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Administration of William J. Clinton, 1995 / Oct. 23 1915 Administration of William J. Clinton, 1995 / Oct. 23 1915 I have authorized these measures in re- The measures I am taking are designed sponse to the relentless threat posed by sig- to deny these traffickers the benefit of any nificant foreign narcotics traffickers centered assets subject to the jurisdiction of the Unit- in Colombia to the national security, foreign ed States and to prevent United States per- policy, and economy of the United States. sons from engaging in any commercial deal- Narcotics production has grown substan- ings with them, their front companies, and tially in recent years. Potential cocaine pro- their agents. These measures demonstrate ductionÐa majority of which is bound for firmly and decisively the commitment of the the United StatesÐis approximately 850 United States to end the scourge that such metric tons per year. Narcotics traffickers traffickers have wrought upon society in the centered in Colombia have exercised control United States and beyond. The magnitude over more than 80 percent of the cocaine and dimension of the current problem war- entering the United States. rant utilizing all available tools to wrest the Narcotics trafficking centered in Colombia destructive hold that these traffickers have undermines dramatically the health and well- on society and governments. being of United States citizens as well as the William J. Clinton domestic economy. Such trafficking also The White House, harms trade and commercial relations be- October 21, 1995. tween our countries. The penetration of le- gitimate sectors of the Colombian economy NOTE: This message was released by the Office by the so-called Cali cartel has frequently of the Press Secretary on October 23. permitted it to corrupt various institutions of Colombian government and society and to The President's News Conference disrupt Colombian commerce and economic With President Boris Yeltsin of development. Russia in Hyde Park, New York The economic impact and corrupting fi- nancial influence of such narcotics trafficking October 23, 1995 is not limited to Colombia but affects com- President Clinton. We don't have pre- merce and finance in the United States and pared statements, but we will each make a beyond. United States law enforcement au- very brief statement and then we'll take a thorities estimate that the traffickers are re- couple of questions. sponsible for the repatriation of $4.7 to $7 This was our eighth visit as heads of state. billion in illicit drug profits from the United It was a good and productive one which em- States to Colombia annually, some of which phasized the stability and the strength of the is invested in ostensibly legitimate busi- partnership between the United States and nesses. Financial resources of that mag- Russia. nitude, which have been illicitly generated We spent the vast majority of our time dis- and injected into the legitimate channels of cussing Bosnia, and we reached complete international commerce, threaten the integ- agreement about how we would work to- rity of the domestic and international finan- gether for peace there. We reached agree- cial systems on which the economies of many ment on the importance of the involvement nations now rely. of Russia and the other Contact Group part- For all of these reasons, I have determined ners in the peace process. On the question that the actions of significant narcotics traf- of what our roles would be in the implemen- fickers centered in Colombia, and the unpar- tation of a peace agreement, we made some alleled violence, corruption, and harm that progress, and we agreed that our representa- they cause in the United States and abroad, tives, Secretary Perry and Minister Grachev, constitute an unusual and extraordinary would continue to work on this in the coming threat to the national security, foreign policy, days, literally in just a matter of days. and economy of the United States. I have, We discussed a number of other issues. accordingly, declared a national emergency I think I should mention three very briefly. in response to this threat. First, we agreed that we would both push VerDate 28-OCT-97 15:29 Mar 09, 1998 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 1244 Sfmt 1244 W:\DISC\P43OC4.024 p43oc4 1916 Oct. 23 / Administration of William J. Clinton, 1995 hard for the ratification of START II. Sec- issues, not just those that affect our two ond, we agreed that we would continue our countries but that affect all the countries of close cooperation on nuclear security, and we the world. Bill neglected to say we also came have a statement that we have already agreed to terms on the flank limits that have been on prepared by our experts which will be re- placed. And I want to say a big, big thank- leased today. And finally, we agreedÐand you to Bill for supporting us so strongly on this is very, very importantÐthat we would this score. work together to succeed in getting a zero- I want to say a big, big thank-you, Bill, yield comprehensive test ban treaty next for inviting me here to this most magnificent year. This is a major, major step, and it dra- site. If all of you look around you, look be- matically increases the chances of our success hind youÐthe most incredible sceneryÐyou for a sweeping comprehensive test ban treaty will find this a most lovely place to host such in 1996. And I want to thank President a meeting. I want to thank Bill from the bot- Yeltsin for that. tom of my heart, to bow my head before all Mr. President. of the people, the people who work here, President Yeltsin. Dear ladies and gentle- who support this wonderful museum, the men, dear journalists: I want to say, first of staff who made this visit so wonderful, all all, that when I came here to the United of you who support not only the museum States for this visit at the invitation of the but also the persona, the personality of Presi- President of the United States, Bill Clinton, dent Roosevelt, the one who was a personal- I did not at that time have the degree of ity not only for the United States but for all optimism with which I now am departing. the peoples of the world for all time. I do And this is all due to you because, coming want to bow my head and thank all of you from my statement yesterday in the United for this wonderful occasion. Nations, and if you looked at the press re- So with this, I want to stop with my intro- ports, one could see that what you were writ- ductory remarks. We'll have just a couple of ing was that today's meeting with President questions. And as soon as we start we're Bill Clinton was going to be a disaster. going to finish, so very short. First question [Laughter] Well, now for the first time, I can to the President of the United States. tell you that you're a disaster. [Laughter] President Clinton. Be sure you get the Bosnia right attribution there. [Laughter] Q. Mr. President, could you tell us what President Yeltsin. This proves that our progressÐÐ partnership is not calculated for one year or Q. Could you tell usÐÐ for 5 years but for years and years to comeÐ Q. Could you tell us, Mr. PresidentÐ tens of years, for a century; that we're President Yeltsin, are Russians now willing friends, and that it's only together, together to work under the command and control of we're going to be trying to solve not only NATO in a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia? our joint bilateral issues but issues affecting And then a followup for President Clinton. the whole world. President Clinton. I understand that, but How many journalists' brains are used to let me just say first, we agreed that it was constantly try to figure out what kinds of dif- important for Russia to participate in the im- ferent versions and options the two Presi- plementation of the agreement. We dis- dents are going to try to come up with re- cussed some specifics on which we were in garding Bosnia? I can't say that your brains accord and some on which we agreed that turned out to be uselessÐ[laughter]Ðof we had to let our defense experts work. And course, you also helped us, and we are grate- we decided that we would say nothing here ful. And so you did help us because when which would make their work any harder Bill and I sat down to look at the different than it already is. options, we used even some of your seem- ingly most unbelievable options. [Laughter] Russia-U.S. Relations Bill said also that we agreed on nuclear Q. Mr. Clinton, as the Russian press, we'd disarmament. We agreed on a whole host of like to ask you the following question. You VerDate 28-OCT-97 15:29 Mar 09, 1998 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 1244 Sfmt 1244 W:\DISC\P43OC4.024 p43oc4 Administration of William J. Clinton, 1995 / Oct. 23 1917 were saying that not only has it not caved most understandable meeting, not only for in, our partnership has not caved in but it each other but for all the people of the world. has become stronger and better. Does that And we discussed individual positions; indicate that Russia and the United States then we arrived at common positions. And will be for the future generations the guaran- I must say that this kind of meeting is not tor of peace, that there will be no wars? an official summit, it is a working meeting; President Yeltsin.
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