The World Bank

Document of The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized

Report No. 6618

Public Disclosure Authorized PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

CYPRUS SECOND PORTS PROJECT

(LOAN 1540-CY) Public Disclosure Authorized

February 3, 1987 Public Disclosure Authorized

Operations Evaluation Department

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may n ,t otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Country Exchange Rates

Appraisal year average : US$1.00 = Cyprus Pounds 0.4078 Intervening years average: = Cyprus Pounds 0.4260 Completion year average: = Cyprus Pounds 0.6095 USE ONLY THE WRLD BANK FOR OFICIAL Washington. DC 204)3 USA

00ke of Daecwor-eeara1 Operatas EaIalson

February 3, 1987

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Performance Audit Report on Cyprus Second Ports Project (Loan 1540-CY)

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Performance Audit Report on Cyprus Second Ports Project (Loan 1540-CY)" prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department.

Attachment

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their ofitcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FoR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

CYPRUS: SECOND PORTS PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY),

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

Preface...... *...... 1 Basic Date She...... 1 Evaluation Summary...... v

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM

I. INTRODUCTION...... 1

II. THE SECOND PORTS PROJECT ...... 2

Background...... 2

Equipment Procurement ...... 4

III. CONCLUSIONS ...... 6

Appendix 1: Comments of the Borrower ...... 9

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

I. Introduction and Background ...... -...... 15 II. Project Identification and Appraisal...... 17 III. Implementation...... ********* *** 23 IV. Traffic and Operations...... 9...... *********** 33 V. Financial Performance...... ********* 36 VI. Institutional Performance...... ****** 37 VII. Project Benefits...... 9***** 40 VIII. Comparison of Results with Appraisal Benefits...... 41 IX.* ocuin...... ******** 45

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their offiei dutes.Itscontents may a otherwise be dscosedwihout Word Bank authobumn Table of Contents (cont'd) Page No.

Annexes

A. Economic Description and Transport Sector...... 47 B. Civil Works Implementation Schedule and Cost Estimates- LarnacaPort...... 50 C. Civil Works Implementation Schedule and Cost Estimates- Limassol Port ...... 52 D. Equipment Implementation...... 54 E. Traffic Data...... 60 F. Income and Expenditure...... ,,...... 96 G. Balance Sheets...... 97 H. Disbursements...... ,...... 98 I. Project Benefits and Economic Reevaluation...... 100

IIA IBRD 13170R2 i

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

CYPRUS SECOND PORTS PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

PREFACE

This is the performance audit report on the Second Ports Project for which Loan 1540-CY in the amount of US$8.5 million was approved in March 1978. The loan has been fully disbursed.

This document consists of a Project Performance Audit Memorandum (PPAM) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED), and of a Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office on the basis of a Project Completion Report prepared by the Cyprus Ports Authority (CPA). The first section in the PCR ("Highlights"), contains discussion or elaboration by the Region of certain points raised by the CPA report.

OED studied the documentation preserved in the Records Center and reviewed the project against the Staff Appraisal (SAR) and the President's Report (PR), as well as against the legal documents and the transcripts of the Executive Directors' meeting which considered the project. Discussions on project formulation, implementation and follow-up were held with Bank staff and consultants. An OED mission visited Cyprus in February/March 1986 to secure the Borrower's views on the project and the assistance extended to the mission is gratefully acknowledged. The draft version of this report was sent to the Borrower whose comments are attached as Appendix 1.

The PCR is a thorough summary of project preparation and implementation. When the OED mission visited Cyprus in March 1986, no further Bank assistance to the ports sector was foreseen. In July 1986, the Region noted that it proposes to continue addressing port issues in Cyprus through a Transport Sector Project, currently under discussion with Government, which could be presented to the Board in FY88. The findings of this audit suggest that the proposed project would afford one more opportunity for the Jank to remind the Government of long-overdue steps for the improvement of the port sub-sector. PROJECT PERPOMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET

CYPRUS: SECOND PORTS PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Key Proiect Data

Borrower/ Executing Agency Cyprus Port Authority Fiscal Year of the Borrower January 1 - December 31

Appraisal Actual/ Estimate Reestimated

Total Project Cost (US$m equivalent) 29.5 36.0 11 Loan Amount (US$m equivalent) 8.5 8.5 Government Participation (US$m equivalent) 21.0 27.5 /2

Project Completion Date March 1981 April 1985 Economic Rate of Return 31% 19%-312 /3

/1 Tentative figure. A number of disputes are under arbitration. For example, the "Extension of quay and other civil works at Limassol" was origiaally estimated to cost US$7.1 million. The latest estimate, reflected in the US$36.0 million "actual" cost, is US$10.3 million. Final settlement is expected by end 1986.

/2 Liable to increase further, depending on the final outcome of arbitrations underway.

/2 Figures given in the PCR (paras 8.01-8.05) calculated for a variety of assuaptions and on the basis of possibly understated costs. Nevertheless, even under the most unfavorable hypotheses, the project remains economically sound. iii

Other ProJect Data

First Document in the File May 1977 Project Appraisal August/September 1977 Negotiations February 1978 Board Approval March 1978 L.an Agreement Signed April 1978 Lean Effective August 1978 F:,nal Disbursement September 1985 Loan Closed December 1984

PCR received by OED June 10, 1986

Cumulative Disbursements

(US$ million)

FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86

Estimated 1.40 4.80 7.70 8.50 Actual 0.09 1.09 2.29 4.60 7.08 7.76 8.39 8.50

Z of Estimated 6.4 22.7 29.7 54.1 iv

Mission Data

Mission Number Man Report Date of Staff Days Date

Identification December 1976 1 7) Preparation June 1977 1 7 ) April 1977 Appraisal Aug/Sep. 1977 3 60 March 1978 Post-appraisal December 1977 2 20 ......

Subtotal 94

Superv. I September 1979 1 8 April 1979 Superv. II October 1979 1 5 October 1979 Superv. III May 1980 3 29 June 1980 Superv. IV February 1981 1 8 March 1981 Superv. V October 1981 2 :6 November 1981 Superv. VI July 1982 2 26 July 1982 Superv. VII April 1983 2 2 April 1983 Superv. VIII October 1983 1 2 October 1983 Superv. IX June 1984 2 4 July 1984 Superv. X October 1984 2 6 October 1984 Superv. XI April 1985 3 6 April 1985 Superv. XII October 1985 3 6 October 1985

Subtotal 118

Total Bank Staff Time (Staff-Weeks)

Preappraisal Appraisal Negotiation Supervision Other Total

FY77 5.6 , . . . 5.6 FY78 3.9 70.1 11.2 .8 3.9 90.0 FY79 . . . 9.2 . 9.2 FY80 . . . 17.1 .1 17.2 FY81 . . . 9.0 . 9.0 FY82 . . . 18.0 .1 18.1 FY83 . . . 10.5 . 10.5 FY84 . . . 1.0 . 1.0 FY85 . . 1.4 . 1.4 FY86 . . . 9.0 . 9.0

TOTAL 9.5 70.1 11.2 76.1 4.1 171.0 V

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

CYPRUS: SECOND PORTS PROJFCT (LOAN 1540-CY)

EVALUATION SUMMARY

Introduction /4

The project was appraised in September 1977 and by end 1978, Government had reactivated the economy which had been severely disturbed by the events of 1974. Since 1978, growth with price stability and external equilibrium have been the main targets of macroeconomic policy. In 1986, growth objectives have been successfully met (with GDP growing at an average annual rate of over 5% p.a. between 1978-1984) but external equilibrium has not been achieved because of large budget deficits (PPAM, para 2).

Project Objectives

The project was intended to help CPA become a commercially competitive organization and the Bank provided financial and technical assistance resources to expand and modernize port operations in Cyprus (PPAM, para 4). Infrastructure was improved (PCR, paras 3.03-3.21) but institutional progress has been limited (PPAM, paras 5, 6-9).

Prolect Implementation

The project was completed in 1985, four years later than scheduled. Delays were due to inadequacy of preparation (PCR, para 2.12), design

/A The OED Mission which visited Cyprus in February/March 1986 collected information for the audit of three Bank-assisted projects: the First and Second Highway Projects (Loans 904 and 1344-CY of 1973 and 1976 respectively) and the Second Ports Project (Loan 1540-CY of 1978). Historical background on Cyprus, a discussion of developments between the 1960s and the 1980s, and a summary of Bank Group operations in Cyprus from 1963 to 1986, are given in Project Performance Audit Memorandum on the First and Second Highway Projects (OED Report under preparation). vi modifications (PCR, para 2.10), and bureaucratic procedures (PCR, pare 6.08). The final cost of the project is undetermined (PCR, paras 3.11-3.13) because of numerous disputes currently under arbitration.

On the whole, physical components were satisfactorily completed. Performance of the civil works contractor and of the equipment supplier was satisfactory (PCR, pare 3.02). Performance of consultants was good and working relations between CPA and Bank staff exemplary.

Operational improvements were substantial in areas where CPA management enjoyed freedom of action but Government declined to approve the purchase of the container handling equipment for which major works had been built (PPAM, paras 10-12); also, it declined to approve the establishment of a company which would undertake the whole cycle of container operations (PCR, pare 3.40). Equally, it declined to approve the Consultant's recommendations (with which CPA and Bank staff concurred) for the improvement of CPA management, operational and technical procedures (PCR, paras 6.01ff).

Prolect Results

Traffic growth and financial results matched or exceeded appraisal forecasts (PCR, pares 4.01-4.07 and 5.01). The reestimated rate of economic return (ranging between 192 and 30%, depending on assumptions used) indicates that the project was fully justified.

The project strengthened CPA as an institution. CPA management is convinced that ports should be run as competitive commercial enterprises and continues to advise Government to this effect. Despite repeated suggestions by the Bank, Government has not resolved crucial issues indispensable for efficient port operations, such as legislation (PCR, pare 6.02), CPA Board-Management relations (PCR, pare 6.03), administration and staffing (PCR, pares 6.04-6.06), and procurement of container stacking equipment at Limassol (PCR, para 6.08).

Largely because of the caliber and determination of CPS staff, the sustainability of project benefits seems to be assured. The PCR, prepared almost in its entirety by CPA, demonstrates the thoroughness with which the Authority confronts its tasks ana it is safe to assume that CPA, if permitted to do so, will continue to look after the growth and prosperity of the ports sector with the same dedication and success it has shown in the past.

Conclusions

The project was in,anded to relieve port congestion in the short run, and this has been accomplished. It was, in addition, intended to assist CPA in becoming an efficient, self-supporting agency which, by improving port vil operations, would contribute to the further economic development of the country. Public welfare we3 the heart of the second objective and, as the record indicates, Bank staff and CPA staff pursued it by working together in remarkable harmony.

More efficient port operations are an eminently worthwhile objective that the Government should wholeheartedly support. The audit acknowledges that due to the differing interests of the various individuals and groups involved, this is a highly sensitive task. The way it was handled in this case, however, entailed unduly long delays. Assuming that further Bank lending to Cyprus in the transport sector is found to be justified, the proposed Transport Sector Project, under preparation in August 1986, will afford one more opportunity for the Bank to remind Government of measures that need to be taken for the improvement of the port sub-sector (PPAM, paras 19-21). 1

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM

C PRUS: SECOND PORTS PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

I INTRODUCTION

1. The approval in 1969 of '.he First Ports Project (Loan 628-CY for US$11.5 million), marked the beginning of the Bank's assistance to the port sector. The loan helped finance construction of a new deep-water port at Limassol, to replace inefficient lighterage facilities. The project included the provision of port handling equipment for Limassol and Famagusta, consultants' services for construction supervision, and studies to advise a n%w Ports Authority on operating and financial matters. /I

2. The Second Ports Project was appraised in September 1977, about three years after the events which produced economic and political upheavals in Cyprus (PCR, paras 1.02-1.04). By end 1978, Government had reactivated the economy. Since then the target has been growth with price stability and external equilibrium. In 1986, growth objectives have been successfully met (with GDP growing at an average annual rate of over 5% p.a. between 1978-1984) but external equilibrium has not been achieved because of large budget deficits. External debt rose from under US$150 million in 1976 to about US$1,000 million in 1985, the budget deficit remained the same in 1985 as it was in 1984, and necessitated additional borrowing, both domestically and abroad. As a result, another large current account deficit is indicated for 1985. The Bank has encouraged Cyprus not only to diversify its sources of official aid, but also to use Bank projects as catalysts to attract other external support, including cofinancing with commercial banks.

3. The events of 1974 (which isolated the port of Famagusta), contributed to the transformation of Limassol from a secondary to the principal port of the island. The same events hindered the establishment and proper operation of the Cyprus Ports Authority (CPA). Although the Authority was formally established in June 1973, it started operating under its own rules

/5 OED has published a Project Performance Audit Report on the First Ports Project (OED Report No. 1965, dated March 13, 1978), which found that implementation took place mostly as planned. There were minor cost overruns (about 13%); very considerable traffic increases (almost four times the volume forecast for 1976); and a reestimated economic return of 40% (as against 15% estimated at appraisal). On the other hand, the creation of the Ports Authority was considerably behind schedule. 2 and regulations on August 1, 1976. By that time, the port of Famagusta, as well as the port of Kyrenia and the specialized facilities at Karavostassil were outside the area controlled by the Government. Alternative port facilities had to be developed and CPA prepared a ports investment program for the 1978-1982 period. It was on the basis of this program that the Second Ports Project was appraised and the resulting Loan Agreement signed on April 12, 1978.

II. THE SECOND PORTS PROJECT

Background

4. Ever since the approval of the First Port Project in 1969, Bank assistance aimed to help CPA become a commercially competitive organization. Freight transshipment is lucrative in the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus is well situated to provide this service. What Cyprus needed was an organization attuned to market demand and quick to respond whenever technological progress led to better methods of cargo handling. Such an organization would be keen to attract increasing volumes of international traffic and would provide a service at competitive prices because its own operations would be modern and efficiently run. Although never defined with any precision, the term used to describe the CPA was "autonomous" and the impression prevailing in the Bank was that this meant freedom for CPA to run the Cyprus ports with an minimum of Government interference, and according to the principle that legitimate income must exceed expenditure. Such were the broad considerations which led the Bank to provide, under the Second Ports Project, financial and technical assistance resources, intended to help expand and modernize port operations. Some of the project components constituted improvements of infrastructure, others were devoted to improvement of managerial and operational practices. Taken as a whole, the project was aimed at strengthening CPA capacity to provide a better service and to earn a fair return.

5. The project increased port productivity, improved CPA's financial standing and strengthened some of its operations. However, in mid-1986, CPA management lacks the authority to undertake actions which are generally considered necessary for the efficient operation of a port, such as the establishment of tariffs, the introduction of appropriate technologies, and a reasonable freedom to hire and fire -.,rsonnel. Bank supervision missions pointed out the results that could be expected if these constraints were not removed. Numerous letters with specific recommendations were sent to the Government but few of the letters were acknowledged and, as of March 1986, few of the major issues had been resolved. The audit has concluded that given the Bank's long involvement with the Cyprus ports sector, as well as the Government's hesitation to take decisive action in certain matters connected with the Second Highway Project, a high level Bank intervention would have 3 been warranted not merely to discuss, but also to resolve loug-standing problems. One of them arose at an early stage of the implementation of the Second Ports Project and had serious implications for the efficient running of the sector: precisely what was the meaning of the term "autonomy".

Autonomy

6. The Cyprus Ports Organization Law of 1973 established CPA as the body "to manage and exploit the ports in the Republic ... with all their assets and liabilities". The Authority is managed and acts through a Board of seven members and the day-to-day management of CPA and implementation of Board decisions is carried out by the General Manager. CPA is empowered by law to regulate and control port operations and provide navigational services, and to levy dues and charges for the use of the ports and their installations. CPA also operates as a commercial entity, can own, acquire, rent and lease property, and has authority to borrow from the Government or other sources. The March 1978 Staff Appraisal Report (para 2.07) states that "the legislation is adequate for the purposes of the project and for lending operations" but, as events proved, autonomy in the etymological sense ("self-regulation"), clearly did not apply. Both the degree of control and who would be empowered to exercise it were unspecified then, and remain so eight years later.

7. The Bank became aware in December 1977 that autonomy could mean different things to different bodies and that Government was concerned that CPA might become "too independent". Two years later, CPA relations with supervisory ministries wera strained and Government control was reported to be unnecessarily detailed. Evidently, CPA had not yet found its exact place in the Government system and needed to be supported. For such support to be effective, an explicit agreement was needed on the respective roles that Government, the CPA Board, and CPA Management had to play in the ports sector.

8. By June 1980, Board-Management difficulties in CPA had escalated. This was brought to the attention of Government by the Bank but, once again, no specific action was taken. Bank supervision missions felt that greater authority should be vested in CPA management, because part-time Board members with their many and varied outside interests could not assume responsibility for running the Port Authority. Still, no clear cut decisions emerged and the situation had not improved one year later. The PCR (para 6.03b) indicates that Board intrusions into the functions of port management were not inspired by theoretical considerationst "it seems that the interest of the Authority does not always coincide with the interest of some members of the Board and frequently this results in conflicts between management and some members of the Board. This situation is not in the best interest of the Authority..." The audit concurs with this view. 4

9. As of August 1986, the matter remains unresolved. The audit believes that CPA should be recognized as a commercial enterprise serving domestic and foreign clients, in competition with the ports of other countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. Sections 5, 8, and 18 of the Cyprus Ports Authority Law of 1973 ought to be reviewed with a view to allow more freedom, and responsibility to CPA Management in three broad areas: first, in setting cost- based tariffs; second, in borrowing funds in the open market without the subsequent involvement of other Government agencies into the details of how these funds would be invested; and third, in designing and implementing personnel policies that would contribute to the greater efficiency and productivity of port operations.

Equipment Procurement

10. CPA was not free to implement the conclusions of expert studies regarding procurement of container handling equipment thAt was considered indispensable for the efficient operation of the port expansion financed under the Second Ports Project. In March 1981, the CPA Board decided to proceed with the acquisition of two container gantry quay cranes together with five yard stacking gantry cranes and associated container-handling equipment. The Council of Ministers suspended its earlier approval of the procurement of rubber-tyred gantries. Government argued that the suspension was needed to enable further review. CPA strongly resisted this proposal and Bank supervision missions-supported CPA management for the following reasons:

(a) the container terminal at Limassol was originally designed and constructed for the on-dock use of transtainer gantries capable of stacking six abreast and up to five high;

(b) this configuration was decided upon after extensive study and has the support of both the Bank and the CPA;

(d) the straddle carriers were not considered suitable for effectively meeting the needs of the new container terminal at Limassol when it would be equipped with a port-trainer (main loading/unloading gantry);

(e) the investment in a container terminal was undertaken because the level of container traffic had reached the point where handling had to be concentrated in a particular area at a special facility;

(f) the continued, scattered port wide container operation in Limassol was not efficient; and 5

(g) the Bank expected the container terminal which it helped finance to be used .. a manner consistent with the purpose for which it was built.

11. The above points were made in a letter dated November 1, 1982, from the Bank to the Minister of Communications and Works. The Minister responded on December 4, 1982, agreeing in substance with all the points raised in the Bank letter but indicating that, whereas he was inclined "to support in principle CPA gaining greater control and authority over port operations in general still such take-over will need to be gradual and planned carefully to avoid a possible crisis which might be prompted by drastic action and the introduction of radical changes without adequate preparation".

12. The reason why a crisis might be prompted by what both the Bank and CPA regarded as genuine improvements was that the major problems associated with port operations and equipment procurement were not technical. Specifically: it would be difficult to get consensus among the four groups involved in port operations (the Ministry of Communications and Works; CPA -- the Cyprus Port Authority; SA -- the Shipping Agents, and LPA -- the Licenced Porters Association).

13. The SA had achieved de facto control of significant aspects of port operation by being able to control important elements of loading- unloading and much of the equipment involved, andu also by being the direct contracting agent with the stevedores, shippers (and to some extent, the ship owners), the LPA and the union stevedores. SA membership owned considerable amounts of equipment (mobile cranes, Prr dle carriers) which gave them a strong interest in port operations. They opposed the proposed new container equipment energetically, especially the introduction of on-dock transtainer gantries to handle the container boxes once they have left (or before they are loaded on) the ship. This was understandable, given their ownership of the straddle carriers, which they had bought cheap as used equipment almost 20 years before. Further, while the SA conceded the need for the portrainers (main loading/unloading gantries) and even their operation by the CPA, they utterly resisted .he acquisition of dock transtainer handling equipment.

14. The labor unions representing registered workers were not enthusiastic about technological developments and mechanization in general. Registered workers fell into two basic groups: 100 "A" card holders (who earned the equivalent of $30,000 to $36,000 per year); and 400 "B" card holders (who earned between $3,000 and $:,600 per year). Earnings were based on the amount of goods handled, either by unit or by weight. Since classification and rates were in many cases aet when goods were largely loaded and unloaded by hand, many of the charges had become excessive, now that one container may have literally thousands of items. The large difference in earnings was due to high pay cargoes being handled by the "A" cardholders, while the "B" cardholders worked on bulk or lower paying cargo. The new container equipment would have allowed more than twice as many boxes to be handled per hour, the high unit 6 labor costs would increase, and would largely negate the competitive advantage of lower charges that the new equipment should generate. The unions would not easily give up these "A" rates, especially since they had been able to sign attractive contracts with the SA in the past; the SA merely passed the cost, plus a little extra, to the shippers. However, sustained high rates could threaten future container activity in Cyprus ports, especially trans-shipment. Here was a sharp confrontation between the public interest on the one hand and the financial concerns of a small group on the other. The Bank continued to insist that the procurement of the two gantry cranes was indispensable and these were eventually installed and put to use in the summer of 1984.

15. By September 1984, port users were beginning to object to the way some services were being extended to them. Truck drivers went on strike in opposition to the LPA decision to purchase six low bed trailers for use between shipside and container stacking areas with a view to increase cargo handling rates. The truck drivers w"nted direct collection/ delivery from their trucks at the quayside rather than at shoreside stacking areas but, eventually, they had to give in. This was another illustration of the sensitivity to changing the entrenched system of port operations and the difficulties for CPA in introducing improvements to management performance.

