969), and recently articulated by Steven Pinker (2011) in his book “The Better Angels of Our Nature.” In its simplest form, the hypothesis suggests that areas which lack a legitimate central authority able to monopolize violence will develop a violent code of honor (a concept introduced by Nisbett and Cohen, 1996). These areas are characterized by a reliance in self-justice, low self-control, and readi- ness to take revenge and respond to insults. These cultural traits are transmitted by parents and society to children until they become second nature for individuals in these communities. In contrast, in areas where the state manages to monopolize violence legitimately, violent codes of honor give way to the centralized exercise of authority.1 These areas are characterized by reliance and trust in the government to adjudicate disputes, self-restraint and empathy, which also become second nature to individuals born and raised in these areas. This hypothesis predicts that, in once-lawless areas that were outside the control of the state, violence will persist. But more importantly, the hypothesis suggests that individuals born and raised in these areas will inherit a violent set of behavioral rules and a world view revolving around self-justice. These cultural traits drive individuals behavior even when the ecological and historical conditions that originated them are long gone. Cultural traits supporting violence thrive when the monopoly of force is weak and the risk of expropriation is high. A violent code of honor becomes useful in such environment because it constitutes a credible deterrence policy: the commonly held belief that you will meet any challenge with violence lowers predation. The problem with these cultural traits is that they cannot be fine-tuned and will permeate behavior in a wide range of situations, even after the ecological conditions that generated them are long gone. Elias (1969) famously argued that, in 19th century Europe, improvements in table manners were part of the same psychological process that was reducing brawls and fights outside the dinner table (See also Pinker, 2011). As a consequence, communities that develop a culture of honor could end up having more homicides and other violent crimes resulting from escalating insults, bar brawls, or quarrels; even if individuals are no longer protecting their property. As the sociologist Donald Black argues, the majority of homicides in the U.S. are seen as acts of self-justice by perpetrators (see Black, 1993), and are unrelated to the circumstances that brought a culture of self-justice in the first place.2 I test this hypothesis through a study of the settlement of the Canadian Prairies, which took place from 1890 to 1920. Before the settlement, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police— 1The defining feature of a monopoly over violence is that a reliable third party—the State— credibly punishes individuals who threaten the life and property of others. Individuals perceive an external cost of offending others’ life and property —a perception that would materialize. 2A large share of homicides occur in the context of arguments between acquaintances (see Reed, 1981 and Simpson, 1985). As an homicide detective quoted in Nisbet and Cohen (1996) puts it: “Murders result from little ol’ arguments over nothing at all. Tempers flare. A fight starts, and somebody gets stabbed or shot.” 1 the Mounties—established a series of forts. From their forts, the Mounties exercised authority, enforced contracts, and protected the property of settlers. Thus, the Canadian state was able to monopolize violence in settlements near these forts, while remote areas remained lawless during the settlement and in subsequent years. The settlement of the Prairies was a critical period with large immigration and little reliance in other mechanisms other than the Mounties or self-justice to protect property and resolve disputes. This offers a unique historical case in which a large borderland was settled and incorpo- rated in a peaceful way, specially when compared to the settlement of the U.S. great plains. As argued by some commentators, the early deployment of the Mounties in the Prairies is responsible for part of the relative success in terms of law and order during their later settlement (Macleod, 1973, Graybill, 2007). In his book, “The Better Angels of our Nature,” Steven Pinker supports this view, writing that “Canadians kill at less than a third of the rate of Americans, partly because in the 19th century the Mounties got to the western frontier before the settlers and spared them from having to cultivate a culture of honor.” (Pinker, 2011). I show that lawless areas during the settlement—as measured by their distance to the existing Mountie forts—were presumably more violent. Though there are no official homicide statistics during this period, data from the 1911 Census suggest that these areas had more widows than widowers than comparable settlements near the Mountie forts. Homicide stands as the most likely cause of higher mortality among men in these areas. Surprisingly, these areas remain more violent a century after. I confirm this result using both homicide and violent crime statistics compiled by official sources in recent years. Violence endures despite the expansion of the Mounties and the Canadian state throughout its territory during the rest of the 20th century. My interpretation is that historically-lawless communities nurtured a violent culture of honor that persisted through time. In contrast, communities near the early forts were under the effective control of the Mounties, who spared them from developing such cultural traits. As I will argue in more detail below, the location of the initial mounties’ forts was largely driven by political considerations unrelated to violence, and the ethnic and economic composition of immigrants were not affected by proximity to the forts. These observations imply that a causal interpretation of these findings is plausible. One potential mechanism explaining the persistence of violence has to do with politics, and builds on the argument presented by Spierenburg (2006). In historically-lawless areas, individuals may have seen the arrival of the Mounties as illegitimate. By that time, individuals already had developed a world view based on self-justice and came to see the external authority of Mounties as threatening this private order. This feeling could have foster political views that supported self-justice and weakened the grip of the State in once-lawless communities. I find some indirect support for this mechanism. In one-lawless areas, people are more likely to vote for the conservative party in parliamentary elections. This party emphasizes a limited role of government and opposed restrictions on gun ownership—the epitome of self-justice. To demonstrate the role of culture I compare the behavior of hockey players born in different communities within the Canadian Prairies. Hockey players born in once-lawless communities seem to carry with them a violent code of honor to the ice rink. Hockey is a fast full-contact sport in which physical violence is tolerated, if not encouraged. Hockey 2 players constantly board, block, charge, check and cross-check one another. Players retaliate in the heat of the moment, and may go as far as to drop their gloves and fight each other. When their behavior is judged too aggressive players are penalized. The players share a common environment and rules in the ice rink, but those who were born in areas historically outside the reach of the Mounties were penalized more often than those who were not. Interestingly, I find that in recent seasons, experienced players and younger cohorts are less influenced by their cultural background. This evidence supports the view that Canadians born in once-lawless communities inherit a violent code of honor that drives their behavior.

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