LUCIA VAN DEN BERGH Why peace worked Mozambique is viewed worldwide as a successful peace process, but not much attention has been paid to the factors Mozambicans look back that make Mozambique unique. This book is based on informa- tion provided by people who played key roles in the transition pe- riod in Mozambique, from war to peace. Mozambique is unique in its combination of smooth transition from a guerrilla move- ment to an opposition party, effective demobilisation and the Why peace worked Mozambicans look back absence of a truth and reconciliation commission like in South Africa – not to mention the absence of war crimes trials. How was this possible? What kept the peace process from break- ing down? Why did a multi-party parliament work in this situa- tion? This book tells a story which has not been told before and will be an infl uentiwal work for anyone researching or analyzing civil wars.

 Map of Mozambique ISBN/EAN 9789078147091 LUCIA VAN DEN BERGH Why peace worked Mozambicans look back

AWEPA, Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa, 2009 Contents

Foreword

Acknowledgements 7

Introduction 1 Introduction 9 2 The war and Renamo: how could it start? 13

Preparing for peace 3 The involvement of the churches 27 4 Negotiations and agreement 31

The transition period and beyond 5 Reconciliation 39 6 The UN peacekeeping mission and the international community 47 7 Civic education in the transition period 63 8 The elections 77 9 Is history being rewritten? 87

Elections are not the end of the story 10 Parliament starts up 95 11 Democracy and people’s organisations 105

Did expectations come out? 12 Credibility of the democratic institutions 111 13 Local governance 117 14 Poverty and stability 125

Conclusions 15 Why did the peace process work? 129

Annexes Historic dates 136 List of interviewees 138 List of abbreviations 143

Foreword

Foreword

t was very interesting for me to read the book written by Lucia van den Bergh, former IAWEPA representative in Mozambique, who worked in this capacity for six years, demonstrating an impressive and timeless commitment.

People say that South Africa is a ‘miracle’. The policy of apartheid with all its intimidation, oppression and aggression came to an end not through a bloodbath but by peaceful means. This non-violent resolution came about thanks to the wisdom of both sides, the oppressed and the oppressor.

But there are many reasons why Mozambique can be considered a miracle as well, although it went through another process than South Africa; Mozambique is viewed worldwide as a successful peace process, but not much attention has been paid to the factors that make Mozambique unique. This book does!

It is a particularly interesting book because it is based on information provided by people who played key roles in the transition period in Mozambique, from war to peace. Mozambique is unique in its combination of smooth transition from a guerrilla movement to an opposition party, effective demobilisation and the absence of a truth and reconciliation commission like in South Africa – not to mention the absence of war crimes trials!

How was this possible? What kept the peace process from breaking down? Why did a multi-party parliament work in this situation? This book tells a story which has not been told before and will be an infl uential work for anyone researching or analysing civil wars.

I am grateful that AWEPA had the opportunity to be intensively involved in the period after the Rome Peace Accord and I thank our partners in Mozambique who accepted AWEPA as an ally in the process of peace and development.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the AWEPA staff in Maputo, especially Obede Baloi and Telma Mahiquene, and in Amsterdam, especially Tamme Hansma, without whom we could not have made our humble contribution.

Dr. Jan Nico Scholten President of AWEPA Acknowledgements

Acknowledgements

his book could not have been written without the open and honest talks that I was Table to have with more than 50 people, who have been – or still are – involved in the Mozambican process for peace, democracy and political stability. I am deeply grateful to them all: the politicians, the parliamentarians, the people who conducted the elections, and last but not least, the citizens who worked for peace in their own environment as well as in civil society organisations. (See the list of interviewees.)

Many friends supported this book, reading my texts, commenting and providing sugges- tions. I especially want to thank Joseph Hanlon, Obede Baloi, Boaventura Zita, George Siemensma, Marijke Teeuw, Carla Schuddeboom, Mirjam Boswijk and Monique van Zijl. Each of them contributed their own special experience or knowledge. Their contributions were greatly appreciated.

And I would like to thank Jan Nico Scholten for being an inspiring president of Awepa for many years, giving support, space and confi dence to the work that Awepa has done and is still doing in Mozambique. He was also the person who created the opportunity for this book to be written. In addition, the staff of Awepa in Amsterdam and Maputo deserve thanks for their continuous cooperation over many years as well as during the writing of this book. In Maputo, the Awepa representative Amarilia Mutemba supported me dur- ing my visits in 2008, as did Telma Mahiquene, Ilda Mbeve, José Matavele and others. In Amsterdam, Tatjana van den Ham and Ilona Kaandorp helped me with the technical and organisational aspects of writing, translating and publishing.

7 Renamo fi ghters and Mozambican troops fraternise shortly after the signing of the peace agreement. (António Muchave, AIM 1992)

8 Introduction

Chapter I fraught and tense peace process draw un- expected conclusions. Some are specifi c to Mozambique, but some may hold valuable Introduction lessons for other peace processes.

e accepted everything, includ- Neither war nor peace happens in isolation. “Wing amnesty for war crimes. We This ‘civil’ war had been largely dependent did not want to look back; we did not ask on initiatives and support from outside. for revenge, nor for the truth. We knew Rhodesia and South Africa promoted civil the truth, but demanding to hear it in of- war as a form of destabilisation, and Cold fi cial trials would have obstructed the pro- War thinking promoted further support for cess; the peace agreement would never have the destruction of Mozambique. But the war been signed.” This comment, made by a also built on internal discontent; over more woman kidnapped by guerrillas who later than a decade, the ongoing armed confl ict escaped, points to the highly unusual na- gained internal dynamics and momentum. ture of Mozambique’s peace process – no The international community was aware of trials and no Truth Commission. Healing the apartheid system and the damage it did was found in rural areas through traditional to the neighbouring countries; sympathy ceremonies, but in many places it was just a for the people and government of Mozam- matter of trying to forget. The peace process bique was widespread, especially amongst in Mozambique has turned out to be one of progressive populations and governments the most successful following a civil war. It in the countries of Northern Europe. How- led to reintegration of the former guerrillas ever, peace only became a reality after the into society and a functioning democracy Cold War was over and the apartheid sys- with an elected government, and has proved tem came to an end. to be sustainable. Peace in 1992 between the Frelimo govern- Fifteen years have passed since the election ment and the Renamo fi ghters became pos- of the fi rst multi-party government. In this sible in part through external infl uence and book, people who were involved in the peace support. By then internal pressure and po- process refl ect on what worked and why. In litical changes, followed by direct negotia- particular, this book looks at the interaction tions, had already prepared the ground. The between the leaders and a civil society anx- transition period took from 1992 to 1994 ious for peace, two military-political move- and was coordinated by a UN mission and a ments which deeply distrusted each other, large peacekeeping force. The government, and a host of foreign and international political parties, churches, organisations of organisations anxious to prevent a return women, youth, and trade unions took initia- to a cruel civil war. Looking back now, the tives to prepare the population for reconcili- people who were immersed in a sometimes ation, dialogue and democratic inclusion of

9 Introduction

everybody. Offi cial language usage on the ing on local traditional and political leaders radio changed from one day to the next; rather than distant national candidates, to ‘bandits’ became ‘members of the Renamo be elected in a secret ballot by people who political party’. could not read and write, or had been iso- Peace agreements and UN intervention lated in former war areas without access to cannot work if the population does not information. Including the population in want peace. However, the Mozambicans the process of understanding the changes wanted it desperately. Consequently, they after the peace agreement was one of the accepted the cruel past, and were prepared main challenges. Democracy would be an to include former rebels and soldiers in empty shell without that. normal daily life. They were willing to adopt donor-backed types of democratic elections This book will address some key questions: and institutions. They wanted to rebuild why was this process successful, while it their country without looking back, and often fails in other countries? What were they wanted to include every Mozambican the crucial elements that contributed to the in the reconstruction. They did not want tri- success, and what failed? What contribu- als; they did not want a Truth Commission. tion was made by the Mozambican people? They just wanted peace. Did the international support and attention do any good, or did it take over too much The transition period, which included a de- from the Mozambicans? What does it mean mobilisation programme, returning refu- for Mozambique now, for the problems of gees, rehabilitation programmes and prep- today, for the expectations of the people? Is aration for the elections, took two years. stability guaranteed, are the traumas gone, The fi rst multi-party parliament had its or are there hidden sentiments that will turbulent opening ceremony in December erupt again years later? Was there too much 1994, and its fi rst session in March 1995. of a focus on the democratic system, over- But systems, institutions and procedures looking equal opportunities in economic were not all that was needed to make de- and social development? Are Mozambican mocracy work. Democratic thinking and peace and democracy indeed sustainable? attitudes cannot be imposed; they have to And have they contributed to a better life be understood and integrated into life and for the people of Mozambique? politics. The multi-party system, with direct elections on ballot papers, was completely The fi rst chapters provide details about ini- new to the institutions, parties and popu- tiatives that made peace possible, especially lation. Legislation was based on the Portu- inside the country, about the diffi culties guese law and Western way of institutional- during the lengthy negotiations, the transi- ising democracy. The system was unknown tion period with complicated reconciliation in Mozambique, which had a tradition of processes, the efforts to get the population consensus rather than competition, rely- involved in the multi-party system. The

10 Introduction

book then also talks about the complicated remember the end of the war and the early preparations for the elections through the post-war period and how they see it now – inexperienced election bodies in a vast and and through their experiences are willing to destroyed country. It raises questions about summarise lessons they learned which may the functioning of the democratic institu- be useful elsewhere. tions, and tells how parliament survived the fi rst clashes, it analyses the changed role The book will not give a complete picture; of civil society, and works out how the de- it arises from my experiences working centralisation process took shape. The last with Awepa and the willingness of my old chapter is about democracy and develop- contacts to talk now about their feelings ment; it talks about poverty, seen as a pos- and experiences. Awepa was not alone in sible threat to stability in the future. The Mozambique; other agencies also con- conclusions provide a fi nal refl ection on tributed, especially as the post-war period the Mozambican process, but also attention progressed. But Awepa was in the special points for today, and dilemma’s and lessons position of being active in Mozambique and that can be considered in other peace pro- retaining trust during the war, playing an cesses. early part in key post-war changes, and con- tinuing its work there ever since. Although AWEPA(A) and the role of the author the book is largely based on interviews, I This book is written from the perspective take full responsibility for what has been of my involvement as a representative of written here. Awepa in Mozambique during the fi rst six years after the peace agreement of 1992. I AWEPAA was founded in 1984 as the As- went back in 2008 to interview politicians, sociation of Western European Parliamen- parliamentarians, representatives of organi- tarians for Action against Apartheid. Fol- sations, and citizens who were involved: lowing political discussions of an economic people who I came to know during that and cultural boycott of apartheid in South period 15 years ago. These people were at Africa, parliamentarians in European coun- the heart of the process, and their views tries organised actions not only to support form the core of this book. Because of the the anti-apartheid struggle, but also to sup- trust in Awepa built up before the end of port the Front Line States, the countries the war and the mutual respect which we neighbouring South Africa which had developed during the post-war period, these only recently become independent at that key fi gures were prepared to honestly re- point and were victims of South Africa’s fl ect on that period, talk about their expe- destabilisation and aggression. They in- riences and doubts then, and draw conclu- formed their governments and parliaments sions now about what had been effective about the background of the Mozambican then and what had not worked. This book war, which ultimately caused more than a presents a unique picture of how key people million deaths, fi ve million refugees and

11 Introduction

displaced persons, and a shattered country. ses through its Mozambique Peace Process Awepa established good relations with the Bulletin, and had a substantial presence in Mozambican government and parliament election observation. After the 1994 elec- during the anti-apartheid struggle, building tions, support was provided to the newly trust through its clear political support for elected democratic institutions, primarily the Front Line States. to the Mozambican Parliament. Training in the provinces prepared political parties and Shortly after the peace agreement, Awepa civil society for the decentralisation process was asked by the Mozambican government and the local elections. Elected local govern- and by civil society organisations to sup- ments in the new municipalities received port the peace and democratisation process training and support. Financially, this work before and after the 1994 elections. Awepa was made possible through donor support. created a team, headed by Jan Nico Scholten, Unusual fl exibility by the EU, the northern president of Awepa, and supported by European countries involved, and other do- Tamme Hansma, a staff member in the nors made it possible for the programmes Amsterdam head offi ce who had worked in to start immediately; regular adaptation to Mozambique in the eighties and had built current needs and changing situations was up good relations through early Awepa ini- accepted. There was no demand for com- tiatives. I (Lucia van den Bergh) had already plicated bureaucratic procedures, making worked in Mozambique for six years. In it possible to analyse the situation on an 1992, I joined the team as programme head ongoing basis and to construct the pro- and Awepa representative, and opened an gramme one step at a time in close coopera- offi ce in the capital city, Maputo, working tion with the Mozambicans. with a small Mozambican staff. One of our early tasks was to build trust with Renamo, And AWEPAA itself changed. After the and to play an active part in solidarity with democratic changes in southern Africa, the Mozambicans, listening to the needs Awepaa became Awepa, the ‘Association and providing requested support, but on for European Parliamentarians with Africa’. the other hand not taking over. As I will Awepa still continues to support democratic show in the book, the process was Mozam- processes in Mozambique, as well as in bican, and initiatives and decisions had to other African countries. remain in Mozambican hands. December 2009 After the 1992 peace agreement and Lucia van den Bergh throughout the transition and election Representative for Awepa in Mozambique process, Awepa sent fact-fi nding missions, from 1992-1998. developed an intense involvement in civic education, provided bilingual versions of key documents, distributed regular analy-

12 The war and Renamo: how could it start?

Chapter 2 convince her that you cannot blame the baby, but it was too traumatic.”

The war and Renamo: how could Over the course of a decade, the war had it start? reduced Mozambique to a wreck. By 1992, more than one million people had died and lived with my family in a township more than fi ve million had sought refuge in “Ithat was safe during the day, but not neighbouring countries or close to the rela- at night,” says Helena, a woman in Maputo. tively safe cities. Maputo was overcrowded; “Along with our neighbours, we always tried every cane hut housed large families that to fi nd out if the ‘bandits’ were close, to warn had fl ed to the city from the countryside, each other. That night seemed peaceful, but often 15 people in two rooms, mostly sus- at 22:00 my mother suddenly looked out- tained by households headed by poverty- side and saw about 50 ‘bandits’ running stricken women. Large camps hosted thou- into our township. We tried to hide inside, sands of displaced people. but they threw a grenade into our house. My sister was wounded, lost her fi ngers; my Renamo’s strategy was to attack the peo- brother was bleeding. My father hid, know- ple with the aim of forcing them to with- ing they would want him, so we said he was draw their support from the Frelimo gov- travelling. They wanted to take my brother ernment. As a result, villages, schools, but then saw that it would be impractical and hospitals were considered legitimate because of all the blood. So they took me. targets, destroying Frelimo successes, creat- I was taken with them to a shop where they ing fear and bringing chaos to the country. stole everything, and I had to help to car- Although Renamo gained a reputation for ry it. I was kept till the next day, when gov- extreme brutality, it also managed to tap ernment soldiers came in. The confronta- into a groundswell of discontent with the tion that followed saved me. The ‘bandits’ Frelimo regime, especially in the north and lost control over the kidnapped people so centre of Mozambique, where authoritarian we had the chance to get away. I was lucky Frelimo governors had lost popular support. that they did not violate me.” Helena con- tinues, “We knew what happened in the Historical background whole country. We, the population, were the Mozambique gained its independence in victims. Renamo did not fi ght the govern- 1975, fi fteen years after most of the British ment or the troops; it fought against us, the and French colonies in Africa. At that time, people. In my family in Inhambane, sev- Portugal was still under the dictatorship of its eral people were killed or kept hostage in powerful prime minister, António Salazar, lat- Renamo areas. My niece was kidnapped er succeeded by Marcelo Caetano; it consid- and had a baby from rape. She had dif- ered the African colonies to be Portuguese fi culties caring for the child. We tried to provinces. Poor families from Portugal had

13 Introduction

Samora Machel, the fi rst president of Mozambique. On his right: Joaquim Chissano (AIM)

14 The war and Renamo: how could it start?

settled in Mozambique, taking the land and that the liberation movements were serious the jobs and creating access to health and and committed. Agostinho Neto, Amilcar education only for themselves. The Mo- Cabral and Eduardo Mondlane were the zambicans were excluded from everything, founders of the three liberation movements, even such simple jobs as taxi driver or shop- but were more poets (Neto), philosophers keeper. Forced labour was only ended in the (Cabral) and academics (Mondlane) than 1960s, under pressure from the interna- fi ghters. These men inspired and led the tional community. Apart from the mission movements. In Mozambique, after Mond- schools, the black Mozambicans only had lane was killed, former health worker limited access to primary school. A small Samora Machel took over the leadership of number of Mozambicans were allowed to the struggle. When the country gained inde- become assimilados (the assimilated) – hon- pendence in 1975, he became the fi rst presi- orary Portuguese – and permitted to attend dent of Mozambique. secondary schools. The liberation move- ment Frelimo rose up in the early sixties, 1974 was the year of the peaceful ‘Carna- mirroring similar movements in the other tion Revolution’ in Portugal by young mili- Portuguese colonies of Guinea Bissau and tary captains tired of the useless colonial Angola. They paved the way for independ- wars. The new regime changed everything: ence in liberated zones, convinced that jus- Portugal became a democracy and the colo- tice and equality could be achieved for the nies gained independence. Mozambique population as a whole. The Portuguese re- became independent on 25 June 1975 un- sponse was a long colonial war, supported der Frelimo, the sole liberation movement by Europe and the US through NATO. The in that country. Frelimo followed a socialist position of most West European countries model inspired by the East Bloc, but adopt- only changed in the seventies, primarily ed a moderate African approach, trying to under pressure from civil society; the soli- secure access to basic services and food for darity movements played an important role everybody. Since Mozambique did not want in this shift. to be dependent solely on aid from Eastern Europe, the newly independent country Some politicians wanted to hear the other searched for support elsewhere in Europe. side of the story. Dutch parliamentarians Most Portuguese settlers left the country, Relus ter Beek and Jan Nico Scholten, who indoctrinated and afraid as they were of later went on to found Awepa, accompanied ‘blacks taking over’, but some stayed to the Liberation Movement PAIGC into the support the country. The schools and hos- bush of southern Guinea Bissau in 1973, pitals were nationalised; the abandoned big travelling secretly in canoes – a dangerous agricultural companies were taken over as trip under the fi re of the Portuguese army. Mozambican state farms, meant to provide They both became convinced not only that food for the population. However, many the struggle was for a just cause, but also people abandoned cotton farming; the

15 Introduction

memories of cruel forced labour under Por- pened in several other countries. Machel tuguese rule were too painful. promoted unity, with no tribal differences; the government tried to promote develop- Mozambique had some years of relative ment through a strong, highly organised peace in which it had time to rebuild. The population in the villages and townships. country had little expertise at its disposal; Local issues were brought forward to the educational levels were low and there were National Party Congresses, which made few Mozambican doctors or managers. Fac- the decisions. Mozambique was praised tories and equipment were partly destroyed internationally by the World Health Or- by departing colonists: there was no infra- ganisation for a switch to primary health structure in the rural areas, where there care, providing simple clinics and schools were few roads, schools or hospitals. De- throughout the country. Adult literacy went spite these problems, a wave of enthusiasm up from only 7% at independence in 1975 swept through the country: Mozambicans to 30% by 1986. could fi nally build their own country. This was supported by solidarity movements, Punished for solidarity with its governments and people from Brazil, Cuba neighbours and both Western and Eastern Europe: South Africa invaded Angola two weeks af- agricultural specialists, teachers, water ter its independence in November 1975, but and sanitation experts and health workers it did not initially attack Mozambique. That came to provide the skills that were lack- was left to white-ruled Rhodesia, which ing. Ministries requested the assistance of began to attack Mozambique in 1976. As foreign specialists, on the condition that a liberation movement, Frelimo had been Mozambican policies would be accepted helped by the independent government in and not overruled or ignored, as had hap- Tanzania; now that it was in power as the

A communal village in the Limpopo valley, 1981 Burnt train in Gaza province (Pieter Boersma) (Marie Reehorst)

16 The war and Renamo: how could it start?

government of Mozambique, it wanted to quire intelligence about ZANU movements help its neighbours, supporting the libera- in Mozambique, which required some cred- tion movements in the adjacent countries: ibility amongst the local population. South ZANU in Rhodesia and ANC in South Af- Africa seemed interested only in using it rica. Unsurprisingly, this was viewed as a for terrorism, disruption and destruction. threat by the white governments in those In late 1980, Renamo re-opened bases in countries. Mozambique applied UN sanc- central Mozambique. These bases were sup- tions against Rhodesia, which cut traffi c plied by air from South Africa, which rapidly through the Mozambican port of Beira, and intensifi ed material support and introduced Rhodesia responded with attacks in the bor- forced recruitment and training. There were der province of Manica. Rhodesian forces weekly fl ights in 1980-1981 as well as sup- attacked refugee camps that held Rhodesian ply boats going up the coast; crates contain- civilians fl eeing the armed confl ict, camps ing several tonnes of weapons, ammunition of ZANU fi ghters, and Mozambican re-ed- and other supplies were dropped at night.1 ucation camps, where collaborators with the The most important new development was Portuguese colonial war were held in custo- the introduction of the strategy of destruc- dy. The head of the Rhodesian Security Serv- tion and terror. South Africa’s independent ice, Ken Flowers, admitted later that after a black neighbour could not be allowed to be number of unsuccessful attacks and incur- successful. sions by his armed forces, he founded the Mozambican Resistance Movement (MNR), Apartheid was not the only external factor; composed of black Mozambican soldiers the Cold War was equally important. The who had been part of vicious Portuguese Reagan administration in the US promoted military units and fl ed after independence. the fi ght against communism, and sup- The name was later changed into a Portu- ported South Africa in its struggle against guese name: Renamo, Resistência Nacional the neighbouring socialist states of Angola, de Moçambique. Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Mozambique was strategic, because of its internation- When Rhodesia became Zimbabwe in 1980, ally recognised successes during the fi rst the Mozambicans felt relieved. It was a year independent years, especially related to its of peace; the war with Ian Smith of Rhode- social policy that lifted people out of their sia was fi nally over, and resources could be marginalisation. But while US involvement returned to building up the economy. But it in Angola was directly visible, most of the was not to be. Their respite was short-lived. work in Mozambique was left to South South African military intelligence took over Africa, with similarly devastating effects. and a weakened Renamo was relocated to South Africa. However, this move to South Africa also changed the nature of the move- 1 Hanlon, J. Beggar your neighbours, 1986, London, ment. Rhodesia had used it mainly to ac- James Curry, 1986, p. 140

17 Introduction

The atrocities: why was this war so cruel? ple in a hospital in Xai-Xai who had their By 1987, the whole country was in the grip ears and genitals cut off. People slept in the of the war; cruelty in the south, where Rena- towns at night and went back to their fi elds mo had failed to win support, had increased in the morning, hoping to fi nd their hut substantially. I just had started my work still intact. Endless stories, every day. in a Mozambican ministry at that time. It quickly became clear to me that none of my Attacks on the roads were ‘logical and ra- friends and colleagues had remained unaf- tional’ within the war philosophy. The Re- fected by the war by then. In June 1987 a namo and South African goal was to cut friend survived the attack on the town of off all transport routes, both railways and Homoine, running 13 kilometers through main roads. It made people afraid to travel. the bush while Renamo killed more than But the government saw the importance 400 people in the small town. (see Chap- of keeping the roads open. The army pro- ter 9). Roads became a particular target, tected the civil transport by organising colu- with attacks on buses, lorries and cars. nas, convoys of cars, lorries and buses. In A lorry driver drank coffee in my kitchen Renamo’s view, people travelling in military before transporting a fridge for friends in convoys were ‘taking sides’. The same view Gaza province, but he was killed in an at- was taken towards those who were lying in tack on the road to the north before reach- government hospitals; they were burned ing his destination, together with more in their beds. The cities were seen as pro- than 200 others. Kidnapping children government, so Renamo regularly cut off had become a regular practice. Some were their electricity. The seemingly mindless forced to kill their parents, to make it im- violence of ‘bandits’ served a strategic mili- possible for them to return home. Brutality tary purpose: stopping travel, bringing the to ordinary civilians increased; I visited peo- economy to a standstill and preventing the use of Frelimo services by creating fear. Nobody could feel safe. What could they ex- pect; what should they be prepared for? In the end the fi ghters even went beyond this rationale. Personal and political motives, hatred and ways of surviving became part of the situation. Moreover, the possibility of stealing food made others join in attacks, sometimes including the starving soldiers from the Frelimo side. Although there had initially been a deliberate strategy behind the violence and cruelty, in the end it de- Food aid in Chimoio, 1991 (Kadier van Lohuizen. generated further to Mozambicans killing NIZA archive/Hollandse Hoogte) Mozambicans.

18 The war and Renamo: how could it start?

Kenya as a refugee from the colonial war, and disagreed with the socialist model from the start. “Kenya was against communism. I was married to a Kenyan wife, but wanted to go back to my country after independ- ence. However, what became clear to me was the infl uence of communist Eastern Europe on the new Mozambican policy. This was not the freedom that I had longed for. The ideological concepts of Frelimo, the lack of freedom, the dissidents; we clearly did not understand each other.” Ululu was in favour of a more liberal economy, and he His ear was cut off by Renamo, 1991 was not the only one; others also wanted to (Joël Chichiane, AIM) set up their own businesses, launch private enterprises, make a profi t, run their own af- Obede Baloi, sociologist and former Awepa fairs. staff member, says, “The map of violence shows signifi cant variations throughout the Political room to accommodate differences country and across different periods of the was also lacking. Machel believed in a cen- war. Let me give one example. In Chipenhe tralised governing system in which every- (Gaza province) many of my interviewees body participated. However, those who did spoke consistently of a low-violence incur- not accept the system were excluded; there sion by Renamo guerrillas at fi rst, which was no room for dissident voices. People intensifi ed as more and more local recruits who wanted to start their own political party were among the guerrillas. This suggests were denied or even punished. The execu- that some locally recruited or kidnapped tion of dissident Uria Simango and his wife people had the feeling: I don’t want to die in a re-education camp is a signifi cant black alone. So one can say that even if external mark in the annals of Mozambican history. factors and objectives had defi ned the start of the war, it had undoubtedly developed an Soon after independence, as part of a huge internal dynamic.” push to bring schools and health posts to rural areas, the Mozambican Government Dissatisfaction was real argued that it was diffi cult to provide serv- Despite the wave of enthusiasm in the fi rst ices to isolated rural families. Its suggested independent years, a different Mozambican alternative was that people should come reality did in fact exist. Vicente Ululu, a together in new ‘communal villages’ where Renamo leader and Member of Parlia- infrastructure could be provided. Some ment in the decade after the war, lived in built in the fi rst rush of excitement after

19 Introduction

can be found in Niassa even now. In 1983, a government frightened by the rapidly ex- panding war carried out public executions and fl oggings, eliciting increasingly strong national and international protest, even from countries friendly to the regime. The Protestant Council of Churches called on the government to abolish the death penal- ty, stating that “nobody has the right to take the life of another person” and that “the rea- son for introducing it, namely ‘to discour- age violence’, had clearly not worked.” Fre- limo relented and reversed its policy; public People sleeping on galleries in the town of executions and fl oggings and the operação Chimoio, seeking safety during the night, 1991 produção were not repeated, and the death (Kadier van Lohuizen. NIZA archive/Hollandse penalty was abolished. Although the of- Hoogte) fending events did not recur, people did not forget. Abuses of power by some governors independence were popular and successful, and the central government fed feelings of but people in many places were unwilling discontent and dissatisfaction. Frelimo’s to leave their land. Authoritarian governors steadfast opposition to ‘traditional leaders’ in Nampula, Manica and other provinces also caused opposition in more conserva- forced people into villages, leading to pro- tive rural areas. As a result, Renamo forces tests, resentment and distrust. It also re- did not always encounter opposition when minded the people of a similar policy of the they moved into a rural area. Portuguese regime during the liberation war, in which people from rural areas were The Catholic church had its own reasons forced to live in aldeamentos with the objec- for dissatisfaction, stemming in part from tive of separating the rural population from its historic ties to the Portuguese colonial the Frelimo freedom fi ghters. regime. Although not opposed to independ- ence, Catholic priests were especially upset There was worse to come, not least the 1983 about the nationalisation of their schools operação produção (Operation Production). and hospitals, and the lack of recognition The unemployed, prostitutes and people for their religion. This only changed in the who were seen as ‘marginal elements’ were late 1980s, when the Pope was offi cially picked up from the streets and transported invited to visit Mozambique and buildings to work in agriculture in the northern prov- were given back. This move was not undis- ince of Niassa. Return was not possible; puted; several schools had to close because people who are angry about being sent there the church got ‘their’ terrain and buildings

20 The war and Renamo: how could it start?

back, without the schools having an alterna- Domingos, second-in-charge after Renamo tive. president Alfonso Dhlakama and chief ne- gotiator in Rome, was kidnapped in the fi rst Would a violent Mozambican uprising have years of the war. “I was indeed captured; taken place without the outside interven- the train was stopped in the Beira corridor tion? Or would peaceful protest, combined and Renamo took some of us. But I met with critical infl uence from supportive Dhlakama and he gave me the choice to countries have led to improvements re- leave. We talked and I decided to stay. I gardless? From 1983 on, Frelimo became found myself backing some of his ideas.” increasingly aware of the erosion of its sup- port. It then not only abandoned the hardest Angelina Enoque, Member of the Perma- aspects of its policy (e.g. operação produção), nent Commission, the leading committee but also adapted its social and economic in Parliament, joined Renamo after the strategies in an attempt to shore up its po- Peace Agreement, but her reasons go back sition. In 1983, the Frelimo Party Congress to her experiences during the war in Manica shifted its emphasis from big agricultural province. The behaviour of the SNASP secu- enterprises to support for family farming. rity service and of the police contributed to But Mozambique was still a one-party state her deep distrust. “There were many prob- with no room for serious opposition. Re- lems; people disappeared. My brother was namo did indeed attract some people who kidnapped by Renamo.” Somebody came to were opposed and disaffected. However, bit warn her that the police were in her house. by bit, it became clear that this was not the “They accused us, saying, ‘The armed ban- alternative that most dissatisfi ed people had dits were in your house.’ They searched wanted. The war was not about building up everything. From that moment they contin- a different kind of society, or about creat- ued to persecute me because of my brother. ing room for opposition or traditional lead- We hoped that a victory by Renamo would ers; instead, while making use of Mozam- bring democracy.” At the time when the bican internal factors, the war was aimed at Peace Agreement was signed, she lived in destabilisation of the entire country. It was Maputo. She tells how she saw her brother intended prevent an independent black ma- on TV. “We had not seen him for 16 years. jority government from inspiring the liber- He was in a barrack with Renamo soldiers. ation movements in white-ruled Rhodesia I phoned my mother, crying, ‘He is alive, and South Africa and spreading socialist my brother is alive.’ When I met with him ideals in the region. again, he said to me, ‘We need good people; why don’t you take on a political role?’” Who was Renamo, and why did people join it? Vicente Ululu discusses his involvement. I spoke to Renamo leaders in 2008, and I “When a resistance movement was created asked what made them join Renamo. Raul with support from Rhodesia, I joined it. I

21 Introduction

But Ululu does not deny the cruelties. “You can have idealistic views, but not everybody understands that. We recruited 25,000 soldiers, which gave power to com- manders, armed men who did not under- stand the cause. Kids grew up in wartime. It was also an environment in which South Africa could use Renamo for its own pur- poses.” He visited Germany several times: “Support from Europe was disappointing. Thatcher was a friend of Machel’s. Strauss [a right-wing German politician] gave moral support – we met in 1983 and 1988 – but Refugee camp (Pieter Boersma) offered no real help. Portugal had reserva- tions. Nobody saw that this war could be spent some time in South Africa. They gave based on a cause. But we could justify this us communication systems and radios; we war: we wanted a democratic state. The Par- had the most modern and advanced sys- liament has to be elected by the population.” tems. We survived because of the commu- I asked Raul Domingos the same question: nication system.” The communication sys- Did you agree with the attacks against the tem remained in place until the end, even population? “Well, there is always cruelty after South Africa discontinued most of its in a war. War is about death and destruc- support. “The troops from Zimbabwe and tion. People are used. Not everybody has Tanzania [that were supporting the Mozam- suffi cient morality to use weapons properly. bican government in the late 1980’s] were Although we may have good principles, we a reason for Renamo to intensify the war,” cannot control everything. There were local Ululu says, “Frelimo lost ground. Strate- commanders who took those initiatives on gic targets were destroyed; we destroyed their own.” the sugar factory in Luabo.” The Renamo fi ghters walked long distances through the Ernst Schade, who worked in Manica prov- bush, from Maringue to Morrumbala. “We ince during the war and transition period, did not have food, but the population gave it thinks that there has always been a differ- to us. We never mistreated the population. ence between the political and military The mines were laid by Frelimo. When wing which led to a later power struggle. Chissano offered amnesty in 1986-87 to “The military part was an unguided missile what he called ‘armed bandits’, we said: we in the eyes of the political fi ghters.” don’t need amnesty, we never harmed the population.”