III. CONCLUSIONS

16. The loan was fully disbursed by August 6, 1985. Physical work was carried out satisfactorily but the project was completed with a four year delay and, because of outstanding disputes, the final cost remains undetermined as of August 1986. Although the subject had been under discussion for several years, one important part of the Project was not completed as originally planned: the container stacking arrangements at Limassol Port. Also, the rubber tyred gantries (RTG), for which the container stacking area was specifically designed and without which it cannot be properly used, have not been procured. In June 1983, CPA informed the Bank of the Council of Ministers' decision that the container traffic did not justify the purchase of RTGs and that the matter would be reexamined if circumstances warranted it. The Bank responded on September 7, 1983 asking the CPA to reexamine its container stacking equipment requirements in the light of the port's ability to handle the container traffic at that time and the higher than expected annual rate of increase of container traffic in the East Mediterranean area. Although the matter was brought up by subsequent supervision missions, the Bank never received a formal response.

17. In November 1985, the Bank brought to the Borrover's attention the potential loss of transshipment traffic if the then current conditions in the Limassol Port were to persist. Transshipment traffic can be a profitable but sensitive source of revenue with ports eagerly competing with each other for 7 the same traffic. Also, shipping lines demand efficient service at a cost which would make their operations profitable. Bank missions repeatedly suggested that CPA take the initiative and actively market transshipment services at Limassol Port. The audit agrees with this suggestion but also wishes to stress that the Limassol facilities would be more competitive and attractive to shippers only when container operations are conducted with equipment for which the port was designed. At the time of the OED mission to Cyprus in March 1986, and despite Bank recommendations over a period of years, procurement of the RTGs had still not taken place.

18. It is possible that sound technical advice may be inapplicable in certain environments and under certain conditions. The audit has found no evidence that policy and operational advice offered by the Bank for the improvement of the Cyprus port sector was either unsound or inapplicable. Nevertheless, the record shows that Government has been slow in responding to policy suggestions offered by the Bank, not only with respect to the Second Ports Project but, also, with respect to the Second Highways Project, on which a PPAR has been recently prepared by OED. Lack of adequate consultation between interested parties regarding port operations and insufficient analysis by the Guarantor, the Borrower, and the Bank of potential and actual institutional prob'.ems resulted in postponing the introduction of new container technology to tie extent that today the equipment envisaged is still not installed. Furt.ier, the broader set of issues concerning the nature and degree of "autonomy" that CPA should enjoy; the extent of Government vetting of CPA investment decisions; and the precise autbority vested in the CPA Board and in CPA management remains unresolved.

19. The Region has stated that, in August 1986, discussions with the Government are underway to formulate a Transport Sector Project which, inter alia, will address outstanding issues in the ports sub-sector.

20. The audit is in no position to judge whether the conditions for sector lending are currently met in Cyprus. Assuming that they are but, also, considering the four-year delay with which the Second Ports Project was completed, the fact that the final project cost is still undetermined, and the difficulties experienced by Government in resolving long-standing issues, the audit believes that, in the ports sector, the proposed project would be helpful only if the Government is willing to act in ways which would increase the autonomy currently enjoyed by CPA. Specifically, the audit believes that the 8 proposed project ought to contain suitable conditionality to ensure the implementation of the following three measures: (a) The purchase of container handling equipment proposed by CPA management under the Second Ports Project; (b) The establishment of a company which would undertake the whole cycle of container operations (PCR, para 3.40); (c) The Implementation of measures advocated,by CPA and its consultant for the improvement of management, operational and technical procedures (PCR, paras 6.01ff).

CYPORT.F Appendix 1 BORROWER COMENTS Page 1 of 5 cyprus ports authority

nicosla CPA 1/73/B/7 23. crete str. cables tyports p.u.box 200? telex 2833 cypa tel 50100

12th December, 1986.

Mr. Brian Shields, Chief, Energy, Infrastructure and Urban Development, Operations Evaluation Department, The World Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington D.C. 20433, U.S.A.

Dear

Project Performance Audit Report Cyprus Second Ports Project (Loan 1540-CY)

Thank you very much for your letter dated November 19, 1986 on the above subject and the draft PCR attached thereto for our comments.

2. I have to state that we find the Reportvery precise and very clear and we generally agree with its content.

3. Subject to this, we make the following comments, which do not change the findings or the spirit of the Report.

PREFACE

P.(i) Within the framework of the p.,oposed Transport Sector Project, we welcome the Bank's intention to remind the Government of steps to be taken wi n a view to improving ports.

P.(iii) Country Exchange Rates. The US$ equivalents should be in EC instead of L.Stg. (?).

EVALUATION SUMMARY

P.(v) The statement about limited institutional progress is correct. In fact, as of recent, all the affairs of the Authority, which have to be channelled to the Council of Ministers through government channels experience very long time lags, let alone that the Authority's autonomy is being severed more and more.

.... /2

all correspondence should be addressed to the general manager 10 Appendix 1 Page 2 of 5

P.(vi) Are actual delays really four years?

PROJECT AUDIT MEMORANDUM

P.4 What is said about the interests of some board members is quite correct. Correct is, also, what is said on autonomy which, as things stand today, leaves much to be desired.

P.4 Substitute "no" for "so" in third line of para. 8.

P.7 The whole paragraph may have to be revised. What is said about the unions is not strictly speaking correct. In fact they were not against the idea of setting up a company but rather they were inclined to see C.P.A. running the show and certainly did not want the Licensed Porters to have a substantial stake in the new company. The existence of the "A" and "B" lists among registered workers - and not L.P.A. as stated - is not instrumental to the problem either, although there is no doubt that Unions are never enthusiastic with technological developments and mechanization in general.

CONCLUSIONS

P.8 We fully share the view expressed by the Bink that "Limassol facilities would be more competitive and attractive to shippers, only when container operations are conducted with equipment for which the port was designed". Unfortunately C.P.A. management did not succeed in getting this message through.

We agree with the conditions put forward in connection with the contemplated new Transport Sector Project.

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

HIGHLIGHTS

P.(ii) We fully agree that the present C.P.A. structure and staffing do not permit the C.P.A. to achieve its objectives. This is also proved by the lack of "target-oriented" management structure.

P.(iv) The objective set out under (a) seems to condradict with what is said in the Banks report of Aug. 27, 1986 (see para. 4.03), in the sense that there, the participation of C.P.A. in the container handling unit is ruled out. Otherwise, we fully subscribe to what is said under (a) to (f).

./3 Appendix 1 Page 3 of 5

III. IMPLEMENTATION

P.9 Substitute Annex "B" for Annex "An in para. 3.03.

P.16 We don't think that the improvement and extension of the existing temporary passenger terminal had anything to do with cost overruns.

P.17 Substitute "mid 1983" for "mid 1973" in line 4 of para. 3.3.8.

VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE

P.23 We fully share the view expressed in para. 6.01 that there is much to be desired in improving the administration and procedures.

We, also, fully agree with what is stated in para. 6.02.

P.24 We agree that there is no clear distinction between the activities of C.P.A. and the Government Department of Customs. In fact, in certain cases, this is very much at the root of some problems that plague C.P.A.

4. Because of their interest I am sending copy of this letter to -

a. Mr. George Hadjianastassiou, Permanent Undersecretary, Ministry of Finance.

b. Mr. Linos Shauallis, Permanent Undersecretary, Ministry of Communications and Works.

With kindest regards,

Yours

(3. BAYADA) General Manager Cyprus Ports Authority

/ER 12 Appendix 1 Page 4 of 5

JWS0070 JGU119 IN 02/06:36 OUT 02/06t43 3678 MINCOM CY

MR. BRIAN SHIELDS SAPLJZARSVELOPMENrSTRUqTURE OPERATIONS EVALUATION DFPARTMENTP THE WORLD BANK DEAR MR. SHIELDSP

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT CYPRUS SECOND PORTS PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.FOR YOUR LETTER OF 19TH NOVFMBRv 1986t ENCLOSING A COPY OF A DRAFT PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDTT REPORT (PPAR) ON THE ABOVEMENTIONED PROJECTt THE CONTENTS OF WHICH HAVE BFEN NOTFD WITH INTEREST.

ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF VIEWS AND RFMARKS EXPRFISFD IN THE ABOVE RFPORTq ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO THOSE PARTS OF THE REPORT REFERRING TO GOVERNMENT JURISDICTIONS, PECISION PROCESSES AND APPROACHESP ARE NOT SHARED BY THIS MINISTRYy I WOULD RATHER AVOID AT THIS POINT EMBARKING ON A DETAILED ELABORATIONP PREFFRRING TO DISCUSS THESE POINTS IN DETAIL DURING THE NEXT VISIT OF THE AUDIT MISSION IN CYPRUS.

NEVERTHELESSP I WOULD LIKE TO UNDFRLINF THE FACT THAT THE OBJECTS# CONSTITUTION, FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF CYPRUS PORTS AUTHORITY, AS WELL AS THE POWERS OF THE MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS AND WOkKS AND OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTKRSP ARE SPELLED OUT IN LAW 38 OF 1973. IN THIS CONTEXT9 IT IS BELIEVED THAT CPA ENJOYS ALL THE NFCESSARY AUTONOMY FOR THE PROPER AND EFFICIENT OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PORTS AND THEIR AFFAIRS.

IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE GOVERNMENT ALWAYS GIVES HIGH PRIORITY TO PORT MATTERS. THE ROLE OF THE OOVkNNMENT AND SPECIFICALLY OF THIS MINISTRY IS ONLY SUPERVISORYr IN ORDFR TO ENSURE THAT ITS POLICIFS FALL UTTHIN THE OVERA.I. ROVERNMFNTAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS AND AIMS AT SERVING THF WIDER PUP.IC INTFRFST. 13 Appendix 1 Page 5 of 5

REGARDINQ THE TWO MAJOR (84U1S OF TH0 LI.MAS30L PORT CONTAINER TERMINAL (MODERNISATION OF EQUIPMFNT AND ESTAPIISHMENT OF A SOITABLE BODY FOR OPERATION)p I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT 80f'H THFSE TSSUES ARE CURRENTLY REVIFWED BY THE POARD OF CPAP IN THF LJGHT OF RFClNT DEVVLOPMENTS AND FIJTIRE PRI)OsPECS AND AS SOON AS CONCREIE PROPOSALS ARE SUBMITTED TO THE GOVERNMFNTt THF FULL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE WILL 8F PROVI01t1 (N ORAFR TO PU.JRSUE THE UFST Pl)S*rB. SOIUATIONS THAT 0(L SERVE THF INTERESTS OF THF PORTS AND THE COU(INTPY*

FINALIYv 1 401.01.0 I.tKE TO AVAIL MY18ELF OF THIS )PPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR THF BANK'S ASSISTANCF AND CONTRIBUTION AND TO ASSURE YOU OF THIS MINISTRY'S CON11NIF)F 10OPFRATIONt YOURS SINCERFLY,

(LINOS SHACALLIS) PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND WORKS NICOSIA-CYPRIUS.

3 36ys MINCOM CY

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CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORTS PROJECT gLOAN 1540-CY)

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A. Country Background

Geograg j and Population

1.01 Cyprus is the largest island in the Eastern Mediterranean. with an area of 925#000 ha., a maximum length of 150 miles from east to west and 60 miles from north to south. It is situated 240 miles north of Egypt, 44 miles south of Turkey and 64 west of Syria. The main geographic character- istics are the extensive mountain massif of Troodos rising to 6,400 feet above sea level in the south-west, the northern Kyrenia (Pentadactylos) range rising to 3,300 feet, the central plain between the two mountain rangesq and the coastal plain of the Island. Average total precipitation is 500 m-m, but it is much higher on the Troodos massif. Summer tempera- tures are high, with a mean monthly temperature of 290C on the central plain in August, while winters are mild with a mean January temperature of 10*C on the central plain. The population of Cyprus in 1985 (provisional) was estimated at 669,000 for the whole Island, of which 544.000 lived in the Government controlled area and the remainder in the Turkish occupied area. In 1960, when the last official census of the whole population was held, 77% of the population were Greek Cypriots, 18.3% Turkish Cypriots and 4.7% other minorities. Population trends were affected by the 1974 Turkish invasion, which reduced the population through war losses and emigration. Nevertheless recent developments in the Government controlled area favored population growth, so that during the 1980's the average rate of growth of population was 1.2%.

The Econopy (Annex A. Tables 1-2)

1.02 The economy of Cyprus developed rapidly in the period that followed independence in 1960 to 1974, this growth being based on what were deemed to be the "three pillars of growth", that is agriculture, manufacturing and tourism. Inflation and unemployment during this period were kept at low levels, the balance of payments was positive, and the country was prospering.

1.03 The situation was drastically changed for the worse by the events of July and August 1974. The productive potential of the occupied areas was, at this time, about 70% of the total, whereas the export capacity lost 16 amounted to 75%. As a result the economy in late 1974 and during 1975 was depressed and dislocated, with a huge social problem in the form of the need to provide for displaced persons, a high level of unemployment at one time running at 86,000 persons (39% of the economically active population), underemployment, and a sharp decline in economic activity.

1.04 The strategy for economic recovery was set in the First Emergency Plan 1975-1976 which provided for the creation of employment opportunities, incentives for the reactivation of industry and other key economic sectors, encouragement of savings and investment, and relief measures for the displaced population. In 1976 the economy grew by 19% in real terms, and the second Emergency Economic Action Plan 1977-1978 aimed at encouraging further the recovery through the rational utilization of resources and the mobilization of capital for the more intense use of resources. By 1978, the economy was expanding rapidly, unemployment was again at low levels and a totally different set of economic problems was being faced, notably a high rate of inflation, pressure on resources, and a high level of demand. It is important to note that the feasibility study for the expansion of Limassol and Larnaca ports was prepared during the depressed years of 1975 and appraised by the World Bank in 1978, when a climate of buoyancy was prevalent as a result of the quick re-activation of the economy and implemented in the period from 1978-1985 when economic and shipping conditions had in the meantime changed radically. Transport Sector in the Economy (Annex A, Table 3)

1.05 The importance of the broad transport sector, which includes land transport, water transport, air transport and communications has been increasing since 1976 with the greater increases occurring in the last few years. The share of the broad transport sector has ranged between 8.1% - 8.6% of G.D.P. with an increase to 9.4% in the last few years. The employment share has steadily increased from 4.1% to 5.1% of the economically active population. In 1984, the gross output at current prices of the total transport sector was estimated at CE186.5 million, while value added was estimated at CE117.8 million, or 63% of output. Value added was made up of 30.4% land transport, 12.4% water transport, 20.6% air transport, 9.8% incidental services, 26.8% storage and communications.

Role of Project in Transport Sector and Economy

1.06 The project was in essence a continuation of the first port project,' which developed the two ports of Larnaca and Limassol and contributed towards more capital intensive operations. It was complementary to improvements carried out to the Nicosia-Limassol highway, financed

1/ Loan 628-CY, signed on June 30, 1969. 17 by the Bank's first and second highway loans, as well as the Lymbia by-pass on the Nicosia-Larnaca road. It was also integrated also into the Government's plans for the creation of free trade and industrial zones.

1.07 Economic programs in Cyprus focus on industrialization, requiring increased imports of industrial materials and exports of finished products. Without the proposed project, this traffic would have been penalized by higher transport costs that would result from delays at the two ports and foregone opportunities associated with loss of transit trade in terms of frequency of connections and lower freight costs. Regional development programs were facilitated as increased port activity enhanced employment of port workers/personnel and the creation of associated services, and improved facilities provided incentives for the establishment of off-shore companies.

II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION AND APPRAISAL

Oriin

2.01 The Bank's interest and involvement in the improvement of the Cyprus Ports dates back to 1969. Under the First Ports Project (Loan 628-CY), a loan of US$11,500,000 was granted to the Republic of Cyprus for the construction of a new deep-water port at Limassol with the necessary storage areas, access road and ancillary buildings. The project also provided for the procurement of equipment for the new Limassol port and the port of Famagusta. Consultants were also engaged for the improvement of port administration, operations and accounting procedures. Completion of the project scheduled at appraisal by September 30, 1973, experienced a delay due to a great extent to the events of 1974. A condition for the granting of the First Ports Project Loan was the establishment by the Republic of Cyprus of a National Ports Authority. This would be responsible for the construction, operation, maintenance and development of the facilities of the public ports of the Republic. It would function under a law and regulations, in form and substance satisfactory to the Bank and the Borrower (the Republic of Cyprus), and would have such powers, management resources, capital structure and financial policies as would be necessary to enable it to carry out its responsibilities efficiently.

2.02 The National Ports Authority was established in June 1973 but because of the hostilities in Cyprus in July 1974, the consultants' recommendations for improvements in port administration, operations and accounting procedures were delayed. In &ctual fact, the National Ports Authority started operating under its own rules and regulations on August 1, 1976.

2.03 As a result of the events of 1974, the then, main port of Cyprus, that of Famagusta, as well as the port of Kyrenia and the specialized facilities at Karavostassi became unavailable to the Government of Cyprus. Immediately after the events of 1974, the Government began the preparation 18 of emergency plans for the recovery of the economy. In preparing these plans special regard was paid to long-term planning including port development.

2.04 Based on a revision of master plans prepared under the Bank financed First Highway Project (Loan 904-CT), as well as feasibility studies carried out by consultants for the expansion of the ports of Limassol and Larnaca, CPA prepared a ports investment program covering the period 1978-1982. This development program was appraised by Bank officials and approved by the Bank, as a result of which the Second Port Project Loan (1540-CT) was appraised in August/September 1977, the Loan Agreement was signed on April 12, 1978, and became effective in August 1978.

Project Description

2.05 The project formed part of the investment program prepared by the CPA for the period 1978-1982 as set out in the Annex to the Agreed Minutes dated February 24, 1978, during the negotiations of the Second Port Project. The scope of the investment program was:

Table 2.1: Investment Program 1978-82

(CE '000) (US$ '000) IBRD Project (as detailed in Schedule II of Loan Agreement) 11,780 29,470

Larnaca Quay Construction and Transit Shed 3,410 8,525

Land Acquisitions Limassol 1,450 3,625 Larnaca 670 1,675

Additional Equipment and Miscellaneous Items 1,090 2j725 Total 600

The IBRD financed Project estimated at CE11,780,000, and including physical and price contingencies, comprised the following:

Part A: Civil Works and Equipment for Limassol

(a) Engineering designs and construction of about 480 m. in length quays, 11 m. deep, including two berths for container vessels, one for passenger vessels and a roll-on/roll-off ramp. 19

(b) Engineering designs and paving surfacing of roads, open storage and parking areas.

(d) Construction of passenger terminal and port administration and ancillary buildings.

(e) Provision of utilities (including inter alia, water supply, electricity, drainage and sewerage), as required to operate the facilities included in Part A (a) and (b) of the Project.

(f) Provision of utilities (including inter alia, water supply, electricity, drainage and sewerage), as required to operate the facilities included in Para A (c) and (d) of the Project.

(g) Provision of cargo handling equipment (mobile cranes) and container handling equipment and tools and equipment for the port's workshop.

Part B: Civil Works and Equipment for Larnaca

(a) Engineering designs and construction of a transit shed.

(b) Engineering designs and paving and surfacing of open storage and parking areas. (c) Construction of a baggage hall and port administration.

(d) Provision of utilities (including inter alia, water supply, elictricity, drainage and sewerage), as required to operate the facilities included in Part B (a), (b) and (c) of the Project.

(e) Provision of cargo handling equipment (mobile cranes) and tools and equipment for the port's workshop.

Part C: Technical Assistance

(a) Strengthening of the management, operational and technical policies and procedures of the Borrower. (b) Establishing cost based service charges and revaluing assets of the Borrower.

(c) Providing vocational training programs for the Borrower's personnel and the port workers. The project cost estimates based on these components are as in the following table: 20

Table 2.2: Project Cost Estimates Foreign -- LC Mllion- -US$ million- Bchagee- Local ForeipL Local Foreip.L Component Currency Bachann. Total Curreney Echanp Toafil j

A) Livassol I. Construction of 480 a of quays 1.43 2.08 3.51 3.58 5.20 8.78 59.0 ii. Roads and paving 0.24 0.25 0.49 0.60 0.63 1.23 51.0 III. Storage facilities 0.55 0.47 1.02 1.37 1.18 2.55 46.0 iv. Buildings 0.63 0.29 0.92 1.57 0.73 2.30 32.0 v. Equipment 0.05 1.23 1.28 0.12 3.08 3.20 96.0

B) Larnaca i. Roads, paving and utilities 0.26 0.19 0.45 0.65 0.47 1.12 42.0 ii. Storage facilities 0.21 0.18 0.39 0.53 0.45 0.98 47,0 iii. Buildings 0.16 0.08 0.24 0.40 0.20 0.60 33.0 iv. Equipment - 0.30 0.30 - 0.75 0.75 100.0

C) Contingencies i. Physical /1 0.57 0.62 1.19 1.43 1.55 2.98 52.0 ii. Price 12 0.61 0.78 1.39 1.53 1.95 3.48 56.0

D) Technical Assistance i. Engineering design and supervision 0.09 0.36 0.45 0.22 0.90 1.12 80.0 ii. Management and adainistration 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.20 0.25 80.0 iii. Other studies 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.13 80 Total: Project Cost Estimates 4.83 6.95 11.78 12.08 17.39 29.47 59.0

L Physical contingencies 152 for civil works, 8% for equipment. .L2 For calculating price contingencies on local and foreign componentp, following expected inflation rates were used:

1978-79 1980-81

Pot civil works 92 p.a. .0%p.a. For equipment 7.5%p.a. 7%p.s.

Cost estimates of civil works were based on the feasibility study prepared by LBI in 1976 on prices given by the PWD resulting from updating those of previous contracts for similar works. They reflect estimated 1978 prices. 21

Objectives of Project

2.06 The main objective of the project was to relieve existing and anticipated congestion at the project ports and to accommodate future traffic. In 197o, ship waiting time amounted to over 2,000 ship days with an average berth occupancy of 88%. Specialized berths, adequate cargo handling equipment and sufficient open and covered storage areas would improve cargo handling operations and throughput capacity of the ports. Improved management, proper port maintenance and training of port personnel would increase operational efficiency. The project, finally, would comple- ment the improvements being carried out to the Nicosia-Limassol highway, financed by the Bank's second highway loan, thus ensuring that the benefits from the road improvement would be achieved.

Dimension

2.07 The scope of the project had been determined taking into account the political situation, investment priorities and traffic growth. Without investment restrictions, a more ambitious project might have been proposed. However, the proposed project provided for sufficient port facilities to cope with forecast traffic up to 1983 at minimum cost, i.e., it was the least cost solution and accorded with an investment policy which was mini- mizing risks since it allowed more time for development of traffic trends and the possibility that the port of Famagusta might become available.

