INSIDE OPCW Chooses New Director-General

Volume 39 Number 9 Arms Control NOVEMBER 2009 THE SOURCE ON NONPROLIFERATION AND GLOBAL SECURITYTODAY

IN THIS ISSUE Pressing a Broad The Role of Nuclear Agenda for Weapons: Japan, the Combating U.S., and “Sole Purpose” Nuclear By Masa Takubo

Dangers: Weighing the Case An Interview With For a Convention to Undersecretary of State Limit Cyberwarfare For Arms Control and By David Elliott International Security Ellen Tauscher Book Review: Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism From Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda Reviewed by Gerard DeGroot

IN THE NEWS START Deadline Looms; Endgame Begins U.S. Supports Arms Trade Treaty Process Officials Air Views on Key Stockpile Issue Iranian Response to LEU Fuel Deal Unclear

U.S. $7.00 A Publication of the Arms Control Association Canada $8.00 www.armscontrol.org Acts of terror. Failed states. Border disputes. Crimes against humanity.

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Features Contents

14 The Role of Nuclear Weapons: Japan, the U.S., and “Sole Purpose” 6

The victory of the Cover Story Democratic Party of Japan Pressing a Broad Agenda for could prove to be a turning point in that country’s Combating Nuclear Dangers: policy toward the United An Interview With States and the “nuclear Undersecretary of State for umbrella.” Arms Control and International By Masa Takubo Security Ellen Tauscher

21 Weighing the Case for a Convention to Limit Cyberwarfare News 29 Europe and the Former The threat of cyberwarfare Soviet Union is likely to grow rapidly, in ways that are hard to • START Deadline Looms; Endgame Begins predict. An international • China, Russia Agree on Launch Notification convention to limit cyberattack might help 33 The World address the problem. • OPCW Chooses New Director-General By David Elliott • U.S. Supports Arms Trade Treaty Process • Arms Exports Fell in 2008, UN Data Say

49 Book Review: Dismissing Doomsday 39 The Middle East and Africa • Iranian Response to LEU Fuel Deal Unclear Gerard DeGroot reviews Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism From Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda by John Mueller. 42 The United States and the Americas • Officials Air Views on Key Stockpile Issue • Congress Funds Nonproliferation Work • UAE-U.S. Nuclear Pact Gets Green Light ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009

Departments 47 Asia and Australia • China Says N. Korea Wants Better Relations 2 Editor’s Note

3  Focus Why the U.S. Doesn’t Need Nuclear Testing

4 In Brief 46 Correction

Cover photo: Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher speaks about nonproliferation and disarmament in New York September 24. Photo credit: Jonathan Wyett/Department of State 1 Editor’sNOTE

he Obama administration has embarked on an ambi- “come to function as a barrier to global nuclear nonprolifera- tious nuclear arms control and nonproliferation agen- tion and disarmament.” T da. That point came across clearly when Arms Control In discussing U.S. policies and their repercussions, Clinton and Today sat down with Undersecretary of State for Arms Control Tauscher put considerable emphasis on the ongoing Nuclear Pos- and International Security Ellen Tauscher for an interview on ture Review and what it will say about the way the United States October 21. views nuclear weapons. In a news analysis, Tom Z. Collina exam- A recurring theme in Tauscher’s comments was the interplay ines one key issue in that review: where the United States draws between U.S. actions and the actions of other countries. She the line in “modernizing” its nuclear arsenal. emphasized the need for U.S. leadership on efforts such as the Elsewhere in the news section, our writers examine non-nucle- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a new strategic arms treaty, ar weapons and efforts to contain them. Oliver Meier reports on but, reiterating a point that Secretary of State Hillary Rodham the election of a new director-general for the Organization for the Clinton made during a speech earlier that day, Tauscher said that Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and Jeff Abramson describes a it is not only the nuclear-weapon states that are responsible for change in the U.S. position on an arms trade treaty. That change dealing with nuclear weapons issues. As participants in the global could significantly boost prospects for concluding a treaty to nonproliferation regime, all countries have “responsibilities and tighten the rules on international arms transfers, he reports. things that they have to invest in, pay attention to,” she said. David Elliott’s feature article looks at a “weapon” that is draw- The interaction between the United States and a prominent ing increasing attention and concern: cyberattack. Elliott care- non-nuclear-weapon state, Japan, is the subject of one of our fully weighs the costs and benefits for the United States of adher- features. Masa Takubo examines the complex relationship ing to an international convention limiting cyberwarfare and between the two countries and finds that the current Japanese- offers suggestions on how such a convention might be structured. U.S. arrangement, centered on the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” has —DANIEL HORNER

Arms PUBLISHER and Executive Director BOARD OF DIRECTORS Arms Control Today (ISSN 0196-125X) is Daryl G. Kimball published monthly, except for two bimonth- Control John Steinbruner ly issues appearing in January/February Editor DEPUTY DIRECTOR Chairman and July/August. Membership in the Arms TODAY Daniel Horner Jeff Abramson Control Association includes a one-year subscription to Arms Control Today at the Volume 39 Managing Editor Senior Fellow Avis Bohlen Number 9 Elisabeth Erickson Greg Thielmann Matthew Bunn following rates: $30 student, $65 individual, $80 international. Non-member subscription November 2009 Anne H. Cahn Assistant Editor Research Director rates are: $60 individual, $80 institutional, J. Bryan Hehir A Publication of the Brian Creamer Tom Z. Collina with international rates of $75 individual Arms Control Association John Isaacs and $85 institutional. Letters to the Editor International Research Analyst Catherine Kelleher are welcome and can be sent via e-mail or 1313 L Street, NW Correspondent Peter Crail Michael Klare postal mail. Letters should be under 600 Suite 130 Oliver Meier Kenneth N. Luongo words and may be edited for space. Inter- Washington, DC 20005 CTBT Project Jack Mendelsohn pretations, opinions, or conclusions in Arms Associate Phone Janne E. Nolan Meri Lugo Control Today should be understood to be 202-463-8270 Hazel R. O’Leary solely those of the authors and should not Fax ADMINISTRATIVE John Rhinelander be attributed to the association, its board of 202-463-8273 ASSISTANT Jeremiah Sullivan directors, officers or other staff members, E-mail Eric Auner Jonathan Tucker or to organizations and individuals that [email protected] Christine Wing support the Arms Control Association. Finance Officer Arms Control Today encourages reprint of Website Merle Newkirk its articles but permission must be granted www.armscontrol.org by the editor. Advertising inquiries may be Scoville Fellow Cole Harvey made to [email protected]. Postmaster: Send address changes to Arms Control InternS Today, 1313 L Street, NW, Suite 130, November 2009 ODAY Luke Champlin Washington, D.C. 20005. Periodicals post- Andrew Fisher age paid at Washington D.C., Suburban, Anna Hood MD and Merrifield, VA. ©November 2009, Arms Control Association.

The Arms Control Association (ACA), founded in 1971, is a nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding and support for effective arms control policies. Through its media and public education programs and its magazine Arms Control Today,

ARMS CONTROL T ACA provides policymakers, journalists, educators, and the interested public with authoritative information and analyses on arms control, proliferation, and global security issues. 2 By Daryl G. Kimball FOCUS Executive Director Why the U.S. Doesn’t Need Nuclear Testing

wenty years ago this month, the Berlin Wall came Additional testing would do little to increase the threat these down, hastening the end of the Cold War. Less than countries already pose to the United States. Countries with T three years later, Moscow and Washington agreed to less nuclear-test experience or design sophistication would be halt nuclear testing. In 1996, after more than 2,000 nuclear test unable to conceal tests in the numbers and yields required to explosions, the world’s nations concluded the Comprehensive master advanced warheads. Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in order to prevent proliferation and The United States’ capability to detect and deter possible help end the nuclear arms race. cheating by other countries will be significantly greater with Today, a growing bipartisan majority of national security the CTBT and its global verification and monitoring network leaders and experts agrees that, by ratifying the CTBT, the than without it. North Korea has provided two recent real- United States stands to gain important national security ben- world tests of U.S. and global monitoring capabilities. In Octo- efits by constraining the ability of other states to build new ber 2006, the International Monitoring System easily detected and more deadly nuclear weapons that could pose a threat to Pyongyang’s relatively low-yield (0.6 kiloton) nuclear explo- U.S. security. sion at 22 seismic stations. Telltale radioactive gases from this Since the Senate’s 1999 rejection of the CTBT, there have test were also detected by South Korea and the United States, been significant advances in the Stockpile Stewardship Pro- as well as one of the international monitoring network’s ra- gram and nuclear test monitoring that should address earlier dionuclide monitoring stations 4,600 miles away in Canada. concerns that led many senators to vote no. President Barack North Korea’s second test in May 2009 was detected by 61 Obama has called for the re- seismic stations. Kyl has tried to consideration of the treaty and suggest that because radionuclide pledged to work intensively with Nuclear testing is a particles from the second test senators so that they are fully were not detected, the monitor- briefed on the latest technical dangerous and unnecessary ing system failed. In fact, the seis- and intelligence assessments be- mic evidence alone would have fore the CTBT comes before the vestige of the past. provided a firm basis and precise Senate sometime in 2010. geographical information for on- Unfortunately, some pro-testers site inspections. are stuck in the past. In his October 21 Wall Street Journal op- Another misleading charge from Kyl and others is that be- ed, “Why We Need to Test Nuclear Weapons,” Sen. Jon Kyl (R- cause the treaty does not define “nuclear test explosion,” some Ariz.) relies on several old and misleading arguments against states, such as Russia, believe very low-yield “hydronuclear” the CTBT. For instance, Kyl claims that “concerns over aging tests are permitted. Wrong again. The record is clear: the and reliability [of the U.S. arsenal] have only grown.” CTBT bans “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other In fact, confidence in the ability to maintain U.S. warheads nuclear explosion.” As the Russian government explained to is increasing through advances in computer modeling, new the Duma in 2000, “[F]ull-scale and hydronuclear tests with experimental facilities, and studies that show that weapons the emission of fissile energy…directly contradict the CTBT.” plutonium is not affected by aging for 85 years or more. Since Ignoring years of evidence to the contrary, Kyl asserts that ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 1994, each warhead type in the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal ratification of the CTBT has no relationship to U.S. nonprolif- has been determined to be safe and reliable through a rigorous eration efforts. Kyl, who argued for continued nuclear testing certification process. Life Extension Programs have refurbished in the 1990s, overlooks the fact that the nuclear Nonprolifera- and modernized major warhead types and, according to new tion Treaty (NPT) would not likely have been renewed in 1995 independent studies, can continue to do so indefinitely. without the pledge from the United States and the others to Despite powerful U.S. national capabilities and a decade stop testing and support the CTBT. If Washington does not of advances in international monitoring capabilities, Kyl follow though, its leverage to strengthen nuclear safeguards, also repeats the age-old charge that clandestine tests cannot tighten controls on nuclear weapons-related technology, and be detected with absolute certainty. This argument misses isolate states that do not follow the rules will be weakened. the point on verification and implies that low-yield tests are It is time to finally recognize that nuclear testing is a danger- worth the high risk of getting caught. Those countries that are ous and unnecessary vestige of the past. The Senate’s reconsid- best able to conduct such clandestine testing successfully al- eration of the CTBT should be based on an honest and up-to- ready possess advanced nuclear weapons of a number of types. date analysis of the facts and issues at stake. ACT 3 November 2009

The By Numbers

InBRIEF Chemical Weapons Destruction in the U.S.

The 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) banned chemical weapons and set a deadline for their destruction. After receiving an extension of the original 2007 deadline, the United States has until 2012 to complete the destruction of its chemical weapons arsenal. Congress has passed a law requiring the destruction of all chemical Notable Quotable weapons by Dec. 31, 2017. “We will take President Obama at his word and enter talks with our allies so that the last of the nuclear weapons 2 Million still stationed in Germany, relics of the Cold War, can Number of U.S. chemical weapons munitions destroyed finally be removed.”

—German Foreign Minister-designate Guido Westerwelle, remarks at a 63% meeting of the Free Democratic Party, Berlin, October 25, 2009 Total percentage of U.S. chemical weapons munitions destroyed* 66% Total percentage of U.S. chemical weapons arsenal destroyed 40% Total percentage of Russian chemical weapons arsenal destroyed Five Years Ago in ACT Time for Arms Talks? Iran, Israel, and Middle East Arms Control 95% Percentage of declared global chemical weapons stockpiles “The ongoing showdown between the International Atomic Energy Agency accounted for by the United (IAEA) and Iran…underscore[s] the limitations of global nonproliferation States and Russia norms in addressing regional proliferation. Despite Tehran’s stated commitment to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as the IAEA’s success in uncovering a pattern of Iranian violations, the violations Sources: Organization for the Prohibition themselves raise many questions about the adequacy of the NPT in of Chemical Weapons, U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, Federation

November 2009 ODAY blocking determined states from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. of American Scientists Even strengthened verification measures under the Additional Protocol

do not address the broader political and security context of proliferation *Estimate based on declared U.S. chemical problems in unstable regions such as the Middle East.” munitions stockpile (2 million munitions destroyed/3,167,933 total munitions) —Dalia Dassa Kaye, November 2004 ARMS CONTROL T

4

Reports of Note Treaty Update

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Convention on Cluster Southeast Asia and Australasia Munitions International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 2009. urundi, France, Macedonia, Malawi, Nuclear power has become increasingly attractive for Southeast Asian countries, and this BMalta, and Uruguay ratified the Con- in-depth report discusses some of the safety concerns associated with its potential use in vention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in the region. The report devotes a chapter to the nuclear potential of each country in South- September and October, bringing the total east Asia and provides recommendations for ensuring that nuclear energy is harnessed in number of ratifying states to 23. One hun- a safe and secure manner. Recommendations include the creation of a “safety culture” in dred one countries have signed the CCM, countries that use nuclear power, the widespread adoption of protocols that give the Inter- which was opened for signature and rati- national Atomic Energy Agency increased inspection rights, and the internationalization of fication in December 2008. The treaty, nuclear fuel provision and disposal. The report pays special attention to Myanmar and recom- which bans the use of nearly all cluster mends that the international community, including Myanmar’s nuclear partner Russia, insist munitions, will enter into force six months on transparency from the regime. Furthermore, countries with interests and influence in the after the 30th ratification. During the an- region should share intelligence on suspicious activities within Myanmar, the report says. nual meeting of the UN General Assem- bly’s First Committee in October, member U.S. Strategy Towards North Korea: states accepted the offer of Laos, one of the first states to ratify the CCM and the Rebuilding Dialogue and Engagement state most affected by cluster munitions, Joel S. Wit, U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS and Weatherhead East Asian Institute, to host the first meeting of states-parties Columbia University, October 2009. following its entry into force. France is the first permanent member of the UN Joel S. Wit’s report provides fresh insight into North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons Security Council to ratify the treaty, as and suggests new options the United States can explore to bring the regime back into the well as the only ratifying state that has international nuclear nonproliferation system. According to the report, North Korea’s recent at some point produced, stockpiled, and nuclear activity has not been motivated by Kim Jong Il’s poor health or the nation’s internal used cluster munitions. political problems. The real impetus, the report says, is a decision made as early as 2002 that North Korea should rely on nuclear weapons, not the country’s relationship with the United States, for its national security. The report suggests that the United States must employ a “transformational approach” whereby strong relations are established between Washington and Pyongyang before nuclear negotiations are launched. When the two On the Calendar countries address North Korea’s nuclear program, they should have a broad agenda that Nov. 12-13 Convention on Certain encompasses Pyongyang’s missile-related imports and exports; its human rights record; its Conventional Weapons production and distribution of narcotics, counterfeit currency, and counterfeit pharmaceuti- meeting of states-parties, cals; and peace on the Korean peninsula, the report says. Geneva Nov. 26-27 International Atomic Energy Skirting the Law: Sudan’s Post-CPA Arms Flows Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting, Vienna Mike Lewis, The Small Arms Survey, September 2009. Nov. 30-Dec. 4 Organization for the Prohibition This report is the 18th in the Small Arms Survey’s series of Sudan Human Security Baseline of Chemical Weapons annual

meeting, The Hague ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 Assessments, which are intended to provide in-depth analysis of security-related issues in Sudan. It details how the patchwork of legal regimes that are designed to restrict arms flows Nov. 30-Dec. 4 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention second review to Sudan, including the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, the UN arms embargoes conference, Cartagena, of 2004 and 2005 on Darfur, and the EU arms embargo on Sudan, have failed to prevent the Colombia supply of military equipment to Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudanese People’s Liber- Dec. 1 Yukiya Amano, new IAEA ation Army forces. According to the Small Arms Survey, this failure stems from suppliers’ in- director-general, takes adequate end-use monitoring and poor export risk assessment, which allow for the diversion office, Vienna of arms to Sudan from neighboring countries. The report argues that arms originating from Dec. 5 START expires the SAF dominate the holdings of armed groups on all sides of the conflicts in both southern Dec. 7-11 Biological Weapons Sudan and Darfur, reaching these nonstate forces through deliberate transfers, theft, capture, Convention meeting of and leakage from stockpiles. There is little evidence that armed groups in Sudan have pro- states-parties, Geneva cured weapons from international illicit arms networks, the report says.

5 Interviewed by Daniel Horner and Tom Z. Collina

Pressing a Broad Agenda for Combating Nuclear Dangers: An Interview With Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher

llen Tauscher was sworn in June 27 as perhaps going to have to be raised up to different principals or moved forward in undersecretary of state for arms control a more expedited way, but it’s our inten- tion to be able to replace the START treaty E and international security. Before that, when it expires. she represented her northern California district ACT: And you’re still confident that you’ll have some agreement by December 5? for 13 years in the House, where she served on Tauscher: Well, keep in mind that the Armed Services Committee. From 2007, she this is very difficult. This administra- tion came into office, had to get people chaired the panel’s Strategic Forces Subcommittee. confirmed, had to step up its engagement and reset our relationship with the Rus- sians. And we think that we have done that in a very quick time frame. But at Arms Control Today spoke with Tauscher Tauscher: Well, I’m not going to the same time, there’s no denying that in her office October 21. The interview negotiate with myself, nor am I going to this existing START treaty expires. We are covered a range of issues in Tauscher’s negotiate through the press. Let me just working to get something that we can put portfolio, from strategic arms control to say that we have a very senior team in into place that meets what the presidents plans for an international fuel bank. Geneva. [The Russians] have a very senior have agreed to. It’s hard to do, but not Shortly before the interview, Secretary team in Geneva. The presidents, President impossible to do. We’ve got everybody of State Hillary Rodham Clinton gave a Medvedev and President Obama, have that we need to have on it on it. The Rus- high-profile speech at the U.S. Institute agreed to have a legally binding follow-on sians have met us with both seniority and of Peace on arms control and nonprolif- to START in place for the expiration of expertise on their negotiating side, and eration. Tauscher and ACT refer to that START on midnight of [December] 4. We we’re pressing ahead. speech at several points in the interview. do have a number of issues to go through. The interview was transcribed by These are complicated treaties, but at ACT: Secretary Clinton said in her Anna Hood. It has been edited for length the same time, I think we really want to confirmation hearing that the adminis- and clarity. have a treaty that reduces our weapons, tration “will seek deep, verifiable reduc- November 2009 ODAY increases stability with our friends, the tions in all U.S. and Russian nuclear ACT: You were recently in Moscow to Russian government, and at the same time weapons, whether deployed or nonde- discuss START, among other issues. On is working toward our nonproliferation ployed, strategic or nonstrategic.” And the START follow-on, there are a lot of objectives, and I think that we are on a President Obama said at the UN Secu- unresolved issues and not very much time. path to go forward. We have a stock-tak- rity Council meeting in September that

