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Cryptographic Algorithms Lifecycle Report 2016 Procurer Cryptographic Algorithms Lifecycle REPORT 2016 Cryptographic algorithms lifecycle report 2016 Research report Version 3.0 June 22, 2016 81 pages Doc. A-101-3 Project leaders: Kaur Kullman (Estonian Information System Authority) Mari Seeba (Cybernetica) Contributing authors: Ahto Buldas, PhD (Cybernetica) Kristo Heero, PhD (Cybernetica) Peeter Laud, PhD (Cybernetica) Riivo Talviste, PhD (Cybernetica) Jan Willemson, PhD (Cybernetica) Estonian Information System Authority, Pärnu maantee 139a, 15169 Tallinn, Estonia. Email: [email protected], Web: https://www.ria.ee, Phone: +372 663 0200. Cybernetica AS, Mäealuse 2/1, 12618 Tallinn, Estonia. E-mail: [email protected], Web: https://www.cyber.ee, Phone: +372 639 7991. © Estonian Information System Authority, 2016 Cryptographic algorithms lifecycle report 2016 3.0 June 22, 2016 2 / 81 Foreword Estonia has a reputation for being a capable and mature IT country. This is enabled by the very high standard of natural sciences education Estonians had during the Soviet era and, on the other hand, by our geographical and cultural position. Afterall, Estonia is a country on the frontiers of the Western and the Eastern civilisations. This enables us to understand the differences and similarities, threats and opportunities of both cultural hemispheres for our unique set of intercultural wisdom in understanding Eurasia, and good education level enables us to innovate. Due to Estonia’s tiny population (1,3 M1) and moderate GDP (ø22,5 B2), we are not able to offer neither fundamental inventions nor create principally new technologies for the inter- national community. However, Estonia has been extremely successful in creating techno- logical solutions that enable modern e-society, e-governance and digital lifestyle. Among those are • nationwide mandatory public key infrastructure (PKI) that enables citizens, institutions and companies to digitally sign documents, • X-Road connectivity system that serves as a primary trust anchor for the messaging system our public and private shareholders’ IT systems use for communication, and, last but not least, • a unique and cryptographically strong Internet voting system that we have used 8 times already for local and national elections, with up to one third of ballots cast electronically over the Internet. However, as an advanced digital society with a dependency model comparable to the tra- ditional Western approach, Estonia with its IT-dependent systems is inherently vulnerable to various threats. These include malicious attacks, administrative mistakes and political turmoil, but also general human stupidity. As many of our government and private sector services have been optimised for the e- society, most of such institutions (e.g. banks and postal service providers) no longer have enough offices to serve citizens in the physical world alone. These institutions usually only have a few offices in larger towns. Because of our tiny economy, it is not economically feasible to serve clients in the traditional way, face to face – it would be too expensive for the clients, i.e. the Estonian taxpayers. In the contemporary world, it means that Estonia has no plan B, would the risks on our 1https://www.stat.ee/277564 2https://www.stat.ee/277536 Cryptographic algorithms lifecycle report 2016 3.0 June 22, 2016 3 / 81 e-society materialise. If we fail to keep our critically important IT infrastructure running, our e-lifestyle will collapse, bringing down the whole Estonian society as well. The Dutch DigiNotar case in 2011 demonstrated the hard choices a country faces if a PKI supporting its government’s IT systems is compromised. To sustain the society, the Dutch government had to rely on potentially compromised systems for the contingency of its operations. The DigiNotar case served as a wake up call for the Estonian politicians who finally understood the need for our country to plan ahead against similar threats. Estonia needs to be able to continue its operations in case the trust in Estonia’s PKI fails, some cryptographic primitive is suddenly broken or the trust in the cryptographic primitives used for our digital signatures is undermined, rendering the systems supporting our e-society unreliable and/or untrustworthy. Therefore, it was decided in 2011 to assemble a scientific task force to analyse the prob- lems and risks that reliance on cryptography is posing on the sustainable functioning of our society. One has to take into account that while Estonia has a well-established crypto- graphic school of thought, the country most likely is not (yet) able to work out and standard- ise its own cryptographic primitives. Thus, we rely on some known cryptographic algorithms standardised by some other countries. Establishment of this scientific task force was delegated to Estonian Information System Authority3 (Riigi Infosüsteemi Amet or RIA in Estonian). Among other duties, RIA coor- dinates the development and administration