Timing

2.08 Although berthing capacity at Larnaca had been expanded by about 60%, with the acquisition of floating pontoons which aommenced operations in July 1977, that development represented an increase of only 14% in overall port capacity and could only serve to postpone serious congestion in the short term. The throughput of the ports of Limassol and Larnaca had also been increased by 21% through overtime working. This throughput could be increased by a further 15%, if the then existing level of overtime working were to be extended into a second full shift. From 1979 onwards, the two ports would be likely to incur increasingly severe congestion, even with the implementation of the second full shift. The Appraisal Report estimated that traffic would reach 100% of capacity by 1981. It was estimated that the proposed project would be completed two to three years later than its optimum timing and this was reflected in the high rates of return shown for the'project in the economic analysis. The first year economic return was estimated at 39% and the overall economic return was estimated at 31%. The feasibility of introducing a third shift was discussed during negotiations as throughput could be increased by a further 25% to 30%. While a third shift was worked for special cargos e.g., grain, its introduction presented operational and labor difficulties. CPA had, however, agreed to keep the possibility of introducing a third shift under review. 22

2.09 The delay in implementation and later completion of the project resulted in additional costs to the economy as 2,070 ship days were lost in 1981 and a congestion surcharge was imposed by some shipping lines between 1980-1981. Also during the period 1978-1981, the Authority could not take advantage of transhipment needs and actively market its ports as a transhipment center. The potential for transhipment is indicated by the increase in transit cargos from 0.2 m. to 0.678 m. tonnes between 1978-1981, despite the congested port situation as evidenced by high berth occupancy 78%-84% and over 1,500 p.a. ship days lost in awaiting berth.

Changes in Project Concept

2.10 The project was originally conceived as a follow-up to the first port project and had been defined bearing in mind investment needs in other transport subsectors as well as other key economic sectors. However, the growth in traffic and the need for new handling methods and storage areas, indicated that modifications were warranted. Hence, the project was modified to permit the improvement of container handling equipment and the construction of additional sheds to serve as a consolidation centre. The major change was to develop a system of container handling at Limassol port using a gravel bed stacking area to be operated by transtainers.

Usefulness of Feasibility Studies

2.11 The overall project feasibility study, undertaken by engineering consultants partly financed by the World Bank, was useful -n quantifying future capacity requirements in terms of port facilities, and also in evaluating the role of transport costs viz-a-viz the two ports. However, as the study was undertaken in 1975, shortly after the coup and the Turkish Invasion, the unsettled state of the economy and shipping connections led to an underestimation of cargo and productivity rates. Indeed, cargo expected to be reached in 1981 had been surpassed by 1976 and had to be served with the facilities existing at the time, albeit at a considerable cost of congestion and higher operation costs in general. In the light of these developments, the decision was taken to proceed with the extension towards the east rather than south and southwest, (see map) which would have entailed additional costs and construction time in breakwater extension. Although the consultants proposals were not strictly adhered to, they formed the basis in formulating the project.

Appraisal in Retrospect

2.12 In retrospect it may be said that, the appraisal focussed on the right physical needs, even though the emphasis on some components was not adequate. Transit trade was underestimated, the analysis of the most suitable handling technology including institutional requirements was inadequate, forecasts on the ability of Cyprus to resolve marketing problems for agricultural products were extremely optimistic, fertilizer export forecasts were inaccurate and the cooperative's proposals to create new factor- ies were unrealistic. Also, the methodology employed was not detailed enough to facilitate comparisons pertaining to the preparation of this report. 23

III. IMPLEMENTATION

General

3.01 Although the actual financing by the Bank concerning civil works covered only the extension of quays at Limassol Port, the project included a number of individual subprojects in both ports i.e. Larnaca and Limassol. As the various individual subprojects have been executed in different loca- tions and timing, under separate contracts and some of them are not related to each other, the implementation of each individual subproject will be dealt with separately.

3.02 The Bank's procurement procedures have been fully understood from the start and thus the Authority did not have any difficulty in preparing bid documents, inviting and evaluating tenders. The performance of the civil works contractor was quite satisfactory, despite the problems encountered, as mentioned in another chapter, and that of equipment suppliers very good.

A. Implementation of Civil Works - Larnaca Port

Extension of Quay and Other Civil Works

Start-up

3.03 From Annex B, Table 1, it can be seen that there was a delay of approximately six months in calling for and submission of tenders. This was due to a decision to carry out further geotechnical investigations to investigate the possibility of allowing for an alternative design for a concrete block gravity quay wall, as an alternative to the original design of steel sheet piles. The additional geotechnical investigations revealed that the construction of a concrete gravity quay wall was possible and a comparison of the alternative tenders proved that the concrete block quay wall construction was a more economical solution and was finally adopted. One might therefore say that the delay which made possible the additional geotechnical investigation proved to be beneficial. The lowest tender for the sheet pile solution was higher than the solution adopted by approximately US$1,000,000 for both Larnaca and Limassol, which were included under the same contract.

3.04 Efforts on the part of the Authority to speed-up the award of the contract, in order to make up for the above mentioned delay, were hindered by another obstacle, namely the availaoility of the only suitable quarry in the area for the stone needed in connection with the breakwater. This quarry, known as the Xylophagou quarry, is within the boundaries of the Dhekelia British Sovereign Base east of Larnaca, and at that time was also used by the British Military Authorities as a firing range. The contractor 24 with the lowest bid included in his tender a condition in relation to the free and unobstructed use of this quarry, something which the Authority was unable to guarantee as the British Military Authorities had already scheduled a range program which would make the quarry unavailable for a number of days per month. Hence, it was necessary to negotiate with the Contrac- tor to satisfy his above mentioned condition and these negotiations which proved to be very difficult and time-consuming neutralized the Authority's efforts to make up for any time losses. The Authority was led to accept a quick agr-ement in connection with the above, for the following two reasons:

(a) the participation guarantee was due to expire and this could cause complications (increase of prices, etc.); and

(b) the realignment of the breakwater had to be started as early as possible, so that its completion could be effected before the winter season.

Revisions

3.05 A major revision was necessary because the material dredged and meant to be used as a backfilling behind the quay wall proved, following further testing which was carried out after the contract award, to be un- suitable and therefore imported fill had to be used instead. This lead to a dispute between the Authority and the Contractor, finally settled through arbitration, and the arbitrator awarded an additional payment to the Contractor.

3.06 This revision, which was one of the main causes for the delay in completing the work according to the contract period, could have been avoided if the suitability of the material dredged for backfilling purposes had been more comprehensively investigated at the design stage. The un- suitability of the material was due to possible liquification under earth- quake conditions.

3.07 Another revision which is worth mentioning was the provision of ducts for the various cables for the electrical and telephone installations, which, compared to the original design which provided for the placement of these cables into trenches filled with sand, was a significant improvement. This revision, which is regarded as an upgrading of the quality of the works, was considered to be necessary for future maintenance as well as extension of underground services and a major reason for the delayed completion of the works. The additional cost was of the order of CE30,000.

3.08 No other serious revisions were necessary in connection with the project under this contract; however, two other major projects were carried out at a later stage, which could be considered as complementary to this particular project. 25

(a) The first one was the dredging of the basin and the entrance channel of the port, to increase the dredged depths from 9.5 m. to 10.00 m. This project was carried out between January and February 1985 at a cost of CE230,000. These dredging works could have been included in the original contract for the extension of the quay, however, it is believed that this would have been of no extra benefit as the Autho- rity was fortunate enough to execute this project at very low cost and with virtually no disruption of port operations, as works were completed in only 20 days. It is worth mentioning that, if dredging was carried out under the main contract, the cost could not have been less. The necessity for additional dredging became apparent only during 1984.

(b) The second project which could be included in the original contract, was the installation of crane rails. This project which commenced in July 1984, was completed in March 1985, at a cost of CE250,000. It caused a great deal of disruption of port operations.

Implementation Schedule 3.09 Annex B, Table 1 shows the implementation schedule of the project comparing expected and actual dates of commencement and completion, as well as the percentage of the work completed by the expected dates of completion. The main causes of the delay as compared to the envisaged contract period are explained in the previous paragraphs, but also the contractor probably had insufficient equipment to procede with both contracta at the same time. It should also be pointed out that the contract completion period of 18 months offered by the Contractor proved to be very tight and very difficult to honor. However, in spite of delays during the contract period, overall completion took place two months before the expected date. Concluding, one might say that the time schedule of the original appraisal proved to be realistic.

Procurement

3.10 Invitations to offer consultancy services were published and a prequalification procedure was followed. Then, the financial offer of the 16 firms of consultants prequalified was considered1 ' and following an overall evaluation of the complete offer of services, the consultants for this project were selected. Because of local regulations, the foreign consultants were required to have local associates. Contractors were selected according to International Competitive Bidding. Firstly, after a relevant advertisement in the press, the prequalification procedure was

1/ Since this time the Cyprus authorities have accepted the method of proposal evaluation, including the two envelope procedure, placing the main emphasis on the technical proposal as recommended in the Bank Guidelines for the Use of Consultants. 26

carried out jointly by the Authority resulting in 32 firms being prequalified. The prequalified contractors were invited to submit their offers. Finally, a public opening took place and upon evaluation of the tenders received the contract was awarded to the contractor with the lowest evaluated bid.

Costs

3.11 Annex B, Table 2, shows the original estimates and the actual costs of the project in both local and foreign currency (US dollars). The actual cost of Larnaca civil works was 136% of the estimated cost and for Limassol civil works 102.5% of the estimated cost.

3.12 Because the exchange rate over the payment period fluctuated considerably, the prevailing rates over six months periods were used. Un- fortunately, due to a number of disputes which are now under arbitration, the final account has not yet been finalized. It is expected to be finalized by the end of 1986. As a consequence, Table 2, shows two sets of figures i.e., the final account according to CPA and the final account according to the Contractor. From Table 2, it can be seen that there has been a cost overrun both compared to the original estimates at the time of the project appraisal and the contract amount.

3.13 It is believed that at the time of the appraisal the project design was insufficiently developed and consequently significant changes were made and thus the cost overrun is relatively high. Also the additional cost of CE320,000 for the quarry, which was mentioned in previous paragraphs, contributed to the higher costs. Variation of prices, i.e., for labor and material during the contract period were considerable. In fact it may be argued that increases that took place in labor, fuel and other materials which amounted to an increase of about CE600,000, were much higher than anticipated in the original estimates and accounted for 171 of the original contract price.

Other Auxiliary Projects (Annex B, Tables 3-4)

3.14 The implementation of these subprojects is shown on two separate tables in addition to those covering the quay extension. These two tables are presented in a more concise form as there was no foreign currency involved. The implementation of these subprojects complied with the actual requirement of the Authority and there have been no delays beyond the expected completion dates. The only revisions which took place are the following:

(a) administration building/baggage hall/construction uf offices for renting - these three subprojects have been combined into one and the substantial cost overrun was due to the fact that an existing building was improved and extended instead of constructing new buildings as originally planned; 27

(b) transit shed by new quay - In this case, the two sheds originally planned were combined into one large shed of an equivalent area. The cost overrun in this case is marginal;

(c) new transit shed and the asphalting of spaces around it - this project was not carried out because it was realized that there was no need for more covered storage space;

(d) asphalting of open areas - the extent of this subproject was not fully defined in the appraisal and the cost overrun is probably due to asphalting larger areas than originally envisaged as well as the unforeseen increases in the price of bitumen which took place after the appraisal; and

(e) auxiliary buildings - the cost overrun which is almost twice the original estimates, may be attributed to the same reasons explained in the case of asphalting of open areas. Thus as the extent of this item was not closely defined additional buildings were finally constructed. The general increases in labor and materials also applied.

B. Extention of quay and Other Civil Works - Limassol Port

Start-up

3.15 The delay of six months shown on Table 1, of Annex C is due to the same reasons explained in connection with the Larnaca Project, as the two projects were jointly proceeded with. Therefore, the comments made in connection with the Larnaca Project up to the award of the contract are applicable to the Limassol Project as well. It is pointed out that, although the Xylophagou quarry had no relation to the Limassol project, it nevertheless contributed to the delay of the Limassol project as well, as the two projects were linked under the same contract.

3.16 The lowest tender for the sheet pile solution in the case of Limassol was higher than the solution finally adopted by appr. US$1,000,000 or 10% for both projects (i.e., Larnaca and Limassol) which were connected under the same contract.

Revision

3.17 Major revisions proved to be necessary in this project which led to considerable delays, cost overruns, claims and disputes. The main reason for these revisions was the substantial change of the scope of the project i.e., the new extensions would serve as a specialized container terminal, rather than the original concept which provided for a multipur- pose quay with container handling facilities.

3.18 In greater detail the revisions were the following: 28

(a) strengthening of the quaywall in order to increase the allowable surcharge, so that increased container handling operations could be carried out;

(b) extension of the crane rails to cover the whole length of the quay;

() rearrangement of the layout, to comply with specialized container handling facilities; and

(e) redesign of pavements to comply with the container handling equipment requirements.

3.19 These revisions were introduced after the award of the contract, as it was only at this late stage realized that the provision of a specialized container terminal was necessary due to the unpredicted increase of the container traffic. This issue is covered in the chapter on traffic (Chapter IV). The Cyprus Ports Authority with the consent of the Bank, through international selection procedures appointed consultants to advise on the various container terminal requirements. The consultants were appointed one year after the commencement of the civil works contract and their final report was made available about six months later. As the implementation of suggestions of the consultants could not have taken place earlier, the unavoidable consequence was a --onsiderable disruption to the project.

3.20 In addition to the above, the situation was further negatively affected by the inability of the Authority to take in time the decisions required for the implementation of the suggestions of the consultants for the container terminal. These suggestions to a great extent are still awaiting their implementation.

3.21 As in the case of Larnaca project, other mincr revisions took place, with a view to improving the quality of the design e.g., the introduction of a ducting system for the underground services.

Implementation Schedule

3.22 Annex C, Table 1, shows the implementation of the project comparing expected and actual dates of comencement and completion as well as the percentage of work completed by the expected dates. In this project, considerable delay has been observed resulting in the construction period being doubled as compared with the contract period.

3.23 The main causes were:

(a) the revisions which were outlined in a previous paragraph; and 29

(b) the non-availability of non-reactive fine aggregates for the concrete works, which are necessary for the avoidance of silica-alkali reaction.

Unfortunately, due to technical and administrative difficulties created mainly by the authorities that would issue the license for the quarrying of the suitable sazd from a specific area which was the only source at that time, the project was delayed for several months.

3.24 In this connection it may be argued that the original 18 month program of the contractor was very tight and very difficult to honor, irrespective of the other reasons mentioned above. At appraisal the estimate was two years (Annex B, Table 2).

Procurement

3.25 As the procurement of this project was connected with the Larnaca project* the same comments made for Larnaca project are applicable to Limassol project as well (see para. 3.10).

Costs

3.26 Annex C, Table 2, shows the original estimates and the actual costs of the project in both local and foreign currency (US dollars). As the exchange rate over the payment period was fluctuating considerably, the prevailing rates over six month periods were used. As already mentioned, the final account has not been finalized as yet mainly due to a number of disputes, which arose because of the introduction of revisions. This issue has been referred to arbitration which is now in progress.

3.27 Table 2, shows two sets of figures i.e., the final account according to CPA and the final account according to the claims of the contractor. From this table it can be-seen that there has been a cost overrun in both the original estimates and the contract amount.

3.28 The cost overrun is mainly due to two reasons:

(a) variations of prices, i.e. labor and material, which were considerable during the contract period. Indeed unforeseen increases took place in labor, fuel and other materials which resulted in a total increase of around CE1,000,000; and

(b) the introduction of the various revisions outlined in previous paragraphs, which resulted in additional work at a cost of approximately CE1,300,000.

Other Auxiliary Subprojects (Annex C. Table 3-4)

3.29 The implementation of these subprojects is shown on two separate tables in addition to those covering the quay extensions. These two tables are more concise as there was no foreign currency involved. 30

3.30 Apart from the administration building, implementation complied with the actual requirements of the Authority and there were no delays beyond the expected completion dates. In the case of the administration building, however, there has been a delay of approximately two years as according to the contract the project ought to have been completed in 1983 but it was actually completed in 1985. The main reason for this delay is a dispute which arose at the early stages of the project between the Consul- tants of the project and the contractor which created serious problems and eventually led to discontinuation of the project, for approximately one year. The execution of additional works was another reason for the delay. The cost overrun is attributable to both the additional works ordered and labor and material price increases.

3.31 The only revisions which took place in the auxiliary subprojects are the following.

Passenger Terminal

3.32 At the appraisal stage it was considered that a new passenger terminal should be constructed. Indeed the master plan of the new extension provided for a passenger terminal at the southern corner of the eastern quay. However, the revisions of the layout of the new extensions which provided for a specialized container terminal for the whole back-up area of the new quay led to the reconsideration of the issue. It was finally decided to improve and extend the existing temporary passenger terminal hall instead of building a new one and this was the main reason for the cost underrun. Nevertheless, as the location of this temporary passenger terminal facilities is not ideal, the issue may have to be recon- sidered during the next phase of expansion of the port.

Container Consolidation Shed

3.33 This project has not been carried out as existing shed capacity proved to be adequate for this purpose. Construction of Offices for Rentin

3.34 This item was combined with the administration building and was one of the reasons for ordering some of the additional works and contributed to the cost overrun.

New Open Storage Areas

3.35 The extent of this project was not fully defined in the appraisal and possibly the cost overrun is due to asphalting larger areas than originally envisaged. Moreover the unforeseen increases in bitumen prices, which took place after the appraisal, added to the overrun. 31

Auxiliary Buildings

3.36 The cost overrun, which is almost twice the original estimates, may be due to the same reasons explained earlier on in the case of asphalting of open areas that is to say inadequate specification of works. Thus, as the extent of this item was not defined, possibly more buildings were constructed than originally anticipated. However, the general increases in labor and materials prices must have also contributed in this overrun.

Implementation of Equipment (Annex D, Tables 1-6)

3.37 The appraisal report provided that the container handling equipment at Limassol would consist of a 40-ton container crane and two straddle carriers, which would double the productivity obtained at the time of appraisal. However, subsequent to the appraisal and for the purpose of establishing optimal investment in port equipment and the timing thereof, the Authority engaged consultants (Associated Marine Consultants, Holland), to review needs. In the light of the new developments in container traffic worldwide, in general, and the actual and projected traffic through the Cyprus ports in particular, which grew more quickly than assumed at the time of appraisal, the consultarts recommended 6 yard gantries (transtainers) for the shore handling of containers. It was also decided to buy a heavy-duty specialized mobile crane for the handling of containers at Limassol port.

3.38 The recommendations of the consultants, as regards the equipment to be provided, as well as the decision to buy a mobile container crane, were endorsed and duly approved by the Bank. The mobile container crane became operational by mid 1983, whereas the two gantry cranes were not installed and put to use until the summer of 1984, due to a lengthy decision taking and procurement process.

3.39 AP far as the equipment for the ship-shore handling of containers is concerned, the recommendations of the consultants were not proceeded with, because of a divergence of opinion between the Authority on the one hand and the Shipping Agents on the other. By necessity, the matter was brought to the attention of the Government, the approval of which was necessary for the investment required. Consequently, the Government requested UNCTAD to prepare an independent assessment of the situation and appointed a Ministerial Committee to examine the usefulness and advantages of straddle-carriers and transtainers and take a final decision as to the type of equipment to be acquired. The Committee would, also, have to decide on the establishment of a suitably body, which we ld be responsible for the operation of the container terminal as well as .a the public organizations and any other associations or companies which would parti- cipate. In July 1983, the Council of Ministers decided that, at that time, the traffic of containers through Limassol port did not justify the investment for the purchase of transtainers and that the straddle carriers operation should continue. The matter would be re-examined in the future if circumstances warranted. 32

3.40 As of today the above decision of tht Council of Ministers has not been changed. The Board of Directors of the Authority is consequently not inclined to go ahead with the acquisition of transtainers. The Management of the Authority has all along advocated that, in the light of the studies carried out by them as well as by Consultants, the most efficient equipment suitable in the circumstances, taking into account the infrastructure already constructed (gravel beds), is the transtainer. IL is also believed that for the most efficient and economical method of handling containers, a company should be established, with substantial interest therein of the Authority, which will undertake the whole cycle of container operation. As things are now, the full benefits of the investment made are not reaped and the Authority is not in a position to exercise control and to coordinate the relevant activities in the port.

3.41 At Larnaca port the handling equipment for general cargo belonging to the Licensed Porters has been renewed and is considered adequate to cover efficiently present and projected general cargo, which as it is stated in another chapter, has relatively lost its importance placed on it at appraisal. On the other hand, container traffic through Larnaca port increased dramatically as a result of the attraction of D.S.R., a German Democratic Republic shipping line, to Larnaca port and its decision to use the port as its transhipment center in the Eastern Mediterranean. As a consequence, the Authority decided to dredge the port to 10 m. and to provide a new container crane on rails. Both the dredging works and the crane were not envisaged in the investment program of the Authority and were not taken into account at appraisal (para. 8.04 (a)).

3.42 Finally, the Authority, as envisaged at appraisal, set up its technical services in proper workshops, which improved significantly the maintenance and repair services to the Authority's plant, machinery and equipment, as compared with the situation at appraisal, when such services were provided by a Government Department. The total number of qualified skilled and semi-skilled personnel in this respect is 20.

Reporting

3.43 Cyprus Ports Authority was regularly submitting quarterly progress reports up to June 1982, for civil works and equipment. Detailed quarterly indicators for port traffic and performance sent to the Bank covered October 1978 to June 1980. The amount of detail requested by the Bank, and the lack of a tested system to generate the necessary information, proved beyond the ability of CPA staff, so subsequently only summarized indicators were sent. Indicators were prepared on an ad hoc basis as required for special studies. As most of the indicators required by the Bank are considered essential to proper port management, computerization was introduced, in 1984, through a service bureau. Preparation time of both the system and the program has taken longer than anticipated because of both the bureau and CPA staff, this was a new process and no expert advice or training were available. In the meantime computerization has enabled the Authority to 33 produce detailed indicators and the time lag by which results are available has been reduced. The installation of computer terminals is expected to reduce the preparation period even further.

3.44 Recommendations of the management and accounting consultants employed under the project were not followed as among other reasons they presupposed organizational changes which did not take place and thus rendered the proposals impracticable (see Chapter VI para. 6.01 et seq.).

IV. TRAFFIC AND OPERATIONS *

4.01 A comparison of traffic and performance indicators show that the main objective of the project, which was to relieve present and anticipated congestion at t4e project ports and to accommodate future traffic was achieved (mor; details on comments and figures are attached as Annex E).