ARMS CONTROL T What in your view are the most difficult ing at the end of [October] with our team the U.S. “will complete a Nuclear Pos- issues to resolve? to see where we are on the issues that are ture Review [NPR] that opens the door to 6 deeper cuts.” Beyond the START follow-on, “Disarmament,” what does that mean? COM [U.S. Strategic Command] in July that what will be the administration’s goals for Does it mean you put it down? Does it the United States, as an inducement to Rus- the scope and scale of further reductions? mean you put it down, take it apart? Does sia, “should be prepared to reduce or elimi- it mean that you put it down, take it apart, nate the relatively small number of U.S. Tauscher: Well, we are finishing the put it on blocks in a garage? Or does that nuclear weapons that remain in Europe.” Nuclear Posture Review that is due toward mean you put it down, take it apart, and Is the United States actively discussing this the end of the year to the Congress. And make sure that you can’t ever use it again? possibility with its NATO allies? what’s clear is that we’re working under We could disagree. I could tell you I’m the scope of strategic offensive weapons disarming, but it could mean that I’m just Tauscher: Well, we are beginning in the START treaty and that there is an putting things on blocks in the garage. So to have conversations because the NPR asymmetry between the United States’ we have to have common agreement on clearly is an opportunity for us to get in stockpile, both strategic and tactical, and what these definitions are, and we have to and discuss these and bigger issues, mis- the Russian stockpile. What we’re looking have verification. sile defense and other things, with our for is a follow-on to the follow-on, where NATO allies. So I was on the phone with we will begin to deal with those issues. Ambassador [to NATO Ivo] Daalder this But one treaty at a time. So we’re congru- morning on how we’re going to man- ent with what both Secretary Clinton age the narrative, as we call it, of the said in her confirmation hearings about NPR and what that means for extended moving forward, after we’ve finished with deterrence, tactical nuclear weapons, all what we’re doing, and certainly with the of that. So we are formulating our posi- president’s ambitions too. tions on these things. We will safely say that there’ll be very large engagement on ACT: I realize that it’s one treaty at a these issues. time, but can you conceptually say where you’d like to get on issues like verification? ACT: Do those conversations begin with Department of State of Department the assumption that tactical weapons still Tauscher: Well, let me just say that have a useful military role in Europe or the underpinning of all of these agree- that they are more symbolic weapons? ments is verification. There is a level of confidence that is meant to be attained Tauscher: That’s what the NPR by these agreements. Although it is not Undersecretary of State for will answer. The narrative of the NPR is trivial to take down weapons, that is not Arms Control and International Security a transformational message. While the the only piece of this that we’re looking to Ellen Tauscher NPR is a lot about numbers and is about attain. It is a sense of stability and confi- declaratory policy, doctrine, and posture, dence building, and the way to do that is the narrative of those pieces of it [is] a through verification protocols. ACT: Are there arrangements in place to significant policy statement of this ad- continue the verification measures under ministration. So it is very important that ACT: One of the things that Secretary START after December 5 if there is no everything is done to prepare what that Clinton talked about that isn’t happening treaty in place and in force? How is that is. We have an agreement on that inside in the START follow-on is verified warhead going to be handled? the Obama administration. Then, once dismantlement. You seem to be moving we do that, we can start to begin to have from the past, when we looked at monitor- Tauscher: Well, our plan is to find conversations with our friends and allies, ing the missiles, to monitoring the actual an accommodation to manage, maintain interested parties and those to whom we warheads in the future at some point. Is verification protocols in between [expira- have extended our deterrence. So there this something that is envisioned as part of tion of the current treaty and ratification is a direct link between what we’re doing the follow-on to the follow-on? of the new one]. We’ve got lawyers look- in the NPR and these conversations that ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 ing at that, we’re talking to our Russian you have suggested, and there are lots Tauscher: It is certainly envisioned friends about how we do that. But as of people that are interested for lots of to be in future opportunities, but, as I you can see, we have a significant accent reasons, and they will become part of the said, verification is a piece of what we’re on verification. So the key is how do we conversation. But we are still in the midst looking for in all future negotiations. It is maintain it in the absence of a ratified of the NPR review. important, not only in the sense that you treaty but a legally binding one. So, we’re move past just the accounting for things looking at that. ACT: The secretary of state alluded to and actually have the ability to reassure this subject in her speech this morning. At the two parties, multiple parties, the world ACT: Moving now to tactical weapons, one point, she talked about providing reas- community, that we are fulfilling our how could the United States draw the Rus- surance to allies in a way that reinforces obligations. The NPT [nuclear Nonprolif- sians into a conversation about tactical nu- U.S. nonproliferation objectives. Can you eration Treaty] obligations of Article VI of clear weapons? Your adviser Robert Einhorn explain what she meant by that and ex- disarmament are defined more than just… suggested at a meeting organized by STRAT- pand on that a little bit? 7 Tauscher: Part of the NPR is that CTBT “is an integral part of our nonpro- it since [President George H.W.] Bush.1 So it’s a policy and political document, liferation and arms control agenda, and it’s been a very long time, and we have and it is meant to articulate how the we will work in the months ahead…to seek had advances in Science-Based Stockpile United States views the uses of nuclear the advice and consent of the United States Stewardship. Secretary Clinton [in her weapons, what that says about the Senate to ratify the treaty.” Could you tell October 21 speech] also talked about stockpile, what it says about our declar- us a bit about how the administration Stockpile Management and where that atory policy. But it also is meant to reas- plans to win Senate support for ratifica- fits in. What we have is a commitment by sure both the people to whom we have tion and your time frame for that? the administration to advance the CTBT. extended our deterrence, our allies, The CTBT is both about policy and [and to] make clear that we are—while Tauscher: The president has set no about politics. This administration the president has articulated a point on specific timeline for achieving ratifica- will not attempt to [seek ratification] the horizon for nuclear zero and while tion. The vice president is very involved unless we believe it can actually pass.2 it will take persistence and patience to in the effort to seek ratification. There’s a So there is a lot about this that is im- get there, we may not get there in our lot of queuing and sequencing going on. portant to informing [the public and lifetime, but we will maintain a cred- Right now, we’re finishing negotiations Congress] to gain [the Senate’s] advice ible deterrent, one that is reliable and on START. START needs to be ratified. and consent. Part of it is clearly a do- effective, until the point where we take In the meantime we’re conducting the mestic campaign, and there is a lot of down our last weapon. So there is a bal- Nuclear Posture Review. We’re going to international interest because of the ancing act there. have a [fiscal year 2011] budget submis- consequences of United States ratifica- sion. There are a number of pieces here tion for those eight Annex II countries,3 ACT: At the CTBT [Comprehensive that are important to the narrative for its significance. The whole question of Test Ban Treaty] Article XIV conference in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We going into force is on the bubble. September, Secretary Clinton said that the have been living under the conditions of From our point of view, we have a Jonathan Wyett/Department of State of Wyett/Department Jonathan November 2009 ODAY

ARMS CONTROL T Tauscher, with U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Alejandro Wolff, speaks about nonproliferation and disarmament in New York September 24. 8 plan, but it is one that is about inform- Tauscher: Yeah, we’re very aware a member of Congress, were instrumental ing and advancing the different parts of of—I think that part of our delivery in in defeating an earlier proposal to develop the president’s agenda. But we do think the short term will be the NPR and the a so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead that these information data points are budget submission. [We are] laying the [RRW]. However, some have suggested very, very key to us getting the narrative groundwork for the support of a super- that, to maintain the existing nuclear right. There is clearly, for many senators, majority in the Senate, 67 votes—we weapons stockpile, the nuclear weapons a need to thread the needle, find the think we understand where we need to infrastructure and perhaps some war- sweet spot between the goal of a nuclear be to attract persuadable senators and heads will need to be “modernized.” You zero but the necessity to maintain a se- certain senators that have voted for it were quoted in The Cable September 15 cure and reliable and effective stockpile before, persuadable senators who have as saying, “I think there are a lot people until those conditions for nuclear zero not voted on it yet. Part of it is also that still hope for the return of [the] RRW are met. So there’s a need to be doing the to get START done in a way where we [program] and they are going to be sadly things necessary to get to nuclear zero, have very good support. The fact is that disappointed.” Can you explain what you which includes things that strengthen these are interconnected and interrelat- mean by that? nonproliferation and the ability to main- ed, and we have to do them somewhat tain weapons in an effective way. Making in order because of circumstances like Tauscher: Well, it’s amazing how those investments in the NNSA [National START expiring. We [will] have a very, things happen. It’s like the tree falling Nuclear Security Administration] stock- very short window to talk about CTBT. in the forest. When I was still chairman pile stewardship management and the But when we believe that we have the of [the] Strategic Forces [Subcommittee [U.S. nuclear weapons] complex itself. right conditions, we will begin to en- of the House Armed Services Commit- Then the things that you’re doing in a gage the Senate. tee] in the winter and spring [of 2008- multilateral, bilateral way and through The NAS [National Academy of Sci- 2009], we built the strategic forces treaty obligations, either ones that you ences] study will be coming out in component of the defense authoriza- build yourself or ones that you have had January-February,5 so there are a bunch tion bill, which included what’s called long relationships with, like the NPT. So of data points that are coming forward. Stockpile Management. Let me just step you’re doing it almost in a parallel effort. There are a number of things that we’re back for a minute. RRW, when it was So we have the NPR, which is [expected looking for to inform the debate and originally conceived by the [national to be released] in late December, early to provide the narrative and to provide laboratory] directors, was something January, and then you have the Febru- the fact base and more current informa- that I supported. It was the ability to ary budget submission. There will be a tion. It’s been a very, very long time refurbish classes of weapons without number of senators looking to those two since the Senate considered this. At the [adding] any capability, changing plat- events for the congruity of their quest to time, it was only six and a half, seven form, or requiring testing. It’s a life be able to support the CTBT. years between the [start of the U.S. extension function; it is not to create Now we also have the issue of hav- testing moratorium] and when the Sen- a new capability or to boost capability ing to ratify START. In a perfect world, ate considered it in ’99. We had a long or to enhance capability or to create a perhaps we wish it was already done. We record at the time of Stockpile Steward- new weapon. It is to take the existing will go to the Senate for the ratification ship and Life Extension Program[s], but weapon portfolio and, as needed or re- of [a] START [follow-on]; and then at the now we have 10 more years. You cannot quired, refurbish that weapon class so same time, we will bring up the conversa- trivialize the success of the Science- that it survives, so that it is part of the tion and the narrative of CTBT, which Based Stockpile Stewardship Program. stockpile that can give the assurance leads us into the NPT. We’re hoping, But at the same time, I think that you that Gen. [Kevin] Chilton, as the com- obviously, that on an FMCT [fissile mate- also see that there are a number of sen- mander of STRATCOM, needs. rial cutoff treaty], the program of work ators that are looking for other kinds Unfortunately, in the previous will go forward in the CD [Conference of reassurances, including what the administration’s hands, RRW became a on Disarmament].4 We join everyone in budget is going to be and the financial new weapon, and it had to go away. requesting that our Pakistani friends pro- commitment and the sustainability. So But the capabilities that were originally ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 test at the right moment but not now. I think that the NAS study is going to envisioned in RRW are still necessary. So As you can see, these are all inter- provide an independent, nonpartisan we brought them back under life exten- related and interconnected. Next year set of facts that can be used by anyone sion principles. The other problem RRW is an election year. It’s a shorter year that wants to be informed on how we had was that it was out by itself. It was on legislatively, so a lot of this is kind of should go forward. its own. It looked like a whole new thing. wait-and-see. But we definitely have a Part of the problem was that it looked plan to go forward. ACT: You talked about how the vari- like an effort as opposed to a tool. So we ous issues are interrelated and many states created something called Stockpile Man- ACT: If the CTBT is not ratified before around the world see the CTBT as a means agement, which effectively is the same the NPT conference, is the administra- to limit qualitative improvements in nuclear kinds of abilities, tools under life exten- tion thinking about any steps short of arsenals. The president made clear during the sion programs, under stockpile steward- that to show progress on the test ban in campaign that he would “stop the develop- ship. A tool called Stockpile Manage- the NPT context? ment of new nuclear weapons,” and you, as ment, and the [congressional] authorizers 9 say you can refurbish weapons but you may not refurbish weapons [in a way] that causes a question of certification. You may not use anything that cannot be certified that could cause you to test. You cannot do anything that is going to increase yield, change the characteriza- tion of a weapon, or change the platform. We put all these fences around it. That exists now, in the [fiscal year 2010] na- tional defense bill. Until about three or four weeks ago, I still had people saying to me, “Don’t you think we need some- thing to refurbish weapons?” or “Don’t you think we have to find a way to bring RRW back?” I’m saying we did. It’s called Stockpile Management. So they started looking at it, and they said, “Oh.” So we have a way to refurbish weapons. You know, even Jim Schlesinger in that strategic posture [commission re- port] says that “modernize” is one of those kind of riddled terms.6 It makes people ask, “What do you mean by that?” So talking about it has been very difficult for a lot of people because you

don’t want to lead people down the Information Public CTBTO of Courtesy RRW path, which is that you’re going to go and build new weapons. The other thing we killed was RNEP [Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator]. So it wasn’t like [the Bush administration] got accused of this without any history of trying to do this stuff. I think this administration understands that we need a capability to refurbish weapons. But it’s a tool. You don’t go out and re- Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton speaks in New York September 24 at the furbish everything. biennial international conference on bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force. ACT: Some are concerned that, in the context of Stockpile Management, RRW, by which we mean new designs of warheads chairwoman of the subcommittee, I led on this. Susan is burning up the phone that may not have any additional charac- an effort to kill the RRW. When I kill lines and racking up the miles seeing teristics or military value, will be brought something, it stays dead. friends, allies, and others. We have a lot be back under the NPR. of friends and allies who have been not ACT: President Obama and other mem- always cooperative in reaching consen- Tauscher: No. No. bers of the administration have argued sus in the NPT. So we are doing every- that U.S. leadership on disarmament is thing we can to deliver a simple mes- ACT: There are these three proposed critical to building support for measures sage: we need to have a consensus reso- categories of stockpile maintenance—re- to strengthen the NPT at the 2010 review lution in the NPT [review conference]. furbish, reuse, replace—and the concern is conference. What are your hopes and goals We need to understand that there are that RRW is the “replace.” Can you tell us for that conference, and what is the United a number of issues that have become November 2009 ODAY if that will be part of the NPR findings? States doing in the run-up to build support causes célèbres for certain countries in for the outcomes it wants and to deal with certain regions, and while we believe Tauscher: Well, I cannot specu- the likely challenges? that those are very, very important, we late because we’re still working on it, cannot get stuck in the wickets here. but I don’t consider RRW to be any- Tauscher: Well, we have a fabu- We’ve got to get out and get something

ARMS CONTROL T thing other than something from the lous presidential envoy, Ambassador done because we don’t help anyone past. As a member of Congress and Susan Burk, who’s working full time who is for the NPT by not making it 10 stronger. That means delivering on the ing us back to New York in May, back at pay attention to the fact that we are promise of a consensus resolution. So I the UN for the NPT. I think we’re having disarming. We may not be going as fast think we have a good message, I think significant bilateral conversations with as we want or as anyone wants it, but she is an amazing messenger, but it countries that have expressed a lot of in- we need to take credit for that. We’re takes a lot of work. terest in working toward a consensus. also attempting to deal with [NPT] Ar- We are a new administration that has ticle IV considerations on civil nuclear got a much more, I think, vital vision ACT: One thing the secretary mentioned [programs]. But at the same time, as for these things. I think it’s safe to say today was nuclear security and the sum- the secretary said today, the right to that President Obama has spoken more mit in April.8 What are the aims and have nuclear power, which we recog- about [these issues] in the nine months goals there, and how will that play into nize as a sovereign right, cannot be [that he has been in office] than per- the work of the NPT review conference? seized without responsibilities. We’re

We are working to get something that we can put into place that meets what the presidents have agreed to. It’s hard to do, but not impossible to do.

haps the previous administration did Tauscher: Well, this is an idea trying to build international consensus in [its eight years], but this is an issue generated by the president; and the for multilateral fuel banking and the that requires American leadership. This president is, I think, sufficiently agi- kinds of safeguards and controls and is the persistence and patience that the tated about the issue of nonprolifera- inspections and IAEA [International president is talking about. We have to tion not delivering on what everyone’s Atomic Energy Agency] authorities and give people a chance to know who we hopes are. Even with lots of people budgeting that cause us to say, “We are and to know what these kinds of saying the right things and even sup- don’t really want to worry about that commitments mean. That’s why the porting the right things, we live in a country that perhaps has an immature secretary of state gave the speech today, very dangerous world. So this is the democracy, or even a immature govern- [why] we were in Moscow last week. president’s effort to get, at his level, at ment, that can’t protect its own borders This is really a very, very significant the head-of-state level, during just a but wants a nuclear power plant.” agenda item. Not for once a month, one-day conference, to bear down on not for once a week, but every day. And what these things are and to get in- ACT: Are those countries accepting that every day we’re doing something, and ternational agreement on the kinds of as part of their responsibilities, or do they every day we’re trying to build con- efforts that we all have to support. see this whole new security push as an sensus. We’re listening, we’re talking For too long, responsibilities for the added obligation that they’re being asked to folks that have had problems in the care, custody, and control of nuclear to assume? past reaching consensus, to find a way weapons, for nonproliferation, for co- to satisfy the issues that they’re con- operative agreements, for disarmament, Tauscher: What was made very cerned about so that they will come to have all been at the feet of the nuclear- clear is what this [nuclear security] where we need them to be. weapon states. As the secretary has conference isn’t. It isn’t a donors’ con- said, as the president has said, no one ference, and it’s not meant to overshad- ACT: In terms of what’s being pursued, can be obviated from responsibility on ow the NPT. We’ve added this fourth is UN Security Council Resolution 18877 a these issues, everybody has something pillar [nuclear security] because we

sort of a road map? to do, everybody has responsibilities believe that it is, unfortunately, what ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 and things that they have to invest in, hit us on the head when we turned the Tauscher: It was. It was. I meant to pay attention to. corner on the 21st century. Part of it is tell you that. Yes. 1887 is a road map. And this whole issue of proliferation the vestiges of the old A. Q. Khan net- security. You could just be a transshipper, work but [also] others, the unnamed ACT: How is the United States going you could be completely out of any of the networks that we don’t even know about implementing it? categories, but you have a global strategic about, and the fact that we live in a situation where you actually might not very integrated world that’s not neces- Tauscher: It was the beginning step even know that you are part of global sarily interdependent yet. to say that even people that in the past transshipping proliferation regime. So there’s a lot of stuff happening have not agreed can find a way to agree. I think part of the opportunity is to that you don’t even know about, that Part of it is to listen, and so we are taking have the president say, “We’re doing you’re involved in. By either geography 1887 on the road, and we’re taking the our part. We’re doing very well, thank or by relationships or by circumstance, principles behind that on the road, lead- you very much.” Not that many people countries have got to have this brought 11 up to them. The president decided that proposal. What is the United States doing to have civilian nuclear power. From he wanted people at his level to under- within the NSG to get the whole NSG to our point of view, and as the secretary stand it. President Obama isn’t the first approve those guidelines? laid out today, and as I’ve said and president to talk about nuclear zero, but as the president’s said, they should he is the first who pointed to a place on Tauscher: We’re working with not be in conflict. The idea of strong the horizon and said, “There it is.” He’s the NSG. We’re also working in the nonproliferation regimes in the NPT, the first one to use his political capital IAEA. We’re on the board of governors; and a number of other initiatives, NTI and persuasion so early in his presi- there’s a board meeting [in November]. [Nuclear Threat Initiative],11 Nunn- dency. He’s using his popularity, his We want to be able to move forward on Lugar programs, all of the other things policy positions, his persuasiveness on a fuel bank. We want there to be a fuel the president’s made a commitment to, this issue because he believes, he be- bank stood up. We are looking strongly holding a nuclear security summit in lieves—this isn’t something that’s been at supporting the Russian Angarsk the spring, tying down fissile material brought to him—he believes that this is facility9 because we want something within four years, all of these com- a threat and that it needs to be brought up. These are not competing ideas; mitments, they are a basket that is po- up to the level of heads of state so that we don’t want them to be viewed as rous, with a membrane between them. they understand that it’s not just the competing ideas. We want them to be There’s a lot of things that go in be- nuclear powers that have these respon- viewed as “Let’s get something going.” tween them, and they don’t contradict sibilities; everybody does. So we’re looking to work with our Rus- each other. It’s important on the civil- sian friends; I’ve been working with ian nuclear side that we make clear that ACT: The United States and other my counterpart on that. What we’re you can have civilian nuclear power, members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group trying to do is to have people look but there has to be a way to ensure that [NSG] have been trying to tighten the across the expanse of opportunities having civilian nuclear power doesn’t guidelines on the transfer of sensitive and to knit together the things you create a proliferation risk. nuclear fuel-cycle technologies, that is, have to have in order to get solutions How do you do that? How do you enrichment and reprocessing. In Novem- to some of these problems. build international consensus to do ber, the NSG negotiated but failed to ap- You have a lot of countries that that? What are the international re- prove a draft proposal for criteria-based are critical about the P-510 record on gimes that you have to put in place? guidelines that would bar NSG states disarmament, [saying that] we’re not What are the incentives? How do you from transferring those technologies to doing enough. You have a number make sure that even for those of us who non-NPT member states, and recently of countries that believe that the P-5 think that they’re climate neutral or the Group of Eight agreed to adopt that have denied them their sovereign right even climate enhancing, whatever the reasoning is, how do you make sure that those countries understand that they’re going to have access to the fuel they need and maintain their reactors? We have a very good example in the UAE [United Arab Emirates] 123 agree- ment [in which the UAE said,] “We’re not going to do any enriching; we’re not going to do any reprocessing”12

ACT: What is the current U.S. policy on export of reprocessing and enrichment? There’s been some confusion about this.

Tauscher: None, we don’t do it.

ACT: You mentioned a fuel bank pro- posal, but that’s run into a lot of opposi- tion. A lot of people had hoped it would be Dean Calma/IAEA Dean wrapped up by now, but the countries, the ones who would be using the fuel bank, November 2009 ODAY are very suspicious; they see it as a way to deny them the capacity to enrich uranium. They don’t recognize the spread of enrich- International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei (left) ment as a proliferation concern. How do speaks with Hamad al Kaabi (right), United Arab Emirates (UAE) special representative you address those really fundamental for international nuclear cooperation, in Vienna August 1, 2008. The UAE pledged

ARMS CONTROL T $10 million toward a nuclear fuel bank proposal launched by the Nuclear Threat concerns that they have and move forward Initiative in 2006. with this proposal? 12 Tauscher: Well, I think the truth ENDNOTES section, Clinton said, “We must continue is, above anything else, nobody can to strengthen each of the three mutually re- say, “Well, the last time I used that 1. On September 24, 1992, Congress passed inforcing pillars of global nonproliferation— fuel bank, this is what happened a spending bill that included the Hatfield- preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, promoting disarmament, and facilitating the to me.” We have to work to educate Exon-Mitchell amendment, which imposed a moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing. The Bush peaceful use of nuclear energy. And to those people, to a certain extent. There are administration opposed the amendment but three pillars, we should add a fourth: prevent- two or three competing proposals right

It’s important on the civilian nuclear side that we make clear that you can have civilian nuclear power, but there has to be a way to ensure that having civilian nuclear power doesn’t create a proliferation risk.

now. I think that in the end there signed the bill into law on October 2, 1992. ing nuclear terrorism. Stopping terrorists from could be one fuel bank, but I think The United States has not conducted a nucle- acquiring the ultimate weapon was not a cen- that we need as many of them up and ar test since September 23, 1992. tral preoccupation when the NPT was negoti- ated, but today, it is, and it must remain at the running as possible. 2. In 1999, the Senate voted 51-48 against top of our national security priorities.” You have to find a way to create that CTBT ratification. safety and security. We have a 123 3. Under Annex 2 of the Comprehensive 9. Russia has made a proposal to the Inter- national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to agreement with the UAE. Are we go- Test Ban Treaty, 44 specified countries must establish a fuel bank of two reactor loads of ing to get other agreements like that? ratify the treaty to bring it into force. China, low-enriched uranium at the International I don’t know, but the key here is to get Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the United States are the Uranium Enrichment Center at Angarsk. This agreement. That’s why we’re interested countries that are on that list but have not proposal is one of several for a fuel bank, in supporting [the proposal for a fuel ratified the treaty. which would serve as a backup source of fuel bank at] Angarsk. Right now, no one for countries with good nonproliferation cre- 4. On May 29, the Conference on Disarmament knows what would happen if they went dentials. The aim of the fuel bank proposals in Geneva agreed on a program of work that to the fuel bank. is to give countries an incentive to refrain included the negotiation of a verifiable treaty But you know part of it is that we from pursuing indigenous uranium-enrich- banning the production of fissile material for ment programs. See Miles Pomper, “Russia have to get some confidence going, use in nuclear weapons. Since then, however, Offers to Jump Start IAEA Fuel Bank,” Arms especially in countries that are very the conference was able to make little progress Control Today, October 2007, p. 41; Daniel concerned about their ability to have before adjourning for the year in September. Horner and Oliver Meier, “Talks on Fuel Bank a reliable bank that they’re going to The conference will have to adopt a new pro- Stalled at IAEA,” Arms Control Today, October be able to go to. But you know there’s gram of work when it returns next year. 2009, pp. 24-26. always a cost for doing business. The 5. The National Academy of Sciences is in the 10. The term “P-5” refers to the five perma- bank is there so that there are alterna- process of updating its 2002 report, Technical nent members of the UN Security Council— tives to reprocessing and enrichment. Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, Ban Treaty. The new report is expected to be Well, it is the luxury that you don’t and the United States. Those countries also

completed in early 2010. ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 have, but what we’re trying to do is to are the ones recognized as nuclear-weapon make that luxury too expensive. We’re 6. Congressional Commission on the Strategic states by the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Posture of the United States, “America’s Stra- sin-taxing it. We’re saying, “Hey, if you 11. See Horner and Meier, “Talks on Fuel tegic Posture,” 2009, http://media.usip.org/re- want to do that, we’re going to make it Bank Stalled at IAEA,” pp. 24-26. really, really hard for you because we ports/strat_posture_report.pdf. 12. Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act 7. For the text of the resolution, see just really can’t afford to have outli- requires the United States to have a nuclear coop- http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UN- ers.” We have to make clear that we eration agreement with any country with which DOC/GEN/N09/523/74/PDF/N0952374. support expansion of nuclear power it is engaging in nuclear trade. Under the terms pdf?OpenElement. See also Cole Harvey, “Nu- and are prepared to help countries gain of the U.S. “123 agreement” with the United clear Arms Resolution Passed at UN Summit,” access to nuclear energy, but in a safe Arab Emirates, the UAE “shall not” pursue an Arms Control Today, October 2009, pp. 22-23. and economical way that does not in- indigenous uranium-enrichment or spent fuel 8. For the text of the speech, as deliv- crease the risk of proliferation. reprocessing program. See Daniel Horner, “U.S., ered, see www.state.gov/secretary/rm/ UAE Sign New Nuclear Cooperation Pact,” Arms 2009a/10/130806.htm. In the relevant Control Today, June 2009, pp. 34-35. ACT: Thank you very much. 13 By Masa Takubo

