Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 49.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Environmental Net Benefits Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

49.0 ENVIRONMENTAL NET BENEFITS 1 As indicated in the PCA written evidence, Trans Mountain is committed to reviewing net benefit 2 ideas presented by the PCA as a result of the potential impacts of the proposed reactivation 3 activities in Jasper National Park. Activities that cannot be fully mitigated or areas restored in 4 accordance with the agreed to Management Objectives and Desired End Results will be 5 reviewed in the context of net benefit opportunities. One of the net benefits arising from 6 construction of the TMX Anchor Loop Project in Jasper National Park from 2006 to 2008 was 7 the automation of specific main line block valves on the legacy pipeline, which will occur as part 8 of the reactivation activities for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project. At the time, this was 9 considered to be a key benefit to PCA and would be realized should the TMEP proceed.

10 Furthermore, in Trans Mountain’s response to NEB IR No. 2.042 (Filing ID A3Z4T9), one of the 11 goals of the Project is to mitigate the loss of native biodiversity and integrity of ecosystems in 12 the regions of the four British Columbia provincial parks and one recreation area through which 13 the pipeline corridor would pass. The Project shall strive to produce a net benefit to native 14 biodiversity and ecological integrity in those regions. Trans Mountain proposes to identify and 15 undertake an offset project, or a suite of projects, in order to produce a measurable ecological 16 benefit of a comparable nature and extent, so as to result in no net loss of native biodiversity 17 and ecological integrity on a regional basis.

18 The BC parks and protected areas crossed by the proposed pipeline have established 19 management plans. Several of these parks have management plans that focus on recreational 20 enjoyment. As part of the NEB IR No. 3.037a (Filing ID A4H1V2) and as described in 21 Section 4.0 in Tab A, B, C and D of the Stage 2 Detailed Proposal submitted to BC Parks, 22 Ministry of Environment, Trans Mountain identified net benefits and offset opportunities within 23 the protected areas through its stakeholder engagement process which included park-specific 24 workshops, various stakeholder meetings and informal conversations.

25 Trans Mountain has further refined its response to NEB IR No. 3.037a (Filing ID A4H1V2) and 26 puts forward the following net benefit proposals and considerations for each of the protected 27 areas traversed, if the Stage 2 Detailed Proposal is approved contingent on Project approval 28 from the NEB.

49.1 Finn Creek Provincial Park 29 Participants of the Parks Workshop were asked to identify key ideas and prioritize benefits to 30 the park that they believed were the most important. Ideas that were considered to be high 31 priorities focused on helping BC Parks manage the use of the park which included:

32 · Restoration of the former rest area that is unused at the edge of Finn Creek to 33 a natural area; and

34 · Placing signage on the pipeline right-of-way to notify park users of appropriate 35 off-road vehicles of its use.

August 2015 Page 49-1 Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 49.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Environmental Net Benefits Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

1 Restoration of Decommissioned Rest Area

2 Value: $85,000

3 Participants at the Finn Creek Parks Workshop noted that the decommissioned rest area, which 4 is a currently an asphalt pad at the edge of Finn Creek has been misused by recreationalists, 5 and posed a public safety issue. Parks Workshop participants would like to see the area 6 reclaimed to a natural area. Trans Mountain supports this benefit and is committed to restoring 7 this area, thereby increasing the conservational value of the Park. Restoration efforts for this 8 area would include the removal of asphalt pad, revegetation of disturbed land including the use 9 of native seed, shrubs, and trees up to a value of $85,000.

10 Signage to Enhance Park Use

11 Value: $25,000

12 Stakeholders also requested the installation of signage to explain appropriate recreational uses 13 within the park. In cooperation with BC Parks, Trans Mountain will develop and install signage 14 (value up to $25,000) to help manage and educate the public on permitted off-road vehicle use 15 in the park and along the existing TMPL right-of-way to enhance appropriate recreational use of 16 the area.

49.2 North Thompson River Provincial Park 17 North Thompson River Provincial Park has multiple park values including conservation, 18 recreation, and cultural heritage. The park conserves the river riparian habitat as well as an 19 important example of the IDFmw2 subzone/variant that is only captured in 4% of the Province. 20 The park attracts visitors to its campground, riverside picnic areas, playground, and hiking trails 21 as well as protects the locally significant cultural heritage and archaeology sites.

22 · The benefit priorities identified by participants in the Parks Workshop for North 23 Thompson River Provincial Park included trail and park facility upgrades;

24 · Park education and enhancements;

25 · Invasive vegetation control or invasive species management programs; and

26 · Access road upgrades.

27 Trail and Park Facility Upgrades

28 Value: $250,000

29 Stakeholders requested upgrades to trails and infrastructure to enhance public use within the 30 park. North Thompson River Provincial Park encourages public use in all seasons, and 31 construction and reclamation of the Project will restrict the use of the right-of-way within the park 32 for a period of time. Trans Mountain has committed to enhancing the trails and/or providing 33 infrastructure upgrades, such as picnicking facilities, in the park, up to a value of $250,000. 34 Trans Mountain will work with BC Parks, First Nations, and other park users to identify ways to 35 enhance trails and facilities in the park.

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1 Park Education and Enhancements

2 Value: $50,000

3 Day users of North Thompson River Provincial Park frequently request First Nation information 4 and interpretative information within the park. Trans Mountain is committed to providing 5 opportunities and engaging in partnerships with Aboriginal groups with interests in the parks to 6 develop and install interpretive signage on First Nation history, traditional knowledge, and use of 7 the park area to generate interest and honor the Aboriginal history and culture in this area. 8 Information kiosks and interpretive programs would be designed in collaboration with First 9 Nations and BC Parks for a value up to $50,000.

10 Invasive Vegetation Control

11 Value: $50,000

12 Participants in the Parks Workshop for North Thompson River Provincial Park requested 13 support for invasive vegetation management programs within the park. Trans Mountain will 14 provide funding up to $50,000 for BC Parks to enter into possible partnerships with BC Ministry 15 of Transportation, local First Nations or other contractors in order to conduct an invasive species 16 survey and implement weed control in the park. Invasive species management will assist in 17 returning vegetation cover to a more natural state.

18 Park Access Road Upgrades

19 Value: $400,000

20 Trans Mountain, through the collaboration with BC Parks will upgrade and leave all roads used 21 to access the park during construction in a better condition than they were before construction, 22 for a value of up to $400,000. Access road upgrades will help improve public safety and facility 23 access.

49.3 Lac du Bois Grasslands Protected Area 24 The Lac du Bois Grasslands Protected Area fulfills a very important conservation role in 25 representing the Thompson Basin and Northern Thompson Uplands Ecosystems. The protected 26 area contains a notable diversity of grasslands and forest types, soils, and cultural uses.

27 Benefit priorities identified through multiple stakeholder meetings and workshops include:

28 · Reclamation of the Telus fibre optic right-of-way;

29 · Reclamation of protected area trial or areas damaged by off-road vehicles;

30 · Reduction of unauthorized off-road vehicles and mountain bike activity;

31 · Invasive vegetation survey and management; and

32 · Signage/promotion to enhance cultural and grassland awareness in the 33 protected area.

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1 As set out in Trans Mountain’s response to NEB IR No. 3037a (Filing ID A4H1V2), Trans 2 Mountain is proposing to use leading science and advance industry best practices to achieve 3 the best possible results in re-establishing grassland ecosystems that could potentially be 4 affected by the Project. Through the Environmental Stewardship Program, Trans Mountain will 5 seek opportunities and partnerships to expand knowledge in grassland reclamation science, 6 materials, and application techniques to restore grasslands affected by the Project’s 7 construction activities.

8 Reclamation of the Telus Fibre Optic Right-of-Way

9 Value: $900,000

10 Trans Mountain has committed to meet BC Park’s request to use native grass species with a 11 suitable genome for revegetation of the Project construction disturbances within Lac du Bois 12 Grasslands Protected Area. In addition, stakeholders have consistently requested the 13 restoration of the Telus Fibre Optic right-of-way with native grass seed. In an effort to meet the 14 request of BC Parks, Trans Mountain has engaged the local Tk’emlups te Secwépemc 15 community through the Tk’emlups Forestry Development Corporation (TFDC). In July 2014, the 16 TFDC collected native seed from native grasslands within the vicinity of Lac du Bois Grasslands 17 Protected Area. A large portion of the collected seed contained bluebunch wheatgrass and 18 other native species indigenous to the protected area. The collected seed has been cleaned, 19 native species were separated, and non-native invasive and agronomic species were removed. 20 Local native seed collection is being continued each season in an effort to collect adequate 21 quantities of viable native seed. Trans Mountain will continue to work with TFDC and Thompson 22 Rivers University to identify the most appropriate methods of acquiring and propagating local 23 native grass seed for reclamation.

24 In the event that local native grass seed collection and/or seed multiplication efforts do not meet 25 the seed mix (or native perennial cover crop) species volume requirements for the Project, then 26 commercially available native species seed, suitable for regional conditions, will be required to 27 supplement the seed mix.

28 Trans Mountain agreed that the nature and extent of the restoration of the Telus right-of-way 29 shall be determined in consultation with Telus and BC Parks and shall be up to a value of 30 $900,000.

31 Reclamation of Park Trails or Areas Damaged by Off-Road Vehicles

32 Value: $100,000

33 Stakeholders at the Lac du Bois Grasslands Protected Area Workshop identified opportunities 34 to restore areas damaged by off-road vehicles near the edge of the protected area boundary at 35 the off-road vehicle staging site. Trans Mountain will provide funding up to $100,000 for 36 contribution to a multi-stakeholder effort to restore the staging area or for trail restoration within 37 the protected area. This commitment will enhance the protected area’s ecosystem by focusing 38 off-road vehicle use to approved areas.

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1 Unauthorized Misuse of Park

2 Value: $75,000

3 The reduction of off-road vehicle and mountain bike use in unauthorized areas was identified by 4 stakeholders as a benefit to the Lac du Bois Protected Area. Trans Mountain will work with BC 5 Parks, ENGOs and park users to fund up to $75,000 for patrol and enforcement of existing 6 regulations in the protected area to reduce further damage.

7 Invasive Vegetation Survey and Management

8 Value: $75,000

9 Another priority that was identified by Lac du Bois stakeholders focused on invasive vegetation 10 control and invasive species management programs within the protected area. Trans Mountain 11 will provide up to $75,000 for BC Parks to enter into a partnerships with local First Nations or 12 other contractors to conduct an invasive vegetation survey and implementation of necessary 13 weed control programs in the protected area in locations outside the Trans Mountain Expansion 14 Project footprint. Invasive species control will assist in returning vegetation cover to a more 15 natural state.

16 Signage and Promotion of Park Conservation

17 Value: $45,000

18 Trans Mountain will prepare and install signage that explains the sensitivity of the Lac du Bois 19 Protected Area to promote compliance with off-road vehicle restrictions. Cultural and grassland 20 awareness materials could include signage, radio, print, or electronic promotion up to a value of 21 $45,000. Trans Mountain acknowledges the rich, diverse, and unique ecosystem of the Lac du 22 Bois Grasslands protected area and is committed to conservation as well as enhancement of 23 the recreational values of the protected area.

24 Status of BC Parks Net Benefits

25 Trans Mountain has identified potential offset projects using information from BC Parks, public 26 consultation, stakeholders, and Aboriginal engagement programs. Potential offset projects are 27 identified in the BC government boundary adjustment process. A Boundary Amendment 28 package was submitted to BC Parks in June 2015, which provided updates to the Traditional 29 Land Use information submitted to Trans Mountain and the NEB as well as an update to the net 30 benefit proposals as presented above. Should the park boundaries be amended and the project 31 proceed, BC Parks will work with Trans Mountain to finalize the offset/net benefit projects that 32 will be implemented to meet park management objectives and will provide oversight and any 33 authorizations necessary for project implementation.

34 Projects that are selected for the purpose of offsetting loss of native biodiversity and ecological 35 integrity in the regions of the four BC provincial parks and one recreational area will be 36 monitored following construction to assess whether targets have been met and performance 37 measures have been achieved. Once the offset projects have been selected, the management 38 system targets and performance measures will be evaluated and determined for each project 39 where such targets and measures are applicable. For the selected projects that are intended to

August 2015 Page 49-5 Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 49.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Environmental Net Benefits Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

1 offset loss of native biodiversity and ecological integrity, management system targets and 2 performance measures will be provided.

3 As presented in the response to NEB IR No. 3.036 (Filing ID A4H1V2) and in response to Metro 4 Vancouver’s written evidence (Filing ID A4L7Y3), community benefit agreements continue to be 5 executed. Some of these community benefit agreements will focus on sensitive ecosystems and 6 municipal parks while others will focus on environmental and socio-economic matters relevant 7 to their communities.

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50.0 POST-CONSTRUCTION MONITORING 1 Parks Canada recommends a condition (Filing ID A4L5U9) that relates to post-construction 2 monitoring through Management Objectives/Desired End Results (MO/DERs). In the past, these 3 MO/DERs have been related to the ecological integrity, commemorative integrity, and visitor 4 experience of Jasper National Park and preservation of the Yellowhead Pass National Historic 5 Site.

6 Trans Mountain has agreed to work with Parks Canada to develop a set of MO/DERs with 7 appropriate and applicable monitoring and performance criteria for the proposed reactivation 8 activities.

9 Parks Canada has recommended the following CPCN condition:

10 H. Trans Mountain shall file with Parks Canada for review and approval a 11 post-reactivation monitoring program that can conclusively (including 12 qualifications as appropriate) show (either directly or through reasonable 13 surrogates) that MO/DERs have been accomplished or not. Time frame for 14 showing this accomplishment is a function of the recovery time normally 15 anticipated or specific recovery time found to be necessary for each MO/DER 16 and associated ecological integrity and commemorative integrity component. 17 Until the MO/DER is shown to have been accomplished or on a trajectory to 18 being accomplished, on or before January 31st of each year, Trans Mountain 19 shall file with Parks Canada for review and approval a post-reactivation 20 monitoring report for each MO/DER that:

21 a. provides a general discussion of the effectiveness of the environmental 22 mitigation applied during or after reactivation;

23 b. identifies deviations from plans and alternative mitigation applied as approved 24 by Parks Canada;

25 c. identifies locations on a map or diagram where corrective action was taken 26 during or after reactivation and the current status of corrective actions; and

27 d. provides proposed measures and the schedule Trans Mountain shall 28 implement to address any unresolved concerns.

29 Trans Mountain supports this recommendation and believes it is consistent with the proposed 30 NEB Draft Condition No. 21 of the NEB’s letter Draft Conditions and Regulatory Oversight 31 (April 16, 2014) (NEB 2014; Filing ID A3V8Z8).

32 Metro Vancouver submitted evidence regarding environmental monitoring, prepared by Zoetica 33 Environmental Research Services (Filing ID A4L8C2). The City of New Westminster submitted 34 similar evidence (Filing ID A4Q0L5). The evidence suggests methodology for statistical analysis 35 of monitoring data collected, particularly in regard to before and after comparison.

36 Trans Mountain’s post-construction environmental monitoring (PCEM) program is considered to 37 be quantitative in some instances; however, no statistical power is used to assess pre- and 38 post-construction conditions. The goal for similarity between pre- and post-construction 39 conditions is considered to have been achieved when the environment has been assessed to be

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1 functionally comparable to pre-construction conditions or adjacent conditions off the 2 right-of-way, or if a community or disturbed area has achieved an early trajectory that will in time 3 resemble the pre-construction condition. That is, the long-term target of PCEM is to return the 4 disturbed portion of the construction footprint to a state where it can be used by the same 5 species or for the same purposes as were used in a similar manner prior to construction, with 6 operational considerations in mind. PCEM relies, in part, on conditions observed on the 7 right-of-way prior to construction, but also relies on comparison to adjacent off-right-of-way 8 conditions and the professional judgment of qualified environmental personnel to determine if an 9 effect is beyond the level predicted and requires further mitigation. Trans Mountain does not 10 agree with the view that extremely detailed data collection and statistical analyses would result 11 in greater environmental protection and reclamation. More data and knowledge of baseline 12 conditions or a particular species would not necessarily improve the understanding of the effect 13 pathways or Trans Mountain’s ability to mitigate Project effects.

14 Trans Mountain is not able to commit to performing statistical comparisons to meet a minimum 15 level of statistical power. The baseline data collected are intended to meet the requirements of 16 the NEB Filing Manual (NEB 2015) and to provide the necessary data to support the ESA. 17 Environmental inspection and monitoring will be undertaken during construction by qualified 18 personnel. In sensitive areas, environmental resource specialists will be onsite to help inform 19 the Environmental Inspector and monitor changes during construction. For example, during 20 instream construction at fish bearing watercourses, total suspended solids will be monitored to 21 compare to baseline data captured upstream of the crossing location. For wetlands, one 22 objective is to achieve an 80% - High Function Condition at the completion of the PCEM 23 program to be determined to have no net loss of function. Thresholds, standards, and targets 24 are generally set and driven by regulatory requirements, and through discussions and 25 agreements reached with the appropriate regulatory authorities.

26 All construction activities will be inspected and monitored in accordance with the EPPs. The 27 EPPs include contingency and management plans to address circumstances where 28 environmental conditions have changed, or were not originally anticipated. Any deviations or 29 changes to the mitigation measures set out in the EPPs will be recorded and captured in the 30 as-built reports that are submitted to the NEB. Trans Mountain has committed to a PCEM 31 program and is willing to work towards solutions on issues or concerns resulting from the 32 construction and operation of the pipeline until they are resolved. The methods proposed for the 33 PCEM program have been successfully used on many other large, complex pipeline projects 34 that encounter similar terrain and environmental features as the Project.

35 Trans Mountain will conduct the PCEM program during a period up to the first five complete 36 growing seasons (or during years one, three, and five) following commissioning of the Project or 37 as per CPCN conditions. The PCEM program will be initiated following completion of 38 construction and initial cleanup, in order to identify any unresolved issues upon the completion 39 of construction. The first PCEM report will be the environmental as-built report. Refer to 40 Volume 6A, Section 9.0 Post-construction Environmental Monitoring (Filing ID A3S2S1) for full 41 details regarding the PCEM program. A summary is provided below.

50.1 Physical Environment, Terrain, and Soils Assessment 42 A review of the Environmental Issues List will identify areas in which soil sampling or additional 43 assessment may be warranted to address reclamation concerns. Soil assessment, sampling, 44 and in situ soil testing can provide additional information to assess reclamation success related

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1 to the mixing of topsoil/root zone material and subsoil, topsoil/root zone material depth, erosion, 2 compaction, subsidence, rutting, contamination issues, stoniness, contour reclamation, and soil 3 structure.

4 The frequency and location of assessment and sample locations along the construction 5 right-of-way will be determined by the resource specialist.