Traffic

Volume of Traffic (Annex E. Table 1)

4.02 Traffic through Limassol and Larnaca ports increased to 3.9 million tons in 1984, which was only 0.2 million tons short of the projected 1985 growth. However, in 1985, there was a severe setback, slack foreign demand for Cyprus exports and reduction in transit trade leading to a fall in the total tonnage to 2.8 million tons.

(a) Exports decreased from 1.3 million tons in 1977 to 0.8 million tons in 1984 (0.6 million est. 1985) against a forecast increase of 71 p.a. as cement exports, which constituted 30% of cargo through Limassol and Larnaca in 1976/1977 almost ceased by 1985, agricultural products faced with marketing problems did not rise above 1977 record levels and manufactured items were faced with production problems.

(b) Imports increased at the expected rate of 71 p.a., 1977-1984 although the 1985 levels are expected to be 10% lower than appraisal figures.

(c) Between 1977-1984, transit trade increased from 0.3 million to 1.8 million tons or 291 per atnum against a forecast increase of 31 p.a. Even with the substantial drop in 1985 to an estimated 1.1 million tons, this is more than double the 0.4 mil'ion tons expected at appraisal stage. This was the result of two major shipping lines transferring some of their container transit traffic to Cyprus, the civil war in Lebanon and for some years, congestion problems at various Middle Eastern ports. 34

Method of Handling-Packaving (Annex E. Tabl,5s 2-4)

4.03 The method of cargo handling packaging changed drastically through the project life, as unitized the bulk cargoes increased their share of total cargo through Limassol and Larnaca ports, from 25% to 74% (1975-1985).

(a) Containerized traffic accounted for 46% (estimate 40% 1985) as opposed to 32% expected for 1985 at appraisal. This was mainly due to the growth of transit cargo which was mostly in containers. Also the percentage of containerized Cyprus cargo (versus containerizable Cyprus cargo) reached a peak of 66% in 1983, as opposed to 50% expected at appraisal stage. So, even although only 160,000 containers are estimated for 1985, as opposed to 236,382 handled in 1984, this is still higher than the 69,000 boxes expected at appraisal stage.

(b) Grains, 85% of solid bulk, increased to 404,000 tons in 1984 and is expected to reach 445,000 tons in 1985 as opposed to 300,000 tons as per appraisal. Also bulk handling has been adopted for other items.

Distributiotn of Traffic (Annex E, Table 5)

4.04 The distribution among Limassol and Larnaca ports of the import/ export of major items continued to be influenced by locational factors e.g. proximity of production and distribution centers. However, the increased availability of port facilities at Larnaca port has improved the relative importance of Larnaca in terms of total cargo handling from about 30% to 39% which is attributed to the increase in transit traffic.

Ship Traffic (Annex E. Tables 6-10)

4.05 As expected at appraisal stage, the increase in number of ships was slower than the cargo, reflecting a general increase in the size of vessels, which in fact doubled from an average of 1,017 NRT to 2,087 NRT during the period 1976-1984. Small cargo vessels of less than 800 NRT are still predominant, especially at Larnaca because of the feeder service offered through the project ports to neighboring countries. The number of cargo ships that called in 1984 was 4,704, 10% lower than the 5,200 ships estimated at appraisal for 1985. Including passenger vessels the total becomes 5,711 ships. The greatest increase between 1978-1984 was registered in container ships which rose from 350 to 2,450, whilst conventional ships decreased from 3,000 to 1,750.

Cargo through Storage Araas (Annex E, Table 11)

4.06 With the advent of containerization, cargo through open stacking areas increased by 158%, from 280,000 to 724,000 tons at Limassol and from 10,000 to 441,000 tons at Larnaca. Tonnage through transit sheds increased less dramatically, fluctuating between 111,000-165,000 tons at Limassol. 35

Passenger Traffic (Annex E, Table 12)

4.07 During the period 1978-1984, passenger traffic more than doubled from 153,000 to 327,000 and Larnaca's share increased significantly from 10% to 28%, mainly due to the Lebanese crisis limiting the use of Beirut airport facilities.

Main Indicators for Operating Efficiency

Berth Utilization (Annex E. Table 13)

4.08 Although it has not been possible to find the method used by the original consultant to estimate the average berth occupancy, the magnitudes are of comparable strength. Indeed it was only in 1985 that there has been a large deviation between actual berth occupancy estimated at 58%-63% and 79% forecasted. This is due to the large drop in tonnage, as already explained under "traffic evolution".

Cargo Handling (Annex E, Tables 14-18)

4.09 Berth occupa:-y experienced was within expectations, even though working hours were not extended to cover a full second shift, as assumed at appraisal. In fact, as pressure was relieved with the provision of new quays, overtime hours worked by labor decreased, especially at Limassol, from 38% to 29% of the total hours worked by gangs. This was possible through higher productivity, as a result of higher than expected cargo unitization and the strengthening of crane capacity of handling unitized cargo. Whereas the use of small mobile cranes between 1980-1985 has been steadily decreasing from 23,000 hours to 7,000 hours the use of specialized cranes has been increasing from 6,000 hours to 9,000 hours. Overall productivity increased from 33-32 tons per gang hour to 61-74 tons per gang hour. Also tonnage per meter of quay increased during the period 1978-1984 from 1,377 to 2,041 at Limassol and from 1,262 to 1,482 at Larnaca. This was due to increased unitization. Thus loose timber and a rate of 7-1/2 tons per hour in 1975 which increased to 25-31 tons in 1978 as timber became palletized. Now-a-days 30-45 tons is more usual. Moreover the rate of handling containers increased from 5 units per hour in 1975 to 7-10 units in 1978 and 10-15 per hour today.

Service Time (Annex E, Tables 19-22)

4.10 From the figures available, there seems to have been a reduction in service time from around 33 to 23 hours per ship (1979-1985). Unfor- tunately, there are no complete trend statistics on the service time (time at berth) for the period so as to arrive at a firm conclusion on this aspect. As the average tonnage per ship called increased from about 679 to about 691 tons per ship 1979-1985, it may be inferred that the relevant service time was even lower. 36

Storage Areas Utilization (Annex E. Table 23)

4.11 Between 1978-1985, the utilization of open stacking areas changed from 2.8 tons per square meter to 1.6 per square meter for Limassol and from 0.7 tons per square meter to 2.4 per square meter for Larnaca. Transit shed utilization has been high over 70% for Limassol and 60% for Larnaca, except for the new shed at Larnaca which was only marginally utilized. This enabled CPA to be more lenient on maximum periods of storage thus reducing transportation costs.

Berthing Delays (Annex E. Table 24)

4.12 As expected the congestion situation of 1976-1977, whereby over 2,200 days were lost in ship waiting time and congestion surcharges from 5%-25% were imposed, eased with the provision of additional quays in 1982. During 1978-1981 about 7,100 ship days were lost or an average of 2,366 per year and in 1980-1981 congestion surcharges were imposed by some lines, ranging from 10%-30% for part of this period. Since then, ship days lost have declined to an average of about 700 per year, or rather more in 1984 when there was cause of concern, as some lines announced their intention to impose a surcharge.

V. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

Financial Results

5.01 The summarized Income and Expenditure Accounts as well as the Balance Sheet of the Authority for the years 1979-1984 are attached as Annex F, and G respectively. The comparison of the forecasts made at appraisal and the actual results obtained are summarized below:

19Z 1980 . 191 1982 1983 1984. Appr. Actual Appr. Actual Appr. Actual Appr. Actual Appr. Actual Appr. Actual ------Cyprus Pounds (000)------

Total Revenue 3,214 4.062 3.325 4,311 4,426 4,546 4.SS7 4.972 - 4,772 - 5,823 Operating Costs (including Depreciation) 1.359 1,53S 1.435 1,960 1.808 2,232 1.876 2,758 - 3.559 - 3.900

Operating Profit 1,855 2,527 1,890 2.351 2,618 2,314 2.681 2.214 - 1,213 - 1,923

Interest on Loan 695 620 1,049 636 1.512 674 1.443 697 - 748 - 859

Net Profit 1,160 1,907 841 1,715 1.106 1,640 1,238 1,518 - 465 - 1,064

Operating Ratio (%) 42 31 43 39 41 43 41 52 - 61 - 52

R.O.C.E. (%) 16 20 16.8 18 13.8 24.5 10.1 18 - S.3 - 7.6

Interest Coverage (%) 2.7 4.1 1.8 3.7 1.7 3.4 1.8 3.2 - 1.6 - 2.2 37

Disbursement

5.02 Annex H summarizes and compares the estimated disbursement schedule at appraisal and actual disbursements. The delays observed in the execution and completion of the project, as mentioned elsewhere in this report, account for the departure from the disbursement schedule estimated at appraisal. By the end of 1982 the amount of US$ 4,601,000, only, was disbursed as compared with the full amount of the loan originally envisaged.

VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE

6.01 In compliance with L.A., the Authority engaged Management Consultants to advise on management, operational and technical policies and procedures of the Authority. The Consultants submitted their draft report in November, 1980 and, in the light of the comments submitted by the Man- agement of the Authority, their final report in December, 1981. The Report covered fairly adequately all the areas, as stated in the terms of refer- ence. It must be confessed, however, that implementation of their recommendations were hardly proceeded with there is, still much to be desired especially in improving the administration and procedures at port level. We state below the problem areas, which, in our opinion, hinder the Autho- rity from actually becoming an autonomous and dynamic organization as was envisaged by the Bank since the granting of the First Port Loan.

Legislation

6.02 The Law establishing the Authority narrowly defined the powers and responsibilities of the Authority and restricted its autonomy from Govern- ment. Instead of the Government exercising a supervisory role over the activities of the Authority and ensuring that its policies fall within the Government general economic and development policy of the country, there are always attempts at intervening and supervising the activities of the Authority, treating it as a quasi-Government Department.

Board of Management

6.03 The members of the Board of Management who are appointed by the Council of Ministers are supposed to represent a cross-section of the Cyprus community. In actual fact labor is not represented on the Board, whereas the presence thereon of the commercial world and the shipping agents is prevalent. In addition experience has shown:

(a) that the demarcation line of the duties and responsibilities of the Board and the Management has not been fully understood by all members of the Board and more frequently than not, the Board engages itself in routine matters and not in policy matters as it should, thus replacing the management to that extent. This results in a great effort on the part of the 38

Management to feed the Board continuously with the necessary papers depriving at the same time the Management, to a great extent, of the opportunity to take initiatives and exert managerial responsibilities;

(b) it seems that the interest of the Authority Management does not, always, coincide with the interest of some members of the Board and, frequently, this results in conflicts between management and some members of the Board. This situation is not in the best interest of the Authority; and

(c) there has never been a clear distinction between the activities of the Customs and the Authority, which very often creates conflicts over the respective authorities and activities of the two Services in the ports. The ex-officio presence on the Board of Directors of Customs and Excise and the overlapping provisions in the Customs Legislation and the Law of the Authority, aggravate the situation. In this connection an attempt is now being made to remedy the situation by suggesting a number of amendments to the Authority's Law and regulations but there is no certainty of the outcome.

Administration and Staffing

6.04 The management consultants in the respective part of their Report made some recommendations, regarding organization, staffing and autonomy of the C.P.A. Despite the efforts that are being made with regard to the administration and operation of the Authority, there is much to be desired in this respect. The great majority of the staff of the Authority, especially at the ports, were transferred from the Government Department of Ports upon the establishment of the Authority. The qualifications, grades and salary of these personnel were not decided by the actual needs of the Authority but by their status at the time of transfer and consequently, they may not be appropriate for modern developments in port efficiency.

6.05 In 1982, in the framework of a general restructuring and job evaluation of the civil service, a similar study was made by the Government expert for the Authority's employees. This, however, resulted only in pay increases and ignored completely the restructuring of the service as would benefit a commercial undertaking. A recommendation by the Consultants to have posts created for certain disciplines necessary for the Authority, such as Marketing Officer, Labor Officer, Public Relations Officer and Personnel Officer has not as yet been implemented. Only lately an attempt is being made to have them approved by the Board and proposed for final approval by the Council of Ministers through the next year's budget.

6.06 Another area in which the Authority has not succeeded in effecting any change in the status-quo is the arrangement of providing services in the port after the official working hours. The practice followed, since before the establishment of the Authority which is continued to present 39 day, has been for work offered after the official working hours to be remunerated at overtime rates. It is generally believed that the introduction of shift work in the ports by the Authority's employees would fail, unless other classes of employees engaged in the same place of work like the Customs Officers changed to the same system. So far, there has been reluctance on the part of Government to move towards this direction. The system is inefficient; it leads to wastage of manpower and money and it needs reappraisal and revision.

6.07 At the end of 1985, the composition of the Authority's staff was as follows:

General Manager's Department 2 Finance Department 15 Administration Department 34 Operations Department 253 (out of which 10 at Nicosia, 165 at Limassol and 78 at Larnaca).

Container Stacking Arrangements at Limassol Port

6.08 Following the recommendation of consultants (para. 3.37) engaged for this purpose by the Authority, the design as appraised of the container terminal at Limassol port was revised and designed and constructed for the on-dock use of transtainers capable of stacking six containers abreast and up to five containers high (although practical experience shows average stacking of only about 1-1/2 containers), a configuration which was approved by the Bank and which continues to have its strong support. Four years after this decision was taken and the gravel bed stacking area constructed the Management had not succeeded in getting approval either for the acquisition of the transtainer equipment recommended by the Consultants or for the setting-up of an organization to take over the cycle of container handling. As a consequence the co..tainer terminal as constructed is not utilized properly, the operations at the terminal are fragmented and not as economical as they could be and the Authority is unable to reap the full benefits from the project. It is believed that the reasons for this undesirable situation are the interventions of private interests to stop any change to the present system which would affect them, directly or indirectly.

Training

6.09 On July 16, 1982, the Authority submitted to the Bank a training programme for the Authority's personnel which was prepared taking into account the recommendation of the consultants. Within the framework of this programme, officers of the Authority at all levels attended about 38 seminars abroad and about 50 seminars held in Cyprus. Furthermore, senior officers of the Authority organized lectures on administrative, operational, technical and financial matters, which were attended by nearly all grades of the Authority's employees in their respective field. However, it should be stressed that work is done on an ad hoc basis rather than in a syste- matic fashion. 40

VII. PROJECT BENEFITS

7.01 At the appraisal stage the main objectives of the project were stated as aiming to relieve present and anticipated congestion at the project ports and to accommodate future traffic. Specialized berths, adequate cargo handling equipment and sufficient open and covered storage areas were expected to improve cargo handling operations and throughput capacity of the ports. Improved management, proper port maintenance and training of port personnel were expected to increase operational efficiency. Hence a reduction in transport and handling costs, especially for containerized traffic. These physical objectives, with the exception of the provision of transtainers, were largely achieved.

7.02 The availability of additional quays and facilities in terms of equipment and storage has enabled Cyprus ports not only to service their own trade without penalties from incurring higher transport costs that would result from delays at the two ports, but also to act as a transhipment center. This has benefitted the Cyprus economy through:

(a) lower transport costs for ships dalling for both Cyprus and transit trade;

(b) lower per unit costs of operating facilities and equipment;

(d) increased employment; and

(e) associated services development.

At the same time costs have been entailed including:

(a) investment and maintenance costs;

(b) inflationary pressures such as are caused through additional demand generated by the extra revenue and pressure on employment; and

7.03 In this connection it should be noted that the figures in Annex I, Table 1, show:

(a) there has been a downward trend in freight costs, in some cases to the extent of 425, however, it is not possible to differentiate the effect of improvements in ports or to the internationally depressed shipping market; 41

(b) a 30% reduction in stevedoring handling rates is offered to containerized cargo as compared to loose general cargo by shipping agents, reflecting comparative costs of the two modes of handling. However, the overall cost comparison between container and other systems is not possible as factors of quality (service, safety, etc.) cannot be evaluated. It is also felt that benefits from containerization have not risen to expected levels, as the door-to-door concept has not been fully implemented due largely to restric- tive labor practices limiting the effective use of container technology; and

(c) although the unemployment in Cyprus is relatively low (0fl), port labor employment has been reduced to a level of 50% less than at the time of appraisal even during the 1984 record year.

7.04 As data required for such an extensive and detailed reevaluation of the project are not readily available, the pressure of time and the lack of computer facilities have forced us to make only simple attempts at re- estimating the economic return on investment. This is described in the following section.

VIII. COMPARISON OF RESULTS WITH APPRAISAL ESTIMATES (Annex I, Tables 2-4)

8.01 At appraisal, an investment of US$33.5 million was expected between 1978-1981 while benefits from shorter ship waiting time and reduction in container ship service time were expected to commence in 1982 at US$15.6 million per annum and $0.6 million per annum respectively. These were estimated on the following basis:

(a) using a simulation model it was estimated that in 1981, 9,500 ship days would be lost in waiting, if the project did not proceed; for subsequent years delays that would have incurred with the project were subtracted;

(b) an average waiting cost per ship day of US$2,500;

(d) two-thirds of the savings in ship-waiting time, would accrue to Cyprus, either as reduced demurrage charges in charter trade, or as avoided congestion surcharges in liner trades and

(e) fifty percent of the savings in service time for container ships will be captured by Cyprus trade. 42

8.02 With the above methodology and data for traffic already mentioned, the project, at appraisal, was expected to yield an economic return (ER) of 31%. This was tested for its sensitivity to variations in the cost and benefit parameters which indicated:

(a) increase of 25% in costs would reduce ER to 26%; (b) decline of 25% in benefits would reduce ER to 24%;

(d) reduction in traffic of 25% would result in 231 return although project would be premature by about three years.

8.03 As use of simulation model was not available to assess the with and without project situation, the following alternative procedures were adopted.

Comparison of Appraisal Estimates with Actual Results and Original Sensitivity Tests

8.04 (a) Actual investment, including a container crane to be installed at Larnaca beginning of 1986, is estimated at US$40 million which is about 19% above original estimate (cf. 26% under 8.02 (a)). However, valuing this investment at replacement cost would result in a higher figure.

(b) Traffic until 1984 was as expected at appraisal but in 1985 it has declined by about 30%. If the assumption at appraisal was that traffic would remain constant at 1985 level until the year 2000, with the new forecast of about 3% p.a. increase, a lower than appraisal overall level of trade is expected but not to the extent of 25% (8.02 (d) above). The ER will thus be above 23%.

(c) The structure of ships has been such that the average ship-waiting cost per day (using 1982-1985 weights) is estimated at US$5,310-US$6,652 for Limassol and US$4,500 for Larnaca i.e., 2-3 times above the US$2,500 used in the appraisal. Using 1979-1980 ship operating costs, the average is above US$3,565 which is about 50% higher . This would lead to a much higher level of benefits.

These lead us to the conclusion that the ER of the project is at least 20%.

Economic Rate of Return Synthesis (Annex I, Tables 5-8)

8.05 (a) Investment expenses were allotted on a per year basis (this was a rough assessment and some discrepancies exist with total investment) as they were incurred. 43

(b) Assuming that the size of ships remained constant as per 1981, the number of ships that would have called over and above 1981 levels was estimated.

(c) The assumption was made that ship waiting time would be 1.5 times 1981 estimate on service time. Actual delays were subtracted. The number of ship days that would have been lost ranged from about 5,400 to 11,000 per year 1982-1995. these are assumed to stay at 1985 levels up to 2000.

(d) Taking the relative importance of conventional, container and ro-ro ships in 1981, and using estimates on ship hire cost, the weighted average of ship cost per day was estimated at US$4,000.

(e) Replacement of equipment would be needed by 1993 for the Gottvald crane at Limassol at US$1.4 whereas for gantries replacement would be after 2000.

(f) Only 50% of savings in ship waiting time would have been captured by Cyprus traders.

(g) Only 10% of savings in container service time would have been captured by Cyprus traders and service time would have been reduced by 50% i.e., $500 per ship day increasing the number of container ships by 3% after 1981 level. Benefits to start in 1983 with the installation of Gottwald crane.

As a result of the calculations based on this synthesized scenario, the ER is estimated at above 31%.

Transit Traffic (Annex I. Table 9-13)

8.06 The availability of quays and facilities in terms of equipment and storage has enabled Cyprus not only to service its own trade without heavy penalties, i.e. incurring higher transport costs that would result from delays at the two ports, but also to act as a transhipment center. To assess the importance of this and based on the following assumptions, additional calculations were undertaken.

(a) It was assumed that Cyprus trade, being a captive trade would be handled through Cyprus ports, even though it might have incurred higher transport costs through the imposition of surcharge.

(b) However, transit trade would not be willing to use Cyprus as a center if it incurred delays. So, it was assumed that transit trade would not have increased above 1981 levels, had the extensions not been made available since 1982.

(i) the rate of discharging/loading of ships and the mixture of cargo, as these directly affect port capacity in handling cargo;

(ii) seasonality of trade. The "average" port activity is meaningless where high seasonal trading, as in the case of Larnaca during potato season may mean the virtual closing of port for other traffic;

(iii) pattern of arrival of ships. Random ship arrival brings on periodical delays even at low levels of activity;

(iv) extent of working hours; and

(v) regulations on berthing priorities of ships. At Cyprus ports ships are berthed according to turn of arrival. Some types of ships/cargoes receive priority berthing at the first available berth. In broad terms such categor- ies are ships handling containers only, ro-ro ships and ships that call for Cyprus exports only. 8.07 To simplify matters it was assumed that transit traffic would have been lost without the expansion of quays and provision of equipment as it would not have been possible to service transit cargoes as follows:

From Larnaca:

(a) During the potato-season the port would be largely closed to any other traffic; and

(b) limitations of turning circle which have been eased with the relocation of the breakwater would not have enabled large mother vessels to call.

From Limassol:

With increasing delays in 1981 levels of traffic could not have been maintained or increased. "Captive" transit trade is assumed to be between 200,000 and 300,000 tons.

8.08 The results of these calculations indicate that:

(a) Larnaca: A revenue of CE14 million would have been foregone and unemployment would have risen by 20%-72% during the period. Even with the traffic that actually occurred, there were problems of underemployment of port labor as with increased unitization and mechanization demand for labor has been decreasing. The above revenue does not take into account associated services that have developed to service this trade. Also, social and economic problems of unemployment are not evaluated. 45

(b) Limassol: A revenue of CE7 million would have been foregone and unemployment would have risen up to 40% during the period.