22 The war and Renamo: how could it start?

Beira, a different case Longing for peace Rivalry always existed between the second In the early 1980s, South Africa increased city of Mozambique, Beira, and the national its pressure and support for Renamo. In capital, Maputo. “Beira was always the city of 1984, President Samora Machel negotiated opposition,” comments Verónica Chemane, with the apartheid regime. “When Machel now working in Maputo. “I lived there as a signed the N’komati Accord with South child, although my parents were from the Africa in 1984, he was criticised fi ercely, but South. I always felt like an outsider; the way I think it was a brave move,” Boaventura people referred to things in Beira was dif- Zita said in 2008. Zita is the national com- ferent. I was told that it was the ‘armed ban- munication offi cer for CCM, the Mozam- dits’ [as they were called by the government] bican Council of Churches. “Machel hoped who created the war, but people around me that the war could be stopped if South Africa often said that it was Frelimo that occupied stopped its support.” Mozambique kept its the country. My ideology apparently be- promise and stopped its logistic support to longed to the South. I was afraid to open my the ANC, but South Africa only reduced mouth. Who was to blame for the war? The its support for Renamo, not discontinuing Mozambican security service, SNASP, was it altogether. Papers found in 1985 when very active in Beira and created fear, saying the former headquarters of Renamo in that the ones who were causing the war had Gorongosa were captured show continuous to pay for it. Men who were suspected of co- South African involvement. operating with Renamo were taken to pris- on. People did not trust each other either. If Samora Machel was killed in a suspicious you had more food than the others, you had plane crash in 1986. Joaquim Chissano took to hide it – who had given that to you? And over as president. When the Frelimo govern- at what price?” Obede Baloi, sociologist, ment discovered that South Africa had not provides more background: “Beira’s frustra- stopped its support, and the war could not be tions against the dominance of the capital won, it asked for support from Zimbabwean in the South existed even in colonial times. and Tanzanian troops in 1987. Although There was always rivalry; it was always con- that intensifi ed the violent reaction from sidered necessary to compete with Maputo, Renamo, it also secured the Beira corridor, at that time called Lourenço Marques.” the vital transport link between Zimbabwe A strong and repressive governor was and the port of Beira. placed in Beira to gain control over the opposition; this move only made things Under pressure of the war and strong for- worse. It seemed a vicious cycle that contin- eign infl uence, Mozambique signed an ued to escalate agreement in 1986 with the IMF and the World Bank. Social principles like free health care and education had to be aban- doned bit by bit. Mozambique opened up

23 Introduction

to privatisation and the free market sys- the negotiation table: ‘Let brothers speak to tem, which replaced the failed centralised brothers.’ (see chapter 3). economy. In 1987, implementation of the Economic Recovery Program (PRE) started. Fear disappeared Queues in the shops disappeared, bread Verónica Chemane talks about her expe- was available on a daily basis now, and riences in Beira at that time: “When the many luxury products appeared in shops Peace Agreement was signed, fear disap- – at least for those who could afford them. peared; we suddenly could speak out. All The new system was welcomed, but it also the churches and civil organisations were created a division in society; most of the involved in a movement for peace, there benefi ts were experienced by a small group. was civic education everywhere. After the war Renamo wanted to show that ‘it was “Why did you think it was enough? Why not our fault, we are not to blame’. They were you in favour of peace negotiations?” I wanted to show that they destroyed for a ask Ululu. He responds, “The war made no cause. The government made space for sense anymore. Reforms had started with them to participate in the process.” She the Economic Recovery Program. Many of continues, “To achieve democracy you need the aspects that I did not like had disap- to have a choice, and that was what we had peared over time. Infl uence of Eastern Eu- lacked. There was no choice, there were no rope stopped, private enterprise was possi- alternatives. But in the preparation time ble again, and the new constitution of 1990 for elections we were still afraid that the opened up the country for free association same would happen as in Angola [with the and for a multi-party system. So one by one, Unita rebel movement], entering the towns my objections disappeared. The war was and then restarting the war.” Throughout not the solution any more. We could take the Mozambican transition period, there part in the society in the way that respected our convictions.” continued to be a vivid fear of a repetition of what happened in Angola, where elections At the same time, the Cold War ended and in 1992 did not consolidate peace. The los- South Africa was preparing its own democ- ing movement Unita did not accept the out- ratisation process. The end of South Afri- come. It restarted the war from a stronger can support and drought in Mozambique position, since it had gained access to the made surviving in the bush increasingly towns through the peace agreement. diffi cult for Renamo. The negotiations be- gan in Rome in 1990 and were concluded “There will always be lack of clarity about in 1992 with a detailed Peace Agreement. the role of each person, even in Frelimo; (AGP) The churches by then had been ac- there were always people wearing two tive for eight years to bring the leaders to hats,” says Alex, who worked in civil service in Manica during the war. “And many peo-

24 The war and Renamo: how could it start?

ple also criticised Frelimo. But the majority lished Renamo as a key political player in of atrocities and organised violence was by Mozambique, and remained as such, at Renamo, no doubt about that. In Manica I least for three consecutive elections. Thus, saw complete villages set to fi re.” And Ernst one fi nds that many Renamo voters don’t Schade notes, “When the war was over and ask questions about the past, they just op- the people could be honest about their sym- pose Frelimo.” pathies, many more people were Renamo members than we thought, even in provin- He continues, “The contradiction is that in cial government.” spite of the way people were used, and in spite of the violence, the multi-party system Obede Baloi states, “It is important to was introduced in Mozambique because record how things really happened. The of the war with Renamo. It was infl uenced context is different now. Many of the cur- by the desire to end the confl ict, making rent explanations about the causes of the space for eventual inclusion of Renamo in war are in fact post-facto reconstructions. the political system. Which is something They are reinterpretations. One important else than saying that Renamo fought for a factor in this change of circumstances is democratic country. the 1994 elections. These elections estab-

25 Preparing for peace

Demonstration: ‘Help! Government and Renamo, please save us’. Maputo, May 1992 (AIM, Antonio Mucave)

26 The involvement of the churches

Chapter 3 that neither evangelisation nor emergency aid would be enough to stop the suffering. The churches wanted to contribute to peace The involvement of the churches and democracy. They were supported and infl uenced by northern European aid or- e felt that the only road to peace ganisations that had an anti-apartheid policy, “Wwas bringing the brothers togeth- including Awepa. European parliamentary er to talk. The government saw Renamo as delegations visited the refugee camps and an instrument of foreign interests, while received information from Bishop Sengu- Renamo said it was fi ghting Marxism. What lane and Reverend Lucas Amosse, who was could be done to bring them together? The equally involved in the peace process. Mozambicans had to talk amongst them- selves, independently from foreign infl u- “When President Samora Machel signed the ence. We had to consolidate what unites N’komati Accord with South Africa in 1984, us,” said Bishop Dinis Sengulane when I he was criticised fi ercely by many African met with him in 2008. For many years, the countries, including allies, but I think it was bishop was the President of the Christian a brave move, and strategically correct, in the Council of Mozambique (CCM), which sense that President Machel didn’t want to has nine Protestant member churches. We give the apartheid regime reason to crush were sitting in Sengulane’s room next to the Mozambique,” says Boaventura Zita, com- Anglican church. Documents and fi les were munication offi cer with CCM; he also coor- piled up in his modest, dusty offi ce. Elderly dinates civic education programmes. Machel women in much-washed capulanas, the tra- hoped that the war could be stopped if South ditional cotton cloth wrap, were waiting in Africa discontinued its support. Three the hall to speak to him. Bishop Sengulane months after the Accord, the churches sent is still highly respected because of the role he a letter to Samora Machel to praise him for played in the peace process, but he remains his initiative. “But the churches thought that an Anglican priest fi rst and foremost. was not enough; the same courage needed to be found to talk with the other Mozambicans CCM created the Commission for Justice, who were causing suffering in the country- Peace and Reconciliation (CJPR) in 1984. side. We said to the government, please “We saw how the population suffered. In talk to the others,” says Zita. The churches the cities there was protection by the gov- were received by Samora Machel in 1985, ernment, but in the rural areas there was but talking to Renamo was not acceptable in none. The attacks and kidnappings by Re- his eyes.1 In 1987, a third letter was sent to namo were horrible.” CCM played a role in the President, who was Joaquim Chissano emergency activities for the victims of the war, and was active in the refugee camps 1 Sengulane, D.S. Vitória sem Vencidos, 1994, in neighbouring countries, but they saw Maputo, p. 9

27 Preparing for peace

at that point. “It is not important where the seminary.”2 When independence came, the bullets come from, or which uniform is Portuguese missionaries left the country. using them; it is the Mozambicans who are Dom Jaime was shocked by the Mozam- dying in this wave of terror.” Steps should bican government’s promotion of athe- be taken to prepare for dialogue, the letter ism and the nationalisation of schools and stated: “even with the ones who are used hospitals that had been in the hands of the by external forces” and: “dialogue is not the church. The government invited the Catho- same as legitimising the destabilisation; lic church leaders for discussions several it is simply an acknowledgement of the times. As Dom Jaime relates, “We talked suffering.” and talked but did not agree. They wanted me to change my ideology.” As the war Bishop Sengulane and the Catholic Bishop of worsened, the Catholic church was not sup- Beira, Dom Jaime Gonçalvez, both played portive of Renamo’s violence, but there was an infl uential role in bringing about peace defi nitely more sympathy and understand- and reconciliation. However, the two men ing for Renamo’s opposition to the Frelimo used different approaches, drawing from government. In full secrecy, Dom Jaime different histories. In Portuguese colonial sought contact with Dhlakama, and fi nally times, the Catholic church was offi cially met him in his base in Maringue, long be- recognised as part of the system and had fore other contacts had been established. a formal agreement with Salazar’s fascist regime, while the Protestant churches in While the Catholics had better access to Mozambique were the targets of offi cial Renamo, the CCM was better equipped discrimination and had to maintain an in- to infl uence the ruling government. CCM dependent position. Consequently, the lat- forged ties with the Archbishop of Mapu- ter developed a better understanding of the to, Dom Alexandro dos Santos, and both position of the black population. The Prot- Catholics and Protestants tried to convince estant churches used local languages and the two parties that talking was necessary. were often at least sympathetic to the lib- They both wanted peace. “We did it in the eration struggle. Protestant church schools pastoral style,” said Sengulane, “not in pub- educated many of the children that later lic. This was different from the Catholic ap- became the leaders of the liberation move- proach; they did not talk to the government, ment. This difference also infl uenced their but put pressure on them in a pastoral letter positions after independence. saying: the government has to talk.” He con- tinues, “But the Mozambican Catholics also Dom Jaime, Bishop of Beira, spoke in a wanted peace. The Archbishop of Maputo radio interview in 1999 of how he came asked us to talk to the government.” back from a study in Rome just before in- dependence. “I was intended to be the spir- 2 Manhique, E. Gente da nossa terra; 1999, Radio itual leader of the preparatory theological Moçambique Maputo, p. 121

28 The involvement of the churches

In 1987, Chissano recognised the need for In the end, the negotiations took place in action and invited the religious leaders to Rome. “We did not want to be part of the ne- explore the possibilities. The churches gotiations themselves,” says Bishop Sengu- then received an invitation from the US lane. “Dom Jaime was present. I never went. Senate. “They wanted to know: ‘who are One of us was enough.” those communists who want to talk? We answered, ‘There are no communists; there CCM then became more openly involved in is a social system that we want to restore.’ preparations for peace amongst the popu- We hoped that direct contact could be pro- lation in the country’s interior and in the moted through the US. But the American refugee camps, preparing people for peace churches did not understand what we want- and reconciliation. “We talked with them ed.” He smiles. “However, we did have the about going back and forgiving.” After the opportunity to talk to somebody who knew peace agreement it took part in nation-wide somebody who had contacts with somebody reconciliation and civic education pro- with contacts with Renamo.” That became grammes. “The wounds were deep; women the start of trips to Kenya and other coun- had been taken away from their homes tries by a delegation of two Catholic and two and forced to stay with Renamo. The main Protestant church leaders. It took until Feb- question here was how to involve the people ruary 1989 for them to meet with two politi- themselves, how to integrate them,” says cal leaders from Renamo: Raul Domingos Bishop Sengulane. and Vicente Ululu. “We said to them: we don’t want to be mediators, we just ask both The fi rst priority was to involve the member sides to talk directly to each other.” churches in the whole country. The main concern for CCM was helping the popula- The meeting created an opening. “When tion accept inclusion of the enemy. Rec- we fi nally met the Renamo leader Alfonso onciliation and forgiveness were the most Dhlakama in August 1989, we were able to important issues at fi rst. Cooperation with bring a twelve-point discussion paper from Awepa started in 1991, developing from the government to the table. It was answered 1993 on into a nation-wide programme that by a sixteen-point Renamo statement, which created possibilities for people to speak out we took back to the government. That was and to discuss the new situation, but also the only thing we did. We did not interpret to be informed about the new political situ- anything. It was highly confi dential.” CCM ation, the multi-party democracy and the leader Reverend Amosse, who was present elections. (See Chapter 7.) The CCM provin- at that meeting, says now: “Of the 16 points cial delegations served as a platform for the raised by Renamo, the question of commu- provincial training and activities. Boaven- nism was the most important; other issues tura Zita writes in 2009: “The programme were exclusion, lack of respect for traditions, gave a new encouragement to the work no recognition of traditional authorities.” of the CJPR, the peace and reconciliation

29 Preparing for peace

commission of the Protestant churches. to artists who use them in creative projects. Awepa brought specialists from other “We don’t ask where the arms come from. countries into the training seminars, who Unfortunately, not everybody wants to hand brought essential experience with them, in their weapons. But the situation is not as as well as questions about human rights serious as in Angola, where people in the and democracy.” CCM perspective over the diamond areas were heavily armed. We are years had changed into a more political ap- lucky that Mozambique had no links be- proach. As Zita says in his notes, “CCM saw tween war and natural resources. Nobody that it was necessary to also consider the profi ted from the war.” causes of the emergency situation.”3 “There is never a justifi cation for such vio- CCM also launched a nation-wide ‘swords lence, even if the cause is accepted,” Sengu- for ploughshares’ campaign, creating op- lane concludes. “80% of the fi ghters were portunities for voluntary disarmament. kidnapped and forced to kill. People paid Bishop Sengulane explains, “There are still with their own lives. The problem now is many arms in the country, although there that history is rewritten; no-one wants to are no armed groups with political inten- take the blame.” (See Chapter 9.) tions.” The weapons are destroyed or given

3 Zita, B. A Cooperacao entre o CCM e a Awepa, 2009, CCM, Maputo

30 Negotiations and agreement

Chapter 4 Tired of war Anselmo Victor was Renamo’s nation- al political offi cer at the time of the Peace Negotiations and agreement Agreement. He now holds a seat in the Mozambican Parliament. When we met in n the 4th of October 1992, we all saw the Renamo parliamentarian offi ce, he told Oit on TV: Chissano and Dhlakama me: “I was a guerrilla in the Beira region. hugged in Rome; the General Peace There were many clandestine Renamo Agreement (AGP) was signed. The last days members. Peace did not come as a surprise of the peace talks had been tense; the sign- to me; everybody was tired of the war, and ing had been scheduled for 1 October, but both sides knew that they had to accept it. Dhlakama delayed his arrival because of un- The international community was also in- resolved issues related to the local admin- terested in supporting the end of the war, istration in Renamo-controlled areas. But and the EU played a role in the process as talking, pressure, and a new draft about well.” the subject helped persuade him past his fi nal objections. Filipa Baltazar da Costa, “There was a serious drought during the Frelimo MP, who held a leading position in last years of the war,” says Manuel Pereira, women’s organisation OMM, will never for- also an MP, who was the political delegate get how they came back. “Chissano wanted for Renamo in Beira in 1992. “The bases peace. He had said before he left: ‘I will not did not have food any more. People were return without a signed peace agreement’. I starving.” Vicente Ululu, former Renamo can still see him coming out of the airplane, negotiator, and leading fi gure in parliament back from Rome, triumphantly holding that for years, confi rms this assessment of the piece of paper in his hand. It was an emo- situation just before the peace agreement. tional moment.” “Both sides were tired. We wanted the war to stop.” Euphoria, unbelief and fear followed: would it work? Would they really stop But the main negotiator, Raul Domingos, fi ghting? War had just broken out again in does not believe that the war stopped be- Angola after successful elections in Septem- cause everybody was tired. “The guerrillas ber. In Mozambique, the peace agreement obeyed their orders; they knew that it was achieved its intended aim; the fi ghting did time for peace. I don’t believe that they indeed come to an end. Renamo relied on were tired. In other countries, fi ghting does a sophisticated communication system, al- not stop just because they are tired; some lowing their leadership to notify all Renamo leave but others take their place. But the units over the next few days, and the units people believed in their leaders, so the war followed the order to cease fi ghting. stopped.”

31 Preparing for peace

Press conference during the peace talks in Rome, announcing the agreement about the ceasefi re. Left: President Joaquim Chissao, middle: mediator Mario Raffaelli, right, Renamo leader Alfonso Dhlakama, 1992 (Joel Chiziane, AIM)

32 Negotiations and agreement

South Africa withdraws and the the strong points that remained was the Cold War ends communication system, but a war never Frelimo had abandoned Marxism and was survives on external support only. Weap- discussing the multi-party system to be in- ons, equipment and medicines are diffi cult cluded in the 1990 Constitution. But the to distribute from outside. The N’komati outside world was changing too. The Cold Accord also created agitation; new fronts War and apartheid were in their fi nal years. were opened.” Raul Domingos was unhap- Mandela was released in 1990 and the py with the South African attitude, saying Berlin Wall had fallen; Namibia achieved in reference to the Minister of Foreign Af- independence from South Africa after long fairs: “Pik Botha did not want to continue negotiations. And indications had already any more. We felt betrayed; they had aban- been given earlier. The Gorongosa papers, doned us. They had their own interests to found in 1985 in former Renamo headquar- pursue.” But Pastor Mutungamira in the ters, showed that South Africa had already central Sofala province says now, “When started to lose interest in Mozambique by the outside world lost its interest in the war, that point: offi cial minutes from the visit of we thought to ourselves: what is left? We ‘Colonel Vanikerke’ (which probably refers did not want this war.” to Van Niekerk) to Dhlakama in May 1985 describe how he proposes a visit from the Frelimo and Renamo talk Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. “Louis In May 2008, I spoke with former Renamo Nel is still interested in the search for peace negotiators Raul Domingos and Vicente in Mozambique.” He also asks Renamo not Ululu. Domingos explains: “Frelimo want- to attack the South Africa-Maputo railway ed a ceasefi re, wanted the Renamo side to and the Cabora Bassa power lines, “but the hand in their weapons before starting nego- most important point is to ask for a resump- tiations. If we would recognise the offi cial tion of Renamo/Frelimo talks.” But he also institutions, they would give us amnesty. conveys a message from General Viljoen: “I This was unacceptable to Renamo; we did assure Mr. President [Dhlakama] that Re- not want to relinquish our position from the namo still has friends in the South African outset. The Kenyan government understood military. I hope that Mr. President under- our concerns, saying that ‘peace cannot be stands the diffi culties that we South Afri- imposed; it has to be negotiated until there cans have with our politicians.”1 is consensus’.” They then had to fi nd a place where they could negotiate. “An initial at- Anselmo Victor continues: “After 1984, the tempt was made in Malawi. But Malawi had South African support diminished. One of troops in the Nacala corridor. Frelimo sent a delegation to Malawi, and the President 1 The origins of armed banditry in Mozambique; of Kenya offered a jet to bring Renamo. But (Extracts) Gorongosa papers, 3rd edition, Dhlakama refused, so it was a fi asco. Kenya Notebook 2, p. 1-2 played a role on our side. President Arab

33 Preparing for peace

President Joaquim Chissano and Renamo leader Alfonso Dhlakama shake hands after Dhlakama’s arrival in Maputo, 1993 (Alfredo Mueche, AIM)

Moi had contacted the Renamo leadership very limited, as its attention was occupied and we were offered Kenyan passports.” It with its own democratisation process. became important to fi nd neutral ground. “The Renamo proposal to hold the negotia- The negotiations in Rome tions in Kenya was not accepted by Frelimo, In February 1990, the news that negotia- and the proposal for Zimbabwe was refused tions had started became public knowl- by Renamo.” edge. The fi rst direct meeting in Rome was on 8-10 July 1990, with a delegation of four Then Don Matteo Zuppi of Sant’Egidio, an Frelimo and four Renamo representatives. Italian church organisation with represen- Armando Guebuza, Minister of Transport, tation in Mozambique, took the initiative headed the Frelimo delegation; its other to mediate. Vicente Ululu explains, “The members were Francisco Madeira, presi- Italian government wrote to Chissano with dential diplomatic advisor, Aguiar Mazula, the proposal to hold the negotiations there. Minister of Labour and Teodato Hunguana, Frelimo and Renamo both accepted.” Italy Minister of Information. The Renamo del- was a good choice, reducing US infl uence egation was led by Raul Domingos, chief and giving the negotiations a Mozambican of the external relations department, who character. South Africa’s involvement was was accompanied by Vicente Ululu, head of the department of Information, Agostinho

34 Negotiations and agreement

Murrial, political affairs, and Joao Almirante lawians did not attack,” says Domingos. from Dhlakama’s cabinet. It was a remark- The fi rst meeting concluded with a joint able fact, and an indication of the serious- statement on the 10th of July 1990. For ness of the peace talks, that neither side the fi rst time, both sides publicly expressed replaced any of the delegation members their intention to seek peace. throughout the two years of negotiations. The meetings were attended by observers: There was a long way to go. During the fi rst one representative from the Italian govern- hour, Guebuza and Domingos had made ment, Mario Raffaeli, two from the commu- opening statements to introduce the mem- nity of Santa Egidio, Andrea Riccardi and bers of their delegations and to express Matteo Zuppi, and Dom Jaime Gonçalvez, a commitment to dialogue. Both avoided Archbishop of Beira. The observers later contentious remarks, and the atmosphere took on a new role, acting as mediators. was good.3 Various countries sent delega- tions that held separate meetings with both The initial points raised by Renamo and by sides. The US in particular claimed a role. Frelimo, and exchanged through mediation They operated in parallel to the mediators, of the churches, had made it clear that both holding their own meetings with both par- sides raised principles that could serve as ties and urging them to sign an agreement a basis for dialogue: a peaceful solution, without a provision on military use of the democracy based on freedom of expression corridors.4 But the two parties wanted a and association, recognition that people more detailed accord. In the third round in have the right to choose their government, November 1990, the negotiators changed and a desire for national reconciliation. Re- their approach. The Italian observers be- namo did not rule out accepting the legiti- came mediators, chairing the meetings and macy of the government, the constitution proposing the agenda. Two issues had prior- and the laws in force.2 “When we came to ity: the Zimbabwean troops, and setting the the negotiation table, our fi rst conditions agenda for further discussions. The agenda were multi-party democracy, free elections needed to include the negotiations about the and justice,” says Domingos. “We also did political and military conditions for peace, a not want the Zimbabwean attacks in the calendar for the cease-fi re and for the elec- Beira corridor to continue.” Domingos re- tions, and the international guarantees. fers to the road between the port of Beira and land-locked Zimbabwe, protected by “On 1 December 1990, we achieved agree- Zimbabwean troops. The Malawian army ment about the role of the Zimbabwean protected the northern corridor between forces in the period prior to the cease-fi re. Malawi and the Nacala port. “But the Ma- This was an important step,” says Raul

2 Hume, C. Ending Mozambique’s war, 1994, 3 Hume, idem, p. 33 US Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C. p. 29 4 Hume, idem, p. 45

35 Preparing for peace

Domingos. The document known as the Dhlakama wants to confi rm the rules. He ‘Agreement on Partial Cease-fi re’ dimin- stresses that the draft is the work of the US ished warfare for the fi rst time. The role of and Frelimo, and that it looks the same as the Zimbabwean troops in the Beira cor- “what ‘the Americans and the Soviets’ did ridor decreased substantially, and Renamo in Angola, where they forced MPLA and promised to not attack the Beira and Lim- UNITA [the two sides in the confl ict] to sign popo corridor anymore. A Joint Verifi cation the agreement that they had elaborated.” Commission was created to monitor imple- He expresses his dismay that they now mentation of the agreement. wanted to do the same thing with Frelimo and Renamo in Mozambique. “That will In more than ten rounds of negotiations, not work in Mozambique.”7 the agreement was discussed issue by is- sue, encountering tense moments, infl ex- Although this comment expressed a fear ibility and some drafts from Renamo that that the US would disproportionately sup- seemed to be introduced just to “complicate port Frelimo, while that was never the the process and make an early agreement case, the effect was the same: it was clear impossible”.5 It was far from simple. There that both sides wanted the agreement to be was a will to negotiate, but mistrust was Mozambican. And indeed, the poorly con- deep and abiding. It made the negotiations structed agreement in Angola and its mini- lengthy. The slow construction of the proto- mal execution, together with the biased at- cols to reach a consensus led to impatience titude of the US and the UN favouring the in the national and international commu- UNITA rebels, were amongst the reasons nity.6 However, the result was an accord that the Angolan peace process failed just with very detailed guidelines. It provided a one year after Dhlakama’s observation. strong foundation during the sensitive and fragile transitional period, and served as a The concluding factor in the last phase was useful tool in many diffi cult situations. the series of meetings with African leaders, especially President Mugabe. These meet- Although there was continuous pressure ings reduced fear and granted African le- from outside, the negotiations took place gitimacy to the negotiating process. States between the Mozambicans. Both the Fre- that had once been involved in the confl ict limo government and Renamo were keen amongst Mozambicans now wanted to fos- to assure that. In a letter to Raul Domingos ter reconciliation. in May 1991 about the ‘basic principles’, In an interview in Mozambican newspaper 5 Hume, C. Ending Mozambique’s war, 1994, Magazine published in June 2008, Raul US Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C, p. 77 Domingos concludes that the negotiations 6 Mazula, B. Eleições, Democracia e Desenvolvimento, Maputo 1995, p. 30-31 7 Mazula, idem, p. 31

36 Negotiations and agreement

President Chissano arrives at Maputo airport after signing the 4 October General Peace Agreement in Rome, 1992 (Antonio Muchave, AIM) were a success. “Given the context, the peace CNE, the National Election Commission accord was negotiated well. No accord can during the transition period. completely satisfy both sides.” The only thing he would have done differently now The Agreement is incorporate the security component, the The agreement on Partial Cease-Fire was police and a non-partisan public service. signed on the 1st of December 1990. “But in short, the Peace Agreement was ne- gotiated in detail, and included knowledge The General Peace Agreement, signed on about the causes of the war and the way to the 4th of October 1992, consisted of seven reach a defi nitive solution.” protocols, which were agreed on different dates. Anselmo Victor says now that he was happy to have peace. “The war created barriers. I Basic principles 18-10-91 People could not easily visit each other. II Political parties 13-11-91 There was a different climate from 1992 III Principles of the Electoral Act 12-03-92 on. I wanted to be part of the process.” He IV Military questions 04-10-92 became a member of the Joint Verifi cation V Guarantees 04-10-92 Commission appointed to oversee the par- VI Cease-fi re 04-10-92 tial cease-fi re agreement, and he was on the VII Donor conference 04-10-92

37 Preparing for peace

ONUMOZ, the UN peace-keeping mis- important points was the consensus about sion, was assigned an important role in the new joint army, consisting of 15,000 guaranteeing the execution of the Peace soldiers from each side, to be fully trained Agreement. The detailed protocols were and in place before the elections, and the executed and controlled by joint commis- rapid assembly and demobilisation of all sions composed of members from the two remaining troops. The actual constitution Mozambican sides, as well as international and government remained in place until members. the elections. This created stability during the transition period. CSC: Supervisory and Monitoring Commis- sion, headed by the UN Special Representative Dialogue and reconciliation now had to CCF: Cease-fi re Commission progress beyond the signing of the agree- CCFADM: Joint Commission for the for- ment. A different period had commenced. mation of the Mozambican Defence Force Mozambique opened up; people started talk- CORE: Reintegration Commission ing, meeting each other, travelling. Refugees returned to their homes and families were The agreement was extremely detailed, reunited. Freedom of expression took on a and none of the parties could anticipate whole new meaning. Independent news- the full scope of the organisational, logistic papers sprang up and everybody wanted to and fi nancial consequences. The election discuss, study and learn. As if the many lost date was set for the end of 1993, but that years had to be compensated. later proved to be impossible. One of the