The Role of Nuclear Weapons: Japan, the U.S., and “Sole Purpose”

n September 22, a day before President weapons to deterrence of only nuclear attacks.2 The letter explained: Barack Obama met with Japanese This policy would be consistent Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama in with President Obama’s [April 5] O statement in Prague that he will New York, 13 nongovernmental U.S. security reduce the role of nuclear weap- ons in U.S. national security strat- experts released an open letter calling on the egy, and urge other countries to do the same. two leaders “to support a U.S. policy declaring Such a change in U.S. policy will also strengthen the Nuclear that the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to Non-Proliferation Treaty—a goal of both nations—by reinforcing deter, and if necessary respond to, the use of the negative security assurances 1 the nuclear weapons states have nuclear weapons by other countries.” made not to use nuclear weapons against states without nuclear weapons. It will also reduce the incentive for more countries to The letter was prompted in part by A key element of the Japanese-U.S. acquire nuclear weapons.3 the coincidence of two events: the U.S. security relationship has been the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which is U.S. pledge to protect Japan against The current Japanese-U.S. supposed to be completed by December any attack. That pledge has been arrangement has come to function as a and delivered to Congress shortly after, understood by the Japanese government barrier to global nuclear nonprolifera- and the victory of the Democratic Party as an offer of a “nuclear umbrella,” or tion and disarmament. Because of a fear of Japan (DPJ) in August. The nuclear extended nuclear deterrence, covering in the United States and elsewhere of the policies of the DPJ appear to be markedly attacks on Japan with conventional, perceived prospect that Japan might ac- different from those of its predecessor, chemical, or biological weapons, as well quire its own nuclear arsenal if it came the Liberal Democratic Party, which as nuclear weapons. to regard the nuclear umbrella as unre- November 2009 ODAY dominated Japanese politics for more The security experts’ letter called for liable, the arrangement in effect gives than 50 years. a policy of limiting the role of nuclear Japan significant leverage. It allows Ja-

Masa Takubo is an independent analyst on nuclear issues living in Japan and operator of the nuclear information Web site Kakujoho. This

ARMS CONTROL T article is based in part on a chapter on Japan’s attitudes toward nuclear disarmament in a forthcoming report by the International Panel on Fissile Materials. 14 pan to put pressure on the United States to avoid taking any significant steps to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in its security and military doctrines and thus impedes progress on freeing the world of nuclear weapons. Those in the United States who oppose narrowing the role of nuclear weapons could also use Japan’s position as an excuse for not changing the current U.S. policy. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry, one of the four authors of Wall Street Journal op-eds calling for a world free of nuclear weapons, said in a recent meeting in Tokyo that he has also been calling on Obama to adopt a policy Stan H Stan declaring that the “sole purpose” of

U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter the use onda/AFP/ of such weapons by others.4 He said this “sole purpose” declaration would G

amount to a no-first-use declaration Images etty but that the latter is not acceptable in the United States because the concept is tarnished by its abuse during the Cold Former Foreign Ministers Gareth Evans of Australia and Yoriko Kawaguchi of Japan, War, when the Soviet Union advocated co-chairs of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and no-first-use while, as was later discovered, Disarmament, speak to the media at UN headquarters in New York May 5. The it was preparing for first use.5 Thus, in commission is expected to release a report early next year. discussions today, the sole purpose, or “only purpose,” declaration is usually interpreted as a euphemistic substitute The International Commission on Nu- General Assembly resolution on nuclear for a no-first-use declaration.6 clear Non-proliferation and Disarmament disarmament that has been adopted every Katsuya Okada, Japan’s new foreign (ICNND), co-chaired by former Foreign year since 1994.13 minister, has been a staunch advocate Ministers Yoriko Kawaguchi of Japan The answer lies in the history of Japan’s of no-first-use, but bureaucrats in his and Gareth Evans of Australia, is sched- nuclear policy. When Japan adopted its ministry are resisting that idea and the uled to issue its report in the coming three non-nuclear principles, it was, in sole purpose concept. According to the months. Referring to the ICNND, which Sato’s mind, part of a package in which security experts’ letter and other accounts, was meeting in Hiroshima the same day protection by the nuclear umbrella of U.S. these Japanese skeptics are playing an he spoke in Kyoto, Okada said, “As a extended deterrence was a precondition.14 important role in the U.S. NPR. The letter general course, we should discuss what The implication is that Japan will not seek said that “[s]ome Japanese bureaucrats could be done to achieve no first use of nuclear weapons as long as the nuclear want to preserve the status quo, and argue nuclear weapons. I would expect that the umbrella is regarded as reliable. that such a change in U.S. nuclear policy Evans-Kawaguchi report would be along Sato raised the issue of the nuclear could undermine Japan’s confidence in those lines. When the report comes out, umbrella during a conversation with U.S. security guarantees.”7 It warned that I would like to discuss this no-first-use Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara some Americans “remain mired in Cold issue fully with the United States."10 on January 13, 1965. According to a

War thinking, and cite these Japanese summary, Sato said, “Please be careful ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 concerns to argue against changing U.S. Historical Background11 about statements concerning bringing policy, which they contend could lead Why do some believe that Japan will nuclear weapons onto the land. Of course, Japan to build its own nuclear weapons.”8 seek a nuclear capability if the United should a war break out, it would be a dif- In an October 18 speech in Kyoto, States adopts a sole purpose policy? After ferent story. We expect that the U.S. will Okada noted the central contradiction all, Japan takes pride in having adopted immediately retaliate with nuclear weap- in Japanese policy on nuclear weapons: three non-nuclear principles. Formalized ons.”15 These comments were made short- “Hitherto, the Japanese government has in 1967 by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, ly after China’s first nuclear test, which said to the U.S., ‘We don’t want you to they specify a clear commitment not to took place on October 16, 1964. declare no first use because it will weaken possess or produce nuclear weapons or In 1982 the Japanese government nuclear deterrence.’ However, it cannot to permit their entry into the country.12 officially expressed its view that the U.S. be said to be consistent to call for nuclear Japan is a strong supporter of the nuclear nuclear umbrella provides for a first-use abolition, while requesting the first use of Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the option in retaliation for an attack by nuclear weapons for yourself.”9 lead sponsor of a widely supported UN conventional weapons. This explanation 15 was given in response to a question raised Later, with the Cold War between the Aso told an August 9 press conference in by Diet member Takahiro Yokomichi on United States and the Soviet Union over, Nagasaki that, “[i]n international society, February 19, 1982, concerning a statement government officials and security experts there exist large arsenals including nucle- made the previous year by Eugene Rostow, in Japan started to consider the security ar forces…. It could disturb the deterrence director of the U.S. Arms Control and Dis- implications of North Korea’s chemical balance and undermine security to have armament Agency. Rostow had said that, and biological weapons, as well as China’s a discussion separating nuclear weapons as with its extended deterrence policy for conventional weapons buildup. In 2003, from other weapons.”20 Reiterating what Western Europe, the United States would for example, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported Masahiko Komura had said when foreign be prepared to use nuclear weapons if the that Mitoji Yabunaka, director-general minister in 1999, Aso said, “Even if a Soviet Union attacked Japan with con- of the Foreign Ministry’s Asian and nuclear power says it won’t make a pre- ventional weapons.16 On June 25, 1982, Oceanian Affairs Bureau, filed a request emptive strike, there’s no way to verify a government official told the Diet that with Assistant Secretary of State for East its intentions. I wonder if that’s a realistic this understanding was implied in a 1975 Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly “to way to ensure Japan’s safety.”21 press statement issued jointly by President make sure the United States does not Such assertions about the difficulty of Gerald Ford and Prime Minister Takeo again [as in 1994] promise not to use its verifying a no-first-use declaration might Miki.17 Referring to the joint statement, nuclear weapons against North Korea if have been referring to China, which has the official said, “We believe that in the Pyongyang agrees to dismantle its nuclear maintained a no-first-use policy since sense that all the measures are included, it development program.”19 1964. That policy is often considered a would mean that the nuclear deterrent or More recently, when asked about en- piece of propaganda in Japan. The Japa- retaliation would not be limited to nuclear couraging the United States to adopt a nese responses cited above intentionally attacks against Japan.”18 no-first-use policy, Prime Minister Taro or unintentionally confuse the no-first- Department of Defense of Department November 2009 ODAY

A Los Angeles-class attack submarine is moored to the pier in Norfolk, Virginia September 21. Such submarines are capable

ARMS CONTROL T of launching nuclear-armed Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles, although no nuclear-armed versions are currently deployed at sea. 16 use policies of an adversary, China, and those of an ally, the United States. Aso’s remarks were made in response to a question about U.S. policy, in the con- text of the United States perhaps being able to make a contribution to the ef- forts toward global nuclear disarmament by declaring a no-first-use policy. This declaration could reduce international tension and the role and value of nuclear weapons and perhaps prepare the way for further reductions in the number of nuclear weapons. Japan is also said to be actively trying

to influence other aspects of U.S. nuclear Kimura/AFP/ Junko policy. In his Web log discussing nuclear- tipped Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAM/N), Hans M. Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists points G out that Japan is being cited as the main Images etty reason for the potential life extension of the TLAM/N force, which has been virtually retired since the days of Presi- dent George H. W. Bush.22 The 2009 Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada speaks during a press conference in Tokyo September 16. final report of the Congressional Com- mission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, headed by Perry and James Schlesinger, says: ation the concerns of its allies. He said When Evans came to Japan in May, there still is “great concern in both he warned that Japan’s position on In Asia, extended deterrence re- Europe and in Asia about the credibility the need for the nuclear umbrella lies heavily on the deployment of of our extended deterrence…. It is im- against conventional, chemical, and nuclear cruise missiles on some portant for us to pay attention to their biological weapons was a major obstacle Los Angeles[-]class attack subma- concern and not try to judge whether to the commission's approval of a rines – the Tomahawk Land Attack deterrence is effective by our standard, recommendation to call on the United Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N). This but we have to take their standards into States to adopt a no-first-use policy.26 capability will be retired in 2013 account as well. And a failure to do The Australian newspaper The Age unless steps are taken to maintain this…would be that those nations would reported September 4 that although it. U.S. allies in Asia are not inte- feel that they had to provide their own “most of the 15-member commission, grated in the same way [as NATO deterrence. They would have to build including Australia's co-chairman, countries] into nuclear planning their own nuclear weapons.”25 former foreign minister Gareth Evans, and have not been asked to make The position of past Japanese plan to call on nuclear-armed states commitments to delivery systems. administrations has influenced the to change their defence doctrine and In our work as a Commission it has deliberations of the ICNND, although declare they will only use atomic become clear to us that some U.S. the commission is an independent body. weapons when faced with direct nuclear allies in Asia would be very con- In addition to commission co-chair attack,” Kawaguchi opposed the idea.27

cerned by TLAM/N retirement.23 Kawaguchi, the advisory board has Later that month, Japan’s Kyodo ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 three Japanese members. Two are former News said the Japanese team opposed In testimony to the House Armed high-ranking officials of the Ministry of language in the draft report calling for Services Committee May 6, Schlesinger Foreign Affairs who are strongly opposed U.S. statements on nuclear doctrine said Japan “is the country that has per- to the idea of limiting the role of nuclear before the May 2010 NPT Review haps the greatest leaning, amongst the weapons to the sole purpose of deterring Conference. According to the article, 30-odd nations that we have under the nuclear attacks, let alone a no-first-use the draft report said the ''sole purpose umbrella, to create its own nuclear force, declaration by the United States. The of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter use and therefore, intimate discussions with third adviser is the chair of the Japanese of nuclear weapons against the United the Japanese, I think, are mandatory at Atomic Energy Commission, who was States and its allies and (possibly) that this stage.”24 Perry followed Schlesinger presumably chosen in part to protect the United States is willing to consider by saying that even if the United States another aspect of Japan’s nuclear policy: moving in combination with other does not see the need to deploy certain Japan’s right to uranium enrichment and nuclear armed states to a clear no-first- weapons, it should take into consider- spent fuel reprocessing. use posture.”28 17 Overestimated Threat The DPJ, which won a landslide He said, however, that “[w]e do not How strong are Japan’s objections to U.S. victory in Japan’s August 30 election, necessarily need a nuclear umbrella adoption of a new policy on the role of declared its nuclear policy supporting against the nuclear threat of North nuclear weapons and deeper nuclear no-first-use in 2000. Okada was the head Korea. I think conventional weapons are weapons reductions? Is it actually likely of the team that developed this policy. enough to deal with it.”33 that if the United States adopted such a Although the current official status of At the recent Tokyo meeting, Perry said policy, Japan would violate its NPT obliga- the document is not clear, on May 12, that the combined conventional forces tions and seek to acquire nuclear weapons 2009, Okada, who was DPJ secretary-gen- of Japan and the United States would against the wishes of the United States eral at the time, told a Diet session that be enough to deter nuclear attacks of

There is a big difference between a theoretical possibility and a realistic probability that Japan will go nuclear.

and world opinion? There is a big differ- “a norm not allowing at least first use, or North Korea and that those forces could ence between a theoretical possibility and making it illegal to use nuclear weapons cause devastating damage. North Korea’s a realistic probability that Japan will go against countries not possessing nuclear leaders know that, and they are not nuclear. Also, a U.S. no-first-use policy does weapons, should be established. Japan suicidal, he said.34 not imply the cessation of Japanese-U.S. should be at the forefront of this effort Okada repeated his position in the security arrangements or a withdrawal of as a leader.”31 In an interview soon after, inaugural Cabinet press conference on the U.S. nuclear umbrella against possible Okada elaborated on his position: September 16, saying, “My own personal nuclear attacks. Furthermore, a Japanese belief has been to question whether nuclear-weapon program could in fact I believe that Japan should advocate countries which declare their willingness jeopardize Japan’s security arrangement the following three points: that the to make first use of nuclear weapons with the United States and its position states possessing nuclear weapons, have any right to speak about nuclear in the international community. Former the United States in particular, disarmament, or nuclear nonproliferation, Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba, who is should declare no first use; formation in particular nonproliferation.”35 known for his knowledge of nuclear and of an agreement that it is illegal During an October 20 meeting in military affairs, recently said about Japan to use nuclear weapons against Japan with Secretary of Defense Robert exercising the option to develop nuclear countries without nuclear weapons; Gates, Okada told Gates that the Japanese weapons, “That would naturally mean and, partly overlapping with these government currently is examining Japan withdrawing from the NPT. We two, the initiative of a Northeast the no-first-use issue and that he would would not be able to obtain nuclear fuel.... Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. like to discuss it with the United States. With dependency on nuclear power for If the United States declares no Gates responded that the flexibility of about 40% of [our] electricity, we would first use, that does not mean that deterrence is necessary.36 Three days experience a major decline in economic Japan will be completely outside later, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of activities. Japan going nuclear would the nuclear umbrella. In a situation Staff Adm. Mike Mullen expressed his automatically mean the collapse of the where nuclear weapons actually exist agreement with Gates while in Tokyo.37 NPT regime and there would be nuclear in this world, it would be natural Thus, U.S. defense officials appear to countries all around us.”29 In a book that people feel worried about the be resisting adoption of a new policy published three years ago, Ishiba said, “In nuclear umbrella going away. advocated by a Japanese foreign minister, any case, the voters would not allow such a I talk about going out of the rather than the other way around. thing as possession of nuclear weapons.”30 nuclear umbrella halfway, where Okada also has taken steps to Japan would have to consider these realities first use would not be exercised, investigate secret understandings before going nuclear, which so-called but in the unfortunate case that between Japan and the United States, November 2009 ODAY realists in the United States tend to ignore. Japan suffers a nuclear attack, we are which include those related to the third Ishiba, a conservative, knows about these not ruling out a nuclear response non-nuclear principle of not permitting realities. If the United States adopts a sole to it. We have such an assurance nuclear weapons to enter Japan.38 The purpose policy, can one really argue that ultimately. So please understand United States and Japan have not strictly Japan would believe that whatever benefits that I am not just talking about an adhered to this principle. Documents 32