To the above benefits, ship waiting times incurred in 1981, assumed to continue, must be added to the extent of 2,000 ship days p.a.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

9.01 The project was an essential element of the long term plans to expand and modernize the port capacity in Cyprus to meet the demands of a growing and diversified economy. The scope and content of the project had to be modified during the implementation stage to meet changing conditions in the world economy and technological developments in sea transportation. The main objectives sought from the project at the time of appraisal were enhanced and on the whole realized.

9.02 Some delays were encountered during preparation and implementation due to inadequacy of preparation, changes in project components and bureaucratic administrative procedures. Also substantial cost overruns were experienced during implementation which are mainly due to:

(a) enhancement of the character of the project;

(b) the delays encountered; and

Traffic development has justified the decision to choose the least cost solution with the revisions made and the project as a whole provided the right framework for long-term servicing of cargos through Cyprus ports.

9.03 Difficulties were encountered in fully implementing institutional reforms envisaged even in the First Ports Project, but efforts are continu- ing to gradually bring about all the changes necessary and appropriate for the efficient management and operation of ports.

9.04 Financial results were generally better than those envisaged at appraisal even though tariffs were not revised until April 1985 as compared to an expected increase in 1981.

9.05 Although difficulties were encountered in assessing the economic benefits, both in terms of methodology and evaluation of benefits, the several approaches adopted yield a satisfactory level of economic benefits accruing to the Cyprus economy. It is observed that these benefits are within the limits estimated at appraisal.

6461D 一か ‘一

芦ぐ－＆パタぐ多今がゲ 47 ANNEX A Table I CYPRUS

'PROJECT COZIPLETION REPORT SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Macroeconomic Indicators

(a) Real GDP growth (Z p.a. change). Expected Actual Actual by World Bank Constant 1973 Constant 1980 Avrraisal Market prices Market prices 1978 8.5 8.3 8.1 2979 7 (imputed) 8.7 10.6 1980 6 (imputed) S.7 5.0 1981 5 3 3.3 1982 S 4.8 S.3 1983 S S.0 1984 S 7.6 298S S 33 (estimate)

NOTE: ApprAisal 1977 -.198S S71 Actual 1977 - 198S 60% (b) Foreign trade sector (4 p.a. change) 1960 a 100 i Expected constant prices Actual(using Actual(Using by World Bank volume index) Unit value method) Appraisal Exports Imports Export Import Export Imp or t

1977 20 20 27.9% 35.7% 0.6 5 1978 10 7 -1.6% 10.8% neg. 0.5% 1979 10 7 ISM 14.St 7 10.8 1980 10 7 7.1% 3.71 8.6 14.4 1981 10 7 6.3% 1.91 22.S 13.2 1982 10 7 41 17.9% -2.2 neg. 1983 -6.9 1 0.4% -1.6 -2.6 1984 17.3 17.6-, NOTE: E2Morts Imports

Appraisal 1976-2982 930 681 Actual 2976-1982 Volume 46 114% Unit Value 40% sit Source: a Economic Report 4 Statistics Dept.. #"It* Subject to revision. 48 ANNE A 48 Table 2 CYPRUS.

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Unemployment

No. of % of economically Inflation persons active~ation Rate population

1976 14,518 7.1 1977 6,144 3.0 10.7 1978 4,017 2.0 10.4 1979 3,691 1.8 13 1980 4,344 1.9 14.2 1981 5,879 2.5 11.4 1982 6,445 2.7 10.2 1983 .7,772 3.2 5.4 1984 7,959 3.3 8.9 Ja,9v 8,321 3.4 4.4

Source:Department of Statistics 4 Monthly Economic Indicator Nov. 1985. Recently revised: Mr. Yokkas Statistics Dept.

/Ex 49 ANNEX A 3 CYPRUS *Table

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CT)

Transport Sector

G.D.P. Gross output Value added 1000 share* No. share £000 * I000 0 1976 46.3 8.4 8,319 4.1 46.3 27.4 1977 55.8 8.4 8,220 4.0 55.8 34.2 1978 69.0 8.6 8,702 4.2 69.0 41.7 1979 86.3 8.1 9,043 4.2 86.3 48.7 1980 106.5 8.3 9,491 4.2 106.5 60.5 1981 120.7 8.5 10,354 4.5 120.7 72.0 1982 137.1 8.6 10,619 4.5 137.1 84.6 1983 162.2 9.4 11,585 4.8 162.2 100.6 1984 118. 0. 12,459 5.1 186.5 111.8 prov. n.a. n.a. n.a. 134.4 - CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORTS PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Actual and Expected Project Implementation of Larnaca Port

Percent of the DATES 0 F Works Completed Bid Receipt Contract Award Beginning of Work Completion of Work by Expected Prolect Component Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Completion Date

1. Extension of Quay As per 0 and Other Civil Contract Works 02/79 09/78 06/79 12/78 06/79 12/78 10/81 12/80 53

As per Appraisal 12/81 89

6461D March 1986

**o PROJCT COMPLETRO REPORT

SECOND POm PAD&CT ILMAN 1S40-CYl

Actual or Oritnal Estimates and Prolect Costs of Larnaa port

Actual Cost in Hillions drtoinal Estinmate of Cost Actual Cost as Promitin. of Local Local original Country Foreign Total US$ Contract Country Foreign Total US$ Estimate Contract Prolect Component CurrncY _SA Eauivalent Amount Currency F= 0L Eanivalant of cot () PAOUnt (1) (2) (3) (1)+(3)xleg (IM(2)x10 CPA*s Final Account Extension of Quay and other civil works (Archirodon Contract) 2.837 2.483 9.624 3.218 X 1.077 1.488 X 2.565 x 136.74% 18.41% 2.7585 = 1/ 2.764 * / 2.764 3/ 8.877 4.113 7.090 Contractor's Final Account 3.097 2.667 10.276 144.94 128.212 Total

1/ Rate at the time of signing the contract (June 1979). I/ Rate as in April 1978 (date of loan agreement with World Bank, when original estimate was made). Note: For actual cost figures see attached working details.

64610 Parch 1986 tom CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORTS PROJECT (LOAM 1540-CY)

Actual and Expected Project Implementation of Limassol Port

Percent of the 2/ DATES 0 F Works Completed Bid Receipt Contract Award Beginning of Work Completion of Work by Expected Project Component Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Completion Date L

As per 1. Extention of quay & Contract other civil works 02/79 09/78 06/79 12/78 06/79 12/78 01/83 1/ 12/80 22%

As per Appraisal 12/81 52%

I/ First partial completion October 1981 (handling over of about 35,000 as paved area). 2/ Second partial completion February 1982 (handling over of quay with apron).

6461D March 1986 CYESS PADJECT COMPLETION KPORT

SECOND PORTS PaJECT UOAM 1540-CYl

Actual or Oriainal Estimates and Project Costs of Li=ssol Port

Actual Cost in Millions Original Estimate of Cost Actual Cost as Praortion of ocal J.cal Original Country Foreign Total US$ Contract Country Foreign Total US$ Estimate Contract ProAat Comannent Currency J Eaulvalent amout CurreY EgUivalent of cost ll Amolunt C.P (1) (2) C.P (3) ()+(3)x1OO (1)+(2)xl00 CPA's Final Account Extension of quay and other civil works C.P. C.P. C.P. (Archirodon Contract) 3.684 3.2448 11.4738 3.244 X 1.701 2.349 X (4.05) X 102.50% 128.212 2.7585 = 1/ 2.764 = 1/ 2.764 = 8.949 US$ 6.493 11.194

Contractor's Final Account 4.670 3.942 13.946 * 124.S8S 1SS.M4 Total

1/ Nate at the time of signing the contract (June 1979). I/ Rate as in April 1978 (date of loan agreement with World Bank. when original estimate was made. Note: For actual cost figures see attached working details. 64610 March 1936 PAD3ECT COMPLETION anR SECOND PaRTS PAJECT ILOA 1s40CYl

Actual and Orininal Estimates of Proect Costs of Limassal Part

Actual Cost Orininal Estimate of Cost I" Actual Cost as Profortion of .Ldocal .. al Original Country Foreign Total US$ Contract Country Project Casonent CurrAMne Foreign Total US$ Estimate Contract U.MSt_ Koulvalent wmut Currnc USS. touivalent of C.P Cost Amont (1) (2) C.P (3) 000's (1)+(3)xtO (1)+G(2)xt0 000'S 000's oo's (1)+3)xl00 (1)M(2)xtO0 Container handling 12.000 ON 3.947 CP equipment (two 40t + 189 2.290 Nil - 6.481 63t gantry cranes) CP oo - 4.106

Total

1/ Using an exchange rate of US$ = 3.04 for actual costs and US$1 = 1.81 for original estimate of costs. Note: Contingency allowances should be distributed over all project components Source: for the original estimates of costs.

Initial I CL = (1980) = 5.12 Om = $2.83 (i.e. $1 = 1.81 DN) Actual 1 CL = (1985) = 4.84 DN = $1.59 (i.e. $1 = 3.04 DN)

64610 harch 1986 CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORTS PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Actual and Expected Project Implementation of Limassol Port

Percent of the DATES 0 F Works Completed Bid Receipt Contract Award Bezinnin of Work Completion of Work by Expected Project Component Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Completion Date

Container handling V1 Equipment (two 40t 01/83 03/79 05/83 07/79 06/83 07/79 08/84 06/81 Nil Gantry Cranes)

Source: b46lD March 1986 CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORTS PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Actual and Expected Project Implementation of Larnaca Port

Percent of the DATE S OF Works Completed Bid Receipt Contract Award Beginning of Work Completion of Work by Expected Project Component Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Completion Date Level luffing crane for containers and 12/84 03/79 01/85 07/79 02/85 09/79 03/86 09/80 Nil general cargo (45t/22m)

Source:

6461D March 1986

wt$ PAOJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND P8RTS PADECT ILAM 1S40-CYl

Atual and Original Estimates of Pr9otct Costs of Larnaca Port

Actual Cost Orininal Estimate of Cost " Actual Cost as Pronortion of ..10S WAL -Original Country Foreign Total US$ Contract Country Foreign Total US$ Estimate Contract Project CoMgonet Currency U_JSA Eaulvalent AMont Currency _gO$ Eguivalent of Cost tz Amount S.Fr. (1) (2) C.P (3) (1)*(3)xISS tl)+(2)xloo 000's 000's 000's G00's Level luffing crane for containers and general cargo (48t/222) 2.810 1.313 CL 350 - - 990 132.4

Total

1/ Using an exchange rate of US$ = 2.14 for actual costs and US$1 = P.83 for original estimate of costs. 0ote: Contingency allowances should be distributed over all project cOAponents for the original estimates of costs. CL 1 = S.81 S.Fr. (Nov. 1985) a US$1.78 $1 - 2.14 S.Fr. (i.e. $1 = 2.14 S.Fr.) Soy. ce: 64610 March 1986

41-al CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORTS PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Actual and Expected Project Implementation of Limassol Port

Percent of the DATES 0 F Works Completed Bid Receipt Contract Award Beginning of Work Completion of Work by Expected Project Component Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Completion Date One mobile container 04/82 04/82 DD harbour crane (36t) 05/82 05/82 06/82 06/82 05/83 05/83 100%

Source; b461D March 1986 CYE2IS PROJECT COMLTION REPORT SECOND PORTS PRDJECT LOAM 1540-CY)

Actual and Orininal Estimates of Project Costs of Lmassal Part

Actual Cost Ortainal Estimate of Cost ' Actual Cost as Proortion of -Local .Lal Original Country Foreign Total US$ Contract Country Foreign Total US$ Estimate Contract Protect Comonent Currency USA Eaulvalent Amount Curreny USA foivalent of sIt f Anmot DM (1) (2) C.P (3) (1)+(3)xIDO (t)+(2)xlOo Mobile Container Harbour Crane (36t) (1982) 3710000 1686000

Total

1/ Using an exchange rate of US$ = 2.14 for actual costs and US$1 = 2.83 for original estimate of costs.

Source: 64610 March 1986 60

ANNEX E Table 1 CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Traffic and Operation

Evolution of Traffic - Detailed Comments

Volume of Traffic The appraisal report by the borld Bank staff was carried cat in 1978 when there were strqng signs of recovery. Already by 1976 cargo through Limassol and Larraca had surpassed 1973 (pre-invasion) levels. This was due to a. the reconstruction boom and efforts to "replenish" households as a consequence of losses due to the war and governent efforts to reactivate the economy. b. the availability of ceent when foreign demand was high c. the high- foreign demand for Cyprus agricultural and manufactured products. d. the external factors, such as the Lebanon crisis and congestion in neighbouring ports which increased the role of Cyprus Ports as transhipment centres.

Consequently the forecasted traffic was affected by the climate of boyancy prevelent throughout the economy at the time. Traffic through Limassol and Larnaca Port was expected to increase from 2. m.o tonnes in 1977 to 4.1 m. tonnes in 1985. (See table A. for details). By 1984 traffic had reached 3.9 m. tonrn

i.e. only 0.2 mtonse short of the projected 1985 growth. However in 1985 there was a sevhre setback, slack in foreign demnd for Cyprus exports esp. cement and agricultural products and a drastic reduction in transhipment, bringing the total tonnage through these ports to 2.8 M.

The structure of traffic expected through ports was substantially different

- from what was actually .experienced.

m* a million 61 - Table I Page 2

a. Cyprus exports through Limassol and Larnaca ports decreased from 1.3 m. tanne to 0.8 million tonnes 1977 - 1984 (0.6 million est. 1985) against a forecasted Itcrease of 7% p.a. (estimate :tP 2.315 m. tonnes i.3 1985.0. The deviation is mainly due to -

1. deeae in Oement exports which accounbed for 30% of cargo through Lisassol and Larma in 1976 - 1978 from over 700,00 tomes 1976/1977 to

139,000 tonnes in 1984 and an est. 16,000 tonnes in 1985. The drop was only partly due to eement exports affected

through 1assiliko port instead of through Larmoa since there was a decline

overall, as major construction projects in importing countries were completed, as cement plants in these countries became operational and as foreign competitors quoted lower prices.

ii. the performance of other general cargo has not been steady against a forecasted'indrease of an average 13% p.a. from 0.4 m. to 1 m.

tomes 1976 - 1985 (20% upto 1977, d0cailing to 10% p.a. by 1981 and a slightly lower rate thereafter). The manufacturing sector increased by 7 1/2% p.a. 1976 - 1983, at a declining rate through the period, due to shortages in skilled labour and local Paw materials, increase in labour

cost, reduction in uorld econoic growth and energy crisis. As a result there was a lowering in the rate of investment compared to the preappraisal p9r4od 1975-1977. Also, part of the reason in low exports by sea is due to competition by air freight for items like footwear and clothing which in value term constitute the major manufacturing

activity. As for most of the items within this category there is no individual quantification in weight Weasurement it is not possible to analyse further 62 ANNEX E Table- 1 Page 3 iii. After an initial drop in agricultural products of 28%,1977-1978 there has been an increase until 1984 to 348,000 tonnes, almost to 1977 record levels. There was a problem in demand and not of productive capacity as expected at appraisal stage when exports were forecasted to increase by 3.5% p.a. upto 1981 and at 4.5% p.a. 1981-1985.

In 1985 the contrast is striking as slackening of demand reduced levels to 236,000 tonnes est., below half the expected levels. iv. The fertilizer plant which was expected to turn Cyprus from an importing to an exporting country only operated for a short period in 1982 when it proved to be unviable and it has been abandoned. Hence, Cyprus continues to import fertilizers through Limassol and Larnaca. Although this development does not affect the volume of traffic through Limassol and Larnaca ports substantially (+ 20,000 - 40,000 tonnes) it has an effect on foreign exchange saved/earned, macroeconomic magnitudes and hence indirectly translated into additional traffic and ability to finance additional developments. $ v. Mineral exports as expected have been declining but the de, lopment of new mineral reserves such as bentonite has not been able to offset overall reduction. However bentonite activated and non-activated is exported through Limassol and Larnaca ports and has counterbalanced the reduction in asbestos exports due to problems in its marketing.

(b) The overall performance of Cyprus imports through Limassol and Larnaca followed expected trends. They increased from 0.8 m to 1.3 m. tonnes 1977 - 1984, i.e. at the expected rate of 7% p.a. However, a 10% reduction to 1.2 m tonnes is estimated for 1985 as a result of the slowdown in the growth rate of the Cyprus economy. Also the structure of imports is different as:

(i) Growth was due to grain imports which doubled during the period, increasing at a rate of 8% p.a. which was much higher than the 5% expected. Hence they constituted 31%-38% of imports 1984/85, instead of 22% expected in 1985.

(ii) General cargo increased from 0.4 m. to 0.6 m. tonnes 1977-1984 which was only about 8% below expected levels. However, this is expected to drop to 0.5 m. as against 0.7 m. tonnes expected in 1985 due to the slackening of economic activity. .63 63 ANNE E Table 1 Page 4

(iii) Although iron and steel increased by 3.5% p.a. it could not have maintained the growth expected, to reach 225,000 tonnes (of 140,000 est. 1985) as construction activity would have to reach a saturation point.

(c) The greatest surprise was in transit traffic which increased from 0.3 a (1977) to 1.8 a tonnes in 1984, against a forecasted increase of 3% p.a. Even with the substantial drop in 1985 to est. 1.1 m. tonnes this is more than double the 0.4 a. expected at appraisal stage. This was the result of activities by two major shipping lines, disturbances in Lebanon and in some years congestion problem at various Middle Eastern ports. 64

ANNEX E CYP S Table 2 (a) PROJEC? COMPLETION REP0RT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-Cn)

Nuber of Containers (mptides Cyprus a Residual* of Full In - Out)

197 1976 197 97 18-90 198 19- 143 194 96 -97 99 1 9

r101 ta 2496 1586 9601 12328 17722 20876 1776 20258 21691 24599 18000 ru out 1181 3080 57P7 8237 8107 9283 6060 8614 10 10973 7000 ~ip1ts 1433 4409 3848 6104 9618 11093 t701 11644 11791 13626 11000 total $10 130715 19210 248689 31444 40712 35530 40516 43382 49198 36000 LIPPOSMI m8 LAMACA ~U in 2401 1186 960D 1230 19197 24130 23824 2584' 24380 28228 20000 2Tål l. t 1m81 3080 1717 6242 8412 9724 900 11392 12094 12969 8000 Dito 1433 440 3048 11 10108 13019 14816 14412 12151 1$219 13000 T5tal - .510 13071 19210 24720 37717 4.6k73 47848 11688 48625 16456 42000

IaITa - 1145 627 1108 3I81 6735 11300 806 11456 22909 11000 MII ut - 176 674 435 78 '7100 17820 14726 12180 31145 20000

•ae ••• 993 G028 887 8783 1721 32122 27263 24683 12706 20000 Total 4014 7329 6640 1402 3158 61322 $1785 48328 106760 63000 1HAUSL A00 LAMACA Tull in • 14 627 1108 3914 689 17007 24000 20479 46848 34000 fTll *at --- 1476 674 431 829 8074 22751 28311 27673 $1687 32000 Emptics - 883 6028 4697 8889 18150 38780 50373 52167 81391 12000 total -- 4014 7329 6~40 13672 33683 718538 10264 108310 17926 1180051

AL CR D 10 17089 2638 31360 11389 016 12616 14372 156844 236332 160000

* This radjustaant cs necessar as distinctios t~tsen Cyp s • transit epty coutal~rs was not Ullable. hence it has bem abolished. 65 ANNEX E '1 7 (b) CYPRUS

PRO'ECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

As Published - Number of Containers

1975 1976 1977 1978. 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984

CYPRUS Limassol

Full in 2496 5586 9605 12328 17722 20376 17765 20258 21691 Full out 1581 3080 5757 6237 8107 9283 8060 8614 9900 FApties 1433 4409 9876 10018 16308 20587 23145 23176 22924 Total 5510 13075 25238 28583 42137 50246 48970 52048 545IS

Limassol * Larnaca Full to 2496 5586 9605 12360 19197 2130 23824 25844 24380 Full out 1581 3080 5757 6242 8412 9724 9000 11392 12094 Empties 1433 4409 9876 10032 16850 22719 27666 24363 23343 Total 5510 13075 25238 28634 44459 56673 60498 61599 59817 TRANSIT Limassol Full in - 1545 627 1508 3881 6735 11380 9806 11465 Full out - 1476 674 435 738 7100 17820 14726 12180 Empties - 993 - 783 2090 8227 18682 15731 13550 Totai - 4014 1301 d?26 6709 22062 47882 40263 37200

Limassol * Larnaca Full in - 1545 627 1508 3954 6859 17007 2400 28479 Full out - 1476 674 435 829 8074 22751 28311 27673 Empties - 993 - 783 2147 9050 25930 40462 40975 Total 44014 1301 2726 6930 23983 65688 92773 97127

TOTAL Cyprus and 5510 17089 26539 31360 51389 80556 126186 154372 156944 236382 Transit - - -I ---

'000 tonnes containerized carg Limassol + Larnaca

Inavar 25 50 88 136 222 277 286 318 30s 322 Outward 16 37 72 80 108 126 111 148 152 153 Tranait (in.out) * 32 12* 25 63 197 474 660 711 1127

TOTAL Cyprus and 41 119 172 241 393 600 871 1126 1168 1602 Transit

Estimate 66

ANNEX E Table 3 (a) CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Summary of Cargo by Handling Method - Limassol and Larnaca Ports

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 LIKASSOL provisic- nal.

Bulk: solid 16 15 14 19 20 27 18 25 liquid 3 2 2 2 2 2 7 2 Containers 18 23 33 39 36 37 42 45 flonventional 63 60 51 40 42 34 33 28

TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

LARNACA

Bulk: solid ------neg. neg. 1 3 liquid neg. neg. neg. neg. neg. 1 2 6 Containers neg. 3 8 26 44 49 54 69 Conventional 100 97 92 74 56 50 43 22

TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

LIMASSOL AND LARNACA

Bulk: solid 11 11 10 12 12 17 13 17 liquid 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 4 Containers 12 17 25 34 39 42 46 53 Conventional 75 70 63 52 47 39 36 26

TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 CYPRUS

PROJECT CO~PLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJEC KLOAN 1540-CY)

Cargo Through Ports and Terminals - by >ode of Handling

1718 1919 1980 1981 1982 1983 ° i's LU. Ler. OU~r lot. L.. tr. ather lot. uå Lr. wmTt. LID. Lur. Other * u&. tr. v Lt Lar. Ibt. Lic. Larhk.