6 Soil sampling frequency and location will be based on areas with evidence of reduced soil 7 productivity. If potentially contaminated soil is observed during the PCEM program, the location 8 will be recorded and recommendations will be made for soil (and potentially groundwater) from 9 the area to be sampled and analyzed to determine if further investigation is required and if so, it 10 will provide recommendations on how to proceed.

50.2 Vegetation Monitoring 11 Vegetation monitoring consists of a visual inspection by a resource specialist. The timing of 12 vegetation monitoring will generally be in the mid to late summer when the vegetation is mature 13 enough for accurate identification and evaluation. Particular attention will be given to areas of 14 terrain instability that may be prone to erosion. If warranted, detailed vegetation assessments 15 will be completed at sites where reclamation problems are identified in the Environmental Issues 16 List. Where warranted, rare plant, rare lichen, and/or rare ecological community monitoring will 17 be conducted by a rare plant specialist in the early and/or late summer (depending on the 18 species to be monitored) one full growing season after cleanup has been completed. For areas 19 that contained native vegetation prior to construction, reclamation will focus on the 20 establishment of an early successional trajectory of a native vegetation community.

21 For cultivated lands, landowners and farm operators will be engaged as needed to solicit 22 information regarding crop production. Vegetation on the construction right-of-way and in 23 reclaimed working areas will be visually assessed for crop growth. For hay and tame pasture 24 lands, ground cover of desirable species will be assessed by estimating the total percent of live 25 cover. The occurrence and type of undesirable species (i.e., weeds) will be assessed by 26 estimating the percent cover using the same method. The construction right-of-way will be 27 inspected for issues such as poor vegetation establishment or reduced crop growth. In forested 28 areas, vegetation on the construction right-of-way will be visually assessed for cover 29 establishment. In urban areas, vegetation will be monitored for the timely establishment of cover 30 that will reduce erosion and sedimentation, and protect against the infestation and spread of 31 invasive plant species and weeds.

32 For some treed areas (e.g., riparian areas, wetlands) where the natural regeneration of woody 33 vegetation along the construction right-of-way is the preferred option for revegetation, the 34 establishment of a vegetative cover compatible with the surrounding vegetation and land use 35 will be evaluated.

50.3 Old Growth Management Areas 36 A monitoring plan for windthrow will be implemented to document changes to newly created 37 edges in old growth management areas; OGMAs) and to identify where further mitigation 38 measures are required should windthrow levels exceed natural levels in consultation with 39 regulatory authorities. Surveying of edges (as part of construction and clearing plan 40 development) will highlight areas rated with moderate to high windthrow potential.

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1 Windthrow surveying will be completed by helicopter or on the ground. Monitoring will continue 2 each year until no major problems associated with the edges created are observed (up to 3 5 years of post-construction monitoring, depending on the level of windthrow incidence 4 observed during annual surveying) or as per CPCN conditions. Generally, areas with more than 5 15% windthrow are experiencing levels in excess of natural windthrow and may require 6 restoration.

7 OGMAs will be monitored during the vegetation monitoring program for invasive species where 8 they are crossed by the PPC.

50.4 Wetland Monitoring 9 The objectives of the wetlands monitoring component of the PCEM program are to gather 10 sufficient information to identify the status of the recovery of wetland function and to measure 11 the effectiveness of Trans Mountain’s wetland construction and reclamation mitigation.

12 The wetland-specific PCEM program entails revisiting all disturbed wetlands following 13 construction to document the progress of function (i.e., habitat, hydrological and 14 biogeochemical) returning to the wetland ecosystem. Ground-based surveys will be conducted 15 at all wetlands disturbed by construction. All wetlands will be surveyed to document wetland 16 recovery during the wetland monitoring component of the PCEM program.

17 Wetland functional conditions documented during pre-construction and wetland functional 18 conditions that were observed either adjacent to, or in close proximity to, the construction 19 right-of-way will be directly compared to wetland functional conditions observed along the 20 reclaimed construction right-of-way. The results of the PCEM program will be compiled in a 21 wetlands PCEM report as an appendix to the general PCEM program.

22 A qualified wetland specialist will conduct wetland monitoring. Wetland specialists view wetlands 23 as dynamic landscape systems (i.e., all variables are interrelated) and complete functional 24 assessments using best professional judgment.

25 Based on the findings during the PCEM program, recommendations for remedial measures will 26 be provided, if warranted, to promote the successful return of wetland function to the baseline 27 conditions as quickly as practical and within the duration of the PCEM program.

50.5 Watercourse Monitoring 28 Watercourse monitoring, as part of the PCEM program, will be carried out by a specialist with 29 experience completing post-construction monitoring. The objective of the watercourse 30 monitoring is to gather sufficient information to document the status of the watercourse 31 reclamation and the function of the reclaimed habitat.

32 Monitoring at fish-bearing watercourses will confirm that instream habitat that was reclaimed 33 remains functional. Fish-bearing watercourses, where an authorization by DFO was necessary, 34 may be subject to specific monitoring conditions and/or timing requirements for monitoring. 35 DFO-prescribed monitoring will be carried out in conjunction with the PCEM program and will 36 ensure that both programs are satisfied.

37 Based on the findings at any stage of the PCEM program, recommendations for remedial 38 measures will be provided, if warranted, at any watercourse, to ensure that the overall objective

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1 or reclaiming the watercourse to pre-construction conditions can be achieved. Fish-bearing 2 watercourses crossed will be revisited during years one to five following construction or as per 3 CPCN conditions. PCEM reporting will take place in years one, three, and five.

50.6 Wildlife and Wildlife Habitat Monitoring 4 The objective of the wildlife and wildlife habitat monitoring component of the PCEM program is 5 to collect sufficient information to determine the effectiveness of mitigation, identify need for 6 adaptive measures, and detect changes in wildlife and wildlife habitat resulting from the Project. 7 The wildlife and wildlife habitat monitoring will use baseline data, collected prior to construction, 8 as a basis for comparison of construction and post-construction monitoring data. 9 Post-construction monitoring will be conducted at intervals over a 5-year period (e.g., years one, 10 three, and five following completion of reclamation). Monitoring will be completed by qualified 11 biologists.

12 Wildlife monitoring will be designed to detect changes in wildlife habitat, wildlife presence and, 13 where feasible, relative abundance compared to pre-construction conditions. An adaptive 14 management component will be included in the wildlife post-construction monitoring program, 15 whereby results of the wildlife monitoring will be used to determine the need for further 16 monitoring, and the need for and nature of remedial measures to address identified issues. For 17 example, remedial measures may include additional seedling planting at locations that are not 18 demonstrating adequate natural regeneration to alleviate effects on sensitive species in a timely 19 manner and/or installing additional access control and/or signage to discourage human access 20 if there is evidence of new access on site-specific segments of the right-of-way.

50.7 Noise Monitoring 21 The objective of the noise PCEM program is to evaluate operational noise levels at select pump 22 stations and terminals where predicted noise levels are approaching provincial regulatory 23 guidelines. The noise monitoring will be conducted by a noise specialist within 1 year of the 24 commencement of operation of the Project or as per CPCN conditions. Noise monitoring will be 25 designed to demonstrate compliance with provincial regulatory guidelines.

26 The PCEM program for noise will document the following items:

27 · noise during operations at each site where predicted noise levels are 28 approaching thresholds (based on the AER Directive 038 Noise Control [ERCB 29 2007], British Columbia Noise Control Best Practices Guideline [B.C. 30 OGC 2009] and the results of the Terrestrial Noise and Vibration Technical 31 Report [Volume 5C, Filing IDs A3S1T7, A3S1T8, and A3S1T9]). Specifically, 32 noise monitoring programs will be implemented at Burnaby Terminal, 33 Westridge Marine Terminal, and Sumas Terminal. At the Westridge Marine 34 Terminal, the noise monitoring program will be implemented at a time when 35 tankers will be involved in operations; and

36 · additional mitigation, if necessary.

50.8 Water Well Monitoring 37 PCEM of well water quality will take place when requested by landowners who note changes to 38 well quality or quantity. Specifically, the water well testing program will document water quality

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1 after construction to assess if a measurable adverse effect has occurred that can be related to 2 activities associated with the Project. Water quality and quantity will be measured, including flow 3 rates, total and dissolved metals, iron related bacteria, sulphur related bacteria and other water 4 quality parameters.

5 All water quality parameters collected will be compared to pre-construction monitoring results 6 and the Guidelines for Canadian Drinking Water Quality (Health Canada 2014). The PCEM 7 program will determine if well samples exceed any maximum acceptable concentration levels 8 (e.g., total coliform, E. coli bacteria, fluoride, or nitrate) and if water quality and quantity are 9 comparable to pre-construction parameters.

50.9 Documentation and Reporting 10 The results of the PCEM program will be submitted to the NEB after each year of monitoring. 11 The PCEM report will be prepared as per Guide AA.2 (PCEM reports) of the NEB Filing Manual 12 (NEB 2015). Wetlands and wildlife results will be submitted as detailed appendices to the 13 overall PCEM report. The first-year PCEM report will also include the environmental as-built 14 report. PCEM reporting will include:

15 · a discussion of the effectiveness of mitigation and reclamation;

16 · the development and implementation of alternative measures to accomplish the 17 reclamation where the initial measures were not successful; and

18 · the identification and documentation of all outstanding environmental issues 19 along with, where warranted, the plans and a schedule for resolution.

20 The PCEM program will document post-construction environmental issues identified for the 21 Project. Issues that have been successfully mitigated will be listed as resolved. The program will 22 also identify any locations with unresolved environmental issues and the remedial measures 23 planned by Trans Mountain to resolve these issues.

24 In the event that construction-related issues persist past 5 years of monitoring, PCEM will 25 continue until remediation measures are considered to be effective and issues are resolved.

50.10 Socio-Economic Effects Monitoring Framework 26 As noted in the Socio-Economic Management Plan (Appendix C of Volume 6B of the 27 Application; Filing ID A3S2S3), Trans Mountain will develop and implement an issues tracking 28 process to monitor and respond to Project-related socio-economic issues and opportunities that 29 emerge during construction and reclamation. As suggested in NEB Draft Condition 11, as 30 outlined in the NEB’s letter - Draft Conditions and Regulatory Oversight (April 16, 2014) (NEB 31 2014), this will be called a Socio-Economic Effects Monitoring Program.

32 As part of its ongoing consultation program, Trans Mountain will consult with key stakeholders 33 (e.g., governments, local/regional service providers, Aboriginal communities, municipalities) 34 regarding the socio-economic effects monitoring framework, indicators to be monitored, 35 methods of reporting, and the level of local/regional interest in participating in socio-economic 36 effects monitoring. The monitoring framework and process will then be finalized and shared 37 publically.

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50.11 References 1 British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission (B.C. OGC). 2009. British Columbia Noise Control 2 Best Practices Guideline. March 2009. https://www.bcogc.ca/node/8152/download

3 Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB). 2007. Directive 038: Noise Control. Calgary, 4 Alberta. February 16, 2007. http://www.aer.ca/documents/directives/Directive038.pdf

5 Health Canada. 2014. Guidelines for Canadian Drinking Water Quality-Summary Table. 6 Prepared by the Federal-Provincial Territorial Committee on Drinking Water of the 7 Federal-Provincial-Territorial Committee on Health and the Environment. Water and Air 8 Quality Bureau, Healthy Environments and Consumer Safety Branch. Ottawa, Ontario. 9 October 2014. 10 http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ewh-semt/alt_formats/pdf/pubs/water-eau/sum_guide-res_recom/ 11 sum_guide-res_recom-eng.pdf

12 National Energy Board (NEB). 2015. Filing Manual. Inclusive of Release 2015-01. June 2015. 13 Calgary, Alberta. https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/bts/ctrg/gnnb/flngmnl/flngmnl-eng.pdf

14 National Energy Board (NEB). 2014. Draft Conditions and Regulatory Oversight. Calgary, 15 Alberta. April 16, 2014. https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/LL- 16 ENG/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90464/90552/548311/956726/2392873/2449981/2450980/A19 17 -1_-_Letter_-_Draft_conditions_and_regulatory_oversight_- 18 _A3V8Z8.pdf?nodeid=2449895&vernum=-2

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51.0 ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 1 The Board of the Friends of Ecological Reserves (FER) submitted written evidence regarding 2 environmental monitoring (Filing ID A4Q2T7) and suggested several conditions. The first 3 suggested condition (Condition 1) is that Trans Mountain establishes a Marine Environmental 4 Research and Monitoring Endowment Fund (MERMEF) of $450,000,000. The endowment fund 5 would support independent science-based information collection through a program called the 6 Marine Research and Environmental Monitoring Program (MREMP). The endowment fund 7 would be permanent and directed to conduct, maintain, and extend monitoring, research, and 8 shore zone species inventory information for as long as oil is being transported in the Salish 9 Sea and Juan de Fuca Strait. Additional conditions suggested by FER relate to the 10 establishment of the MERMEF, the scope and management of the MREMP, and the 11 dissemination of information collected as part of the MREMP (Conditions 2, 3, 4, and 5).

12 The basis for FER’s suggested conditions is that FER contends Trans Mountain has not 13 collected adequate marine environmental data in the vicinity of the international shipping lanes 14 and has not accurately predicted effects from Project-related marine transportation. This is 15 incorrect. Trans Mountain conducted the marine transportation effects assessment based on 16 up-to-date research and does not believe that additional data collection would affect the 17 conclusions presented in the Application. Trans Mountain believes the Application, including the 18 effects assessment, is complete, meets the NEB’s requirements, and adheres to the standards 19 of industry best practice.

20 As discussed in Volume 8A of the Application (Filing ID A3S4Y3), vessel traffic associated with 21 the Project would represent a relatively small proportion of total vessel traffic along the marine 22 shipping lanes. To date, Trans Mountain has contributed to a number of collaborative initiatives 23 that involve the collection of marine environmental data within the marine RSA. These 24 contributions are detailed below.

25 · Trans Mountain has provided support for Environment Canada to expand on the agency’s 26 existing program of collecting marine bird data from operating vessels.

27 · Trans Mountain has sponsored a study by Bird Studies Canada (BSC) to map bird 28 populations in the Burrard Inlet area in 2015. Trans Mountain donated $27,000 to BSC and 29 PMV matched the donation to enable the study to occur. The study will quantify and map 30 seasonal bird populations by depicting distribution and abundance for individual species and 31 guilds. BSC will be making the maps publicly available and writing summary accounts so 32 that local stakeholders (industry, government, and environmental organizations) can use the 33 information in planning for the appropriate conservation and protection of marine birds as 34 Burrard Inlet continues to develop.

35 · Trans Mountain has entered into a funding agreement with Vancouver Fraser Port Authority, 36 wherein Trans Mountain has agreed to contribute $1.6 million to PMV’s Enhancing 37 Cetacean Habitat and Observation (ECHO) Program, which seeks to better understand and 38 manage potential effects on cetaceans (i.e., whales, porpoises, and dolphins) resulting from 39 commercial vessel activities throughout the southern coast of BC. Through the ECHO 40 Program, PMV will work in collaboration with government agencies, First Nations, marine 41 industry users, non-government organizations, and scientific experts to examine threats to 42 at-risk cetaceans in the region. Under the umbrella of the ECHO Program, a series of 43 individual short-term projects, scientific studies, and education initiatives are being

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1 considered, including projects that would involve visual and acoustic monitoring of 2 cetaceans within the marine RSA. For more information on the PMV ECHO Program, please 3 refer to Section 54 (Marine Mammals) of this Reply Evidence.

4 In addition to the above commitments, Trans Mountain will continue to identify, select, and 5 evaluate potential marine environmental monitoring initiatives that align with priority areas of 6 Trans Mountain’s Environmental Stewardship Program (refer to NEB IR No. 3.036a – 7 Attachment 1, Filing ID A4H1X7). Given the monitoring commitments that Trans Mountain has 8 made to date, and considering the Project’s relatively small contribution to regional vessel 9 traffic, Trans Mountain does not believe that the conditions recommended by FER are 10 appropriate or required, and the NEB should not impose them.

11 Section 4.4 of the written evidence submitted by Metro Vancouver suggests that inadequate 12 information was gathered for certain areas along the PPC and the various pipeline corridor 13 alternatives considered. Volumes 5A and 5B, Sections 7.0 (Filing IDs A3S1Q9 and A3S1S7) 14 provide the potential effects, the proposed mitigation to manage the effects, and any residual 15 effects resulting once the mitigation has been applied. The mitigation measures that are applied 16 to reduce or eliminate potential residual effects are included in the Project-specific EPPs. Trans 17 Mountain has presented the appropriate level of data necessary to adequately assess the 18 environmental and socio-economic effects. The natural environments identified in Zoetica 19 (2015) were previously noted by Trans Mountain. In areas where surveys were unable to be 20 completed along the Project footprint, and known occurrences or where wildlife or fisheries 21 timing windows for construction need to be defined, Trans Mountain will undertake this work 22 before construction and employ the appropriate mitigation measures set out in the EPPs. In the 23 event that surveys cannot be completed before construction, the appropriate management and 24 contingency plans will be implemented.

25 Baseline information for each of the elements is captured in the various technical supporting 26 reports provided in Volumes 5C and 5D of the Application. Additional data and field information 27 has been and will continue to be gathered in 2014 and 2015, and will also be used to establish 28 baseline conditions before construction.

29 The effectiveness of these mitigation measures have been demonstrated and learned through 30 the construction of thousands of kilometres of pipeline in Canada and the establishment of 31 regulatory requirements, best practices, and the results of numerous post-construction 32 monitoring reports completed for NEB-regulated pipelines. Volume 6A of the Application 33 outlines the approach to evaluating the effectiveness of these mitigation measures through 34 environmental compliance and Trans Mountain’s approach to PCEM (Filing ID A3S2S1). The 35 goal of the inspection, monitoring, follow-up, and operation is further described in the NEB Filing 36 Manual. An Environmental Compliance Plan for the Project will be developed before 37 construction.

38 Examples of successful implementation of mitigation measures are presented in the Application 39 and referenced in both the ESA in Volumes 5A and 5B, and the supporting technical reports in 40 Volumes 5C and 5D. For example, mitigation measures that are presented for watercourse 41 crossings are also noted in the “Pipeline Associated Watercourse Crossings, 4th Edition,” an 42 industry accepted best practice approach to pipeline crossings, which has been endorsed by 43 provincial governments and the DFO. There are numerous PCEM reports that have been filed 44 by pipeline companies with the NEB that further demonstrate the successful implementation of 45 mitigation measures, including the Trans Mountain Anchor Loop project.

