“Red Tabs” Life and Death in the 6 South
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DEFENCE Annual Performance Plan for 2020/2021
“Lets grow South Africa together” DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN For 2020/2021 “Lets grow South Africa together” DATE OF TABLING: 12 MARCH 2020 Annual Performance Plan I 2020/21 1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE FOREWORD BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND MILITARY VETERANS This Plan has been developed against the backdrop of the sixth administration Medium-Term Strategic Framework priorities, 2019-2024, in support of the National Development Plan, ‘’Vision 2030’’. As a developmental State, government through the Medium-Term Strategic Framework, will continue to priorities the following goals; improving the human capital base, reducing inequalities, modernising the public service and transforming the economy. These Medium-Term Strategic Framework goals articulate the strategic focus of Government and its on-going commitment to build a stronger and effective State, able to respond to the needs and aspirations of the people of South Africa. It is within the defence mandate that the role of defence will find expression in support of the Medium- Term Strategic Framework Pillars and Priorities of government and support to the national security architecture of the RSA at domestic, regional and continental dimensions. The reconfiguration of the departmental planning instruments aligned with national requirements, now reflects the DOD Results-Based Model enabling the pursuing of the defence Impact Statement ‘’Enhance and contribute to peace, security and stability in the RSA, region, Africa and the world through appropriately resourced and sustained defence capabilities’’. This Impact Statement will be supported by measurable Outcomes, Outputs and Activities that will be implemented and monitored at appropriate governance structures of the Department thereby ensuring support to national imperative. -
6Th South African Armoured Division
6TH SOUTH AFRICAN ARMOURED DIVISION By J.C. von Winterbach, Scott Sutherland, Mike Bersiks, Rex Barret and Barry Cooper. Beginning The idea of a South African Armoured Division was born out of the chaos of the Western Desert Campaign, the Of- ficers in the 1st and 2nd South African Infantry Divisions felt the need for their own armour instead of depending on other Commonwealth Armoured Units. The formation of two strong Armoured Divisions was first discussed between Lt. Gen. G. E. Brink and rimeP Minister (Field Marshal) J.C. Smuts in April 1941. At that point time, South Africa was struggling to maintain the manpo- wer needed to sustain the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions in the field due to the political divisions in the Country. The 3rd South African Infantry Division was based in South Africa and provided the pool from which reinforcements were drawn to supplement the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions. A re-organisation committee met for the first time in May 1942 to discuss the armour option, it was decided to send three Infantry Battalions for armour training in August 1942, but the plan was rudely interrupted when Rommel launched his attack on the Gazala line in late May 1942. Nine days after the final El Alamein offensive the South African Divisions were pulling back to regroup. The plan was for the 1st Infantry Division that was withdrawn to Quassasin and that its 1st Brigade would return to South Africa to regroup with the 7th Infantry Brigade in Madagascar to form the 1st South African Armoured Division and the 1st Infantry Divisions 2nd and 3rd Brigades would remain in Egypt to form the 6th South African Armoured Division, which would replace the 2nd Infantry Division that had been captured at Tobruk in June 1942. -
Joseph Stalin Revolutionary, Politician, Generalissimus and Dictator
Military Despatches Vol 34 April 2020 Flip-flop Generals that switch sides Surviving the Arctic convoys 93 year WWII veteran tells his story Joseph Stalin Revolutionary, politician, Generalissimus and dictator Aarthus Air Raid RAF Mosquitos destory Gestapo headquarters For the military enthusiast CONTENTS April 2020 Page 14 Click on any video below to view How much do you know about movie theme songs? Take our quiz and find out. Hipe’s Wouter de The old South African Goede interviews former Defence Force used 28’s gang boss David a mixture of English, Williams. Afrikaans, slang and techno-speak that few Russian Special Forces outside the military could hope to under- stand. Some of the terms Features 34 were humorous, some A matter of survival were clever, while others 6 This month we continue with were downright crude. Ten generals that switched sides our look at fish and fishing for Imagine you’re a soldier heading survival. into battle under the leadership of Part of Hipe’s “On the a general who, until very recently 30 couch” series, this is an been trying very hard to kill you. interview with one of How much faith and trust would Ranks you have in a leader like that? This month we look at the author Herman Charles Army of the Republic of Viet- Bosman’s most famous 20 nam (ARVN), the South Viet- characters, Oom Schalk Social media - Soldier’s menace namese army. A taxi driver was shot Lourens. Hipe spent time in These days nearly everyone has dead in an ongoing Hanover Park, an area a smart phone, laptop or PC plagued with gang with access to the Internet and Quiz war between rival taxi to social media. -