2 - 1 - -- - M - JU ------95 6- - 9 »

~m 226- - 226 258 - - 258 252 - - 2523 - - 3735- -305438- - 4384 - -

fath - - 150 19D - - 155 155 -- 89 89 - - 63 63 17 - 29 46 19 -58 7 15 12 92 119 there 6- 6 14 9 - 15 4 6 - 27 33 12 - - 12 68 5 8 158 57 837 102 5 -. - 5?

EPt-ulang- -a - 9-- 6 101 44 1 I M 1 11 1148 19 45 101 Mg! 4 19 1_ 1394 14 .121 IM 186 21 IM62

»ltroe- 9 67 - - -I - 19 - - - -81 - 1 8 - - 1 -1199 M99 1494 17 137D ma 38- - 38 44- - 44 36 - 36 45- - 45 49 - 49 47 - - 47 37 - 37 - 5 - - 7 - 7 - 11 • I- 11 - 1- 19 10 29 - 14 16 3 -17 8 25

263 . - 2631 082 - 41 - 669 -1 - 16s& - 11 1 -WI al3 241 mg. - 241 371 - 393 537 63 - 600655 216 - 81 503 - 126643 55 - 1168 60 - 1601 &PI 22 oas. - 22 37 1 - 38 58 6 - 64 4 23 - 10? 52 -13D 73 56 - 19 1 61- 194 arma~ - 6 -- 1- 6n M 66 MTsi6 61 -la ism 7OraL 1460 664 1134 3258 175 109 1348 32 802 839 1264 911 926 3919 1956 1395 912 195 1392 4449 261 289 1410 5372

2164 113> 32158 284 138 2641 1264 m83 9 33 5 310? 32 3902 1470 5312

Us.s Biamnn A>tili S=~~~~ =L h at~s Imr. m amaamso See au s ftr asrem 68 iNExE Table 3 (b)

CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Notes:-

Through Li=ssc! these were usually carets and scrap iron. Since 1SE2 mostly scya bean meal. Tnrough "other" these are again some variety of =!nerals/earth through Vassilico except for 65,000 tonnes of cement in 1982

** Bunkering is included under oil Terminals except for the operations of 1-2 boats now used for bunkering through Limassol/Larnaca ports since 1954.

* Usually edible oil. Although part of this was in the past handled through pipelines at the oil Terminals it was for convenience in computations included under Larnaca Port. In 1982/3 under "other" It refers to sulphuric acid and ammonia handled at Vassilico*Port. **** Zacades ro-ro carp. ---

I l a e -

IRCR98

E if

a,~uaauI I1 1!

- - - fl-E5-1 -- - -

- f -- [ -M - -- --

s GE'I* II

- - -~ - f

~ - 2 - -

.~.!_ _ _ _- - CYFRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Distribut:on of Traffic - Between Limassol and Larnaca '000 Tonnes

1978 l979 1980 195 1986 17 3985 1989 1981 r98 ~ 3 1984 (ProeSa.> Porecast forest Porcast Forecast LiM. r. LI,. Lar. ia. Lar. LIM. Lar. LiM. Lar. Li.. lar. LI.. Lar. Lie. Lar. LiM. Ler. LI. Lar. Li. Lar. LI.. Lar. la. Lar. 1tatoe 1 214 6 1 M i 148 Cis 4 1 1 10 - 5 115 5 t 1 15 i i.2W9.05I0 513 5 - -. 1 t u i 1 - - 5- = - 15 - 15 - f - - -- - . - - - - - 0 1 - il - Asesos-am-.. 4 1 4 1 -=- a=- - 4 - - --

ta1e - -5 -T -4 ?0WBL Om 598576 118 572S0 667Sn 65780870 674785 9750615 517 US.481 68350003483 717 ,481 70 47? C

qe3n2 06 - - - Tr~st I i -i -W 720 1 9 1 77 3,3 27 1 M 9 230 2U3 169 300 473 403M 21395 235 283 249 291 22286 272 283 283 27 MUAL IUT $0:26 5 22 567 a T63 50 2 52 8 6 7se 572 1 67 18427 1657 3 7 85 m 165 01 7 l? 9 97101858 7 239 625 7 665U 4321 63 50 73 1248 17 48915730 99*77

FobeQ*ro of~ Gmtsaiab

10> CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

% Distribution of Traffic - Between Limassol and Larnaca Ports

1988 1989 1990 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

LIM LR LIM R LIM LAR LIM LAR LIN LAR LIM LAR LIM LR LIM LAR LIM LAR LIM LAR. LIM LAR LIM LAP .IW LAF

XP~RT 4 96 4 96 4 96 4 96 99 2 98 neg. 100 - 100 4 96 otatoes 5 95 2 98 4 96 2 98 1 90 10 90 10 91 9 85 15 94 6 90 10 89 11 89 11 i 22 76 24 84 16 75 25 78 22 itus 100 -- 100 ------100 -- 100 -- 100 -- 100 -- 100 -- 10 - 100 -- 90 10 100 -- 100 - 100 - 100 - s 100 -- 100 - 100 -- 100 - 100 - 100 100 -- 100 -- 100 -- 100 -- 100 -- 20 80 20 80 20 80 50 201 20 0 20 80 20 80 20 80 - rots -- 100 17 83 -- 100 5 95 9 91 -- 0 -- 1020,1oo -- 100 -- 98 2 9 loo - 25 bestos 100 -- 100 -- k-,0117 78 22 - 60 38 62 22 67 33 62 54 46 25 75 22 eKnt 35 65 41 69 40 100 -- 100 -- --- ,-100 - 1 -100 -- 100 100 nes _____ 100 -- 100 -- 100 - -- 100 -7- -1 29 13 87 ------nerls ------U,QIC1UM -- -- 17 03 17 83 17 83 17 82 19 -- 21 88 11 83 17 83 1' 83 ther 91 9 96 4 77 23 76 24 btotal 67 33 69 31 69 31 70 30 5 50 48 52 51 49 62 38 71 29 68 32 CTPRUS) 49 51 53 47 50 50 46 54i 48 52 49 51 50 50 74 48 52 36 64 54 46 -38 62 45 55 rensi 77 23 78 24 84 16 26 59 41 60 40 61 39 48 52 54 58 42 SS 45 58 42 42 aut Total 51 -49 56 44 55 45 56 44 46 100 -- MPORTS -- 100 -- 100 - 100 1-- 100 -- 100 -- -- 100 -- 100 -- 100 -100 -- 100 -- 100 80 20 rain 100 82 18 80 20 80 20 1 80 20 80 20 97 3 91 9 93 7 6 38 86 14 91 9 33 67 33 67 åb 9 73 32 68 2 , 33 67 13 67 33 67 ertiliers 40 60 42 58 26 74 53 47 28 72 dper and 100 -- 100 -- 100 -- 100 -- 100 -- 5 *2 8 88 12 99 1 98 2 100 -- 100 -- rb. 95 5 95 85 15 85 15 Ö5 15 Ö5 15 G 15 86 14 6 97 3 88 12 8 18 86 14 89 11 85 15 Iron and Ste#I 94 5 95 5 94 6 94 6 94 6 94 6 11 80 20 96 4 95 s- 95 5 95 - nioal fod. 100 - 9 5 89 ------100 -- 100 ------etroem 100 - 100 - 100 -- 10 21 13 88 12 , 21 79- 21 79 21 79 21 79 21 79 her 88 2 83 17 76 24 71 29 77 23 71 Sabtotal 88 88 12 9 89 11 87 13 88 12 88 12 88 12 12 91 9 88 12 84 16 8 18 86 14 91 5 (CYPRUS) 4 57 5 4 48 49 51 5so 50 11 9 4 92 8 7 27 50 50 38 62 52 48 sit89 - 74 26 575 -25 7 24 77 2 23 91 9 88 12 85 15 8 20 75 25 75 2 7 AL IN 33 66 37 68 32 68 32 69 31 70 30 7 2 OTA; 69 31 71 29 68 32 67 33 63 39 61 38 67 46 _ ters of quay 67 33 67 33 67 33 641 36 fl 37 64 36 60

/EN 72 ANNEX E Table 5 (c) CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION R;PORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Distribution of Cargo ('000 tonnes)

1976 1977 % 1979 % 1981 4 1983 1 1984 1 1985

LIMASSOL Projected 1606 1810 67 2010 66 2210 66 2610 71 2820 69 Actual 1584 1640 69 1715 71 1911 67 1912 62 2613 66 2036 65 LARNACA Prov sioi, Projected 718 885 33 1020 34 1115 34 1060 29 1255 31 Actual 709 .745 31 709 29 926 33 1195 30 1289 34 1083 35 rov± iont 1

Distribution of Cargo %

Porecast 1979 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1990 Lim. Lar. Lix. Lar Lim Lar. Lim. Lar Lia Lar Lin Lar L. Lar.

Cyprus Exporti 53 47 50 SO 48 52 S1 49 62 38 71 29 70 30

Cyprus Iaports 88 12 82 18 86 14 91 9 89 11 87 13 88 12 Total Cyprus 70 30 65 35 66 34 73 27 79 21 82 18 82 18 Transit 83 17 73 27 49 51 37 63 S3 47 40 60 50 so 73

CYPRUS ANX E Table 6 PROJRCT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Ships '000 NRT

19M5 iff6 Ign1M218 m1 18 18 1983 19345 193S5

Psngr1,470 1,034 886 1,059 1,57 1,6&4 1,915 2,22 oueum1nt *., 2,067 1,395 1,986 1,751 2,53? 1,908 1,285 1,558 849 1,00? 1,150 1,496 1,965 2,508 2,040 239m-o 458 378 261 52L 628 692 625 Muk Ca~ie o =Lvt.l 115 114 106 139 203 22 346 312 Tr 27 28 22 27 89 512 1,204 1,149 f~ 77 77 37 27 45 16 76 66 ~Whar - 1 208 42

______2,!ffi 3,02? 3,583 4,561 3*m5 1,4 4 6,0 6.4 8,3 8,018

102 97 114 143 2S 571 371 75% 621 561 10 589 959 1,610 498 309 I 58 188 453 913 923 1,197 761 MM- 9 15 '13 22 32 100 157 car• 0• » 5 1% r-' 1 6 158 160 2 26 8 42 - 28 .32 P 10 1,130 270 612 1,315 71? 739 738 941 1,211 2,221 3,152 3,87? 2,460

1,572 1,132 1,000 1,202 1,1 2,255 2,286 2,989 e2,688 1,936 2,626 2, 3,491 3,586 1,86 1,932 6.07 1,155 1, 2,09 2,888 3,05 2,800 ReE le 473 391 -279 550 660 992 782 a1 183 152 164 233 25 386 345 m502 6m2 584 . 648 1,366 1,468 2,053 2,183- 83 79 L%3 87 16 104, 98 h . 11 1,338 310 TO?0 AL: 3,624 8,669 5,135 5,896 j 5,112 5,971 6,273 9,5?? 11,139 I r ,

S ne,=y et by owstrton. 74

ANEX E CYPRUS Table 7

PROJECT CONPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (WAN 1540-CY)

Number of Ships by Type

-- . ... --- .. w 15 l6 1? 1978 1979 190 1981 1-82 1953 19-4 ag 261 219 296 379 30 2 41 501 544 513 eKN es 1,818 1,521 1,872 1 1,547 1,33 1,054 1,381 an7 a 355 356 539 783 O 943 1,643 820 165 182 143 142 195 240 327 255 Ga ~ .24 30 2? 2 Gl 60 93 52 t~ 27 40 27 28 32 22 28 60 64 102 103 il9 21 9 7 15 3 27 20 - - 1 84 87 T 0 T A L 1,976 2,917 2,880 2,788 2.538 2,881 2,888 3,140 3,195 3,879 3,231.

.sta 6 ------635 - --416 cOmmftv~ .8...... 4 6- 101 .2 916 ,81 97 .521 .3 ana1 36 8 8 '371 389 516 380 k-4»11 18 18 15 18 10 39 32 SW1 gea*• - - - . • • • - 2 s- 8 . 4 i 45 42. 1fere . 4 9 15 28 17 21 *Omar. .. . . E.. . 18 32 98 T iTA L 569 1,352 1,16c 1,38 1,122 219 1,329 1,631 1,648 1,832 1,301

32 251 388 4138 39 311 371 676 800 1,001 929 2,986 2,600 2,995 2,520 2,498 2,322 1,7^0 1,760 a P07 506 422 626 99 1.231 1,332 2,164 1,200 h7b 200 161 157 213 250 366 287 70 100 76 43 64 83 122 61 m14 160 144* 161 20 251 323 323 fpP 2 1a 2n 43 3 44 41 2. 1. 19 309 188 1 0 T : 2,689 4,564 4,268 14,191 3,861 4,331 4,269 5,315 5,060 6,075 4,793 Sy =, e bl wt ~on. U=Wol: iok arrir" fbr gainst tank~rs 30 tbr wins untl 1981, later year inmi. other; reer until 1981 fbr rapes, subseqent years imL other. D etaild ~ ~aYais =t Oviabe 1975-1977. CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Average Net Registered Tonnage

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

L IMASSOL- -

Passenger 3,879 3,379 3,294 3,530 2,774. 3,361 3.520 4,345 Conventional 1,137 882 1,061 1,092 1,637 1,423 1,219 1.128 Container 1, 54 2,199 1,868 1,469 1,739 2,084 J,522 2,487 Ro-Ro 1,448 2,516 2,643 1,838 2,708 2,617 2,728 2,450 Bulk Carrier 4,792 3,800 3,926 5,792 4,951 3,667 3,720 6,000 Tanker 964 873 1,000 964 4,817 8,000 11,803 11,155 Reefer 4,053 3j667 4,111 3,857 3,000 S,333 2,815 3,300 Other 1,000 2,476 483 TOTAL 1.242 1 .244 1.h3s6- .iuS1 1MA I.S78 1,aon0a 9 4.14 781

LARNACA Passenger 1,729 2,256 2,7-14 1,857 1,096 1,910 801 1,817 Conventional 532 550 569 643 1,008 1,756 956 1,006 Container 1,000 1,611 1,721 2,199 2,461 2,373 2.320 2,002 Ro-Ro 818 533 722 1,200 1,222 3,200 2,564 4,906 Bulk Carrier - - - - 833 3,200 Tanker - 2,500 - - 250 400 3,511 3,809 Reefer 6,000 500 ,889 533 1,500 - 1,647 1,523 Other - - - -S 5,022 2,755 TOTAL 1.076 973 '616 97 6S8 736 9S .62. 1913 1.903 1:98M LINASSOL 4

Passenger 3,589 3,241 3,219 3,188 2,132 2,819 2,270 3,213 Conventional 901 752 876 928 1,397 1,556 1,132 1,106 Container 1,593 2,149 1,848 1,621 1,957 2,168 1,712 2,334 Ro-Ro 1,409 2,365 2,428 1,777 2,582 2,640 2,710 2,724 m Bulk Carrier 4,792 3,800 3,926 5,792 4,951 3,667 3,545 5,754 m Tanker 964 970 1,000 964 4,531 6,557 9,265 9,027 Reefer 4,150 3,160 3,500 1,591 2,023 5,333 2,364 2,390 Other - . 579S 4,330 1,681 LTOTAL 1205 1,017 1,063 19316 1,282 1,289 1,366 1,775 2,095 2,087 2,312 CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Number of Ships by Type

m*mnæm l l i 19-76 5r,7 ap7s 19F 1980 1981 ]P9.2 193 39t4 19

Po.sseage 25:, n22 676 800 1,007 929 4 2,00 * 2,320 ' 2,498 2,300 1,375 ].tie e .. .. :356 .422 125 ...989 1,231 1,332 2,164 1,200 ReRo- 76··.40 61' 57 213 250 .366 2 7 aulk c... 3 .-- 7 .24 -4 .99 Taker 28 34 22 .'.28 ..64 ·79 347 1453 eefer 20. 25 1- 22 43 3 44 41 Other 19 309 385 TOTAL 2,345 4,269 4,044 4 j26 3,660 4.u0 4,117 4,771 4,843 5,711 4,532

000s IMT DF SBTYP -m

P aeger 1,572 1,131 1,000 1,202 1,441 Coaveatomal 2,255 2,286 2,985 2,688 1,956 2,626 2,340 3,491 3,578 3,783 1,867 Co .t....r...573,55.907 .6032,409 2,888 3,705 2,801 - 248 473 .sol& Carrier 391 279 550 660 992 782 -113 114 106 -139 203 .220 351 328 Taker 27 33 Reefeir 22 .27 . 290 518 1'362 1,309. '3 79 .63 35 87 16 104 98 Otr - 7AL067 - .- - il 1,338 312. 1 4 4300 '5308 4,693 1,33 325 18,471 ,lr14611,921 10,481 77 ANNEX E Table 10 CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Comparison of Actual Trends in Ships with Expected Trends

Limassol and Larnaca Ports

I. verLLL (a) Number of ships (excl. passenger ships)

As per appraisal Actuals

1976 3,200 ) 6 1976 4,018 ) ) 1985 5,200 ) 1984 4,704 ) )m .1985 ) ) (prov.) ) )

(b) TOTAL NRT AVERAGE NRT APPRASAL ActualeAtul

1976 ) 17% 1976 ) 1055 ) expeted NURT to 1984 ) ) 141% .1984 ) ) 127% inorease at a 1985 ) 1985 ) hghr rate than ...... mber of ohips I. Container ships Average NRT Actual Apraisal

1976 ) ) expected higher 1984 ) ) than overall ) average NRT increase

III. Bulk Carrier Averale NRT

Actual Apraisal

1976 ) ) expected higher 1984 ) -26% ) than overall 1985 e ) average (prov.) )

Comments: A frequency analysis of'. sizes of ships shoved that average NX% is not representative as it in affected by extremes. e.g. Out of 376 container ships which called at Larnaca 213 ahips had an NRT of less than 800 tbile 62 ships had an NRT of over 4,000.

* Inc. Limassol 01 Port Had it been excluded it would have made substantial Impact on 1976 but not since 1983.

00 The docrease is believed to bo due to the use of bulk carriers for trades other than grain. 78 ANNEX E Table 11 CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Routing of Inward Cargo through Part Areas* tonnes

LIMAS SOL LARtNACA

SRE YARD DELIVERl SHIP TrlWAL ST OE .AYARD DLv-MRy SHIP TOTAL

Cyprus 106,000 225,000 431,000 - 762,000 12,000 8,000 55,000 - 75,000 1978 Transit 20,000 55,000 35,000 100,000 1,000 2,000 10,000 - 13,000 Total 126,000 280,000 456,000 - 862,000 13,000 10,000 65,000 - 88,000

Cyprus 930,000 122,000 1979 Transit n.a. n.A. n.a. n.a. 127,000 n.a. n.a. 0.a. n.a. 15,000 Total 1,057, 137,000 Cyprus 120,000 280,000 407,000 - 807,000 155,000 1980 Transit 45,000 120,000 26,000 - 191,000 n.a. n.a. n.a. n0a. 17,000 Total 165,000 ,000 433,000 998,000 172,000 Cyprus 100,000 240,000 494,000 - 834,000 177,000 1981 Transit 61,000 162,000 27,000 - 250,000 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 92,000 Total 161,000 402,000 521.000 - 1,084,000 269,000

Cyprus 110,000 300,000 514,000 - 924,000 153,000 1982 Transit 42,000 158,000 17,000 13,000 230,000 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 232,000 Total 152,000 458,000 531,000 13,000 1,154,000 385,000

Cyprus 98,000 302,000 650,000 - 1,050,000 9,000 42,000 46,000 97,000 1983 Transit 13,000 156,000 19,000 - 188,000 40,000 271,000 2,000 313,000 Total 111,000 458,000 669,000 - 1,238,000 49,000 313,000 48,000 410,000 ------_____ Cyprus 110,000 377,000 677,000 - 1,164,000 8,000 38,000 94,000 - 140,000 1984 Transit 30,000 347,000 10,00 87,000 474,000 32,000 403,000 2,000 6,000 443,000 .Total 140,000 724,000 687,000 87,000 1,638,000 40,000 441,000 96,000 6,000 583,000

Cyprus 105,000 347,000 718,000 - ,170,000 9,000 54,000 96,000 - 59,000 1985 Transit 19,000 183,000 16,000 7,000 235,000 2,000 360,000 - 23,000 85,000 Total_ 124,000 530,000 734,000 7,000 1405,000 11,000 414,000 96,000 23,000 44,000

* Figures are estimates based on large samples of data CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Cyprus Ports Authority

Movement of Passengers - by Sea ('000)

1978 1979 1980 1981 .. - 1982

In Dut Exc Total In out Exc. Total in out Exc. Total ta Out E=. Total In Out Exe. Tota Limassol 35.Is 36 66.N 137.8 39.3 39.8 52.5 131.6 45 5 4 3.5 133.5 48.9 48.1 54.9 161.9 59.4 63.6 50 173 ------Lar.aca 5.9 3.3 6. 15.8 2.3 2.3 6.6 11.2 2.3 2.4 6.6 11.3 2.5 1.3 7.9 11.7 24.1 19.4 8.7 52. Total 41.9 38.7 73 153.6 41.6 42.1 59.1 142.9 47.3 47.4 50.1 144.8 51.4 49.4 72.8 173.6 83.6 33.5 58.7 225.

