Sri Lanka's Return To

SRI LANKA’S RETURN TO WAR: LIMITING THE DAMAGE Asia Report N°146 – 20 February 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................i I. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................1 II. THE RETURN TO WAR...............................................................................................2 A. THE END OF THE CEASEFIRE .................................................................................................2 B. THE POLITICS OF WAR..........................................................................................................3 C. INTERNATIONAL REACTION ..................................................................................................3 III. A MILITARY PATH TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION? ...........................................4 A. WILL THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN WORK?..............................................................................4 B. THE APRC AND A POLITICAL SOLUTION ..............................................................................7 IV. THE COSTS OF WAR...................................................................................................9 A. THE HUMAN TOLL ................................................................................................................9 B. ETHNIC TENSIONS...............................................................................................................10 C. THE EASTERN PROVINCE ....................................................................................................10 D. HUMAN RIGHTS ..................................................................................................................13 E. CONCENTRATION OF POWER AND INTOLERANCE OF DISSENT .............................................15 V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS..............................................................................................17 A. POLITICAL DYNAMICS ........................................................................................................17 B. DANGEROUS TRENDS..........................................................................................................17 VI. INTERNATIONAL ACTION .....................................................................................19 A. THE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS ............................................................................................20 B. THE AGENDA......................................................................................................................22 VII. CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................26 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SRI LANKA ............................................................................................................27 B. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS...........................................................................................28 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................29 D. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA ....................................30 E. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES.........................................................32 Asia Report N°146 20 February 2008 SRI LANKA’S RETURN TO WAR: LIMITING THE DAMAGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Sri Lanka is in civil war again, and there are no prospects eighteen months: it has lost the areas it controlled in the of a peace process resuming soon. On 2 January 2008, the Eastern Province; its arms routes have been disrupted; government announced its withdrawal from a ceasefire hundreds, perhaps thousands, of its fighters have been agreement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam killed; and senior commanders are now vulnerable to (LTTE). This formalised a return to conflict that has been targeted elimination, either from air force bombs or special underway since 2006 but also presaged worse to come. The forces. But the Tigers remain a formidable fighting force. humanitarian crisis is deepening, abuses of human rights While the army has been inching forward in the north, by both sides are increasing, and those calling for peace they are fighting back from well-defended positions. Even are being silenced. There is no present chance of a new assuming the Tigers can be defeated militarily, it remains ceasefire or negotiations since the government, despite unclear how the government would pacify and control the pro forma statements in favour of a political solution, is large Tamil-speaking areas in the north that have been dependent on hardliners and appears intent on a military under LTTE domination for a decade or more. decision. International actors must concentrate for now on damage limitation: protecting civilians from the war’s The government argues its military campaign will clear the worst effects and supporting those working to preserve Sri way for a political solution. Vowing to “eradicate terrorism”, Lanka’s democratic institutions. it says it aims to destroy the Tigers or force them to disarm and enter democratic politics and negotiations alongside In addition to heavy fighting in the north, the first weeks of other Tamil and Muslim parties. But after promising for 2008 have seen the assassinations of a government minister more than a year to undertake substantial constitutional and a Tamil opposition member of parliament, multiple reforms once the All-Party Representative Committee bombings in Colombo, a wave of deadly attacks on (APRC) recommended them, it now proposes only to civilians in the majority Sinhalese south, and widespread “fully implement” the constitution’s long-existing Thirteenth disappearances and killings of non-combantants in the Amendment. The limited devolved powers for the north north and east. More than 5,000 combatants and civilians and east that this would represent are unlikely even in the are estimated to have been killed over the past two years. best case to be sufficient to win over many Tamils or At least 140,000 have fled intensified fighting in the north, Muslims, though they could be a useful start if implemented and more are likely to be forced out if the military continues sincerely. Since President Rajapaksa has chosen to depend its push into Tiger-controlled territory. If the government’s on strongly Sinhala nationalist parties for his government’s military approach in the east is a precedent for its conduct survival, however, this seems unlikely. of the northern campaign, civilians and their property are at grave risk. Meanwhile, ethnic divisions are deepening. The humanitarian costs of the war are concentrated in Tamil- Much of the blame for the resumption in violence lies with speaking areas. In Colombo, security forces have the LTTE; its ceasefire violations and abuses of the conducted large, often indiscriminate arrests of Tamils population under its control pushed the government towards under emergency regulations. But Muslims are under war. The Tiger strategy was to shore up internal support pressure from both the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal by provoking a Sinhala nationalist reaction; it worked, (TMVP), a paramilitary group which broke from the although the insurgents may come to regret their approach. Tigers and operates with the government’s blessing, and President Mahinda Rajapaksa has also overplayed his hand. government-sponsored land and administrative changes. Relying on support from Sinhala extremists, he has let The much touted “liberation” of the Eastern Province has them set an agenda that allows only for a military approach. failed to bring development or democracy; instead it has been characterised by military rule and rising ethnic The military and much of the government leadership believe tensions. The government will lose an opportunity to set they can defeat or permanently weaken the Tigers by the up a democratic alternative to the LTTE in the east if it end of 2008. The LTTE has been badly hurt over the past Sri Lanka’s Return to War: Limiting the Damage Crisis Group Asia Report N°146, 20 February 2008 Page ii fails to rein in the TMVP ahead of a series of elections allegations by hardline politicians and parties scheduled to begin in March 2008. and guaranteeing the safety of all humanitarian workers, Sri Lankan and foreign. The human rights and governance crisis continues unabated, with paralysis of the institutions empowered to investigate 2. Take all necessary steps to protect the fundamental and prosecute, and consequent impunity for abusers. The human rights of all citizens, including: many ad hoc commissions of inquiry of the past two years (a) conducting anti-terrorist operations in have accomplished nothing, while disappearances and accordance with both domestic constitutional political killings continue, especially in Jaffna and other guarantees and international human rights parts of the north. Both the Tigers and the TMVP continue and humanitarian law; to recruit and make use of child soldiers, despite repeated (b) investigating fully all allegations of pledges to UN agencies and others not to. disappearances and killings carried out by The current conflict is worse than what preceded the 2002 state forces or militant groups aligned with ceasefire. The government’s counter-insurgency campaign the state and prosecuting when credible is more brutal and indiscriminate, the terror and criminal evidence is available; activities of its

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