38 Reconciliation

Chapter 5 proaching. We asked to have a word with the commander. A man came to us and held out his hand. I had to respond, but I Reconciliation: “If we start punishing, hesitated. It was as if I saw the blood shed where would we end?” in the brutal war on his hands. He looked at me, waiting for me to shake his hand. Sud- lift from a lorry in Quelimane was al- denly I thought: if the Mozambicans can Amost the only way to reach the interior live with this, if they are willing to accept of the province of Zambezia in December and forgive, if they want reconciliation, who 1992. Fighting had stopped immediately am I to do otherwise? I took his hand. It was following the October Peace Agreement at the start of a serious and rapidly growing and the roads had opened up. Trade from involvement by my organisation, Awepa, the city shops had started to reach the iso- in the peace process, the reconciliation lated provincial towns. Gurue was our des- efforts and the construction of a function- tination. The road was bad; grooves in the ing multi-party democracy. road marked the places where cars had been forced to slow down, and the burnt Punishment or amnesty? out wrecks showed what had happened af- The offi cial peace agreement, the AGP, terwards. Tiny women came out of the bush granted general amnesty, and nobody had shyly, peeping at us from behind a tree, objected, not the Mozambican population amazed by the sight of a normal car passing nor the international community. The am- without a problem. They were clothed only nesty law applied to everybody involved in in bark and too afraid to come closer. the war, Renamo guerrillas as well as the government army. Trials were never dis- I made a second trip that month, this time cussed as a serious option. Filipa Baltazar to Morrumbala, a destroyed town in Zam- da Costa, former deputy head of OMM and bezia province that had been occupied by a Frelimo MP, says now, “If we start pun- Renamo for several years. There I met the ishing, where would it end? The line be- new Frelimo administrator, who told me tween being guilty or being a victim was how he had taken the initiative to commu- often blurred. Mozambicans understood nicate with the Renamo troops that had laid that; most families still had members that down their weapons. Reconciliation had al- had been kidnapped by Renamo, dividing ready started, he said; there was no need to families into Frelimo and Renamo mem- wait for offi cial instructions. He sent some- bers. Punishing the Renamo war crimes one with me to a Renamo military camp would also mean opening up the issue of close to the town. I saw an old monastery criminal acts committed by the government in ruins, and boys with heavy weapons, no army. Who always knew what was done by older than 15, lounging around the grounds whom?” Her colleague Gertrudes Vitorino but immediately alert when they saw us ap- adds, “We had to forgive, not forget. How

39 The transition period and beyond

Woman in Angonia in Tete province: the pictures of Chissano and Dhlakama with the text on her cloth wrap: ‘Fruit of Reconciliation’, 1993 (Alfredo Mueche, AIM)

40 Reconciliation

can you forget what you saw? People who had collaborated with the Portuguese admin- saw their daughter being pounded in the istration during the colonial war. If they were way women pound their maize. There honest about crimes committed against the are so many witnesses, youth kidnapped, Mozambican population, they were accepted raped. But we had the example of South and received amnesty. In 1986-1987, a gov- Africa: punishment is not the way.” ernment radio campaign encouraged people to run away from Renamo; if they did, and if “How do you feel now, that those crimes they submitted to government authority, they were never punished?” I asked in an inter- were given amnesty and support. 2000 men view in 2008 with Helena and Isabel, living changed sides at that time. Many of them in Maputo. Their response was unambigu- were victims as well, and the population was ous. “We have never questioned that. It was asked to receive and accept them. “That sort clear from the beginning of the negotiations of thing taught us to understand and accept that if we started to talk about punishment, the enemy, even after serious crimes. Reli- peace would never be achieved. We had to gion was also important in teaching us about accept that we would keep our mouths shut peace and tolerance,” says Isabel. “After the and forget.” peace agreement, we tried to live with the fact that from one day to the next, the ban- “But can you forget?” dits were no longer bandits anymore. It was “No, we will never forget.” far more important to keep the peace than to ask questions.” When the Peace Agreement “And forgive? Can you live with people when was signed, silence about the atrocities was you know they have been part of it?” the norm. But when I ask Filipa Baltazar why people did not speak out during the civic “Sometimes it is still diffi cult, particularly education programmes, she says, “Oh, they when you see people with big cars, speaking did, not in public, but amongst themselves.” in Parliament as if they care for the popula- (See Chapter 7.) tion, when you know that they have been complicit in brutal war crimes. But yes, in Traditional healing or Truth Commission? general we are able to forgive. We Mozam- “If we would not have had a Truth and bicans are very tolerant, maybe too tolerant; Reconciliation Commission, we would have it is in our people’s nature. We are able to gone up in smoke,” Bishop Desmond Tutu tolerate, even if it is not reasonable.” said in an interview on Dutch TV in January 2008 in reference to the South African rec- It was not the fi rst time that amnesty was onciliation process. “How can you forgive granted, although the previous occasions had someone who says: I deny everything?” been related to admissions of wrongdoing. In the fi rst years after independence, Presi- Mozambique survived; it did not go up dent Samora Machel spoke with people who in smoke. The main concern during the

41 The transition period and beyond

transitional period was to integrate and Mozambican researcher Alcinda Honwana accept the former enemy. In addition, the held a lecture at a Dutch university in 2008 churches preached forgiveness and inte- explaining the importance of traditional gration. It is a discussion that I had several healing, especially for former child sol- times with Boaventura Zita of CCM during diers, who are victims and perpetrators at our joint civic education programmes of the same time. She told the story of a ten- that time. His response was, “A truth com- year-old boy, Marula, who was kidnapped mission is not our way to deal with this, al- but tried to escape together with his father. though it worked in South Africa. We have Their escape attempt failed. our traditional ways of healing.” “As punishment, and for his own life to be It confi rms what I heard in a visit with an spared, Marula was ordered to kill his fa- Awepa parliamentarian delegation in April ther. And so he did. Following this fi rst kill- 1993 to a village to the north of Maputo. ing, Marula grew into a fi erce Renamo com- It was a region that had been severely af- batant and was active for more than seven fected by the war, where attacks and kill- years. He does not remember how many ings had driven the population away from people he tortured, how many he killed, their villages to safer camps in the town of how many villages he burnt and how many Manhiça. Men came back to rebuild, but food convoys and shops he looted. After women and children still remained in the the war, he returned to his village. But his camp until they could be sure that safety paternal uncle, the only close relative who had been restored for good. I asked about survived the war, refused to welcome him the lost children, the ones that had fought in home. These events established Marula’s Renamo. Could they come back as well? transition from child to soldier, civilian to “Yes, of course; they are our children.” combatant; from victim to perpetrator, in- But could these people accept what they nocent to guilty, a killer rejected by his own had done? “We have our ceremonies for family. It shows the moral and emotional that. We don’t speak of the violence that dilemmas created by a war that tore apart has been committed. That would bring communities and split entire families.”1 the spirit of violence back. Our curandeiros, our traditional healers, hold a ceremony to Honwana explained how Mozambicans cleanse them of the evil, of the violence, of deal with traditional healing. “Cleansing the crimes. And after that they will be ac- and purifi cation rituals were performed to cepted.” And another man said, “We are deal with the emotional and social problems not always the ones who are in a position of war-affected populations. The rituals were to impose punishment. In the end, justice will be done. That is our strong belief; that 1 Honwana, A. War, Reconciliation and Citizenship gives us peace.” in Mozambique. 2008, The Hague, ISS Public Lecture Series no. 1, page 9

42 Reconciliation

based on cultural notions of social pollution a good man who was killed just like that, by the spirits of death.” She explains that the without any reason, but they never apolo- spirits of the victims wander around, and, if gised; they never said sorry.” no purifi cation takes place, it can affect not only the individual who committed the of- Talking with Boaventura Zita of CCM in fences, but the whole family or community. 2008, I returned to the discussions we had “In the post-war chaos, when governments fi fteen years before. I asked him, “Why did and international organisations are unable Mozambique not create a truth commis- to provide effective mechanisms, these sion like in South Africa?” He explained, community rituals are often the only means “To have a truth commission, you need a available to help communities to move for- strong judicial system. Also, South Africa ward. The rituals offered the former child had a different reality; the war was not as soldiers what they needed: forgiveness and brutal as in Mozambique. In addition, there reacceptance into the community. In this was a lot of contradictory information or way, the community also reconciled itself misinformation here; at some point in with its troubled past.” Marula was indeed time, you no longer knew any more what later accepted by his family. was true and what was not. Will it help? To know now what a present MP has done “And what about us, the victims?” and what not? It is easy to judge. Behind Traditional healing through local ‘curan- the war is the empty stomach: hunger and deiros’ made many people’s life bearable, starvation. Searching for total justice is dif- mainly in the rural areas. But the silence fi cult. Massacres were committed for eco- about what happened was very real and con- nomic reasons. Where is the justice? Let’s tinues to this day. No crime was ever ad- not forget that the process has political, eco- mitted openly, and no direct relation was nomic and social victims. Who has treated laid between the offender and the victims. the invisible wounds of the Mozambicans? Nothing was offi cially documented, and tes- Many have been turned into instruments timonies of victims have not been request- but thanks to treatments, no visible trau- ed. Helena says now, “In the beginning, it mas are left. We were brothers, but we were was not necessary to speak out; people knew used. External conditions promoted that. who had done what. But now history is be- We in the churches have spoken strongly ing rewritten more and more, and the new about forgiveness. The civic education pro- generation does not even seem to know gramme that we carried out together with what happened. It hurts that the people who Awepa gave everybody the opportunity to attacked us say now that they fought for jus- talk; that was the best thing that could have tice. I sometimes think: and what about happened. (See Chapter 7.) The centre of us? Did what we went through not mat- the country, Manica and Sofala provinces, ter?” And Fernanda, a friend from a north- were more diffi cult. The wounds from the ern province, says, “I lost my father. He was war were different there. But after several

43 The transition period and beyond

meetings and seminars, the difference was the war and were not recognised as having gone.” committed crimes. With an invisible enemy it is easier to accept the other.” I raised the same question with Reverend Lucas Amosse, former Secretary-General of Could prosecuting war criminals indeed CCM, who had been involved in peace and block peace processes? reconciliation programmes for many years, Perpetrators from the wars in former and was instrumental in setting up the civic Yugoslavia and in Sierra Leone, and from education programme with other church the genocide in Rwanda, have been brought leaders. “It would have been very compli- to court. These legal proceedings prob- cated to research what happened. It was ably come as a relief to many victims after already complicated enough, and peace had years of impunity. The trials are also meant priority above everything else. South Africa as prevention, as a signal: you cannot just is an organised society, different from us kill, thinking that you will go unpunished. when we came out of the war.” Thinking However, the International Criminal Court back, he then adds, “Almost all of us were (ICC) is increasingly confronted with doubts victims. But I do see now that we did not do from diplomats and judiciary who question enough to recognise the suffering. We did whether the charges are not hindering the not want to prolong the pain. I think this peace process rather than contributing to was a mistake, but I don’t know what we can the solution, e.g. in the current confl icts in do now. People who suffered need room to Sudan and Uganda. Bert Koenders, Dutch express their suffering. The ones who com- Minister for Development Cooperation, mitted war crimes were not punished, and said in an interview in 2007 that the obvi- we did not acknowledge the suffering of the ous choice is not always to opt for justice people who were abused. Trying to open fi rst, and then for peace.2 He speaks about it up now will have many consequences. a dilemma. Who will be willing to sign a There are risks involved; false stories will peace agreement if he knows that he will be be told. Going back to a truth commission headed straight to the court in The Hague? now is almost impossible.” “You have to listen to the population,” he said, “that is where the victims are.” The Obede Baloi explains: “In the Mozambican role of the ICC is also disputed in Africa. case, former warriors were key to establish- But the founders of the ICC argued that ing peace, there would have been no peace peace cannot be sustainable without justice. without them. The leaders made a compro- A Uganda analyst disagrees, saying that it is mise; they had no interest in pursuing the a matter of priorities, since neither justice truth. And the people needed their leader to be part of a new beginning, so they did 2 Koelé, T. Reportage in Afrika met minister Bert not ask questions. Violent actors hardly re- Koenders, De Volkskrant, The Netherlands, May 12, mained in places where they acted during 2007

44 Reconciliation

A delegation of parliamentarians, members of Awepa, and representatives from refugee organisations on a fact-fi nding mission in villages in Gaza province where people are coming back, April 1993 (Pieter Boersma) nor a democratic state would be possible And the support in the context of the Cold without peace: “Enough space should be giv- War? There seems to be a kind of unspoken en to make the deal.” However, setting that agreement not to touch the international priority also means that the victims will not responsibility. have justice. It does indeed present a huge dilemma. People from Southern Sudan say, Conclusion “Our priority should be reconciliation.”3 Amnesty, traditional healing and forgive- ness worked in Mozambique. It did indeed Trials are always selective. Who defi nes bring peace; it made it possible for former who is most guilty: the ones who actually enemies to live side by side and build up a kill, or the ones who initiated the violence, new life together. It was different from the but remained behind the scenes? In the colonial war for independence, or from oth- Mozambican case: what about apartheid er wars where one side achieved an undis- South Africa and Rhodesia at that time? puted victory, such as the Second World War in Europe. Those wars ended with 3 Lindeyer, K. ‘Vrede en gerechtigheid in Afrika’ NRC a clear statement of right and wrong, al- Handelsblad, The Netherlands, 14 July 2008 lowing room for acknowledgement of the

45 The transition period and beyond

suffering – at least on the winning side; Real reconciliation means honesty on both only after 60 years is there some room for sides. But that was not possible for the people nuances and shades of grey. The way the in post-war Mozambique, at least not openly. war ends is signifi cant for the decisions In the end, the only way to deal with the past about punishment.When there is no clear was just to live with it. Still, long-term conse- winner or loser, pinpointing the line be- quences are unclear, and dilemmas remain. tween right and wrong is a diffi cult and sen- sitive matter.

46 The UN peacekeeping mission and the international community

Chapter 6 nally displaced people also needed support. Many international organisations were in- volved in their return and integration, for The UN peacekeeping mission and example the Norwegian Refugee Council. the international community The International Organization for Migra- tion (IOM) organised the transport of refu- he psychological importance of the UN gees, internally displaced persons and de- Ttroops, especially in the fi rst period, mobilised soldiers. Many refugees returned should not be underestimated, several peo- spontaneously, long before the offi cial ple told me. The UN wanted to make sure programmes started. Ajello found a very that Mozambique’s peace process would be sympathetic ear in Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a success, especially after the recent failures Secretary-General of the UN at that time, in Somalia, former Yugoslavia and Angola. who pushed donor countries to contribute Mozambique had a serious chance of be- manpower and money and to agree to new coming a success story, as it fulfi lled most timetables. of the conditions needed to make it work: both sides in the confl ict and the popula- The UN had not been closely involved in tion as a whole all wanted peace, and long the peace talks and was caught off-guard negotiations between the government and by the demands that the Peace Agreement Renamo had resulted in a serious and placed on them. Ajello had initially been detailed agreement with compromises made appointed to the position on a temporary consciously by both sides, laid down in the basis. Consequently, in late 1992 and early General Peace Agreement (AGP). At that 1993, it was an unprepared international point, it looked as if there was hardly a way community that had to move quickly. In back. December 1992, ONUMOZ offi ces were established in Maputo. Ajello complained “The situation is miraculously fi ne” in a meeting in early 1993 about the slow Italian diplomat Aldo Ajello was appointed budget approval process, causing delays in by the UN to coordinate the ONUMOZ the arrival of troops. Only $11 million had peacekeeping mission to Mozambique, con- been approved in advance, but another sisting of a political staff, a humanitarian aid $300 million needed for UN involvement programme coordinated by aid programme had not yet been committed. Peacekeep- coordinated by UNOHAC, and about 6.500 ing forces from Italy, Botswana, India, UN troops and 1000 civil police. The UN Zimbabwe and Uruguay were ready to High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) come, he said.1 Quick arrival of the troops was responsible for arranging the return of was important in order for peace to hold. As more than 2 million refugees, together with NARML, the Mozambican government in- 1 Hansma, T. Minutes of Awepa meetings in stitution in charge. But three million inter- Maputo, 31 February 1993

47 The transition period and beyond

Mozambicans repatriated from Swaziland, arriving by train in Boane, 30 km west of Maputo, 1993 (Alfredo Mueche, AIM)

48 The UN peacekeeping mission and the international community

Ajello stated at that time, “Renamo does not joint army. Consequently, the UN and donor want to move its troops until the UN is in organisations were welcomed and needed. place.” “Delaying demobilisation is danger- However, almost every country, international ous,” said Renamo leader Raul Domingos organisation and ambassador had an opin- in January 1993, referring to the insuffi - ion on how Mozambique should develop. cient UN presence. The fi rst UN troops did Ajello had the important and diffi cult task not arrive until April 1993. of trying to coordinate these differing views and to promote joint refl ection. Arranging In that meeting in early 1993, Ajello de- donor involvement to ensure that funds scribed the situation as “miraculously fi ne”, were provided at the right time and place despite a UN presence that was still far too was also important. However, it sometimes small. “People are not dying, thanks to a looked as if the country had been taken over. good food response. The peace is holding; rain is falling. But there is a lack of interna- Renamo made threats regularly, toying tional media coverage, since the situation is with the idea of resuming the armed con- calm.” fl ict. Their threats of war were dangerous; they could still make it happen. However, Ajello’s mission is generally seen as success- these residual rumblings of unrest were ful. He played an important role, not only also, and perhaps primarily, a way for as the head of the peacekeeping force, but Renamo to exert pressure on the proceed- as a politician who played chess with all the ings – and it achieved the desired results. pieces on his diplomatic chessboard, often From a position of relative weakness, since under time pressure, involving the Mozam- the existing government was already estab- bican government and parties, the interna- lished and recognised by the international tional community and his UN staff in seek- community, Renamo’s only recourse to re- ing solutions. Ajello’s strength was that he tain power in further negotiations was to was new to UN peace-keeping missions, and threaten to boycott the process. “We regu- perhaps more open to unusual solutions as a larly faced intimidation and threats,” former result, responding seriously to signals from UNOHAC representative in Sofala and In- Mozambican society. hambane George Siemensma now says, “but I don’t think it was from any real desire The Mozambican politicians welcomed the or even possibility to go back to war. I think support coming in from the international that Renamo leaders knew that those times community. They wanted desperately to were over. The only moment that I felt a real make peace work and tried to create the danger that everything could go wrong was necessary conditions, but acknowledged when Dhlakama announced a boycott one their lack of experience and limited capac- day before the elections. Not a return to war, ity. Moreover, trust had to be built on all lev- maybe, but the feeling that everything had els – in politics, in society and in the future been in vain.” (See Chapter 8.)

49 The transition period and beyond

were not the only ones to respond. Entre- preneur ‘Tiny’ Rowland of the international company Lonrho had made fi nancial deals with Renamo in the past, in exchange for an agreement from Renamo not to at- tack the Lonrho installations in the Tete province of Mozambique. When that ap- proach no longer worked, and Lonrho was no longer excluded from violent attacks, Rowland turned to supporting peace. “There is no democracy without money,” Raul Domingos seems to have said to Rowland UNOHAC trying to cross the water next to a in June 1992. A deal was made to provide destroyed bridge over the Luaua river in Sofala between six and eight million US dollars, province, 1993 (George Siemensma) the exact amount dependant on continued Renamo adherence to the peace accords. Ajello had stressed the importance of re- Rowland also helped with Renamo’s de- sponding to Renamo’s material demands, mands for houses, putting the four-star providing money that hardly could be ex- Cardoso Hotel in Maputo at Renamo’s dis- pected to be accounted for. Providing fi - posal for a period of one year and providing nancial resources would increase interest a fl eet of vehicles.3 among the Renamo leadership to build a life in the city, creating an appealing alter- The AGP was both sophisticated and com- native to a return to the harsh, primitive liv- plex. It included agreed procedures and ing conditions in the bush. Danish Ambas- precise timetables, and stipulated that the sador Peter Truelsen supported that idea, transition period should be concluded with saying in early 1993, “It is in everybody’s elections at the end of 1993. However, that interest to get them out of the bush. Others period proved far too short. With the ex- have a base, houses, income, but Renamo ample of Angola clear in the minds of the do not. Getting them into the city, providing Mozambicans and the international com- the means of survival, helping to establish a munity, an example in which the rebel political party is important.”2 movement Unita restarted the war after the 1992 elections, it was clear that much Money and luxurious houses in Maputo better preparations would be needed. Even were indeed important for Renamo to build after elections were postponed by a year, it their new position. The donor community 3 Alex Vines, The Business of Peace: ‘Tiny’ Rowland, 2 Hansma, T. Minutes of Awepa meetings in fi nancial incentives and the Mozambican settle- Maputo, 31 February 1993 ment, 1998, Accord, Conciliation Resources, UK

50 The UN peacekeeping mission and the international community

was a race against the clock. Just one month community has often underestimated the before the elections, Renamo had still not importance of making time to involve the relinquished control of all the areas it oc- population, to build realistic perspectives cupied, which meant limited access, hardly for a better life, to achieve reconciliation any information and no freedom of move- between the former enemies, and arrange ment for the people in those areas. serious preparation of the politicians before they take up their new tasks. If pre-election Postponing the elections, however, also preparation is rushed and incomplete, it meant a longer UN presence, at the cost of provides a weak base for the post-election US$20 million a month. In January 1993, period. De Mul also expressed his concerns UNDP Representative Erik de Mul said in about the democratisation process follow- a meeting, “If UNOMOZ has to stay till ing elections. It was clear that elections sometime in 1994, the costs of the UN could not be the end of the story. operation will increase substantially. It is almost unthinkable that the Security Council Another problem was the language. The will extend the operation beyond 1993.” national language spoken in Mozambique Despite the considerable expense, the UN is Portuguese. UN personnel and troops, Security Council approved the extension; embassy personnel, international organi- Ajello supported the postponement, which sations that came in to provide technical proved to be crucial. Quick elections im- support for repatriation, rehabilitation and posed from outside, ignoring the context, elections were hardly able to read the basic have caused peace processes in several documents, let alone comprehend the nu- countries to fail, even though the elections ances, especially in the beginning. At the themselves went well. The international request of the government, Awepa provided translations into English and bilingual pub- lications of key documents. Extra copies were made for the UN.

UN troops The fi rst troops arrived in April 1993. The Italians came to replace the Zimbabwean troops in the Beira corridor. They estab- lished a visible presence at fi rst, with regu- lar armed patrols, but after some time this was no longer necessary; there were hardly any serious incidents. However, the pres- ence of the UN military as a neutral force Demining in Sofala province by a South African had a positive effect, especially around the company, 1993 (George Siemensma) demobilisation assembly centres.

51 The transition period and beyond

The UN peacekeeping force had a limited children fi nd their way back to their fami- mandate; if war or violence had broken out, lies. “The fi rst sign that something was an adequate reaction would probably have wrong was when staff members saw a lot been diffi cult. Fortunately, that was not put of young girls with very short skirts.” The to the test in any serious way. The war was situation became much more serious when indeed over after the 4th of October; the UN Redd Barna discovered widespread and soldiers were mainly in Mozambique as a well-organised sexual abuse of children by symbol of peace and security. On the other the troops. Schade describes witnessing hand, it was a large army and had little to the abuse fi rst-hand. “Two staff members do. By the end of the transition period, the came to my house at 11 p.m. and asked me population mainly viewed them as soldiers to come and have a look in a nightclub. who spent most of their time lying on the There were 40-50 Italians there. They had beach. Some contingents played an espe- constructed a stage and I saw four very cially constructive and positive role, sup- young naked girls, and four naked Italian porting efforts to build roads and children’s men. They had numbers on their body and playgrounds and gardens. As Siemensma one of the men shouted, ‘Number 1 goes relates, “They helped to make roads acces- on number 6.’ They fi lmed everything.” sible and locate land mines. They opened Through a friend, a Mozambican photogra- their hospitals to the population and pro- pher who was asked by the Italians to copy vided logistic support.” the fi lms, Schade was able to obtain a copy of the material. “It was pure child pornogra- In contrast, the Italians in Manica province phy.” Redd Barna wrote up an offi cial report caused serious problems. Ernst Schade, co- for the UN in December 1993, but it took ordinator of Norwegian organisation Redd some months and a wave of international Barna (Save the Children Norway), who was publicity before a serious investigation was based in Manica, tells me in 2008 how he launched. However, the investigative mis- became involved. “The Italian contingent sion drew clear conclusions and the Italians was not very well prepared for this mis- were sent home in April 1994.4 sion. They had no prior information about Mozambique; it could have been any coun- The Italians were replaced by a contingent try as far as they were concerned. Their from Botswana. The contrast was dramatic. behaviour in Manica demonstrated a lack The Botswanan troops gained popularity by of respect for the population, driving cars undertaking community-oriented projects. recklessly, causing accidents, refusing to Schade describes the difference in ap- pay for the damage.” proach. “The Botswana chief commander

At that time, Redd Barna was working 4 Schade, E. Experiences with regard to the UN to help unaccompanied minors who had Peacekeeping Forces in Mozambique, 1995, Redd lost their parents in the war, trying to help Barna, Norway-Mozambique

52 The UN peacekeeping mission and the international community

came to me, a tall and impressive man. He The intervention in Sofala was not limited gave me his personal telephone numbers, to aid. UNOHAC mediated in four cases saying: if there ever is a problem with our of mutiny related to ex-soldiers who were soldiers, please call me.” waiting in the assembly areas for demobili- sation. “In July 1994, we received an urgent UNOHAC message that the disabled soldiers in Muan- The general mandate for the coordina- za had taken a substantial number of hos- tion of humanitarian aid was assigned to tages,” says Siemensma. “On our way to the UNOHAC, and included reintegration of ex- spot, we met the UN troops, who had put soldiers and coordination of demining. Un- up a barricade across the road. They warned like the other UN staff, UNOHAC provincial us that the situation was dangerous, but we coordinators were recruited from expatri- decided to continue with the UN fl ag on ates who lived in Mozambique, who knew top. In Muanza, we saw about 200 peo- the local situation and spoke the language. ple camping at the side of the road, being Their teams were the only ones that had held by the soldiers. They were very aggres- unrestricted access to Renamo areas. “Our sive, although they were only armed with strength was twofold,” says Siemensma, sticks and crutches. They protested about who worked in Sofala province, one of the the slow demobilisation process.” The more diffi cult areas. “Our mandate was es- former soldiers now also wanted to hold the tablished in the Peace Agreement, and that UNOHAC team hostage, but negotiation put us in a good position to negotiate and to resolved the situation. “Back in Beira, we convince Renamo to stick to the rules at dif- did what we had promised. With the help fi cult moments. In particular, we had access of the Red Cross, they received food for the to diffi cult areas where there were people hostages and for themselves. Involvement in hiding, still under Renamo control. But on a higher level made it possible to include it also gave us the possibility of coordinat- Manuel Pereira, the Renamo representative ing the emergency organisations effectively, for Sofala, who talked with them about the which avoided a situation in which each demobilisation problems. They then let the organisation just started wherever they liked, 200 people go. It still took several weeks or let other interests prevail. We let them un- before the soldiers were out of the assembly fold their plans and adjust to each other.” centre.” Most NGOs did not like UNOHAC involve- ment in the beginning; newcomers simply In another case of a blockade in Dondo, wanted to rush into Renamo areas, prefer- the ex-soldiers had arms and fi red them ring the ‘popular’ areas like Gorongosa, for into the air. No hostages were taken that which it was easier to raise money. “But time. It was Pereira who had called for a they did in fact need us to gain access to the demonstration, so they would not listen to regions where the situation was still tense.” UNOHAC pleas to stop it. “A forceful discus- sion with Pereira was necessary, referring to

53 The transition period and beyond

the AGP agreements, especially about weap- to be transparent, so that both parties could ons, before the blockade was lifted,” says have confi dence and hand in their weapons Siemensma. without losing face.”