19LJ 1984 1sanl 1D86 1987 In Out Exc. Total In Out Exc. Total In Out Exc. Total In Out Exc. Total In Out Exc. TotU Li 170.3 74.8 a5.- j-ro 73.6 77.4 93.7 234.7 59.11 66.1 41.3 217.1 Larnz:a 35.5 17.1 :.,a .5 41.8 5.8 92.3 39.5 42.5 8.6 90.6 [ Tota. 10S.0 96.9 i4.4 297.5 116.3 119.2 b. 327.0 98.6 108,.6 100.5 307.7

I.. 80

Table 13

CYPRUlS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CYI

Rarkh OCCcc (Average Daily)

Nov.- Jan. Paeentan of Utiiztion 12Z= I1=21926 12ZZ 12 1 12= 1= 12M 1m8 12A 1I8= 2M Limassol New 76 91 93 89 92 90 89 76 75 81 71

Limassol Old 58 78 72 66 75 82 86 40 26 30 14

Larnaca 68 88 69 57 70 76 67 65 58 66 52 60'

Average incl. Old Port - - 83 76 82 84 81 68 64 70 58

Average excl. Old Part - - 85 78 83 84 80 71 68 75 63 Numer of Ships

Limassol New 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 10 10 11 10

Limassol Old 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 2 1 1 1

Larnaca 3 4 4 4 6 6 S 7 6 7 5 QuaX Length Uds; For Larnaca On 326 m until June 1977 On 526 metres since July 1977 On 866 metres since 22/10/81 * On 426 m as 100 metres of quay were not available. Jan. - March. due to construction works. For Limassol

New Port on 820 m until 1982 mid. Feb; On 1280 m. since 1982 mid. - Feb. Old Port on 240 metres. Barth _ccugancX Anraisal Exnactatigns X Utilization

Nov.- Jan. 12Zm 12 12 128 122 MA1 1281 1981 1281 128m 151 128 With Existing Facilities 88 89 87 92 95 97 With Proposed Limassol and Larnaca Expansions 64 68 72 75 79

64610 June 1986 81

ANNEX E CYPRUS Table 14

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Crane Utilization

LIMASSOL Tota'A hours used

Type of crane units 1980 1981 1982 1983 1964 1985

Luft..n 1 2780 2868 2989 2448 2670 1467 FloatIME 1 2034 2583 1459 1161 1892 1183 0**0 Cottwald 1 - - - 1394 3061 1575 2 - 1061 3349

Subt,t&l 5 4814 5451 4448 5003 8664 7574

Mbile -- 5 6 *7262 7089 4883 4279 17 1001 Mobile 7-16 3 4701 3789 3649 3414 4774 2642

Subtetal . 9 11963 10878 8532 7693 6520 3643 TOTAL 10 i6777 16329 12980 12696 15204 11217 ILRNACA

Type of crane No & 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

Lufting 1 1180 1638 1846 1438 1952 1599

Subtotal 1 1180 1638 1846 1438 1952 1599

Mobile - 5 3266 2942 2210 1433 2351 1381 Mobile 7-16 !4 8195 7142 6672 5501 3864 1855

Subtotal 8 11461 10084 8882 6934 6215 3236

ToA. 9 12641 11722 10728 8372 8167 4835

Another 5 cranes that did not work ** S;nce September 1984 * 5 cranes, one did not work **** Since Hay (partly) CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Rate of Discharging/Loading (Productivity)

LIMASSOL LARNACA LIMASSOL AND LARNACA

Tonnes Tonnes per Tonnes gang hours Tonnes:.per Tomes Tonnes per '000 gang hours gang hour '000 gang hour '000 gang hours gang hour

1978 1,460 44,422 33 664 20,473 32 a?124 64,895 33 1979 1,775 48,494 37 709 22,980 31 2,484 71,474 35 1980 1,802 44,472 41 839 23,100 36 2,641 67,572 39 1981 1,911 39,985 48 926 19,967 46 2,837 59,952 47 1982 1,956 45,962 43 1,255 23,432 54 3,211 69,394 46 1983 1,912 36,613 52 1,195 21,030 57 3,107 57,643 54 1984 2,463* 46,133 53 1,283* 22,996 56 3,746* 699129 54 1985 2,013 32,079 62 1,037 13,868 74 3,050* 45,947 66 (Provis.)

* Do not include petroleum gang hour a points of loading/unloading

/DP 83 ANNEX E I; Table 16

É in -~

I: -%

ti i 9.~ LU øi dl

Sis

2 1

__ _ IIIN______. @ - e.. CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Tonnage per Meter of Quay (1975-1985)

1975 1976 1977 1978 19?9 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984

A.L1uassol a) 0000 Tomes

Now Port t.a. ri.a. a.a. 1238 1418 1441 1605 1815 a.a. a.a. ma. Old Port n.a. 0.a. n.a. 222 331 342 306 141 n.a. n.m. nm.a Totl 9d 1584 1640 1460 1749 1783 1911 1956 1912 2463 2D13 Including w 924 15841 1640 1460 1775 1802 1911 1956 1912 2613 2036 b)Matre3 er Quay New Port 82U 620 820 820 820 820 820 1222 1280 1210 1280

Old 1ort 24(0 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240

Total 1060 1060 1060 1060 1060 1060 1060 1462 1520 1520 1520 c)Tonnes per setre Now Port n.a. n.a. n.a. 1510 1729 1751 1957 1485 1494 20m1 1%3 Old Port n.a. n.a. n.a. 925 1379 1425 1257 588 *** Boes go"

Over all b?5 I*194 15417 1377 1650 1682 1803 1338 1258 1620 131 B. Larnaca a)*000 Toes 390 709 745 664 701 822 926 1255 1195 1283 MR? m Including as 391 709 745 664 709 839 926 1255 1195 - 1289 108 b)MetreS ori o n 326 326 42b* 526 526 526 591 866 866 866 86 )ToTeas per etre 1221 2175 1749 1262 1333 1563 1567 1449 1380 1482. 1197

Please see next vaee for notes CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (WAN 1540-CY)

Tonnage per Meter of Quay (1975-1985)

C. aIJ$ssat Am L4p1&cA

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

*000 tones (excl. 1,326 2,293 2,385 1,902 2,119 2,263 2,531 3,070 3,107 3,746 3,050 tonns of old port and SS, mherepossible)

mres o quay and 1,386 1,386 1,486 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,411 2,088 2,146 2,146 2,146 pontoons

bnmage per metre 957 1,654 1,605 1,413 1,574 1,681 1,794 1,470 1,448 1,745 1,421

......

'Ø 1-3t Ibc. CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Tonnage per Meter of Quay (1975-19s5)

Notes

8) Tranahipment cargo excluded Irof above cargo -

Limassol year Subtotal Larnaea new Port Old Port I I _ I I Basis it estimates 1979(est) 25,000 1,000 26,000 8,000 1979 - April-3ept.: Nev a 24,501 Old a 1,012 1980(est) 19,000 .ea. 19,000 17,000 Lanaca a 7,726 1984Vest) 150,000 150,000 6,000 190.- Jan.-Mkys tew a 16.154 Old a neg. Larnat a 16,154 2) a. a ship to ship le. transhipment cargo 3) Althoughntervening years there was some transhipment cargo, It is not possible to make estimates. 4)a Since 326 metres until June, 526 metres July-Dec., agi average figure Was Used. However it Dast be noted that for LArnaCa, due to marked seasonality in cargo movments (marked peak duriag potato-season April-May-June, the average figures are not representative. Spa handling 5)** 820 metres until Oid ftsb. 198, 1280 metrus since aid Feb. 1982 a 1222 mtes average for year Uweable quay for cargal 820 mtres until mid Feb. 1982, 1310 metres siooe mid Feb. 1982 a 1249 0 0 a 8 (this to not used here) 64ae The not quay lensth available for berthing shAips is 1280 metres. The quay length by construction Io 1310 metres. 7)*000 Sine 1982 utilization of Limassol Old Port has dropped dramatically, and oargp through the port to at very low . levels. So for 1963/84 a calculation is made as it all caro4 soved via the New Port, which Is not unrealistle 60** 526 metres until 21.10.81; 866 metres since 22.10.81, average 591 9) For Mamsol 01d Port 240 metres of usable quay Is used as a base 10) For Larnaca Port 200 metres berthing space available on pontoons are included as *quaysO.

Ippraisal Report: 1976 . 1700 tonnes per metre of quay at Limassol; 2,200 tename per metre of quay at Lar&C0 1000 * * * * t LimaseolU Old Port 87 ANNEX E Tble 18 CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Tonnage per Gang Hour

Louis Berger 197 1979 1980 - - ~Average Range- - - 1975 Future App. LIM. LAR LIM. LAR.

1. Cement 31 50 38-50 50 49-65 50 50 49 57 on 2. Fertilizers 28 37 38-50 26 20-30 24 30 22 29 ** 3. Sugar 38-50 32 25 4. Potatoes 30 44 38-50 25 24 21 5. Carrots 17 6. Animal Fodders 25 7. Asbestos 25-31 33-64 50 43 8. Citrus 25 37 25-31 20 17-24 17 23 16 23 (on pallets) 0 9. Grapes 25-31 12-24 9 (on pallets) 10. Iron+Steel 19 29 30 30-38 30 27 20 o 11. Timber 7.5 13 25-31 40-50 45

12. Paper and paperboard 20 20-36 20 33 13. General 12-15 13 13 13 13 JI, Containers - 10 7-10 64 54 63 69 units units units 15. Cb 23 16. Ro-Ro 85 40 94 17. Cars 18. Grains 165 90 106 19. Wines 35 50 20. Bentonite 54 21. Scrap Iron 14-23

App. a Appraisal by World Bank 1978 * palletized ** bagged

/DP CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Berthing Delays, Service Time - by Type of Ship

a. LSMSGOL AMD IIACA

1979 1e4 19e (provisional) kver.g service time

No. called No. delayed Delay Service No. called o. delayed Delay Service Mo. called No. delayed delay ervice 197S 1984 1985 Container 433 174 i536 5892 1314 242 8078 22382 1200 70 1772 17270 17.4 17.0 14.4 so -110 193 42 1203 2801 366 31 782 51411 287 12 370 3404 14.5 14.0 11.9 Passenger 346 - -- 2562 1009 -- -- 18285 929 -- -- 13525 7.4 18.1 114.6 Other 2688 575 29242 106267 3022 442 21003 106346 2116 64 1952 72552 39.5 35.2 34.3 Total 3660 791 36337 119166 5711 715 29863 152154I 4532 146 1094 106751 32.6 26.6 23.5

b. LIASSOL CD 00 Container 397 173 5867 7090 665 235 7948 12942 820 70 1772 10557 17.9 15.0 12.9 -- So-p-- 175 42 1203 2693 327 29 7481 4438 255 12 370 2876 15.5 13.6 11.3 Parsener 306 - -- 2288 _ _ -- - 41909 513 -- -- 495 7.5 9.0 9.6 Other 1660 551 27667 65058 2143 384 Total: New 1927 71995 1643 62 1890 5093L 39.2 33.5 30.9 Old Port 1866 632 237180 $3036 670 134 7557 24102 Total 2538 766 34737 77138 3079 648 2697 94184 " 1441 4032 69219 30.4 21.3 21.4 c. LARNIACA

Container 36 1 251437 I 49_igos gg_ .. - 6713 1.1 Ro-Ro 1s - 108 20 7 39 2 34 703 32 - -- 528 6.0 18.0 16.5 Passenter 4S- 274 465 -- 837b 416 -575 6,4 28.F 20.6 Other 1025 24 1575 1209 879 58 272 3141 4M73 2 Total 62 21716 40.2 39.2 45.9 1122 25 1600 42028 1832 67 2884 57970 1a51 2 3B753 37*b 31.68.g

194 - 1985: Ships are classified by construction not by use lIt 89 ANNEX E Table 20 CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

AVERAGE SERVICE TIME PER SHIP (hours)

Limassol Larnaca Total

1979 30.4 37.5 32.6

1980 25.7 n.a. n.a.

1982 23.1 30.8* n.e.

1983 24.5 n.a.

1984 24.3 31.6 26.6

1985 21.4 28.8 23.5

______I______I I J

* 3 months sample

/EN 90 ANNEX E Table 21 CYPRUS PagePg 1 PROJECT COMPLETION REPOPT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

LZMASSOL AND LARNACA

TRID IN AVERAGE SH.I? LMQA

...... YR TONNAGE NO. OF AVERAGE TONNAGE '000 SHIPS PER SHIP ...... I......

1975 1,326 2,545 . 521 1976 2,293 4,269 537 1977 2,385 4,044 590 1978 2,124 4,026 527 1979 2,484 3,660 679 1980 2,641 4,160 635 1981 2,837 4,117 689 1982 3,211 4,771 673 1983 3,107 4,843 641 1984 3,902 5,711 683 1985 3,119 4,516 691 provisiona t ...... 91 ANNEX E Table 21 CYPRUS Page 2 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Average tonnage handled per ship called

LIMASSOL LARNACA Year Tcnpage Ships onnage T onnage Ships Tonnage per ship per ship

1978 1,460,000 2,788 524 664,000 1,238 536

1979 1,775,000 2,538 699 709,000 1,122 632

1980 1,802,000 2,881 625 839,000 1,279 656

1981 ,,911,000 2,888 662 926,000 1,229 753

1982 1,956,000 3,140 623 1,255,000 1,631 769

1983 1,912,000 3,195 598 1,195,000 1,648 725

1984 2,613,000 3,879 674 1,289,000 1,832 703

1985 2,036,000 3,223 632 1,083,000 1,293 837 provisionak , 92 ANNEX E Table 22

CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 140-CY)

Tonnage per Ship Day in Port

TONNAGE '000 SHIP DAYS AT BERTH AVERAH 0P PDA SHZP DA Y LIMASSOL LAINACA TOTAL LIASSOL LARNACA TOTAL LANACA TOTAL NEW PORT NEW PORT NEW PORT

1975 928 398 1326 2555 1095 3650 363 363 363 1976 1584 709 2293 2928 1464 4392 541 484 $2 1977 1640 745 2385 2920 1460 4380 562 510 544 1978 1238 664 1902 2920 1468 4380 424 455 434 1979 1418 701 2119 2920 2190 5110 486 320 415 1980 1441 822 2263 2928 2196 5124 492 374 442 1981 1605 926 2531 2928 1825 4745 548 507 533 1982 1815 1255 3070 3650 2555 6205 497 491 495 1983 1912 1195 3107 3650 2190 5840 524 546 132 1984 2463* 1283' 3746 4026 2562 6588 611 501 569 1985 2013 1037 3050 3650 1825 5475 551 568 557 Provisional 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

Note: Excluding ship to ship cargo No. of ship days at berth a Average number of ships at berth per day multiplied by number of days in year. 93 ANNEX E Table 23

CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY) Utilization of Storage Areas

A. a) Storage areas available (0quare metres)

LIMASSOL (excl. Old Port) LARNACA Storage area 1978 1982 1984 1985 1978 1992 1984 1985

Transit Sheds 24,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 6,000 18,000 18,000 18,000

Paved area 100,000 170,0081340,000 340,000 15,000 155,000 170,000 170,000

Containers 50,000 90,000 200,000 200,000* No spe- 40,000 55,000 cific 55,000

Other 50,000 80,000 140,000 140,000 15,000 116,000 115,000 115,000

2 * including 42,000 a gravel beds

* plus 40,000 a2 unpaved but used for general cargo, cars etc. b) Tonnage through storage areas

Transit sheds 126,000 152,000 140,000 124,000 13,000 n.a. 40,000 11,000

Open area 280,000 458,000 724,000 530,000 10,000 n.a. 441,000 414,000

c) Tonnage per square metre

Transit sheds 5.25 3.8 3.5 3.1 2.2 n.a. 2.2 0.6

Open qLrea 2.8 2.7 2.1 1.6 0.7 n.a. 2.6 2.4

B. % of area utilized*

LIMASSOL LARNACA 2 2 ) - A-N-C Shed No. Area (m ) - - Area (m available** 1983 1984 1985 available ** 1983 1984 1985

1 5200 74 90. 78 2430 62 67 55

2 2800 46 69 80 1640 64 59 10

3 6900 n.a. 89 74 7000 neg. 28 0.5 4 7100 70 82 79

5 3800 90 90 79 _ _ - -- vera 25988 8 1070 2 41 14 /EN on useful area avae[ 4lly exc store(3) 07 63 s 37 CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Berthing Delaya

(a) For s]ll aft Actual 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1 1983 1984 1935

No. Days do. ys ao. Days mo. vaya mo. Dys mo. Rays Bo. 1&ysM o. DaysMays N.abs Day8 No. No.

267 317 915 2059 847 2206 655 8117 766 1446 721 1568 67511865 316 502 153 65 648 1124 144 168

~RllCA 48 129 57 174 24 160 21 68 17 -47 - - 82 144 - - - - 67 120 2 3

MA?L 315 446 972 2233 871 2366 676 915 783 1493 721 1568 757 2009 -316 502 153 -265 715 1244 146 171

:N (1) Durie som years, for smms hips it m difficult to distinguish betamn the aso t of time pent aiaiting flo' oarg= or for-brth'.So in this tabls cot approa~h ms tsan..- (2) §b. a s'of Mpe delayed. Days Duto~Ulay dua to no berth beirg avaibla. (3) Q_sCsM.p ffiMåMra 1976 : frm 4.10.1976 10% on i~ports, 5% on export; -iom 20.12.1976 15% on ibport, 5% on export . 1977 : from 1.1.1977 20% on iports, 20% on export; from 17.1.1977 25% on iqport., 12.5% on export. from 21.2.1977 10% on iports, 5% on exporti; co äweku~ sgafter 30arch. 1980 : from 7.4.1980 20%; from 12.5.1980 10% by sm ahippia lines. 1981 : frm~ 1.3.1981 20%; from 22.4.1981 30; from 12.6.1981 10%: o. ae after J . 1984 : Threa to lm1oe aun~harge.

00 CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Berthing Delays

(b) Avea. delay Lker ship

1 1985 1975 1976 1977 1976 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 198 oral No. MS No. aRs No cRS No. MRS No. IRS No. JHRS No. HURE No. HEFS No. NIM No. IRS no. wRS

LIVAssoL 6.95 3231 1.2 Called 1976 3.85 2917 16.9 280 18.4 2TO8 7.3 2538 13.7 2881 13.1 2888 15.5 3140 3.63 3195 2.0 3879 - 38.1 S1.6 41.6 28 Delayed 28.5 S4 62.5 31.0 45.3 52.2 66.3 LARVACA i8 1.6 1301 0.1 Called 569 5.4 1352 3.1 1164 3. 1238 1.3 1122 1 1279 1229 2.8 1631 - 1648 - - 43.0 36 Delayed 64.5 73.3 160 77.7 66.4 - 42.1 - LIMASSOL + LARNACA 5.2 4532 0.9 Called 2545 4.2 4269 12.5 4044 14.0 4026 5.4 3660 9.8 4160 9.0 1117 11.7 4771 2.5 4843 1.3 5711 63.7 38.1 1.5 Iu.8 28.1 Delayed 34.0 55.1 65.2 32.5 45.8 52.

No. Number of ships delayed or called, as indicated.

/DP

Ow CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Income and Expenditure Accounts (in thousands C1)

As of Decdaber 31, 1979 1980 1962

OperLile, : 3,051.4 3,151.0 3,190.5 3,537.4 3,616.0 4,308.8 Stodrage Isevva 598.9 735.3 891.0 931.0 692.3 919.2 Rents aid buyuit,Iv 204.2 210.9 258.2 374.7 395.3 5%4.0 Inveu-ert I6oae 191.3 213.7 203.0 122.5 65.8 47.5 audrifs 16.5 0.6 4.1 72 - 3.1 2.1 Gain on DIspAsal cf Fixed Assets - - * * 1.9 4,062.3 4,311.5 4,546.8 4,972.8 4,772.5 5,823.5 EXPENDFU Sbaries ai tdne 886.4 1,162.4 1,452.7 1,737.3 2,248.3 2,33D.6 Travel1wr* isJ sa "suasae 19.4 26.1 25.9 23.0 26.0 28.6 ortic -4wl 71.5 99.9 126.6 170.9 191.0 188.8 fbinteance aSI Cpertions of ft,tor aa Fort Equipan 61.4 136.1 96.6 136.6 125.6 228.2 Other tanfes*tre 15.4 49.4 64.7 118.0 74.3 6.'*0 andry exptas.es 97.6 117.5 94.2 109.5 1)4.0 144.5 Non aourm-sr. L%Itts - - - 60.2 98.2 29.9 Deterred Exwesiture - - - - 22.0 fAslesrationl of UA authets or the kard or msideent 2.5 3.8 3.5 3.8 3.8 3.8 1,184.2 1,595.2 1,64.2 2.359.3 2,881.2 3,039.4 Deprecation 350.8 365.0 368.6 399.0 678.1 60.5 Total Expeiture 1,535.0 1,960.2 2,232.8 2,758.3 3,559.3 3,899.9

Wr OPERATM AEVEWE 2,527.3 2,351.3 2,314.0 2,214.5 1,213.2 1,923.6 InEEST LONGoUMnA s 620.4 636.6 674.3 696.9 747.6 859.5 KTr SUWus 1,906.9 1,714.7 1,639.7 1,517.6 465.6 1,064.1 52 x. 31 39 43 52 61 CIERATING RAMl0 () 7.6 18 24.5 18 5.3 R.0.C.E. (M) 20 ItrfcO.I covk.WZE 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.2 1.6 2.2

SOURCE: Cyprus Ports Authority 97 ANNEX G

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to g .le 0%9 41 0 24 # -5

181 9,4 Flo å 二． ―一，，必，，。，、，，二’。！ &!{蘊弓 l 驕禹f 謹鬥― 取

屬＿、―一必⋯ 籷魚織·�候 �·墾 �妒，股”·優觀�細羈二一仕離舞視。鬥屆錘雜群規「很發藝果糁且羅離 ’〕巒日婦．。劃騙膩縴 11 丰―馴 d 婦 g 誡 if :._邑 I 么他豐喂寫匹寥d IJ “闢〕’憎、 &，獸‘h 郡屬l 藝珊聯邑巒絲職二 U 啊細名邊，藝、：：：騙 ‘易!豐婦：‘擊j，：乏”:::呈，馴h雪，“勻”,,！賽“星，奮“韁，認·“夏，當婦:!’ 卻“C一叩膩唱劉p 州誅。― 。

匹 J 計 1 1 11 居 I!11- ― 為 1 11!I 屆！ !11-r--eeee 甲二二兀二亡斤ee- －〕 11!11 了 IL 斤 ― -I!--l 肩 l!-l!11-!---!-----1 一’ 梁

方，LI-!-!I-!!1 1 11-11!I!11-1 Lsees 一望圍俎劉瀉四二騙勵么－--I-L 付 j,!1 11-11-l 月 ― 1 1 11!I 二 1 1 1 11 二 11-- ―嗡為誣出獵剴鵬洲紲礬。勾山劉團團州軍心則。娥遞沁細 p 軍州凶。p 啊。山平臼州×細趁曬舉卹切。O 州和細么）O皓卜u劇功」以初）細斗以瀾 ONO詼莽蔔輪鬍O 100 ANNEX I CYPRUS

PROJECT CONPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Freight Costs (Liner Terms)

(a) Per Container 201

Origin/Destination 1979 rreight 1986 Change

From U.K. ussl'lso-1'8001 US$ 799- 944 -30% From Europe DMI2,SOO-2,530* DM 1,900-2,000*0 -24% (Rotterdam, Antwerp, Denmark) Jeddah US$1,000-1034S US$ 900-11000 -10%

Dubai, Kuwait $2*400 USS1,600 14% To Italy us$ 6001 700 US$ 3so -42% From Italy US11,100 U5$ '770 -30% Frm far least L -32%

Plus 61 bunker surcharge. Official rate 2,Z00

M Per Tonne weight/measurement (decreasing in importance)

. Origin/Destinatton 1979 Freight 1986 Change

U.K. Stgt3o* Stg130-40 - Italy US$70 US$44 -371

Plus fuel surcharge

Source: Leading agents in Cyprus

/Ex 101 ANNEX I CYPRUS Table 2 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LAN 1540-CY)

Ship Costs

A. Åtjzatajlilvn t!egL 19j86ó

Type of Ship Size Hire cost AdmLn. Port and Alternative per day US$ Costs fuel costs Source ..... - - . .-.- as - g,. ...-

Conventional 2000 DWT 1,400 400 180 1,980 1,500 3000 DWT 2,000 400 240 2,640 2,000 Container 350 TE 7,1000 2,000 910 10,010 10,200

Ro-Ro 2000 la. 4,200 900 510 5,610 7,000

Asption: (1) Hire cost is left comtant as ~eight ~t have been de ngasi, other costs incrain mo on the balanm it is assumd that they caned out. *imludes aost of oontuimra Um$ 1 X 350 X 4 times a 2100 needed to svioe a linm. (2) Opportunity cost/inom fregsne throug loge voyage times is æt taken into aount.