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1 Volume 6A, Section 8.2 of the Application (Filing ID A3S2S1) addresses the approach to 2 Environmental Commitment Tracking and addresses the development of the Environmental 3 As-Built Report. Trans Mountain is committed to a PCEM program as described in Volume 6A, 4 Section 9.0 of the Application and Section 24 of this Reply Evidence. The action thresholds will 5 vary depending on the issue and elements being considered. The PCEM program will help 6 identify the cause of the issue and relate it to other environments of a similar nature along the 7 PPC. Trans Mountain is committed to working with First Nations, government agencies, 8 landowners, and other stakeholders to identify and address environmental issues along the 9 PPC until they are resolved.

10 The criteria for success for PCEM can be found in Volume 6A, Section 9.3 (Filing ID A3S2S1).

11 Trans Mountain uses third-party environmental consultants to undertake the environmental 12 assessments. These consultants include qualified resource specialists in their field including, 13 but not limited to, professional biologists, archaeologists, botanists, ecologists, agrologists, etc. 14 who all must adhere to the requirements of practice in their field of expertise as obligated by 15 membership in professional organizations and permits required to collect this information. Many 16 of these resource specialists are recognized experts in their field and conduct work for a 17 combination of Aboriginal groups, environmental non-government organizations, government, 18 and industry.

19 Pre-construction environmental information that will be used as a benchmark can be found in 20 Volume 5C: Biophysical Technical Reports (Filing ID A3S1T2). Each technical report contains 21 baseline information collected that can be used, if needed, to determine the pre-construction 22 environmental state.

23 Table F-IR 2.06.1c-1 in the ALIB follow-up IR response (Filing ID A4K9Y9) outlines the 24 elements to be investigated during PCEM, and the parameters and targets associated with 25 those elements. Items listed in the parameter column are types of data that would be collected 26 after construction to determine if effects are similar to predicted effects and whether mitigation 27 has been effective. However, not all parameters will be measured at all areas along the right-of- 28 way. The level of detail of PCEM at any location will be determined by the sensitivity of the area, 29 the results of any ground visits and helicopter overflights, the results of environmental as-built 30 reports, and any concerns received from landowners or land administrators. High sensitivity 31 areas including, but not limited to, major fish bearing watercourses, locations with known 32 species at risk, urban areas, parks, and protected areas will undergo a higher level of PCEM.

33 Although quantitative targets are not feasible for some parameters, qualitative assessments of 34 the environment after construction and reclamation can provide useful information about 35 whether the effects are at or below predicted levels, including effects to traditional and cultural 36 resources and lands.

37 Data collected for all biophysical disciplines (e.g., wetland habitat and hydrological function 38 data, watercourse crossing measurements) and photographs of sensitive areas will be used as 39 an indication of the baseline state of the environment during the PCEM program. However, 40 areas disturbed by the construction of the Project will not necessarily be monitored until they are 41 identical to pre-construction conditions. Rather, they will be monitored until a satisfactory 42 trajectory is established, and environmental issues such as sedimentation and weeds have 43 been resolved, within the confines of operational requirements (refer to the response to ALIB IR 44 No. 2.06.6e [Filing ID A4H7X5] for more information). More detailed information about the state

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1 of the environment before construction would not necessarily improve the post-construction 2 monitoring program or reclamation practices.

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52.0 MARINE SPILL MODELLING 52.1 Introduction 1 This section of Reply Evidence addresses intervenor evidence concerning the approach taken 2 by Trans Mountain for marine spill modelling, including Environment Canada (Filing ID A4L8Y6) 3 and reply to IRs from Tsawout to Environment Canada, (Filing ID A71604), Dr. David Farmer 4 (Filing ID A4L6R8), the City of Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7V8), Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing IDs 5 A4L5Z2 to A4L6C4), and Metro Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7Y3). Trans Mountain has also 6 responded separately and in detail to specific third-party reports which address this topic:

7 · Levelton Consultants, Inc. (Levelton): “Air Quality Impacts from Simulated Oil 8 Spills in Burrard Inlet and English Bay,” submitted by the City of Vancouver, 9 Tsleil-Waututh Nation, and Metro Vancouver (Filing ID A4L6C4);

10 · Genwest Systems Inc. (Genwest): “Oil Spill Trajectory Modeling Report in 11 Burrard Inlet for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project,” submitted by the City 12 of Vancouver, Tsleil-Waututh Nation, and Metro Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7Y7); 13 and

14 · Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC: “Technical Analysis of Oil Spill 15 Response Capabilities Report” (Filing ID A4L7Y6).

16 This section should be read in conjunction with Section 25 (Fate and Behaviour of Oil) and 17 Section 60 (Marine Risk Assessment).

52.2 Identification of Credible Worst-Case Oil Spill Scenario and Spill Scenario Locations 18 Evidence submitted by several intervenors, such as the Genwest (Filing ID A4L7Y7) and 19 Levelton (Filing ID A4L6C4) reports, has indicated concern about the CWC oil spill scenarios 20 used by Trans Mountain in various marine oil spill studies. The concern was on the choice of the 21 location and the spilled volume. These concerns are addressed in Sections 52.2.1 and 52.2.2 of 22 this section of the Reply Evidence.

52.2.1 Credible Worst-Case Oil Spill 23 The process used by Trans Mountain to identify and assess potential effects at representative 24 and credible spill scenarios is explained in this subsection to provide background information for 25 the discussion of the modelling approach that follows.

26 In 2013, the NEB issued “Filing Requirements Related to the Potential Environmental and 27 Socio-economic Effects of Increased Marine Shipping Activities, Trans Mountain Expansion 28 Project” (Filing ID A3K9I2). These Filing Requirements specified that (emphasis added):

29 “The assessment of accidents and malfunctions related to the increase in marine 30 shipping activities must include an assessment of potential accidents at the 31 Terminal and at representative locations along the marine shipping routes. 32 Selection of locations should be risk informed considering both probability and 33 consequence.” The NEB also requires that the assessment must include a 34 description of “credible worst case spill scenarios and smaller spill scenarios.”

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1 As explained in TERMPOL 3.15, Section 9.15 (Filing ID A3S5F6), the definition of a CWCS is 2 not provided in the TERMPOL Review Process 2001 Guidelines (TRP 743), but is determined 3 by the risk assessor and then evaluated by the TERMPOL Review Committee (TRC). DNV 4 recommends that a CWCS should be defined as representing a very low likelihood scenario 5 which would have a significant impact.

6 There is no precedent of complete loss of all cargo from a double hull tanker. The Monte Carlo 7 simulations of tanker damage carried out by DNV on a representative double hull Aframax 8 tanker did not produce a single case of complete loss of all oil cargo. The 90% highest volume 9 was 16,500 m3, which corresponds to the low probability 90th percentile size loss of cargo oil 10 resulting from a collision (refer to Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.15, Figures 34 and 35, Filing 11 ID A3S5F6). The 90th percentile size loss of cargo oil resulting from a grounding is less.

12 The volume of oil spilled during an accident is directly related to the severity of the incident and 13 the type and extent of damage caused. Therefore, the probability of a very large oil volume to 14 be released during a tanker incident must be assessed, in the first place, based upon the 15 probability of the selected location being capable of hosting such a severe incident.

52.2.1.1 Vancouver Harbour Oil Spill 16 DNV did not consider 16,500 m3 spill volume as a CWC oil spill scenario in Vancouver Harbour 17 as realistic and relevant for the risk analysis study. The CWC oil spill volume for an oil spill 18 within Vancouver Harbour area was determined by DNV as 103 m3, based upon a credible oil 19 spill scenario during cargo transfer whereby there is complete break of one of three loading 20 arms.

21 Following an IR from PMV (Trans Mountain Response to PMV IR No. 1.8, Filing ID A3X6V4), 22 DNV made a more detailed assessment of the collision risk in Vancouver Harbour area based 23 on energy levels of the traffic in the area. In studies for the Dutch Department of Transport, DNV 24 has established energy thresholds for breaking the cargo tank of a tank vessel. The energy to 25 make a small hole is 9 MJ while the energy to make a large hole is 18.7 MJ, given that the 26 collision is 90 degrees on the tanker vessel. DNV conducted a detailed analysis of the traffic in 27 Segment 2 and calculated the energy of all vessel transits in the segment over one year, based 28 on the vessels’ deadweight tonnage and the speed restrictions in the area.

29 The detailed analysis (Filing ID A3X6V4) shows that 73% of the vessel transits in this area are 30 so small that they will not cause any breakage of the cargo tank in case of a collision, while 2% 31 of the vessel transits can cause a small hole in the case of a collision 90 degrees on the tanker. 32 The remaining 25% of vessels transits in Vancouver Harbour area are vessels that have the 33 energy to exceed 18.7 MJ and make a large hole in the cargo tank. However, these vessels are 34 over 51,000 deadweight (DWT) with an average length of approximately 200 m. Because such 35 large vessels are under pilotage and must follow the rules of the harbour, these vessels cannot 36 approach a laden tanker moving through the harbour from the Westridge Terminal to sea.

37 As such, DNV’s detailed analysis shows that the large majority of the collisions will not have the 38 energy to break the cargo hull, and that only small hole sizes are possible in the case of 39 breakage of a cargo tank. Thus, in the rare event of a collision that might cause an oil spill, only 40 potential smaller oil spills than the estimated CWC size spill will occur. As well, the detailed 41 analysis shows that the probability for a collision causing an oil spill of any size is 1 in 19,286 42 years. By this measure, a CWC volume outflow (16,500 m3) would be a 1 in 190,286 year event.

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52.2.2 Marine Oil Spill Scenario Locations 1 Spill modelling was carried out at several locations between Westridge Marine Terminal and 2 Buoy J AIS data of regional marine traffic was used to develop a picture of the marine network 3 of the study area. It was observed through that process that, within the study area, there are a 4 number of marine traffic network focal points where traffic lanes meet, cross, or make sharp 5 direction changes therefore requiring heightened navigational focus. As an oil spill from a tanker 6 would necessarily be caused as a result of a collision or grounding, each of the eight key 7 network focal points was reviewed for possible risk of oil spill due to accidents, and five 8 locations were selected for spill modelling, including one at Westridge Marine Terminal.

9 It should be noted that the inclusion of Project tankers to the marine network only marginally 10 increases the probability of an oil spill in the region when compared with the existing probability. 11 Thus, current marine traffic patterns are valid for evaluating regions of elevated collision 12 probability.

13 The selection of scenarios for oil spill modelling considered information from the quantitative risk 14 assessment (TERMPOL 3.15, Table 18, Filing ID A3S5F6). Both probability and consequence 15 of oil spill were evaluated in order to arrive at a final list of locations for spill modelling. Some of 16 the considerations were as follows.

17 a) Likelihood of an oil spill occurring in any one of the route sections, and in 18 consideration of existing and future measures to reduce navigation 19 issues, chances of grounding, etc.

20 b) Possible size of oil spill that could occur at the location as a result of an 21 incident given the types of vessels encountered at the location by the 22 tanker, the speed of the vessels involved, room available for the vessels 23 to maneuver in order to reduce striking impact, etc.

24 c) Ability of the oil spill to spread over a large area.

25 d) Extent to which oil could impact shorelines.

26 e) Biological values at risk from an oil spill at the location. For this purpose, 27 a heat map was developed that aggregated several biological attributes 28 from government websites (Filing ID A4H6F4).

29 f) Socio-economic values at risk from an oil spill at the location. A similar 30 map as in item e. was used for this purpose (Filing ID A4H6F4).

31 g) Ensure sufficient locations are selected to provide oil spill fate and 32 behaviour information that would be representative of all sections of the 33 shipping route from Westridge Marine Terminal to Buoy J.

34 h) Ability to use the results of spill modelling in determining future oil spill 35 response needs.

36 Sites E, F, and G are in close alignment with areas of higher biological and socio-economic 37 attributes; that is, these locations are in the midst of regions that are characterized by many 38 overlapping types of biological or socio-economic resources. Spills at Site D have an 39 opportunity to affect both the eastern side of the Gulf Islands as well as Roberts and Sturgeon

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1 Banks. Initial oil spill modelling stochastic results showed that oil spills at other sites would also 2 impact areas with a number of biological and socio-economic attributes, thus validating that the 3 consequences of an oil spill were being adequately considered in the site selection process.

4 Finally, oil spill simulations were carried out at the five selected locations: Westridge Terminal 5 plus four locations along the tanker route (please refer to TERMPOL 3.15, Figure 39, Filing 6 ID A3S5F6). Location A (Westridge Marine Terminal) was modelled based on an oil spill 7 occurring during cargo transfer. As noted in Section 73.4, the credible oil spill volume for Site A 8 was determined by DNV as 103 m3, based upon a credible oil spill scenario during cargo 9 transfer whereby there is complete break of one of three loading arms. For sites D, E, G, and H, 10 credible oil spill volume was assumed as 16,500 m3 due to a vessel grounding or collision.

11 Locations B, C, and F were not modelled for the following reasons.

12 · Site B near the western entrance to English Bay was not modelled because of the very low 13 probability of a viable navigation incident at this location leading to a tanker oil spill, due to 14 the low speed of the tanker and other vessels while moving through this area.

15 · Site C in the Strait of Georgia near routes to and from the North Arm of the Fraser River was 16 not modelled because the traffic here is mainly barge traffic, and there is low probability of a 17 viable navigation incident given the available sea room to either evade or reduce impact. 18 Also, Site D (also in Strait of Georgia) was deemed more appropriate and representative of 19 the Strait of Georgia.

20 · Site F at the pilot boarding point off Victoria was not modelled because Site G was being 21 modelled due to higher environmental values at that location (Race Rocks). A spill modelled 22 at either of these locations would be representative.

23 Based on this selection of scenarios, the Preliminary Quantitative Ecological Risk Assessment 24 (Volume 8B, Filing ID A56022) was able to draw estimates of varying consequences such as 25 the resulting levels of shoreline oiling and recovery times for key ecological components that 26 were resolved both spatially (spill source location) and temporally (seasonality). Because of the 27 large area that a spill can cover, the credible site selection process that was used caused the 28 distinction between spills at one location versus another to be is largely obliterated. Analyses of 29 spills at additional locations would not significantly alter the findings of the Quantitative 30 Ecological Risk Assessment. Evaluation of potential effects at other less credible sites would not 31 have changed assessment conclusions, or identified the need for additional preparedness and 32 response planning measures.

52.3 Framework 33 Several intervenors have expressed concerns regarding the modelling framework 34 (hydrodynamic model, wave model, oil spill model, and air dispersion model) used in the TMEP 35 marine spill modelling. Among others:

36 · The Genwest (Filing ID A4L7Y7) and Levelton (Filing ID A4L6C4) reports used 37 a 2D depth-averaged hydrodynamic model (the oil spill model GNOME 38 [General NOAA Operational Modeling Environment]) but no wave model;

39 · Dr. Farmer’s evidence (Filing ID A4L6R8) asked about the tidal front presence 40 in Haro Strait; and

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1 · Environment Canada (Filing ID A4L8Y6) requested additional model validation.

2 For context in responding to intervenor evidence on marine spill modelling, this section 3 describes the framework that was used to simulate the behaviour and fate of hypothetical 4 marine spills for the TMEP Application. A three-dimensional (3D) hydrodynamic model (H3D) 5 and a wave model (SWAN) provided surface currents and wave data, respectively, to an oil spill 6 trajectory and weathering model, SPILLCALC. The evaporative fluxes provided by the oil spill 7 model were used as inputs for the air dispersion model CALPUFF.

8 I. H3D, the hydrodynamic model, ran independently in stochastic mode, generating files of 9 surface currents for SPILLCALC. In deterministic mode, SPILLCALC was embedded in H3D 10 as a subroutine, so that the flux of soluble constituents into the water column, i.e., dissolved 11 hydrocarbons, could be simulated.

12 II. SWAN, the wave model, ran independent of the other models, but used the same spatially 13 and temporally-varying wind input as the hydrodynamic, oil spill, and air dispersion models. 14 It generated maps of wave parameters (height and period) for use by the oil spill model, 15 SPILLCALC.

16 III. The oil spill model SPILLCALC ran independently of the other models in stochastic mode, 17 but used the same wind data as the other models, and obtained wave data and current data 18 from prior runs of H3D and SWAN. In deterministic mode, SPILLCALC was a subroutine to 19 H3D.

20 IV. The air dispersion model, CALPUFF, ran independently of the other models, but obtained its 21 evaporative flux from the deterministic H3D run, which included an embedded SPILLCALC.

22 V. Over most of the Salish Sea, simple spatial interpolation from a network of coastal stations 23 and buoys was felt to be adequate to describe surface winds for the hydrodynamic, wave, 24 and spill modelling. For Burrard Inlet and the Fraser River, CALMET was used to generate 25 wind fields from observed data, because of the large degree of spatial variability in terrain. 26 Because CALPUFF utilizes the 3D description of the wind field, winds for air dispersion 27 calculations were modelled by a companion wind model, CALMET, before use in CALPUFF.

28 The major factor in model selection was the criterion of providing realistic simulations of currents 29 in the Salish Sea. The hydrodynamic model, H3D, has been successfully used for several 30 studies for government and industry in these waters and other coastal regions, so was an 31 obvious choice. The model is 3D, essential for simulating currents in an estuarine system, as 32 well as essential for simulating wind-driven currents. Although descriptions of H3D have not 33 appeared recently in peer-reviewed journals, the same model has been used very successfully 34 in studies of the Gulf of St. Lawrence by scientists at the Institut Maurice Lamontagne in 35 Québec (Saucier and Chassée 2000). It has been used, and is likely still in use in the Gulf, for 36 search and rescue, providing daily forecasts of currents, coupling with ice models of the Gulf, 37 and for climate research.

38 Once the hydrodynamic model was selected, several different oil spill models could be selected. 39 The oil spill model SPILLCALC was selected for the following reasons:

40 I. The need to address the specific properties of dilbit was anticipated. The ability to modify 41 the source code was an important consideration, especially because of the manner in which 42 the effects of molecular diffusion on evaporation are significant, and were incorporated into

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1 SPILLCALC. This procedure was described in a peer-reviewed paper for Environment 2 Canada’s (Arctic and Marine Oilspill Program [AMOP]) Conference 2014 (Stronach and 3 Hospital 2014). As well, shoreline properties data that Coastal & Ocean Resources prepared 4 could be integrated into the overall model framework, these procedures having been 5 previously developed for the Vancouver Airport Fuel Facility project.

6 II. Wave data could be imported from SWAN, an appropriate model for waves in the Salish 7 Sea. This is a benefit because dispersion into the water column depends on wave heights 8 but is usually parameterised as depending on winds in commercial spill models, which is 9 inappropriate for the relatively short fetches and storm durations characterizing the Salish 10 Sea.

11 III. The regulatory-approved CALPUFF for modelling air dispersion could readily be integrated 12 into the overall system. The integration is implemented as a one-way flow of information, 13 SPILLCALC providing spatially-resolved evaporative flux of each of the 14 17 pseudo-components as input data files to CALPUFF.