Demobilisation and a new unifi ed army The number of Renamo soldiers was equally Timely demobilisation and integration of unclear, and was exaggerated in the begin- former soldiers were indeed crucial. If that ning. Doubts existed as to whether all troops process was not completed before the elec- had come forward. Renamo held back a tions, war could restart at any moment. The substantial number, especially in the area Peace Agreement defi ned that the two Mo- around the former Renamo headquarters zambican armies should be integrated in of Maringue. Moreover, not all the child sol- one unifi ed army of 30,000 soldiers, 15,000 diers had been demobilised or released im- from each side, to be recruited on a volun- mediately, as had been agreed. In June 1994, tary basis. But most soldiers just wanted to Renamo admitted that it still had more than go home. Ajello also expressed his concern, 2000 child soldiers. A UNICEF survey had saying that “an initial survey indicates that confi rmed their presence in tightly guarded only about 15% are interested in being in the bases within Renamo’s strongest military joint army. And donors are not interested in zones. A special demobilization team was paying for the new army, or for any army.” organized for the benefi t of those under 15 Military training and support were later pro- years of age.6 But even in 1995, after the vided by Britain, France and Portugal and elections, an additional 50 children were Zimbabwe; Italy contributed fi nancially. released from Maringue through Red Cross intervention. Ton Pardoel was head of the UN Technical A Dutch diplomat who was involved at that Unit for demobilisation. In an interview with time says now, “We did not know exactly a Dutch newspaper in May 2009,5 he said, how many had to be demobilised. The early “Everything had to be invented; even the gov- fi gures from Renamo were very high, but ernment did not know how many soldiers it later proved to be much lower. We were pre- had in the country. It was a public secret that pared to contribute, but became concerned a third had been killed or deserted, but there about the slow process.” was no documentation anywhere.” 49 as- sembly camps were created, where soldiers The fi rst troops went to the assembly areas would be prepared for demobilisation. They in December 1993, a year after the AGP, and received an identity pass with a photograph. demobilisation started in March 1994. At the “For many of them, it was the fi rst time that end of the UN mandate in December 1994, they had seen themselves. [The process] had 6 Synge, R. Mozambique, UN Peacekeeping in 5 Steen, H. van de ‘Je hebt antennes nodig, geen plan.’ action 1992-1994. 1997, US Institute of Peace Press, Brabants Dagblad, 30 May 2009 p. 97

54 The UN peacekeeping mission and the international community

Aldo Ajello (centre) talks with an Awepa delegation. Left: Jan Nico Scholten, president of Awepa; right: Sir David Steel, member of the Awepa Board, 1993 (Pieter Boersma)

92,881 soldiers had been demobilised; it? Ex-soldiers often become the new mar- 11,579 had joined the new army by then, far ginalised youth, lacking experience in any- fewer than expected. The slow demobilisa- thing but war, unwelcome in their former tion process and delays had caused many village, or still having access to guns. Their problems. By July 1994, the number of mu- presence would continue to jeopardise sta- tinies had increased, it appeared as though bility if they were not able to fi nd a new discipline on both sides had disappeared way to live. In Angola, during the period of almost entirely. It was clear: soldiers did peace in 1992, frustration about the slow not want to join the new army. They only demobilisation process created space for wanted to be demobilised, receive their sal- criminal attacks on the re-opened roads. ary, get food, blankets and shoes and leave.7 In January 1994, Ajello expressed his con- A Mozambican success story: two years cern that demobilisation was not moving income made integration of ex-soldiers along fast enough. He then took an unu- happen sual initiative. He proposed guaranteeing What should Mozambique do with more monthly support for two years in cash, to be than 92,000 ex-soldiers who had no place paid for six months by the government, and in the new army, or who did not want to join eighteen months by the donor community. The demobilising soldiers were fi rst given 7 Fauvet, P. and M. Mosse. Carlos Cardoso e a Revo- an introductory course about their rights luçao Moçambicana, 2003, Maputo, Ndjira, p. 327 and duties and about peaceful civilian

55 The transition period and beyond

Soldiers at the UN-run assembly point in Massinga waiting for their demobilisation, Inhambane province, 1994 (Ferhat Momade, AIM)

56 The UN peacekeeping mission and the international community

57 The transition period and beyond

A demobilised soldier receives money and clothing, 1994 (Ferhat Momade, AIM) behaviour. They also had access to vocation- the fi rst soldiers drew their money from the al training. They had to choose the place bank in their district in July 1994. where they wanted to go, received a pack- age of civilian clothing and were provided “It gave us a good position to return,” says transport to their chosen destination. The one of the ex-soldiers. “We became respect- monthly sum was related to the last salary ed members of the community, had some- in the government army, and paid through thing to offer to the family, could invest the local bank. It was between $7 and $24 in our lives.” Most of the ex-soldiers went a month, and higher ranks up to $46, with back to rural areas, built a house, invested a lump sum of US$52 for all at the end.8 in their impoverished family, found a wife, had a baby and worked a piece of land. The “It was a revolutionary way of thinking; we outcomes of the evaluations are positive.9 could hardly sell this idea to our govern- By 1996, 87% of these demobilised soldiers ment in The Hague,” says the Dutch diplo- had been reintegrated into society and ac- mat. “But once the EU had accepted it, the cepted by the community; most of them Dutch were prepared to join the initiative.” had secured a food supply or a small guar- The programme was approved in March; anteed income. Their families were better off, with more children going to school. The

8 Barnes, S. The Socio-Economic Reintegration 9 Lundin, I. et. al. ‘Reducing Costs through an of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique. 1997, Expensive Exercise.’ Case study, 2000, London, Maputo, UNDP/RSS Macmillan Press

58 The UN peacekeeping mission and the international community

men who stayed in the capital had a lower bican approach challenged this. What hap- success rate, but it was still within reason- pened was the opposite: when a regular and able parameters. unconditional supply of money was pro- vided, men worked with their families and The total reintegration budget was US$94.4 planned how to improve their lives – and million. From that budget, $35.5 million was many succeeded. allocated to the project to provide the two years of cash income. Of that amount, $33.7 The new army: “we were under military million went directly to the demobilised orders not to discuss politics” soldiers. The overhead was extremely low: During the negotiations, the Frelimo 2.5% for UNDP, which coordinated the pro- government had diffi culties agreeing to gramme, and 2.5% for the bank. Sam Barnes an army of 30,000; they had wanted at concludes in her evaluation for UNDP that least twice that number. UN coordinator “cash and material benefi ts for all demobi- Ton Pardoel confi rms the lack of enthusi- lised soldiers should be the base of all re- asm that soldiers felt for joining the new integration programmes. There is neither army. “The question of whether we could organisational capacity, nor an economic get enough soldiers for the new voluntary base in post-confl ict societies to implement army was crucial. Most were completely fed large-scale job creation programmes.”10 In up with the war; they wanted to go home. the end, more than 92,000 soldiers ben- They wanted peace.” At the time of the elec- efi ted, about 71,000 from the government tions, the new army was not yet complete. forces and 21,000 from Renamo. While an army of 30,000 soldiers had been planned, by late August 1994 it totalled Despite its success, the example has hardly 7,806 soldiers, consisting of 4,263 former ever been followed in other countries. Government troops and 3,543 former Re- Most went back to the traditional project namo fi ghters. By the end of the ONUMOZ approach. There are taboos and prejudices mandate in December 1994, the total had about providing direct cash. One objection reached 11,579. is that poor people lack the proper skills to improve their lives themselves and need Adriano Malache was working in the specialised help from others to spend the Ministry of Defence in 1995. I interviewed money in an adequate way. Another view him in October 2008. “It was still diffi cult. holds that it would be better to give it to the Troop numbers had been reduced substan- women, because they take responsibility for tially, and there was a lack of confi dence. the family, while men do not. The Mozam- Joint courses had to minimise the tension. There were major differences between the 10 Barnes, S. The Socio-Economic Reintegration ones who came from the former government of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique. 1997, forces, and had often attended military Maputo, UNDP/RSS school, some even going to the academy,

59 The transition period and beyond

while the Renamo guerrillas came out of The peak of international aid the bush. They had to be integrated, learn- Refugees and displaced people returned ing the principles of regular drills. Semi- home and families tried to fi nd each other, nars were organised with both sides about people started to build again, and minimal the role played by armed forces in a situa- living conditions had to be created. “We saw tion of peace in a democratic society, with a lot of new international NGOs coming in due respect for the law and for human just to profi t from the opportunities,” says rights. It was discussed together. Aguiar Alex, a former employee in the water sec- Mazula, the Minister of Defence, took this tor in Manica. “There was money available initiative. It was a slow process; theory does and many applied for it, even if they lacked not change actual behaviour overnight. But the capacity to deliver quality. UNCHR had bit by bit it was understood.” distributed the districts amongst the aid or- ganisations. Even if they were specialised Public statements did not always refl ect in only one issue, they suddenly had to do reality. “Publicly, we said that there was no everything: agriculture, building schools, division, but everybody knew how diffi cult digging wells, etc.” it was. But the leadership of the armed forces helped everyone to accept each other, The return of refugees through UNHCR saying, ‘We have all killed; we are not go- had suffered many delays. UNHCR had ing accuse one another.’ We were under been unprepared, and was only beginning military orders not to discuss politics. The to get itself organised in August 1993, after lack of space to express political sentiments it had secured a budget of $204 million. It actually facilitated integration. It took place took so long that returning refugees even in a spirit of reconciliation, not transpos- missed the planting season. 250,000 peo- ing the old problems to the new situa- ple had already returned on their own by tion. We had to be democratic.” Malache then, mainly from Malawi.11 Alex contin- continues: “Now we sometimes feel that ues, “Peace brought relief and optimism; there are so many things to be questioned: everybody felt that. You could travel with- who was to blame, what did we do wrong? out fear. But the transition period was also Many things still hurt, give you a feeling very confusing, involving many irritations, of revolt. But at that time all the efforts especially towards international NGOs that were directed at maintaining peace. For came temporarily. You had to wait until the the youth, it is already history.” Malache is peak was over to return to normality. Serious now the director of the Mozambican offi ce NGOs that were in the country before the of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Peace Agreement mostly stayed and tried Democracy (NIMD), an organisation that supports democratic development of politi- 11 Synge, R. Mozambique, UN Peace-keeping in cal parties in seventeen countries. action 1992-1994. 1997, US Institute of Peace Press. Washington D.C.

60 The UN peacekeeping mission and the international community

to guarantee continuity.” And Siemensma 1. Everybody has to be convinced that there says: “We built up a very good database that is no military solution; was later handed over to the competent gov- 2. After the negotiations, there should be ernment authorities, together with all the no losers; material, computers, etc. But it was more 3. The peace agreement should be very diffi cult for the government than it had detailed. If it is not, there will be huge been for us to get a grip on the coordination problems when it is implemented; of the international NGOs.” 4. The peace-keeping force has to be there for the population. If not, it becomes an Looking back occupation force; In an interview in 1999 in a Dutch news- 5. The most support should go to the paper12, Aldo Ajello refl ects on the process rebels, and not to the government. and the role of the UN. “In Mozambique, we came as friends. That is not the case in Conclusions many other countries; the UN has often Two years of negotiation and two years of a bad name. I violated all the UN rules. I transition have been criticised as excessively knew that it would be the end of the story if slow and expensive. Yet the unorthodox we were associated with the New York bu- approach and the extra time that was taken reaucracy.” He continues, “After an agree- to sort things out were actually useful, ment is signed, the guerrilla movement is and probably provided the most important extremely vulnerable. The fi ghters have to basis for the success of the peace process. come out of the bush. They are afraid, see The international organisations provided peace as a trap and start to violate the agree- necessary support – morally, fi nancially ment.” Renamo attacked four villages in the and technically – but not all organisations fi rst days. Ajello went directly to Dhlakama, recognised the importance of having the saying: “We spend one million dollars a Mozambicans in the driver’s seat, being the day on this process, a fortune. We cannot owners of their own country. The interna- continue like this. What is your problem? tional presence was sometimes too over- Maybe we have the means to solve it. If not, whelming. you remain bandits that nobody wants to deal with.” The UN spent 17 million dol- lars on fi nancial support to Renamo during transition. “That was absolutely necessary to change Renamo into a political party.” Lessons can be learned from Mozambique, says Ajello. He lists fi ve points:

12 Bossema, W. ‘Na vredesonderhandelingen mogen er geen verliezers zijn.’ De Volkskrant, 16-04-1999

61 The transition period and beyond

Civic education seminar in Inhambane, March 1994 (Awepa Maputo)

62 Civic education in the transition period

Chapter 7 different phases of civic education1, and in election observation. After elections we were involved in providing training and support Civic education in the to Parliament and in capacity building for transition period local elections.”

was studying outside the country when Mozambican organisations and Awepa “II heard that the Peace Agreement In November 1992, one month after the had been signed,” says Obede Baloi, AGP was signed, Awepa supported the Mozambican sociologist and my colleague international conference of women’s or- from 1993-1998. “It was a new era. I came ganisation OMM, in which the participat- back to be part of it; I was passionately in- ing delegates together with leading women spired by it. In the beginning of 1993, I trav- from other Portuguese-speaking countries elled to Gaza for the fi rst time and saw the exchanged ideas about how Mozambican destruction from the war, burned cars on women could be involved in peace-building the way. But I also saw the people coming efforts. The OMM conference became the back on foot. They came on their own ini- fi rst step in the nation-wide involvement of tiative. They did not wait for ONUMOZ; women in the Mozambican process. After they started to build houses. They believed this event, Minister of Justice Aly Dauto that it was possible. This impressed me”. in January 1993 asked Jan Nico Scholten, He continues: “At that time, Awepa held its president of Awepa, to pursue involvement fi rst series of civic education seminars with in civic education. civil society organisations. One of the train- ers for the CCM seminar did not show up, “Awepa was the fi rst international organi- so CCM suggested that Awepa should talk sation in the country that was prepared with me. I had two days to prepare for the and able to address the issues of peace subject on democracy. I did it and got in- and democracy with civil society, and for a volved. It seemed an opportunity to make a long time it was the only one,” says Angelo useful contribution.” Matusse in 2008.” Matusse was Awepa Representative for Mozambique from 2000- Baloi talks about his growing enthusiasm, 2008, and was interested from the start. “People were already involved in the tran- A joint programme was then set up with sition. I was impressed by the discussions the Protestant churches, organised in CCM, about freedom and democracy. People and with the women’s organisation, OMM. aired their opinions; there was no self- censorship. They were already using the 1 Baloi, O, ‘… e muitos participaram!; um estudo space of freedom. It was wonderful. That sobre a educaçao cívica por ocasião das was the start of my fi ve intensive years in primeiras eleiçoes gerais e multipartidárias em Awepa programmes, taking part in the Moçambique’, 1995, Awepa Maputo-Amsterdam

63 The transition period and beyond

CCM had been actively promoting peace for the education programs. In 1995, she and reconciliation for several years. The concluded in an interview: “We put our ex- programmes included series of national, periences together and the result was a great regional and provincial training seminars programme.”2 Her colleague Gertrudes in which the provincial leadership, mem- Vitorino added: “In the beginning, we did bers and activists were trained to involve not know how to start. We developed eve- and inform the local population. The issues rything in cooperation with Awepa. We had were about the content of the peace agree- no idea that the programme would grow to ment, with explanation of new rights like such an enormous size, nor what we would free circulation, the reconciliation process, be able to realise in the end.”3 acceptance and cooperation with the former enemy, and the new multi- party system. The civic education programme: where The programme expanded later, includ- should we start? ing the youth organisation OJM and the The people of Mozambique were trauma- organisation of trade unions OTM, as well tised; many had lost their families and their as some small organisations. With ONJ, homes, while others had been abused, or the independent trade union of journalists, had to seek refuge in neighbouring coun- the special role of journalists in the process tries or in camps. Now that peace had fi nal- was addressed. In the fi nal phase before the ly been achieved, they tried to resume their elections, a small group of Renamo activists lives. The majority were illiterate and public was trained. awareness of the new constitution of 1990 and the General Peace Agreement, the The trainers were Mozambican specialists, AGP, was almost non-existent, especially in staff from the participating organisations the rural areas. The new democratic system and Awepa staff and specialists. Awepa in Mozambique was based on Western leg- was a trusted partner for Mozambique. islation, founded on principles that are dif- Through its international members, which ferent from traditional African practices, included MPs, politicians and human which are based more on consensus than rights experts, it was able to provide the competition. Apart from that, it was also necessary expertise. The activists from the different from the recent political systems, Mozambican organisations presented the both the colonial times when there was no message, using local languages in regions democracy at all, and the one-party democ- where Portuguese was too diffi cult to un- racy after independence. The concept of derstand. The organisational capacity and motivation, down to the smallest villages, 2 Baloi, O, ‘… e muitos participaram!; um estudo was impressive. sobre a educaçao cívica por ocasião das primeiras eleiçoes gerais e multipartidárias em Moçambi- Filipa Baltazar was Deputy Secretary-General que’, 1995, Awepa, Maputo-Amsterdam, p. 19 of the OMM at that time, and responsible 3 Idem

64 Civic education in the transition period

making a choice between parties was un- Civic education was not yet as much of a known, and general elections by secret bal- trend in international organisations as it lot had never been held before. is now, and we often had to reinvent the wheel. The Mozambican organisations The new situation needed to be discussed; built the programme around their active it was necessary to talk about peace, toler- membership in the districts and villages. ance, freedom of circulation, respect for Everything was discussed together, analys- different opinions and respect for human ing the phases in the Mozambican process rights. It was necessary to explain the new and inventing new methodologies. political system, democracy, political par- ties, voting. How could the population be Awepa’s international offi ce and staff were involved? How to prevent democracy from supportive, and our donors were fl exible, becoming an empty shell, excluding the so the programme was able to start without people? What could be done to prevent war bureaucratic delays. Specialists and par- traumas and hatred from overshadowing liamentarians from Europe and Southern hope and cooperation? Africa came in, joining us as colleagues on voluntary basis, never asking for con- Developing the programmes sultancy salaries or luxuries. Many of them Shortly after the Peace Agreement, Awepa knew Mozambique and spoke the Portu- started in a small offi ce in the back yard of guese language, and were motivated to con- the Norwegian Refugee Council, just me and tribute. They say now that they learned as Telma Mahiquene, a young Mozambican much from the Mozambican process as the woman, who just had fi nished commercial Mozambicans did from them. administration school. She was a combina- tion of assistant, bookkeeper and reception- Other players ist, and I was everything else, with nothing At the start, no other organisations were but my laptop and motorcycle. After the fi rst available to provide civic education, and big OMM conference, we were immediately the work of the electoral bodies had not yet caught up in the rush of requests. We hard- started, but a broader involvement devel- ly had time to refl ect; we simply had to get oped later, especially prior to the elections. started. It was a period of learning by do- The Catholic church had already started a ing for everyone involved, carefully identi- programme of ‘reconciliation and forgive- fying the most urgent needs. This meant ness’ in August 1992. In December 1993, involving creative and motivated people in they started a civic education programme the programme, and arranging all the sup- in the run-up to the elections, supported by port we needed from the offi cial institutions, Caritas Mozambique. 36 trained activists the Ministry of Justice and later the electoral went into the provinces to accompany 736 bodies CNE and STAE. activists in the countryside. When the elec- toral bodies were installed, the American

65 The transition period and beyond

organisation NDI worked directly with teams.”5 Many Mozambican organisations them, providing support for the materi- picked up the subject; round table discus- als and manuals that had to be developed. sions were broadcast on the radio, and the In 1994, provincial civic education coordi- ‘Companhia Nacional de Canto e Dança’ nators were appointed by NDI/STAE, prin- (the National Song and Dance Company) cipally to focus on voter education. Taking and other theatre and dance groups held a pragmatic approach, most coordinators performances about the elections, often in combined their election-oriented efforts cooperation with civic education activists. with what was happening already in other civic education programmes. International Working with the mass organisations: NGO Friedrich Ebert organised several de- OMM, OJM and OTM bates and produced educational materi- Coming out of a one-party system, the only als. Party observer training was fi nanced by organisations that had nation-wide mem- the US; the funding that was provided was bership and experience in local activities intended to train 35,000 monitors from dif- were the so-called ‘mass organisations’ – ferent parties4 and the programme was im- OMM (women), OJM (youth) and OTM plemented through three international or- (trade unions) – created by Frelimo after ganisations: CARE, IRI and IOM. independence as a way to involve the pop- ulation in development. The churches had As the offi cial technical institute for the a nation-wide presence as well, although organisation of the elections, STAE trained with a different history and position. New 1600 civic education activists. The informa- organisations had only started emerging tion they provided was mainly technical: the since 1990, but most were still small and lo- dates and locations for registration and vot- cal. Many of them joined the programmes ing, the importance of having a voter regis- of the big organisations. The ‘mass organi- tration card, and how to vote. The training sations’ had declared themselves independ- came too late to help with voter registra- ent from the Frelimo party after the consti- tion, but Baloi describes a major push in tution had opened up options for diversity the last three weeks before elections. “STAE in 1990. They wanted to adopt a role in pro- organised a giant campaign, combining ra- moting diversity in society, creating room dio and TV, but also mobile units, making for different opinions in women’s groups direct contact with the population through and youth, and involve themselves in im- election simulations by the civic education partial civic education work. The impar- tiality of the message they conveyed was a

5 Baloi, O., ‘… e muitos participaram!; um estudo sobre a educaçao cívica por ocasião das primeiras 4 The U.N. and Mozambique 1992-1995; intro by eleiçoes gerais e multipartidárias em Moçambi- Boutros Boutros-Ghali, p. 60 que’, 1995, Awepa, Maputo-Amsterdam, p. 14

66 Civic education in the transition period

condition of programme support from rights into the districts. OMM was known Awepa, but that did not require much discus- for its effective campaigns on topics relat- sion; it was clearly the way they had chosen ed to hygiene and health, as well as its early to play their role in peace building, reconcilia- attention for domestic violence. Circulos de tion and the new democratic society. interesses, or interest groups, created in the townships and in the villages, organised lo- OMM, and the involvement of the women cal women, giving them the opportunity to I met the two women in 2008 again, who had improve their lives. Since 1990, a different set up all the OMM programmes from 1993- kind of room had been developed for new 1997, Filipa Baltazar da Costa, and Gertrudes local programmes. Because OMM was los- Vitorino. After ten years, we had so much to ing its fi nancial support from the Frelimo tell, so many experiences to exchange that party, it now received some donor funding. it was often diffi cult to get us back on track However, most of the work was done by the and discuss the issues that the interview was large women’s networks out of a sense of intended to address. “When the Constitution solidarity – operating with a very low budg- paved the way for a multi-party system in et. For OMM, the end of war meant a new 1990, many women in OMM were against it. motivation to build peace, but also to seek But we, the leadership, had travelled outside a place for women in the new emerging the country several times and seen different democracy. political systems, fi rst in Zambia and later in Malawi. It was diffi cult for many people to The Mulher e Democracia Conference of accept that Chissano wanted to introduce a November 1992 was intended as a time of multi-party system, since the majority of the refl ection by the OMM provincial delegates. people taking part in the nation-wide discus- Participation from Angola and other coun- sions had been against it. But Chissano was tries offered outside inspiration. But by searching for peace.” then Angola had already gone back to war, a sign for Mozambique that the preservation OMM had been effective within the one- of peace was not a foregone conclusion. party system, maintaining direct lines of Filipa still feels that as a hard failure. “I was communication with the party, the Frelimo invited as an observer for the Angolan elec- government and Parliament. “As OMM, tions, the elections themselves went fairly we had infl uence; we could change some well.” But preparations for peace in Angola legislation and practices related to wom- had been less than thorough, The armies en, precisely because we were accepted by had not been dismantled and were imme- the Government as the leading women’s diately able to take up their old positions, organisation. Mozambique always made with Unita even stronger now it had gained room for women’s leadership. But it is access to the cities. a different matter in our homes.” Local structures brought the issue of women’s

67 The transition period and beyond

The OMM conference became the fi rst population received us with a theatrical per- step in the nation-wide involvement of the formance that showed what had happened: women in Mozambique in the peace and the stealing, the kidnapping, the killing. We democratisation process “We made people left very sad. We accompanied the governor aware of the changes,” says Filipa. “People to a camp that had received the victims. now had to deal with many parties; they had One pregnant woman had her body covered to know the rules. They had to fi ght for a only in tree bark. They had been liberated just position of women in society. The im- by the army. I cried and cried; I kept being portant thing was to forgive, not to punish.” haunted by those images.”

“We pushed the women to be demanding Those images motivated Augusta to con- in the democracy” tinue to work for peace after the agreement. Augusta Lôbo de Odadilea, long-term ac- “We did not talk about what had happened; tivist with OMM in Nampula and Maputo, only then was it possible to accept it. No- says in 2008: “We explained that democ- body was punished, nobody was put in jail; racy starts at home. The provincial dele- there was a general pardon. It was not easy gates from Zambezia and Nampula were to lend a helping hand, to live with a person an inspiration to me. They knew what it was who had killed your family. But we carried about; they had the spirit to do the work; the message with us and kept explaining they were not in a leading position just for until it was understood: let’s build up Mo- the sake of being the boss or for the mon- zambique together. We went on foot, with- ey. If it is just about the money, that can de- out having a bed or proper food. In Nama- stroy everything. But they wanted to leave cura, we slept in a guesthouse that had been something behind for the well-being of the partly burned down.” Although it was dif- people. We went into the townships, involv- fi cult, they even sometimes went into the ing the population; it was in a spirit of toler- Renamo zones to try to reach the women ance, solidarity, harmony.” there. “They were isolated from any infor- mation. Later, we tried to cooperate with the Even during the war, the OMM women in Women’s League of Renamo which was just Nampula had tried to reach the women in emerging.” the rural areas, often taking risks. “We had brigades in every district. We tried to work The OMM provincial coordinator of Nam- with the isolated women. We were on the pula had already told me in 1993 how they way to a town 80 kilometers from Nampula tried to break through the distrust. They in a convoy travelling with military protec- were refused permission by Renamo to go tion when we heard that the enemy was into a Renamo-controlled area; they were close. We found a place to stay overnight, told that it was not worth it and that nobody but hardly slept out of fear. We later saw would be interested. When they contacted how a village was attacked and burned. The Renamo women, they were allowed to enter

68 Civic education in the transition period

the zone together. The women inside had children and work.” Going back to the topic not even heard that peace had come to the of civic education, she relates, “We worked country. in the districts in local languages, using theatre, songs and puppet shows. We called It happened that a household had one per- upon women to get involved, telling them son from Frelimo and another from Rena- to be demanding in the democracy. Partici- mo. Augusta explains, ‘We compared it with pation in the elections has been as high as two football teams; different parties had to it has thanks to the massive involvement of learn to coexist.” OMM activists always de- women.” (See Chapter 8.) liberately left space to discuss the position of women in society. During a seminar, the OJM: the youth get involved women were told that they also could be OJM took the initiative in December 1992 to candidates in the elections, but one woman organise a national seminar, with Norwegian responded, “How is that possible? I don’t support. At their request, they were also in- have time. I have to work in the fi eld, search cluded in the fi rst Awepa/CCM national for wood, cook, feed my husband and chil- seminar some months later. But the three- dren and sell the products in the market, day regional seminars that OJM held with while my husband is in a meeting with the Awepa were only launched in December agricultural association. Life is already very of 1993, fi rst in Inhambane, and later in hard for a woman.”6 Nampula. Although the seminars normal- ly had 60 attendees, there were almost a Augusta remembers the diffi cult task they hundred participants. But that did not mat- faced: “The legislation was diffi cult to un- ter, said Maria Chuma, Deputy Secretary of derstand. The multi-party system had to be OJM, who shared responsibility for the pro- explained, the concept of the direct vote, gramme with her colleague Carlos Tembe, making a choice. And the discussions about “We can handle it.” She was expecting a the role of women were heated: what am I baby within three weeks, but even with her as a woman? The woman is taught to be- big belly, she maintained strong control of lieve that her only role is to serve the man, the seminar, which was run with great dis- that the man rules over her. But OMM cipline. tried to give them a sense of self-esteem.” Augusta considers her own life in the con- Building up the programmes with CCM text of women’s rights: “As a woman, I ask and OMM had taken all our energy in the myself what my role is; it is not just having fi rst months of the transition period, so it was diffi cult to include another big pro- 6 Baloi, O, ‘… e muitos participaram!; um estudo gramme. But Chuma had not given up sobre a educaçao cívica por ocasião das primeiras knocking on our door. “We wanted to con- eleiçoes gerais e multipartidárias em Moçambi- tribute,” Maria Chuma says in May 2008. que’, 1995, Awepa, Maputo-Amsterdam, p. 30 “We wanted to have good elections; we did

69 The transition period and beyond

not want to call our brothers ‘bandits’ any- After the regional seminars, working more. It was a historic moment.” The pro- groups were formed to go into the districts. gramme in Inhambane included offi cial in- “The activists went from village to village. formation about the peace process and the But many zones were not yet accessible; we agreement, but the most interesting part of could not work in the Renamo zones. And the seminar was about democracy. Renamo some zones still had mines.” OJM staff youth and some small parties were invited. member Carlos Tembe was responsible for One of them later said, “This was the fi rst the logistics. “Feeding and housing 100 time that I had to think about what democ- people was a nightmare in those days, but racy means in practice. And about the idea I was proud that we managed. The seminar that democracy starts within the party. A lot was where the message started multiplying. still has to be done.” The principles of the In the districts, the message was transmit- new electoral system were explained. “The ted in local languages. It was about making secret ballot was diffi cult,” says Chuma, people understand; there was no fi nancial “especially for married couples. The man interest involved.” normally wants to make the choice for his wife. But civic education was very helpful; Although OJM was the national youth or- the changes needed to be discussed and un- ganisation in the Mozambican one-party derstood.” state, they were very eager to fi nd a non- partisan way to do their work. “It was inde- pendent work, for all the youth; the learn- ing process was independent.” However, in the districts, not everybody was always able to hide their preferences.

The whole process was a miracle, Chuma explains. “For example, the seriousness of the joint commissions that had to imple- ment the AGP. It was a lengthy process. But it was also work based on moral convic- tion, inspired by the attitude of the leaders, Chissano and Dhlakama. The international exchange of that time was important. It created pride on the Mozambican side. We could show that the Mozambican people were serious. But many people were trau- Civic education seminar in Nampula, March matised; two years was not enough time to 1994. Left: Obede Baloi; centre: Lucia van den solve the problems.” About the possibility Bergh; right: a participant (Awepa Maputo) of a Truth Commission, she says: “That was

70 Civic education in the transition period

not necessary. For us, it was clear: stop the Cometal Mometal. People were sitting in the war, rebuild the country, take steps forward. main hall in their working clothes, eager to No rancour. We would have had many more hear what was going on. Even with this high problems if people had felt bitter.” number of participants, OTM activists went beyond simply providing information, also Some of the youth trained by OJM were lat- managing to include discussions and simu- er recruited by STAE in the provinces and lations. Working in groups, they prepared a districts to work as trainers or civic educa- theatre show and quickly learned a song the tion activists. In Niassa province, 6 out of participants wrote themselves. 10 youths who were trained in the Nampula seminar were recruited by STAE, and 11 out In May 2008, I spoke with two of the main of 15 in Zambezia. Some later ran for Par- OTM organisers, Candido Mathe and João liament or for local elections. One of them Moiane. They told me, “After the peace became a mayor, saying to me later, “We agreement, we had to restore contact with learned everything about democracy and the countryside. The war had destroyed the about how the system works from the civic infrastructure in the rural areas. It had also education programmes,” been a diffi cult time for the factories; they could hardly work, they had no raw mate- OTM: the Trade Union Organisation rials.” Mathe says, “We had to make the The trade unions, united in OTM, got off to workers aware in order to create a peaceful a late start, mainly because including more situation. Every worker was asked to take organisations in the programme was too the message home, and to infl uence their much for our small organisation. However, family and neighbours. We had sometimes their request to be included was so strongly diffi culties: you are from Frelimo, some expressed that we fi nally gave in and started people said, so how can you do impartial a programme with one national and three civic education? But in all our civic educa- regional training seminars in July 1994. tion work, we spread the message neutrally. Little time was left before the elections, We never took sides.” but OTM organised its activities quickly throughout the country, using the full scope Working with CCM and its Protestant of its access to the workers in the compa- member churches nies, through its network of local branch- Independence from government and par- es. “We are going in the factories; we will ty structures had always been the point of reach different groups in society,” they said. departure for CCM. The organisation ran Most companies’ management were sup- a powerful programme through its mem- portive, providing time and space for the ber churches. It worked in the same way workers to take part. In September 1994, as the other civic education programmes, I attended a meeting with 600 workers in through training on regional and provin- a big factory close to Maputo, the Empresa cial level, moving forward from there. The

71 The transition period and beyond

sions to anyone.” Many of the trained CCM members were appointed as provincial co- ordinators in the STAE/NDI program in the last months before registration and elec- tions.

