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OF TIME AND JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: TIME SERIES ANALYSES OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AGENDA SETTING AND DECISION-MAKING, 1888-1989 DISSERTATION Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of North Texas in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY By Drew Noble Lanier, B.A., J.D. Denton, Texas December, 1997 Lanier, Drew Noble, Of Time and Judicial Behavior: Time Series Analyses of United States Supreme Court Agenda Setting and Decision-making, 1888-1989. Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science), December, 1997, 424 pp., 14 tables, 32 illustrations, references, 136 titles. This study examines the agenda setting and decision- making behavior of the United States Supreme Court from 1888 to 1989. Using Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research data and data that the author assisted in gathering, the study investigates the changing composition of the Court's agenda and the level of its unanimity. The study also examines the level of the liberalism of its decisions. The study specifies time series models and structural equations models to test the strength of the association between the justices' personal attributes and liberalism. The study finds that economics decisions dominated the Court's docket up until the 1950s, when civil liberties- civil rights cases became more prominent. Judicial power decisions remained relatively constant. The unanimity of its decisions also declined across the period analyzed, first observed during the White Court. The liberalism of the Court's economics decisions was unexpectedly high for or the Fuller and White Courts, but as expected for the Taft, Hughes and Stone Courts. The Court's civil liberties-civil rights jurisprudence was conservative through the 1940's, but became more liberal during the Warren Court. Judicial power liberalism was quite volatile. Time series analysis demonstrates that the justices' religious affiliations, and agricultural origins were positively associated with the Court's economic liberalism, while judicial experience was negatively associated with the Court's economic policy preferences. The Great Depression and Roosevelt's Court-packing plan served to increase the liberalism of the Court's economics rulings. Partisan affiliation was shown to be related to the Court's civil liberties-civil rights liberalism. The occurrence of World War I is modestly related to a decline in liberalism. Judicial power liberalism is related to party identification, religious affiliation and career service, as well as the Judiciary Act of 1925. OF TIME AND JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: TIME SERIES ANALYSES OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AGENDA SETTING AND DECISION-MAKING, 1888-1989 DISSERTATION Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of North Texas in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY By Drew Noble Lanier, B.A., J.D. Denton, Texas December, 1997 Copyright by- Drew Noble Lanier 1997 111 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS There have been many people whose help made the completion of this dissertation possible. First and foremost, the love, support, kindness and generosity of my parents, J.E. and Jeannine Lanier, were key to my completing the degree and my education in general. Their love for knowledge and learning provided me the motivation to earn education's highest degree. My father's analytical way provided me an environment in which to sharpen my own cognitive skills. Second, the unbelievable patience, high standards, good nature and humor of my dissertation supervisor, Dr. C. Neal Tate, have carried me through this ordeal. He prodded me when I was simply not working up to the level that he, thankfully, knew that I could reach. He has made a tough road a little bit easier. I certainly hope that I can learn from his example as a scholar, teacher, and supervisor of future graduate students. Third, the kindness, warmth, intelligence and generosity of Dr. Frank Feigert have helped me immeasurably during the nearly five years that this degree has taken to complete. His love of politics inspired me as a teacher and as a scholar. His genuine friendship (if a professor ever can be a graduate student's friend) is heartily appreciated. Fourth, this study could not have been completed without the work of Dr. Sandra L. Wood, Linda Camp Keith, and Ayo Ogundele. Each of them helped code the bulk of the data on which the analyses done in this work are based. Without their diligence, the data would not have been collected. They, of course, bear no responsibility for any of the analyses conducted in the study. Fifth, the data utilized in this dissertation were made available in part by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data for United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-1988 Terms were originally collected by Harold J. Spaeth. Neither the collector of the original data nor the Consortium bears any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES X LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xi Chapter I. THE DECISION-MAKING AND AGENDA SETTING FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1888-1989 1 Purpose, Outline, and Importance of the Study