15 IV. It should be noted that, even though the oil spill model SPILLCALC is proprietary, its 16 equations for advection and weathering are presented in the Application and in several 17 peer-reviewed published papers.

52.3.1 Three-Dimensional Hydrodynamic Model, H3D 18 Although the dominant currents affecting an oil spill are the surface currents, the best way to 19 model realistic surface currents is to use a full 3D model. In this way, processes such as wind 20 stress, river plumes, and large-scale estuarine circulation are correctly included in the 21 calculation of surface currents. Surface currents for the oil spill simulations were hindcast using 22 a proprietary 3D hydrodynamic model, H3D. This model is derived from GF8, a baroclinic 3D 23 numerical model originally developed for the Georgia Fuca system (Stronach et al. 1993) 24 developed for DFO. H3D has been used on several studies along the BC coast, including the 25 Northern Gateway Project. An extensive application of an operational version of this model to 26 the St. Lawrence Estuary is described in Saucier and Chassée (2000).

27 The following key points provide further information on the hydrodynamic characteristics of the 28 model, as applied to the simulation of oil spills in the Salish Sea.

29 · Tidal constituents to provide water level data at the oceanic boundary of H3D were obtained 30 from the Canadian Hydrographic Service. Tidal currents at the boundaries are generated by 31 the model and are the response of the basin to the fluctuating water levels on the 32 boundaries.

33 · Wind forcing causes both currents and water level differences. Consideration of wind forcing 34 is also important because wind energy has a notable effect on vertical mixing, and therefore, 35 scalar distributions. Wind stresses acting at the water surface are derived from wind records 36 collected from coastal Meteorological Service of Canada (MSC), National Oceanic and 37 Atmospheric Administration (USA), Metro Vancouver, and BC Ministry stations and moored 38 buoys.

39 · The model incorporates inflows from 50 rivers and creeks throughout the model domain. 40 These inflows contribute mass and momentum to the water body. Where available, all input 41 river flows are generated from daily hydrographs of the particular river under consideration.

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1 · In addition to wind, other meteorological data are also needed to compute heat flux into the 2 water body and thus its temperature structure. These data are obtained from Environment 3 Canada’s Halibut Bank buoy, with the exception of cloud cover, which was obtained from 4 MSC’s Vancouver International Airport meteorological station. In the summer, heat input 5 leads to increased temperature stratification. In the winter, when salinity stratification is often 6 minimal, cooling can lead to static instabilities and overturning in the upper part of the water 7 column. H3D’s ability to simulate both summer heating and winter cooling has been 8 rigorously verified in simulations done for freshwater lakes, where adequate temperature 9 data is more routinely available over several years (Zaremba et al. 2005).

10 · Turbulence modelling is important in determining the correct distribution of velocity and 11 scalars such as temperature and salinity. H3D uses a Schwiderski scheme for horizontal 12 turbulent mixing, and a Mellor-Yamada level 2 scheme for vertical mixing.

13 · The model operates in a time-stepping mode over the period of simulation. The time-step 14 length is variable, depending on the maximum velocity present in the model at that particular 15 time-step.

16 · The model is initialized with salinity and temperature fields obtained by interpolating 17 observations archived at the Institute of Ocean Sciences. An initial condition of zero velocity 18 is chosen, and the water level is set to mean sea level initially. The model is run in 19 prognostic mode from this initial state, with the tide and wind being ramped up over one day. 20 At least the first 15 days of the run are discarded, as they are deemed to be contaminated 21 by start-up transients.

22 · Oceanic boundary conditions for salinity and temperature were available via models 23 maintained by the Alaska Ocean Observing System (AOOS). The southern boundary of this 24 model domain is approximately 450 km south of the mouth of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, 25 and the AOOS provides and archives model predictions every 4 hours since early 2011. 26 These data were downloaded and used to provide realistic boundary conditions to H3D.

27 · The grid size is 1 km × 1 km for the main Salish Sea model. For Burrard Inlet and English 28 Bay area, a separate model with grid size 125 m × 125 m was used, coupled to the 29 1 km × 1 km model, and similarly for the Fraser River, a separate model with grid size 30 50 m × 20 m was used, also coupled to the Salish Sea model.

31 In written evidence, questions arose from intervenors (Dr. Farmer [Filing ID A4L6R8] in 32 particular) about the model’s ability to deal with tidal fronts in Haro Strait and Boundary Pass. 33 While the presence of these tidal fronts has been proven under specific conditions, and their 34 role as part of the circulation patterns in the Strait of Georgia is undeniable, the associated rate 35 of entrainment of air or oil, if present, has been shown to be negligible. A technical paper 36 provided as part of Dr. Farmer’s evidence (Filing ID A4L6R9) indicates that the increase in 37 dissolved oxygen in deeper layers due to tidal front entrainment is only about 0.1% of the 38 background oxygen level. Furthermore, it should be noted that during down-welling stages of 39 the tide, only a portion of the surface water is actively engaged in down-welling, the other 40 portion staying on the surface. Should a small portion of the oil (0.1%, comparable to the 41 calculated air entrainment) be entrained, its buoyancy would lead to resurfacing at a later stage. 42 A more detailed response is presented in Appendix 52A. The TMEP Application incorporated 43 the study of oil in the water column due to submergence or sinking and this behaviour, 44 specifically the concentration of soluble oil constituents, was part of the Ecological Risk

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1 Assessment (Volume 8A, Section 5.4, Filing IDs A3S4Y5 and A3S4Y6), and Technical Report 2 TR 8B7 Ecological Risk Assessment of a Marine Spill in Volume 8B (Filing IDs A3S4K7, 3 A3S4K8, A3S4K9, A3S4L0, A3S4L1, A3S4L2, A3S4L3, A3S4L4, A3S4L5, A3S4L6, A3S4L7, 4 A3S4L8, A3S4L9, A3S4Q0, A3S4Q1, A3S4Q2, A3S4Q3, A3S4Q4, A3S4Q5, A3S4Q6, 5 A3S4Q7, A3S4Q8, A3S4Q9, A3S4R0). A slight temporary increase of oil in the water column 6 due to frontal subduction would not affect these results.

7 Several pieces of evidence (Genwest Report, Filing ID A4L7Y7, Levelton report, Filing 8 ID A4L6C4) showed the use of a 2D depth-averaged model to support the spill modelling 9 conducted by evidence authors. To properly simulate the complexity of BC coastal waters, a 3D 10 model is necessary, as demonstrated by Figures 52-1 to 52-4. These figures are extracted from 11 a paper published in the International Oil Spill Conference (2014) and available in 12 Appendix 52B. These four figures illustrate the impact of stratification and down-welling on the 13 distribution of dissolved hydrocarbons resulting from a surface spill, in this case benzene. For 14 the Strait of Juan de Fuca, typical of many estuarine systems, dissolved benzene concentration 15 is high near the surface in summer and does not mix in significant quantities below a depth of 16 5 m, due to the summer stratification. The mixing of dissolved benzene goes much deeper 17 during winter, down to a depth of 30 m. Therefore, the 2D depth-averaged hydrodynamic model 18 used in intervenor’s evidence (e.g., Genwest Report, Filing ID A4L7Y7, Levelton report, Filing ID 19 A4L6C4) is not appropriate to stratified or wind-influenced water bodies. As such, the results 20 obtained by the authors using 2D models cannot be relied upon.

21

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1 2 Figure 52-1 Surface Layer Benzene Concentration and Transects for the Summer 3 Period

4 5 Figure 52-2 West, Central, and East Transects during Summer Period (from top to 6 bottom)

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1 2 Figure 52-3 Surface Layer Benzene Concentration and Transects for the Winter Period

3 4 Figure 52-4 West, Central, and East Transects during Winter Period (from top to 5 bottom)

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52.3.2 Two-Dimensional Wave Model, SWAN 1 The oil spill model, SPILLCALC, requires wave conditions as an input to its weathering 2 processes. Wave conditions for the simulation period were hindcast using SWAN version 40.72 3 (Booij et al. 2006). For consistency with the hydrodynamic inputs, wave conditions were 4 simulated on the same set of computational grids as were used for the hydrodynamic modelling, 5 hence with a model grid of 1 km by 1 km for the Salish Sea, 125 m × 125 m for Burrard Inlet and 6 50 m × 20 m for the Fraser River.

7 SWAN is a third-generation wave model for obtaining realistic estimates of wave parameters in 8 coastal areas, lakes, reservoirs, and estuaries from given wind and bottom conditions. SWAN 9 utilizes a finite difference scheme to compute random, short-crested wind-generated waves. 10 SWAN incorporates physical processes such as wave propagation, wave generation by wind, 11 whitecapping, shoaling, wave breaking, bottom friction, sub-sea obstacles, wave setup, and 12 wave-wave interactions in its computations. It is thus well-suited to computing a wave field as it 13 propagates from the Pacific into Juan de Fuca Strait, the Strait of Georgia, Burrard Inlet, and the 14 Fraser estuary.

15 The wind inputs for each of the three SWAN model grids were also the same as those used in 16 the hydrodynamic model H3D. Wave boundary conditions along the southwest and northwest 17 edges of the 1 km × 1 km model domain were taken from the La Perouse Bank and South 18 Brook’s wave buoys. These buoys do not record wave direction. The simplifying assumption 19 that waves on the boundary always came from the west provided good agreement with the 20 wave directions observed at Neah Bay.

21 This Salish Sea SWAN model also provided boundary condition data for the other nested 22 SWAN models: the 200 m grid model of the central Strait of Georgia, the 125 m grid model of 23 Burrard Inlet and the 50 m × 20 m grid model of the Fraser River.

52.3.3 Trajectory and Weathering Oil Spill Model, SPILLCALC 24 SPILLCALC is a time-stepping model that computes the motion and weathering of liquid 25 hydrocarbon spills. SPILLCALC uses currents from the H3D circulation model to move the spill. 26 Oil released on the water surface is represented as a large number of independent floating 27 particles, referred to as slicklets. Individual slicklets are not intended to be physically 28 meaningful. Instead, the cloud of particles as a whole is the area covered by the spill, and its 29 progress is the spill’s dispersion and trajectory. Each slicklet knows its location, its volume and 30 the volume fraction of each pseudo-component, age, the amount on intertidal banks, and 31 whether or not the oil is in the form of a tar ball. Because of the importance to the fate of spilled 32 dilbit, the weathering algorithms incorporated in SPILLCALC are discussed in Technical Report 33 TR 8C 12 Supplemental TR S9 in Volume 8C, Modelling the Fate and Behaviour of Marine Oil 34 Spills for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project (EBA November 2013, Filing IDs A3S5G9, 35 A3S5H1, A3S5H3, A3S5H4, A3S5H7, A3S5H8, A3S5H9, A3S5I0, A3S5I1), and summarized 36 below. Figure 52-5 illustrates these processes.

52.3.3.1 Evaporation 37 In SPILLCALC, there are two processes that determine the rate of evaporation: first, the 38 standard bulk aerodynamic process, incorporating on Raoult’s Law, which calculates the mass 39 flux from the surface slick based on wind speed, temperature, equilibrium pressure for each the 40 pseudo-component and molar fraction of the pseudo-component in the total product. This

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1 method is used in NOAA ADIOS2 model, for instance. The mass transfer coefficient was 2 obtained from by Mackay and Matsugu (1973).

3 However, SPILLCALC includes an additional mechanism to account for the effect of the slow 4 rate of molecular diffusion within dilbit. Molecular diffusion is responsible for bringing the lighter 5 fractions to the evaporating surface, to replace the losses due to evaporation. In thicker slicks, 6 exceeding a few mm in thickness, the rate of molecular diffusion through the vertical extent of 7 the slick is considerably slower than the rate of evaporation from the surface, so that in fact the 8 controlling mechanism is the internal diffusion process. A ten-layer vertical diffusion equation is 9 implemented for each SPILLCALC cell, for each pseudo-component, to calculate the flux of 10 volatiles to the evaporating surface.

52.3.3.2 Vertical Dispersion and Resurfacing 11 The process of vertical dispersion was implemented in SPILLCALC using equations developed 12 by Delvigne and Sweeney (1988). The opposing process of resurfacing was implemented in 13 SPILLCALC using the equations developed by Tkalich and Chan (2002). A unique feature of 14 SPILLCALC is that the wave field is generated by a reliable and widely used wave model 15 SWAN, an improvement on the usual procedure of estimating waves from wind speed and 16 fetch. The use of SWAN provides much more realistic wave energy for computing vertical 17 dispersion.

52.3.3.3 Contact with Shorelines, Beach, and Intertidal Areas 18 The shoreline is based on BC and Washington State databases, and includes shore location, 19 coastline type, and a value for oil retention. Oil retention was calculated based on shore types 20 and the known properties of dilbit, especially its relatively high viscosity (Methods for Estimating 21 Shoreline Oil Retention, in Volume 8B, Filing ID A3S5I8).

22 A potential issue of concern is the extent to which oil would come into contact with intertidal 23 sand and mud flats and adversely affect benthic invertebrates and bio-films. In addition to 24 entering beach and mud flat sediment via the standard shore contact process, SPILLCALC 25 contains an algorithm to simulate stranding of oil as water levels change due to tides when oil 26 interacts with beaches, sand flats, or mudflats.

52.3.3.4 Oil-Sediment Interaction 27 The method used in the SPILLCALC model follows the approach proposed by Payne (1987) 28 and incorporates the effect of water turbulence. Calibration and validation of the SPILLCALC 29 oil-sediment interaction module was conducted using data reported by Khelifa, Fingas, and 30 Brown (2008). Sediment concentration over the model domain was obtained from the H3D 31 model. Monthly concentrations of sediment in the Fraser River at Mission were used as in input 32 into H3D, and validated against samples collected at different times and locations in the Fraser 33 River.

52.3.3.5 Emulsification 34 Formulas for water uptake and emulsion stability were proposed by Mackay et al. (1980) and 35 Mackay and Zagorsky (1982) respectively. Emulsification has a strong impact on the 36 evaporation process. The inhibition of evaporation increases with increasing water content and 37 slick thickness. With respect to impact on evaporation, SPILLCALC follows the method

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1 developed by Ross and Buist (1995): hydrocarbon evaporation is assumed to have a linear 2 relationship with the water content, decreasing as the water content rises.

52.3.3.6 Dissolution 3 The rate of dissolution is computed according to the equation published by MacKay and 4 Leinonen (1977) and uses their value for a mass transfer coefficient: 2.36 10-6 m/s.

52.3.3.7 Sinking 5 Depending on the initial density of the product (927 kg/m3 for the dilbit studied in the 6 Application), its composition and properties of the receiving environment (i.e., marine, estuaries 7 or freshwater), the potential for submergence varies. In the 3D simulations, if a slicklet does 8 become submerged, it is then advected horizontally and vertically based on water currents at 9 the depth where the water density and slicklet density are the same. If the slicklet density is 10 greater than any part of the water column, the slicklet is considered sunk, and is transferred to 11 the sea bed.

52.3.3.8 Biodegradation 12 Since the initial bacteria population is rarely well-known, SPILLCALC uses a first order bacterial 13 decay process in which the rate of oil biodegraded is proportional to the initial mass of oil and an 14 empirical decay coefficient (Niu et al. 2011).

15 16 Figure 52-5 Weathering Processes in SPILLCALC

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52.3.4 Air Dispersion Model, CALPUFF 1 Evaporation can account for almost 25% of the fate of spilled dilbit, and the bulk of the 2 evaporation occurs within the first two days. Therefore, in a major release, as much as 4,000 m3 3 of volatile hydrocarbons will be released to the atmosphere. These volatiles contain significant 4 toxic components, so their distribution in space and time is significant for both human and 5 ecological health. Human health concerns arise for both a vessel’s crew and responders, as 6 well as people living in adjacent areas. Because the source, the slick itself, covers a wide area 7 and is moving, the behaviour of the evaporated hydrocarbons is relatively complex, and is 8 treated using a numerical model, CALPUFF.

9 CALPUFF is an advanced, multi-layered, multi-species, non-steady-state Gaussian puff air 10 dispersion modelling system which can simulate the effects of time- and space-varying 11 meteorological conditions on pollutant transport. It is a model recommended by the BC Ministry 12 of Environment for long-range transport and for short-range transport in complex, 13 non-steady-state meteorological conditions found in complex terrain and coastal situations.

14 The main components of the modelling system are CALMET (a diagnostic 3D meteorological 15 model), CALPUFF (an air quality dispersion model), and a post-processing package. In addition 16 to these components, there are numerous other processors that are used to prepare 17 geophysical (land use and terrain) and meteorological data (surface, upper air, precipitation, 18 and buoy data).

19 CALMET’s wind module contains algorithms for calculating kinematic effects of terrain, slope 20 flows, and terrain blocking which alter domain-scale winds at the resolution of the 21 meteorological grid size. The three scenarios (Arachne Reef, Westridge Terminal, and Fraser 22 River) were modelled with meteorological grids of varying spatial extent and resolution based on 23 the size of the domain, the complexity of the terrain and the availability of surface 24 meteorological data.

25 Data was acquired from 44 meteorological stations and buoys, operated by various 26 organizations, situated in coastal areas. All surface data was reviewed for representativeness 27 and subjected to QA/QC and substitution methods described in “Guidelines for Air Dispersion 28 Modelling in British Columbia” (BC MOE 2008).

29 CALPUFF has the ability to model time- and spatially-varying area sources through an external 30 buoyant area source file. The external file is designed for tracking the effects from buoyant area 31 sources such as forest fires, but contains changeable parameters to more closely simulate a 32 non-buoyant source such as an evaporating hydrocarbon pool. The file allows for up to 200 area 33 sources with an emission rate defined for each species (pseudo-component) (in g/s) over each 34 time-step (1 hour). Since the number of area sources was well in excess of 200, multiple files 35 were used and run separately in CALPUFF and the results were summed together in 36 post-processing using the utility CALSUM.

37 The average evaporation flux (emission rate) for each of the 17 pseudo-components was 38 determined by SPILLCALC in hourly intervals and written to an output file. The total source area 39 (oil on the surface of the water) was then divided into smaller area sources (500 m2 for Arachne 40 Reef, 62.5 m2 for Westridge) for each hour. The flux rate for each smaller source polygon is 41 assumed to occur homogeneously over the entire surface area. Of the 17 pseudo-components, 42 11 were shown to readily evaporate into the air. CALPUFF then tracked the transport of these

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1 fluxes, calculating the concentration and transport time to each receptor grid point, set up at 2 ground level with 100 m spacing across the model domain. It then determined the total 3 contribution at each receptor for each pseudo-component over hourly intervals.