A Short Chronicle of Warfare in South Africa Compiled by the Military Information Bureau*
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 16, Nr 3, 1986. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za A short chronicle of warfare in South Africa Compiled by the Military Information Bureau* Khoisan Wars tween whites, Khoikhoi and slaves on the one side and the nomadic San hunters on the other Khoisan is the collective name for the South Afri- which was to last for almost 200 years. In gen- can people known as Hottentots and Bushmen. eral actions consisted of raids on cattle by the It is compounded from the first part of Khoi San and of punitive commandos which aimed at Khoin (men of men) as the Hottentots called nothing short of the extermination of the San themselves, and San, the names given by the themselves. On both sides the fighting was ruth- Hottentots to the Bushmen. The Hottentots and less and extremely destructive of both life and Bushmen were the first natives Dutch colonist property. encountered in South Africa. Both had a relative low cultural development and may therefore be During 18th century the threat increased to such grouped. The Colonists fought two wars against an extent that the Government had to reissue the the Hottentots while the struggle against the defence-system. Commandos were sent out and Bushmen was manned by casual ranks on the eventually the Bushmen threat was overcome. colonist farms. The Frontier War (1779-1878) The KhoiKhoi Wars This term is used to cover the nine so-called "Kaffir Wars" which took place on the eastern 1st Khoikhoi War (1659-1660) border of the Cape between the Cape govern- This was the first violent reaction of the Khoikhoi ment and the Xhosa. -
Class, Race and Gender Amongst White Volunteers, 1939-1953
From War to Workplace: Class, Race and Gender amongst White Volunteers, 1939-1953 By Neil Roos Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the Faculty of Human and Social Sciences at the University of North West Supervisor: Dr. Tim Clynick Mafikeng, North West Province August 2001 To Dick Abstract Through a case study of the war and post-war experiences of those who volunteered to serve in the Second World War, the thesis explores aspects of the social and cultural history of white men in South Africa. The thesis begins from the premise that class and ethnicity, the major binary categories conventionally used to explain developments in white South African society, are unable to account for the history of white men who volunteered to serve in the Second World War. It argues that the history of these volunteers is best understood in the context of racist culture, which can be defined as an evolving consensus amongst whites in South Africa on the political, social and cultural primacy of whiteness. It argues that, when the call to arms came in 1939, it was answered mainly by white men from those little traditions incorporated politically into the segregationist colonial order, largely through the explicit emphases of white privilege and the cultural hegemony of whiteness. Their decision to enlist was underscored by an awareness that volunteering entailed a set of rights and duties, which centred on their expectations of post-war "social justice." Chapter three examines some of the highly idealised and implicitly racialised ways in which, during wartime, white troops expanded their understanding of social justice. -
Copyright © and Moral Rights for This Thesis Are Retained by the Author And/Or Other Copyright Owners
McDonald, Jared. (2015) Subjects of the Crown: Khoesan identity and assimilation in the Cape Colony, c. 1795- 1858. PhD thesis. SOAS University of London. http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22831/ Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. When referring to this thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination. Subjects of the Crown: Khoesan Identity and Assimilation in the Cape Colony, c.1795-1858 Jared McDonald Department of History School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) University of London A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in History 2015 Declaration for PhD Thesis I declare that all the material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the thesis which I present for examination. -
SA Army Unit Histories