Civic education with Renamo In the course of 1994, Renamo request- ed a civic education programme. However, the nature of the message had to be impar- tial, so the inclusion of political parties in the actual process had not been anticipated. Despite that consideration, it seemed im- portant to do something. We asked for ad- vice from Minister of Justice Aly Dauto, who Brazão Mazula, chairman of the National had encouraged Awepa at the start. “Do it,” Election Commission CNE (left) and Lucas he said, “it is important. Find a way to in- Amosse, Secretary General of CCM (right) at a clude them.” CCM seminar in preparation for the elections, 1994 (Awepa Maputo) So we organised a seminar with 17 activists from Renamo in June 1994. It was diffi cult message included a strong focus on for- at fi rst; Awepa had historic links with the giveness, and was spread in churches and Frelimo government, and I remember how in community groups. Because of the plu- strong their suspicion was, but also their ralism represented in its membership, the curiosity. They made provocative state- programme included many interesting dis- ments, but they relaxed when they saw that cussions. Reverend Amosse said to me in we did not attack Renamo. Anselmo Victor, May 2008, “Our partners understood our political secretary of Renamo in 1994 and position; the position of the church was re- now Renamo MP, looks back now to that spected. We encouraged the people to con- fi rst seminar. Participants from this fairly tribute to guarantees for democracy, to try elementary training seminar were sent into and reduce fear, saying, ‘you have the pow- the Renamo areas to disseminate the knowl- er to decide’. I think many people voted for edge they had gained about the new multi- Renamo to prevent them from going back party system and the elections. “After that, to war.” He continues, “The churches were the responsibility for the civic education neutral, impartial; they avoided being on one work was passed on to the Renamo Wom- side or the other. From our perspective, this en and Youth Leagues; the political bodies independent position was good. We could could not do that part. The leagues have in- promote justice without making conces- tegrated this responsibility as a permanent

72 Civic education in the transition period

programme in their activities. The leagues is. For the women, that concept was some- are still active. Their statutes have been times confronting. Even the ones who had changed, and the president of the league is no husband had sons, and experienced the now elected by its members.” From 1996 inequality at home.” on, Awepa included the Renamo Leagues in the programmes. (see Chapter 11). When I talk about the process as a miracle, Ana says, “No, miracle is not the right word. The civic education trainers That makes it look as if it just happened to Over the years, the organisations and the them. But it was not like that. I still believe Awepa staff developed a strong working that Samora Machel played a fundamental relationship with many of the trainers, role in creating a society like this, one coun- Mozambicans as well as foreigners from try from Rovuma to Maputo, a unity that is the international network. “In 1993, I was rarely seen in other African countries, and not convinced that elections would solve a capacity to discuss and seek consensus.” the Mozambican problems,” says Ana Mendonça, a Portuguese sociologist who In our interview in 2008 Candido Mathe was one of the trainers, “I was not sure that from OTM made more or less the same ob- the parliamentarian system was the best for servation. “Machel was a great worker for Mozambique, or that the country was pre- peace. The fi rst thing he taught us was: we pared for it with the deep division at that are all Mozambicans.” His colleague Moi- time. I believe in a balance of power, a coun- ane adds, “Machel has always paid a great tering power that corrects, somebody stand- deal of attention to the concept of ‘one na- ing beside you who tells you that what you tion’. We were not used to being divided are doing is not right. However, in Africa, along lines of tribal differences or political introducing the multi-party election system leaders.” But he also says: “The struggle is often means ‘winner takes all’. This has to different now. It is a struggle for a better do with the notion of a single tribal chief. life, a fi ght against abject poverty; we have But there was no alternative, so I thought: if to get involved in work that creates wealth.” it has to happen now, it should be prepared as well as possible.” The party gap There was a gap between training for po- Ana was responsible for the part on hu- litical parties and training in civil society. man rights and democracy, mainly with Civic education activists said at that time the women. As she put it, “democracia não that they met people from the parties dur- cai do ceu”: democracy does not fall from ing their civic education meetings with the heaven, you have to work for it. “Democ- population. “Our knowledge was far bet- racy in your own life and in politics are ter than theirs, and the confusion they of- related to each other. That was always the ten caused by making untrue statements way I started to introduce what democracy was diffi cult to cope with.” Frelimo had its

73 The transition period and beyond

internal organisation suffi ciently in place, prepared to monitor the elections, and asked but even some of their members later said for a special training programme for jour- that it would have been useful to receive nalists. ONJ, the independent trade union of training about the new political system. It journalists, took the lead. was even more diffi cult for the less organ- ised parties. Joseph Hanlon, journalist and writer, coor- dinated the training in three regional semi- The training given to delegados da lista, par- nars in January and April 1994. Hanlon ty election monitors, proved to be far from had analysed the process in Awepa’s suffi cient. When elections were held, many Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 7 since of the monitors were untrained. Anselmo the beginning of the transitional period. Victor says in 2008: “Mozambique is a large But later, the journalists complained that country. Renamo tried to include thousands their editors-in-chief were not interested in of party monitors to observe the elections, their stories. In response, an extra seminar but we were preoccupied when we realised was organised in June 1994, directed at that they did not dominate the material suf- the leadership. The programme provided fi ciently. The training programme did not concrete information, but also discussed reach everybody. Even nowadays there is the role and responsibility of journalists in a lack of training for party monitors. But covering the elections and seeking the truth in general, it was an excellent process. behind accusations. In his report about the Going to the ballot box for the fi rst time is a electoral process, Hanlon writes, “Mozam- signifi cant event for the population. When bique’s inexperienced and poorly resourced you negotiate, you know that you lose some journalists had serious diffi culties coping things and win others. But in the end, with wild allegations and disinformation Mozambican society won.” from both sides. When parties made lu- dicrous charges and refused to back them Information, media and the independent up with facts, journalists did not have the trade union of journalists means to conduct independent investiga- Media were always invited to take part in tions and felt forced to run the charges be- the civic education programmes. The ra- cause they feared criticism for bias if they dio journalists stayed for most of the three did not.”8 days, especially in the provinces, broadcast- ing large parts of the discussions. TV was only available in Maputo, a camera team 7 Hanlon, J. (ed.), Mozambique Peace Process was always present for several hours, hold- Bulletin, January 1993 to present, Awepa, Maputo- ing interviews with the organisers and with Amsterdam participants. Most journalists were very in- 8 Hanlon, J. Report on Awepa’s observation of the terested; it was a learning opportunity for Mozambique electoral process, 1995, Awepa, them as well. They realised that they were ill Maputo-Amsterdam, p. 30

74 Civic education in the transition period

The Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin Bulletin still follows the issues on democ- (MPPB) racy and elections. In its current form, it is The bulletin was initially intended to in- entitled the Mozambique Political Process form the international community and the Bulletin; it is now a joint publication by parliamentarians in Europe. The broad for- Awepa and CIP, a Mozambican investiga- eign involvement required proper infor- tive institute. mation and analyses. From January 1993 to the end of 1994, 13 issues of the MPPB “The openness of that period and the will- were published. It became clear, however, ingness to talk were important,” Obede that there was an even stronger need for the Baloi says. “There is more self-censorship information inside Mozambique, so from in government institutions now. There is December 1995 on (nr. 16), it was also pub- a different atmosphere in the parties, im- lished in Portuguese. The MPPBs were dis- plying: what we say is correct.” The open tributed amongst embassies, institutions, and nation-wide discussions were amongst parties, ministries and civil organisations the most important benefi ts of the peace involved in the process, and was cited reg- process, contributing immensely to the ularly. It added critical information of the acceptance of the situation. It was like a kind that Mozambican journalists were not fresh breeze after a period of darkness. always able to investigate or publish. The

75 The transition period and beyond

Frelimo rally for the 1994 elections (Pieter Boersma)

76 The elections

Chapter 8 including Renamo as well. “It was impor- tant to involve Renamo as early as possi- ble,” Valigy says. “President Chissano was The elections supposed to give the opening speech and he also wanted to participate. But Renamo and he electoral law was approved in the parties indicated that they would walk TDecember 1993, after a long and diffi - out of the hall en masse as a statement that cult process. “We started to develop the legis- they did not accept the head of state.” It did lation after the 1990 constitutional changes not work; for the second time the confer- that opened up the way for the multi party sys- ence did not take place. “So we continued in tem,” says Ismael Valigy, who was then work- a different way, drafting the law on the base ing at the Ministry of Justice. “The process de- of the peace agreement. But the process was veloped well. After the Peace Agreement [in very long and extremely diffi cult. The only October 1992], we had to incorporate the new aspects of the protocols, and to make some ad- justments to the Constitution to make it com- patible. We did a comparative study of elector- al legislation of countries that had extensive experience, mainly the Portuguese-speaking countries, and we participated in observer teams in other countries, to learn from their experiences.”

However, the process now required a broad- er involvement. Valigy explains, “Just after the donor conference in December 1992, we wanted to organise a conference to dis- cuss the law with all political parties and stakeholders. Renamo was not involved yet; the other political forces at that time, e.g. Monamo, PCN, Fumo were involved. But there were a lot of diffi culties. There was not much willingness to participate. They were seriously divided – not because of the content; the division was of political char- acter. The conference did not take place, so we then tried a different strategy: individual Supporter of Renamo president Dhlakama, consultations.” A new effort was under- waiting for the arrival of Vicente Ululu, Maputo, taken after some months, with the aim of 1992 (Ferhat Momade, AIM)

77 The transition period and beyond

positive element was that we could refer to support base in society, and most of them the detailed protocol that includes the elec- had few ideas about what programme they toral process.” The two failed conferences wanted to present. Many were primarily were an indication of the deep distrust worried about fi nancial means, about the which still had to be resolved. money and cars that were made available through the donors. But they faced many The small political parties challenges; they had to refl ect on what it The new, small political parties emerging at means to be a political party in the new this point became increasingly involved in system, and how to operate in an environ- the political developments, being invited to ment like Mozambique where communica- take part in meetings, discussions and tran- tion was diffi cult and resources were scarce. sitional institutions. The creation of politi- Some politicians had been active under the cal parties had been allowed since the 1990 one-party system, or even in colonial times, Constitution, two years before the signing and were now prepared to compete for the of the General Peace Agreement, and many presidency. Competing with Chissano and had been created rapidly. Donors fi nanced Dhlakama for the presidency could serve registered parties, encouraging them to get as good publicity, but it was not a realistic organised and to prepare a programme and goal. On the other hand, winning enough campaign for the 1994 elections. However, votes for seats in Parliament for the small while Frelimo and Renamo were familiar parties was not easy either. Lack of experi- throughout in the country, hardly anybody ence, lack of cooperation and basic mistrust had heard of the others. The small par- often stood in their way. It was characteris- ties lacked experience and did not have a tic of that specifi c moment in history, with

Vicente Ululu, general secretary of Renamo is Representatives of small political parties with greeted by supporters on his arrival in Maputo, Domingos Arouca (left) and Carlos Jeque (right), 1992 (Ferhat Momade, AIM) both later candidates for the presidential elections, 1993 (Joel Chiziane, AIM)

78 The elections

the two big parties just coming out of a civil were appointed: Leonardo Simbine from war, that the name given to the new small the government, Jose de Castro from Re- parties during the transitional process was namo. All decisions had to be taken in full partidos não armados (unarmed parties). consensus.

CNE and STAE Brazao Mazula was generally considered The electoral bodies now had to be created. as an independent intellectual who did not The National Election Commission (CNE) have current ties to Frelimo or Renamo. was responsible for the process as a whole When I spoke with him in May 2008, he and for the main decisions, and STAE (the said, “When I came back from studying Technical Secretariat for Electoral Admin- in Brazil, I realised that I had to start my istration) was responsible for execution of life all over again.” The multi-party system the elections. But by then, complicated dis- was diffi cult, especially in the current situ- cussions had started. “The parties wanted ation of reconciling the former enemies. STAE staff to be appointed on a party basis. Mazula describes the situation. “For the We saw it as a technical government body, fi rst time, the CNE members were brought part of the public administration, and there- together with their former enemies in the fore non-partisan,” says Valigy. A compro- same meeting hall, and I had to construct mise was found: the general director was the platform. It was also the fi rst time that appointed by the government and assisted new political parties were involved. It was by two deputy directors, one appointed by anthropological work, meeting as human Renamo, and one appointed by the other beings.” parties. Valigy smiles, “They were called unarmed parties, which seems like a very strange name now.”

The discussion about the composition of CNE was equally long, culminating in a compromise: 10 members were appointed from the government, 7 from Renamo and 3 from the other parties, headed by an in- dependent president (chair). Valigy was one of the Frelimo members. “It was diffi cult to choose the president. Three candidates were nominated. We had a maximum of two days to decide, but there was still no so- President Chissano presents his candidacy for lution on the second day.” Brazão Mazula, the presidential elections to Brazão Mazula, the candidate for the small parties, was chairman of the National Election Commission fi nally accepted by all. Two vice presidents CNE, 1994 (Ferhat Momad, AIM)

79 The transition period and beyond

He continues, “The electoral law facilitated we decided.” But the offi cial materials took the work of the CNE. It was very detailed time to develop. “CNE had to approve every- because of the lack of trust between the par- thing; if one small thing was not accepted, ties. Every detail had been discussed and everything stopped.” They accepted the compromises had been reached. It was a early start by the civil society organisations, ‘goodwill law’, a consensus law.” Mazula although not wholeheartedly. Valigy says felt a heavy responsibility; if they failed, it now, “It is clear that the ones who wanted could jeopardise the entire peace process. to participate in civic education could do Civic education was being done amongst so. There was great enthusiasm, especially the population, but Mazula felt that the amongst the youth. I think that the role of CNE members needed it just as much. “In the churches was one of the most important fact, the population reconciled earlier than factors, even before STAE was created at the the politicians, and we had an equally fun- provincial level.” damental lack of knowledge. We met once a week and started to fi nd out exactly what Discussions with donors about the materi- our role was; we fi rst studied and analysed als were another headache for Valigy. “We the law.” wanted solid ballot boxes that could be used again in the next elections, but the UN only Ismael Valigy was especially worried about wanted to pay for cardboard boxes. You the civic education programme in the coun- could not even lock them properly, and they try. “Civic education should be one pro- were not water-resistant in the rain. We gramme, with one message, and with the knew that we would have many open-air same material and manuals; that was what voting assemblies. And they wanted the bal- lot papers to be printed in black and white. The majority of the population was illiter- ate, but they could recognise the colours of the party fl ags.”

Full consensus: useful or not? Every decision had to be taken with a full consensus. One opposing vote could delay decisions for weeks. The CNE was therefore often considered as slow, not reacting ade- quately to the problems and the decisions that had to be taken. The implementing body, STAE, often encountered obstacles Preparation of a group of international Awepa as a result of these delays. STAE also had observers. Right: Tamme Hansma, staff Awepa its own problems. Its staff members were Amsterdam, 1994 (Pieter Boersma) inexperienced, had to work in a vast coun-

80 The elections

try that had been devastated by war, dealing informatics. I explained how it could work, with many potential voters without identifi - how you could build in security. We talked cation cards, hidden in remote rural areas for hours, and then he thanked me, saying that were almost inaccessible. Moreover, ‘I was not aware of this problem, nobody STAE was politicised. It became soon clear had talked to me about it.’ Chissano also that the date that had been planned for 1993 said that he had not been informed. But was unattainable. the consequence of the meetings was that Dhlakama ordered Jose de Castro not to A week after CNE was installed, the ambas- make diffi culties about computers any- sadors stood on their doorstep. They want- more.” ed Mazula to set a date for the elections. “I said, ‘I cannot. I have to adapt to the real- As a result, the CNE meeting on the next ity.’ They answered, ‘But we are only talking day started with trouble. Frelimo vice presi- about the technical aspects.’ But this is not dent Leonardo Simbine did not accept that a purely technical process; it is a socio-polit- Mazula had taken this initiative, and saw it ical process, I told them. We only could set as a lack of confi dence in the CNE. “If we go dates once we had established some confi - to talk to the president of Renamo, we have to dence, and that would only be established do that on the base of consensus,” Simbine along the way. In addition, although CNE said in the meeting. Mazula continues, “It is an independent body, the parties had to was Frelimo member Valigy who saved be consulted regularly, which also delayed us. He said: Mr Vice President, Dr Mazula decision-making.” solved a problem which gives us the possi- bility to proceed. He has informed us about Mazula remembers many tense moments. His idea was to have a computerised sys- tem, as he had seen in Brazil. However, computers were a new phenomenon in Mozambique; expertise was minimal and Renamo was afraid that they would not be able to control what happened. They stressed that the Angolan elections had been vulnerable to fraud because of the use of computers. Months of delay passed, from January to May 1994, without a deci- sion being taken. “I decided to talk to the leaders, Chissano and Dhlakama. In May, I met with Dhlakama without informing Long queues at the fi rst election day, Maputo, CNE. I told him that we were facing serious 27 October 1994 (Pieter Boersma) delays because of the lack of decision about

81 The transition period and beyond

the issue. But then he adds, “Aldo Ajello announced the date of the elections in a press conference without CNE knowing it. I called him for a meeting, and said that it was CNE’s decision. What authority did he have to do this? Ajello said, ‘We are here to verify the electoral process.’ But I asked him to go back to the press, and he humbly agreed.”

Elections almost boycotted: a narrow escape The Awepa coordination team for the election The most dangerous moment came the observation discusses its fi nal press release. day before elections, when Dhlakama sud- From left to right: Jan Nico Scholten, president of denly announced a boycott of the elections, Awepa, Guido van Hecken, Joseph Hanlon, Luc stating that there were irregularities. Three Dhoore, Sir David Steel, 1994 (Pieter Boersma) small parties joined the boycott. Everybody held their breath. Mazula says, “We heard everything he did, about the objective and the news, so I asked for a meeting at 8:00 the result. There is no secrecy, nothing has p.m. and we discussed till midnight with- been hidden. Why condemn this?” out reaching a solution. But then I said, ‘We are not leaving here without a decision’. So Building trust was an underlying theme we went on, and it was 5:00 in the morning throughout the whole process. As Mazula and we still had not reached a consensus. says, “From the start of the negotiations till Renamo members wanted to be loyal to the spontaneous hug between Chissano and their president. Then I said, ‘At 7:00 a.m., Dhlakama when the agreement was signed, when the polling stations are opening, I it was a long and diffi cult way, and it con- want to have an offi cial statement on the tinued during the transition. This process radio with our position.’ So I asked for the was lacking in Angola; preparations there position of every member for the last time. were far too weak. I am thankful to the lead- This time I did not use alphabetic order ers now; both Chissano and Dhlakama have or start with the vice presidents. Instead, resolved problems several times.” I started at the left side of the table, with Renamo member Anselmo Victor, and next Was the large involvement of the interna- to him Frelimo member Valigy. Victor hesi- tional community positive or negative, I tated but then started to talk carefully: ‘As a asked Mazula. “There were many meetings. loyal member of Renamo, I want to support Once a month we met with the ambassa- our president Dhlakama. But I am here a dors and the World Bank,” he sidesteps member of CNE in the fi rst place, and that

82 The elections

confers certain responsibilities. Any party of whom about 100 came six months before can declare a boycott, but that has to be the elections. Most of the others stayed just done at least 15 days before the presiden- for the days of the elections. Awepa was in- tial elections. That means that legally there vited to bring in a group of 160 observers, is no basis for a boycott. So our position parliamentarians from Europe and Africa has to be that the elections can continue and high-level representatives from church- as planned.’ This raised more discussion es and civil society organisations. Similarly, amongst Renamo members; Jose de Castro Awepa had participated in the observation was the strongest voice in favour of the boy- of the fi rst democratic elections in South cott. But after all the others had agreed, de Africa and Malawi (1994), and in Angola Castro fi nally agreed as well. At 7:00 a.m. (1992). Organising observation on such when the radio broadcast opened, the fi rst a scale during the peak of our other work announcement was that CNE had declared was impossible, so a separate team came in full consensus that the elections could go in to prepare and organise it, under direct ahead. I saw this as one of the most impor- responsibility of Awepa vice president Luc tant battles that we won in the end. Even in Dhoore and director Bartie Lürhman. Renamo strongholds like Nampula, there were long queues fi rst thing in the morn- There were 2,700 polling sites with 7,300 ing.” Dhlakama only lifted the boycott the polling stations spread over the country. It second day. But then people had already did not make sense to only go to the obvi- gone to vote in huge numbers. ous places; Awepa wanted to bring them into the remote areas. But fi nding places to “Not all of the process was concluded by sleep, fi nding transport and food was not the time elections were held,” says Mazula. easy. International NGOs in the provinces “Renamo still had a substantial number of were very supportive, providing cars, expe- hidden arms, but I think that there were rienced drivers and guesthouses. Awepa also generals on the Frelimo side who would sent provincial coordinators of the teams to have been prepared to take up arms again, all provinces six weeks prior to the elections. depending on the outcome of the elections. Joao Cravinho was one of those coordinators. After the elections, Dhlakama said to me, I met him again in 2009 in Portugal, in his ‘We lost the presidential elections, but we offi ce as Secretary of State of Cooperation. won in Parliament. We won 112 seats out Back then, at the time of the elections, he of 250; we had never expected this number. did research and supported our programme, We only involved ourselves in the course of working as a civic education trainer, coordi- this process’.” nating the Awepa group of observers in Tete, and helping to handle the fi rst seminar with Observation the newly elected Parliament. More than 3,000 international observers came to Mozambique, 2,100 through the UN,

83 The transition period and beyond

Polling station, 27 October 1994 (Pieter Boersma)

84 The elections

85 The transition period and beyond

Electoral observation in the provinces Knowledge about the elections was quite Joao Cravinho coordinated an observation good in Tete, concludes Cravinho. “Frelimo team from Awepa in the province of Tete. and Renamo had enough information; they The observers held their breath the day be- knew what it was about. The small parties fore the elections. Cravinho remembers, were weak and did not know much about “When Dhlakama announced a boycott, the process, except for their political leader I called them all back. It was very unsure from Maputo. In general, the Frelimo peo- what consequences this could have; fear ple were better qualifi ed and had more ex- rose again. They all slept in the provincial perience. Renamo complained to us that capital that night. But in the morning CNE the international community gave more announced that elections would continue, support to Frelimo. I spoke with the PCN and everything was calm. People came to leader for a long time about the conditions vote in huge numbers. We did not notice and the freedom, and I also spoke a lot with any hesitation because of the announced journalists. But there was little information boycott. They wanted to vote.” about other parts of the country. Our rela- tions with the UN were diverse. They felt During six weeks of pre-election observa- that they had priority above everything else. tion, he had travelled throughout the whole When the UN came, I had to leave my hotel province of Tete, preparing the places where although it was already paid for. I got my observation could take place. “Tete had a money back and was put on the street. I had stronger involvement by Renamo than I was to fi nd some place in a house somewhere. used to in the South. From the beginning, It was diffi cult to deal with them at fi rst, but I was impressed by the easy way people they were more supportive later. The group and even political parties were able to live of MPs that I accompanied was from differ- together. At political rallies, you saw the ent countries: Malawi, Tanzania, Holland, normal agitation but there were hardly any Germany, about six. They had to travel far diffi culties. I could easily speak to the party into very remote areas in groups of two. leaders that came to Tete. Dhlakama was Some of them had to take live chickens with an exception; I was not able to talk to him. them, to be prepared on the spot.” The head of the list on the Frelimo side was a hard-liner.” Cravinho contemplates the “Did your time in Tete change your perspec- unique situation in Mozambique: “I have tive?” I ask him. “Yes,” he answers. “I did thought about the psychological aspect: the not know Renamo. During the war, you two sides beat each other almost to death. heard the shooting in Maputo and could In other countries, that destroys the rela- not go to nearby places like Catembe or tionship for ever. In Mozambique, they Marraquene at night, only during the day. have beaten each other almost to death, but It was the fi rst time that I had contact with then concluded that the war could not con- Renamo, in a process that went beyond de- tinue.” picting them as devils. I was also reading

86 The elections

the book A causa das armas, an anthropo- logic study about the Mozambican war [by Christian Jeffray], which also gave a more diverse picture. But in general, there was still a lot of fear and uncertainty. Before the results were announced, the situation was tense. At that time, we were not yet sure that the war not would start again, as it had done in Angola.”

Mirjam Boswijk, working in agriculture in Zambezia, coordinated a team in that province. She said, “Tete has much better roads and the distances are not like in Zam- bezia. We did not go back when Renamo announced the boycott, because we never could have reached that spot again in time.” Although Awepa had tried to be clear about the conditions in Mozambique, the Zam- bezian teams were not happy with the hard- ships. The team to Mopeia complained, al- though the local staff had done everything they could to make the guesthouse comfort- Supporter of President Chissano of Frelimo, able. But there was no electricity, no run- Ilha de Moçambique, Nampula province, 1994 ning water, traditional latrines and simple (Ferhat Momade, AIM) beds. “And Mopeia is hot; the heat is like a wall you can lean against,” says Mirjam. The prolongation was announced at the The Gurue team had to drive 350 km over last moment. In most of the places, it was bad roads to get into their region. “But the not necessary anymore; people had voted. elections went extremely well. Queues eve- Mirjam saw the diffi culties that this extra rywhere from the fi rst moment on. At one day caused for the electoral staff, who were place, the president of the electoral staff obliged to stay at the polling station day and apologised: ‘Not everybody could come to night during the election period: no food, vote, because one person died recently.’ ” batteries of the lamps running out. Staff members from World Vision brought food The elections were planned for two days on into the more remote districts. However, the 27th and 28th of October, but delays and the Awepa observation teams from Zam- diffi culties on the fi rst day infl uenced the bezia decided to leave, and thus missed the decision to prolong them by one extra day. count.

87 The transition period and beyond

The elections: “When two elephants fi ght, Conclusion the grass suffers. But the grass spoke Nothing was simple during the prepara- out” tions or the elections. Mistrust, mistakes, Long queues had already formed by six in diffi culties, delays, it all happened. The ex- the morning of 27th of October, the fi rst day tra year that was allotted for the transition of the three-day elections. That is a picture period provided time to sort things out, that remains very vivid. More than six mil- and that was crucial. The decision-making lion people had registered, about 80% of based on full consensus in the CNE elec- all voting age adults, and 5.4 million peo- toral commission delayed the process, as ple voted. Those fi gures are extremely good did the drafting of the detailed law. How- considering the diffi cult Mozambican cir- ever, it created a solid base for implementa- cumstances. It was clear that people were tion of the electoral system. And the over- eager to vote. The votes were divided quite whelming truth is that the elections went equally. The results were surprising: 44.3% extremely well, under the most diffi cult of for Frelimo, which gave them 129 seats, circumstances. Elections were conducted 37.7% for Renamo (112 seats), and 5.5% for well and voter turnout and participation the UD coalition (9 seats). The remaining were huge. The dedication and honesty of votes were for the small parties. Chissano electoral staff deserve admiration, and the won the presidential elections with 53%. results refl ected the will of the people: “the Dhlakama was second with 34%. A nine- grass had spoken and the elephants should seat win for the starting UD coalition was listen.”1 an unexpectedly high result. Some say that it had only been possible because people were confused about where candidates were placed on the lists. True or not, it was a positive sign for democracy that at least one extra party held seats in Parliament.

1 Hanlon, J. Report of AWEPA’s observation of the Mozambique electoral process 1992-1994, 1995, Amsterdam, Awepa

88 Is history being rewritten?

Chapter 9 “Now Renamo says it was to bring democ- racy,” says Helena, one of the women I in- terviewed in Maputo. “Should we believe Is history being rewritten? that? A falsifi cation of history is happen- ing.” Most of the Members of Parliament t the time of the Peace Agreement, avoid the past, because the situation would Apeople thought that they knew what otherwise be untenable, but bitterness is had happened, that it was not necessary to sometimes still the response: in one of the say it. The only thing that mattered was try- sessions, Renamo stressed that the gov- ing to forget. But stories started to circu- ernment was not doing enough to build late that could no longer be verifi ed. On one schools. One of the Frelimo MPs burst out, hand, these stories emerged out of a need “But who was it that burned them all?” to justify the war, to convince the tellers and their listeners that it had been for a good The Cold War perception of Renamo fi ght- cause: the democratic state. On the other ing a just war against communism had long hand, the stories were intended to change been the base of the US support to Renamo. perspectives on responsibility, making both But in the late eighties stories about the factions look equally guilty. Earlier factual brutality could not been denied any more. stories about who had done what sudden- Kidnapping a US nurse, the Homoine mas- ly no longer seemed reliable. Truth became sacre on 18 July 1987 when 424 people relative, depending on what was reported were killed, and other atrocities seemed to and what others in the neighbourhood be- tip the balance. The US State Department lieved, and only partly relying on personal abandoned the perception of Renamo be- experiences. As far as the victims were con- ing ‘anti communist freedom fi ghters’ after cerned, the made-up stories and justifi ca- a solid study under their assignment, car- tions hurt, but many young people no long- ried out by Robert Gersony in 1988.1 He er know which stories are true. interviewed refugees and catalogued atroci- ties. “The level of violence reported to be A good cause conducted by Renamo against the civilian A friend was waiting in a shop in Zambezia, population is extraordinary high”, he con- not long after the war, and a political leader cluded, “It is conservatory estimated that from Renamo was standing in the shop be- 100.000 civilians may have been murdered side her. New goods had come in and she looked at a nice colourful capulana, a cloth wrap. “Isn’t it beautiful?” the politician 1 Gersony, R. Summary of Mozambican Refugee said. “Thanks to us, you can buy that now.” Accounts of Principally Confl ict –Related She looked at him and said, “Apparently, Experience in Mozambique; Report submitted to you fi rst had to kill my father for that,” and Dr. Chester Crocker, Ass. Secr. Of African Affairs; April walked away. 1988, Department of State, US

89 The transition period and beyond

Victims of the massacre in Homoine on 18 July 1987, where 424 people were killed, 1987 (AIM)

90 Is history being rewritten?

by Renamo.”2 This study changed most of The idea of support from the population was the US attitude, reinforced through the end also defended during the transition period. of the Cold War. UNOHAC provincial representative George Siemensma visited Inhaminga in 1993, a “The population was behind us” town that was then still under Renamo ad- Contradictory as it may seem, the attitude ministration. “The Renamo governor told us of believing in the good cause contribut- proudly that the population had overturned ed to the peace process, and to Renamo’s many kilometres of railway track in order general desire to create a credible politi- to prevent Frelimo from using the trains cal party and to participate in a democratic for transporting their heavy arms in the di- society after the war. In the fi rst seminars rection of Tete to, as he said, oppress the that Awepa held with Renamo Youth and people there.” Siemensma later asked a Women’s Leagues, justifying what hap- man how it had been possible to turn the pened amongst themselves was important; heavy rails. “He told me that they had been they needed to confi rm that their years of forced, in large groups and with machine hardship in the bush had not been in vain, guns in their backs. Another man showed confi rming that it was Renamo that brought me the football pitch where people who democracy about. “The population was be- had been too tired and given up had been hind Renamo; they trusted their leaders.” executed, while the others were forced to says Raul Domingos in 2008. These senti- watch.” ments were expressed in several Renamo interviews that I conducted. The recogni- Stories and rumours tion of widespread support is important. An oral society lives with rumours. The “Frelimo made mistakes, was authoritar- sheer number of rumours makes it diffi cult ian, was communist, so the population chose Renamo.” Although the people’s criticism of the Frelimo government may be true and justifi ed, the testimony of thou- sands of kidnapped and mistreated people tell a different story about their choice to support Renamo. Fear and seeking refuge was a daily reality for the Mozambicans dur- ing the war. Once the people were held by Renamo, they had no choice at all.

Mass grave of 350 people, killed in the Homoine 2 Hanlon, J. Mozambique; Who calls the shots?, massacre. Others were buried in individual 1991, James Curry, London, p. 47 graves, July 2007 (Mirjam Boswijk)

91 The transition period and beyond

the time, says, “Some of the people from Frelimo were so arrogant. It did not matter how much the people suffered.”