52.4 Model Validation 4 As requested by Environment Canada (Filing ID A4L8Y6), validations are presented for both the 5 hydrodynamic and the spill model. The hydrodynamic models were validated against water 6 level, observed currents, and surface drift patterns (response to Weaver IR 1.11c [Filing IDs 7 A3Y3W4, A3Y3W6, and A3Y3W7]; follow-up response to Weaver F-IR No. 1.11c [Filing IDs 8 A4A2A0, and A4A2A1]). The spill model was validated independently against analytical 9 solutions for its major transport components (advection and lateral diffusion). The spill model’s 10 evaporation algorithm was validated against observations collected at the Gainford site.

52.4.1 Three-Dimensional Hydrodynamic Model 11 The validation of the hydrodynamic model was conducted at various sites across the model 12 domain against water level and currents. The statistical methods used to measure model 13 performance are based on calculation of the root-mean-square error (RMSE) (Equation 1) and a 14 comprehensive ‘model skill’ equation (Equation 2). RMSE is presented in the same units as the 15 original data and represents the magnitude of all errors over the entire predicted time period. 16 Model skill, as defined by Willmott (1981), is a measure of the agreement between predicted 17 and observed data, with a skill of one representing a perfect match, and is dimensionless. 18 Relative RMSE is the value of the RMSE over the approximate absolute range of the variable in 19 the plotted period, expressed as a percentage.

20 (Equation 1) RMSE:

= | | 2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 21 (Equation 2) Model Skill: 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 � 𝑋𝑋 − 𝑋𝑋 | | = 1 (| | + | 2 |) ∑ 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 2 22 Validation against water level: ∑ 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − �𝑋𝑋�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷����� 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 − �𝑋𝑋�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷�����

23 TABLE 52-1 24 25 TIDAL VALIDATION STATISTICS

Tide Gauge RMSE (m) Relative RMSE (%) Model Skill Point Atkinson 0.24 5.4 0.98 Campbell River 0.22 5.6 0.98 Victoria 0.19 7.9 0.97 Bamfield 0.10 2.56 0.99 Point Atkinson (observed) 0.23 5.2 0.97 Victoria (observed) 0.22 8.8 0.96 26

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1 Modelled tide heights are generally within 0.2 m at all stations, with excellent reproduction of 2 variations in tidal patterns throughout the modelled regions as shown in Table 52-1.

3 Validation against measured currents:

4 TABLE 52-2 5 6 HARO STRAIT ALONG-CHANNEL STATISTICS

Current Meter RMSE (m/s) Relative RMSE (%) Model Skill H182@29 (m) 0.35 11.3 0.92 H182@85 (m) 0.27 9.4 0.93 H182@162 (m) 0.35 13.3 0.88 H184@35 (m) 0.31 11.0 0.89 H184@95 (m) 0.20 9.4 0.94 H187@32 (m) 0.33 18.4 0.77 7

8 TABLE 52-3 9 10 HARO STRAIT ACROSS-CHANNEL STATISTICS

Current Meter RMSE (m/s) Relative RMSE (%) Model Skill H182@29 (m) 0.22 7.10 0.65 H182@85 (m) 0.30 10.5 0.45 H182@162 (m) 0.16 6.1 0.47 H184@35 (m) 0.24 8.5 0.73 H184@95 (m) 0.19 8.9 0.64 H187@32 (m) 0.20 11.1 0.63 11

12 TABLE 52-4 13 14 JUAN DE FUCA STRAIT ALONG-CHANNEL STATISTICS

Current Meter RMSE Relative RMSE (%) Model Skill L130@20 (m) 0.23 9.3 0.93 L131@120 (m) 0.11 5.0 0.98 L135@120 (m) 0.13 5.8 0.98 L136@20 (m) 0.22 9.9 0.89 15

16 TABLE 52-5 17 18 JUAN DE FUCA STRAIT ACROSS-CHANNEL STATISTICS

Current Meter RMSE Relative RMSE (%) Model Skill L130@20 (m) 0.11 4.5 0.33 L131@120 (m) 0.09 4.1 0.48 L135@120 (m) 0.09 4.0 0.42 L136@20 (m) 0.12 5.4 0.31

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1 TABLE 52-6 2 3 STATISTICS FOR WESTRIDGE MARINE TERMINAL ADCP

ADCP Location RMSE (m/s) Relative RMSE (%) Model Skill Burrard Inlet (Westridge 0.058 7.0 0.95 Terminal) 4

5 Another validation is to compare the modelled and observed behaviour of the Fraser River 6 Plume, which is a persistent feature of the Strait of Georgia from about May to August, 7 depending on river flow. During periods of high flow, as the fresh water leaves the river at Sand 8 Heads, it transitions from a rapidly-flowing river, with depths of about 10 m at low tide and 9 currents up to 2 m/s, into a shallow river plume with vertical extent of about 3 m just off the river 10 mouth. This plume possesses significant momentum out into the middle of the Strait of Georgia 11 during the peak of the freshet, but is generally deflected northward under the combined action of 12 a flood tide, which follows the peak outflow velocities at low tide, and the Coriolis force. 13 Modelling this relatively thin upper layer is a challenge in waterways with tidal range of up to 14 5 m, but H3D’s treatment of near–surface processes, by adding and deleting layers as the water 15 level rises and falls, is fully capable of treating this phenomenon, thus allowing the close 16 comparison shown in Figure 52-6.

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Modelled plume

1 2 Figure 52-6 Modelled and Observed Fraser River Plume (observed corresponding 3 plume shown lower right)

52.4.2 Oil Spill Model 4 Questions were raised by some intervenors (Environment Canada [Filing ID A4L8Y6] in 5 particular) about the validation of the model:

6 “While the modelling tools used by the Proponent appear to be appropriate, we 7 did not find evidence that the models have been verified and validated. This 8 validation would increase confidence in the ability of the model to reliably predict 9 the fate, behaviour and trajectory of spilled oil”; and “EC recommends that the 10 Proponent provide evidence that the EBA modelling routines have been verified 11 and validated, perhaps through comparisons with models such as OilMap (RPA 12 ASA), OSCAR (SINTEF) and/or ADIOS/GNOME (NOAA)” (page 127 of 317 of 13 Environment Canada’s Written Evidence, Filing ID A4L8Y6).

14 Weathering algorithms in the SPILLCALC model were developed so as to be in agreement with 15 ADIOS2, since ADIOS2 has the most up-to-date weathering algorithms. Given the high degree 16 of sophistication of the SPILLCALC Model, undertaking validations against off the shelf models

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1 and on the fly oil spill tracking methods would not be a valid comparison. Results of such a 2 comparison if carried out would be misleading, and therefore will not be carried out. Rather, 3 validations against actual events are more reliable. The Marathassa hindcast (provided in 4 Appendix 52C) was conducted by Tetra Tech EBA in its own effort to test the ability of the 5 SPILLCALC model to be operational within a short amount of time and provide valuable results 6 as a potential tool for decision-making support to the Incident Command Centre. A framework 7 similar to the TMEP Application was used during the Marathassa hindcast: a 3D hydrodynamic 8 model, H3D, provided surface currents to the model SPILLCALC. Feedback from Port Metro 9 and first responders, i.e., CCG and WCMRC, was very positive, as the time-varying spatial 10 distribution of the oil was similar to what was observed. The thickest patches of oil 11 corresponded to the locations where response vessels spent most of their time. Also, the extent 12 and the location of simulated contacted shorelines had a good agreement with observed oil 13 shoreline. This example clearly shows the ability of the model to properly simulate the trajectory 14 of an oil spill in the marine environment.

15 In this section, the many sophistications of SPILLCALC are explained and compared with the 16 models mentioned by Environment Canada. Firstly, SPILLCALC was originally developed as a 17 trajectory model, to which various weathering, shore contact and then mitigation modules were 18 added as requirements dictated. The development was always informed by the various 19 processes and their schematizations that other oil spill models, referenced above, contained. At 20 each stage of model development, the model code and underlying equations were checked 21 against observations data, which Trans Mountain believes is a better method than comparison 22 with another model. Comparison to observational data, rather than to another model, is always 23 the best practice to validate a model. In the absence of such data, recourse to comparison with 24 other models is a reasonable backup plan. The paragraphs below present validation results for 25 some key components of SPILLCALC: the evaporation algorithm and the OMA formation 26 algorithm.

27 The hindcast of one of the Gainford experiments (S9B tank) was used to validate the 28 evaporation module, hence the associated potential sinking module, of the trajectory and 29 weathering model, SPILLCALC. Figure 52-7 shows the density computed by SPILLCALC 30 (orange line) and the measurements conducted at the Gainford laboratory facility (blue points). 31 Very good agreement was achieved, but could only be achieved by considering the two factors 32 controlling the evaporation process: wind-driven flux at the oil-air interface, and vertical diffusive 33 flux from the interior of the slick up to the evaporating surface.

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990

980

970

960

S9B 950 Spillcalc Density (kg/m3) Density 940

930

920 0 2 4 6 8 10 Time (days) 1 2 Figure 52-7 Modelled Density in SPILLCALC vs. Measured Density at S9B Tank, 3 Gainford

4 To further understand the significance of vertical diffusion control on evaporation, comparisons 5 were made with ADIOS2 (which does not have a diffusive control mechanism), and are shown 6 in Figure 52-8. The figure demonstrates that the agreement between SPILLCALC (with or 7 without molecular diffusion) and ADIOS2 is very good for any slick thinner than 7 mm, which is 8 representative of most of the slicks in the marine environment and modelled in the TMEP 9 Application. The agreement between SPILLCALC (without molecular diffusion) and ADIOS2 10 continues for thicker slicks, whereas SPILLCALC (with molecular diffusion) diverges for slicks 11 thicker than 7 mm. This graph shows the validity of SPILLCALC by comparing it to ADIOS2, but 12 also the advantage that SPILLCALC has through the incorporation of molecular diffusion. 13 A technical paper (Stronach and Hospital 2014) was published and presented at the AMOP 14 2014 Conference hosted by Environment Canada. One can note that ADIOS3, currently in 15 development by the NOAA, is planning to incorporate the molecular diffusion process for 16 improved accuracy and flexibility.

17

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1 2 Figure 52-8 Comparison between SPILLCALC and ADIOS2 (NOAA)

3 Another validation is presented below regarding the parameterization of the OMA formation 4 process. A hindcast of Dr. Khelifa’s experiment (Khelifa, Fingas, and Brown 2008) was used to 5 validate the OMA model of SPILLCALC. Figure 52-9 shows the percentage of oil that would 6 form stable OMA as a function of the energy dissipation rate and the suspended sediment 7 concentration. The observational data is shown by grey triangles, and two versions of the 8 modelled data are show by alternately blue and green squares. The energy in the reaction 9 vessel (variable Dba in Dr. Khelifa’s experiment and in Figure 52-9) was not constant but ranges 10 between 0.1 and 0.4 m2/s3, hence the two lines, blue and green, in the figure.

11 Figure 52-9 shows that the agreement is good between SPILLCALC and Dr. Khelifa’s 12 experiment. The best agreement is achieved for values of sediment concentration lower than 13 100 mg/L, which are typical conditions in the surface waters of the Fraser River, although 14 somewhat higher than sediments typical of the marine environment.

15 Although the agreement between SPILLCALC and the Khelifa et al. results is very good, given 16 the uncertainty concerning the energy level in the reaction vessel, there remains a fundamental 17 problem with respect to OMA formation. In response to Province of BC IR No. 2.44a (Filing ID 18 A4H8W6), it was shown that the energy required to achieve OMA formation in the laboratory is 19 at least two orders (100×) greater than the naturally-occurring energy along the marine route or 20 in the Lower Fraser River. For this reason, only a negligible amount of OMA formation occurred 21 in the modelling.

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5.0% 4.5% 4.0% 3.5% 3.0% 2.5%

2.0% Khelifa 2008 1.5% Dba 0.4 1.0% Dba 0.1 SPM Formation (% of spilled oil) spilledof (% Formation SPM -

Oil 0.5% 0.0% 0 50 100 150 200 250 SPM Concentration [mg/L] 1 2 Figure 52-9 OMA Formation in SPILLCALC vs. Khelifa’s Experiment

52.5 Inputs to the Oil Spill Model 52.5.1 Shoreline Retention 3 The Genwest Report (Filing ID A4L7Y7) contains a simplistic approach in dealing with oiled 4 shoreline. The following describes the detailed approach to shore/oil interaction considered in 5 the TMEP Application and discusses it in comparison to Genwest’s approach.

6 Each segment of shoreline of length less than the SPILLCALC grid size, or less than 500 m for 7 the marine spills, for example, can retain a certain maximum volume of oil, based on the shore 8 type, the tabulated retention capacity of that type of shoreline, and the length of the shoreline 9 segment. Whenever a particle’s new position would bring it in contact with the shore, the 10 shoreline is checked to determine if it has reached its full retention capacity. If it has, the status 11 and volume of the particle remains unchanged, and the particle remains on the water, ready to 12 be carried offshore whenever winds drive it offshore. If the shoreline is below capacity, some 13 volume of oil is transferred from the particle to the shore. If the remaining capacity of the 14 shoreline segment is greater than the particle’s volume, the entire volume is transferred to the 15 shore and the particle’s status is switched to “on land.” Otherwise, the remaining capacity of the 16 shoreline segment is filled, the particle’s volume is reduced correspondingly, and its status 17 remains “on water.” Once oil is “on land,” it is held there for the remainder of the simulation, 18 because the spill model does not allow the tide or waves to move it back onto the water.

19 The shoreline retention values were provided by Dr. Harper and based on BC and Washington 20 State databases, and include not only shore location, but also coastline type, and a value for oil 21 retention (Technical Report TR 8C 12 Supplemental TR S11, Methods for Estimating Shoreline 22 Oil Retention, in Volume 8C, Filing ID A3S5I8). Figure 52-10 shows an extract of the shore 23 retention values presented in the Application.

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1 2 Figure 52-10 Shore Retention Values used in the TMEP Application

3 For intertidal areas, SPILLCALC considered the following: when water levels retreat during an 4 ebb tide, if oil is contained in a cell for which the water depth is less than 4 cm, all the oil in that 5 cell was forced to become beached. There was no accounting for re-floating, so that the study 6 would provide conservative results with respect to estimating damage to sensitive intertidal 7 areas due to an oil spill.

8 In contrast, the Genwest Report (Filing ID A4L7Y7) submitted by several intervenors used a 9 more simplistic approach in the GNOME model (developed by the NOAA) regarding shore and 10 oil interaction: when a particle of oil contacts the shore, all of the associated oil will stay 11 attached to this shore segment, regardless of the shore type (man-made or sand beach), or the 12 tide level. In addition, half the oil ashore will refloat after 18 hours regardless again of the 13 viscosity of the oil and the type of shore the oil adheres to. Half of the remaining oil on shore 14 refloats after another 18 hours, etc. It is noted that, based on information in the Genwest Report 15 (PDF page 29, Filing ID A4L7Y7), this 18 hour half-life has not been numerically calibrated with 16 published papers or laboratory experiments that would support such a value.

52.5.2 Meteorology 17 In its written evidence, Environment Canada recommends “that the Proponent, given the limited 18 measurements available to simulate environmental conditions such as winds, weather and 19 waves, use an extended range of input parameters to ensure that the modelling outputs are 20 representative of the expected range of possible environmental conditions, including extreme 21 events” (Recommendation 4-2, PDF Page 128, Filing ID A4L8Y6).

22 Trans Mountain does not consider this a reasonable or required request. The inputs used are 23 wholly representative of a wide range of environmental conditions, including calm periods and 24 extreme events, which are therefore also reflected in the associated outputs. This is explained 25 below together with a description of the data used in order to provide context.

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1 Observed data from coastal meteorological stations and buoys were used for the Juan de Fuca, 2 and the Strait of Georgia simulations. Figure 52-11 presents stations and buoys that were used 3 for this study. The station network covers a wide area, including the Strait of Georgia, Haro 4 Strait, Juan de Fuca Strait, and the west side of Vancouver Island. A blue dot represents a 5 weather and wave buoy and a red dot represents a coastal meteorological station.

6 7 Figure 52-11 Wind Stations for Marine Spills

8 Land stations were used for the simulations in Burrard Inlet and the Lower Fraser River. In 9 contrast, the Genwest Report (Filing ID A4L7Y7) built the wind fields for their modelling of 10 Burrard Inlet using MM5 data; that is, data from a prognostic wind model. Observed wind data 11 are preferred over MM5 data in areas of good spatial coverage, which is characteristic of the 12 Project area. The MM5 data available are at a 4 km resolution, but were downscaled twice from 13 an original 32 km resolution model. This means that the resolution of the MM5 data, even after 14 downscaling, may not adequately resolve Burrard Inlet or Indian Arm winds. This appeared to 15 be the case, as described in the separate standalone response to the Genwest Report 16 (Attachment 1.08: Reply to “Oil Spill Trajectory Modeling Report in Burrard Inlet for the Trans 17 Mountain Expansion Project,” Genwest Systems Inc. Edmonds, Washington, USA 98020 18 (Genwest Report)): the winds employed by Genwest were unrealistic, for example, winds at 19 Vancouver International Airport were mainly from the south, whereas a wind rose for that site 20 shows winds are predominantly aligned along an east-west axis. In other words, the wind inputs 21 for the air dispersion analysis of oil in Burrard Inlet may not be appropriate since the MM5 data 22 likely misses smaller scale flows. Several intervenors opted to use MM5 data, likely because 23 data can be readily available with no additional processing. In contrast, Trans Mountain 24 recognized the need to provide a realistic wind field, and therefore used observed data.

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1 The representativeness of the simulated period (October 2011 to September 2012) is discussed 2 below.

3 To assess the overall wind strength during the simulation year, root-mean-square (RMS) wind 4 speeds for the summer and winter were compared against the full period of record. RMS wind 5 speed was selected as the comparison parameter instead of average wind speed because it 6 better represents the wind energy available for oil weathering processes. The summer period 7 covers April to September and the winter period covers October to March.

8 Wind roses were also generated by season for the full period of record and for the simulation 9 year, at each location. In all cases, the simulation year wind rose follows the directional pattern 10 of the full period of record, indicating that seasonal wind directionality was typical during the 11 simulation year.

12 Firstly, the simulation year winds have magnitudes and directions similar to previous years, as 13 demonstrated by comparisons of seasonal RMS wind speeds, seasonal wind roses, and 14 monthly average vector winds. The simulation year is not an anomalous year and, in fact, is 15 shown to be representative of wind conditions over a multi-year period. This includes extreme 16 events. As an example, the sampled period had winds exceeding 10 m/s (an arbitrary high 17 value) approximately 6% of the time at the Halibut Bank buoy. For comparison, winds exceeded 18 the same threshold during the period from 1992 to 2012 approximately 5% of the time at the 19 same location.