Appendix 9C SA Army unit histories 1 SA Infantry Division 1 The division was formed on August 13, 1940 at the South African Military College at Roberts’ Heights (now Thaba Tshwane), Pretoria. The formation demobilised in South Africa in January 1943 as part of a plan to form two armoured divisions. The divisional commanders were: • From August 13, 1940: Brigadier, then Major General “Uncle” George Brink. • From March 10, 1942: Major General Dan H Pienaar. Divisional Troops From To Remarks Artillery Antitank 1st Anti-Tank Brigade, SAA 25-Jan-41 12-Jun-41 renamed 1st Anti-Tank Regiment, SAA 01-Jun-41 01-Jan-43 Field Artillery 3rd Field Brigade, THA, SAA 29-Dec-40 11-Aug-41 renamed 4th Field Brigade, SAA 13-Aug-40 30-Jul-41 renamed 7th Field Brigade, SAA 13-Aug-40 11-Aug-41 renamed 1st Field Regiment, CFA,SAA 20-Apr-42 01-Jan-43 3rd Field Regiment, THA, SAA 11-Aug-41 25-Jun-42 4th Field Regiment, SAA 31-Jul-41 01-Jan-43 7th Field Regiment, SAA 11-Aug-41 01-Jan-43 Light Antiaircraft 1st Light Antiaircraft Regiment, SAA 01-Sep-41 01-Jan-43 Engineers Field Companies 12th Field Company, SA Engineers 13-Aug-40 02-Apr-41 1st Field Company, SA Engineers 13-Aug-40 01-Jan-43 2nd Field Company, SA Engineers 01-May-42 01-Jan-43 3rd Field Company, SA Engineers 03-May-41 01-Jan-43 5th Field Company, SA Engineers 05-Dec-40 01-Jan-43 Field Park Companies 19th Field Park Company, SA Eng 01-Apr-42 01-Jan-43 21st Corps Field Park Company, SA Eng 01-Dec-40 30-Apr-42 Infantry 2nd Regiment Botha 05-Feb-42 01-Jan-43 Machine Gun B Coy, Die Middellandse Regiment 27-Jun-42 01-Jan-43 1 Steve Rothwell, http://homepages.force9.net/rothwell/1sa.htm, August 24, 2003, accessed June 6, 2006. -
Strategic Military Colonisation: the Cape Eastern Frontier 1806 – 1872
46 STRATEGIC MILITARY COLONISATION: THE CAPE EASTERN FRONTIER 1806–1872 Linda Robson* and Mark Oranje† Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Pretoria Abstract The Cape Eastern Frontier of South Africa offers a fascinating insight into British military strategy as well as colonial development. The Eastern Frontier was for over 100 years a very turbulent frontier. It was the area where the four main population groups (the Dutch, the British, the Xhosa and the Khoikhoi) met, and in many respects, key decisions taken on this frontier were seminal in the shaping of South Africa. This article seeks to analyse this frontier in a spatial manner, to analyse how British settlement patterns on the ground were influenced by strategy and policy. The time frame of the study reflects the truly imperial colonial era, from the second British occupation of the Cape colony in 1806 until representative self- governance of the Cape colony in 1872. Introduction British colonial expansion into the Eastern Cape of Southern Africa offers a unique insight into the British method of colonisation, land acquisition and consolidation. This article seeks to analyse the British imperial approach to settlement on a turbulent frontier. The spatial development pattern is discussed in order to understand the defensive approach of the British during the period 1806 to 1872 better. Scientia Militaria, South African South Africa began as a refuelling Journal of Military Studies, station for the Dutch East India Company on Vol 40, Nr 2, 2012, pp. 46-71. the lucrative Indian trade route. However, doi: 10.5787/40-2-996 military campaigns in Europe played * Linda Robson is a PhD student in the Department of Town and Regional Planning at the University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa. -
The Role of Non-Whites in the South African Defence Force by Cmdt C.J
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 16, Nr 2, 1986. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za The Role of Non-Whites in the South African Defence Force by Cmdt C.J. N6thling* assisted by Mrs L. 5teyn* The early period for Blacks, Coloureds and Indians were non- existent. It was, however, inevitable that they As long ago as 1700, when the Cape of Good would be resuscitated when war came in 1939. Hope was still a small settlement ruled by the Dutch East India Company, Coloureds were As war establishment tables from this period subject to the same military duties as Euro- indicate, Non-Whites served as separate units in peans. non-combatant roles such as drivers, stretcher- bearers and batmen. However, in some cases It was, however, a foreign war that caused the the official non-combatant edifice could not be establishment of the first Pandour regiment in maintained especially as South Africa's shortage 1781. They comprised a force under white offi- of manpower became more acute. This under- cers that fought against the British prior to the lined the need for better utilization of Non-Whites occupation of the Cape in 1795. Between the in posts listed on the establishment tables of years 1795-1803 the British employed white units and a number of Non-Whites were Coloured soldiers; they became known as the subsequently attached to combat units and they Cape Corps after the second British occupation rendered active service, inter alia in an anti-air- in 1806. During the first period of British rule craft role. -
The Role and Application of the Union Defence Force in the Suppression of Internal Unrest, 1912 - 1945