Those stories can be told now, but talk- ing about the Renamo atrocities is still a highly sensitive matter. “You need courage now to talk about that.” says CCM pastor Mutungamira from Beira. “But people are not mad; they know about good and bad.” Even he started to doubt the accounts about the Homoine massacre, now that there are many contradictory stories circulating about what happened there. The massacre Memorial service in Homoine, 20 years after the of Homoine in July 1987 is in dispute. In a massacre, July 2007 (Mirjam Boswijk) single day of attacks, 424 people were killed and many were kidnapped. Is it true that it to know what is true. Stories are repeated was not Renamo, as rumours say now, or is easily without being verifi ed. Some reliable that story made up? stories also came out bit by bit, for exam- ple the acknowledgement that certain areas Homoine: “hear the witnesses” had in fact been more or less sympathetic to Mirjam Boswijk lived in Homoine in 1987. Renamo, especially in the central provinces. I ask her about the attack in an interview in In the border area, Renamo fi ghters came 2009. “Renamo was approaching the town; from Malawi to visit their wives and family we knew that we were almost surrounded. at night without anybody asking questions. Attacks in the neighbourhood had increased In Zambezia province, Renamo distributed and people from the villages slept in town, Bibles at fi rst. The issue of sympathy for one returning to their fi elds in the morning. side or the other was not completely black The government army dug trenches, trying and white. to protect the city of Homoine. The evening before the attack, someone came to our Accusations are now also arising about the house out of fear for our safety. He wanted to behaviour of government troops, malnour- tell us to leave, but saw that we did not have ished youth who had to fi ght an endless war a car available, so he let us sleep. Using our not of their own choosing. People in refu- motorcycles through areas under Renamo gee camps in the Zambezian districts died control would have been too dangerous.” of starvation; they could not leave for fear The attack started at 05:30 in the morning. their departure would make them suspect. It was a nightmare. Mirjam escaped, running Mirjam Boswijk, who lived in Zambezia at barefoot for 13 kilometers through the bush

92 Is history being rewritten?

with gunfi re from all sides crisscrossing Raul Domingos, Renamo political leader at above her head, but she fi nally reached the that time, defends the position that it was town of Maxixe. That evening, cars carry- not Renamo. He tells me his story in May ing the wounded arrived. A friend accompa- 2008; most of what he tells me was also in nied them. He had hidden under the stairs the Mozambican newspaper Magazine (30 outside a hotel. “What he saw was horri- June 2008). “We intensifi ed the war in the ble,” she says. “The killing took place on South in 1987, after the Zimbabweans had the streets and in the townships, where they started to support Frelimo in the Beira cor- broke into people’s houses. Our friend saw ridor. They said that we did not have the ca- the dead bodies in the streets when he fi nal- pacity to cross the Rio Save for operations ly dared to come out of his hiding place.” in the South.” Renamo, in contrast, had in fact crossed the rivers. “Frelimo wanted to Mirjam went back the day after. “There destroy Renamo’s credibility, creating the were dead people laying in rows in a gal- impression that we were no more than a lery of the hospital, where they collected the group of criminals without a political agen- bodies, all covered with blankets. People da, and that we were sowing terror, carry- would walk along the rows, searching for ing out massacres of the population.” The missing relatives. I could not understand Grupos de Contra-Insurgencia or counter- the logic behind the killing. Why kill an old insurgency groups from Zimbabwe incor- innocent woman, and split her head in two porated Mozambicans who spoke the local with an axe?” She cannot get that picture languages “so people would confuse them out of her head. with Renamo soldiers.”

The Homoine attack drew international I show Mirjam the interview with Raul attention; it became iconic, recognised as Domingos, and ask her opinion about the extremely horrifi c. Some months later, be- possibility of a Frelimo role. “Of course that tween 400 and 500 people were killed in thought occurred to me after the rumours two major attacks carried out by Renamo started,” Mirjam admits. “But I never re- on the road from Maputo to Gaza, in which ally doubted; it was too clear. What con- people burned to death in buses and cars. vinced me even more were the stories of Those attacks did not draw the same degree friends. A colleague was held inside the of attention, although there were many tes- house together with her father. She man- timonies, including from escaped young aged to escape through the back door, but boys who told about the preparation in the her father, brother and other men were kid- Renamo camps and about the attack itself. napped. Some months later, three of them Nobody, including Renamo, ever ques- came back, emaciated to the point of skin tioned who carried out these attacks. But and bone, and told their story. They were different stories about Homoine keep crop- forced to walk for many hours. Anyone who ping up persistently: who actually did it? could not walk any more was killed ‘like

93 The transition period and beyond

chickens’, in the man’s words. In the Rena- both sides kill; both are equally guilty’ is a mo camp, they were called to meetings and generally accepted message now. But that had to listen to taped speeches by Renamo seems to remove the responsibility from president Dhlakama. Later, young men and the ones who caused the suffering in the boys were selected to be trained to take part fi rst place. Who still defends the truth? in attacks. As a misto, a man of mixed race, Who defends the victims? her young brother was not selected. He was lucky, because mistos não prestam, people of Does the truth still matter? mixed race, are not considered useful for Many African countries, including Mozam- anything.” The three were able to escape af- bique, have had a history full of violence. ter being held by Renamo for three months. Colonial war and oppression by Portugal were amongst the worst. Despite the scars “I went back to Homoine 20 years after left by past wrongs, people had to forget it happened. There was a ceremony with what happened, and reconcile with former survivors and family. A pastor from CCM oppressive colonial nations. This raises an led us to the mass grave where 350 people important question: Will this recent war, are buried, victims of the massacre. Others which involved much more violence be- were lying in individual graves, 424 in all. tween Mozambicans themselves, simply Many of the people who were kidnapped be forgotten in the next generation? Or will died as well. There were fl owers, candles, people still want to search for the truth and reading and prayers.” She thinks back to all document it? Are they going to be willing to the people she met at the memorial service: deal with it honestly? people who had been able to run away or hide. Reconciliation without a truth commission was essential to bring the war to an end “Everybody has a story, and they started quickly. But it also meant that people had to talk about it, to tell their stories. Some no place to tell their stories of suffering, friends refused to come because of the and to recount the brutalities and atrocities. doubts that exist. That hurts. Even if you There is no offi cial record, so there is a seri- doubt, you can come and pay respect to the ous danger that history is being rewritten. victims, not accusing one side or the other. You could hear the real stories from the people who were there, hear the witnesses.”

Many victims feel offended that their story is hardly taken seriously anymore. They are put in the position of having to defend themselves. What Frelimo and Renamo did was apparently the same thing: ‘in a war,

94 Parliament starts up

Chapter 10 “Formally, Chissano made the right deci- sion, but he could have been more fl exible in order to adapt to the new situation,” says Parliament starts up a former colleague. When no solution had been found by January 1995 everybody be- he elections garnered high praise came nervous; it was not even certain that Tfrom all sides, within the country Renamo would take part in the fi rst parlia- and beyond. Joaquim Chissano was elect- mentarian session in March. Neither party ed President, Frelimo had a majority in took the fi rst step to call for a joint meeting Parliament with 129 seats, Renamo gained to attempt reconciliation. an unexpected 112 seats, and the UD coali- tion won 9. Now the real work could com- In late January, Awepa president Jan Nico mence. Scholten asked for a meeting with the three party leaders to discuss support, refusing Derailed in the very fi rst meeting to meet with each leader separately. They Of the 250 new Members of Parliament, all came; it was an opportunity for them to about 35 had experience in the former one- meet without losing face. “It was that meet- party parliament, and nobody had ever ing that broke through the impasse,” says held a seat in a multi-party parliament; Raul Domingos. “The multi-party parlia- many had no prior experience in politics at ment had to start its work using rules from all. Events went wrong at the very start. In the one-party system. So we walked out, December 1994, the Speaker (president) of and only resumed participation after inter- the Parliament had to be elected in a pre- vention from Awepa and the Inter-parlia- paratory general meeting. Frelimo’s can- mentary Union.” Speaker Eduardo Mulem- didate was Eduardo Mulembwe, former bwe confi rms, “There was so much distrust Attorney General, while Renamo’s candi- between the three parties. We felt insecure, date was Raul Domingos, the main Rome asking ourselves what would happen. The negotiator. In the past, those elections went ones that had experience with parliamen- by a simple show of hands and the new par- tary life considered themselves the leaders. liamentary procedures had not yet been Many others, who came from the bush, had adopted. Chissano, who chaired the meet- only completed four or fi ve years of pri- ing, adhered to the rules still in place. “We mary school. The situation did not permit a wanted a secret ballot,” says Renamo MP peaceful start. People were ignorant, lacked Manuel Pereira. “So when this was re- references, and the parliamentary regula- fused we left the hall.” Renamo had hoped tions were not adequate anymore.” to win some votes from Frelimo members. Mulembwe was elected by the Frelimo ma- Three initial actions were agreed in that jority, but the fi rst clash occurred even be- January meeting with Awepa. The fi rst was fore Parliament had held its fi rst session. to hold a three-day training session after the

95 Elections are not the end of the story

Members of the Permanent Commission of Parliament in deliberation. From left to right: Eduardo Mulembwe, Speaker of Parliament, Abdul Carrimo (Frelimo), Antonio Palange (UD coalition), Raul Domingos (Renamo), Vicente Ululu (Renamo), Armando Guebuza (Frelimo), 1995 (Ussene Mamudo, AIM)

96 Parliament starts up

opening of the fi rst session in March, but By that time, they had already been received before the parliamentary work would start. by the Dutch Parliament, attended a ses- The second was to arrange for a working sion, raised many questions and doubts in visit by four prominent Mozambican MPs, informal meetings with Dutch MPs, wanted plus the Speaker and the Secretary-Gener- to know how much a MP in Holland earned, al to the parliaments in the Netherlands, and how they paid for their transport. Secre- Belgium and Portugal. The third and fi nal tary-General David Sibambo had additional agreement was about a working visit by the appointments on his agenda that the others Deputy Head of the Dutch Parliamentary did not attend, including more contacts with Secretariat, to sit down with the Mozam- the Parliamentary Secretariats. bican Secretary-General and analyse how the Mozambican Parliament might be able “We saw on that trip how a parliament to adapt to the new needs. All three par- functions, how things were done in other ties accepted these three planned actions; countries,” says Raul Domingos in 2008. preparations could start. Renamo returned “For us, it was important to hear about the to participating in the preparations for the immunity of a parliamentarian. After that, fi rst parliamentarian session, planned for we were also better able to draft our own March. regulations. It had not been a personal war; there was no problem between one person European visit clears the air and the next.” David Sibambo adds, “It was Sitting in the train from The Hague to interesting to witness the process between Brussels, the delegates from Mozambique the deputies. The leaders of the parliamen- relaxed.1 Before that, the atmosphere had tary parties already understood each other been quite formal. They had frowned when well. When we came back, we worked bet- they heard that we would travel by train to ter, especially on the new regulations.” Brussels; why not go by plane? The train might be easier and quicker, but was that March 1995: the test case respectful enough? But sitting together, try- Everybody was nervous. Would the fi rst ses- ing out various seats in the empty fi rst-class sion fall apart, like the meeting in December compartment, jokes were made, and the ice had? Would the former enemies be able to was suddenly broken. take the others seriously? Would they un- derstand their role as parliamentarians, inexperienced as they were?

1 The delegation consisted of President Eduardo Within Awepa, we were also nervous about Mulembwe, Virginia Matabele (from the Frelimo the training. We included Mozambicans Permanent Commission), Raul Domingos (head of the with knowledge about the constitution and Renamo parliamentary party), and Antonio Palange, legislation, as well as eight European MPs MP from UD, and Secretary General David Sibambo and specialists. But how could we deal with

97 Elections are not the end of the story

existing distrust; how could it be possible to promote a democratic attitude in a situ- ation like that? How could we work with people who had no experience at all in the parliamentarian system, making clear that procedures can be the base of democratic decision-making? The Maputo offi ce had to coordinate the training. We had been using simulations successfully in the civic educa- tion programme, developing it in coopera- tion with the Mozambican organisations. Because Mozambicans come from an oral society, they have a much easier time un- Parliament building in Maputo (Pieter Boersma) derstanding the practical usefulness than most Europeans – not to mention the fun law discussed in the simulation was about of it. We accordingly proposed a similar growing tobacco, a non-issue at that time. approach for this training seminar as well. The phases of the play included the discus- My Mozambican colleagues understood the sion in the party bench to take a position, concept, but the Amsterdam head offi ce the work in the committees, procedures had doubts; it looked ridiculous to include like motions, the consultation of the elec- MPs who had been ministers in the former torate, and the plenary session. Contacts government in a play. Still, they gave us the with the press were included, and they also benefi t of the doubt. had to deal with a pressure group.

The Speaker of Parliament opened the ses- The play quickly took on its own dynamics. sion by announcing the three-day training I saw an MP, playing a journalist, running seminar. The real work would only start through the corridors asking, “Where is the after that had been completed. The simu- minister; I want an interview with him.” lation was divided in blocks over the three Committee meetings involving heavy dis- days, alternating theoretical information, cussions took place; I saw an MP suddenly further explanations and discussions. It looking questioningly to someone with started with a proposal of a draft law from whom he had worked, “Are you actually the ‘minister’ in the simulation. The roles Frelimo or Renamo?” were distributed carefully, avoiding tension before we even got started. My colleague When the time came at the end of the three had puzzled some days over how to mix days for the fi nal evaluation to take place, party members and regions. The three par- the parliamentarians were supposed to ties were not defi ned at a recognisable size move back to their normal seats. But the and were assigned invented names. The MPs refused, saying “We want to stay in the

98 Parliament starts up

seats that we had over the last three days.” even more important to learn to accept each Speaker Mulembwe had not fully partici- other.” pated in the training; when he came in to take his own seat, the MPs called him back: Some years later, Alcido Guenha, at that “No, no, the public balcony is back there be- time parliamentary spokesperson for Fre- hind.” Mulembwe laughed and took a seat limo, said to my colleague, “I only gradually as part of the audience. realised the great importance of starting this way.” It is exceptional that Parliament Learn the job and reconcile created space for it. It was done at exactly Raul Domingos talks about those early the right moment; half a year later might days. “In that fi rst seminar with Awepa, we have been too late. learned the rules of the game. I have never again seen such a clear explanation of how Another important factor was the choice Parliament works in practice. It was inter- of the two former negotiators, Armando esting for everybody. Frelimo had only had Guebuza and Raul Domingos, as the actual experience in the one-party system; the mul- parliamentary party leaders. As Domingos ti-party system was only created in 1990 in states, “We had gone through all the po- the new Constitution and confi rmed in the litical discussions, the demobilisation and AGP. Now we had a clearer perspective on new army, the return of the refugees. Dur- what that meant in practice.” ing the negotiations, we always had to seek consensus; every step required debate and Roberto Chitsondzo, Frelimo MP, remem- agreement. We needed the same kind of bers, “A that time, we did not know each consensus in the new Parliament. When other. We had to draw closer to each other; there was a serious problem, the session that was what we tried to do constantly. We was stopped and the problem was brought learned how Parliament functions. We did to the leaders. Because of our joint experi- not have any experience.” ence, we had developed a large capacity to search for consensus, so we took our re- “The simulation was very important,” most sponsibility. After that, the MPs went back of the interviewed MPs say now. It makes to the plenary session and were able to take Raul Domingos smile: “Former enemies a decision.” were laughing together. The Frelimo col- leagues thought that they had enough “I was impressed,” says Chitsondzo. “Those experience, but it was not the experience two were real leaders.” But he is also clear you need in a multi-party system. So we about the importance of Mulembwe’s role: started to learn together, and the opposi- “He said to us, ‘The war has ended, you tion showed that they were good pupils. We are now important actors. There is no way learned how to dominate and make use of back. You have to feel responsible for that.’ the parliamentary instruments. But it was But there were terrible moments. Renamo

99 Elections are not the end of the story

Parliament after renovation, 2007 (Pieter Boersma) had the strategy of leaving the meeting hall. for the MPs that they actually have the power We were able to continue anyway because to break through the secrecy of the army, to we held the majority, but it was sad, terrible. ask openness in the event that political deci- Things got better later; the strategy changed sions need to be made.” to making a scene. Disruptive behaviour is not the way we work; we call it the escolinha More travel was requested as well, including de barrulho (the noisy infants’ class).” visits to parliaments in Zambia and South Africa, and in European countries. Less ex- The fi rst session succeeded and paved the perienced MPs and committee members way for continuation. However, more train- were now included. The programmes were ing was requested, e.g. with the parliamen- carefully prepared in cooperation with the tary committees. Pär Grandsted, Awepa other parliaments; it was not intended to board member and member of the former become tourism. And indeed, during the defence committee in Sweden at that time, fi rst years, that did not happen. In seminars said after several days of working with the in Nampula and Cabo Delgado provinces, defence committee, “It was an eye-opener dealing with MPs and their electorate, the

100 Parliament starts up

Speaker of the Namibian Parliament was is non-partisan. They exchange, work and one of the lecturers. He talked to the Mo- lunch together.” zambicans about the modest conditions in his own parliament and the voluntary work In the course of 1996, more international that had to be done. He stressed, “Travel- organisations came in to support Parlia- ling gives you the opportunity to learn; use ment, SUNY (State University of New York) it well, make sure that you benefi t.” being the most important. “The legisla- tive production with the support of SUNY In 1998, a group of women from political was signifi cant, continuing from 1996 un- parties and from women’s organisations til 2001,” says former Secretary-General went to Brazil. The trip was hosted by the David Sibambo in 2008. However, UNDP Brazilian organisation Cfemia. Former involvement in those fi rst years was a fail- women MPs in Brazil had founded this ure. A trust fund was set up in 1995, but organisation, realising the lack of support donors quarrelled about the draft project for women to understand the discussions proposal. “All the donors wanted infl uence. in parliament, and their opportunities to Many meetings were held. They forgot what infl uence the decisions. Angelina Enoque, Parliament wanted.” Sibambo thinks that by Renamo MP, talks about her experiences. the time an agreement was fi nally signed in “The trip to Brazil was wonderful. We also 1998, it had lost much of its effectiveness. saw how the municipalities worked, and “Some things were realised; others were not. we were presented to a community group The coordinator came from outside, without in Sao Paulo. It helped us a lot. In the end, knowing what he actually had to do.” we grew more than the Brazilian women. Brazil has 530 seats but only 46 women in Angelina Enoque says, “I learned a lot parliament.” At that time, Mozambique had through the programmes. Awepa asked us 24.8% women in parliament: 62 women questions: What are you doing in this role? out of 250 MPs. The Mozambican women How do you represent the people? They had indicated that they preferred to go taught us how the institutions function and separately, rather than being mixed up with how you could deal with your colleagues, women from civil society. However, in the including the ones from the other party. end it was possible to convince them that In the fi rst legislative period, the learning the strong point of Cfemia was precisely process was very well guided. We learned that convergence, bringing women together about legislation, learned to draft proposals. independently from their background. My We saw the difference between this way of colleague Obede Baloi accompanied them working and the one-party system. We were on the trip. He now says, “No, it was not dif- the enemies, the ‘armed bandits’, but that fi cult; the group was spontaneous, had no disappeared bit by bit. We accept diversity reserves. While they were travelling, they of ideas, we argue in the plenary session, were no longer party delegates; the agenda

101 Elections are not the end of the story

but afterwards we drink coffee together; been little support for improvements be- that is maturity.” fore the elections. When the urgency be- came clear, donors were willing to provide “Awepa’s participation in that phase was support. Some provided urgent necessi- historic,” Raul Domingos says now. “It was ties – a copy machine, paper for the fi rst ses- about establishing a multi-party system sion – but most were waiting for the trust where the battlefi eld and its weapons were fund programme to do more. Awepa does transformed into a political forum.” He not normally provide materials, but it made continues: “It was a critical period. Many sense to quickly buy three computers and people did not believe in the success of the to organise a computer course for ten staff multi-party system; they expected shocks. members, as well as an audio recorder to But there were not very many in the fi rst simplify the reporting process. This con- legislature. The fi rst legislature showed tribution was just a drop in a bucket com- that it was possible. It encouraged all the pared to what was needed. “It was the fi rst Mozambicans. The second was often more time that most of the staff had seen a com- violent, e.g. hammering with shoes on the puter,” says former Secretary-General David table.” (See Chapter 12.) Sibambo.

“Parliament played an important role in The staff consisted of serious and dedicated the pacifi cation of the country,” the current people, but they had to deal with many Secretary-General of the parliamentary sec- problems. Paulo Mupengue, then Head of retariat, Baptista Machaieie, says now. “It Finances, explains, “In the old system, we helped us to coexist peacefully. It was an were considered professionals who had to important decision to establish equal posi- serve the Parliament. Suddenly we were tions in the commissions: when the presi- considered Frelimo and therefore partisan. dent was from Frelimo, the secretary was There was a great deal of mistrust, even from Renamo and vice versa.” though we tried to do the same for every- body.” David Sibambo adds, “The Secretariat The Secretariat could not remain the same as before; we all A dusty offi ce on the ground fl oor of the came from Frelimo, we had only worked parliament building, two typewriters and a with Frelimo. The arrival of Renamo and UD hand-operated stencil machine for typing led to shocking experiences. We had to solve and reproducing the minutes of the ses- that problem in the fi rst mandate. We had to sions: that was what the Secretariat of the be politically neutral, without personal sym- Mozambican Parliament had to work with pathies. 1994 was the most diffi cult phase. in 1994, at the time of the elections. They We had only a small staff and 4 billion Mt knew that their conditions were not ade- on our budget. (1994 about 550.000,- US$) quate to meet the new demands of the mul- A year later, that amount rose to 42 billion ti-party parliament. However, there had (1995 about 3.700.000,- US$)

102 Parliament starts up

Mupenge explains, “In the old system, the then commented, “That is how we would MPs did not get a salary. It was voluntary do it ideally. Now we are going to look into work, done out of a feeling of responsibility, possibilities and priorities in a poor coun- but the new fi nancial demands of the MPs try.” The Portuguese parliamentary secre- caused a lot of stress.” Sibambo agrees, tariat was helpful regardless. For example, “Management was suddenly very complex. they invited six trainees in 1997, offering The MPs needed hotels, subsidies, had to them the opportunity to improve their pro- justify what they spent; there was a lot of fessionalism in reporting sessions. paperwork. It was not a very transparent system; that is much better now. There Fifteen years later, the Mozambican parlia- was permanent lack of cadre. People took mentary secretariat has its own offi ce, built evening courses to obtain the level they by the Chinese, offering proper conditions needed to have.” New staff came in; the and enough space to accommodate the par- parliamentary parties had the option of liamentary parties and hold meetings, and appointing their own personnel. “I called housing a good library. I was welcomed them in together and said, “These are the proudly. “We have an information bul- conditions here; you have to work with it. letin, broadcasting time on radio and TV, And we are neutral. We will not accept any and a network of journalists that follow the underhanded tricks here.” work. TV now also reaches the provinces and districts. That helps,” says the current In February 1995, Jan Nico Overbeeke Secretary-General. And Mupengue, now Deputy Secretary-General of the Dutch Par- personal assistant to the Secretary-General, liament, came to Mozambique to analyse states with pride: “We are now as good as the needs of the Mozambican parliamenta- the neighbouring countries.” ry secretariat, in consultation with Sibambo and the staff. Mupengue was one of the few who spoke English, so he accompanied the visitor. “It was about how to create the re- quired basic conditions required. We ana- lysed where the differences were.” Gradual- ly, the basic conditions were put into place.

Awepa’s contribution to the Secretariat was modest, but I remember a seminar in which the Portuguese Head of Communi- cation explained how to deal with the fl ow of information, and she gave examples of the advanced system in the Portuguese par- liament. The Zambian Secretary-General

103 Elections are not the end of the story

Seminar with OJM for the preparation of local governance, Inhambane, 1997 (Awepa Maputo)

104 Democracy and people’s organisations

Chapter 11 Changes in organised civil society Civic education during transition had been successful, not only because of the curiosity Democracy and peoples’ of the population, but even more because of organisations nation-wide organisational structures of the churches and of what were known as the lections are not the end of the story. But ‘democratic mass organisations’ for women Eknowledge and understanding about (OMM) and youth (OJM), and by the organ- democratic rights following the elections ised trade unions (OTM). (See Chapter 7.) was minimal. The people had been pre- The women and youth mass organisations pared for reconciliation and participation in had been created immediately after inde- the elections, but what were the prospects pendence and held a monopoly position, afterwards? What concrete actions could until the changes in the 1990 constitution they take to bring their concerns forward that allowed diversity. The mass organisa- and to gain infl uence? For many people, tions then declared themselves independ- parliamentary proceedings did not seem ent. They could count on active member- to have any bearing of their daily lives. The ship in the entire country. lines of infl uence through the former nation- wide Frelimo organisations and local party By 1996, the new emerging NGOs had structures had disappeared. Although de- pursued their own independent identities. cisions were often top-down in those days, Where they could easily be included in the it also gave clarity about whom to address. big civic education programmes in the fi rst In the new political reality, people had to or- phase, this solution was no longer accept- ganise themselves in a completely different able. However, organising a programme way. with these smaller organisations on a large In 1996, former civic education partners scale was complicated; most did not have asked Awepa for a follow-up of the pro- a network, their capacity was often lim- grammes, adapted to the new situation. ited, and many were in the process of im- Awepa wrote a manual to explain how plementing programmes that were tied to Parliament works and what opportuni- contracts with donors. Staff often saw the ties there are to infl uence decisions1, but training mainly as their own learning proc- that was far too diffi cult for most people to ess or felt isolated in the execution, so the comprehend. It was then decided to hold outreach was disappointing. Awepa then a new series of seminars, trying to help the looked for experienced structures for people Mozambicans to get a grip on the new to help coordinate and accompany the ac- democratic possibilities. tivities of the small organisations after their training. CCM and others took up the task 1 Guia sobre a Assembleia da Republica, editor in the provinces. Operating on the basis of Obede Baloi, 1997, Awepa Amsterdam-Maputo simple proposals, some money was provided

105 Elections are not the end of the story

for their work at grassroots level. Cultural Civil society as part of a political party: groups were amongst the most active. the Renamo Leagues The more that the work with OMM and From 1997, legislation was prepared for lo- OJM was viewed as one-sided, the more cal elections. (See Chapter 13.) When the civ- critical Renamo became of the support that ic education programmes started to include Awepa provided to those organisations and information about the future local munici- not to their Youth and Women’s Leagues. palities, the subject of democracy suddenly Coming back from an OMM seminar in became more tangible. The training semi- the North, I met Vicente Ululu in the plane, nars became lively again; simulations about and he asked me urgently not to neglect the how local government works were included. Renamo Leagues anymore. At the end of Nicknames were given to the municipalities 1996, Awepa president Jan Nico Scholten and local budgets were worked out on the had a meeting with Dhlakama, in which basis of priorities of the community. Some he promised to launch a programme with fun was included; working groups during the Renamo Leagues as quickly as pos- the seminars provoked other participants by sible. This marked our acceptance of the giving the mayor a luxury car, while others changing nature of the civic education pro- made a budget that only allowed space for a gramme. For Renamo, the programmes bicycle, saying that that was good enough, were an important part of learning about and that a local water pump was more the system, but the seminars also served urgent. as a forum, an opportunity to meet other members, to discuss and exchange experi- The work with OMM, OJM and OTM was ences, and to see how they could include as effi cient as before; they continued to be themselves in the new society. well organised. OMM was preparing its congress, in which it wanted to formalise its Angelina Enoque, MP and head of the complete independence from the Frelimo Renamo Women’s League at that time, was party. Nevertheless, what had been natural one of the inspiring fi gures for the women: in the fi rst phase changed entirely in the “I want to support the voice of those who next: with the differentiation of civil society, don’t have a voice, helping women to speak it increasingly became a matter for dispute. out,” she says in 2008. She was unhappy Signifi cant attention on those organisations with the emphasis that Awepa put on was now viewed as too one-sided. At the OMM. “OMM had the opportunity to grow, same time, Renamo’s Women and Youth but we felt marginalised. We had such Leagues gained strength and wanted to put a lack of experience. We wanted to take a their own stamp upon the civil movement. step forwards. But then we managed to get support from the Awepa programmes. This was important for the women; we entered a new phase. The Women’s League gained

106 Democracy and people’s organisations

offi cial status. In Parliament, we now have They also did not trust people from ‘the a cabinet for women MPs; outside the gov- other side’, the established institutions, and ernment, women work to achieve more we felt that they had a lack of confi dence to- equality. Women are the target of discrimi- wards us. The fi rst evening they quarrelled nation in many ways.” about the TV and broke it. The Red Cross coordinator wanted to throw us out, saying, In the fi rst seminar with the Youth League “This work is not serious; how can you do a the discourse was ideological, establishing seminar with those kids?” Because we had the offi cial position. It was organised in good relations with him, we were able to Chokwè, and was intended for the southern convince him to let us stay. We talked with region of Mozambique. Most of the youth the Renamo leadership and they were help- were over 30, and many party leaders took ful; they convinced the youth to behave. part. The programme was a mixture of the ‘normal’ non-partisan issues and current The programme started in an atmosphere prevailing opinions. Renamo MPs such as of mistrust, but then the miracle happened. David Alone, and journalists of their choice They became interested, started to think such as Salomão Moyane, were included about the questions in the working groups. as trainers. At supper, the trainers sat with We had developed practical approaches and the leadership. That was the moment when exercises to explain the new situation and the past became tangible. References were discuss how a democracy works. So what made to war and to walking long distances was their role? Did they believe that they after attacking a village. It felt a bit uncom- could have a role? Did they think that there fortable. was democracy in Mozambique? The last

The Chimoio and Nampula seminars (in the centre and north of Mozambique) were different from Chokwè. Although the number of attendees was set at 70, about 90-100 came. While the Renamo intellectu- als had been present in Chokwè, now the participants were young, coming from the bush and hardly literate. They were not used to being asked their opinions. The fi rst evening in Chimoio was a disaster. We were hosted in the Red Cross Centre, a nice place with good four-person bedrooms, a meet- Seminar with Renamo Youth in Nampula for ing hall and a place for meals and social preparation of local governance. Left: Obede gathering. But the boys were not used to Baloi, centre: Lucia van den Bergh, right: such luxury, to TVs and comfortable seats. Renamo activist, 1997

107 Elections are not the end of the story

question led to lively discussions with dif- to reassert its infl uence as well, trying to re- ferent outcomes in each group. In the end, gain control that had been lost. most of them concluded, “Yes, there is de- mocracy, but it was Renamo who brought “It was a coup,” says Filipa Baltasar da Costa it.” We were happy with this outcome. How when we meet in 2008. She had drafted the could they ever endure that they had fought proposal. Her colleague Gertrudes Victori- for nothing, think that it had been in vain? no, OMM spokesperson at the time, relates, After the fi rst diffi cult hours, the enthusi- “Just before the approval, I left the hall to asm remained. They felt that they were be- inform the press about our independence. ing taken seriously. I was explaining it to them when we heard applause, expecting that the decision was The seminar in Nampula, where my col- taken. Then we suddenly heard that OMM league Baloi had to deal with 100 partici- had rejoined the party. The Frelimo party pants, also got off to a diffi cult start, but in had used the charisma of Graça Machel [the the end they were also eager to learn and widow of the former president]. She said wanted to be taken seriously; recognition to the hall that the OMM belonged to the and inclusion were important. Later series party, and then everybody applauded and of seminars with Renamo did not encoun- the decision was taken.” ter the same problems any more. The train- ing programme became established. Extra delegates had been brought in from the North, female antigas combatentes, OMM returns to the Frelimo party: “We former fi ghters from the colonial war, who were overruled” were unhappy with the modernisation. OMM had taken the challenges after the They took the lead in the applause. OMM changes seriously and promoted a genuine activist Otília is bitter: “The antigas comba- women’s movement throughout the coun- tentes took over OMM; it does not achieve try. It had reactivated its dynamic structures anything anymore.” The open-minded Pro- right down to the smallest villages after the vincial Secretaries of Nampula and Manica war. Circulos de interesses (women’s inter- were not re-elected. In Tete, the national est groups in townships and villages) were leadership’s attempt to push the provincial active and now often received some donor secretary aside was stopped by the mem- support. The organisation was growing in- bers. Filipa tells me, “We immediately creasingly strong and independent. After lost most of our donor support for good discussions in the provinces, new statutes programmes that were already being im- to make their position offi cial were sup- plemented. Almost the next day, UNIFEM posed to be adopted in the national OMM came to take back the car that they had congress of September 1996, but that did given us before.” not happen. While Renamo wanted to as- sert its role in civil society, Frelimo wanted

108 Democracy and people’s organisations

“I did not agree to go back to the party,” were more abstentions. Civic education has says Ana Madalena Charovar, then provin- to be permanent.” cial OMM Secretary, and now Frelimo MP. “We had gained so much; we had good The infl uence of the population: the ex- programmes, we had working groups in ample of the land law every district. We have lost a lot; nowadays Many of the people who had gained expe- OMM is paralysed, takes no action. Going rience in OMM and OJM did not want to back was a strategy proposed by the par- return to Frelimo control, and started their ty.” The provincial secretaries of Nampula own NGO; donors were eager to support and Manica were amongst the most active them. The result was the development of in trying to break through the party lines. active and independent groups in civil soci- They included Renamo women in every ety, some of which were critical but close to seminar, and the Nampula Secretary visited the Frelimo philosophy, while others were women in Renamo areas in 1993 and 1994, more on the opposing side. This new form trying to build up relationships between of involvement by civil society had a suc- the women. Ana Madalena continues, “My cessful impact on several crucial occasions. personal analysis is that the party saw a The broad discussion of the review of the women’s movement growing that could as- land law, approved in 1997, is a good ex- sociate itself with any party. They felt threat- ample. The Government appointed a land ened; they wanted to remain in control. The committee, which functioned as a platform cadre that we trained is now in associations for specialists to give their input. However, and NGOs.” civil society did not think that was enough. Organisations published manuals in which After OMM, OJM followed suit and re- the law was analysed, especially examining joined Frelimo. We in Awepa did continue its impact on poor farmers and on women. the implementation of the current pro- ORAM, an agriculture support organisa- gramme, also including the preparation tion, was established by ex-CCM activists. phase for local elections, but we at that time They set up a programme to explain and did not start a new programme with them, discuss the law and its possible pitfalls in nor with OTM, although the trade unions the countryside. Concrete improvements always had a more independent position. were the result.