20 Secondly, with respect to EC Written Evidence (Filing ID A4L8Y6) and Environment Canada’s 21 response to Tsawout IR (Filing ID A71604), while it would be possible to construct a 200-year 22 return period storm, the joint probability of such a storm and a large spill occurring 23 simultaneously is roughly 1/200 of the probability of the CWC spill already modelled; for 24 example, if structural failure is considered the cause of a large spill near Buoy J, DNV has 25 calculated that the return period is one in 19,806 years (Refer to Table A6, Response to NEB IR 26 regarding TERMPOL report and Outstanding Filings, Filing ID A4G3U5). If such a failure is to 27 occur in a one in 200 year storm, the confluence of events leading to such an accident is close 28 to one in 4 million years, which is clearly not something that can be deemed to be a credible 29 event requiring to be modelled and researched as part of the Project’s review. Such a low 30 likelihood event is then at variance with the CWC definition. Modelling such an event would not 31 change Trans Mountain’s findings on oil spill consequence or alter its proposal regarding 32 enhanced oil spill mitigation. As noted in Environment Canada’s evidence, Environment Canada 33 is not mandated to consider or assess likelihood and this recommendation appears to be a 34 result of not considering the effect of likelihood on risk.

35 Further to the above comments, we note that Section 19(1)(a) of the CEA Act, 2012 requires 36 environmental assessments of designated projects to take into account “the environmental 37 effects of the designated project, including the environmental effects of malfunctions or 38 accidents that may occur in connection with the designated project and any cumulative effects 39 that are likely to result from the project in combination with other physical activities that have 40 been or will be carried out.” The CEA Act, 2012 does not, however, necessitate an assessment 41 of every conceivable accident and malfunction scenario, nor of the effects of extreme 42 meteorological conditions.

43 Finally, it should be emphasized that representative conditions are the key when conducting 44 deterministic modelling. The Levelton Evidence (Filing ID A4L6C4) considered a large amount

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1 of simulations at night for assessing the impact of evaporated hydrocarbons on humans. Night 2 time conditions are much more atmospherically stable (diminished vertical mixing) with low 3 mixing heights trapping pollutants released at the surface closer to the ground, as shown from 4 CALMET output at several locations in the Burrard Inlet grid in Figure 52-12. As described in the 5 standalone report in response to Levelton’s Evidence, the consideration of night time 6 simulations was not appropriate and resulted in about 84% of the Levelton Evidence’s 7 simulations that were not realistic based on the daytime departure rule, and consequently the 8 evidence strongly overstates benzene concentrations in the air.

9 10 Figure 52-12 CALMET-Predicted Mixing Heights for Locations through Burrard Inlet over 11 Four Days in August 2012

52.5.3 Type of Oil 12 Several intervenors filed evidence having used a different oil product to conduct their analysis: 13 EmergWest Evidence (Filing ID A4Q1A2) and Levelton Evidence (Filing ID A4L6C4). The 14 product used for the marine spill modelling in the Trans Mountain Application is representative 15 of the transported product and was described in the Application. A reminder of the product’s 16 properties used for the spill modelling in the TMEP Application is describe below in order to 17 demonstrate that not using representative oil in the intervenors’ analysis leads to faulty results 18 that are not useful and could be misleading.

19 Table 52-7 is the pseudo-component description of a CLWB bitumen sample, using the pseudo- 20 component categories adopted for this project (Sample BG5490, collected February 19, 2013 at 21 the Westridge Marine Terminal). This composition was used for the modelling simulations 22 described in the Application. Trans Mountain expects this product will form a large proportion of 23 the crude oil shipped from the Westridge Marine Terminal once the Project is in operation.

24 Each pseudo-component is an aggregation of several pure components, all with similar physical 25 and biological properties. In addition to the list of 14 pseudo-components outlined in the 26 Canadian Standards, three additional were added: C34 and greater, resins, and asphaltenes. 27 These two latter pseudo-components account for about 28% of the oil mass, but have limited 28 solubility, very high boiling points, hence limited evaporability, and are generally not 29 toxicologically significant. However, they represent a significant part of the molar composition of 30 the oil, which will influence the evaporation and dissolution rates of the lighter fractions, through 31 Raoult’s Law. These two heavier fractions will figure prominently in the formation of tar balls, 32 so are important for the overall simulations. A detailed description of the pseudo-component 33 properties is available in Section 2 of Technical Report TR 8C 12 Supplemental TR S9, 34 Modelling the Fate and Behaviour of Marine Oil Spill for TMEP, in Volume 8C (Filing 35 ID A3S5G9).

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1 TABLE 52-7 2 3 PSEUDO-COMPONENT DESCRIPTION

Pseudo-Component Description VOL Volatiles AR1 Benzene AR2 TEX AR3 Aromatics >C8-C10 AR4 Aromatics >C10-C12 AR5 Aromatics >C12-C16 AR6 Aromatics >C16-C21 AR7 Aromatics >C21-C34 AL1 Aliphatics >C6-C8 AL2 Aliphatics >C8-C10 AL3 Aliphatics >C10-C12 AL4 Aliphatics >C12-C16 AL5 Aliphatics >C16-C21 AL6 Aliphatics >C21-C34 RES1 F4 (>C34-C50) RES2 Resins RES3 Asphaltenes 4

52.5.4 Wind Drift Coefficient 5 Intervenors raised concerns about the wind drift coefficient used in the TMEP marine spill 6 modelling during previous rounds of IRs and also as part of evidence, e.g., the Genwest Report 7 (Filing ID A4L7Y7). The section below clarifies the coefficient used in the TMEP Application and 8 its appropriateness.

9 A wind drift coefficient of 1%, 2%, or 3% of the wind speed is often referred to as the oil leeway, 10 a differential drift with respect to surface currents. In fact, oil on water does not have significant 11 leeway: leeway is more appropriate for floating bodies that have significant air drag as well as 12 water drag, so that their ultimate direction and speed of motion is a response to both winds and 13 currents. The 3% rule in oil spill simulation is an empirically-based rule of thumb used to 14 estimate the speed of the surface current, for cases where either no information is known about 15 the surface current, or cases where the numerical model providing currents under-represents 16 surface currents, usually because of limited vertical in-water resolution.

17 The numerical hydrodynamic model, H3D, used for this study has 1 m vertical resolution, so 18 resolves the shear in the water column due to wind-driven currents. The top-layer currents from 19 H3D are hence a vertical average of currents from 0 m depth to 1 m depth, i.e., roughly currents 20 at 0.5 m depth. In a recent paper (Breivik et al. 2011), experimental procedures to measure 21 leeway for objects, not oil slicks, measured the surface current using a current meter suspended 22 at about 0.5 m depth. They also noted that High Frequency (HF) Radar measures currents at an 23 effective depth of about 0.5 m, and concluded that HF Radar is therefore a good instrument to 24 measure surface currents. For these reasons, Trans Mountain believes that the top-layer 25 currents from the hydrodynamic model H3D are a good representation of surface currents, and 26 that there is no need to add leeway, except as discussed in the next point.

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1 The 1% leeway used in the SPILLCALC model for the TMEP Application is primarily intended to 2 represent the effect of wave drift, called Stokes drift, on oil movement. The relationship between 3 wind speed and Stokes drift is linear, although it depends in a complex way on fetch and 4 duration. Trans Mountain experts believe that 1% is a reasonably representative value for the 5 waters in the study area.

6 The Genwest Report (Filing ID A4L7Y7) describes the spill model GNOME that was used by 7 Genwest to model spills in Burrard Inlet. That model is 2D, i.e., all variables are vertically 8 averaged. Consequently, it cannot reproduce wind drift, in which the surface flow is with the 9 wind, but flows at depth are generally against the wind, to conserve water volume. In a 2D 10 model, as shown in the Genwest Report, flows in the deep water are against the wind, contrary 11 to the well-known behaviour of surface currents. To compensate, it is assumed, GNOME uses a 12 randomly–varying wind drift coefficient, ranging from 1% to 4.5%, in an attempt to emulate 13 realistic winds. However, without a fundamentally correct model of currents, such a 14 wide-ranging leeway coefficient can have no effect other than to increase the dispersion in the 15 direction of the wind.

52.6 Burrard Inlet Spill Modelling 16 This section addresses the oil spill modelling carried in Burrard Inlet. Several intervenors 17 (Levelton, Genwest Evidence) focused on this area.

18 The large spill modelled at the Westridge Marine Terminal, resulting from an incident during 19 loading of a tanker, was assessed under conservative conditions, assuming a volume of 160 m3. 20 Statistics for shoreline contact and mass balance were computed on a seasonal basis for the 21 modelled spill at Westridge Marine Terminal. Results among the four seasons were similar: 22 about 80% of the oil was still on water (contained in the pre-deployed boom), approximately 23 18% ended up on shore, and the remaining 2% was either evaporated in the air or dissolved in 24 the water column (refer to Section 8.1 of Technical Report TR 8C 12 Supplemental TR S9, 25 Modelling the Fate and Behaviour of Marine Oil Spill for TMEP, Volume 8C [Filing ID A3S5G9]).

26 In response to an IR, Tsleil-Waututh Nation provided maps of oil time series and sensitivity atlas 27 concerning their Burrard Inlet spill modelling evidence (Genwest Report, Filing ID A4L7Y7, with 28 maps, Filing IDs A4R3X3, A4R3X7, A4R3X8, A4R3Y2, A4R3Y3, A4R3Y4, A4R3Y5, A4R3Y6, 29 A4R3Y7, A4R3Y8). First, one can note that the oil entering Indian Arm, shown in the evidence, 30 was confined in its southern section in the vicinity of Deep Cove. This result is in agreement with 31 the stochastic results presented in the TMEP Application where most of the oil (40% probability) 32 would be confined in the southern part of Indian Arm.

33 Furthermore, it should be noted that the evidence (Genwest Report, Filing ID A4L7Y7) points to 34 some sensitive habitat and cultural sites at risk such as the northern section of Indian Arm, even 35 though no oil seems to reach this area. Indeed, the evidence provided an oil spill time series 36 atlas that shows the location of the oil. None of the series indicate oil reaching the northern 37 section of Indian Arm. On the other hand, the TMEP Application did show that there was a 1% 38 probability to have oil reaching this area.

52.7 References 39 Booij N., Haagsma I.J., Holthuijsen L., Kieftenburg A., Ris R., van der Westhuysen A., and 40 M. Zijlema. 2006. SWAN User Manual, Cycle III Version 40.51. Delft University of 41 Technology, Netherlands, 111 pp.

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1 Breivika O., Allenb A.A., Maisondieuc C., and J.C. Rothd. 2011. Wind-induced drift of objects at 2 sea: The leeway field method. Applied Ocean Research. April 2011, Volume 33, Issue 2, 3 Pages 100-109.

4 Delvigne G.A.L. and C.E. Sweeney. 1988. Natural Dispersion of Oil. Oil & Chemical Pollution, 4, 5 pp. 281-310.

6 Khelifa A., Fingas M., and C. Brown. 2008. “Effects of Dispersants on Oil-SPM Aggregation and 7 Fate in US Coastal Waters.” Final Report to the Coastal Research Response Center, 8 University of New Hampshire, July 2008, 38 pp.

9 MacKay D. and P.J. Leinonen. 1977. Mathematical Model of the Behaviour of Oil Spills on 10 Water with Natural and Chemical Dispersion, Report Submitted to Environmental Protein 11 Service, Department of Fisheries and the Environment. EPS-3-EC-77-19.

12 MacKay D. and R.S. Matsugu. 1973. Evaporation Rates of Liquid Hydrocarbon Spills on Land 13 and Water, The Canadian Journal of Chemical Engineering, Vol. 51.

14 Mackay D. and W. Zagorsky. 1982. Water-in-oil emulsions: a stability hypothesis. Proceedings, 15 5th Arctic Marine Oilspill Program, Technical Seminar, Environment Canada, pp 61-74.

16 Mackay D.I., Buistt I.A., Mascarenhas R., and S. Paterson. 1980. Oil spill processes and 17 models. Manuscript Report, Vol. EE-8, Environment Canada, Ottawa.

18 Ministry of Environment (MoE) 2008. Guidelines for Air Dispersion Modelling in British 19 Columbia.

20 Niu H., Li Z., Lee K., and P. Kepkay. 2011. Modelling the Long Term Fate of Oil-Mineral- 21 Aggregates (OMAs) in the Marine Environment and Assessment of their Potential Risks. 22 International Oil Spill Conference.

23 Payne J.R., Kirstein B.E., Clayton J.R., Clary C., Redding R., McNabb D., and G. Farmer. 1987. 24 Integration of Suspended Particulate Matter and Oil Transportation Study. Report 25 Submitted to Minerals Management Service by Science Application International 26 Corporation. 215 pp.

27 Ross R. and I. Buist. 1995. Preliminary laboratory study to determine the effect of emulsification 28 on oilspill evaporation. Proceeding, 18th Arctic Marine Oilspill Program, Technical 29 Seminar. Environment Canada, Edmonton, Alberta. pp 61-74.

30 Saucier F.J. and J. Chassée. 2000. Tidal Circulation and Buoyancy Effects in the St. Lawrence 31 Estuary. Atmosphere-Ocean, 38, 505-556.

32 Stronach J.A. and A. Hospital. 2014. “The Implementation of Molecular Diffusion to Simulate the 33 Fate and Behaviour of a Diluted Bitumen Oil Spill and its Application to Stochastic 34 Modelling,” in Proceedings of the thirty-seventh AMOP Technical Seminar on 35 Environmental Contamination and Response, Environment Canada, Ottawa, ON, 1:353- 36 373.

37 Stronach J.A., Backhaus J.O., and T.S. Murty. 1993. “An Update on the Numerical Simulation of 38 Oceanographic Processes in the Waters between Vancouver Island and the Mainland: 39 the GF8 Model,” Oceanography and Marine Biology Annual Review, 31:1-86.

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1 Tkalich P. and E.S. Chan. 2002. Vertical mixing of oil droplets by breaking waves, Marine 2 Pollution Bulletin, 44, pp 1219-1229.

3 Willmott C.J. 1981. On the Validation of Models, physical Geography, 2. 184-194.

4 Zaremba L., Wang E., and J. Stronach. 2005. The physical limnology of Okanagan Lake. In 5 “Water – Our Limiting Resource”: Towards Sustainable Water Management in the 6 Okanagan, Proceedings of Canadian Water Resources Association B.C. Branch 7 Conference, Feb. 23-25, 2005, Kelowna, BC. ISBN 1-896513-28-X.

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53.0 MARINE SEDIMENT AND WATER QUALITY 1 A number of intervenors submitted written evidence that commented on the assessment of 2 potential effects of Project construction and operations on marine sediment and water quality. 3 Comments raised in these submissions include:

4 · requests for additional information about potential for dredging at the Westridge 5 Marine Terminal and for management of dredged sediment;

6 · concerns about oil spills and their effects on marine sediment and water 7 quality; and

8 · requests for incorporation of additional baseline sediment and water quality 9 data and modification of scope of assessment.

10 The following provides Trans Mountain’s response to the above comments related to marine 11 sediment and water quality.

53.1 Additional Information About Dredging and Sediment Disposal 12 In its written evidence submission, Environment Canada advised that, based on sediment 13 testing conducted at the Westridge Marine Terminal in fall 2014, the top layer (surface 0.5 m) of 14 marine sediment from the foreshore infill area would not be considered appropriate for disposal 15 at sea, unless additional sampling and testing, including biological testing, indicated that the 16 sediment would be suitable (Filing ID A4L8Y6). Environment Canada also re-iterated the types 17 of information required for a disposal at sea permit application, including details identifying 18 disposal at sea as the preferred environmental and technical option for managing sediments 19 and a review of alternative management options for dredged materials.

20 Environment Canada recommended that Trans Mountain demonstrate, in finalizing the Project 21 design, consideration of engineering options and construction methods that could reduce or 22 eliminate the dredge footprint and volume of material proposed for disposal at sea. Trans 23 Mountain has indicated that decisions about construction of the foreshore infill area will be made 24 during the detailed construction design phase in Q4 2015 and Q1 2016. Construction methods 25 that avoid or minimize dredging of sediment are being investigated, as are sediment 26 management methods that avoid disposal at sea. If dredging and disposal at sea become the 27 preferred construction method, details on alternatives will be provided in a disposal at sea 28 application.

29 Environment Canada also recommended that Trans Mountain demonstrate how the NEB review 30 process outcomes related to the protection of the marine environment (e.g., marine fish and fish 31 habitat) will be respected, taking into account concerns identified by Aboriginal groups and other 32 users of the sea. Trans Mountain has committed to implementing a number of mitigation 33 measures during construction of the Westridge Marine Terminal to protect marine fish and fish 34 habitat. These measures are described in detail in Volume 5A, Sections 7.6.8.4 and 7.6.9.4 35 (Filing ID A3S1R0) and Volume 6D, Section 8.2 (Westridge Marine Terminal EPP; Filing 36 ID A3S2S9). Mitigation measures specific to dredging include:

37 · a commitment that dredging, should it be required, be done during the DFO 38 least risk work window for Burrard Inlet (August 16 to February 28);

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1 · use of silt curtains to contain the spread of sediment during dredging; and

2 · habitat offsetting for marine fish habitat lost due to dredging and infilling at the 3 Westridge Marine Terminal (Preliminary Marine Fish Habitat Offsetting Plan; 4 Filing ID A4F5C5).

5 The Adams Lake Indian Band also identified a concern about dredging in its May 2014 6 submission (Filing ID A3W6Z6) and July 2015 follow up to the Major Projects Management 7 Office and NEB (Filing ID A4R4D0). This was a general concern about site contamination during 8 construction, including the effects of dredging on marine and estuarine environments. This 9 concern is addressed through Trans Mountain’s objective of minimizing or eliminating the need 10 for dredging at the marine terminal, and if dredging is identified as the feasible construction 11 method, for following the application process required for a Disposal at Sea permit and 12 incorporating appropriate mitigation measures to manage movement of any contaminants.

53.2 Concerns About Oil Spills and Effects on Marine Sediment and Water Quality 13 Written evidence submissions from the Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q2F9), the U.S. 14 Tribes (Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, Tulalip Tribes, Suquamish Tribe, Lummi Nation; 15 Filing ID A4L7G2), and Cowichan Tribes (Filing ID A4Q0U9) expressed concerns about 16 potential effects of oil spills on marine sediment and water quality. These concerns are 17 addressed in Section 46 (Ecological Risk Assessment) of this reply evidence.