ARMS CONTROL T it might gain from going nuclear would idealistic theory. declassified in the United States show a outweigh the negative consequences? secret agreement at the time of the 1960 18 revision of the Japanese-U.S. security policy review taking place within States to declare a clear no-first-use policy. treaty to allow port calls by U.S. ships car- the Japanese government should be However, Obama should not wait for rying nuclear weapons.39 On September interpreted as a message to the Obama Japanese action to make bold changes in 17, Okada ordered the Foreign Ministry’s administration to act boldly in its NPR U.S. nuclear policy. top bureaucrat to investigate the issue of process and adopt a sole purpose policy, The world now has an opportunity to secret pacts. Because of the 1991 decision if not a no-first-use policy. make significant steps toward a nuclear- by Bush to withdraw nuclear weapons weapon-free world. Outdated and from surface ships and attack submarines, Conclusion misunderstood policies should not stand the port-call issue has been moot. Yet, the The Guardian reported September 20 that in the way. ACT alleged request by Japan to put TLAM/N Obama rejected a draft NPR because it was on attack submarines, which frequently too timid. According to the report, Obama ENDNOTES stop at Japanese ports, would, if realized, called for a range of more far-reaching lead to a situation necessitating secret options, including more radical reduc- Unless otherwise noted, all translations are the pacts or abandonment of the third tions of nuclear weapons and a redrafting author’s. principle. The logical step for Okada is to of nuclear doctrine to narrow the range of 1. Union of Concerned Scientists, “Letter Urges investigate these “requests” and withdraw conditions under which the United States Obama, Hatoyama to Change Nuclear Policy,” them officially if Japan is to come clean would use nuclear weapons.40 In his Sep- September 22, 2009, www.ucsusa.org/news/press_ and keep the third principle intact. It tember 23 speech to the UN General As- release/letter-urges-us-japan-nuclear-0285.html would be rather difficult for Japan to sembly, Obama appeared to provide a hint (hereinafter Union of Concerned Scientists letter). tell the United States not to bring in any of his intentions when he said: “We will 2. This would mean adoption of “core deterrence,” nuclear weapons, while demanding that complete a Nuclear Posture Review that defined by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences’ the United States put tactical weapons opens the door to deeper cuts and reduces Committee on International Security and Arms 41 on attack submarines that roam around the role of nuclear weapons.” Control as “the restricted form of extended nuclear Japan and keep open the option of using The ICNND is expected to release its deterrence in which coverage is intended against nuclear weapons in response to a non- final report in a weakened form around nuclear threats—and only nuclear threats—to nuclear attack on Japan. January 2010.42 The Japanese government one’s own country and to one’s allies.” See The picture should be clear to should not wait until then to express its Committee on International Security and Arms Obama. Okada’s speech in Kyoto and official support for a sole purpose policy. Control, National Academy of Sciences, “The his explanation to Gates about the Japan also should encourage the United Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 1997, p.15, www.puaf.umd.edu/Fetter/1997-fun.pdf. 3. Union of Concerned Scientists letter. 4. William Perry, Remarks at “The Japan-US Partnership Toward A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Tokyo, October 21, 2009 (hereinafter Perry remarks). 5. Ibid. 6. Some Cold War thinkers could interpret “sole purpose” to allow for a scenario for first use: a counterforce first strike for the purpose of limiting the damage when the enemy is considered to be about to attack with nuclear weapons. Therefore it will eventually be necessary to rule out this scenario by making a clear-cut no-first-use declaration. See Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich, “From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons,” Occasional ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 Paper No. 7, Federation of American Scientists and Natural Resources Defense Council, April 2009. 7. Union of Concerned Scientists letter. 8. Ibid. Department of Defense of Department 9. Katsuya Okada, Remarks at “Atarashii Jidai no Nichibei Kankei” [Japan-U.S. relationship in a new era], Kyoto, October 18, 2009. 10. Ibid. 11. For more information, see Masa Takubo, “Japan's Challenges and Dilemmas Over Nuclear Secretary of Defense Robert Gates holds a meeting at the Ministry of Defense in Disarmament,” Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 91 Tokyo October 21. Gates visited Japan to discuss defense issues with members of the (Summer 2009). country’s new government. 19 12. The policy of the three non-nuclear principles continue to abide by its defense commitment to Shirazushite Heiwa wo Kataruna [Without knowing was first expressed by Prime Minister Eisaku Japan under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and military affairs, do not talk about peace] (Tokyo: Sato at the Diet (House of Representatives Security in the event of armed attack against Japan, KK Best Sellers, 2006), p. 176. Budget Committee) on December 11, 1967. whether by nuclear or conventional forces.” For the 31. House of Representatives Budget Committee, See Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan [National Diet full statement, see “Japan-U.S. Joint Announcement May 12, 2009. See Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan Library], Shugiin Kaigiroku Joho [House of to the Press (by Prime Minister Takeo Miki and [National Diet Library], Shugiin Kaigiroku Joho Representatives minutes], December 11, 1967, President Gerald R. Ford),” Washington, August 6, [House of Representatives minutes], May 12, 2009, http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/057/ 1975, www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/ http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/171/ 0514/05712110514002a.html. texts/JPUS/19750806.O1E.html (hereinafter Miki- 0018/17105120018027a.html. LDP member Taro 13. See Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ford statement). Kono argued in the Diet in 1999 for a Japanese- “Adoption of Nuclear Disarmament Resolution 18. House of Representatives Budget Committee, U.S. joint declaration for no-first-use. House Submitted by Japan to the 63rd Plenary June 25, 1982. See Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Session of the United Nations General [National Diet Library], Shugiin Kaigiroku Joho June 12, 1999). See Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan Assembly,” December 3, 2008, www.mofa. [House of Representatives Minutes], June 25, [National Diet Library], Shugiin Kaigiroku Joho go.jp/announce/announce/2008/12/1185313_ 1982, http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/ [House of Representatives minutes], June 12, 1999, 1080.html; UN General Assembly, “Australia, 096/0380/09606250380022a.html. http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/145/ Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Chile, 19. “Govt Wants U.S. to Keep North Korea N- 0005/14506020005008c.html. Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Deterrent,” Daily Yomiuri, August 23, 2003. 32. Katsuya Okada, “Interview: Ajia no Naka no Salvador, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, 20. “Shusho Kaku Senseifushiyo niwa Hiteiteki” Nihon toshite Anzen Hosho Seiseku wo Kochiku Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, [Prime minister negative about no first use], Shinakereba Naranai” [We should develop a Paraguay, Philippines, Switzerland, the former Nihon Hoso Kyokai [Japan Broadcasting security policy as Japan inside Asia], Sekai, July Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine: Corporation], August 9, 2009. 2009, pp. 138-143. Draft Resolution: Renewed Determination 33. Ibid. Towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear 21. Ibid. Weapons,” A/C.1/63/L.58, October 23, 2008, 22. Hans Kristensen, “Japan, TLAM/N, and 34. Perry remarks. He also emphasized the www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/ Extended Deterrence,” FAS Strategic Security Web importance of nonmilitary deterrence, including arms/un0810.pdf. log, July 2, 2009, www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/ economic power. 14. Sato explained the relationship between the tlam.php. See Jeffrey Lewis, "Japan ♥ TLAM/N,” 35. Katsuya Okada, Remarks at ministers’ nuclear umbrella and the principles as follows: ArmsControlWonk Web log, May 8, 2009, www. inaugural press conference, September 16, 2009. “What should Japan do about its security under armscontrolwonk.com/2284/japan-tlamn. See Seifu Intanet Terevi [Government Internet the three principles concerning nuclear weapons: 23. Congressional Commission on the Strategic TV], “Daijin Shunin Kaiken” [Ministers' inaugural not possessing, not producing, and not bringing Posture of the United States, “America’s press conference], September 16, 2009, in nuclear weapons?… When I met President Strategic Posture,” 2009, p. 26, http://media. http://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/prg/prg2758.html. Johnson last time in 1965, and this time too, usip.org/reports/strat_posture_report.pdf. The 36. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press I said: ‘Could the Japan-U.S. security treaty commission’s wording in this passage could Conference by the Deputy Press Secretary defend Japan against any kind of attacks?’ In be read to suggest that TLAM/N are currently (English),” October 22, 2009, www.mofa.go.jp/ other words, is it useful against nuclear attacks? deployed on the Los Angeles-class submarines. announce/press/2009/10/1022.html. President Johnson said [that the U.S.] will clearly As discussed elsewhere in this article, that is not 37. “Top U.S. Military Officer Warns Japan Against defend Japan against any attacks.” House of the case. Reneging on Futemma Plan,” Kyodo News, Representatives Budget Committee, December 11, 24. James Schlesinger, Statement before the House October 23, 2009, www.breitbart.com/article. 1967. See Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan [National Armed Services Committee, May 6, 2009, http:// php?id=D9BGR3R84&show_article=1. Diet Library], Shugiin Kaigiroku Joho [House of armedservices.house.gov/hearing_information- 38. Tomoko A. Hosaka, “Japan launches probe of Representatives minutes], December 11, 1967, jan-may2009.shtml. secret pacts with US,” Associated Press, September http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/057/ 25. William J. Perry, Statement before the House 24, 2009, www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/ 0514/05712110514002a.html. Armed Services Committee, May 6, 2009, http:// n/a/2009/09/24/international/i224839D04. 15. “Sato Makunamara Kaidan no Omona armedservices.house.gov/hearing_information- DTL&feed=rss.business. Yaritori” [Main conversation at the Sato- jan-may2009.shtml. 39. For related declassified documents, see www. McNamara meeting], Kyodo News, December 22, 26. Yumi Kanazaki,“Kakuno Kasa Kaishaku gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb291/index.htm. 2008, http://yamagata-np.jp/news_core/index_p Saikowo” [Interpretation of nuclear umbrella should r.php?kate=Detail&no=2008122101000153&key 40. Julian Borger, “Barack Obama Ready to Slash be reexamined], Chugoku Shimbun, May 28, 2009. word=. The summary was among the documents US Nuclear Arsenal,” The Guardian, September 20, declassified last December by the Ministry of 27. Daniel Flitton, “Australia, Japan in Nuclear 2009, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/20/ Foreign Affairs. Rift,” The Age, September 4, 2009, www.theage. barack-obama-us-nuclear-weapons. com.au/national/australia-japan-in-nuclear-rift- 16. House of Representataives Budget Committee, 41. Office of the Press Secretary, The White 20090903-f9yw.html. February 19, 1982. See Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan House, “Remarks by the President to the United [National Diet Library], Shugiin Kaigiroku Joho 28. “Japan Reluctant to Accept Proposal for Nations General Assembly,” United Nations November 2009 ODAY [House of Representatives minutes], February 19, U.S. to Reduce Role of Nukes,” Kyodo News, headquarters, New York, September 23, 2009, 1982, http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/ September 13, 2009, www.breitbart.com/article. www.whitehouse.gov. 096/0380/09602190380013a.html. php?id=D9AMDKV80&show_article=1. 42. “International Panel Calls for Nuke 17. “Further, they recognized that the US nuclear 29. Shigeru Ishiba and Kazuhisa Ogawa, Nhihon Disarmament After 2025 at Conference in deterrent is an important contributor to the security no Senso to Heiwa [Japan’s war and peace] (Tokyo: Hiroshima,” Mainichi Daily News, October 21,

ARMS CONTROL T of Japan. In this connection, the President reassured Bijinesu Sha, 2009), p. 284. 2009, http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/ the Prime Minister that the United States would 30. Shigeru Ishiba and Shinichi Kiyotani, Gunjiwo 20091021p2a00m0na016000c.html. 20 By David Elliott

Weighing the Case For a Convention to Limit Cyberwarfare

yberattack is emerging as a new type serious international attacks.2 All of these attacks have occurred against an essentially of nonlethal weapon that can cause constant background of lower-level probes that are not publicized. A common attack substantial harm to society, especially when mode is the distributed denial of service C (DDOS) blitz, in which tens of thousands used in its most advanced version by countries at of unwittingly cooperating computers are combined into a network (botnet) to flood war. It may be time to consider an international a target’s Web site and thereby disable it. The identity of the organizer and initiator convention to limit the initiation of such use, of such an attack can be very difficult to determine, including, importantly, whether particularly against targets that are part of critical it is another government. The public re- porting of events almost always speaks only national infrastructure and are basically civilian. of assumed or likely sources. Attacks much more harmful than DDOS, with cascading effects, are techni- cally feasible and are assumed to be under Cyberattack refers to offensive actions to cyberattack by one state against another development, certainly at the state level. alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy state’s critical infrastructure. There have A characterization of the threat potential computer systems or networks or the infor- been proposals to reduce the threat of cy- appears in a recent National Academy of mation or programs resident in or transit- berwarfare through an arms control agree- Sciences (NAS) study of cyberattack as a ing these systems. Its purpose is to mislead ment; some of the key issues underlying the weapon of war.3 The threat, according to or disable an important network-dependent pursuit of such an agreement are examined the study, is expected to grow in scope ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 activity. A passive form of attack is cyber- in this article. and sophistication. exploitation, which gathers intelligence The threat of serious cyberattack by state As the United States continues to look information. A flip side of cyberattack is or nonstate actors has been on the U.S. for ways to protect its civil cyberdomain, cybersecurity, which undertakes, through security agenda for many years. There have it also has been actively pursuing, through procedural and technical means, to defend been notable cyberattacks in recent years its national security agencies, efforts not against cyberintrusions. The concern ad- on the United States and other countries,1 only to protect its own cyber-based military dressed in this article relates primarily to and President Barack Obama’s recent “clean systems but also effectively to attack the the offensive and destructive version of slate” review of cybersecurity notes other cybersystems that are integral to a potential

David Elliott is an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and a participant in its program on information security and policy research. He was a senior staff member and director for science and technology on the National Security Council during the Nixon and Ford administrations and was involved in the negotiation or ratification of several arms control agreements. 21 Figure 1: What Is a Cyberattack? Awareness of the threat from cyberattack has increased in recent years, in part because of high-profile attacks in the United States and other countries. A common form of attack is “distributed denial of service.” More damaging variants, such as use of malicious software to disable an electric power grid, are assumed to be under development.

Scenario 1: Distributed Denial of Service Attack

Free-flowing information over Internet

Web site 1 Web site 2

Bounce

00100011001000 10110011100011 Web site is 01010101100011 unavailable 00100100101...... *

Web site 1 Web site 2 overwhelmed by can no sudden onslaught longer access Distributed of data; server Web site 1 denial of service crashes attack

Scenario 2: Cyberattack Using Malicious Software to Disable Electric Power Grid Cyberattacker remotely disables electric power grid

Malicious software !

Cyberattacker Utility company network security compromised Before After

enemy’s military capacity. The focus of the vention on Cybercrime as an important Such a review could be fairly wide- latter is on military and military-relevant step in obtaining international cooperation ranging because the targets potentially targets but also may include components in controlling the general threat.5 vulnerable to cyberattack are extensive and of an enemy’s national infrastructure as a More than 10 years ago, the concept of varied. This article will be limited to the target of strategic information operations.4 an arms control agreement was examined major question of how an agreement might The U.S. offensive programs are very sen- as part of a broader government-sponsored restrict cyberattack by one state-party sitive and thus never openly referenced program at Stanford University6 and re- against the critical national infrastructure in any of the last three presidents’ public viewed at a conference on infrastructure of another and to the pros and cons of such reviews of cybersecurity. Yet, they will be a protection.7 Even though the United States restrictions from a U.S. perspective. For the background factor, possibly an important might potentially be the greatest beneficia- purposes of this article, “critical national one, as the United States seeks international ry of such an agreement, the idea was not infrastructure” is defined to encompass cooperation in protecting its critical infra- pursued further for several reasons, detailed those large cyber-dependent networks that November 2009 ODAY structure against cyberattack. In discus- below. Later, a draft amendment to the laws are important to the efficient functioning sions preceding Obama’s July meeting in of war was suggested to deal specifically of society, including its economy and civil Moscow, the Russians again raised the sub- with the effects of cyberattack,8 but it also governance. Frequently cited examples are ject of an arms control agreement to restrict did not trigger government interest. The is- the electric power grid, telecommunica- cyberwarfare. The United States did not sue is likely to continue to be pursued, and tions, the Internet, the financial system,

ARMS CONTROL T support the initiative but urged the Rus- a brief review of the conflicting factors fac- transportation management, and many sians to sign the Council of Europe Con- ing U.S. decision-makers may be useful. government services, including air traffic 22 control. Many of these systems and services the infrequency of wars, and have an un- on an enemy during wartime or to deny are dual use, and although primarily built certain outcome. Further, this approach itself a tool for coercing others in situations to support the needs of the civil sector, they would not have the normative value of an short of armed conflict? The answers to are used by and important to the military explicit agreement. these questions will require the U.S. gov- sector to one degree or another. The NAS study examined whether ernment to weigh the gains and losses be- peacetime cyberattack directed at com- tween two contrary and incommensurable Existing Legal Limits ponents of another state’s infrastructure policy choices.11 The nongovernmental Several studies have examined what might be configured to fall below the sector can contribute to this analysis and restrictions the present laws of war and threshold of an act of war (jus ad bellum). debate. However, because of the sensitive other, less directly applicable agreements Such use would add to the United States’ and fragile character of this particular mili- would place on cyberattack, including limited options for effective coercion short tary capability and the resulting security one directed at critical national infra- of military action. restrictions, only the government will be structure.9 There is no clear answer, and in a position to judge the trade-off fully. specific cases would turn on the details U.S. Needs In assessing the trade-off, there are three of the attack and arguments over the A central question is whether the United important underlying questions. proportionality of anticipated military States believes it can adequately protect its effect and civilian harm. The self-defense infrastructure against interstate cyberat- • Can the U.S. infrastructure be article of the UN Charter would lessen the tack through its own actions or, instead, made robust enough to withstand need to demonstrate military necessity or finds it needs international cooperation to state-level cyberattack, such that an obtain Security Council approval to carry move toward that goal. In the latter case, agreement limiting offensive use out retaliation-in-kind and active defense might that cooperation include and pos- would be unnecessary? in response to a cyberattack, although sibly be predicated on an international consideration of proportionality would agreement to restrict interstate attacks, • Can the United States devise remain a restraining factor.10 Attempts with prohibition of first use being a mini- reliable cybermeans to attack an to use the current laws of war to build a mum commitment? At the same time, is adversary’s national infrastructure body of precedents for restricting cyber- the United States willing to limit this par- and predictably produce strategically warfare would be protracted, hopefully by ticular means of visiting strategic damage important disruption? ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 Kim Jae- Kim H wan/AFP/ G etty Images etty

The home pages of South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense and Office of the President appear to be unavailable July 8 during a cyberattack that shut down Web sites in South Korea and the United States. 23 • Is the normative value of an inter- invest in security against recognized non- • Secondary and tertiary systemic national agreement that is at best state threats to achieve dependable func- and socioeconomic effects of an at- self-verifying12 worth the limitation tioning of their enterprise but will be less tack will often be more important it would place on the United States, willing to go beyond that. Moreover, some than the initial effect. Because pro- and can other states-parties be ex- steps taken by private companies would jecting these effects requires difficult- pected to conform their offensive require a number of legal exceptions to to-obtain specialized knowledge of decisions to the restrictions of such be made by governments. For example, the interdependence of the systems an agreement? businesses would need an exemption from involved, such estimates will be un-

Cyberattack planning may require longer lead times, greater intelligence gathering, and more target preparation than are needed for conventional attacks.

Protection Without an Agreement antitrust laws to allow confidential joint reliable. This latter consideration also The cybervulnerability of various ele- planning and cooperation among compet- makes it more difficult to project and ments of critical U.S. infrastructure itors on cybersecurity matters. Companies control collateral damage. was first examined in detail in the mid- also would need immunity from the Com- 1990s.13 Since then, efforts to make the puter Fraud and Abuse Act’s prohibition • Because the hardware and soft- infrastructure more resilient have in- on damaging actions as they attempted to ware subsystems and operating cluded technical and procedural advances neutralize an attack at its origin. procedures of a complex network in system security, adoption of new Given this history and this basic im- are not permanent, maintaining a standards and practices, and, importantly, pediment, it seems unlikely, certainly over reliable attack capability may neces- recognition by the involved domestic the medium term, that national measures sitate periodic digital probing, with constituencies of the need for coordinated alone can achieve a strengthened U.S. its risks of discovery, premature remedial action. There have been national infrastructure that could confidently face exposure of target vulnerabilities, action plans announced by three succes- an evolving state-level cyberthreat, partic- and installation by adversaries of sive presidents,14 with contributions to the ularly if the NAS study is correct that the measures to defeat the capability. plans from government agencies, compa- ease of cyberattack is increasing for many nies in potentially affected sectors, profes- kinds of infrastructure targets. The U.S. military notes that cyberat- sional associations, and academia. tack planning may require longer lead Unfortunately, no periodic national Cyberattack Capability times, greater intelligence gathering, and report card characterizes the state of the Do U.S. leaders have enough confidence in more target preparation than are needed threat and assesses the overall progress be- their capability to attack the critical infra- for conventional attacks.16 It also realizes ing made in protecting the infrastructure, structure of other states, and in the effects that launching an infrastructure cyberat- but the conclusion of the latest high-level of such attacks, that they should resist tack would require concurrent high-level review is that U.S. vulnerability remains attempts to limit that capability through political authorization.17 Hence, its use acute.15 Comparing President Bill Clinton’s international agreement? Few people can cannot be reliably integrated into coordi- public assessment of the problem with even begin to estimate an answer to this nated-attack planning for operations. The that of Obama nearly 10 years later, one question in detail, and they cannot partici- NAS points out that, if the government would judge that the country is not mak- pate in any public debate. However, there authorizes an attack, it will either have to ing adequate progress. Part of that may are some general characteristics of large warn the operators of U.S. infrastructure, well be due to the laissez-faire approach networked, interdependent cybersystems thereby eliminating the option of plau- during much of the Bush administration, that should be taken into account when sible deniability, or accept the impact of a in which case the more directed efforts of considering the surety of the capability. retaliatory attack without U.S. infrastruc- the Obama administration may show bet- These characteristics include: ture defenses being alerted.18 November 2009 ODAY ter progress. Some impediments, however, The NAS study notes the argument that are inherent to the problem. For instance, • Because the outcome of a cyberat- it is too early to consider limiting cyberat- most of the critical infrastructure is pri- tack depends on the minute details of tack against infrastructure as a military op- vately owned, and businesses, unless re- the target’s configuration at the mo- tion because the technique is in its develop- quired to do so, do not include or budget ment of attack and cannot be reliably mental stages. The study observes, however,

ARMS CONTROL T for measures to combat national security predicted, such attacks are not a first- that this stage is also the time of policy risks. They will shape their operations and line offensive tool. flexibility before a significant internal con- 24 Table 1: Multilateral U.S. Arms Control Agreements That Prohibit First Hostile Use

Cooperative Latency Security Import Agreement Subject Verification Risk Of Breach Mil. Civ. Prohibits first use of poisonous gases and biological Geneva Protocol None specified H None L/M weapons

Bans use, development, acquisition, or possession of Biological Weapons biological weapons and agents, except for prophylaxis None specified M M M Convention or defense

Environmental Prohibits use of classes of environmental modification Cooperation in investigation of Modification L L L techniques to damage other parties claims of breach Convention

Monitoring of destruction of existing agent and facilities Chemical Weapons Bans use, development, acquisition, or possession of and of commercial production M M M Convention chemical weapons and agents, except for defense of precursor chemicals; challenge inspections

Convention on Restricts use of fragment weapons, landmines, Certain incendiary weapons, laser blinding, and remnants of None specified H None L Conventional war, with certain reservations by the United States Weapons

Key: H-high, M-medium, L-low, Mil.-military, Civ.-civilian. Assignments of values are the author’s. See Arms Control Models (below) for further explanation. stituency has formed, in the United States • Barring a major breakthrough, com- the latency risk (an important factor ex- and in other countries, to resist limitations pliance with any restrictions on use plained below) was deemed manageable, the on national capabilities for cyberattack.19 will be very difficult to verify in any potential security and political import of a Because these considerations collectively reasonable time, owing to the consid- breach (abrogation, violation, or withdrawal) are inconclusive, the basic question re- erable technical difficulty of forensic was acceptable, and uncertainty about other mains open within the public debate. analysis and of tracing an attack’s ori- parties’ compliance was offset to an accept- gin. Furthermore, treating all levels able degree by self-verification measures. A Cyberattack Convention of attack as possible violations would Latency risk is a function of time. Given To be acceptable to the United States, a cyber- overwhelm any U.S. verification re- the estimated capabilities of a party, what is attack convention likely would have to take gime, given the certainty of continu- the time scale for that state to create, re-es- into account the following considerations: ing lower-level cyberattacks from a tablish, or conduct the particular prohibited variety of sources. capacity or activity? High risk means short • Military applications of cyber- time. For example, the time from intention warfare are useful and may become Considering these factors, the most prac- to action for a party to use incendiary weap- quite important. The United States tical convention would be multilateral and ons against prohibited targets (Protocol III would be unlikely to consider any directed at first use and intent. It would set of the Convention on Certain Convention- limitations that would restrict the thresholds on the scale, duration, and sever- al Weapons [CCW]) is immediate. Based development, adoption, or use of this ity of attacks and stipulate that exceeding on available know-how, records, stored capability in general. Further, the any of the thresholds constituted a violation equipment, and the permitted prophylaxis development of measures to defend of the convention; reinforce the require- or defense reserves, the time for Russia to U.S. infrastructure will require threat ment for proportionality in anticipated ef- reconstitute a significant biological weapon characterization, to which an of- fect on civil society; and preclude assistance capability might be a year or two. The time

fensive program may be a major con- to others in conducting prohibited attacks. scale to violate the Environmental Modi- ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 tributor. Such a program also would No cooperative verification measures should fication (ENMOD) Convention might be be the best source of knowledge for be attempted, other than agreement by all decades because the underlying capability “red-team” testing.20 parties to cooperate in the investigation of a does not exist. If there is undetected prepa- claim of violation. Such cooperation is vital ration, all times would be less than estimat- • The United States should insist on because some of the pertinent information ed. There are two sources of latency, from the option for retaliation in kind, for will reside in third countries. dedicated or related military programs and its potential effect and its deterrence from unconnected but applicable civilian value. The United States should also Arms Control Models enterprises. Civilian latency is only a fac- insist on the right to thwart an antici- Table 1 lists the five major multilateral arms tor in a few agreements, but when present, pated cyberattack by cybercounter- control agreements in which the United it can be important, as in the case of the measures, as part of an active defense States participates that prohibit first use. Chemical Weapons Convention, where the of national infrastructure. In each case, the strategic gain was judged verification procedures involve the monitor- worth the loss of a relinquished capability, ing of certain private companies. 25 Table 1 also estimates the importance of risk. The security and political importance convention. The two differ in one im- a breach from a U.S. security perspective. of a breach would be high. portant way: the latency risk and the In addition, there is the political import The agreements in table 1 are the most security import of a breach are judged to of a breach, and that would be uniformly relevant models for a cyberattack conven- be low for environmental attack, whereas high, as it should be to reinforce the nor- tion because they all contain no-first-use both are high for cyberattack. Neverthe- mative value of arms control agreements. commitments. In addition, four of the five less, the ENMOD Convention model may Assuming a breach would necessitate agreements define the prohibited weapon, be a useful starting point for negotiation some form of quid pro quo response, a and the ENMOD Convention describes of a limited cyberattack convention. state can offset high latency risk by devot- the proscribed techniques and effects by ing resources to maintaining a reason- example. Other than the inferred laws of Conclusion able latent capacity itself. The decision to war protection of noncombatants, none The United States must take steps to pro- conduct such a response would depend on except for the CCW, in two protocols, tect its critical national infrastructure the importance of the particular breach at defines a protected class of target. Only against serious cyberattack. One step the time it occurs.21 the ENMOD Convention sets standards in might be to negotiate a multilateral con- The latency risk accompanying a con- terms of scale, duration, or severity of un- vention to limit such attacks by states, vention to limit cyberattack directed at acceptable damage and constrains parties which are the most likely source of an critical national infrastructure would be from assisting others in conducting the attack at the level of greatest concern. Al- high. Special preparatory actions would prohibited actions. The latency risk var- though verification of compliance would be required for a specific attack, but the ies among the five, as does the import of be difficult, the convention in and of itself overall capability would exist in the agen- breach, although none have high import. might be worthwhile for its norm-setting cy responsible for information operations. By adding a definition of a protected value, to be a restraining factor in the of- There would be some capability at the class of target, namely, specified compo- fensive decisions of other states, and as a technology level within the civil sector, nents of critical national infrastructure, necessary step in obtaining fuller inter- but it would require a longer development the ENMOD Convention may be the national cooperation in controlling the time and hence have a smaller latency closest model for a limited cyberattack general cyberthreat. Shaun Curry/AFP/ Shaun November 2009 ODAY G etty Images etty