Candido Mate and João Moiane of OTM The conditions were optimal in this case: look back with regret: “We were heavily in- the Government and the Parliament had an volved in the 1994-1997 period, but after open mind. They did not see the input as a that OTM was no longer included in the threat, but as an asset they were prepared to civic education programmes. We felt mar- use. The president of the Agricultural Com- ginalised. Workers lost interest, so there mission, Helder Muteia, organised a public hearing in Parliament. It became an example

109 Elections are not the end of the story

of a functioning democracy, but even more ent press is diverse and infl uential. The importantly, it resulted in a good land law, Human Rights League has been following written to protect small farmers and the the situation since the early 1990s and has rural population. Although practical imple- published many critical reports and articles mentation of the law is not always as good, about human rights violations. Civil society the law still serves as an example for other has actually achieved an independent po- countries. The initiatives by ORAM and sition towards the government, and their other organisations were extremely impor- infl uence is substantial. On the other hand, tant in showing that infl uence was possible, considerable control over Mozambican pri- and that legislation is relevant to the lives orities and approaches was lost through of the people, for whom access to land is increased donor dependency. Issues often crucial. However, this example was partly have to be adapted to the philosophies and so successful due to high investments from trends of headquarters in Europe or the US. organisations and some supportive donors. The number of donor-funded organisations Moreover, involvement on such large scale has grown, but it is not always clear who is only possible on a few issues. Women’s they represent groups have been successful in other cases: both the family law and the recently ap- A young generation is coming up, willing proved law on domestic violence were civil and able to discuss the important issues in society initiatives, although the last is still society, talking about poverty, about neces- subject to heavy debate in the independent sary changes in the Mozambican economic press. Men feel that they are being accused and social system. Pastor Mutungamira from and that their interests are being neglected. Beira recognises the problems, but is also optimistic. “Mozambique changed forever; Who sets the priorities? people here will never accept situations like Diversity in organised civil society has grown in Zimbabwe under Mugabe. Other coun- over the years. Some civil society organisa- tries failed to include the grassroots. We tions opt to cooperate with the government did include them, and we are proud of that. at the national or local level, while others It is our big lesson. They cannot take that monitor government policy or choose a away from us any more. We grew up; we role as a critical watchdog. The independ- are adults now.”

110 Credibility of the democratic institutions

Chapter 12 “There is growth, also on the Renamo side,” Frelimo MP Alfredo Gamito concurs. “But Parliament could improve if we improve Credibility of the Democratic how the committees function. The popula- Institutions; does the system work? tion does not know them, yet committees have an important say. But they are second- he Western multi-party system is im- ary to the party strategies and the leading Tposed “in total disregard for the accu- Permanent Commission. The leaders of the mulated experiences based on the histo- parliamentary parties are more of a deter- ry, culture, values and traditions of African minant, more important.” societies,” says former president Chissano in a lecture in the Netherlands in April 2008. Speaker of Parliament Eduardo Mulembwe He gives examples of countries thrown into confi rms that the work of the committees deep division and confl icts through the is not very visible. “We are used to having rapid imposition of the multi-party system the main discussion in the plenary session. while recovering their dignity and their land We have two days of committees and two after colonialism, eager to follow their own days of plenary every week but it means path. He thinks that Mozambique managed that the same discussions often take place its own process of transition quite success- twice. But the number of laws that are ap- fully, but states that “democratisation takes proved by consensus has grown. The MPs time, and is frequently subject to pitfalls.” are starting to take up their role; there is not The adopted system is complicated and very so much ignorance anymore.” Renamo MP costly, especially for a poor country. Albino Muchanga says, “Reaching consen- sus is diffi cult, but we sometimes manage, Parliamentarians struggling with their for example about the statute on civil serv- role ants. But Parliament should function more Ernesto Lipapa is Frelimo MP from Cabo separately from the parties; they should rec- Delgado province in the north of Mozam- ognise our specifi c position. Our role is to bique. approve the social and economic plan, and “In 1994, we did not have experience. But to monitor whether it has been executed.” we learned that political work means par- ticipating, not abandoning. Still, there was Getting a grip on the issues a lack of continuity in the learning process. The pressures of daily work are high, and The tumultuous acts inside Parliament af- there is a substantial backlog in approving fected our credibility towards the popula- new legislation; time to study and discuss tion.” He refers to the second mandate, the proposals is limited. Complicated issues when Renamo’s demonstrative departure like EPAs (free trade agreements with the from the hall was replaced by the practice EU) or the conditions that accompany the of banging shoes on the table. “But we are loans from the World Bank and the IMF doing better now.”

111 Did expectations come out?

require background information, research true for Renamo; they have never approved and support. However, inclusion of special- an annual plan or budget yet. It is often not ists or researchers in the preparations is about the right decision, but about what the rare. In December 1998, Awepa organised party discipline asks.” But does Parliament a conference in Maputo with the Southern make suffi cient use of its opportunities, try- African parliaments about debt. It was at ing to be a representative body of the peo- the time of Jubilee 2000, an international ple, addressing their problems? Talking to movement demanding debt cancellation for several MPs now, they see the problem. third-world countries. There was a growing awareness in poor countries about the neg- MP Alfredo Gamito says, “Every MP has to ative effects of World Bank and IMF loans, visit his province twice a year, to meet his and the conditions that accompany them. electorate. There is huge pressure to spend One of our specialists prepared the confer- 30 days in the districts. But the distance be- ence with a small group of MPs. Most did tween Parliament and the people is grow- not have a strong command of the English ing.” Frelimo MP Ernesto Lipapa explains, language, while all the documents from the “When I come into the town of Mueda [in World Bank and IMF are in English. This Cabo Delgado province], people expect that meant that providing a translation into Por- I can do something for them. They want a tuguese was important. “Did we really ac- representative in every district; they want us cept that we cannot give free healthcare to to look into the price of maize, to set the the poor anymore? How can we explain that minimum wage. It is confusing for them to our people? I never agreed!” one of them when we don’t have an answer to their ques- said with growing concern. tions. They also don’t know which party the people are from, and they often don’t care.” Far from the people’s concerns? During Chissano’s presidential period, Ar- The dominant party: does the winner mando Guebuza was leader of the Frelimo take all? Is the one-party system creeping parliamentary party. He opted for a strong back in? independent voice for the Parliament. Par- While parliamentarians are trying to estab- liamentary infl uence, including voices from lish their roles, the difference between the society e.g. on the land law, was especially opposition and the governing party is grow- possible during the fi rst mandate. But while ing. Renamo support shrank in the parlia- Guebuza is president now, Parliament does mentary elections from 37.7% in 1994 to not seem to have the same independent 29.7% in the 2004 elections. The inclusion force or space. “Nobody wants to put their of small parties in a coalition with Renamo bread in danger,” says Verónica Chemane, (Renamo União Eleitoral) did not help. The working in a civil society organisation in UD coalition that gained 9 seats during Maputo. “It is diffi cult for Frelimo MPs to the fi rst mandate disappeared and no oth- oppose the government. The opposite is er party gained access to Parliament. The

112 Credibility of the democratic institutions

dominance of the Frelimo party in govern- Renamo MP Eduardo Namburete was fi red ance and in society increased. Some of the from his position as a lecturer at Eduardo people I interviewed say that government Mondlane University in Maputo. He took le- and party now seem almost the same, and gal action and won. Angelo Matusse, former that room for diversity is diminishing. Is Awepa representative says, “It was not the that the case? government that sent him away from uni- versity; it was Brazao Mazula, the rector at The Nampula representative of the Human that time. There is a perception of exclusion Rights League (LDH) Tarcísio Abibo sus- by the Frelimo government that is not al- pects that he had diffi culties getting into ways based on reality.” university because of his job and his critical views. “The ‘red card’ [Frelimo membership Did the opposition use its opportunities? card] is now the basis for everything. Only “It is diffi cult to always be in opposition,” people who support Frelimo can study; the says Renamo MP Angelina Enoque. “We new intellectuals all share the same ideol- have good ideas but they hardly ever pass. ogy. I will never get a job in government Last week, after a horrible wave of violence institutions. Even my children will have in South Africa against Mozambicans and fewer possibilities because of my activities.” other foreigners, we wanted to react as Par- Complaints have generally increased about liament, as the sovereign institution. It is privileges for Frelimo members and about a matter of national interest. But then the restrictions for those who do not have the Frelimo bench did it alone. It is not a com- ‘red card’, or who criticise the Frelimo gov- fortable position we are in.” ernment. The opposition had a free ride after the war. “Frelimo prepares its candidates very well, Everybody encouraged them and donors especially about the interests of the party. It were ready to fi nance the new parties, stim- is a pre-programmed story,” says Alcinda, ulating a democratic party structure and a working in Nampula. “And if you aren’t fol- political programme that is open to discus- lowing the mainstream, everything is more sion, as the only way to gain the continu- diffi cult: getting jobs, a land title, opening ous support of the population. But Renamo a shop. But what is it that makes people never distanced itself from the authoritar- afraid to talk?” Obede Baloi says, “People ian structure of wartime. It lost many good think that all measures are taken based on people; cadre like Raul Domingos, Jafar instructions from the leadership. But that is Gulamo Jafar, Daviz Simango and Maria not the complete picture. Restrictive meas- Moreno, all in key positions, were expelled ures are often taken at lower levels by peo- or pushed aside. ple who just want to ingratiate themselves “The opposition only hurls insults,” says with the boss.” Marcos Juma, leader of Panamo and MP for the UD coalition during the fi rst mandate.

113 Did expectations come out?

“We should point out the mistakes, but “The present system can be very divisive. being more positive, being constructive.” The parties don’t talk about serious things, Juma has ideas about education, about the they only talk about how they can win,” says exploration of minerals, about agriculture: Ernesto, a man from Nampula. “Parties “We should change the agricultural system, come to ask for your vote, make promises lay down the hoes, re-open the rural shops, and then disappear.” No vision, no serious give jobs to that part of the population. discussion, no local base. Those things should be discussed in the par- ties.” Angelo Matusse says, “After the Peace Small political parties: “We did not see Agreement, the party in power promoted the opportunities” the opposition. In 1992, it was necessary in Everybody in Mozambique knows the word: order to maintain peace. The opposition be- the ‘envelope’. It is not about bribery, but came accustomed to being promoted. But about the offi cial sum provided to support now they have to spread their wings and fl y small parties, initially paid by the donors, on their own.” He continues: “I think Fre- and later included in the offi cial govern- limo is pushing too much towards its own ment support. It is the money that each reg- side now. Opposition already exists within istered political party receives to organise the party, stating that freedom of expression their activities and to compete with other is necessary. People are appearing within parties. Leaders of small parties now say Frelimo who talk openly.” that this is one of the reasons that parties do not work together. They each want to have Longing for unity the right to receive. In contrast to the concern about Frelimo’s increasing dominance, there is certainly “The start was wrong,” says Andre Balate, some nostalgia for the past, for when no president of the political party ‘Parena’. time was lost on competition and discus- “In 1993, they should not have promoted sions were about real issues. People re- the creation of parties like that. Many were member the preparations for the Frelimo created just for the money. It is necessary congresses and the constitutional changes, to stop for a while and see what each party the discussions in factories, institutions delivers. Parties should prove themselves and in the townships, the outcome being fi rst and receive money only after the work carried forward to a higher level by their is done. This approach creates laziness and representatives. Nobody wants to go back; nothing is achieved. Political parties have people now want the freedom to choose, to to work for the population, not for them- express other opinions. But seeking con- selves,” says Balate. “But at that time, it was sensus is fi rmly rooted in the traditional the only possibility to avoid that only the thinking about leadership, so they talk two big parties would participate. about the necessity to discuss the national problems, about fi nding solutions together.

114 Credibility of the democratic institutions

Marcos Juma of Panamo agrees that many Juma continues, “Outside support for po- parties were created because of the money, litical parties is hardly coming in anymore and that it keeps them divided. “Division now.” CPDM [a centre for political parties means that you always lose. They say: ‘I that was created through outside support] am going to create my own party, so I can still exists, but at the same time it does not. receive money’.” But he does not think that There is a lot of quarrelling going on inside. it was wrong at the start. “It was the best Donors now feel that we, the small parties, that could be done. But we did not see the are not interested in growing.” opportunity of the support that we got.” Juma tried to form a broad coalition for “In the end, it is about personal survival” the local elections of November 2008. “We Adriano Malache is the coordinator of the wanted to form a block for constructive op- Mozambique offi ce of NIMD, the Nether- position. 19 parties were with us. But then lands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. they asked me: ‘but who will receive the en- NIMD has supported small parties since velope?’ Only two stayed together, Pimo and 2000, and created the party centre (CPDM). Panamo.” He observes, “The organisational structure Juma’s political choices go back to the past. of the small parties is weak. They should “I was never really with Frelimo, but I never have a support base, ask for membership agreed with the war. We suffered, after in- fees. What is their social base? Where do dependence those from outside, from the they have visibility? What is their mes- apartheid regime were laughing about us, sage? They have to ask themselves who will who were killing our brothers” During an concur and collaborate with that message. attack by Renamo in the Northern city of However, the majority does not have a vi- Nacala he escaped. On his way to the pro- sion like that; the party is the source of per- vincial capital Nampula, he saw that Re- sonal survival for the leadership.” He con- namo had set fi re to a tractor, with people tinues, “The conclusion of the international tied up on it. He wonders: “Is war the way community after the elections was that the to achieve democracy? They keep talking money was used poorly. Capacity build- about bringing democracy, but I don’t agree. ing was provided, but with what results? If that is truly their goal, then they now have None of those people currently hold seats to sustain democracy. But Renamo was nev- in Parliament.” NIMD has been providing er democratic; that is why they pushed their training for almost ten years now. “They all good people out. Mozambique had its own come to workshops, except the two big par- form of democracy. It was not Renamo that ties; their culture now is to say no.” Malache achieved peace; the people brought peace views the dialogue between the parties as because they were tired of suffering. We are the most important aspect: “Discussing the here thanks to the people.” national interests is essential for multiparty democracy.”

115 Did expectations come out?

The large investments made by the donor solve local problems. But we see that the community with the aim of creating a third parties keep the confl ict alive, instead of force before the fi rst multiparty elections creating space to discuss it together. The did not result in serious political diver- multiparty system still faces many weak- sity. Most small parties remained artifi cial nesses in part because of poverty. There is a creations. Even the ones that have some lot of tension in the provinces of Zambezia, visibility now, either because they have Sofala, and Manica; everybody now wants to been included in a parliamentary coalition enter into party structures. Access to power with Renamo in the 2004-09 mandate, or also gives access to fi nancial resources. The through a presence at local level, have not competition is becoming more aggressive. built up a credible and democratic party in- In the end, it is about personal survival.” side the country. Training and support has not changed that. There is still limited com- “What is the solution?” I ask him. He answers, prehension of what proper and effective “There is none, not in this generation. It is a opposition means. But there are certainly process. In institutional terms, Mozambique opportunities. A new party was created re- is functioning. But talking about the practical cently, the MDM (see Chapter 13), gaining aspects, the benefi ts for the population, there- force rapidly in 2009, the year of the na- in lies the problem. There is room to express tional and provincial elections. yourself and political parties can be created, but to what point does the population benefi t?” But Malache is not very optimistic for the short Matusse states, “It is not enough to look into term. He describes the current divisions. “We the question of democracy. If there are no work with an NGO called AMODE. They go social guarantees, if democracy is only for the into the districts to work with the political ones who eat, it does not work.” parties and community leaders, trying to

116 Local governance

Chapter 13 and thought that the discussion should be reopened, but now including the op- position. In 1995, Alfredo Gamito became Local governance Minister of State Administration, and thus responsible for the new legislation. He ex- eira looked different in 2008 when I plains in 2008, “In 1990, the government Bcame back after ten years. When I vis- wanted to change the 128 districts into ited it before, the city was dirty, the streets municipalities. But later we saw that we were full of potholes, and the neighbourhood could not start on that scale, so we opted around the market was an uneasy place, with for a gradual approach.” The model also aggressive pickpockets. But now everything changed. Not the districts, but the towns looks clean and organised, new public toilets would be municipalities; later, the more do not have the same smell, and the infor- than 600 povoações or small villages would mal markets are organised by product. I walk have their own elected representatives. “We through a street full of second-hand shoes. had many discussions with Dennis Jett, the US Ambassador, and he put us under huge “It really improved,” says the taxi driver on pressure,” says Gamito. Jett was not the the way from the airport, as we drive over only one who was trying to push through the repaired roads. “We are so happy with quick elections. In 1997 a letter from 10 do- our Mayor, he looked into our priorities.” nors, written in a blackmailing tone, urged When we pass an open fi eld he says, “Do that local elections should be held no later you remember how everybody did their ne- than the end of that year. This went too far cessities here in the open air?” Yes, I do; I for other donors; the Nordic countries in still remember the women, just spreading particular disassociated themselves from their legs under their capulana, their tradi- that position. The new law on decentralisa- tional cloth wraps. “Three months it took to tion was approved by consensus in April solve the problem,” he says. “After the place 1997 and the fi rst local elections were held was cleaned up, you had to pay a high fi ne. in June 1998, after several delays. 33 mu- People complained at fi rst, but now every- nicipalities were selected to start with, of body is happy.” He is not the only person who feels proud. Any party sympathies aside, Daviz Simango, the Renamo Mayor of Beira, did a good job.

Decentralisation process The fi rst law on municipalities was ap- proved in September 1994, just before the fi rst multi-party elections. But the new par- liament declared the law unconstitutional, Maputo City Hall, 2007 (Pieter Boersma)

117 Did expectations come out?

which 23 were cities, including all the pro- specialists for the training, and experienced vincial capitals, and 10 vilas (towns). Ten deputies from municipalities in other coun- years later, the local elections of November tries were brought in as well. Manuals were 2008 added 10 more vilas. National parties written and the law was explained in a de- could compete locally, as well as local grupos tailed analysis.1 The Frelimo party was well de cidadões or citizen groups. The latter had organised at the local level, but had to deal the same rights as the local party branches. with centralised instructions and decisions, and the party branches were not used to Gaining experience and thinking locally local independence. It was even more dif- There was a huge lack of knowledge. For fi cult for Renamo and the small parties, and Awepa, informing civil society was a logical donors did not want to give Mozambique follow-up to earlier civic education pro- much time to adapt. grammes. However, the lack of knowledge among parties and their candidates was Boycott no longer works even more serious. From 1997, Awepa After several delays, in March 1998, the trained civil society organisations again, but CNE announced the elections for June also trained political parties and their candi- 1998. By then, Renamo had unexpectedly dates, as well as local observers. I left Awepa announced a boycott, which most small shortly after the local elections, but my suc- parties joined. But an approach that had cessor set up a programme for the newly worked during the negotiations and the elected local governments and assemblies. transition period, when full consensus was required and a boycott could delay every “Political parties are not used to thinking decision, had now lost its power. After sev- locally,” said one of the trainers. “National eral efforts to satisfy Renamo, the elections head offi ces take the lead in selecting local went ahead on the 30th of June without their candidates, in campaigning and in prepar- participation. Doubts existed if their move ing a programme.” Small parties did not was motivated by realistic complaints, or if have a local base, and the local citizens the parties were simply not ready and did groups did not have easy access to informa- not want to lose face. tion; the bureaucracy to register as a com- peting party was complicated. By then, Awepa had conducted 8 out of 11 provincial seminars with potential Renamo The seminars tried to promote local think- candidates and their party structures. We ing as the fi rst priority. They raised the wanted to stop, but they begged us to con- questions of what candidates and parties tinue. Many participants were frustrated actually wanted to do on a local level, and that the decision to boycott the elections what relationship they had with the local population. To guarantee quality, the Minis- 1 Hanlon, J., Guia basico sobre as autarquias locais, try of State Administration (MAE) provided 1997, MAE & Awepa, Maputo

118 Local governance

was made without consulting the local ance with IMF and World Bank conditions, branches. so the government had no choice. And Phyllis Pomerantz, responsible World Bank Angoche offi cial in New York, did not even want to At the end of October 2008, I spoke to hear about the social and political conse- Alberto Massane, Renamo Mayor of quences in post-war Mozambique.2 The Angoche at that time. He admits that he did once-lively town with its many economic not like the boycott: “It was a pity; if we had activities fell apart. People lost their jobs entered in 1998, we could have done much and many frustrated workers blamed the more locally. We had so much support.” government and turned to Renamo. That was probably true. I was in Angoche during these fi rst local elections, as an ob- Mayor Massane had no ties to Renamo server. Voter turnout at the national level during the war. “What hurts most is that was only 14%. Frelimo was going to win any- I worked 30 years in the cashew industry, how, so why vote? The boycott brought back through the whole war as well. The work- tensions; people did not want to be seen at a ers were simply sacked. The government polling station, because that meant that you only gave compensation to the jobless were in favour of Frelimo. “I won’t go; we after a lot of pressure, but it was far from don’t want new confl icts,” I heard people enough.” The companies did not accept saying, “Let them fi ght out their differences much responsibility for the workers. I ask amongst themselves and not make our if he knows about the World Bank policy. lives diffi cult again.” In spite of the boycott, He replies, “Yes, I know about it, the condi- Renamo was authorised to held mass rallies tion that the whole raw cashew production during the campaign period. Dhlakama or- should be exported. Because of the crisis in ganised one when I was in Angoche, and India and Guinea, the Mozambican market thousands of people attended it. was liberalised. The exporters got all the privileges; it meant a quick profi t for the Many in Angoche had turned to Renamo af- trade companies, but they did not pay the ter the cashew scandal. In 1995, the World workers. The World Bank wanted manu- Bank imposed its policy on Mozambique, al processing instead of the mechanical forcing it to export raw cashew nuts, in- processing that we did, but that is neither stead of encouraging them to be processed appropriate nor adequate. People were paid in the Mozambican factories. This measure per kilo, under legal minimum wage, like had dramatic consequences: the cashew in- slaves.” dustry, just recovering after the war, and by then mostly in the hands of private Mozam- bican companies, collapsed. 14 factories closed in the area around Angoche. Donors 2 Hanlon, J. and T. Smart, Do bicycles equal develop- had made their aid dependent on compli- ment in Mozambique, 2008, James Curry, London

119 Did expectations come out?

Massane was convinced that he would be of local income. “Quelimane collects tax re-elected in November. “I believe in the from commercial taxi bicycles. In Ilha de victory, despite fraud and games.” He is Mozambique, the city council had prom- from Angoche, and blames the government ised not to collect taxes, but later they did for excluding the Angoche natives in public so after all, so the population is in revolt.” services. He receives little support from the district government, he says, and Frelimo Rita Muianga, Frelimo mayor of Xai Xai, municipalities are privileged. “The Awepa was a member of the Assembly from 1998, capacity building is welcome,” says Mas- but replaced the former Mayor when he sane, “but we now have little support from died. In 2003, a women’s group came to her, the international community. The twin city saying “we want you to be our next Mayor.” ties with the Portuguese town of Figueira She was indeed elected, but remained one da Foz are not functional.” Massane dreams of the few women in local councils. Even af- about better roads, water, a new cemetery, ter the 2008 elections, only 3 out of 41 may- and economic investments in tourism: “We ors are women. The other two towns that have a virgin beach 40 kilometers long.” He have women mayors are Mandlacazi and mentions that he had yet not taken the initi- Marrupa. Quotas guarantee women a place ative to exploit this opportunity during this on the national candidate lists, but this rule mandate, but does not give a reason. And was never established for the municipali- his next mandate did not come; he was not ties. Yet Mozambican history has brought re-elected. There was no evidence of fraud, many strong women to the forefront, and say well-organised national observers. it is frustrating to see how they are pushed aside locally. “We involve women as much Progress, but why no women in local as possible,” says Rita Muianga. “Associa- government? tions receive support, especially the ones The same dreams come back everywhere: that defend the vulnerable groups. The cost a clean city, water, roads. Carlos Tembe, of living has increased, and people have former OJM staff member, now heads the to work in agriculture without the proper Department for Municipalities in the Fre- means. We try to support casas agrarias, limo party. When I meet him in May 2008, thus supporting small farmers, many of he gives some indications of the progress: them women.” “Chimoio was a clean city, but it deteriorat- ed; it is dirty now. In contrast, Tete did very Juntos pela Cidade: a citizen list in well, the way the Mayor works is good. He Maputo does not stay in the offi ce; he talks with the Not many small parties or citizen groups population.” The local taxes often provoke were able to establish a good position at the diffi cult debates. The municipalities receive local level over the years. Only two of the fi nancial support from the national govern- fi ve citizen groups from 1998 came back in ment, but local salaries have to be paid out 2003. But Juntos Pela Cidade had made a

120 Local governance

good start, winning 15 seats at the fi rst elec- public transport. “Why not have a munici- tions. Critical investigative journalist Carlos pal public transport system?” Talking about Cardoso, killed in 2000, was one of the ini- the present phase, he says: “JPC is becom- tiators. ing less intellectual; the candidates are now from the townships. But they don’t have the I see them in the streets of Maputo during level needed to govern.” In 2003, JPC went the 2008 campaign, young people walking back to 5 seats, sinking further in 2008 to in small groups. They distribute postcard- 2. In the end, JPC failed to live up to expec- sized pamphlets, and it is diffi cult to spot tations; it failed to consolidate its base and them between big lorries full of fl ags and work with it. people from Frelimo, and smaller Renamo cars. “JPC played a very good role in the fi rst Popular Maputo and Beira mayors not period; they put their fi nger on the things re-nominated that were not going well,” says Helena, a The popular mayors of the two main cities, well-informed Maputo citizen. “But now Maputo and Beira, were not selected as can- they hardly participate any more. Philipe didates for the 2008 elections. In Maputo, Gagneaux, the party leader, gave up.” JPC Frelimo Mayor Eneas Comiche had built up was especially successful because they credibility. Cleaning up the city had been showed what a progressive and independ- important for the population of Maputo. ent opposition could look like. They also Comiche was known as honest and trans- showed other small parties that boycotting parent, and people felt that he addressed was not the right approach. the real problems of the town. Why can he not fi nish his job? We were happy with him. I speak to Philipe Gagneaux in November Why do parties never listen to what the pop- 2008: “I withdrew in part because of pres- ulation wants? is what I hear in Maputo. sure from my family.” But the big question Gagneaux says about him: “Comiche did for him is why their support diminished. not give privileges to party members. That “We had dreams after the elections. It was is why he was pushed aside.” Comiche ac- a movement of intellectuals but 35 groups cepted the choice of the party. In November were supporting us in the fi rst campaign. I 2008, Frelimo candidate David Simango did everything: wrote statements, handled (no relation to Daviz Simango from Beira) 200 phone calls every day.” During a work- was elected with 85.8% of the vote.3 ing visit to Brazil with Awepa, he saw how Brazilians work with participative budg- ets, giving the population infl uence on the priorities: “It entered into my perceptions of democracy.” Gagneaux is critical about Maputo Mayor Eneas Comiche, for example 3 Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, Issue 37, about his way of dealing with the traffi c and Awepa/CIP, 15 December 2008

121 Did expectations come out?

Beira’s independent Mayor; a new alter- against; it was an order from the party.” He native coming up? laughs, “And now they complain, this budg- In Beira, when Renamo did not re-nomi- et had the new salary scale. It was a lack of nate Mayor Daviz Simango, massive crowds knowledge. The municipality now uses the of people fl ooded the streets, asking him to old 2008 version.” I ask how he can work stay. He did, running as an independent without majority support in the Assem- candidate, and won with an overwhelming bly. “If the Assembly rejects the plan three majority. 61.6% of the votes went to him, times, then the Assembly is sent away.” while the Renamo candidate got 2.7%. In Simango’s view, Renamo’s war was nec- Two weeks before the local elections, I spoke essary. “The churches were closed. If you to Daviz Simango. The person who organ- had two huts, they nationalised one. We ised my meeting knew me; he had been ac- tried to create political parties peacefully. In tive in Renamo seminars, so he was helpful, the end, the only alternative was taking up but avoided actually meeting me. The mo- arms.” But was the cruelty of the war nec- ment was diffi cult; the personnel struggled essary? He avoids giving a straight answer. with the question of their loyalties. “The struggle for independence was for all Mozambicans. Frelimo created the idea that Daviz Simango’s father was Uria Simango, there were foreign interests. But no, the re- who was allegedly executed in a re-educa- volt was national.” tion camp in the early 1980s together with his wife. He is still the Mozambican symbol At the time of the interview, Simango still for how dissidents were treated at that time. kept the possibility open of returning to This and other aspects of Frelimo policy Renamo, but this later became impossi- are the reasons why Daviz Simango chose ble. Renamo now sees him as a traitor. In Renamo, right from the beginning. So why May 2009, there was an attempt on his life, run as an independent candidate now? “I although the background is still unclear. am Renamo, I will always be Renamo,” he Simango announced the formation of a na- says, “but my candidature was imposed by tional party, the MDM. Several senior Re- the people. The population is behind me. namo politicians who accepted the invita- Only if the party recognise its mistake, if tion to attend the ceremony were expelled, the Chief indicates…” He gestures word- amongst them Maria Morena, leader of the lessly. Renamo parliamentarian party. The estab- lishment of MDM seems to have had conse- Simango’s choice to run as an independent quences for Beira already. The potholes are candidate had immediate consequences: coming back – the Mayor is busy with other the majority of the Municipal Assembly re- aspirations now. jected the plan and budget for 2009. “All 19 of Frelimo and 6 out of 25 Renamo voted

122 Local governance

High turnout in November 2008: what are Simango’s MDM party opens new perspec- the perspectives? tives, at the national level as well as locally. Voter turnout in the elections was sur- It could offer a third way, the alternative prisingly high: 46%, compared to 28% in that many people hoped for, and it might 2003. The election was generally well run.4 break through the bipartisan polarisation. But Renamo lost its fi ve mayors, and has But it is again a new and diffi cult process, no majority in any of the assemblies. The requiring a democratic attitude and space GBD, a small party that supported Simango from both major parties. It requires an abil- for the elections, won seven seats. For the ity to share, or even to lose. And it requires fi rst time, Beira now has an assembly with MDM to do what most opposition failed to no majority for one of the big parties. This do: build up a base and create a serious and gives GBD a great deal of power; they can realistic programme. help one or the other to achieve a majority. The tradition of good local observation that MDM now also has the possibility to de- had grown over the past years worked. Par- velop another view about the cruelties of allel counts were carried out in an organ- the war. Simango defi nitely has reasons to ised way by a national Electoral Observatory be bitter about the Frelimo government in that coordinated preparations in the whole the fi rst years after independence, but as a country. party leader and potential presidential can- didate, an honest approach about the terror- Campaigns and programmes are now lo- ist acts during the war could contribute to cal, and the population increasingly judges his credibility towards the population. Just local government on what they actually do. as his parents deserve recognition, so do However, the diversity that was seen in the the innocent people who suffered from the elections of 2003 is in jeopardy. Four small Renamo violence during the war; they de- parties and three citizen’s lists won assem- serve someone who has the courage to say bly seats, but in general the small players that what happened to them was wrong, no lost ground everywhere except in Beira. matter who did it. In that respect as well, Complaints about the control of the ruling MDM could offer a third way. party are growing, in the national govern- ment as well as in the municipalities, and there is said to be some discrimination of Renamo municipalities. Renamo has again lost support, but its analyses of the reasons why should go beyond blaming others.