53.3 Incorporation of Additional Baseline Data and Modification of the Scope of the Marine Sediment and Water Quality Assessment 18 As part of its written evidence, Cowichan Tribes submitted a report entitled Trans Mountain 19 Expansion Project Environmental Assessment Application Review (Filing ID A4Q0U9). In this 20 report, various recommendations are made to expand the scope of the assessment of potential 21 Project effects on marine sediment and water quality (e.g., change in spatial boundaries, 22 indicators, extent of baseline data coverage). At this stage of the Application review, no changes 23 to indicators used to assess potential effects of the Project on marine sediment and water 24 quality, or changes to spatial boundaries are considered necessary. The indicators and spatial 25 boundaries were developed based on the NEB Filing Manual and refined in consultation with 26 regulatory agencies and technical experts. Trans Mountain considers the scoping of the 27 Application to be appropriate for assessing construction and operation activities at the 28 Westridge Marine Terminal and the increase in Project-related marine vessel traffic along the 29 shipping lanes. Should disposal of sediment at sea be identified as a Project activity, the 30 requirements of a disposal at sea permit application would be met, including consideration of 31 sediment dispersal at a disposal site, as well as any other required information to support the 32 application.

33 Trans Mountain thanks the Cowichan Tribes for identifying additional oceanographic data, and 34 water and sediment chemistry data sources for the Strait of Georgia. The incorporation of 35 additional data into the Application is not considered necessary at this time. The level of data 36 provided in the Application was sufficient to identify potential Project interactions with marine 37 sediment and water quality and to develop mitigation measures appropriate to managing those 38 potential effects. For a discussion on the mitigation measures that will be implemented at the 39 Westridge Marine Terminal to reduce potential effects on marine sediment and water quality,

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1 and resultant effects on marine biota, please refer to Volume 5A, Section 7.6.8.4 (Filing ID 2 A3S1R0) and Volume 6D, Section 8.2 (Westridge Marine Terminal EPP, Filing ID A3S2S9).

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54.0 MARINE FISH AND FISH HABITAT 1 A number of intervenors submitted written evidence that commented on the assessment of 2 potential effects of Project construction and operations on marine fish and fish habitat. Topics 3 raised in these submissions include:

4 · adequacy of the assessment of potential effects of ballast water introductions 5 of marine aquatic invasive species and measures to reduce the risk of aquatic 6 invasive species introductions;

7 · adequacy of the assessment of potential effects of vessel noise on marine fish;

8 · concern that vessel wake from the increase in Project-related marine vessel 9 traffic will result in shoreline erosion; and

10 · adequacy of the proposed approach to marine fish habitat offsetting.

11 The following provides Trans Mountain’s response to the above assertions related to marine fish 12 and fish habitat.

54.1 Ballast Water and Aquatic Invasive Species 13 As part of its written evidence, Cowichan Tribes submitted a report titled Trans Mountain 14 Expansion Project Environmental Assessment Application Review (Ecofish Research Ltd. 15 [Ecofish] 2015; Filing ID A4Q0U9). This report states that the Application does not provide an 16 adequate assessment of the environmental effects of potential ballast water introductions of 17 marine aquatic invasive species. Trans Mountain disagrees with this assertion. Volume 5A, 18 Section 7.6.9.4 (Filing ID A3S1R0) discusses the potential effects of accidental introductions of 19 aquatic invasive species from ballast water discharges, and provides an overview of the federal 20 laws and legislation that are in place to reduce the risk of aquatic invasive species introductions. 21 As discussed in Volume 5A, Section 7.6.9.4 (Filing ID A3S1R0), the most effective way to 22 mitigate the introduction of aquatic invasive species is to regulate and manage pathways of 23 introduction.

24 In Canadian waters, the release of ballast water is regulated by the Ballast Water Control and 25 Management Regulations (Ballast Water Regulations) pursuant to subsection 35(1) and 26 section 190 of the Canada Shipping Act, 2001. According to Transport Canada (2012), the 27 purpose of the Ballast Water Regulations is to protect waters under Canadian jurisdiction from 28 non-indigenous aquatic organisms and pathogens that can be harmful to ecosystems by 29 minimizing the probability of future introductions of harmful aquatic organisms and pathogens 30 from ships’ ballast water while protecting the safety of ships. Ballast water is considered 31 managed if it is exchanged, treated or transferred to a reception facility once sediment has 32 settled into tanks, or retained onboard the vessel (Transport Canada 2012). The Ballast Water 33 Regulations outline a number of mandatory ballast water management procedures related to 34 ballast water management plans, ballast water exchange and treatment, reporting requirements, 35 compliance and enforcement, and research.

36 A ballast water management plan outlines the processes and procedures for the safe and 37 effective management of ballast water. Under the Ballast Water Regulations, owners of 38 Canadian and foreign vessels must ensure the preparation of ballast water management plans,

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1 and ensure that a copy of the applicable plan is carried on board and the processes and 2 procedures in the plan are carried out.

3 The Ballast Water Regulations outline a set of procedures for ballast water exchange or 4 treatment prior to discharge in waters under Canadian jurisdiction. These procedures are based 5 on the IMO Guidelines for Ballast Water Management and Development of Ballast Water 6 Management Plans and the IMO Guidelines for Ballast Water Exchange (IMO 2005a,b). All 7 ships entering Canadian waters must exchange ballast water outside the 200 nautical mile limit 8 of Canada’s exclusive economic zone (Transport Canada 2015). Exchange of ballast water in 9 deep ocean areas or open seas lowers the probability that harmful aquatic organisms and 10 pathogens will be transferred in ships’ ballast water (Transport Canada 2012). If offshore 11 exchange is not feasible for safety reasons such as poor weather, ballast exchange is allowed 12 in designated alternate exchange zones (Transport Canada 2015). Loaded vessels coming from 13 outside waters normally carry some residual ballast water onboard. Before a vessel can take on 14 ballast in tanks containing residual ballast water and subsequently discharge it in Canadian 15 waters, it must ensure that the residual ballast water has been exposed to salinity conditions 16 equivalent to mid-ocean ballast exchange (Transport Canada 2012).

17 Transport Canada inspectors may inspect a vessel to determine whether the vessel is in 18 compliance with the Ballast Water Regulations. The inspection process may include inspection 19 of the ballast water record book, ballast water management plan, sampling of the vessels ballast 20 water, and any other documentation or assistance as required by the inspector (Transport 21 Canada 2012). Vessels may also be boarded to collect ballast water samples for scientific 22 analysis to further research the effectiveness of ballast water management (Transport 23 Canada 2012).

24 Ships can choose to treat ballast water before entering Canadian waters instead of exchanging 25 it. Under the Ballast Water Regulations, treated ballast water must meet the Ballast Water 26 Performance Standard specified in Regulation D-2 of the IMO Regulations for the Control and 27 Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments to be acceptable (Transport Canada 2012). 28 In their report, Ecofish recommends that Trans Mountain require all tankers calling on the 29 Westridge Marine Terminal to undergo mandatory treatment of ballast water to standards 30 recommended by the IMO Ballast Water Management Conference (Filing ID A4Q0U9). 31 However, Trans Mountain does not own or operate the vessels calling on the Westridge Marine 32 Terminal and, therefore, cannot impose such a requirement.

33 All tankers calling on the Westridge Marine Terminal are required to comply with all federal laws 34 and legislation regarding ballast water management, including the Canadian Shipping Act, 2001 35 and the Ballast Water Regulations. Compliance with the Ballast Water Regulations will reduce 36 the likelihood that aquatic invasive species will be introduced during ballast water exchange. In 37 its written evidence, DFO states that “[a]lthough Trans Mountain does not own or operate the 38 vessels that will be calling at the Westridge Marine Terminal these vessels will be required to 39 comply with the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 and the Ballast Water Regulations. Compliance 40 with these regulations will reduce the risk of introduction of harmful aquatic organisms or 41 pathogens during ballast water exchanges as is currently the case with commercial shipping 42 vessels berthing at Canadian ports on the west coast.” (Filing ID A4L7D4).

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54.2 Underwater Noise from Vessels 1 The written evidence of Raincoast includes a report prepared by Dr. Caroline H. Fox titled 2 Evaluation of Impacts on Pacific Herring and Other Forage Fish from Proposed Trans Mountain 3 Pipeline Expansion Project (Filing ID A4L9F3). In this report, Dr. Fox states that the Application 4 lacks relevant information regarding fish responses to underwater noise, and that this may have 5 served to “minimize potential project-related effects.” Trans Mountain disagrees with this 6 assertion. Volume 8A, Section 4.3.6.4.1 (Filing ID A3S4Y3) provides a discussion on the 7 potential effects of underwater noise from Project-related vessels (i.e., tankers and tugs) on 8 marine fish and invertebrates found within the Marine RSA. This section of the Application 9 discusses the study conducted by Schwarz and Greer (1984), who investigated the behavioural 10 responses of net-penned Pacific herring to a variety of tape-recorded underwater sounds, and 11 references several review papers on the effects of anthropogenic sounds on fish and 12 invertebrates (e.g., Hastings and Popper 2005, Moriyasu et al. 2004, Popper and Hastings 13 2009a,b). Further discussion on the effects of vessel noise on marine fish is provided in the 14 response to GoC DFO IR No. 2.081 (Filing ID A4H6A5), including reference to additional 15 behavioural studies (e.g., Vabø et al. 2002, Jørgensen et al. 2004, Sarà et al. 2007) and review 16 papers (e.g., Slabbekoorn et al. 2010, Hawkins et al. 2014, Popper et al. 2014).

17 As discussed in Volume 8A,Section 4.3.6.4.1 (Filing ID A3S4Y3), and in the response to GoC 18 DFO IR No. 2.081 (Filing ID A4H6A5), there are few studies that have investigated the effects of 19 underwater noise from vessel traffic on marine fish, particularly for those species that occur 20 within the Marine RSA. While the few available studies indicate that some species exhibit 21 localized avoidance behaviour (e.g., Schwarz and Greer 1984, Vabø et al. 2002, Jørgensen et 22 al. 2004, Sarà et al. 2007), there is general consensus in the literature that the number and 23 context of these studies is too limited for extrapolation (Popper and Hastings 2009a,b; 24 Slabbekoorn et al. 2010; Hawkins et al. 2014; Popper et al. 2014). Currently, there are no 25 universal criteria or thresholds for assessing the effects of underwater noise produced by 26 vessels on marine fish (Popper and Hastings 2009a,b; Hawkins et al. 2014). Due to these 27 limitations, the potential effects of vessel noise on marine fish were discussed in the Application, 28 but were not carried forward for detailed assessment. In its written evidence, DFO agrees with 29 the approach taken, stating that “it would be difficult for the Proponent to conduct a detailed 30 effects assessment on the potential effects of underwater noise on marine fish and 31 invertebrates,” given that there is “limited information available on species-specific behavioural 32 responses of marine fish and invertebrates to marine vessel noise in the Marine RSA” and that 33 “no Canadian standards or thresholds have been established for assessing such effects” (Filing 34 ID A4L7D4).

35 Trans Mountain maintains its position with respect to the potential effects of underwater noise 36 generated by Project-related vessels on marine fish. Specifically, marine fish located near 37 berthed or transiting tankers and escort tugs may respond to the underwater noise by moving 38 away from the sound source for the duration of the disturbance; however, this is not expected to 39 result in large-scale displacement of fish populations from foraging, spawning, rearing, or 40 migration areas. Thus, no effects at the population level are anticipated.

54.3 Vessel Wake 41 Shoreline erosion resulting from Project-related vessel wake is also identified as a concern in 42 intervenor evidence. In the Affidavit of Chief Arliss Daniels of the Pacheedaht FN (Filing 43 ID A4L5K2), Chief Daniels states that “Pacheedaht are concerned that damage to sensitive

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1 ecosystems through erosion may have a detrimental effect on the shoreline resources and our 2 ability to harvest our traditional foods.” In the Affidavit of Chief Gordon Planes of the T’Sou-ke 3 Nation (Filing ID A4L5T0), Chief Planes states that “wake from increased tanker traffic could 4 damage intertidal and shoreline habitat, which is where T’Sou-ke members harvest many 5 important species.” The written evidence of the Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing ID A4L6A4) states 6 that the increase in Project-related vessel traffic “will contribute to ongoing shoreline erosion and 7 in turn lead to loss of important archaeological and cultural heritage sites, damage to important 8 forage fish habitat, and loss of land on Tsleil-Waututh Reserve.” The report commissioned by 9 the Musqueam IB entitled Preliminary Report – Written Evidence (Filing ID A4Q2F9) also lists 10 “wake/prop energy” as a concern related to increased tanker traffic.

11 In Volume 8A, Section 4.3.6.6.1 (Filing ID A3S4Y3), Trans Mountain provides a detailed 12 assessment of the potential effects of vessel wake generated by Project-related tankers and 13 tugs on shoreline habitats and associated biota. Calculated wake wave heights from tankers 14 and tugs travelling at various speeds along the marine shipping route are presented in 15 Tables 4.3.6.4 and 4.3.6.5 of Volume 8A, Section 4.3.6.6.1 (Filing ID A3S4Y3). The results of 16 this quantitative assessment indicate that vessel wake will not be detectable from existing wave 17 conditions along most of the shoreline adjacent to the shipping lanes. In areas where the 18 shipping lanes pass within 2 km of the shoreline, such as in Burrard Inlet, Haro Strait, and the 19 area around Victoria on Vancouver Island, maximum wave heights are predicted to be less than 20 0.1 m at the shoreline. Waves of this height are well within the range of natural wave conditions, 21 and are not expected to result in increased sediment erosion or disturbance to intertidal habitats 22 or biota. In its written evidence, DFO agrees with Trans Mountain’s conclusions presented in the 23 Application, stating that “[b]ased on the Proponent’s findings, DFO is of the view that potential 24 effects on intertidal fish habitat from Project-related vessel wake are unlikely to differ 25 substantially from current conditions in the Marine RSA, and considers the likelihood and 26 magnitude of such occurrences to be of low risk to intertidal habitat and associated biota.” 27 (Filing ID A4L7D4).

54.4 Habitat Offsetting 28 Construction of the Westridge Marine Terminal is expected to result in the permanent alteration 29 and destruction of marine fish habitat within the footprint of the expanded terminal. To offset 30 these impacts, Trans Mountain is proposing to construct a subtidal rock reef within the Eastern 31 Burrard Inlet Rockfish Conservation Area (RCA). The creation of this subtidal rock reef will 32 increase the availability of rock substrate in the Eastern Burrard Inlet RCA, providing structurally 33 complex habitat for a diverse assemblage of algae, invertebrates, and fish. While the primary 34 goal of the subtidal rock reef is to improve habitat for rockfish, the reefs are expected to benefit 35 a variety of other important CRA fishery species, including, but not limited to, Pacific salmon, 36 lingcod, Pacific herring, red rock crab, and Dungeness crab. A detailed discussion of the 37 ecological benefits of the proposed subtidal rock reef offsetting measure is provided in the 38 Preliminary Marine Fish Habitat Offsetting Plan (Stantec Consulting Ltd. August 2014; Filing ID 39 A4F5C5).

40 In its written evidence, the Village of Belcarra (Filing ID A4L5G5) argues that the proposed 41 subtidal rock reef offsetting measure is alone insufficient, and that Trans Mountain should also 42 be required to create additional eelgrass habitat within Central Burrard Inlet as “recompense” for 43 the increased footprint of the Westridge Marine Terminal. While Trans Mountain agrees that 44 eelgrass beds provide high value habitat for a number of important CRA fish species, and 45 appreciates Belcarra’s suggestion, Trans Mountain does not believe that eelgrass habitat

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1 creation is a suitable offsetting measure for the Project. First, construction of the Westridge 2 Marine Terminal will not adversely affect any eelgrass habitat. There are no eelgrass beds 3 located within the footprint of the expanded terminal, or within the Marine Fish and Fish Habitat 4 LSA, which extends 500 m outward from the proposed water lot expansion. Second, since there 5 are no naturally-occurring eelgrass beds located in close proximity to the Westridge Marine 6 Terminal, the environmental conditions in this area (e.g., substrate type, elevation, light 7 penetration, and current regime) may not be suitable for eelgrass establishment and growth. To 8 minimize the likelihood of failure, an eelgrass transplant site should be located adjacent to, or in 9 close proximity to, an existing bed. This would require that the offsetting site be located away 10 from the Westridge Marine Terminal, resulting in non-localized benefits. In DFO’s Fisheries 11 Productivity Investment Policy: A Proponent’s Guide to Offsetting, DFO recommends that 12 “[w]hen determining the location for offsetting, offsets that occur within the vicinity of the project 13 or within the same watershed are preferable.” (DFO 2013). Finally, while there are numerous 14 examples of successful eelgrass transplant projects, success is not guaranteed. In a review of 15 15 eelgrass transplant projects completed in British Columbia between 1985 and 2000, 16 Precision Identification (2002) rated seven projects as successful and three as failures, with the 17 remaining five projects demonstrating good development and expected to be classified as 18 successes in future years. Compared to eelgrass beds, which require specific abiotic and biotic 19 conditions for survival, artificial rock reefs have a very low likelihood of failure. Once 20 constructed, the three-dimensional structure of a rock reef provides complex habitat for a myriad 21 of marine organisms for as long as the reef remains in place.

22 As discussed in Section 6.0 of the Preliminary Marine Fish Habitat Offsetting Plan (Filing 23 ID A4F5C5), Trans Mountain has not yet determined the final size or dimensions of the subtidal 24 rock reef. This will depend on the ultimate quantification of habitat loss incurred as a result of 25 Project construction, which will not be known with certainty until detailed engineering of the 26 Westridge Marine Terminal is complete. Once the final losses are known, the amount of 27 offsetting habitat will be determined in consultation with DFO and PMV. The final size of the reef 28 will reflect the ecological value of the affected habitats (i.e., marine riparian, intertidal, and 29 subtidal) and the ecological value of the offsetting habitat (i.e., subtidal rock reef), and will 30 consider any time-lag between Project construction and offsetting construction, as well as any 31 uncertainty in the effectiveness of the subtidal reef. This will ensure that all habitat losses are 32 fully offset and that the ongoing productivity of CRA fisheries is maintained or improved.

54.5 References 33 Fisheries and Oceans Canada. 2013. Fisheries Productivity Investment Policy: A Proponent’s 34 Guide to Offsetting. Ecosystem Programs Policy. Fisheries and Oceans Canada. 35 Ottawa, Ontario. 19 pp.

36 Hastings, M.C. and A.N. Popper. 2005. Effects of Sound on Fish. Prepared for California 37 Department of Transportation Contract No. 43A0139, Task Order 1. Jones & Stokes, 38 Sacramento, CA. 82 pp.

39 Hawkins, A.D., A.E. Pembroke and A.N. Popper. 2014. Information gaps in understanding the 40 effects of noise on fishes and invertebrates. Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries. DOI 41 10.1007/s11160-014-9369-3.