ARMS CONTROL T Secretary-General of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen speaks at a conference in London October 1. The conference focused on ways the private and public sectors can work together on several emerging issues, including cybersecurity. 26 On the other hand, the U.S. military 2. The White House, “Cyberspace Policy Re- capability are difficult to quantify at this stage of believes that cyberattack in its own hands view: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Infor- cyberattack development. may be an important addition to its war- mation and Communications Infrastructure,” 12. Self-verification means that individual states making capacity. It may be unwilling to n.d., www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/ determine the compliance of another state with- Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf (herein- limit that capacity, particularly as the un- out help from any international entity, such as after White House cyberspace policy review); derstanding of cyberwarfare potential is the International Atomic Energy Agency, or trust- Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, still being formed. worthy cooperation from a suspected miscreant, “Remarks by the President on Securing Our but may include some input from an ally on a Balancing these conflicting objectives Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure,” May 29, 2009, bilateral basis. will require a full debate and executive www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Re- 13. The White House, “Report of the Presi- decision. This process will have to be car- marks-by-the-President-on-Securing-Our- dent’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure ried out by a special high-level govern- Nations-Cyber-Infrastructure/ (hereinafter Protection,” October 1997, http://lccn.loc. ment group because of the sensitive and Obama cyber infrastructure remarks). gov/98113463. fragile nature of certain aspects of the 3. William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, and 14. The White House, “Defending America’s information involved. Herbert S. Lin, eds., “Technology, Policy, Law, Cyberspace: National Plan for Information Sys- One model of a convention that could and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use tems Protection Version 1.0: An Invitation to a serve as a starting point would commit of Cyberattack Capabilities,” National Research Dialogue,” January 2000, http://clinton5.nara. Council, 2009 (hereinafter NAS study). the parties to no-first-use of cyberattack gov/media/pdf/npisp-fullreport-000112.pdf; The directed at elements of another party’s 4. Gregory J. Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyber- White House, “The National Strategy to Secure critical infrastructure if the disruption space (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); Chair- Cyberspace,” February 2003, www.dhs.gov/xli- from that attack was intended22 to be man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The National brary/assets/National_Cyberspace_Strategy.pdf; widespread, long-lasting, or severe. One Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations,” Obama cyber infrastructure remarks. December 2006 (declassified),www.dod.mil/ reason for these thresholds is to differ- 15. White House cyberspace policy review. pubs/foi/ojcs/07-F-2105doc1.pdf. entiate continuing, manageable lower- 16. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Information Opera- 5. John Markoff and Andrew E. Kramer, “U.S. and level attacks from those that constitute tions,” Joint Publication 3-13, February 13, 2006, Russia Differ on a Treaty for Cyberspace,” The a serious violation by a state-party. All www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf. New York Times, June 28, 2009, www.nytimes. the terms in this commitment could be com/2009/06/28/world/28cyber.html. 17. John Markoff and Thom Shanker, “Halted defined in an Understanding Annex, as ‘03 Iraq Plan Illustrated U.S. Fear of Cyberwar 6. Kevin Soo Hoo, Lawrence Greenberg, and in the ENMOD Convention, and would Risk,” The New York Times, August 2, 2009, www. David Elliott, “Strategic Information Warfare—A be the subject of negotiation. The con- nytimes.com/2009/08/02/us/politics/02cyber. New Arena for Arms Control?” October 1996, vention would also preclude assistance to html; Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Information Warfare: http://fsi.stanford.edu/publications/strategic_in- A Strategy for Peace, the Decisive Edge in War,” others in conducting prohibited attacks. formation_warfare__a_new_arena_for_arms_ USGPO Doc. D 5.2:IN3, 1997, http://handle.dtic. Because the cyberthreat is evolving control/. rapidly and is difficult to define, any mil/100.2/ada318379. 7. Kevin J. Soo Hoo et al., “Workshop on 18. NAS study, pp. 1-25 – 1-26, 2-39. proposed solution is very unlikely to Protecting and Assuring Critical National In- address the problem effectively for the frastructure: Setting the Research and Policy 19. NAS study, p. 10-6. long term or perhaps even the medium Agenda,” October 1997, http://iis-db.stanford. 20. Red-teaming is a technique used in the term. On the other hand, it may be im- edu/pubs/10354/it5.pdf. development of military systems in which an portant to constrain this form of warfare 8. Davis Brown, “A Proposal for an International independent friendly force undertakes to defeat a in the relatively early stages of its devel- Convention to Regulate the Use of Information system and thereby identifies vulnerabilities that opment. The type of limited convention Systems in Armed Conflict,”Harvard International must be fixed. In the case of the Eligible Receiver described in this article strikes an ap- Law Journal, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 2006): 179-221. project, government experts, using public infor- mation, analyzed and probed certain civil op- propriate balance by establishing some 9. For a summary of this extensive literature and erational systems and found that many of them, important initial parameters that could further development of the subject, see NAS thought to be secure from cyberattack, could be serve as the basis for more comprehen- study, section 7. penetrated. See www.globalsecurity.org/military/ sive agreements in the future. ACT 10. NAS study, box 7.1. ops/eligible-receiver.htm; John Hamre, interview, 11. In an arms control agreement, a government Frontline, PBS, February 18, 2003. ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 ENDNOTES typically decides to accept a reduction in some 21. A good example of sensitivity to the circum- aspect of its military capability so that it can bet- stances of a breach is Russia’s recent deploy- 1. Mark Landler and John Markoff, “Digital ter protect its military personnel and assets, as ment of troops in violation of the Conventional Fears Emerge After Data Siege in Estonia,” The a result of the other side’s comparable military Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. That violation New York Times, May 29, 2007, www.nytimes. reduction. Although such tradeoffs may be dif- elicited little international response. If it had com/2007/05/29/technology/29estonia. ficult to assess, they are generally less difficult occurred during the Cold War, it could have html; John Markoff, “Cyber Attack Preceded than those, such as the type under discussion in been a casus belli. Invasion,” Chicago Tribune, August 13, 2008, this article, in which the reduction in military 22. U.S. intelligence analysts and the U.S. mili- http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2008/ capability must be weighed against the benefits to tary would be expected to have some insights aug/13/business/chi-cyber-war_13aug13; civilian populations and infrastructure. A further into an adversary’s intentions from its military Siobhan Gorman and Evan Ramstad, “Cyber complication in the case of assessing the value of manuals and journals and through military ex- Blitz Hits U.S., Korea,” The Wall Street Journal, a cyberattack agreement is that the level of civilian changes, observation of its military maneuvers, July 9, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/ damage and the value of the forgone military SB124701806176209691.html. national technical means, and espionage. 27 November 2009 ODAY ARMS CONTROL T

28 InThe 29 Europe and the 42 The United States Former Soviet Union and the Americas 33 The World 47 Asia and Australia NEWS 39 The Middle East November 2009 and Africa

START Deadline Looms; Endgame Begins

ne month away from START’s Dec. 5 expiration had a “very good discussion on a number of bilateral issues,” date, it is unclear that a replacement treaty will be according to the Associated Press. O ready for signature by that time, comments by admin- In an Oct. 24 telephone conversation, Presidents Dmitry istration officials and nongovernmental observers suggest. After Medvedev and Barack Obama reiterated their intent to fin- months of U.S.-Russian negotiations and high-level visits, major ish talks on schedule, according to the White House. The two areas of disagreement remain, the experts said. The talks are countries held their latest round of talks in Geneva Oct. 19-30; entering a pivotal phase and may need presidential involvement the next round is scheduled to begin Nov. 9. to overcome the differences, the experts said. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Undersecretary Efforts to close a deal are getting high-level political atten- of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen tion in both capitals. National security adviser Gen. James L. Tauscher, and Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Com- Jones traveled to Moscow Oct. 28-29 to meet with his Russian pliance, and Implementation Rose Gottemoeller traveled to counterpart, Nikolai Patrushev, and Foreign Minister Sergey Moscow Oct. 13 to meet Medvedev and Lavrov for discussions Lavrov. After their talks, Lavrov said “intensive efforts” would on the prospects for replacing START. Medvedev “said that he be required to reach an agreement, and Jones said that the two thought we should lock our negotiators in a room in Geneva ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 AFP/ G etty Images etty

National security adviser Gen. James L. Jones (left) shakes hands with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during their meeting in Moscow October 29. 29 and not let them out until they had reached a new START agree- ment,” Clinton told an audience at the U.S. Institute of Peace Oct. 21. “We haven’t done that yet, but I’m glad to have his full concurrence if that turns out to be necessary,” she said. In an Oct. 21 interview with Arms Control Today (see page 6), Tauscher said that the administration would have a “stock-taking” at the end of October to determine which of the major unresolved issues need to be referred to “principals,” or top-level officials, for final decisions. Tauscher reaffirmed the U.S. “intention to be able to replace the START treaty when it expires.” There would need to be agreement on the major components by mid-November in order to leave sufficient time before Dec. 5 for drafting, translation, and final administration review, according to officials. Because of the tight schedule and slow progress since the ba- sic outlines of the new treaty were established in the presidents’ joint understanding document in Moscow July 6, speculation is growing that the talks might not conclude in time without personal attention from the two national leaders. At a briefing hosted by the Arms Control Association Oct. 19, arms control EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION experts John Steinbruner of the University of Maryland and Sergey Rogov of the Institute for USA and Canadian Studies in Moscow agreed on that point.

Bridging the Gap Kostyukov/AFP/ Dmitry If negotiators succeed in reaching agreement by Dec. 5, the ad- ministration may seek a “provisional application,” according to officials. That approach would put the terms of the new treaty into place on a temporary basis pending a Senate vote, possibly

in the spring. As concern grows that a new treaty will not be G etty Images etty ready for signature by December, questions are increasing about what will happen to the verification and monitoring provisions of START once it expires. If the two sides do not settle on a new treaty, the adminis- A Russian Topol-M ICBM drives through Red Square during the tration may seek some form of executive agreement with Rus- country’s Victory Day parade in Moscow May 9. sia to allow inspectors to stay and information to be shared in ways similar to those established under the current treaty while talks continue, The New York Times reported Oct. 20. Senate Opposition Such an agreement, according to the Times, would not require Meanwhile, some Senate Republicans are gearing up for battle Senate approval. on treaty ratification. Sen. Jon Kyl (Ariz.) said in a Senate floor Some Republican senators apparently would prefer START speech Oct. 19 that Russia’s development of the new multiple- contingency options that require Senate approval. The Senate warhead RS-24 missile violates the current START. “In this case, Republican Policy Committee, chaired by John Thune (S.D.), is- it appears the Russians have cheated—if not in the letter of the sued a report Sept. 30 stating that if the treaty negotiations can- START agreement, at least in its spirit—by converting one of not be finished by year’s end, “the parties should either extend their existing missiles, the Topol-M, to this new multiple-war- the treaty for five years as provided for [in the treaty], or amend head variant,” he said. START prohibits “increasing the num- the treaty to remain in force for a different period of time, to ber of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM [submarine- which the Senate should consent, while the parties continue to launched ballistic missile] of an existing or new type,” meaning negotiate a new agreement.” that Russia cannot take the single-warhead Topol-M, rename In the Oct. 21 interview, Tauscher said the U.S. plan is to it the RS-24, and deploy it with three warheads, but the treaty “find an accommodation” to maintain START’s verification pro- does not prohibit the testing of such missiles. Rogov said Russia tocols in the period between the expiration of the current treaty was waiting to deploy this missile until December 2009, after and ratification of its replacement. START expires, to avoid any question of violating the treaty. At November 2009 ODAY “We really haven’t developed contingency plans, to my an Oct. 26 panel discussion at the U.S. Institute of Peace, former knowledge, for what [to] do if we don’t get a START follow-on by START negotiator Linton Brooks said the Bush administration Dec. 5,” Michael Nacht, assistant secretary of defense for global had made it clear to Moscow during testing of the RS-24 that it strategic affairs, said during a panel discussion at the Atlantic did not have any objections. Council Oct. 7. “The Russians tend to have a negotiating style The Obama administration is also feeling pressure from the

ARMS CONTROL T where they leave a lot of things for the last minute,” he said. Democratic side of the aisle. In a Sept. 29 letter to Secretary “We are used to this.” of Defense Robert Gates, a bipartisan group of eleven senators 30 said, “As we have indicated to the president, we would strongly Russia wants the low end and the United States the high end, oppose a reduction below the current force structure of 450 mis- as these limits reflect the number of delivery vehicles each side siles, divided into three wings of 150 missiles each. We believe expects to deploy over the next few years. The U.S. number this structure represents the optimal number of missiles and the was developed using START counting rules, under which the optimal organization.” The group of signers includes Democrats United States declared in October it had 1,188 strategic delivery Max Baucus (Mont.), Jon Tester (Mont.), Kent Conrad (N.D.), vehicles. Many of these are “phantom” weapons that no longer Byron L. Dorgan (N.D.), and Mary L. Landrieu (La.). carry strategic nuclear warheads but still count under START, U.S. ICBMs are currently based in Montana, North Dakota, including 100 ICBM silos, 96 SLBM launch tubes on four Trident and Wyoming. The two Republican senators from Wyoming submarines, and nearly 150 bombers, according to the Congres- also signed the letter. sional Research Service. If the counting rules are reformed to exclude launchers that no longer carry nuclear weapons, the Endgame United States could reduce the delivery vehicle limit from 1,100 According to knowledgeable sources, there are several major to around 800, which is the actual number of launchers the areas of disagreement that would need to be resolved in the United States is believed to have deployed today. Below that lev- next few weeks. el, the Obama administration would need to retire operational Missile defense. According to the July 6 joint understanding, nuclear systems, possibly including land-based ICBMs. the new treaty will include a provision on “the interrelation- Even if the United States drops down to 800 delivery ve- ship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.” The hicles or lower under the new treaty, the Russians may still be Obama administration has made clear that the START succes- concerned about “uploading”—the U.S. ability to take nuclear sor agreement deals with offensive weapons, not defenses, and forces out of storage quickly and put them back in the field. wants to discuss defenses in a separate forum. Russian negotia- “The uploading potential of the United States is 200 percent or tors are seeking a commitment from the United States not to more of what would be the ceiling for deployed weapons. For increase its strategic missile defenses beyond current levels, the Russian side, the uploading potential would be no more although the United States addressed a major Russian concern than 500 warheads, and this is a very optimistic assessment by canceling the deployment of strategic missile defense inter- based on the plans for deployment of a new MIRVed ICBM,” ceptors in Poland. (See ACT, October 2009.) said Rogov. He was referring to a missile that would have mul- “The most important of these [START] principles for us is tiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles. the inter-connection between strategic offensive and defensive To address the Trident D-5’s upload potential, which Rus- weapons, linked to a U.S. program of creating strategic weap- sia finds particularly troubling, Rogov proposed reducing the ons with non-nuclear charges,” Lavrov said Oct. 27, according number of launch tubes on each submarine, reducing the to Reuters. “On both issues, as we understand, the Americans number of submarines, reducing the number of warheads that heard our concerns, are ready to take them into account and can be loaded onto each missile, and verifiably dismantling promised that within days they would hand over their own warheads taken out of service. proposals, addressing these problems,” he said. Brooks said it might be best to “kick the can” down the road Conventional warheads. The joint understanding says the to the next treaty if possible, given the difficulty of reaching new treaty will cover “the impact” of ICBMs and SLBMs “in a agreement on uploading. If not, he said he would propose re- non-nuclear configuration on strategic stability.” The issue is moving Trident SLBMs from submarines and either cutting up the deployment of conventional warheads on ballistic missiles the subs to remove the launch tubes or otherwise rendering that, up to now, could only carry nuclear warheads. The U.S. them unusable. He said that changing the warhead platform to Department of Defense apparently wants to preserve this option allow fewer warheads to be loaded would be too expensive and as it is exploring technologies for Prompt Global Strike weapons verifiably dismantling the warheads would be too difficult to that might be launched on short notice against faraway targets, address in this treaty. such as a state’s missile launch or a nuclear material transfer to Warhead verification. An additional problem, according to a terrorist group. The Pentagon had initially proposed using the Rogov, is that the United States wants to move away from the Trident D-5 SLBM, counted under START as a nuclear delivery START practice of allocating, for counting purposes, a certain system, for this purpose. Congress declined to fund this pro- number of warheads to each type of missile. For example, un- ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 gram in 2008 out of concern that Russia might be unable to dis- der START the Trident D-5 missile is counted as having eight tinguish between a nuclear and conventional attack, increasing warheads; it can carry fewer than eight but not more. Instead the risk of nuclear war. Russia wants the conventional-weapon of this approach, the U.S. side is proposing, according to option banned under the new treaty. “There are very few coun- Rogov, to allow on-site inspections so that each side can count tries in the world that are afraid of American nuclear weapons, for itself how many warheads are on the other’s delivery sys- but there are many countries which are afraid of American tems. The Russians are concerned that, without a set number conventional weapons,” Alexei Arbatov, a scholar-in-residence at of warheads per missile, what they find on one missile might the Carnegie Moscow Center, said in April. A possible compro- not tell them enough about the total stockpile, Rogov said. The mise, according to Brooks, would be to count conventional war- July 6 agreement calls for each side to maintain no more than heads deployed on strategic delivery systems against the nuclear 1,500 to 1,675 strategic warheads. warhead limit under the new treaty. Other unresolved verification issues include the monitoring Launcher numbers. The July 6 agreement calls for the num- of missile production sites and mobile missile deployments. ber of strategic delivery vehicles to be limited to 500-1,100. —TOM Z. COLLINA 31 China, Russia Agree on Launch Notification

hina and Russia signed an agreement Oct. 13 to notify C each other of impending bal- listic missile launches. The agreement was part of a large package of economic and political deals signed during Rus- sian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s visit with his Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabao. Putin called the agreement “a very important step towards enhancing mutual trust and strengthening our stra- tegic partnership,” according to Russia’s Interfax news agency. This agreement would be the first of its kind between China and Russia. Li Daguang of China’s National Defense EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION University said the agreement “shows the special relationship between the two countries...as the launches of ballistic missiles are core state secrets rarely dis- closed with other countries,” according to the Chinese newspaper Global Times. In an Oct. 24 e-mail to Arms Control Today, Pavel Podvig of Stanford Univer- sity’s Center for International Security and Cooperation praised the agreement for enhancing transparency between the two countries. Hans M. Kristensen, direc-

tor of the Nuclear Information Project Druzhinin/AFP/ Alexey for the Federation of American Scientists, also welcomed the increased transparen- cy. The pact “probably reflects a wish in both [countries] to avoid misunderstand- ings,” he said in an Oct. 27 e-mail. G The new pact is especially signifi- Images etty cant because China has traditionally avoided agreements, such as the Hague Code of Conduct, that affect its ballis- Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin gives an interview to Chinese press at the Russian tic missile capabilities. embassy in Beijing October 13. That day, China and Russia signed an agreement to notify Prior to the agreement with Russia, each other of impending ballistic missile launches. China had not engaged in bilateral arms control measures with Russia or the Unit- ed States. The official Chinese media took The new agreement builds on a prec- exchange information in advance of all pains to distinguish the Chinese-Russian edent established by the first launch- launches of ICBMs or submarine-launched notification accord from “offensive agree- notification regime concluded between ballistic missiles (SLBMs). ments” in place between Russia and the the Soviet Union and the United States START further codified and expanded United States, as the notification agree- in 1971 at the Strategic Arms Limitation this regime by requiring the sides to pro- ment does not limit the nuclear arsenal Talks (SALT). That accord, known as the vide telemetry data from every ICBM or of either side. Accidents Measures Agreement, required SLBM launch. This notification system has November 2009 ODAY The specific provisions of the new each side to notify the other in advance of served as a confidence-building measure agreement have not been released. The missile launches that resulted in missiles intended to prevent an accidental nuclear agreement was signed by Russian First traveling beyond the country’s borders. exchange. The agreement between China Deputy Defense Minister Alexander These measures were expanded by the and Russia apparently is intended to serve Kolmakov and Ma Xiaotian, deputy 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification a similar function, as China continues to

ARMS CONTROL T chief of the general staff of the People’s Agreement, which relied on Nuclear Risk improve the range and capability of its Liberation Army. Reduction Centers established in 1987 to ICBM force. —LUKE CHAMPLIN 32 OPCW Chooses New Director-General WORLD THE

he Executive Council of the Organization for the Pro- manages a staff of 500. hibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) last month According to a diplomatic source chose Ahmet Üzümcü of Turkey to succeed Rogelio close to the process, three straw polls

T M Permanent Pfirter as the organization’s director-general. conducted in the eight days before The council made the decision by consensus during its Oct. the Executive Council meeting 13-16 meeting in The Hague, according to an Oct. 16 OPCW quickly established Üzümcü as the

press release. The 41-member council also accepted Libya’s re- front-runner. On Oct. 13, Pölhö and Turkey of ission quest to extend the deadline for the destruction of its chemical Thalmann were the first to withdraw. weapons by five and a half months, until May 15, 2011. Sudjadnan was next on Oct. 14, after Both decisions require formal approval by the Nov. 30-Dec. a fourth secret ballot, the source said. 4 conference of states-parties of the Chemical Weapons Con- These three candidates had consist- vention (CWC), the annual meeting and highest decision-mak- ently received the lowest number of Ahmet Üzümcü, OPCW director- ing body of the 188 CWC parties. votes in the initial polls, the source general-designate In addition to Üzümcü, six career diplomats had been put said. Shortly before a fifth vote Oct. forward by their governments as candidates for the post of 15, Freeman also quit the race, the source said. On Oct. 16, the director-general: Benchaa Dani of Algeria, John Freeman of last day of the council meeting, Gottwald and Dani conceded the United Kingdom, Peter Gottwald of Germany, Sudjadnan to Üzümcü, who was then unanimously appointed by council Parnohadiningrat of Indonesia, Aapo Pölhö of Finland, and members, the source said. Anton Thalmann of Switzerland. (See ACT, September 2009.) Üzümcü, 58, is currently Turkey’s permanent representative The director-general heads the OPCW Technical Secre- to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Previously, he tariat, which implements the CWC. He is in charge of ad- held a variety of posts at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Af- ministering a €75 million ($105 million) annual budget and fairs and served as Turkey’s representative to NATO. ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 M annie G annie arcia/AFP/ G etty Images etty

Rogelio Pfirter (right), director-general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), speaks at a press conference in Washington in 2007 as Paul Walker of Global Green USA listens. The Executive Council of the OPCW last month chose Ahmet Üzümcü of Turkey to succeed Pfirter. 33 There had been fears that the election of a new director-general the council, Üzümcü said the CWC members and the OPCW might be contentious, pitting the Nonaligned Movement against director-general should “vigorously pursue” the goal of “uni- Western states. That was the case in the 2002 OPCW election of versal adherence” to the treaty. Although Turkey has good Pfirter and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) elec- relations with all three of the Middle Eastern nonparties, tion this year of Japan’s Yukiya Amano as director-general. (See “early progress” will be difficult, he said.