THE ROLE AND APPLICATION OF THE UNION DEFENCE FORCE IN THE SUPPRESSION OF INTERNAL UNREST, 1912 - 1945 Andries Marius Fokkens Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Military Science (Military History) at the Military Academy, Saldanha, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. Supervisor: Lieutenant Colonel (Prof.) G.E. Visser Co-supervisor: Dr. W.P. Visser Date of Submission: September 2006 ii Declaration I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously submitted it, in its entirety or in part, to any university for a degree. Signature:…………………….. Date:………………………….. iii ABSTRACT The use of military force to suppress internal unrest has been an integral part of South African history. The European colonisation of South Africa from 1652 was facilitated by the use of force. Boer commandos and British military regiments and volunteer units enforced the peace in outlying areas and fought against the indigenous population as did other colonial powers such as France in North Africa and Germany in German South West Africa, to name but a few. The period 1912 to 1945 is no exception, but with the difference that military force was used to suppress uprisings of white citizens as well. White industrial workers experienced this military suppression in 1907, 1913, 1914 and 1922 when they went on strike. Job insecurity and wages were the main causes of the strikes and militant actions from the strikers forced the government to use military force when the police failed to maintain law and order. -
The Battle of Sandfontein: the Role and Legacy of Major- General Sir Henry Timson Lukin
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 34, Nr 2, 2006. doi: 10.5787/34-2-24 65 THE BATTLE OF SANDFONTEIN: THE ROLE AND LEGACY OF MAJOR- 1 GENERAL SIR HENRY TIMSON LUKIN Rodney C. Warwick2 Diocesan College, Cape Town Introduction Commemorative statues, plaques and monuments from decades past remain widespread across both the urban and rural South Africa landscape. Included amongst these is the stone likeness of General Tim Lukin in Cape Town: just one of such structures intended to encapsulate the emotions and memories of those who commissioned it. The South African involvement at Delville Wood ninety years ago would still resonate with some of the country’s population; those who at some stage have delved into reading up on the history of our participation in the First World War. However mention of the Battle of Sandfontein during the Union invasion of German South West Africa in 1914 to the same reasonably historically literate grouping, would from the larger proportion of them, most probably elicit an admittance of ignorance. Only the well-read enthusiast of South African military history would be aware of Lukin’s roles at both Delville Wood and Sandfontein, let alone how the latter engagement constituted one of the bleakest moments in the General’s career. This article revives debate about this long forgotten First World War military clash in Africa: the first full set battle-piece in which the two year old Union Defence Force was involved, and which resulted in a defeat for the South African forces. It also investigates the role of General Lukin therein, and how culpability for 1 This paper was presented at the 4th War and Society in Africa Conference: Strategy, Generalship and Command in Southern Africa: Past, Present, Future, held at the South African Military Academy, Saldanha, 4-6 September 2003. -
Australians at the First Battle of El Alamein
Road to Ruin: The 9th Australian Division and the First Battle of El Alamein, July 1942. Nicole Townsend Abstract Throughout July 1942, the Allies made numerous attempts to break through the Axis lines at El Alamein, however, these operations were largely unsuccessful and failed to achieve a decisive victory. On 27 July, a final assault against enemy lines was launched with the aim of capturing the key feature of Miteiriya Ridge, commonly referred to as Ruin Ridge. Although the operation met with initial success, the operation ended in complete disaster as the British and Australian infantry involved were surrounded by German tanks and forced to surrender. During this single operation, over 1000 men were lost. The 2/28th Australian Infantry Battalion was virtually wiped out whilst the British 69th Brigade suffered casualties of more than 600 men. Using archival sources held by the Australian War Memorial, this paper analyses the disaster at Ruin Ridge to determine what went wrong. It will be argued that the failure of the operation was due largely to poor operational planning and the failure of armoured support to materialise as planned. Introduction A seemingly innocuous railway siding located approximately 100 kilometres west of the key port city of Alexandria on Egypt’s Mediterranean coast, El Alamein was the site of three key battles between July and November 1942. The 9th Australian Division played a significant role in each of the three battles, suffering particularly heavy casualties in both the first and third battles. Though the third and final battle (which the Allies would call the second battle of El Alamein) would live on in memory as the most significant, with the battle consistently heralded as a major turning point in the Mediterranean theatre, the July operations under Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck were equally significant.