The United States Supreme Court and Its Decision-Making and Agenda Setting The United States Supreme Court and Politics The Supreme Court's Agenda-Setting Process Determinants of Supreme Court Decision-Making Chapter Summary II. HISTORICAL SETTING OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1888-1946 37 The Court in Historical Perspective The Fuller Court (1888-1910) Brief Biographical Sketches of the Fuller Court Justices Substance of the Fuller Court's Decisions The White Court (1910-1921) Brief Biographical Sketches of the White Court Justices Political Context of the White Court Substance of the White Court's Decisions The Taft Court (1921-1930) Brief Biographical Sketches of the Taft Court Justices Substance of the Taft Court's Decisions The Hughes Court (1930-1941) Brief Biographical Sketches of the Hughes Court Justices Substance of the Hughes Court's Decisions The Stone Court (1941-1946) Brief Biographical Sketches of the Stone Court Justices Substance of the Stone Court's Decisions Chapter Summary Notes III. INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL ANALYSES: COMPOSITION AND DYNAMICS OF THE WORKLOAD AND THE AGENDA OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1888-1989 101 Data Collection Process Size and Composition of the Court's Caseload Total Reported Decisions Issue Areas Economics Decisions Judicial Power Federal Taxation Criminal Procedure Civil Rights First Amendment Privacy Due Process Federalism Interstate Relations Separation of Powers Union Attorney vi Major Issue Areas The Content of the Issue Areas Chapter Summary Notes Appendix A: Coding Sheet Appendix B: Coding Protocol for Agenda and Decisional Data for the United States Supreme Court, 1888-1989 IV. INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL ANALYSES: UNANIMITY OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING, 1888-1989 165 Unanimity Explored Unanimity Examined The Influence of the Chief Justice on Unanimity Unanimity on the Supreme Court, 1888-1946 Concurring Votes Concurring Opinions Dissenting Votes: Behind the Purple Curtain The Judges' Bill and Dissensus Multiple Dissents The Decline of Consensual Norms Dissenting Opinions Chapter Summary Notes V. INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL ANALYSES: LIBERALISM OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING, 1888-1989 222 Politics, Liberalism and the Supreme Court Liberalism Defined Liberalism in Individual Issue Areas Economics Federal Taxation Judicial Power Criminal Procedure Civil Rights First Amendment Due Process Privacy Attorneys Unions Liberalism in Aggregated Issue Areas The Content of the Issue Areas Economics Civil Liberties-Civil Rights Judicial Power Other Chapter Summary Notes VI. INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL ANALYSES: TIME SERIES ANALYSES OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT LIBERALISM, 1888-1989 296 Overview of Box-Jenkins-Tiao Modeling Scheme General Rationale and Procedure Transfer Functions Interventions Diagnostics Models of Institutional Liberalism Case Selection Aggregated Issue Dimensions Economic Liberalism Civil Liberties-Civil Rights Liberalism Judicial Power Liberalism Chapter Summary Notes VII. CONCLUSION 376 Overview and Importance of the Study's Findings The Court in Historical Context Importance of the Dataset Workload and Agenda Dynamics Unanimity of Decisions Liberalism of the Court's Decisions Explaining the Supreme Court's Liberalism Importance of the Study's Findings Suggestions for Further Research REFERENCES 409 LIST OF TABLES Table Page 3-1. United States Supreme Court's Agenda, 1888-1989 108 4-1. Percentage of Unanimous Decisions and Concurring Votes and Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 1888-1989 169 4-2. Percentage of United States Supreme Court Decisions with Dissenting Votes and Opinions, 1888-1989 193 5-1. Proportion of Liberal Decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Indicated Issues, 1888-1989 229 5-2. Percentage of Liberal Decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Aggregated Issue Dimensions, 1888-1989 277 6-1. Univariate ARIMA Model of United States Supreme Court Economic Liberalism, 1888-1989 310 6-2. Multivariate Models of United States Supreme Court Liberalism, 1888-1989 333 6-3. Summary of Research Findings With Regard to Individual Hypotheses of Economic Liberalism 342 6-4. Univariate ARIMA Model of United States Supreme Court Civil Liberties-Civil Rights Liberalism, 1888-1989 344 6-5. Multivariate ARIMA Models of United States Supreme Court Civil Liberties Liberalism, 1888-1989 351 6-6. Summary of Research Findings With Regard to Individual Hypotheses of Civil Liberties-Civil Rights Liberalism 360 6-7. Univariate ARIMA Model of United States Supreme Court Judicial Power Liberalism, 1888-1989 361 6-8. Multivariate ARIMA Models of United States Supreme Court Judicial Power Liberalism, 1888-1989 365 6-9. Summary of Research Findings With Regard to Individual Hypotheses of Judicial Power Liberalism 369 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Page 3-1. Caseload of the United States Supreme Court, 1888-1989 107 3-2. Composition of the Agenda of the United States Supreme Court, 1888-1989 118 3-3. Composition of the Agenda of the United States Supreme Court, 1888-1989 123 3-4.
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