THE WORLD ACT, September 2002; September 2009.) Speaking privately, some At the October meeting, the council, after some discussion, observers said Üzümcü had been able to win only by securing the agreed to forward to the upcoming conference a request by support of some key nonaligned states. Turkey is a member of the Libya for an extension of its deadline for the destruction of OPCW’s Western Europe and Other States group but is seen as a its chemical weapons stockpile. Libya acceded to the CWC in country with “one foot in the South and one foot in the North,” February 2004. In December 2006, states-parties granted the Paul Walker, director of security and sustainability for the envi- country an extension of its original April 29, 2007, deadline, ronmental group Global Green USA, said in an Oct. 21 interview. to Dec. 31, 2010. In an Aug. 24 paper submitted to the council, According to the observers, there was relief that a lengthy Libya requested that the deadline be moved again, to May 15, selection process and formal vote could be avoided. Pfirter, 2011. The Libyan paper was not released to the public, but ac- who is scheduled to step down in July when his second four- cording to an Oct. 7 OPCW report, Libya cited several reasons year term ends, emphasized in the OPCW press release that for its difficulties in meeting the 2010 deadline, “including cer- the consensus appointment of Üzümcü reaffirmed that the tain logistical and financial problems that have arisen against OPCW is “an example of successful multilateralism” and the background of the global economic crisis, as well as strong described the outcome as “a proud moment” for the organiza- opposition from civil organisations to the destruction of chem- tion. Jorge Lomónaco Tonda of Mexico, who is currently chairing ical weapons, prompted by fears about the potential harmful the council and facilitated the selection process, said in an consequences of implementation of the destruction project.” Oct. 16 interview that he had worked “relentlessly to make According to diplomats, several delegations were unhappy with clear that this process was not about regions and not about the Libyan explanations. During the meeting, “some delega- North and South.” The decision has proven that the OPCW tions requested additional information on how Libya intends is able to operate on a consensus basis “even in complicated to use the additional time,” Lomónaco said. situations,” Lomónaco said. During the whole selection pro- In June 2007, Libya withdrew from a bilateral agreement cess, there was consistent cross-regional support for all can- with the United States on major U.S. assistance to the techni- didates, and council members made “no distinction whether cally challenging and costly effort of eliminating chemical a candidate came from one region or another,” he said. In an weaponry in the Libyan desert. In addition to destroying 23.6 apparent reference to the IAEA process for selecting Amano, metric tons of mustard gas, Libya must eliminate around 1,300 he said the OPCW decision showed “a level of cooperation metric tons of precursor chemicals to comply with the con- and the ability to work as a team you rarely see in other inter- vention. (See ACT, July/August 2007.) Libya has not yet begun national organizations.” destruction of the most dangerous chemical weapons, which Walker called Üzümcü “a very good choice,” citing his were developed on the basis of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 experience in arms control and multilateral organizations. of the CWC’s Annex on Chemicals. Schedule 1 lists chemical Walker also noted that Üzümcü has had postings in Israel and agents and precursors that were developed and manufactured Syria, which, with Egypt, are the Middle Eastern countries for military purposes and have no significant commercial ap- that have not ratified the CWC. In his July 15 presentation to plications. —OLIVER MEIER and DANIEL HORNER

U.S. Supports Arms Trade Treaty Process

he United States last month entire international community that the mittee meetings leading up to the UN pledged its support for talks on United States and other responsible arms Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty T a legally binding instrument to exporters already have in place to ensure in 2012. The resolution, approved Oct. regulate the global trade of conventional that weaponry is transferred for legiti- 30, states that the conference will be arms, breaking with previous U.S. votes mate purposes.” Her statement marked a undertaken “on the basis of consensus,” against the United Nations-led process. change in U.S. policy from the Bush ad- a controversial and key demand made by UN member states are now expected to ministration, which opposed resolutions the United States. November 2009 ODAY approve a schedule that could see an arms on the ATT process in 2006 and 2008. Supporters of a consensus process ar- trade treaty (ATT) negotiated in 2012. (See ACT, December 2008.) gue that it is necessary to promote uni- Secretary of State Hillary Rodham The breakthrough occurred as the versal standards. In her brief statement, Clinton said in an Oct. 14 statement UN First Committee considered a draft Clinton said that “[c]onsensus is needed that “the Arms Trade Treaty initiative resolution that would convert the four to ensure the widest possible support

ARMS CONTROL T presents us with the opportunity to remaining sessions of an open-ended for the Treaty and to avoid loopholes promote the same high standards for the working group into preparatory com- in the Treaty that can be exploited by 34 ATT leader, welcomed Clinton’s an- nouncement. In an Oct. 15 statement, he said, “For many years we have sought an active U.S. partner in the drive for a strong Arms Trade Treaty. Now for the first time, we have one.” With U.S. opposition removed, some observers had wondered whether other major arms-trading countries that had previously abstained would be forced to vote either for or against the treaty pro- cess. However, China, India, Pakistan, and Russia again abstained. Those coun- tries participated in last year’s group of governmental experts meetings but ab- stained in UN First Committee and Gen- eral Assembly votes. In total, 153 states voted for the resolution, 19 abstained, and Zimbabwe voted against it. The resolution was offered by Ar- gentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya, and the United Kingdom. Committee recommendations are typi- cally referred to and later approved by the entire General Assembly. In 2006 the General Assembly passed Resolution 61/89, entitled “Toward an Arms Trade Treaty: Establishing Com- mon International Standards for the Import, Export and Transfer of Conven- tional Arms.” The resolution led to the submission of views from approximately 100 states on the feasibility and param- eters of a treaty. It also led to the estab- UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office & Commonwealth Foreign UK lishment of a group of governmental experts. The United States decided at the last minute to participate in the group. (See ACT, March 2008.) In December 2008, the General As- sembly passed Resolution 63/240 estab- lishing an open-ended working group to meet for six one-week sessions from 2009 to 2011. In contrast to a group of governmental experts, which is closed A participant puts a pledge on a board during an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) youth conference at the UK Foreign Office June 15. During the conference, 150 students and to the public and limited to invited activists pledged their support for the ATT. experts, an open-ended working group ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 conducts public debate that is open to all member states. those wishing to export arms irrespon- ment contend that it gives individual This year, the open-ended working sibly.” Last year, U.S. officials indicated countries the ability to stall the process group met March 2-6 and July 13-17 in to Arms Control Today that the United or weaken the final document. New York. Far from resolving all issues, States would likely have supported the The United States is the world’s top the group reported that the meetings 2008 resolution if it had included a con- arms exporter and maintains what Clin- had “allowed for constructive, in- sensus provision. Observers suggest that ton called the “gold standard” of export depth, and extensive discussion on the U.S. leaders also do not want a treaty controls on arms transfers. ATT advo- elements regarding objectives, goals, to proceed without them, as happened cates have long been seeking Washing- scope, parameters and other aspects recently with the Convention on Cluster ton’s involvement in the treaty process. where consensus could be developed Munitions. (See ACT, December 2008.) British Foreign Minister David for their inclusion in a possible treaty.” Detractors of the consensus require- Miliband, whose country has been an —JEFF ABRAMSON 35 Arms Exports Fell in 2008, UN Data Say

fter increasing to record levels in 2007, transfers of tional weapons trade between 2007 and 2008. major weapons systems as well as small arms and The number of countries submitting data to the register de- THE WORLD A light weapons dropped in 2008, according to volun- clined. At least 100 countries submitted records each year from tary reports submitted to the United Nations’ conventional 1999 to 2006, but that number fell to 91 for 2007. By September arms registry. 30 of this year, only 75 countries had reported calendar year 2008 Based on a 1991 agreement, the UN Register of Conventional transfers. Some of that decrease can be attributed to a reduc- Arms collects voluntary information on imports, exports, domes- tion in the number of countries filing “nil” reports. For 2006, 63 tic production, and holdings of seven categories of major weap- countries filed such reports, claiming no transfers in any of the ons systems: tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artil- seven categories of major weapons. Only 39 did so for 2007 and lery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles 32 for 2008. Such reports, which affirmatively state that there and missile launchers. In 2003, countries agreed to request data were no transfers, are seen as statements of support for the regis- on small arms and light weapons but did not create an official ter. The recent failure of a group of government experts to recom- category for the weapons. (See ACT, September 2009.) mend adding small arms and light weapons as an official eighth A comparison of reports submitted to the UN by or near the category may further erode participation in the register. end of September for each reporting year indicates that exports of major weapons systems dropped from 28,577 to 7,913 be- Missiles Lead Decline in Major Weapons tween 2007 and 2008. Small arms and light weapons exports Five of the seven major weapons categories saw a drop in deliv- declined from 2,089,986 to 1,480,790, according to the data in eries, led by a dramatic decline in claimed missile and missile the reports (see table 1). launcher exports. Because a missile and a warship are each count- The register’s data do not provide a complete picture of the ed as one unit in the register despite the difference in size and global arms trade. Some countries do not submit reports; all capability, comparing overall numbers can be misleading. countries do not define transfers in the same way; and there is Slovakia, which reported the export of 17,740 missiles in 2007, no verification provision. Nonetheless, the register is the pri- said it had no missile exports in 2008, accounting for the biggest mary international mechanism for states to detail their arms single difference. trade, and the 2008 decline aligns with findings reported by Within the missiles category, Turkey delivered 1,480 122 mm other sources. A recent report from the Congressional Research rockets to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), marking the fourth Service said the conventional arms market shrank in 2008. year in a row that Ankara claimed at least 1,000 missiles exported (See ACT, October 2009.) The 2009 yearbook produced by the to Abu Dhabi. As in 2007, one-half of the rockets delivered con- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) cal- tained submunitions, which are smaller bombs that often fail to culated a drop of approximately 10 percent in major conven- explode as originally intended. The Convention on Cluster Muni- Pedro Rey/AFP/ Pedro November 2009 ODAY G etty Images etty ARMS CONTROL T A Russian-made helicopter gunship patrols near Caracas, Venezuela in 2008. 36 Table 1: International Arms Exports Reported to the UN Register of Conventional Arms 2007 2008 Major Weapons Systems Warships 16 14 Attack Helicopters 81 70 Combat Aircraft 219 222 Large-Caliber Artillery Systems 630 874 Battle Tanks 954 510 Armored Combat Vehicles 2,254 1,385 Missiles and Missile Launchers 24,423 4,838 TOTAL 28,577 7,913

Small Arms and Light Weapons 2,089,986 1,480,790

Source: Data derived from claimed exports in voluntary submissions to the UN Register of Conventional Arms by or near the end of September of each reporting year. See http://disarmament.un.org/UN_REGISTER.NSF for specific country reports. See www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_11/UNROCA for more details on data calculations.

tions, which would ban such weapons, has 23 ratifying parties, aircraft to Pakistan, a marked decrease from its reports of 120 seven short of the number required for entry into force, but nei- exported weapons in 2007 and 387 in 2006. ther Turkey nor the UAE has signed the treaty (see page 5). Paul Holtom, an arms expert at SIPRI, highlighted China’s low Russia led the missile category in 2008, noting a total of number as one of several filings in 2008 in which national interpre- 1,683 missiles and launching mechanisms exported. Most tations of what constitutes a transfer could lead to an underreport- went to Algeria, Egypt, and Venezuela. These weapons ac- ing of exports of conventional arms. In an Oct. 19 interview, he also counted for the vast majority of Russia’s 1,884 claimed exports noted the relative absence of data directly from African countries. across all seven categories. The group of governmental experts examining the register Among Russia’s exports were 12 attack helicopters and eight earlier this year concluded that the register “continues to be an combat aircraft sent to Venezuela. The strengthening relation- important confidence-building measure.” Although the overall ship between the two countries drew statements of concern from number of countries participating in the register declined, most Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton when additional arms major weapons suppliers, with the exception of Israel, did submit deals were announced in September. reports on their major weapons exports. Russia continued its long-standing arms relationship with Those reports indicate that some African countries were ma- India, sending the country 24 tanks, 12 large-caliber artillery jor importers in certain weapons categories. The United States systems, four combat aircraft, and 29 missiles, according to the reported sending 55 battle tanks to Egypt, Russia reported the Russian report. India claimed that all its imported weapons came transfer of 53 tanks to Algeria, and Ukraine sent 33 tanks to Ke- from Russia in 2008, but future sales to the country are a possible nya. According to exporter’s claims, Nigeria received 153 armored source of Russian-U.S. rivalry as Washington seeks to expand its combat vehicles, 149 from Turkey and four from Canada, while conventional arms trade with New Delhi. U.S. firms are currently Chad received 113 armored combat vehicles, 88 from Ukraine competing for a combat fighter contract estimated at more than and 25 from France. $10 billion. (See ACT, September 2009.) Overall, 27 countries filed non-nil export reports for major As with Russia, missiles accounted for the majority of U.S. ex- weapons in 2008, providing data on 74 recipient states. ports, with 298 of a total of 463 weapons exported falling into the missile category. According to the U.S. report, Turkey received U.S. Is Dominant Small-Arms Customer ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 114 missiles from the United States. Washington also noted the Although not filing a report on its small arms and light weapons transfer of 89 missiles to Pakistan, an ally in U.S. anti-terrorism transfers, the United States remained the dominant destination efforts and a traditional rival of India. for exports of those weapons in a shrinking market. (See ACT, In the combat aircraft category, the United States led all other November 2007; October 2008.) states, claiming the transfer of 50 such weapons in 2008. Israel Eighteen of 22 countries reporting nonzero and nonclassified received 17 F-16D aircraft, the most sophisticated combat planes exports of small arms and light weapons for 2008 indicated the exported by the United States. Pakistan received 10 F-16Bs. United States was a recipient. Together, these states transferred Belarus was second in total claimed exports of combat aircraft, 936,036 weapons to the United States, 63 percent of all claimed sending 33 Russian-origin MiG-23s to Syria and 11 Russian-origin exports. In 2007 the United States received approximately 75 per- Su-25s to Sudan. cent of the 2.1 million small arms and light weapons exported. China, a traditional supplier of less-sophisticated arms, es- Italy, the largest exporter in 2008, reported transferring pecially to Africa, claimed very few transfers in 2008. Beijing 472,991 small arms, 301,957 of which went to the United States. delivered 20 armored combat vehicles to Rwanda and six fighter Turkey received 28,989 small arms from Italy; Russia received 37 23,978. Mexico and South Africa each imported more than 10,000 weapons from Italy, according to Rome’s report. All of Italy’s exports came from the first two of six categories of small arms, consisting of revolvers and self-loading pistols, and rifles and carbines. The four additional small arms catego-

THE WORLD ries are assault rifles, submachine guns, light machine guns, and others. Light weapons, which accounted for slightly more than 2 percent of total exports claimed in 2008 by all coun- tries, are defined in seven categories as heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, por- table anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable anti-tank missile

launchers and rocket systems, mortars of calibers less than 75 Defense of Department millimeters, and others. Italy replaced Croatia as the top exporter in 2008. Croatia claimed the export of more than 650,000 weapons in 2007, but reported only the transfer of 10,000 AK-47s to Iraq in 2008. After not filing for 2007, the Philippines reported transferring 299,739 small arms in 2008 to become the second-largest exporter. A U.S. F-16 taxis during an exercise in Bulgaria in 2007. The United States received 220,316 small arms from the Philip- pines, Thailand received 50,538, and Australia 15,290. As with Italy, two categories, revolvers and self-loading pistols and rifles claimed sending 18,852 weapons in total to Iraq. Five coun- and carbines, comprised the entirety of Philippine exports. tries transferred a total of 16,838 weapons to Afghanistan. In The United Kingdom remained the third-largest exporter of each instance, the number of weapons declined significantly small arms and light weapons, claiming the transfer of 283,450 from 2007, when nearly 100,000 weapons went to Iraq and weapons, 266,906 of which went to the United States. Both 30,000 to Afghanistan. The ongoing lack of a U.S. small arms numbers were approximately 30,000 higher than in 2007. Unlike and light weapons report, even though the United States is a Italy and the Philippines, the majority of the United Kingdom’s known major supplier of weapons to Iraq, indicates that the exports consisted of assault rifles. register only captures a small portion of the transfers to that Submissions to the register did capture some small arms country. (See ACT, September 2007.) and light weapons transfers to Afghanistan and Iraq in 2008, In total, exporting states claimed to transfer weapons to 131 although neither country submitted a report. Four countries countries in 2008. —JEFF ABRAMSON November 2009 ODAY ARMS CONTROL T

38 Iranian Response to LEU Fuel Deal Unclear AFRICA AND EAST MIDDLE THE

ran failed to respond formally in October to an Interna- Russia for further enrichment. France would then fabricate that tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) proposal under which material or Russian-origin enriched uranium into fuel for the I most of Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU) Tehran Research Reactor. would be converted to nuclear fuel abroad. The delayed response That reactor has been operating on Argentine fuel since coincided with mixed messages from Iranian officials and state 1993. It is expected to run out of fuel “in roughly the next media regarding Iran’s approach to the arrangement and with year, year and a half,” a U.S. official said during an Oct. 1 back- vocal opposition to the proposal from political opponents of Ira- ground briefing. nian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The discussions over arrangements to supply the reactor with France, Russia, and the United States agreed to the proposal fuel began several months ago. In an Oct. 21 interview with Oct. 23 following IAEA-hosted negotiations Oct. 19-21 between Iran’s state-owned Press TV, Iranian Permanent Representative those three countries and Iran. According to an Oct. 23 IAEA to the IAEA Ali Asghar Soltanieh said that he sent a letter to statement, Tehran told the agency that it would need more time IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei June 2 requesting to respond, but was “considering the proposal in depth and in assistance in refueling the reactor. He said Russia and the United a favorable light.” The agency said Oct. 29 that it received an States had indicated that they would be willing to participate in “initial response” from and would continue consultations with an arrangement to provide such fuel and were joined by France to Tehran and the other parties. Department of State spokesman Ian carry out the manufacturing. Kelly told reporters the same day that Washington needs “further The senior U.S. official said that this arrangement “would be a clarification” and a formal response from Iran. positive interim step to help build confidence” for further nego- Although the specific terms of the proposal have not been tiations with Iran on the nuclear issue. made public, the deal is based on an Oct. 1 agreement “in prin- The talks in Vienna were intended to work out the technical ciple” between Iran and the P5+1, the five permanent members details of the deal. When Iranian negotiators sought approval for of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United the IAEA proposal from Tehran, however, the arrangements faced Kingdom, and the United States) and Germany. Under the opposition from several major political figures. proposal, Iran would send about 1,200 kilograms of its LEU to Ali Larijani, speaker of the Iranian parliament and former head ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 Samuel Kubani/AFP/ Samuel G etty Images etty

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei speaks after a meeting of representatives from France, Iran, Russia and the United States at IAEA headquarters in Vienna October 21. At the October 19-21 meetings, the four countries discussed an IAEA proposal under which most of Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium would be converted to nuclear fuel abroad. 39 Iran’s Options Limited In spite of suggestions by Iranian officials to purchase fuel rather than agree to the IAEA proposal, Iran’s ability to do so appears in doubt. France, one of two countries with the technical capability to fab- ricate fuel to the specifications required, has stipulated that it would not agree to do so unless Iran shipped most of its LEU stockpile out of the country by the end of the year. French Foreign Minister Ber- nard Kouchner told reporters Oct. 20 that the transfer of the urani- um out of Iran “must be before the end of the year, [and] there must be at least 1,200 kilograms—on that we won’t back down.” The 1,200-kilogram figure represents about 75 percent of Iran’s LEU stockpile. According to U.S. officials and independent experts, Iran has produced enough LEU to be able to build one nuclear weapon if the material were further enriched. At its current rate

THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA of production, it would take Iran about a year to replace the 1,200 kilograms. Iran is likely to reduce that timeframe as it continues to expand its enrichment capacity. Amid the French stipulations, Tehran has shown some resistance to France’s involvement in such an arrangement. Mottaki said dur- ing an Oct. 20 press conference that Tehran would hold negotia- AFP/ tions with Russia and the United States on supplying the nuclear G

etty Images etty fuel but that “there is no need for France to be present.” Iran was previously involved in a decade-long legal dispute with France regarding Iran’s investment in Eurodif, a French-based ura- nium-enrichment consortium. (See ACT, January/February 2006.) Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki speaks during a press conference in Tehran October 20. Mottaki said that Tehran Following Iran’s 1979 revolution, Tehran halted payments to the would hold negotiations with Russia and the United States on consortium for nuclear fuel it declared it would no longer need and supplying nuclear fuel, but objected to French participation. demanded repayment of a $1 billion loan, plus interest, it made to help build the Eurodif plant in France. Before the two countries came to a settlement in 1991, Iran nuclear negotiator, questioned whether Iran should trust sending its LEU stockpile abroad. “My guess is that the Americans have made a secret deal with certain countries to take enriched ura- nium away from us under the pretext of providing nuclear fuel,” he told the Iranian Students News Agency Oct. 24, adding, “I see no links between providing the fuel for the Tehran reactor and sending Iran’s LEU abroad.” Mir Hossein Mousavi, Ahmadinejad’s key opponent in Iran’s still-disputed presidential election in June, also criticized the ar- rangement to send Iran’s LEU abroad. He was quoted by his of- ficial news Web site Kaleme Oct. 27 as stating that, under such a deal, “the hard work of thousands of scientists would be ruined.” “And if we cannot keep our promises then it would prepare the ground for harder sanctions against the country,” he added. Weighing in on the issue, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki left the door open for buying fuel or agreeing to an ar- rangement to ship out some of the LEU stockpile. He told the Is- lamic Republic News Agency Oct. 26 that “we might spend money

as in the past or we might present part of the fuel that we have Kubani/AFP/ Samuel right now, and currently do not need, for further processing.” He indicated Iran would provide a response within a few days. Tehran currently does not appear to have any other civilian November 2009 ODAY use for its LEU stockpile. Iran’s sole nuclear reactor at Bushehr

is scheduled to start operations later this year. (See ACT, April G 2009.) Russia has already supplied the first load of fuel for that Images etty reactor. Although Iran has expressed its intent to construct an- other reactor at a site called Darkhovin, the IAEA said in an Aug.