4 Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, Issue 37, Awepa/CIP, 15 December 2008

123 Did expectations come out?

Every space is used to grow food – urban gardening Maputo, 2007 (Pieter Boersma)

124 Poverty and stability

Chapter 14 py to have something in their stomach. It is not a production problem, it seems, nor a problem of local demand; the problem is Poverty and stability; ‘you cannot eat buying power. People who have no money democracy’ will not eat, and people who produce be- come poorer because their investments do he thinking in most Western coun- not earn enough profi t to even pay the ini- “Ttries is that democracy will deliver tial costs. So will those women work hard development”, former president Chissano and invest their money next time? It is a said in a lecture in the Netherlands in April downward spiral. 2008. “Therefore, democracy is often pre- Money should be brought into the poor sented as a pre-condition for development society to create the much-needed buying assistance. That is a wrong assumption.” In power, through decent salaries and at least Chissano’s view, it is the other way around. a minimum level of social security. Bring- You cannot build democracy on an empty ing cash into the poor society is a way to stomach.”1 stimulate the local economy and avoid mar- ginalisation of the underclass. Producing for those who cannot buy Walking in the Beira market, I see piles of Is Mozambican stability in jeopardy? boxes with tomatoes. There is a new gov- “Poverty is the main danger for post-elec- ernment policy to stimulate rural people toral confl icts,” says Renamo MP Ange- to produce more. People should fi ght pov- lina Enoque in May 2008. “The population erty by working harder. But poor people changed its attitude, as you can see from the already work hard, often under minimal explosion of violence last February. From conditions with hardly any means. Women January to May of this year [2008], the costs work the fi elds with a primitive hoe in the of living went up every month. The country hot sun, carrying their babies on their back. has to defi ne its priorities better. And one We know the lovely pictures at sunrise, but priority is to produce food.” it is not romantic; it is pure poverty. They produce for their family and for the local The February 2008 uprising in Maputo market, in the hope that they will earn some townships was about the price of public small profi t to get them through the period transport. before the next harvest. But do they actually A taxi driver, working for an owner, explains earn anything? The tomatoes are already that he works about half the day just to earn rotting; the production seems to have been the costs of the chapa (privately-owned mini- in vain. At the same time, hungry people bus) that brings him into town. Just then, walk through the streets who would be hap- the radio broadcasts the current session in Parliament. “Do you hear what they’re 1 Chissano, J.A. ‘Democracy in Africa’, 2008, Evert saying? The only time when they all agree is Vermeer Annual Lecture, Amsterdam when it is about their own salary and cars.

125 Did expectations come out?

They were all given new cars, and look how Mozambicans is not relevant; there is none. the population has to reach their work. Our But the anger of young South Africans who transport is not important.” It is true; there see no future for themselves is frighten- are long queues for the chapas. Although ing. I expected words of revenge, but none the transport price increase was reversed, it were spoken. “That is not our way to handle still takes a large part of low salaries. The confl icts,” agreed people in a public debate ones who earn a good wage live in town, on TV. “We have to be clear about the unac- but support personnel, house cleaners, ceptability of the attacks, but there will be and drivers with low incomes have to build no revenge. That only can lead to a new spi- their houses far from the centre. They do ral of violence.” And that is the last thing not benefi t from improvements in town. that Mozambicans want. They take the chapas over bad roads, chang- ing two or three times, and paying the full Governance for all price every time. “It would cost me 60 Mt a Although eager to avoid new violence, day [about 2 US$],” says a friend, a serious Mozambicans understand and share the worker who earns a modest salary, “so it is frustration of the young South Africans. better for me to walk three hours a day; I The feeling of exclusion is a dangerous don’t want to spend my whole salary on the breeding ground in Mozambique as well. chapas.” What’s more, reversing the trans- Inclusion is not just a question of democ- port price increase is not a long-term solu- racy, multiparty or otherwise; it is a ques- tion. The costs for the owners of the chapas tion of equal opportunities and governance are rising as well, so the prices will go up for all. Inequality is growing; the big houses later; there is no way to avoid that. But the and cars are for the happy few, while most real problem of the low salaries – that tiny people have a hard time keeping their heads wages mean people cannot afford to use the above water. Hunger and inequality under- chapas – is not addressed. mine the credibility of the present demo- cratic system. In the actual free market In April and May 2008, there was a wave system, only a small group takes the profi t. of violence in South Africa against Mo- zambicans and other foreigners. The taxi Addressing poverty is diffi cult in a poor driver says angrily, “We suffered a lot in country like Mozambique. But it is also a the times of apartheid, because we sup- matter of political choices: the will to redis- ported the struggle. They forget about that. tribute wealth, nationally and internation- What did the Mozambicans do to deserve ally. Can rich countries continue to take such behaviour? They always worked hard their profi t from cheap labour and from in the mines. Now many are coming back exploitation of natural resources in the to Mozambique. They have lost everything; South, while the poor people pay the price? they have no job, they have nothing.” Ask- At least something should be given in ing for a reason why they turned against return. Decent salaries and fair prices are

126 Poverty and stability

crucial, but they are only the beginning. Dis- ity for the population. Not only the poorest, cussions are growing about social security or but also the workers, the middle class, the a guaranteed basic income. There are many people with jobs see how the costs of living experiments going on now, such as the bolsa are rising all the time, so the money that they familia in Brazil, a cash grant provided on a earn is worth almost nothing in the end.” regular basis to poorer families, or social pen- sions and child benefi ts in South Africa. And Candido Mate from the trade union organi- there are Mozambican examples: 15 years sation OTM says: “There are no jobs in the ago, at the end of the war, two years’ guaran- cities. We have to stimulate entrepreneur- teed cash income was provided for the demo- ship, create capacity for small businesses, bilised soldiers. (See Chapter 6.) Now, small produce and sell things. We cannot all have amounts of money are given every month to a paid job; they simply are not available. We more than 100,000 very poor elderly people, need our own initiatives. However, a policy mostly women. Cash transfers offer a dif- of creating infrastructure and strengthen- ferent perspective on poverty. People with a ing citizens is lacking. Government-initiated small guaranteed income tend to take more capacity building, or initiatives like build- initiatives, their children are sent to school, ing dikes for water management, are good and transport to the clinic can be paid for. It examples of what could be done. The banks also stimulates the local economy: through are not helpful in rural areas. I believe in increased buying power, and means that people’s capacity for taking initiatives if they small-scale farming can be profi table again. have the opportunity.” He then adds: “Life is For donors, contributing to a modernised so- a struggle, it takes time. But the gap between cial system may in the end be cheaper than the population and the top has become the current project approach. Moreover, it wider. People say now, ‘they only solve their could avoid problems and confl icts that lead own problems, we continue to live in mis- to economic losses and human suffering on ery, nobody supports our living costs’.” His a scale that is not even imaginable. colleague continues: “People don’t vote any more. They say: ‘Vote? For what? For them ‘It is time to see if this democracy serves to eat? What is left for us?’” And a friend in the poor” Maputo says, “Many people feel now that “The danger of social explosions sparked off elections don’t change anything.” by poverty is real, as we saw recently in Kenya and South Africa,” says Veronica, a woman Can a democratic system save people from working in Maputo. “In the fi rst years after poverty? Or can access to basic needs save the end of the war, we saw nation-wide mo- democracy? Food and democracy are both tivation, which Mozambique used to recover. necessary, but a full stomach is the fi rst pri- But now it is time to see if this democracy ority for most people. Democracy, yes, but it really serves the poor. I see a major difference has to reduce inequality and bring develop- between the offi cial statements and the real- ment.

127

Why did the peace process work?

Chapter 15 bique was not rich in resources like Angola. Everybody wanted to stop the war, because nobody profi ted from it. Conclusions: Why did the peace process work? No amnesty, no Truth Commissions: “if we started to punish, where would we end” Mozambicans talking to Mozambicans: Since the 1990s, the international courts the agreement was theirs have prosecuted war criminals. This prac- n a war that was largely imposed from out- tice is probably a relief for many victims Iside, the churches encouraged Mozambi- after years of impunity. But nobody asked cans to speak with each other, without the for trials in Mozambique. There was no involvement of a foreign force: “let broth- punishment, not even systematic identifi - ers speak to brothers.” When the negotia- cation and documentation of war crimes. tions fi nally started, they were in the hands Superfi cially, it seemed as if it had been a of the Mozambican political leaders from bad dream and now everybody had woken both sides. The direct talks in Rome started up. No talking about what had happened, no in 1990 and the General Peace Agreement visible rancour, just looking forward. But as (AGP) was signed in October 1992. It was people say, “the pain is not forgotten”, and a negotiated agreement, with detailed steps “we don’t mention the evil aloud, because to be worked out in the transition peri- then it comes back. Traditional ceremonies od; both parties had made compromises. in the communities were part of the heal- Despite outside pressure, the agreement ing process for the ones who committed the was theirs. The General Peace Agreement crimes and their communities, providing could be carried out because it was accept- forgiveness and acceptance. However, no able to both sides. real attention has been paid to the victims.

The right moment Accept the enemy Mozambique had adopted the multi-party The attitude of the established government, system in its 1990 Constitution and had churches and organisations was clear: ac- opened the country for the free market sys- cept and forgive the enemy, take him up in tem. At the same time, South Africa, which your community, ban division and hatred. had supported the war for over a decade, And that was not the fi rst time; former was changing and Nelson Mandela was re- President Samora Machel had questioned leased. The Berlin Wall had fallen. The in- former administrators and collaborators of terests of the Cold War and apartheid had the Portuguese regime during the colonial disappeared. One by one, the reasons to war; if they were guilty of crimes against continue fell away. Renamo saw its foreign the Mozambican population, and admitted support drying up, and droughts made sur- culpability, they received amnesty. In 1986 viving in the bush diffi cult. And Mozam- and 1987, amnesty was given to Renamo

129 Conclusions

fi ghters who handed themselves in to the Learning from Angola: taking time for the government. The argument to convince negotiations and the changes the population was that “they are victims Mozambicans as well as the international as well,” referring to the fact that many community did learn from the failed proc- had been kidnapped or otherwise forcefully ess in Angola in 1992, where the war re- recruited. Acceptance of the enemy is de- started after the elections. They took the pendent on two sides coming together. In time to work out a serious and detailed their weak position when coming out of the agreement, and prolonged the transitional bush, Renamo fi ghters also had to learn to period by another year, not only to prepare live with a new reality. Reconciliation was for the elections, but to get most of the oth- the key word, and it was taken forward by er elements into position: demobilisation the political leaders from both sides, by civil and integration of ex-soldiers, return of ref- society, by churches and the press. A tenta- ugees, building up a new joint army. Each of tive start to deal with each other, to create those elements faced the need for reconcili- daily coexistence even while the wounds ation, for fi nding ways to work together, for had not been healed. accepting the former enemy as an equal in the day-to-day work. The civil organisations and churches involved the people The international community was The massive involvement of the popula- supportive, key actors listened to tion was crucial. It was about reconciliation Mozambican solutions at all levels, but also about understanding The UN also learned from Angola and sent what was happening, about discussing and a fl exible and dedicated UN Representa- participating in the changes. The Mozam- tive to Mozambique, who was indeed able bicans knew how to discuss, how to look to listen and fi nd unusual solutions. The for solutions together; they were used to it. process received massive international People were intensely curious about all the support, something that is lacking in many new elements, such as the multiparty sys- post-confl ict countries, and Mozambique tem and the direct and secret vote. It was was happy with it. It was the only way to different from what they were used to, the carry out the Peace Agreement and build African tradition of seeking consensus and the social and political system on a new the more recent one-party system. People at reality. Mozambique tried not to be over- all levels wanted to contribute and to spread whelmed by it, keeping the key decisions the message. A church leader says, “Other in their own hands. Trusted organisations countries failed to include the grassroots. could build their interventions and sup- We did, it is our big lesson.” port on close cooperation, and were asked to start immediately on the basis of the existing Mozambican structures and expe- rience. Awepa was one of those organisa-

130 Why did the peace process work?

tions. Donors provided fl exible money that was sometimes close. But peace was hold- made it possible for urgent programmes to ing and the elections went well; under the start immediately. ONUMOZ had a large circumstances, they were well organised peacekeeping presence, and also played a and had a high voter turnout. crucial political role at tense moments. For the fi rst time in a peacekeeping operation, The fi rst multiparty parliament: including a humanitarian component was included the former enemies and learning the job (UNOHAC), reassuring RENAMO that the together humanitarian interests in the areas under Cold as ice: that was the atmosphere be- their control were equally guaranteed. tween the two parties at the start of the fi rst parliamentary session following the 1994 Stability during transition: government elections. There was a complete lack of ex- and constitution were recognised in the perience; international support and train- Peace Agreement ing were important. But the Mozambicans Mozambique kept its functioning govern- were eager to learn the job, also seeing the ment in place during the transition period. importance of building up the country af- No experiments were imposed to introduce ter elections, and not giving up on reconcil- immediate changes, as happened in some iation now. The competitive multiparty de- other post-confl ict situations. The leaders of mocracy could intensify hostilities, but that both parties had carefully set out the road in was not what the new MPs wanted. The two a detailed Peace Agreement, to which both main negotiators, Guebuza and Domingos, parts had committed themselves. That road were the new parliamentary party lead- has been followed quite seriously and closely. ers. They were used to each other, fi ghting for their cause but reaching compromises Seeking consensus complicated and in the end. They wanted this new experi- delayed the implementation, but it ment to succeed, and sought to fi nd solu- worked in the end tions at tense moments. But mistrust was It was a fragile process. Consensus was high and the fi rst meeting broke down into a key word in almost every aspect of the hostilities. An unusual and practical train- agreement’s execution. This often delayed ing seminar started before the fi rst ses- the process; talking went on for days with- sion. It was set up by Awepa in cooperation out any result. Renamo walked out of meet- with the leadership of Parliament. Many be- ing halls as a way of pressure and boycott- lieve now that this contributed to saving the ed the conference about the electoral law. Mozambican Parliament from falling apart. The National Election Commission (CNE) The fi ght became political, through proce- had to take every decision by full consensus, dures, and the situation slowly normalised. with the agreement of all 20 representatives of the political parties. Tense moments were frequent and regular, and a return to war

131 Conclusions

The issues Mozambique faces now external support were exceptional. The most Consolidating democracy and addressing pov- important factor was the broad involve- erty are the current challenges. Mozambique ment of the population right from the start. is still listed amongst the poorest countries Including the grassroots is an important in the world. Hunger and inequality can un- lesson indeed. In Mozambique, churches dermine the credibility of the present dem- and civil society organisations went into the ocratic system. The war will not return in smallest villages to discuss and explain the its previous form, but the actual multi-par- new reality. The Mozambicans made mas- ty system might have divisive elements, and sive use of the period of relief, hope and mo- future stability could be jeopardised by the tivation to make peace work. abject poverty of a large majority. In the cur- rent free market system, only a small group Tolerance and forgiveness saved the peace takes the profi t. Modernising the social sys- process, but at a price: nobody ever admit- tem with minimal guarantees, including for ted what was done; nobody ever apologised. income, could ease the situation, increasing Cruel attacks are now often hidden or de- buying power, and thus also stimulating the nied. If there is guilt, the two are now often local economy. supposed to be equally guilty. Because of the absence of a Truth Commission in which Conclusion personal histories could be expressed, and Accepting the enemy on all levels of so- people could admit that they were part of ciety and in the political institutions was it, it is now diffi cult to verify what actually diffi cult. The introduction of European- happened. But, although history will be ana- style elections and parliamentary system, lysed bit by bit, it is important already now alien to existing Mozambican traditions to keep things in perspective. Denying the and decision-making systems, was an al- cruel nature of the war, and the way it was most unmanageable change. It required a started, is now an offence to the victims. completely different way of thinking – but more importantly, for a poor and destroyed And many questions remain: about the country, it required almost impossible logis- present functioning of the democratic in- tics and organisation. The effects of radical stitutions, about being in opposition, about changes are often underestimated, especial- opportunities for small parties, about de- ly by Western countries that put pressure on mocracy on local level and the role of civil rapid elections and the quick introduction society organisations. Democratic institu- of a new model. tions lose credibility if they cannot solve the most important problems. Poverty and The Mozambican process did indeed suc- marginalisation are the most urgent issues ceed, both initially and in the longer term. now. The gap between the elite and the poor It became possible because the agreement is wide and has broadened even more in was consensual, and because internal and recent years. If new confl icts break out, it

132 Why did the peace process work?

will be because of poverty and lack of pros- to the same country, a person who could be pects. cooperated with. Key donors were fl exible and respected the most important Mozam- Although there are lessons to learn here, bican decisions, although not always whole- conclusions to be drawn, the process cannot heartedly. just be copied to other situations. On the contrary, one of the strong points is that it Seventeen years after the Peace Agreement, was owned by the Mozambicans; it was an Mozambique’s struggle is not over. And inclusive process and it was linked to the most of the country’s youth are not inter- Mozambican context. It brought the idea of ested in the past; they want a future. the enemy back to a person who belonged

133

Annexes

Annexes

Historic dates 136 List of interviewees 138 List of abbreviations 143

135 Why peace worked: Mozambicans look back

Historic dates

Mozambique Population Estimated at 22 million Area 801,590 km2 Capital Maputo Offi cial language Portuguese

Some historical data Early 1900s Final resistance is defeated and Portuguese colonial administration over the country is established. Mozambique becomes a ‘Portuguese province’, later under the dictatorship of António Salazar (1932-1968) and Marcelo Caetano (1968-1974). 1962 The Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) is founded, with Eduardo Mondlane as its fi rst president. 1964 Frelimo launches an armed struggle in northern Mozambique, creat- ing liberated zones. The same is happening in other Portuguese colonies in Africa, Angola and Guine Bissau. Portugal responds with a colonial war, supported by NATO. 1969 Mondlane is assassinated by a parcel bomb. 1970 Samora Machel is elected the next Frelimo president. 1974 On 25 April, a bloodless coup of army offi cers in Portugal opens the door for democracy in Portugal and independence of the colonies. 1975 On 25 June, Mozambique declares independence. Samora Machel is the fi rst president. 1976 White-ruled Rhodesia creates an opposition movement, the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR). 1980 Rhodesia becomes Zimbabwe. Support to MNR, renamed Renamo, is transferred to the military of South Africa, which was still under white rule. 1981-84 The war intensifi es with a revitalised Renamo, supported by South Africa. 1984 Samora Machel signs the N’komati Accord with South Africa which states that logistical support to the South African liberation movement (African National Congress, ANC) by Mozambique will be stopped. In exchange, South Africa promises to stop its support to Renamo.

136 Historic dates

1985 Renamo headquarters in Gorongosa is captured by the government army. The ‘Gorongosa papers’ are found, providing evidence that South Africa still supports Renamo. 1986 Samora Machel is killed in a suspicious air crash. Joaquim Chissano becomes the next president. 1986 Zimbabwean and Tanzanian troops come in to support the Mozambican government. Renamo increases its attacks in the south. 1987 A massacre takes place in Homoine in which 424 civilians are killed. 1990 A new constitution paves the way for the multi-party system. 1990 Peace talks offi cially start in Rome. 1992 On 4 October, the General Peace Agreement is signed between the Frelimo government and Renamo. 1994 On 27-29 October, the fi rst general multi-party elections take place. 1998 The fi rst local elections take place: local councils and local assemblies are elected in 33 cities and towns.

137 Why peace worked: Mozambicans look back

List of interviewees

Name Position held in the period between Position held in 2008/09 at the 1992-1996 time of the interview

Abibo, Tarcísio Representative of the Human Rights League in Nampula

Amosse, Rev. Lucas Secr. General of the Christian Council Mozambique (CCM)

Balate, André President of the Centre for Promotion of Democracy (CPDM); President of Parena

Baloi, Obede Suarte Programme Offi cer for Awepa Lector at the Maputo University Mozambique; sociologist, pastor UEM, sociologist

Baltazar da Costa, Filipa Dept Secr. General of OMM; coordinator of civic education programmes. Frelimo MP, Tete constituency

Boswijk, Mirjam Working in an agricultural development programme in Inhambane province. Witness of the Homoine massacre.

Cadeado, Ana Jaime (Anita) Delegate in Sofala for Panamo. Candidate in the municipal elections of 2008 for Panamo/ Pimo

Carvalho, César de Mayor of Tete municipality for Frelimo, Tete province

Charomar, Ana Madalena Provincial Secretary for OMM in Frelimo MP, Manica da Silva Manica constituency

Chitsondzo, Roberto Frelimo MP, Maputo-City Idem Maxiamiano constituency

Chuma, Maria Deputy Secretary of OJM, responsible for the civic education programmes

Correia, Rafael Mayor of Montepuez for Frelimo, Cabo Delgado province

138 List of interviewees

Name Position held in the period between Position held in 2008/09 at the 1992-1996 time of the interview

Cravinho, João Trainer in Awepa’s programmes; Secretary of State for long-term observer of 1994 Development, Portugal elections

Domingos, Raúl Manuel Head of the political department President of the PDD political of Renamo; Head of the Renamo party delegation at the negotiations After 1994: Head of the Renamo Parliamentary Party, Renamo MP, member of the Permanent Commission

Enoque, Maria Angelina Renamo MP, member of the Idem Dique Permanent Commission; Manica Constituency

Gagneaux, Philipe President of ‘Juntos Pela Cidade’ in Maputo

Gamito, Alfredo Maria Provincial Governor of Nampula Frelimo MP, Nampula Minister of State Administration constituency (MAE)

Hackenberg, Inez Awepa representative from Programme Offi cer in Nampula 1999-2000 for Dutch NGO HIVOS

Juma, Marcos President of the Panamo political President of the Panamo party; UD coalition MP; member of the Permanent Commission, 3rd Dept Speaker

Lipapa, Ernesto Frelimo MP, Cabo Delgado Idem Cassimuca constituency

Lôbo de Odadilia, Augusta OMM in Nampula and nationally

Machambisse, Francisco Renamo MP, Sofala constituency Idem Domingos Paulo

139 Why peace worked: Mozambicans look back

Name Position held in the period between Position held in 2008/09 at the 1992-1996 time of the interview

Magaia, Sara Head of the department of information at OMM National Secretariat, jointly responsible for implementation of civic education seminars

Mapache, Adriano Manuel Civil servant at the Ministry of National Coordinator of NIMD Defence

Massane, Alberto Mayor of Angoche for Renamo (Nampula province)

Mathe, Candido João OTM Central Sindical, Maputo Idem

Matsimbe, Elias Secretary of the Centre for Promotion of Democracy (CPDM); President of the Ecologists-Green party.

Matusse, Ângelo Representative of Awepa Mozambique from 2000-2008

Mazula, Brazão President of CNE from 1993-1994 Rector of Edward Mondlane University UEM, Maputo

Mendonça, Ana Trainer in Awepa’s civic education programmes and with Parliament

Moiane, João OTM Central Sindical Maputo Idem

Mondlane, Justino OJM Matola

Muchanga, Albino Faife Renamo MP, Manica constituency Idem Ducuza

Muianga, Rita Mayor of Xai-Xai for Frelimo, Gaza province

Mulémbwè, Eduardo Speaker of Parliament Idem Joaquim Dinis Erasto

Mulémbwè, Joana Manuel OJM Maputo

Mupengue, Paulo Naftal Head of the fi nancial department in Personal Assistant to the the Parliamentary Offi ce. Secretary General of the Parliamentary Secretariat

140 List of interviewees

Name Position held in the period between Position held in 2008/09 at the 1992-1996 time of the interview

Mururuia, Pastor Arlindo CCM Nampula CCM Nampula/ NGO Amode

Mutungamira, Pastor CCM Sofala CCM Sofala, coordinator for an NGO

Nazive, José Efraim Secretary of OTM in Beira

Pereira, Manuel Fernandes Political Secretary Renamo MP, Sofala Renamo MP, Sofala constituency constituency

Rafael, Virgínia Head of the fi nancial department at OMM Secretariat, jointly responsible for implementation of civic education seminars

Sengulane, Dinis Salomão, Anglican Bishop, President of the Anglican Bishop Bispo dos Limbombos Mozambican Christian Council of Churches

Schade, Ernst National Coordinator of Redd Barna Mozambique

Sibambo, David Zefanias Secretary General of the General Administrative Tribunal Parliamentary Secretariat

Siemensma, George Provincial Delegate for Sofala and Inhambane, UNOHAC

Simango, Daviz Mayor in Beira for Renamo; after 2008 elections: independent Mayor and President of MDM political party.

Tembe, Carlos Senior staff member with the OJM Head of the Frelimo national offi ce, jointly responsible national department for the for civic education programmes municipalities

Tivane, Pastor CCM Sofala CCM Provincial Coordinator in Sofala

Ululu, Vicente Zacarias Secretary General of Renamo; Renamo MP, interim member member of the Renamo delegation of the Permanent Commission at the negotiations After 1994: Renamo MP, member of the Permanent Commission, 2nd Dept Speaker

141 List of interviewees

Name Position held in the period between Position held in 2008/09 at the 1992-1996 time of the interview

Valigy, Ismael Ministry of Justice, member of CNE, trainer in Awepa’s programmes

Victor, Anselmo Political representative of Renamo Renamo MP; Zambézia in Maputo. Member of the constituency Verifi cation Commission (COMIVE); member of CNE

Vitorino, Gertrudes da Foreign Relations Secretary Conceição Frederico with OMM; coordinator of civic education programmes. Frelimo MP, Maputo constituency

Zita, Boaventura Head of communications with CCM Idem Maputo. Coordinator of the civic education programmes

When only the fi rst name is mentioned, the name is a pseudonym.

142 List of abbreviations

List of abbreviations

AGP Acordo Geral de Paz (General Peace Agreement) AWEPA Association for European Parliamentarians for Africa AWEPAA Association of Western European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid CARE Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere CCM Conselho Cristão de Moçambique (Christian Council of Mozambique) CNE Commissão Nacional de Eleições (National Election Commission) CJPR Commission for Justice, Peace and Reconciliation CPDM Centre for the Promotion of Multi-party Democracy EU European Union FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique IOM International Organization for Migration IRI International Republican Institute MNR Mozambican Resistance Movement MP Member of Parliament MPPB Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin (later: Mozambique Political Process Bulletin) NDI National Democratic Institute NGO Non Governmental Organisation NIMD Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. OJM Organização da Juventude Moçambicana (Mozambican Youth Organisation) OMM Organização da Mulher Moçambicana (Organisation of Mozambican Women) OTM Organização dos Trabalhadores de Moçambique (Organisation of Mozambican Workers) ONJ Organização Nacional de Jornalistas (National Journalists’ Organisation) ONUMOZ United Nations Operations in Mozambique RENAMO Resistência Nacional de Moçambique STAE Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNOHAC United Nations Offi ce for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination US United States of America

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The publication may be freely downloaded from the website www.awepa.org

Why peace worked: Mozambicans look back © Lucia van den Bergh isbn / ean 9789078147091