May 28th, 2009

Jeffrey Owen Herzog and the aftermath of overexpansion [email protected] O The deleveraging process for commercial banks is likely to last years and overshoot compared to fundamentals Banking System Asset and Growth O A strong procyclical correlation exists between asset growth and Nominal Values, 1934-2008 leverage growth over the past 75 years 25% O At the level of the firm, boom times generate decreasing 20% 1942 collateralization rates and increasing average loan sizes 15% O Given two-year loan losses of $1.1tr and leverage declines of -5% 10% 2008 to -7.5%, we expect deleveraging to curtail commercial bank 5% credit by $646bn and $687bn per year for 2009-2010 0% -5% Trends in deleveraging and commercial banking over time Leverage Growth -10% 2004 -15% 1946 Deleveraging is the process whereby commercial banks reduce their ratio of -20% assets to equity capital, thus bringing down their aggregate exposure to the 0% 5% -5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% economy. Many commentators point to this process as an eventual destination -10% Asset Growth for the US commercial banking system, but few have described where or how Source: FDIC we arrive at a more deleveraged commercial banking system. Commercial Bank Assets and Equity Adjusted for by CPI, $tr Over the past seventy years, the commercial banking sector’s aggregate 0.6 6 has demonstrated a strong positive correlation between leverage and asset growth. For the banking industry, 2004 was an 0.5 5 S&L Crisis, 1989-1991 exceptionally unusual year, with equity increasing yoy by 22%. A considerable 0.4 4 part of this increase related to a merger boom during the year, with goodwill in the banking system increasing by $117bn, a gain of 74% yoy. 0.3 3

Additionally, banking crises sometimes lead to industry-wide declines in assets 0.2 2 alongside significant deleveraging. When adjusted for inflation, the savings 0.1 1 and loan crisis of 1989-1991 is viewed as a period of significant decline in Assets (rhs) Equity (lhs) assets. During this era roughly 1,000 banking institutions closed or were - - assisted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Leverage increased in each year from 1990 to 1993, with total assets declining by 3.6% 1935 1939 1943 1947 1951 1955 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 Source: BBVA ERD and FDIC in inflation-adjusted dollars. A similar period of deleveraging occurred from 1980 to 1984 and 1975-1976, with assets declining 4% in 1975. Leverage and Asset Growth Adjusted by CPI, 1948-2008 20% Recent research into banking conditions during the Great Depression also demonstrates asset declines and deleveraging.1 Banks during this era faced a 15% lack of deposit insurance which promoted bank runs and significant stigma 10%

attached to external capital raising. As a result, loan liquidation was costly and 5% lengthy. Data on New York City member banks revealed a roughly 30% drop in assets between 1929 and 1933. Aggregate loans dropped 0% by roughly half during the same period. -5% -10% 1 Calomiris, Charles, Wilson, Berry, (2004) “Bank Capital and Portfolio Management: The 1930’s ‘Capital Crunch’ and the Scramble to Shed Risk,” Journal of Business, 77:3:421-455. -15% 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 Asset Growth Leverage Growth Source: BBVA ERD, NBER and FDIC

Banking Observatory

Asset and Leverage Growth Deleveraging at the firm level 20 Largest Banks By Assets 15% The procyclical historical process described above between leverage and asset growth can be viewed at the level of the firm in two major ways. First, in 10% parallel with the aggregate FDIC data, the balance sheets of major banks 5% exhibit strong positive correlation between leverage and asset growth. Second,

the lending practices of banks are procyclical, with banks assuming higher 0% leverage when they experience asset growth. As assets become more

valuable, collateral becomes easier to obtain, haircuts on borrowing Growth Leverage -5% decline, and financial agents extend more loans. However, when a banking crisis occurs, all of these effects go in reverse: collateral is worth less, haircuts -10% increase, and fewer loans are originated. The financial system is in effect Source: BBVA ERD and SNL Financial working in a procyclical manner: the economic downturn is exacerbated by a -15% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40%

decline in lending as a result of deleveraging. -20% -10% Asset Growth Collateralization and Asset Bubbles Using quarterly data on the 20 largest US commercial banks from 1990 to 46 240 2009, we generate roughly 1500 observations between leverage and asset 44 230 growth. The relationship between these two variables is clearly positive and 220 42 procyclical, but with significant noise from mergers and other agglomerations 210 between firms. 40 200 38 190 Another means of conceiving the is through the Federal 180 Reserve’s E2 Release on the Survey of Terms of Lending. This data is compiled 36 170 by the Federal Reserve to understand the disposition of loans at US 34 160 commercial banks. The extent to which loans are collateralized, or backed by 32 real assets, represents an indication of asset quality. As assets increase in 150 value – the Case-Shiller Housing Price Index represents one proxy for asset 30 140 04 05 06 07 08 09 bubbles – banks extend loans increasingly-less collateralized by assets. In Case-Shiller Index (rhs) % Collateralized 4Q MA (lhs) , banks require high levels of collateralization due to risk aversion Source: Federal Reserve and Bloomberg and this in turn causes collateralization to vary in a procyclical manner over Loan Size and Fed Funds Rate