ARMS CONTROL T 28 report that it has not received the requested preliminary de- Florence Margin, French ambassador to the IAEA, arrives at a sign information for that facility. meeting on Iran’s uranium enrichment in Vienna October 20. 40 changed its position and requested that France fulfill its old contracts with its required fuel, Iran will enrich uranium to the 20 percent to provide fuel for the Tehran reactor. By that time, however, Iran fell level needed itself.” under U.S.-led Western sanctions, and Paris denied Iran the fuel. Iran does not currently have the technical capability to manu- Iran has since used that dispute as a rationale for producing its facture fuel for the reactor from that enriched uranium, but having own nuclear fuel rather than relying on the international market. uranium enriched to the 19.75 percent needed for the facility would Soltanieh said during his Oct. 21 interview that he raised the Eurodif place Iran closer to the enrichment levels required for a nuclear issue in the fuel deal negotiations to express concern that the fuel weapon. According to IAEA reports, Iran has enriched its current might not be returned in light of what he called a “previous unfortu- LEU stockpile to levels below 5 percent, consistent with the needs of nate confidence deficit.” most nuclear power reactors. In addition to France, the only state that can make fuel to the required specifications for the Tehran reactor is Argentina, IAEA Inspects Second Enrichment Site a country that has been at odds with Iran since August when Meanwhile, IAEA inspectors visited for the first time Iran’s recently Tehran appointed Ahmad Vahidi as defense minister. Vahidi is revealed uranium-enrichment site near the city of Qom Oct. 25. (See wanted by Argentina in connection with the 1994 bombing of a ACT, October 2009.) Iran has named the plant Fordo, after the vil- Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires. lage believed to have sustained the largest percentage of casualties in Argentina and Iran concluded a deal in 1987 for Argentina to the country’s eight-year war with Iraq during the 1980s. convert the Tehran reactor to operate on fuel enriched to 19.75 The West claims that the previously undeclared site was likely to percent uranium-235 and supply a shipment of fuel, which has be used to produce material for nuclear weapons. U.S. intelligence been in use since 1993. When the United States provided Iran officials have since stated that now that the facility is in the open, with the reactor under the Atoms for Peace program in 1967, Iran will not likely use it for that purpose. it operated on 93 percent enriched uranium fuel. Uranium en- During an Oct. 4 joint press conference with AEOI head Ali Akbar riched to 20 percent of the fissile isotope uranium-235 is consid- Salehi in Tehran, ElBaradei said that the agency must have “com- ered highly enriched, although the percentage generally required prehensive cooperation” from Iran regarding the enrichment site. for weapons purposes is considerably higher. He added, “Iran should have informed the IAEA the day they had Iranian officials have threatened to carry out further enrich- decided to construct the facility.” ment in Iran if the talks fall through. Ali Shirzadian, a spokesman The agency’s next report on Iran’s nuclear activities is due to for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), told report- be considered by the IAEA Board of Governors when it meets ers Oct. 10 that “should talks fail or sellers refuse to provide Iran Nov. 26-27. —PETER CRAIL

Promoting Understanding of Russia

Alfa-Bank and CDS International are pleased to announce a call for Applications must be received applications for the Alfa Fellowship Program’s 2010-11 Fellows. Now entering by CDS International no later its eighth round, the Alfa Fellowship Program is a professional-level exchange than December 1, 2009. designed to foster a new generation of American leaders and decision-makers with meaningful professional experience in Russia. Program information and application materials are The Alfa Fellowship begins with language training in the U.S. followed by an available on the CDS website: intensive language course in Moscow. In October, Alfa Fellows attend a www.cdsintl.org/alfa ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 two-week seminar program with key Russian government, public, and private sector officials to discuss current issues facing Russia. Fellows then undertake individualized professional assignments at leading organizations For more information contact: in Russia including private companies, media outlets, think tanks, NGOs, and CDS International, Inc. government institutions. Alfa Fellowship Program Eligible candidates must have a graduate degree and professional experience 440 Park Avenue South, 2nd Fl. in business, economics, journalism, law, government, or public policy. NewYork, NY 10016 Russian language proficiency is preferred. The Fellowship includes monthly Tel: (212) 497-3510 stipends, related travel costs, housing, and insurance. Email: [email protected] www.cdsintl.org/alfa OJSC Alfa-Bank is incorporated, focused and based in Russia, and is not affiliated with U.S.-based Alfa Insurance. 41 News Officials Air Views ANALYSIS On Key Stockpile Issue

s the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) moves to- publicly opposed the idea of any program that would pursue new ward completion in the coming months, the Obama designs, even if they would not provide new capabilities. In an Oct. A administration is grappling with a major question about 21 interview with Arms Control Today (see page 6), Undersecretary the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Given the stated need to maintain the of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher arsenal for the foreseeable future, can the United States reliably declined to comment specifically on whether the NPR would in- maintain existing warhead designs, or will the country eventu- clude a new version of the RRW program. She said she does not ally need new ones? “consider RRW to be anything other than something from the Public statements by senior officials from the departments past.” Noting that she chaired the House subcommittee that had of Defense and State appear to be at odds on this point, and oversight of the program and that she led the effort to kill it, she officials from other parts of the government apparently have said, “When I kill something, it stays dead.” weighed in as well. In comments to The Cable in September, she said, “I think The debate reveals what some observers see as a tension born there are a lot people that still hope for the return of [the] RRW from President Barack Obama’s Prague speech in April, where he [program], and they are going to be sadly disappointed.” THE UNITED AND STATES THE AMERICAS called for “a world without nuclear weapons” while also saying, A former congressional staffer who followed the RRW issue “As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a closely said Oct. 27 that there was “an apparent disconnect” be- safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary.” tween the public comments of Gates and Tauscher. Inside the Obama administration, this debate is not about nu- Eric Edelman, who served as undersecretary of defense for pol- clear testing; the administration strongly supports the Compre- icy under Gates, said in a separate Oct. 27 interview that his im- hensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and opposes additional tests. Nor pression is that Gates “is not wedded to something called RRW” is it about developing weapons with new military capabilities. but does strongly support modernization of the U.S. stockpile. At issue is how long nuclear warheads “last.” During the Cold Noting that he no longer has day-to-day contact with Gates, War, nuclear warheads were continually replaced with new, more- Edelman, now a distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic lethal types, developed with the help of more than 1,000 nuclear and Budgetary Assessments, said he believes that Gates views such tests. The United States has not conducted a nuclear test since an effort as necessary if the Obama administration is to get Senate 1992. Since then, no new warhead types have been introduced approval for a new strategic arms control agreement and the CTBT. into the arsenal. As a result, existing designs are getting older. Edelman, who held senior positions in the State and Defense Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has said repeatedly that Departments, said his sense was that the administration “has the United States probably needs to replace at least some exist- not come to closure yet” on this issue. However, it is not “bad” to ing weapons with new designs. He told the Air Force Associa- have differing views within the administration, he said. “Those tion Sept. 16 that the United States should “continue to make investments, and I think larger investments, in modernizing [its] nuclear infrastructure.” That would include programs to extend the life of nuclear war- heads “and in one or two cases probably new designs that will be safer and more reliable,” he said. He added, “We have no desire for new capabilities. That’s a red herring. This is about modernizing and keeping safe a capa- bility that everyone acknowledges we will have to have for some considerable period into the future before achieving some of the

objectives of significant arms reduction and Defense of Department eventually no nuclear weapons at all.” According to knowledgeable sources, the November 2009 ODAY NPR has not reached a conclusion about the need for new warhead designs. Gates supported a similar effort in the Bush administration called the Reliable Replace- Secretary of Defense Robert Gates speaks at an Air Force Association conference in ment Warhead (RRW) program, which was Maryland September 16. He said the United States should continue to invest in programs

ARMS CONTROL T canceled by Congress. to extend the life of nuclear warheads and “in one or two cases” probably will need “new A top Department of State official has designs that will be safer and more reliable.” 42 disagreements get ironed out because, at the end of the day, it’s the president’s decision,” he said. Tauscher’s position reportedly has some backing in the White House. At a high-level meeting in June, Vice President Joe Biden opposed the idea of a resurrected RRW program on the grounds that the perception that the United States was upgrading its nu- clear warheads could undermine the administration’s credibility on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, according to an Aug. 18 report by Global Security Newswire. The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Admin- istration (NNSA), which, along with the Defense Department, is responsible for maintaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal, is also push- ing for the ability to design new warheads, as is the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM).

RRW Redux? Some are seeking to achieve certain goals of the earlier RRW pro- gram by folding the basic idea—that new-design warheads will be needed in the future—into the definition of “stockpile manage- ment.” The fiscal year 2010 defense authorization bill states that the top objectives of the Stockpile Management Program are “to

increase the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons Defense of Department stockpile of the United States” and “to further reduce the likeli- hood of the resumption of underground nuclear weapons testing.” Some see new warhead designs as serving both of these goals. The idea of certifying new warhead designs for the arsenal without the help of nuclear tests now seems feasible, thanks to new diagnostic tools in the Stockpile Stewardship Program that A Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile is test-fired have led to greater understanding of the basic physics of nuclear February 13. In October, Congress appropriated $223 million to weapons. STRATCOM and the NNSA are now making the case refurbish the W76 warhead, which is used on Tridents. that new, untested weapons designs would be more reliable than well-tested, older designs. “Confidence in [the] reliability of [the] aging stockpile is de- This RRW-style approach to stockpile maintenance is contro- creasing,” say STRATCOM viewgraphs, and STRATCOM wants versial in part because it would involve the design of new war- the option to “replace” existing warheads with new designs. The heads whose performance would not be confirmed with nuclear STRATCOM viewgraphs, originally obtained by The Washington tests—something that has never been done in the age of modern Times and published in September, describe a “range of options U.S. weapons. RRW critics are concerned that new, untested de- to manage the stockpile” into the future, from least intrusive to signs may turn out to be less reliable than current designs, even- most, as follows: tually leading to calls for renewed nuclear testing.

Refurbish: Rebuild the warhead nuclear components as Warhead Lifetimes close to the original as possible. Because nuclear warheads are no longer being replaced with new designs, as they were during the Cold War, the average age of the Reuse: Mix and match the best nuclear components of dif- nuclear arsenal is increasing beyond previous experience. ferent warheads; may have to remanufacture parts. That is not a major concern for the non-nuclear parts of war-

heads, which can be replaced under the Life Extension Program ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 Replace: Manufacture new nuclear components similar to (LEP) and fully tested without nuclear explosions. But nuclear those previously nuclear tested. parts of warheads—primaries (plutonium pits) and secondaries (lithium-deuteride components)—cannot be explosively tested. The last option is STRATCOM’s new version of the RRW pro- RRW skeptics counter that the aging of the arsenal is not a gram. STRATCOM is evaluating a new design option for a com- near-term problem because recent studies show that the pits can mon warhead to replace the W78 (Minuteman ICBM) and W88 last a very long time. (Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile) warheads for the The NNSA had estimated as recently as April 2006 that the pits post-2020 time frame. would last roughly 45-60 years. In November 2006, Lawrence NNSA viewgraphs released in September by Nuclear Watch Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories concluded that New Mexico, a local group that tracks Los Alamos National Labo- plutonium pits in current nuclear weapons have a shelf life of 85 ratory, include a similar list of the three options, stating that “[r] years to perhaps 100 years or more. That conclusion was endorsed eplacement is essential for a viable modernized stockpile with by the JASON group of senior defense consultants and by the increased flexibility and diversity.” NNSA. “These studies show that the degradation of plutonium 43 For now, it appears that independent weap- ons scientists have more confidence in exist- ing, well-tested designs than new, untested ones. In an April 2008 paper, Sidney Drell, a JASON member and former director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, and Mar- vin Adams of Texas A&M University found that “[w]e still have far to go before answer- ing whether new designs can be created that incorporate all the desired attributes, can be fielded without [underground tests], and pro- vide confidence as high as or higher than we

Department of Energy of Department have currently in the legacy weapons.” A new JASON report on the LEP has been completed, and an unclassified summary has been prepared but not yet released by the NNSA, according to an administration official. Congress in October included $223 mil- THE UNITED AND STATES THE AMERICAS A disassembled B61 nuclear gravity bomb is displayed by the Department of Energy in this undated photo. lion for the LEP in the fiscal year 2010 en- ergy and water development appropriations act. All of the money is to go to refurbish- in our nuclear weapons will not affect warhead reliability for de- ment, but not replacement, of the W76 warhead, which is used cades,” then-NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks said in a Novem- on Trident submarines. The act also provides $32.5 million to ber 2006 press release. “It is now clear that although plutonium study refurbishing non-nuclear parts of the B61 bomb. Seeking aging contributes, other factors control the overall life expec- to avoid any appearance of designing new nuclear weapons, the tancy of nuclear weapons systems,” he said. Given the arsenal’s law’s language states that no funding was requested to study re- current age, the newer estimates indicate that it will be more than furbishment of the nuclear parts of the B61 and that any funds 50 years before any plutonium parts in the 2009 stockpile start to be used for that purpose require prior congressional approval. facing significant aging issues. —TOM Z. COLLINA and DANIEL HORNER

Congress Funds Nonproliferation Work

ongress largely approved Presi- million, $20 million above the presi- national Atomic Energy Agency. They dent Barack Obama’s nuclear dential request. The program works to also work to improve export controls and C nonproliferation budget, with develop new technologies to help detect safeguards in other countries. some small adjustments, when both nuclear proliferation. Congress trimmed $20 million from chambers approved the fiscal year 2010 The second-largest boost went to inter- the administration request for the Global energy and water development appropria- national nuclear materials protection and Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), pro- tions bill last month. cooperation, which received $19.8 million viding $333.5 million. GTRI programs Obama signed the bill into law Oct. 28. above the president’s request, for a total aim to reduce the risks created by stock- The legislation, which includes monies of $572.1 million. Programs under that piles of nuclear and radiological material for the Department of Energy’s National heading work in Russia and other regions around the world. Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), of proliferation concern to secure nuclear A report accompanying the bill speci- appropriates $2.14 billion for nuclear non- weapons and material against theft. The fied that $20 million of the GTRI funds be proliferation efforts, $15 million above program also funds the installation of used to support the domestic production Obama’s request. (See ACT, June 2009.) equipment at foreign ports and border of molybdenum-99, a widely used medical The act also provides $6.38 billion, the crossings to detect nuclear material. isotope. The United States currently has no amount requested by the administration, Congress provided $187.2 million, capacity to produce the isotope and de- November 2009 ODAY for weapons activities. $5 million less than the administration pends on foreign producers that use highly In nonproliferation, there were several requested, for the group of programs enriched uranium (HEU) for a key part of program areas in which the congressional known as nonproliferation and interna- the process. The facilities being considered funding differed from the administration tional security. Those programs provide for construction in the United States would request. The largest adjustment went to technical support for international trea- use low-enriched uranium (LEU) instead.

ARMS CONTROL T nonproliferation and verification research ties and organizations such as the nuclear Nonproliferation advocates have long and development, which received $317.3 Nonproliferation Treaty and the Inter- urged that existing isotope reactors con- 44 vert from HEU to LEU and that new ones should be made to ensure this does funding request for the maintenance of be designed to use LEU. In a June letter, not occur.” all nuclear bombs and warheads in the a coalition of nonproliferation advocates For fiscal year 2010, Congress returned stockpile, with one exception. The request and medical professionals noted increas- the MOX fuel project to the NNSA, where included $65 million for a study of the ing problems at the foreign reactors and it has been historically. In recent years, B61 nuclear bomb to determine options urged Congress to address the issue by Congress, at the instigation of the House related to its refurbishment and service- using the energy and water appropria- appropriations energy and water sub- life extension. Congress approved half tions bill to support domestic, LEU-based committee, had moved it to the Energy that amount, $32.5 million, to study only isotope production. Department’s nuclear energy office. The the non-nuclear components of the bomb. Congress fully funded the largest item House appropriators had questioned the The new law also provides $96.1 mil- under the nonproliferation heading, the project’s nonproliferation value and did lion for nuclear weapons dismantle- construction of a mixed-oxide (MOX) not want the facility to drain funds from ment, $12 million more than the ad- fuel fabrication facility in South Carolina. other nonproliferation programs. ministration requested. The plant, which is the centerpiece of the In the section covering weapons pro- The ranking Republican on the NNSA’s plutonium-disposition program, grams, the appropriations act provides House Appropriations Committee, Rep. is being built to make MOX fuel, a blend $1.51 billion, $8.8 million below the Jerry Lewis (Calif.), faulted the legis- of uranium and plutonium oxides, from administration’s request, for work directly lation for inadequately funding the surplus U.S. weapons plutonium. related to maintaining the U.S. nuclear nuclear weapons complex. “Given the Congress provided $504.2 million weapons stockpile. The legislation pro- Obama administration’s plan to reduce for the facility but expressed concerns vides $223.2 million for the Life Exten- the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile, about its cost. In the report accom- sion Program (LEP) for the W76 warhead, we need to make sure that the weapons panying the bill, Congress said it was the only LEP currently being undertaken we have left are safe and reliable, espe- worried that “future cost increases in by the NNSA. The LEP is intended to cially at a time when new threats to our the construction of the Mixed Oxide allow the 1970s-era W76 to remain in security are emerging around the world. Fuel Fabrication Facility…could divert service for another 30 years without con- The funding level in this bill is simply resources from high-priority overseas ducting nuclear tests. inadequate to meet this need,” he said. nonproliferation activities. All efforts Congress met the administration’s —COLE HARVEY and DANIEL HORNER ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 Department of Energy of Department

Technicians prepare a W76 warhead for movement between work facilities at the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Pantex plant in Texas in 2007. The fiscal year 2010 funding legislation provides $223 million for the Life Extension Program for the W76 warhead. 45 UAE-U.S. Nuclear Pact Gets Green Light

he congressional review period Obama administration officials and for the U.S. nuclear cooperation congressional supporters of the agree- T agreement with the United Arab ment have highlighted those provisions, Emirates (UAE) ended Oct. 17 without which have not appeared in previous U.S. action by Congress to block or add condi- nuclear agreements. The UAE agreement tions to the pact. The expiration of the has frequently been cited by supporters review period paves the way for the gov- as a potential model for other countries, ernments to exchange diplomatic notes to particularly in the Middle East. At an Oct. 7 bring the agreement into force. hearing on the agreement by the Senate Department of State spokesman Ian Foreign Relations Near Eastern and South Kelly said Oct. 22 that the U.S. govern- and Central Asian Affairs Subcommittee, ment has completed all the required in- Vann H. Van Diepen, acting assistant sec- ternal procedures for entry into force. In retary of state for international security an e-mail to Arms Control Today, a spokes- and nonproliferation, said that “the idea woman for the UAE embassy in Washing- that we want to have the best possible Senate U.S.

THE UNITED AND STATES THE AMERICAS ton said that as of the end of October, the controls on enrichment and reprocess- agreement was “still going through [a] pro ing technology will absolutely be part of forma process” in the UAE. the mix” in negotiating agreements with Sen. Russ Feingold (D-Wis.) Under U.S. law, Congress does not have other countries but that “once you start to vote in favor of such agreements, which getting into specific negotiations with are a prerequisite for U.S. nuclear trade specific countries in specific contexts, you known. The Group of Eight countries with other countries. However, Congress may not be able to skin the cat exactly the agreed at their summit in July to adopt must be given 90 days of so-called contin- same way each time.” the policies in the NSG text. (See ACT, uous session to review the agreements. Critics of the agreement have pointed September 2009.) Although there was some criticism of to the UAE’s history of serving as a trans- Van Diepen said he was “optimistic” the accord, particularly in the House, shipment point for illicit exports. At the that the NSG “ultimately” will approve there was no sustained effort during the hearing, Van Diepen said, “While the UAE the agreement. He said “a couple of 90 days to block or modify it. still has work to do, we believe that it is countries” have raised objections deal- The agreement has gone through sev- taking the necessary steps to implement ing with a “kind of broad sovereignty eral versions under the Bush and Obama an effective export control system.” principle at very high levels” and that administrations. (See ACT, June 2009.) At the hearing, Sen. Russ Feingold (D- “it’s going to take us some time to work The latest version, which was submitted Wis.) said he had “strong concerns about around” the objections. to Congress in May, contains what the expanding the use of nuclear energy, par- He added that there have been “very, Obama administration describes as “a ticularly in this volatile region, before we very, very few” enrichment and reprocess- legally binding obligation” on the UAE have an international regime in place to ing exports approved under the current to refrain from uranium enrichment and ensure that countries will not export en- NSG rules. spent fuel reprocessing. richment and reprocessing technologies.” In a congressionally required report, the Under Article 7 of the pact, the UAE He asked Van Diepen when the Nuclear Obama administration said Oct. 8 that, “shall not possess sensitive nuclear facili- Suppliers Group (NSG) was expected to at NSG meetings in June, two countries ties within its territory or otherwise en- approve an agreement to tighten restric- continued to raise “strong policy-level gage in activities within its territory for, or tions on exports relating to enrichment conceptual concerns” and that “[s]everal” relating to, the enrichment or reprocess- and reprocessing. other NSG members “continued to have ing of material.” The agreement defines a NSG members have drafted a document concerns about limitations on the right “sensitive nuclear facility” as “any facility that sets out specific criteria that countries of non-enrichment technology holders to designed or used primarily for uranium must meet in order to be eligible to receive receive enabling technology.” The admin- enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel, enrichment or reprocessing technology istration said it is “working closely” with heavy water production, or fabrication of exports. However, some members of the other governments to reach consensus in nuclear fuel containing plutonium.” NSG, which operates by consensus, have time for a November meeting of the NSG’s The agreement also says that the UAE not supported the “clean text,” as it is consultative group. —DANIEL HORNER November 2009 ODAY must have an additional protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency • On page 56 of Arms Control Today’s October 2009 issue, the article “In Me- safeguards agreement in force before the moriam: Edward M. Kennedy” contained three incorrect dates. The House United States will issue licenses for nuclear voted on the nuclear freeze resolution in 1983, the subsequent election was in exports to the UAE. The protocol gives the 1984, and U.S.-Soviet arms control talks resumed in 1985.

