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A Social Cognitive Approach to Understanding and Predicting Egotistic and Philanthropic Leadership

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A Social Cognitive Approach to Understanding and Predicting Egotistic and Philanthropic Leadership University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 12-2006 Justifying Leadership: A Social Cognitive Approach to Understanding and Predicting Egotistic and Philanthropic Leadership Katherine R. Helland University of Tennessee - Knoxville Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss Part of the Psychology Commons Recommended Citation Helland, Katherine R., "Justifying Leadership: A Social Cognitive Approach to Understanding and Predicting Egotistic and Philanthropic Leadership. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2006. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/1943 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Katherine R. Helland entitled "Justifying Leadership: A Social Cognitive Approach to Understanding and Predicting Egotistic and Philanthropic Leadership." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Physics. Michael C. Rush, Major Professor We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: Lawrence James, Janie Elaine Seat, Michael McIntyre Accepted for the Council: Carolyn R. Hodges Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School (Original signatures are on file with official studentecor r ds.) To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Katherine R. Helland entitled “Justifying Leadership: A Social Cognitive Approach to Understanding and Predicting Egotistic and Philanthropic Leadership”. I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Michael C. Rush Major Professor We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: Lawrence James Janie Elaine Seat Michael McIntyre Acceptance for the Council: Linda Painter Interim Dean of Graduate Studies (Original signatures are on file with official student records) JUSTIFYING LEADERSHIP: A SOCIAL COGNITIVE APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AND PREDICTING EGOTISTIC AND PHILANTHROPIC LEADERSHIP A Dissertation Presented for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree The University of Tennessee, Knoxville Katherine R. Helland December 2006 Acknowledgments The completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without the help of many individuals. Specifically, I owe much gratitude to Dr. Michael Rush for his continual guidance and encouragement. I would also like to thank Dr. Larry James for his dedication to the conditional reasoning methodology and for inspiring me to develop a conditional reasoning test to measure leadership behaviors. Furthermore, I would like to thank Dr. Michael McIntyre for spending endless hours helping me write and rewrite items. I also owe much thanks to Dr. Elaine Seat and the National Science Foundation for providing me with the opportunity to take part in the development of the group decision making task that was used in this study. Additionally, I would like to thank all of my committee members mentioned above for their positive words of encouragement and not giving up on me even as I struggled with this project. Moreover, I wish to thank all of the undergraduate and graduate students who helped me collect and code data. In particular, I would like to thank current and former I/O graduate students (i.e., Cheryl Barksdale, Shawn Bergman, Jacqui Bergman, Carrie Blair, Mark Bowler, Michelle Bush, Lisa Delise, Brian Frost, Allen Gorman, James LeBreton, John Meriac, Joy Oliver, Jillian Peat, Taylor Poling, Betsy Smith, Scott Turner, Bill Walton, & Jim Whanger,) for always offering to help out despite their busy schedules. I am truly grateful for all of their help and support, and most importantly their friendship. ii Abstract This study extends the current literature on egotistic and philanthropic leadership by considering the role of social cognition in explaining self-serving versus collective- serving leadership behaviors. Specifically, this study proposed that the overt traits and behaviors that constitute egotistic and philanthropic leadership are surface manifestations of the justification mechanisms (JMs) stemming from uninhibited and inhibited power motives. Thus, the purpose of this study was to identify the JMs that egotistic leaders rely on to enhance the rational appeal of self-serving influence behaviors and the JMs that philanthropic leaders rely on to enhance the rational appeal of collective-serving influence behaviors. Additionally, this study aimed to develop and validate a conditional reasoning test designed to measure these JMs. It was hypothesized that the extent to which individuals’ rely on egotistic justifications mechanisms to rationalize behavior would be positively related to the extent to which they use hard influence tactics and manipulative influence tactics. Furthermore, it was also hypothesized that the extent to which individuals’ use philanthropic justifications mechanisms to rationalize behavior would be positively related to the extent to which they use soft influence tactics and rational persuasion to influence others. Preliminary support was found for the relationship between the egotistic JMs and self-serving influence behaviors and for the relationship between the philanthropic JMs and collective-serving influence behaviors. Thus, the initial validity evidence for using the conditional reasoning methodology in the prediction of egotistic and philanthropic leadership behaviors was promising. iii Table of Contents Chapter I. Introduction.............................................................................................1 II. Present Study...........................................................................................5 The Empirical Foundations of Egotistic and Philanthropic Leadership........................................................................................8 The Missing Link between Motives and Egotistic and Philanthropic Leadership ...............................................................13 A Conditional Reasoning Approach to Egotistic and Philanthropic Leadership ...............................................................14 Justification Mechanisms Used by Egotistic Leaders....................18 Justification Mechanisms Used by Philanthropic Leaders ............24 Present Research ............................................................................29 Study 1 ...........................................................................................31 Study 2 & Study 3..........................................................................32 III. Methodology ..........................................................................................41 Overview of Study 1 ......................................................................41 Participants and Procedures (Study 1) ...........................................41 Overview of Study 2 ......................................................................43 Participants and Procedures (Study 2) ..........................................44 Measures ........................................................................................46 Egotistic and Philanthropic Conditional Reasoning Items ......46 Narcissism................................................................................49 iv Machiavellianism.....................................................................51 Responsibility ..........................................................................51 Emotional Maturity..................................................................51 Influence Tactics......................................................................52 Overview of Study 3 ......................................................................52 Participants and Procedures (Study 3) ...........................................54 Measures ........................................................................................56 Narcissism...............................................................................56 Previously Mentioned Measures.............................................56 Composite Key Development........................................................57 IV. Results...........................................................................................59 Study 1 ...........................................................................................59 Study 2 & Study 3..........................................................................60 Composite Key Development (Study 2).................................61 Composite Key Development (Study 3) ................................64 Validity Evidence...........................................................................68 Hypothesis 1.............................................................................68 Hypothesis 2.............................................................................69 Hypothesis 3.............................................................................71
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