time. Similarly, as a boom progresses, banks extend larger size loans. As a 2.9 6 result, the average loan size increases in step with the Federal Reserve Funds 2.85 Rate. Notably, the rapid cutting of the key rate by the Federal Reserve has 5 moved faster than the four-quarter moving average can respond, suggesting a 2.8 lagged effect on average loan size from cuts. 2.75 4 2.7 3 The deleveraging process is most visible in the behavior of asset-backed 2.65 securities issuers and primary dealers and brokers. These firms are most 2.6 2 sensitive to changes in collateral value, haircuts and liquidity in the 2.55 securitization markets. As a result, their sensitivity to leverage is very strong 1 and highly procyclical. Commercial banks, on the other hand, remain partially 2.5 supported by their deposit base. 2.45 0 04 05 06 07 08 09 Equity write-downs, deleveraging and the balance sheet Fed Funds (rhs) 4Q MA Log of Loan Size (lhs) Source: Federal Reserve and BBVA ERD The procyclical relationship between leverage and asset growth necessitates Leverage Cycles two key variables for our understanding of balance sheet effects: (1) the size yoy % change of capital raised to match write-downs to equity and (2) the extent banks react Broker-Dealers ABS Issuers Commercial Banks to either new risks or a smaller overall credit market. These ideas are 50% 25% incorporated into a model by Greenlaw (2008), which is presented below:2 40% ABS Issuers, Broker-Dealers 30% 20% 20% 15% 10% 0% 10% -10%

-20% 5% Commercial Banks -30% 2 Greenlaw, David, Hatzius, Jan, Kashyap, Anil, Shin, Hyun Song, “Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Market Meltdown,” US Forum Conference Draft, 29 February 2008. -40% 0% 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 U.S. Economic Research Department Source: FED Flow of Funds Page 2 of 3

Banking Observatory

2-Yr Balance Loan Capital Sheet As % of Credit Table 1 Loss Shortfall Leverage Effect Assets Reduction ($tr) % %chng ($bn/year) % ($bn/year) where A*/A is the ratio of the new level of assets to the old level, E*/E is the Mild 0.95 15.8% -5.0% 711 5.8% 378 ratio of the new level of equity to the old level, µ the ratio of new leverage to 0.95 15.8% -7.5% 800 6.5% 425 old leverage, L is the two-year loan loss rate and k is capital raised for equity. Adverse 1.1 27.3% -5.0% 1216 9.9% 646 This allows us to examine both changes in asset levels as a result of write- 1.1 27.3% -7.5% 1292 10.5% 687 downs to equity and also a decision to deleverage. Liquidation 1.3 38.5% -5.0% 1890 15.4% 1004

1.3 38.5% -7.5% 1948 15.8% 1035 According to the FDIC’s 2008Q4 statistics, the total assets of the commercial banking system are $12.312tr with $1.157tr in equity. Using these headline US Commercial Bank Lending numbers and the above equation adjusted for different assumptions about yoy % growth 25% capital raising, declines in leverage and two-year loss rates, we can determine C&I Real Estate Individual the balance sheet effect of loan losses and deleveraging. Our estimate for 20% capital shortfalls includes $700bn in TARP assistance, $75bn in capital raised as a result of stress-testing, and $25bn announced assistance for small banks; 15% this is a total of $800bn raised. Two-year lost rates for the largest US banks have been estimated by the US Treasury at $950bn for the entire crisis. Since 10%

these banks represent roughly two-thirds of the banking system, it is 5% reasonable to add additional losses up to $1.1tr for the entire system. 0% The balance sheet effect represents lost capacity as the result of write-downs -5% and deleveraging. However, the entire balance sheet is not devoted to end- users of credit. Often commercial banks hold assets from other banks, -10% securitized products and the government. As an approximation of the effect 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 for end-users of credit, we use the proportion of deposits in domestic offices to Source: Bloomberg total assets to get the reduction in credit each year. US Commercial Bank Deposits yoy % growth 30% The results in Table 1 imply that under the adverse scenario, the credit 25% reduction implied by deleveraging is between $646bn and $687bn per year for 20% 2009-2010. On a historical basis, the average change in leverage for negative 15% years on an inflation-adjusted basis is -3.2%, making a leverage reduction of 10% -5% to -7.5% within historical experience. The average increase in leverage 5% for positive years on an inflation-adjusted basis is 4.8%, but excluding 1940- 0% 1945 generates an average of 3.4%. -5% -10% Just as banks take boom years as an opportunity to become overextended, -15% banks also react to recessions to become highly restrictive in balance sheet

management. This is precisely why some commentators argue that the credit Jul-08 Jan-08 Jan-09 Nov-08 Mar-08 Sep-08 Mar-09 system becomes a propagating mechanism for economic crises. As a result, May-08 some overshooting of deleveraging will occur. Total Deposits Transaction Deposits Large Time Deposits Source: Bloomberg, Federal Reserve Bottom line: switching leverage gears Consumer Revolving Credit yoy % change The leverage cycle represents a rational economic response to market conditions, making the cycle that much more difficult to defeat. Regulations to 40 encourage countercyclical action on the part of financial firms are essentially 30 asking these firms to act in a manner contrary to the history of modern 20 banking. Additionally, the temptation during good years for regulators to 10 unleash the dogs of leverage will be very enticing. The deleveraging process 0 will also reveal “excess capacity” in the banking system, typified by low profitability and high per unit operating expense relative to industry norms. -10 Just as financial entities overshoot leverage on the upside, they will overshoot -20 Finance Companies Commercial Banks deleveraging on the downside. -30 -40 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Sep-04 Sep-05 Sep-06 Sep-07 Sep-08 May-04 May-05 May-06 May-07 May-08

Source: Federal Reserve G.19 Release

U.S. Economic Research Department Page 3 of 3