S~uroe: Le~ding shippir~ agent in Cyprus.

B. PaiLste g;ven 1979-198,0

Type of p .Sluost Alternamtv per day US$

Convntional 2,500 DT 2,000 m1ler 600 larger 11,000 container 260 TEJ 8,500 IM. investent in containrs Ro-Ro 7,100 DWT 12,500 IML. investent in trailers 7,300 Eæl. investnent in over 8,000 tralers ?~ter 9,100 DMT 5,000-6,000 Bdk carriers (grai ) 20,000 DMf 7,000-10,000 .WTane lnkers 2,500 3,000-4,000 depending on quality 6,000 ot tanks

t El. port dus and tul ost~. imi. P md I, n , interet, depr~ tion. 102 CYPRUS ANNEX I

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Limassol. Port

NO. OP SHPS WEIGHT 1982 1983 1984 1985 1982 1983 1984 1985

Conventional 1,547 1,383 1,054 900 59 54 35 39 Cbntaner 860 943 1,648 1,160 33 37 54 50 Eb-P4 195 240 327 248 8 9 11 11 T 0 T A L 2,602 2,566 3,029 2,308 100 ir 100 100

We~gted average of ahip-oost per day...... M."...... 1982 1983 1984 1985

(nventioml (3000 DW) 1,558 1,426 924 1,030 Container (350 TEU) 3,303 3,704 5,405 5,005 Fb-Ro 2000 (1n) 449 505 617 617 AVERAGE 5,310 5,635 6,946 6,652

LARNACA PORT US$ cost Type of Ship Weiht per day Conventional 0.7 2,000 1,400 Container 0.3 10,200 3060 US$ 4,460 (At Larnaca most container ships are feeders) 103 ANNEX I CYPRUS Table 4 OROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-,Y)

Structure of Ships 1981*

1986 figures No. of Weight cost per Weighted Ships8 shig daUS$ cost US$ (a) Conventional 2 U1300 cs Container 989 27 10000 2700 Ro-Ro 157 4 5610 224 Total 3666 100 4304

1979-1980 figures of cost shig day

(b) Conventional 2520 67 1300 871 Container 989 27 800 229b Ro-Ro 57 4 7300 292 Reefer 22 0.6 5000 30 Bulk carrier 24 0.7 7000 49 Wine Tankers 28 0.7 4000 28

Total 3740 100 .3565

* Passengers are excl. as they would not have to wait Ehlusiveb of port dues and fuel costs 104 CYPRUS ANNEX I

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Acquisition of assets Calculation Net benefit U$ m. Nc of Savings in Savings (costs) shipdays shipwaiting in lost time service US$ a .. time USaS US$ m 1978 1.83 (1.83) 1979 3.75 (3.75) 1980 8.66 (8.66) 1981 8.68 (8.68) 1982 7.72 5434 10.9 3.18 1983 3.69 9179 18.4 0.5 15.21 1984 5.22 10986 22.0 0.5 17.28 1985 0.95 8725 17.45 0.5 17.00 1986 1.3 8725 17,45 O'.5 16.65 1987 8725 17.45 0.6 18.1 1988 8725 17.45 0.6 18.1 1989 8725 17.45 0.6 18.1 1990-2 18.1 1993 1.4** 17.45 0.6 16.65 1993 - 2000 17.45 0.6 18.1

Note: Although it is realised that these should have been deflated/ inflated to a comon year,the exercise was not undertaken as figures will have to be reviewed anyway.

A plus consultants and Takraf

** Replacement of Gottvald

/EN 105 CYPRUS ANNEX I Table 6 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

(a) Number of ship days served by extensions

Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 V Limassol - 953 1348 1437 1472 Larnaca 99 543 457 552 307 Total 99 1496 1805 1989 1779

(b) Number of ships called abowe 1981 level

Limassol 252 307 991 343 Larnaca 402 419 603 72 Total 654 726 1594 415

Limassol 4072 4556 5494 5223 Larnaca 3018 4283 4738 3342 Total 7090 8839 10232 8565

(d) Number of ships that would nave called above 1981 level using (c) above Limassol 1184 1668 2606 2335 Larnaca 1789 3054 3509 2113 Total 2973 4722 6115 4448

(e) assumption on service time 1 32 hours per ship (t) assumption a freeze waiting time at 1.5 times service time (g) Number of ship days that vould have been lost

Limassol 2368 3336 5212 4670 Larnaca 3578 6108 7018 4226 Total 5936 9444 12230 8896 Leas 502 265 1244 171 Net 5434 9179 10986 8725 106 ANNEX I CYRUS CYPRUS .Table-7 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

(a) Number of ship days served by extensions

Yer 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 (povisional)

Limassol -- 953 1348 1437 1472

Larnaca 99 543 457 552 307

T 0 T A L 99 1496 1805 1989 1779

(b) Number of shis days that would have been lost in vaitin for a berth*

Limsassol -- 1430 2022 2156 2208

Larnaca 148 814 686 828 460

T 0 TAL 148 2244 2708 2984 2668 *(Assumption: waiting time at 1.5 times service time)

Limassol - 7.6 11.4 15 14.7 Larnaca 0.7 3.6 3.1 3.7 2.0

T 0 T A L 0.7 11.2 14.5 18.7 16.7

/EN 0 107

CYPRUS ANNEX I - Table 8 PROJECT .COMPLETION REPORT Page 1

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Savings in ship Savings in Net Acquisition waiting service benefit of assets time time (cost) US$ m US$ m US$ m US$m 1978 1.83 (1.83) 1979 3.75 (3.75) 1980 8.66 (8.66) 1981 8.68 0.350 -- (8.33) 1982 7.72 S.6 -- (2.12) 1983 3.69 7.25 0.5 = 7.75 4.06 1984 5.22 9.35 0.5 a 9.85 4.63 1985 0.95 8.35 0.5 a 8.85 7.9 1986 1.3 8.00 0.5 : 8.5 7.2 1987 0.5 : 8.6 8.6 1988 0.6 a 8.6 8.6 1989 0.6 a8.6 8.6 1990 0.6 a 8.6 8.6 1991 assumed 0.6 a 8.6 8.6 1992 contant 0.6 - 8.6 8.6 1993 1.4 0.6 8.6 7.2 1994 0.6 8.6 1995 0.6 8.6 1996 0.6 8.6 1997 0.6 8.6 1997 0.6 8.6 1999 0.6 8.6 2000 0.6 8.6

Using 1982 - 1985 structure of ships and costs

/EN CYPRUS ANNEX I

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Page 2

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

(a) Number of shBi days served by extensions

Year 1981 1982 1983. 1984 1985 pgovisional

Limassol -- 953 1348 1437 1472 Laraca 99 543 457 552 307 T 0 T A L 99 1496 1805 1989 1779

(b) Number of ship days that would have been lost in waiting for a berthe

Limassol - 1430 2022 2156 2208

Lanms 148 814 686 828 460 T 0 TAL 148 2244 2708 2984 2668

*(Assumption: waiting time eat 1.5 times service time)

Limassol -- 7.6 11.4 15 14.7 Larnaca 0.7 3.6 3.1 3.7 2.0 T 0 TAL 0.7 11.2 14.5 18.7 16.7

/EN 109 CYPRUSANNEX i --. NNEXTable9 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Page 1

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY>

Larnaca

A. Z)SR.W.AMIT CONTlS. TMRQUDA ^ARNACA

1982 1983 1984

FULL IN 14,194 17,014 23,939 19,000 FULL OUT 13,585 15,493 20,542 12,000

.MIES 23,110 •27,484 28,685 24,000

T 0 T A L 50,889 59,991 73,166 55,000 lag88annaaaaa83U8sa aancassan s s ntz=nanst8aaaUaa88aanaaaa sm aa nn intiaaaaaaaaaaa

B. .mP.CAtS~ l 2N=OTDi ,fifiu.AT MiC

1982 1983 194

m~E arStP 371 389 516 400 AVERAE N.R.T. 2,454 2,33 2,320 2, 000

...... 1F ,__ C. QAQSfWALUAA(~ .Ng0= 0!!) 1982 1983 1984 st ______.9.85.. TOrAL TRANSIT 475 613 846 670 TRANSIT IN CONTAINERS 386 460 574 372 EMTIES 58 69 72 60 DIER 31 84 200 238

est. 25% 40'

D. AVERAGE WEIGHT OF FULL CONTAINERS (TONNES)

1982 1983 1984 1985

13 12 11 12 110

CYPRUS ANNE I Table 9 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Page 2

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

E. QRU?A0A .C.0 X11R W7EifA/STß3FFm P.0%

Estimte 10% of full in oontainers. 5% of full out containers.

1982 1983 1984 1985

-E OF C=T=: IN 1,419 1,701 2,394 1,900 T 680 775 1,027 600

T 0 T A L 2,029 2,476 3,421 2,500

ToNNA=PON(1TINR) (10 TGIeS 20,290 24,760 34,210 25,000

P. Hurs vrked by oran s for general cargo.

(1) Averae ptdutivity 20 tonnes per ang hour, a mLxtue ot generl cargo. (2) 50% oføcarg loaded by CpA orans. 111

CYPRUS ANNEX I Table 10 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Page 1 SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Effect on Employment Level

A. FOR CONTAINERS Average amber of men per gLig a) It ship's crane 10z6 stevedores - 1 foreman - 3 quay porters. b) It shore cranes 13z9 stevedores - 1 foreman - 3 quay porters. c) Assumption 50%-70% ship's cranes .. use average 11 -on per gang. d) Assumed productivity per day - 80 containers ie. 10 containers X 8 hours. e) Placaments allocated for containers in transit.

EAR NO. OF CONTAINERS GANGS PLACEMETS

1982 50,889 636 6,996 1983 59,991 750 8,250 1984 73,166 915 10,065 1985 55,000 688 7,568

f) Tally clerks 1 per gaW per ship per day.

1982 636 1983 750 1984 915 1985 688

B. FMR OT&E CAROqk IN TRASIT a) 1. Number of workers. When shore cranes Stevedores 13 z 6 + 3 quay porters + 3 cranes + 1 foreman. When ship's cranes Stevedor. 10 = 6 + 3 quay porters + 1 foreman. b) Tonnage with shore cranes assumption 50% . use average of 11 port workers. a) Productivity 8 hrs. X 20 tonnes per day a 120 tonnes.

1982 1983 1984 1985 Other cargo in transit 31,000 84,000 200,000 238,000 Number of gangs 258 700 1,667 1,983 Number of placement 2,838 7,700 18,337 21,813 Number of tally 258 700 1,667 1,983 112

CYPRUS ANNEX I Table 10 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Page 2

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Effect on Employment Level

C. _LWEY. t0 STUF'G/PgSTUFFING.

a) 6 workers + 2 forklift drivers. b) 12 - 14 containers per day.

1982 1983 1984 1985

croupae containers 2,029 2,476 3,421 2,500 Number of days (413) 156 190 263 192

Number of workers X 8 1248 1 520 2,104 1,536 113

ANNEX I Table 11 CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Transit Operations from Larnaca Effects on Employment of Port Labour and Tally Clerks

1982' 1983 1984 1985

a) Container handling (1) Stevedoring 6,996 8,250 -10,065 7,568 Tally 636 750 915 688

SUB-TOTAL 7,632 9,000 10,980 8,256

b) Other Qargo in transit (2) Stevedoring 2,838 7,700 18,337 21,813 Tally 258 700 1,667 1,983

SUB-TOTAL 3,096 8,400 20,004 23,796

0) Groupage 1,248 1,520 2,164 1,536

%on employment (1) 14% 20% 23% 18%

(1+2) 20% 39% 64% 72% CYPRUS

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Estimates of Revenue

1982 1983 19814 1985 Pe full 20*,12 tonres average I OU IN IN CUT IN CUT

F.I.O.0 (revenue for port labours, cranes, overtime, shipping agent's services) 39 39 44 44 46 46 49 49 Landing charges (Agents, Licensed Porters, quay porters, equipment) 16.2 10.4 6.2 10.1 16. 10.4 16.2 10.4 General port charges (wharfage) - 1.5 - 1.5 - 1.5 - 1!8

TOTAL 55.2 50.9 .2 55. 62. 57.9 65.2 61.2 Conjack 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 5 Storage charges (assum 10 days) 1. - 1.8 - 2.1

TOTAL 58.2 57.7 63. 62.7 65. 64.7 68.2 68.

Per .omtimr empty 20', 3 tonnes F.I.o.8.8 8.8 9. 9. 10 10 11 11 Landing Charges 4 2.4 4 2.4 4 2.4 4 2.4 General port charges (wharfage) - 0.37 - 0.37 - 0.37 - 0.45 ...... -- - TOTAL 12.8 11.57 13. 2. 14 12.77 15 13.85 Fort storage charges (assumC,20 days) - 4.8 - 4.8 - 4.8 - 6.00 Conjack 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 ' ' . & J... "LI.LL& 1.&- & I-&. .. " TOTAL. 15.8 17.37 16.88. 18.57 1 0 Cm Storage at Larnaca: C9,000 p.a. £10,000 p.1.s9n8e e8 1985. 115

ANNEX I CYPRUS Table 12 Page 2 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Estimates of Revenue

For Ships (Using Larnaca Average N.R.T.) Even though it is estimated as higher because of the larger insidence of small ships.

1985 rates weighte average 1982 1983 1984 1985 1985

General port charges 800 X 30 ails 4 cent 24 24 24 30 X 15 mils 2 cent 19 mils 25 24 23 22

Pilotage - 2000 X 2 X 23 mils 3 cent 28 mils 92 92 92 112

2 X 15 mils 2 cent 19 mils 14 11 10 -- harthage - X 2 days X 12 ails 2 cent 18 ails 59 57 56 72 Mooring boat - 16 per boat (7.50) 6 6 6 7

Garbage - 14.50 X 2 days (5.63) 5.3 -- -- 9 11

220 214 220 254

/EN 116

ANNEX I Table 12 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Page 3

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Estimates of Revenue

EM. Aelm sem per tonne

WEIGHT RATE 1982 1983 1984 1985

Landing chaiges (to.75 Limassol Porte.s (112) 1.375 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.625**** agents) 1985 0.36 Wharfages (1/2) 0.3 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.18

Storages (assumption 15 days) (1/2) 0.05 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.45

Delivery charges (1/2) 0.75 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375

F.I.O. Caarges* 1 * 4.69 5.25 5.555 5.92

T 0 TAL 6.28 6.84 7.145 7.61!

For stuffing/destuffing containers £0.75 per tome.

**** Agents charge 25 mils per tonne instead of the 20 mils approved 13.3.1981.

***** As weighted,25% increase since April 1985. 117

ANNEX I CYPRUS Table 12 Page 4 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Estimates of Revenue - Notes

F.1.0. (revenue for port labour, cranes, overtime Rate shipping agent's services) Date Discount 304 2.9.81 6 4.690 X 0.7 a 3.28 (used) 17.9.82 0 5.215 X 0.7 a 3.65 10.2.83 e 5.255 X 0.7 a 3.68 (used) 16.1.84 0 5.453 X 0.7 a 3.82) 88 19.7.84 0 5.644 X 0.7 a 3.95) 1.7.85 & 5.920 X 4.14 4.14 (used)

* Increased by 25% since April 1985, 16 cent per tonne for containers,since then for wharfage, 38 oent per container, for storage, 38 cent per tonne ftr general cargo.

** 2.9.81 6 2.920 (used) 17.9.82 6 3.250 10.2.83 6 3.275 (used) 16.1.84 6 3.399) 19.7.84 f 3.518) 3 1.7.85 & 3.690 (used) 118 -

ANNEX I CYPRUS Table 12 Page 5 PROJECT CO1PLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Results - Larnaca Revenue from Transit

I . 1982 1983 1984 1985 a) from container handling

(1) Storage 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 (ii) Movement - full in 783,500 - 1,024,200 1,489,000 1,238,800 (iii) Movement - full out 691,500 866,000 1,189,400 734,400 (iv) Empty - in and out 281,600 362,400 383,900 346.200 SUTMTOTAL 1,765,600 2,261,600 3,071,300 2,328,400 b) from general cargo movement and storage 194,700 574,600 1,429,000 1,812,400 c) for stuffing/destuffing 15,200 18,600 25,700 18,800 d) from shis 81,800 83,200 113,500 101,600 T 0 T A L: 2,057,300 2,938,000 4,639,500 4,261,200

Cumulative total: 113,896,000

/EN 119

ANNEX I cypRus Table 13 Page 1 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Limassol

A. NU?'R .0...T.A...TA7NE. R..I... .MAO...L.

1982 1983 1984 1985 provisional

Full IN 9,806 11,465 22,909 15,000 Full CUT 14,726 12,180 31,145 20,000 bipties 27,263 24,683 52,706 28,000

T 0 T A L : 51,795 48,328 106,760 63,000

B. CAø XM .TMS.. .C'0.0..T. ....

T 0 T A L 451 357 807' 422

Contaners FULL 274 251 553 350

CDntainers EMPTY 55 50 105 56

T HER 12 56 149 26

0&0l. petroletm

Et~te 10% of ful in containr. Estimte 5% of fUll out contains.

NUMER OF CONTAINERS 1982 1983 1984 pro18oal

IN 980 1,146 2,290 1,500 CUT 763 609 1,557 1,000

1,7431,AL 1,755 3,847 2,500

TPE <10 TNR 17,430 17,550 38,470 25,000 PER CONT~IE)

.38 .124 0.0 ... 430 471 824 600 120

ANNEX I CYPRUS Table 13 ""'""""".Page 2 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Limassol - Effect on Employment

A. FOP CONTAINERS (SEE 3 FOR ACA MSJMTIC0 WTO.RE CRAN))

TALU..Y YEAR NO. OF CONTAINERS GANGS PLACEMENTS TLLW

1982 51,795 647 7,117 647 1983 f 48,328 604 6,644 604 1984 106,760 1,334 14,674 1,334 GI 1985 (prov) 63,000 787 8,657 787

Frequently acre than one tally clerk per gang va used.

B. .J .1.ARG. R .W4T.(.2 Mo 2 AW0A. .AW4M&CA).

1982 1983 1984 (po8onal)

Other cargo in transit 122,000 56,000 149,000 16,000 Number of sangs 1,017 467 1,242 133 Number of placements 11,187 5,137 13,662 1,463 Number of tally 1,017 467 1,242 133

1983 1984 198 a 1982 (provisioal)

Groupage containers 1,743 1,755 3,847 2,500 Number of days (013) 134 135 296 192 Number of works x8 1,072 1,080 2,368 1,536 121 ANNEX I Table 13 CYPRUS Page 3 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAN 1540-CY)

Limassol - Effect-onEmployment

D. FE.CT qL EMPLO"YME'T

...... 1 ...... 1982 1983 1984 1985 (provisional)

a) Container: Stevedores 7,117 6,644 14,674 8,657 Tally 647 604 1,334 787 b) Other cargo: Stevedores 11,187 5,137 13,662 1,463 Tally 1,017 467 1,242 133 c) Groupage 1,072 1,080 2,368 1,536 GRAND TOTAL 21,040 13,932 33,280 12,576 1A.A.6...... TOTAL STEV. (INCL. ABOVE) 19,376 12,861 30,704 11,656

% on employment: 27% 21% 42% 25%

1982 1983 1984 (

a) Container hand: FULL: IN 570,709 724,588 1,493,667 1,023,000 CUT 849,690 763,686 2,015,081 1,366,800 EMPTY IN AND OUT 452,157 434,050 937,376 143,900 b) From general 766,160 383,040 1,064,605 121,840 a) FroM stuffing/ destuffing containers 13,072 13,162 28,852 18,750 d) From ships 94,600 100,794 181,280 152,400

T 0 T A L 2,746,388 2,419,320 5,720,861 . 3,226,690

TOTAL a £14,113,000 122 SNNEX 1 CTPRUS Table 13 Page 4 PROJECT COMLEToN REPORT

SECOND PORT PROJECT (LOAn 1540-CY)

Limassol - Effect on Eployment

actual ~ i? T

Would have been-loss 33 16% -63% -29%

£ m. 0.906 0.387 3.603 0.935 £5.831

"Caot±veo 200 0Q 00 actua

Wauld have been loss 56% 44% 75% 53%

£m. 1.538 1.064 4.290 1.710 £8.602 33° CYPRUS SECOND PORTS F

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S PROJECT Rizokarpas

Galinoporni Yialousa 35030

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4havios Komi Kebir Kantara Akanthou :NIA ylos AmvrgsiOs vi s 'EktitosKnarcha,-' Boghaz Trikom Koutsv, dr < Lefkoniko Kythrea arathovouno onas ia Mle Palekyt Yenagra ko An as *na Ayios Serylo Salamis ICOSIA SStyllo IA Asha Prastio tyllo Engomio ~ot Strongylos Vatili FAMAGUSTA

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'~ LARNACAPOT PORTS

-- PRESENT CEASE - FIRE LINES

nglisidhes Kiti U.K. SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS ophinou ROADS Mazotos HARDSURFACE 2LANESORMORE

HARD SURFACE 1 LANE

LOOSE SURFACE

0 10 20 DISTRICT BOUNDARIES I II 0 KILOMETERS 20

MILES 33030' 340 340 30' JULY 1986