ARMS CONTROL T agency increased inspection rights; the UAE has signed but not ratified its protocol. CORRECTION 46 ASIA AND AUSTRALIA AND ASIA China Says N. Korea Wants Better Relations

orth Korea wants to return to multilateral denucle- States was “pleased” that Pyongyang reaffirmed its commitment to arization talks and improve relations with Japan, the talks. He noted, however, that North Korea did so “with some N South Korea, and the United States, Chinese Premier caveats that we’re going to have to explore in greater detail,” an ap- Wen Jiabao said during an Oct. 10 press conference in Beijing. parent reference to Kim’s linkage between a return to the six-party Wen met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il Oct. 5 to dis- talks and the outcome of discussions with Washington. cuss ways to bring Pyongyang back to multilateral talks on North Department of State spokesman Ian Kelly said during an Oct. Korea’s denuclearization. During the Oct. 10 briefing, he ex- 20 briefing that there has been a standing invitation from North pressed concern that the chance for restarting those talks, which Korea for U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Ste- included Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States as well phen Bosworth to travel to Pyongyang for talks, but that Wash- as China and North Korea, may not last. ington has not decided whether it would accept. “If we miss this opportunity, then we may have to make even North Korea’s willingness to return to the talks does not more efforts further down the road,” Wen said. appear to be the only U.S. condition for holding discussions According to an Oct. 5 report by the official Korean Central with Pyongyang. News Agency (KCNA), Kim told Wen during their meeting that Campbell told reporters Oct. 14 that the United States and its his country was ready to hold multilateral talks “depending on allies in the region insist that Pyongyang honor the denucleariza- the outcome” of bilateral discussions with the United States. tion pledges that it has made in the past. “So we’re going to need “The hostile relations between [North Korea] and the United to see North Korea accepting those provisions for us to move for- States should be converted into peaceful ties through the bilateral ward in the course of the next several months,” he said. talks without fail,” KCNA reported Kim as saying. North Korea has not indicated that it is willing to make such Washington has indicated that it is willing to hold bilateral dis- a recommitment. Although KCNA quoted Kim as telling Wen cussions with North Korea but only for the purpose of bringing that Pyongyang’s “efforts to attain the goal of denuclearizing the that country back to the six-party talks. (See ACT, October 2009.) peninsula remain unchanged,” North Korea has also signaled Pyongyang withdrew from those talks, which had been held in- that it would expand its preconditions for denuclearization. Re- termittently since 2003, in April. (See ACT, May 2009.) cent statements by North Korean officials and the country’s state Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and media have tied Pyongyang’s denuclearization to broader global Pacific affairs, said during an Oct. 11 press briefing that the United nuclear disarmament efforts. ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 KNS/AFP/ G etty Images etty

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (second from left) and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il (second from right) appear in Pyongyang October 4. Wen and Kim discussed ways to bring North Korea back to multilateral denuclearization talks. 47 In an English-language statement issued by the Foreign Min- istry Sept. 30, North Korea said that its denuclearization “is unthinkable even in a dream as long as there exists the sources that compelled it to have access to nukes,” reiterating Pyong- yang’s claim that it developed nuclear weapons in response to “the U.S. nuclear threat.” The statement was delivered in response to the UN Security

Council’s Sept. 24 adoption of a U.S.-sponsored resolution outlin- Parks/AFP/ Peter ing steps that the international community should take to work toward a “world without nuclear weapons.” (See ACT, October ASIA AND AUSTRALIA 2009.) North Korea rejected that resolution in its Sept. 30 state-

ment, calling it “a double-standards document” which “failed to G etty Images etty fully reflect” an international consensus. At the same time, the statement reiterated that the founder of the North Korean state, Kim Il Sung, called for the denucleariza- tion of the Korean peninsula, claiming that Pyongyang would Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian pursue that goal in the context of global nuclear disarmament. and Pacific affairs, speaks at the U.S. embassy in Beijing North Korea reiterated this broader condition for its denuclear- October 14. The United States and its allies are insisting that Pyongyang honor the denuclearization pledges that it has ization in an Oct. 14 commentary by Pyongyang’s officialRodong made in the past, Campbell said. Sinmun newspaper. “In order to make the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free, it is necessary to make a comprehensive and total elimination of all the nuclear weapons on earth,” said the editorial, Although the United States has not made plans for formal bi- which also highlighted the need for the United States to take lateral discussions with North Korea, the two countries recently steps toward nuclear disarmament first. held informal talks in New York. State Department Spokesman The North Korean statements go beyond Pyongyang’s previous Noel Clay said in an Oct. 24 statement that Sung Kim, U.S. denuclearization commitment. In a 2005 joint statement by the special envoy for the six-party talks, met that same day with Ri countries involved in the six-party talks, North Korea pledged Gun, director-general of the North American affairs bureau of denuclearization in return for an affirmation that there are no the North Korean Foreign Ministry, “to convey our position on nuclear weapons in South Korea, assurances against attack by denuclearization and the six party talks.” Ri visited the United the United States, and pledges by Washington and Tokyo to work States at the end of October to attend conferences hosted by non- toward normalizing relations with Pyongyang. governmental organizations. —PETER CRAIL

Memo: An Historic Opportunity for Nuclear Disarmament From: Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Action: Support U.S.-Russia Talks Now

This is the official policy of President Barack Obama and his administration:

• Seek deep, verifiable reductions in all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons and work with other nuclear powers to reduce global stockpiles dramatically.

• Work with Russia to end dangerous Cold War policies like keeping nuclear weapons ready to launch on a moment’s notice, in a mutual and verifiable manner.

• Show the world that America believes in its existing commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to work to ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons. (source: www.whitehouse.gov)

November 2009 ODAY Take action now on this and other issues. Join the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Turn the Tide action alert network at

http://capwiz.com/wagingpeace. PMB 121, 1187 Coast Village Road

ARMS CONTROL T Suite 1 • Santa Barbara, CA 93108-2794 (805) 965-3443 • www.wagingpeace.org 48 Reviewed by Gerard DeGroot

BOOK REVIEW: Dismissing Doomsday

very year, I teach a course on the Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism atom bomb. At the end of each From Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda E semester, I ask my students to tell By John Mueller me at what point the world came closest Oxford University Press, 2009, 320 pp. to nuclear Armageddon. The answers are usually predictable: the Cuban missile crisis, the Yom Kippur War, the Indo-Paki- stani conflict. One year, however, I got a very different response. It came from a student who was sitting in the far corner. Usually taciturn, he crisis in North Korea. The fact that atomic rial, or technology to other countries. now looked ready to explode. “Thomas,” I weapons and ballistic missiles are being The safeguards against such an eventual- asked, “do you have something to offer?” tested reduces otherwise sensible people ity, he believes, are simply too strong. In He hesitated, then spat, “NEVER! There’s in Washington to trembling panic. As any case, he argues, given the depths to never been a nuclear crisis. Nuclear weap- Mueller indicates, the White House has, which North Korea’s reputation has sunk, ons are stupid, and no nation would ever at various times in the recent past, seri- it seems unlikely that any state would be stupid enough to use them.” ously considered going to war to stop the risk universal opprobrium by making a At the time, I dismissed the outburst as North Korean project. Yet, such a war, Faustian deal with such a pariah. That heartfelt but wrong. Someone had clearly experts predict, would result in a cata- seems, however, a bit like whistling in the not been doing his homework. Now, how- strophic loss of human life. dark, given that Syria has already made ever, after reading John Mueller’s Atomic Would such a sacrifice be justified in such a deal and Iran has also apparently Obsession, I am not so sure. Mueller, pro- order to prevent one nation from join- cooperated with North Korea on missile fessor of political science at Ohio State ing the nuclear club? Mueller shouts a development. Mueller takes solace in the University, has provided lucidity and logic resounding “no.” So far, he argues, the assumption that provenance would be to my student’s tirade. As Mueller argues, North Koreans have tested devices of pa- easy to trace, and guilt—not to mention nuclear weapons are indeed stupid, and thetically low yield. As for their missiles, punishment—would thus be shared. because they are, the risk of their use is they have only managed to demonstrate tiny. Mueller’s argument seems at first a capacity to hit the Pacific Ocean. These Bang for the Buck recklessly glib, but by the end of the book, meager results have been achieved amid Suppose instead that Kim had invested I found myself swayed by his devastat- insolvency and mass starvation. It is his money in conventional weapons and ing logic. This is one of those annoyingly clearly beyond the capacity of the North traditional methods of delivery. The huge convincing books that undermine one’s Koreans to develop their nuclear capabil- sums spent on his atomic project to date sacred truths. I am supposed to be an ex- ity to a point where they could genuinely would have bought a lot of bombs and ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 pert on this subject, but right now, I am threaten any other nation. As the some- a fair number of bombers to drop them. questioning a lot of what I know. I may times mischievous Mueller indicates, Bombers, we need to remind ourselves, have to rethink my bomb course. given the crippling cost of a nuclear pro- remain the most dependable method of Mueller’s thesis, as his title suggests, gram, there might even be ironic logic in delivering a payload. Failing that, the is that we are held captive by a paralyz- allowing North Korea to go ahead because money could have been invested in heavy ing obsession when it comes to all things that seems the best way to bankrupt the artillery because Seoul and other major nuclear. That obsession corrodes common vile regime of Kim Jong Il. cities in South Korea are easily within sense, causing us to lose our sense of pro- Mueller dismisses as bogus the risk of range. Had Kim taken either of these portion. Take, for instance, the present North Korea transferring weapons, mate- routes, he would have made his country

Gerard DeGroot is a history professor at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. He has written 12 books, including The Bomb: A Life (2004). 49 might not be certain, but the risks are too great to allow the leader to gamble. The basic principle that once kept the United States and U.S.S.R. from destroying each other still stands: no leader, no matter how unstable he might seem, would ever take action that might result in the utter

Collections/Los Angeles Times Photographic Archives Photographic Times Angeles Special of Collections/Los Department Library Research Young E. Charles UCLA destruction of his country. Some readers might find cold comfort in the shield of deterrence. While reading this book, I occasionally felt uneasy about Mueller’s clinical logic, given that some world leaders are far from logical. That said, an argument could be made that nuclear weapons have forced leaders, even notoriously unstable ones, to act rational- ly. Some critics might argue that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran cannot be trusted to act rationally, but it is equally possible that the bomb will impose sanity on him. A case in point, Mueller argues, is China, a country once rather contemptu- ous of human life. In the 1960s and 1970s, China was in every sense a “rogue nation.” Women stand in front of civil defense posters in Los Angeles in 1952. Yet, it never came close to using its nuclear weapons, despite Chairman Mao Tse- a much greater threat to regional stability of Tokyo, although rarely displayed, show tung’s febrile boasts that he was prepared than it is now. One suspects that hardly virtually identical destruction. In other to allow one-half of his population to die anyone would have protested. words, nuclear weapons are not uniquely in defense of communism. The bomb, in other words, is too often terrible. The bomb is unique in deliver- seen as an absolute weapon, when it is ing potentially lethal radiation, but that Sowing Fear nothing of the sort. The term “absolute too, Mueller argues, has been exaggerated. Rather predictably, the Mueller train of weapon” originated with Bernard Brodie’s The horror lies in war, not in the specific logic moves relentlessly to the conclusion book by that title and has been treated as methods of waging it. that Iran and North Korea should be al- gospel ever since.1 Granted, the bombs dropped on Hiro- lowed to pursue their nuclear projects. In impressively methodical fashion, shima and Nagasaki had yields of around He sees the two nations as akin to spoiled Mueller dismantles the myths of an om- 20 kilotons, while weapons today are children who will probably find that the nipotent leviathan. The imaginary mon- often measured in megatons. That would toy they covet is not quite so attractive if ster, he feels, was brought into being by J. suggest that it is facile to compare atomic it is granted without need of a tantrum. Robert Oppenheimer, who could not resist weapons with conventional bombs. Clearly, the value of these weapons for Ah- indulging in apocalyptic imagery after Mueller answers that rebuttal rather madinejad and Kim lies not in their poten- witnessing the first atomic test on July cleverly. There are indeed thermonuclear tial for devastation but in the abhorrence 16, 1945. “I am become Death, Destroyer weapons capable of immense destruction, they inspire in the rest of the world. Once of Worlds,” he mused, quoting from the but they remain in the stockpiles of pow- the weapons cease to sow fear, they lose Bhagavad Gita. Making a dent in the ers unlikely ever to use them, at least not their value as a tool of political extortion. New Mexico desert or even leveling a few as a first strike. The weapons causing the Mueller also argues that the best way to square miles of Hiroshima is not, Mueller most fuss in the world at the moment, insure that proper safeguards are applied insists, the same as destroying a world. namely those possessed by Pakistan or to Iranian or North Korean weapons is to By pretending that it is, we misjudge the being developed by Iran or North Korea, treat those nations like responsible mem- threat the bomb poses. are similar in size to the Hiroshima bomb bers of the nuclear club. Although Mueller A sense of proportion is essential. Muel- or even smaller. does not advocate simply abandoning all ler rightly points out that the destruction The danger posed by these weapons, efforts to persuade Iran and North Ko- November 2009 ODAY of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was no worse Mueller argues, is minuscule. He bases his rea to abstain, he insists that persuasion than the firebombing of Tokyo. The dif- argument on classical deterrence—a dwarf must remain in the realm of responsible ference lay only in efficiency: one bomb nuclear power such as Iran will forever be dialogue. Threats of military action, he achieved what elsewhere took thousands. prevented from using its weapons by the insists, will only encourage greater stub- We are constantly bombarded with grisly knowledge that, if it did so, the nuclear gi- bornness. If a nation is labeled a rogue, it

ARMS CONTROL T photographs of Hiroshima as proof of the ants would deliver vengeance a thousand tends to behave in that manner. bomb’s awesome power, but photographs times greater. Granted, nuclear retaliation The word “if” does not, however, jux- 50 tapose comfortably with kiloton power. As Robert McNamara once argued, “[A] Books OF NOTE strategic planner…must prepare for the worst plausible case and not be content to hope and prepare for the most prob- Inside Nuclear South Asia able.”2 That explains why it was considered Scott D. Sagan, ed., Stanford University Press, 2009, 281 pp. necessary for the United States to spend cott D. Sagan of Stanford University’s Center for International Security and $5.5 trillion on nuclear weapons between Cooperation has compiled the work of a number of South Asia experts who 1940 and 1996.3 The same logic suggests S discuss nuclear proliferation in the region and offer alternatives to the common ex- that the best way to keep Iran from using an atomic bomb is to prevent it from ever planations for its occurrence. The first part of the book covers the causes of South making one. Thus, Secretary of State Hill- Asian nuclear proliferation. The authors in this section focus particularly on three ex- ary Rodham Clinton has maintained that planations for why India and Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons: domestic politics, Iran must be prevented from getting the issues of prestige and grievance, and external threats. For instance, Itty Abraham bomb “at all costs.” What does that mean? argues that different actors within India attached varied meanings to the nuclear Would prevention be worth another war in program and that the nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998 were intended in large part to the Middle East, one that would probably demonstrate the greatness and accomplishment of India as an independent nation. be even more destructive than the current The second section focuses on the implications of the current regional nuclear or- conflict in Iraq? Mueller, an expert at keep- der and offers reasons for pessimism about its long-term stability. ing things in perspective, rightly points out that the danger of going to war with Iran and further inflaming Islamic opinion is far Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of greater than the danger that could ever be Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of posed by an Iranian nuclear weapon. Weapons of Mass Destruction Mueller also does not grant much cre- Thomas Graham Jr. and Keith A. Hansen, Stanford University Press, 2009, 300 pp. dence to what he calls the “cascadologists,” homas Graham Jr., former acting director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disar- namely those so-called security experts who maintain that an Iranian or North Tmament Agency, and veteran arms control verification expert Keith A. Hansen Korean bomb would trigger relentless have written an authoritative and comprehensive survey of the way intelligence proliferation. As he points out, cascadolo- has been and can be used to support global nonproliferation objectives. The book gists have been crying wolf ever since the has much to recommend it as a reference work or textbook for scholars and Soviets first exploded a nuclear weapon in students, including concise summaries of historical events and key documents. 1949. If warnings uttered decades ago had The authors’ nonjudgmental prose and obvious sympathy for the challenges con- proven correct, there would be about 40 fronting the producers of intelligence may leave some readers hungry for tougher nuclear powers today. Instead, most na- critiques of the intelligence community for its record during the debacle over Iraq’s tions have proven remarkably reluctant to alleged weapons of mass destruction and for its use of controversial counterterrorism join the nuclear club, and some have even methods. Yet, exposure to the careful conclusions of experts such as Graham and suspended their membership by getting Hansen in the context of their balanced presentation of recent history carries its rid of their weapons. This reluctance can own rewards. be explained by the fact that the weapons have no military utility and are ferociously expensive. Even Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi eventually came to the conclusion Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security that nuclear weapons are “crazy.” Gregory D. Koblentz, Cornell University Press, 2009, 255 pp. Mueller rejects entirely the notion that the bomb is a tool of coercion, useful in n Living Weapons, Gregory D. Koblentz thoroughly addresses the wide ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2009 frightening adversaries into doing what Irange of challenges that biological weapons pose to countries in the 21st is wanted. As he points out, the fact that century. He outlines the difficulties the international community faces in the United Kingdom had nuclear weapons obtaining intelligence about biological weapons, verifying whether state or did not prevent Argentina from invading nonstate actors are developing biological weapons, holding state and nonstate the Falklands. Israel’s possession of atomic bombs did not frighten off the Egyptians actors accountable for biological weapons programs, and preventing the rise on Yom Kippur in 1973; Israel would have of biological terrorism. Koblentz explores these issues by weaving together been better off buying tanks. “The United historical information on Iraqi, Russian, South African, and Soviet biological States,” he adds, “possesses a tidy array weapons programs with analysis of the scientific and security challenges bio- of thousands of nuclear weapons and logical weapons present in the 21st century. Rather than developing any one for years has had difficulty dominating solution in depth, he recommends several possible ways for countries to de- downtown Baghdad—or even keeping the crease, unilaterally and multilaterally, the threat posed by biological weapons. lights on there.” 51 Questioning Sacred Truths one in a million. Examined through that they seem could easily be used by those Like a marksman at a fairground shooting lens, a decision to pursue nuclear weap- prepared to think the unthinkable, those gallery, Mueller carefully guns down the sa- ons seems ludicrous. It makes no sense who have occasionally tried to construct cred truths of nuclear orthodoxy. “All radia- for a terrorist organization to invest huge scenarios in which nuclear weapons tion is dangerous.” Bang! “Atomic weapons sums of money, time, and effort in such a might conceivably be used. After all, de- were essential to the stability of the Cold risky enterprise because its purpose can be terrence is strengthened by a belief in Ar- War.” Bang! The ducks keep coming, and served much more easily by strapping a few mageddon, even if that belief occasionally Mueller keeps shooting them down. He pounds of gelignite to the body of a fanatic warps good sense. eventually arrives at essentially the same and sending him into a crowded train. For This still very worthy book deserves conclusion many arms control advocates these reasons, Mueller is not greatly con- attention and discussion. Its publication

Although by no means the last word on nuclear weapons, Mueller deserves praise for having the guts to shout that the atomic emperor has no clothes.

have long advanced, namely that nuclear cerned by reports that al Qaeda has been coincides nicely with a renewal of ten- weapons should be abolished. He comes to seeking nuclear material and information sion in Iran’s relations with the rest of that conclusion, however, from a very dif- for bomb-making. the international community. Despite ferent direction. In his view, the weapons Lurking ominously in our nuclear con- that inadvertent plug, I doubt the book should go not because they are dangerous, sciousness is the specter of Armageddon, will do very well, for the simple reason but because they serve no purpose. a terribly inappropriate word that warps that, as Mueller admits, “ghoulish copy Mueller sees nuclear weapons as a mas- good sense. In popular perception, a nucle- very commonly sells” while serene good sive misjudgment inspired by irrational ar explosion has wrongly come to be equat- sense does not. “Nothing is as boring as a fear. Worst-case scenario fantasists have ed with the apocalypse. That in turn has book about how urgent something isn’t,” exercised an iron grip on international demanded preparation for the worst-case he says. Boring or not, and it is not, the sensibilities, he argues, forcing nations to scenario. Stripped of our sense of propor- book should nevertheless be packaged up spend money on weapons that they did tion, we cower in an artificial world of ab- and sent to Presidents Barack Obama and not need. In the aftermath of the Septem- solute danger, imprisoned by our fears. The Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister Gor- ber 11 attacks, that same fear has prompt- steps we have taken to protect ourselves don Brown with a simple message: “Please ed an obsession with nuclear terrorism, from an exaggerated danger are arguably calm down.” While reading Atomic Obses- a danger Mueller also judges bogus. Ad- more destructive than the danger itself, as sion, I constantly heard President Franklin dicted to fear, the doomsday merchants has been potently demonstrated in Iraq. Roosevelt whispering, “The only thing we have turned to the terrorist because Russia Mueller’s achievement deserves admira- have to fear is fear itself.” could no longer provide a fix. The last tion even by those inclined to resist his In his preface, Mueller wryly remarks section of his book aims at this new bo- central thesis. The book is meticulously that he wants his book to be a cure for in- gey, blowing it away with the same deadly researched and punctuated with a dry wit somnia. He sees no reason to suffer sleep- precision. Central to Mueller’s argument that seems the perfect riposte to the pom- less nights worrying about a danger that is the assertion that terrorists are basically posity of security experts who have so far does not exist. The book does indeed have opportunists: they achieve success by tyrannized debate. Although by no means a soporific effect, not through dry prose keeping attacks simple. The complexity of the last word on nuclear weapons, Mueller but through devastating logic. Since read- a nuclear strike—the time, effort, risk, and deserves praise for having the guts to shout ing it, I have felt a tiny bit better about the expense—contradicts that ethic. that the atomic emperor has no clothes. world my children will inherit. ACT In examining the terrorist scenario, The biggest fault of the book is the way Mueller analyzes the process of funding, he attacks one obsession with another. He ENDNOTES designing, building, transporting, and is clearly passionate about his topic, and detonating a weapon and breaks the pro- that passion causes him to overplay his 1. Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic November 2009 ODAY cess down into 20 clearly identified tasks. hand. For instance, the contention that Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace, As he stresses, the terrorist needs to suc- radiation is less dangerous than we think 1946). ceed at each task, while those who wish to is not necessary for his central argument. 2. John Cox, Overkill: Weapons of the Nuclear Age stop him require only one success. Even Likewise, his attempt to bring the destruc- (New York: Crowell, 1977), pp. 96-97. the very generous 50-50 odds that he gives tion of Hiroshima into perspective seems 3. Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940

ARMS CONTROL T for each stage in the process mean the ac- occasionally callous. His insistence that cumulated likelihood of success is less than atomic weapons are not as dangerous as (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1998). 52