of the state’s information systems, organises activities related to information security and handles the security incidents that have oc- curred in Estonian computer networks. RIA also advises the public services and critical infrastructure providers on how to manage their information systems. For that, RIA partic- ipates in development of the corresponding requirements, including legal framework and the baseline protection system ISKE (based on BSI’s IT-Grundschutz). Therefore, maintaining the state of cryptography that our country depends on was a natural addition to the portfolio of responsibilities of RIA. After the first report of this task force, it was clear that we had to keep on updating the reports, as this field keeps on developing. The report you, dear reader, are reading is the fourth in this series. It is an update, not a rewrite of previous reports. Nonetheless, we in RIA understand that the problems we have discovered on our path are generic and valuable for the international audience, espe- cially for the countries that are following Estonia’s example on the quest for a secure and sustainable digital society. Anto Veldre Estonian Information System Authority 3https://www.ria.ee/en/about-estonian-information-system-authority.html Cryptographic algorithms lifecycle report 2016 3.0 June 22, 2016 4 / 81 Contents 1 Introduction . 7 2 TLS attacks in 2015 . 9 2.1 Nature of attacks . 9 2.2 Attacks against weaknesses in protocol logic . 11 2.3 Attacks against insecure cryptographic constructions . 12 2.4 Attacks against short keys . 13 2.5 Attacks against weak cryptographic primitives . 15 2.6 Attacks against misunderstandings in abstractions . 16 2.7 Attacks against implementation errors . 16 Attacks against buffer overflows . 17 Timing attacks . 17 Attacks against missing checks . 18 3 RSA public key cryptosystem . 19 3.1 Breaking RSA with a classical computer . 19 3.2 Breaking RSA with dedicated hardware . 20 3.3 Breaking RSA with a quantum computer . 20 3.4 Breaking RSA with a D-Wave computer . 21 3.5 Transition to 3072-bit RSA . 22 4 Elliptic curve cryptography . 23 4.1 NSA Suite B controversy . 23 5 Known attacks against hash functions . 24 5.1 Types of attacks and the notions of hash function security . 24 5.2 Collision attacks against Merkle-Damgård hash functions . 25 5.3 Practical chosen-prefix collision attack against certificates . 26 5.4 The cost of chosen-prefix collision attacks against SHA-1 . 27 5.5 Attacks against existing certificates . 27 6 The SHA-3 hash function . 29 6.1 Sponge construction . 29 6.2 Padding . 30 6.3 State transformation function . 30 6.4 Instances of SHA-3 . 31 7 Secure computation outsourcing . 33 7.1 Garbled circuits . 34 7.2 Fully homomorphic encryption . 34 7.3 Secure computation based on secret sharing . 35 7.4 Security considerations . 35 7.5 Applications and performance . 36 7.6 Practical deployments . 37 Cryptographic algorithms lifecycle report 2016 3.0 June 22, 2016 5 / 81 8 Post-quantum cryptography . 39 8.1 Quantum computers . 39 8.2 What is post-quantum cryptography? . 40 8.3 Lattice-based cryptography . 40 8.4 Multi-variate cryptography . 41 8.5 Hash-based cryptography . 42 8.6 Code-based cryptography . 43 8.7 Standards and implementations . 44 9 Cryptographic protocols over radio connection . 45 9.1 MIFARE cards . 45 9.2 MIFARE EV1 and Ultralight C authentication protocol . 46 9.3 HID iClass . 47 9.4 HID INDALA . 47 9.5 Estonian public transportation cards . 48 9.6 Deployment issues . 49 9.7 Transparency issues . 49 10 Mobile-ID protocol analysis . 52 10.1 Authentication with Mobile-ID . 53 10.2 Digitally signing documents with Mobile-ID . 54 10.3 Other security considerations . 54 11 Conclusions and recommendations . 57 Bibliography . 59 A Shor’s algorithm . 73 A.1 Basic Principles of Quantum Mechanics . 73 A.2 Quantum Bit and Quantum Register . 74 A.3 Quantum Gates . 74 Single Qubit Gates . 74 Two Qubit Gates . 75 Quantum Circuits . 75 A.4 Quantum Fourier Transform . 75 A.5 Shor’s Period-Finding Algorithm . 77 B Support for elliptic curves in various libraries . 79 Cryptographic algorithms lifecycle report 2016 3.0 June 22, 2016 6 / 81 1 Introduction This study is a natural continuation of three previous studies conducted in 2011, 2013 and 2015 [9, 12, 18]. Whereas the two first iterations aimed at giving a self-contained overview of the status all major cryptographic primitives and protocols in practical use, the report published in 2015 only contained updates on some specific topics. The current version follows this approach and only covers certain topics that are of interest from the viewpoint of information systems used in Estonia in 2016. However, both the procurer (Estonian Information System Authority) and the authors (Cy- bernetica’s research team) feel that many of the topics are actually quite universal and hence subject of a wider international interest. This is the reason why the 2016 report is the first one in its sequence to be written in English.
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