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1 International Maritime Organization. 2005a. Guidelines for Ballast Water Management and 2 Development of Ballast Water Management Plans. Annex 5, Resolution 3 MEPC.127(53).15 pp.

4 International Maritime Organization 2005b. Guidelines for Ballast Water Exchange. Annex 2, 5 Resolution MEPC.124(53). 7 pp.

6 Jørgensen, R., N.O. Handegard, H. Gjøsæter and A. Slotte. 2004. Possible vessel avoidance 7 behaviour of capelin in a feeding area and on a spawning ground. Fisheries Research 8 69:251-261.

9 Moriyasu, M., R. Allain, K. Benhalimaand and R. Claytor. 2004. Effects of Seismic and Marine 10 Noise on Invertebrates: A Literature Review. Canadian Science Advisory Secretariat 11 Research Document 2004/126. Fisheries and Oceans Canada. 50 pp.

12 Popper, A.N. and M.C. Hastings. 2009a. The effects of anthropogenic sources of sound on 13 fishes. Journal of Fish Biology 75:455-489.

14 Popper, A.N. and M.C. Hastings. 2009b. The effects of human-generated sound on fish. 15 Integrative Zoology 4:43-52.

16 Popper, A.N., A.D. Hawkins, R.R. Fay, D.A. Mann, S. Bartol, T.J. Carlson, S. Coombs, W.T. 17 Ellison, R.L. Gentry, M.B. Halvorsen, S. Løkkeborg, P.H. Rogers, B.L. Southall, D.G. 18 Zeddies and W.N. Tavolga. 2014. Sound Exposure Guidelines for Fishes and Sea 19 Turtles: A Technical Report prepared by ANSI-Accredited Standards Committee S3/SC1 20 and registered with ANSI. ASA S3/SC1.4 TR-2014. ASA Press. 73 pp.

21 Precision Identification. 2002. A review and assessment of eelgrass transplant projects in British 22 Columbia. Prepared for Fisheries and Oceans Canada. 55 pp.

23 Sarà, G., J.M. Dean, D. D’Amato, G. Buscaino, A. Olivieri, S. Genovese, S. Ferro, G. Buffa, M. 24 Lo Martire and S. Mazzola. 2007. Effect of boat noise on the behaviour of Bluefin tuna 25 Thunnus thynnus in the Mediterranean Sea. Marine Ecology Progress Series 331:243- 26 253.

27 Schwarz, A.L. and G.L. Greer. 1984. Responses of Pacific herring, Clupea harengus pallasi, to 28 some underwater sounds. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 29 41(8):1183-1192.

30 Slabbekoorn, H., N. Bouton, E. van Opzeeland, A. Coers, C. ten Cate and A.N. Popper. 2010. A 31 noisy spring: the impact of globally rising underwater sound levels on fish. Trends in 32 Ecology and Evolution 25(7):419-427.

33 Transport Canada. 2012. A Guide to Canada’s Ballast Water Control and Management 34 Regulations TP 13617 E. Website: http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/marinesafety/tp-tp13617- 35 menu-2138.htm. (Note that “A Guide to Canada’s Ballast Water Control and 36 Management Regulations TP 13617 E” is an online resource and is not optimized for 37 printing or saving offline). Accessed: June 2015.

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1 Transport Canada. 2015. The Canadian Ballast Water Program. Website: 2 http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/marinesafety/oep-environment-ballastwater-menu-449.htm. 3 (Note that “The Canadian Ballast Water Program” is an online resource and is not 4 optimized for printing or saving offline). Accessed: June 2015.

5 Vabø, R., K. Olsen and I. Huse. 2002. The effect of vessel avoidance of wintering Norwegian 6 spring spawning herring. Fisheries Research 58:59-77.

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55.0 MARINE MAMMALS 1 Several intervenors filed written evidence identifying concerns regarding potential Project 2 interactions with marine mammals. Assertions focused primarily on the potential effects of 3 increased marine shipping associated with the Project, and specifically the resulting:

4 · increase in underwater noise (and to a lesser degree atmospheric noise; 5 Filing IDs A4L6A4, A4L6Y2, A4L8Y1, A4Q0U9, A4Q0H9, A4L8C2, A4L5F3, 6 A4Q1D4, A4L7T2, A4L6A4, A4L5T0, A4L9F2, A4L9G0, A4L9G2, A4Q0Q5);

7 · potential increase in vessel strikes (Filing IDs A4L6Y2, A4Q0H9, A4L8C2, 8 A4L5F3, A4Q1D4, A4L5T0, A4L9F2, A4L9G2, A4Q0Q5);

9 · potential for Project-related oil spills and marine pollution (Filing IDs A4L6Y2, 10 A4L8Y1, A4Q0U9, A4Q0H9, A4L8C2, A4L7T2, A4L6A4, A4L5T0, A4Q1X6, 11 A4L92, A4Q0Q5, A4L9F2); and

12 · secondary effects on marine mammals resulting from Project-related effects on 13 prey (Filing IDs A4Q0H9, A4L8C2, A4L9F2).

14 The above list of identified concerns and related effects on marine mammals have been 15 identified and assessed by Trans Mountain in the Application (Volume 8A, Section 4.3.7, Marine 16 Mammals; Filing ID A3S4Y3). Intervenors such as Cowichan Tribes (Filing ID A4Q0U9) 17 expressed that they considered this list to include all potential effects on marine mammals.

18 The following subsections provide Trans Mountain’s response to issues relating to the first two 19 points above (i.e., underwater noise and vessel strikes), and also provide clarification on 20 apparent items of misunderstanding. The remaining two issues were addressed in separate 21 sections of the Application and are not further addressed in this section. They are discussed 22 elsewhere in the Reply Evidence as follows:

23 · Potential for effects associated with contaminants was addressed in the 24 Application in Volume 8A, Sections 4.3.2, Marine Sediment and Water Quality, 25 4.3.13 (bilge water release), and 5.0 (oil spills; Filing ID A3S4Y3). Further 26 information may be found in Section 53 (Marine Sediment and Water Quality) 27 and Section 46 (Ecological Risk Assessment) of this Reply Evidence.

28 · Potential Project-related effects on marine fish and fish habitat (i.e., potential 29 prey) were assessed in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.6 of the Application 30 (Filing ID A3S4Y3) and were found to be not significant. Further information 31 may be found in Section 55 (Marine Fish and Fish Habitat) of this Reply 32 Evidence.

33 Several intervenors also provided traditional or personal knowledge and sighting information for 34 marine mammals in the Marine RSA; Filing IDs A4L6Y2, A4Q0H9, A4L5F3, A4L6A4). Trans 35 Mountain is appreciative of this type of information and welcomes further such contributions. 36 Local knowledge of this nature will improve Trans Mountain’s understanding of this marine 37 resource and may contribute to future refinement of mitigation measures such as those 38 identified in the Framework for the Marine Mammal Protection Program (MMPP; refer to 39 response to NEB IR No. 1.56; Filing ID A3W9H8).

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55.1 Westridge Marine Terminal 1 No pathways of effects to marine mammals associated with operation of the Westridge Marine 2 Terminal were identified by Trans Mountain (Volume 5A, Section 7.6.11.1; Filing ID A3S1R0) or 3 raised by any of the intervenors, and only a few intervenors commented on potential effects 4 during the construction phase of the Project.

5 Tsleil-Waututh Nation raised concerns that acoustic disturbance in Burrard Inlet was not 6 included in the assessment (Filing ID A4L6A4); however, the potential effects of underwater 7 noise on marine mammals during construction of the Westridge Marine Terminal were assessed 8 in detail in Volume 5A, Section 7.6.11 of the Application (Filing ID A3S1R0). As described in 9 Volume 8A, Section 4.3.7.2 of the Application (Filing ID A3S4Y3), the Marine RSA [Marine 10 Transportation] is generally centred on the marine shipping lanes, and these extend from the 11 Westridge Marine Terminal through Burrard Inlet, south through the southern part of the Strait of 12 Georgia, the Gulf Islands and Haro Strait, westward past Victoria and through Juan de Fuca 13 Strait out to the 12 nautical mile limit of Canada’s territorial sea. Thus, the waters of Burrard 14 Inlet are included in the assessments of underwater noise presented in both Volumes 5A and 15 8A of the Application (i.e., during construction at Westridge Marine Terminal and during marine 16 transportation).

17 DFO supported Trans Mountain’s characterization of marine mammal use of the waters 18 surrounding the Westridge Marine Terminal when they stated: “the Marine Mammal LSA and 19 RSA have been highly influenced by anthropogenic development, and <…> the existing habitat 20 for marine mammals in the vicinity of the Terminal not considered high quality habitat” 21 (Filing ID A4L7D4). DFO’s evidence (Filing ID A4L7D4) also supported the conclusions 22 presented in Trans Mountain’s assessment of construction effects on marine mammals (Filing 23 ID A3S1R0): “DFO is of the view that the residual effects of TTS and sensory disturbance on marine mammals from Project construction-related noise will 25 likely be of low risk.”

26 Métis Nation British Columbia (Filing ID A4Q2H2) has encouraged Trans Mountain to implement 27 a mitigation plan at the Westridge Marine Terminal, in the “unlikely event” that marine mammals 28 were observed within the Marine RSA [Westridge Marine Terminal]. Trans Mountain welcomes 29 this suggestion and would like to direct Métis Nation British Columbia to the MMPP (refer to 30 response to NEB IR No. 1.56; Filing ID A3W9H8), which outlines measures that will reduce 31 potential effects on marine mammals during construction of the Westridge Marine Terminal. As 32 concluded by DFO in their review of this plan: “Residual effects on marine mammals from 33 construction and operation of the proposed Westridge Marine Terminal expansion are unlikely 34 with the implementation of mitigation measures identified in the Proponent’s Marine Mammal 35 Protection Program.” (Filing ID A4L7D4).

55.1.1 Harbour Seal Indicator 36 Development of the ESA considered potential Project-related effects with respect to all marine 37 mammal species within the Marine RSA [Westridge Marine Terminal]; however, an indicator 38 species was selected upon which to focus the assessment. For the assessment of the 39 Westridge Marine Terminal, harbour seals (Phoca vitulina richardsi) were used to assess 40 potential effects of construction. No intervenors raised concerns about the use of this species 41 for the assessment of effects during construction at Westridge Marine Terminal; however, some 42 intervenors argued that this species should also have been considered as its own indicator in

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1 the assessment of marine transportation. This issue is discussed further in Section 55.2.1 2 below, under the Steller sea lion indicator section.

55.2 Marine Transportation 3 Development of the ESA considered potential Project-related effects with respect to all marine 4 mammal species within the Marine RSA [Marine Transportation]. However, for the assessment 5 of the increase of marine transportation associated with the Project, three indicators were 6 selected for a more detailed assessment to represent the full range of potential effects to a 7 broad range of marine mammal species. The selected indicators were Steller sea lions 8 (Eumetopias jubatus spp. monteriensis), southern resident killer whales (Orcinus orca), and 9 humpback whales (Megaptera novaeangliae). Intervenor evidence relating to each of these 10 indicators is addressed separately below.

55.2.1 Steller Sea Lion Indicator 11 Cowichan Tribes expressed uncertainty as to whether the assessment of effects on Steller sea 12 lion (the pinniped indicator selected for marine transportation) could adequately capture 13 potential effects on other pinniped species such as harbour seals. The rationale provided was 14 that there is DFO-identified Important Area for harbour seals within the Marine RSA, and the 15 same is not true for Steller sea lions (Filing ID A4Q0U9). Board of FER had a similar concern 16 about the appropriate use of Steller sea lion as a pinniped indicator (Filing ID A4L6Y2), given 17 the presence of pupping sites for harbour seals and elephant seals in the Marine RSA (Steller 18 sea lions only breed on a few select rookeries in BC and none of these occur in the Marine 19 RSA). Trans Mountain addressed these issues previously, in their response to Cowichan Tribes 20 IR No. 2.1.03 (Filing ID A61126) and Board of FER IR No. 1.11 (Filing ID A3Y2D7).

21 While Trans Mountain recognizes that there is DFO-identified Important Area for harbour seals 22 in the Marine RSA (as shown on Volume 8A, Figure 4.2.22 of the Application; Filing 23 ID A3S4X9), as stated in the aforementioned IR responses, harbour seals are ubiquitous in 24 BC’s coastal waters, and use over a thousand haulout sites to rest, moult, mate, and give birth 25 to their pups (DFO 2010a). Harbour seal habitat within the Marine RSA is therefore not unique 26 to this area. Harbour seals are also not a SCC and are not listed on SARA given their large and 27 increasing population. In contrast to this, Steller sea lions, which are listed as Special Concern, 28 congregate to breed, birth, and rear their pups on a very limited number of rookeries in BC 29 (DFO 2010b). The rationale for selection of marine mammal indicators was presented in Volume 30 8A, Section 4.3.7.1 of the Application (Filing ID A3S4Y3). All pinnipeds belong to the same 31 functional hearing group, and effects of sensory disturbance to the Steller sea lion indicator are 32 expected to be comparable to effects on all pinniped species found within the Marine RSA, 33 including harbour seals. Furthermore, all pinnipeds (including elephant seals and harbour seals) 34 pup and rear their young onshore, and therefore pups are not expected to be disturbed by 35 underwater noise from transiting vessels. Current levels of vessel traffic along the shipping 36 lanes in the Marine RSA do not appear to have affected pinniped use of haulouts or breeding 37 sites. Despite the fact that there exists DFO-important area for harbour seals in the Marine RSA, 38 Steller sea lions are also regularly sighted in this area, are a species of higher conservation 39 concern, and effect pathways and thresholds for assessment (i.e., acoustic disturbance 40 thresholds) are the same between both species; therefore, Trans Mountain maintains that the 41 Steller sea lion is a reasonable indicator to represent effects to other pinniped species in the 42 Marine RSA. As concluded by DFO in their evidence: “The Proponent’s assessment supports

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1 their conclusion that potential residual effects from underwater noise and ship strikes would be 2 negligible on Stellar [sic] Sea Lions.” (Filing ID A4L7D4).

3 Cowichan Tribes raised concerns that the assessment did not include effects of in-air noise for 4 pinniped species (Filing ID A4Q0U9). Potential for effects of in-air (i.e., atmospheric) noise on 5 pinniped behaviour were considered, but were scoped out of the assessment, as discussed in 6 Volume 8A, Section 4.3.7.4.1 of the Application (Filing ID A3S4Y3). In their evidence, DFO 7 agreed with the findings of Trans Mountain’s ESA, stating: “Potential effects of atmospheric 8 noise are most likely to affect pinnipeds as opposed to other marine mammal species 9 (e.g., cetaceans) since they spend more of their time on land. Behavioural responses of 10 pinnipeds to noise from Project-related marine traffic is unlikely to change substantially from 11 current conditions; as noted by the Proponent, Steller Sea Lions often habituate to chronic 12 disturbances, and many well-used pinniped haulout locations are in close proximity to existing 13 shipping lanes” (Filing ID A4L7D4).

14 Based largely on their dissatisfaction with the selection of Steller sea lions as the pinniped 15 indicator, Board of FER (Filing ID A4L6Y2) claims that the selection of marine mammal 16 indicators is flawed and that Trans Mountain had not done a thorough job of getting the most 17 up-to-date data available on marine mammal populations. In contrast, DFO noted that “The 18 Proponent has accurately characterized existing <…> marine mammal resources within the 19 Marine Regional Study Area (Marine RSA) for the proposed Westridge Marine Terminal 20 Expansion and the marine shipping lanes.” (Filing ID A4L7D4).

21 Trans Mountain’s Application concluded that Project-related effects of marine transportation on 22 Steller sea lions in the Marine RSA are considered to be not significant (Filing ID A3S4Y3) and 23 the evidence filed by DFO supports this conclusion: “Based on DFO’s review of the Proponent’s 24 assessment, the residual effect of underwater noise from increased Project-related marine 25 vessel traffic on Steller Sea Lions has been accurately characterized in the Project Application, 26 and their assessment supports their conclusion that potential residual effects would be 27 negligible for this species.” (Filing ID A4L7D4).

55.2.2 Humpback Whale Indicator 28 In their evidence, DFO stated that: “The Proponent concludes Project-related vessel noise is 29 unlikely to have an effect on humpback whales.” (Filing ID A4L7D4). This statement is incorrect 30 and Trans Mountain would like to provide clarification on this point. Trans Mountain’s 31 assessment of underwater noise concluded that there would in fact be residual effects from the 32 increase in Project-related marine traffic on humpback whales. Based on the United States’ 33 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association’s (NOAA) behavioural disruption threshold and 34 acoustic modelling done for this Project, Trans Mountain concluded that there is a high 35 probability that Project-related underwater noise within the Marine RSA will exceed NOAA’s 36 regulatory standards for sensory disturbance. While there are no Canadian regulatory standards 37 with respect to this effect, the NOAA thresholds are used as commonly-applied environmental 38 standards. The standard nature of this approach was recognized by DFO in their evidence: 39 “These are commonly applied standards that have also been used by DFO in the past 40 (e.g., Lawson and Lesage 2012).” (Filing ID A4L7D4). Trans Mountain further concluded that 41 humpback whales within 4 to 7 km of the shipping lanes are expected to be disturbed by vessel 42 traffic, that this noise would likely be detectable over much greater distances, and that 43 humpback whales will experience some degree of Project-related sensory disturbance while in 44 the Marine RSA. Despite this predicted residual effect, Trans Mountain recognized that the

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1 Marine RSA overlaps a small portion of the identified Canadian critical habitat for this species 2 and only a small proportion of the much larger North Pacific population of humpback whales 3 occurs seasonally in the Marine RSA. For these population status reasons, the magnitude of the 4 residual effect was rated as medium.

5 DFO also expressed uncertainty as to whether Trans Mountain had considered humpback 6 whale foraging site fidelity (Filing ID A4L7D4), an ecological factor which could influence the 7 conclusions presented in the Application. Trans Mountain maintains that its assessment of 8 effects on humpback whales and subsequent significance determination accurately considered 9 the localized areas of high humpback whale abundance that occur within the marine RSA. As 10 evidenced by the opportunistic sightings of humpback whales reported to the BC Cetacean 11 Sightings Network (BC CSN), and presented by Trans Mountain in the Application in 12 Volume 8B, Technical Report 8B-1, Figure 4.12 (Marine Resources - Marine Transportation 13 Technical Report; Filing ID A3S4J5), humpback whales have been observed throughout most of 14 the Marine RSA. While the BC CSN dataset is not corrected for effort, most humpback whale 15 sightings have been reported off Victoria and Race Rocks Ecological Reserve, in the Gulf and 16 San Juan Islands, and west of Cape Flattery. It is further understood by Trans Mountain that 17 humpback whales show high site fidelity to localized foraging areas (i.e., they return to the same 18 site to feed year after year) (e.g., Rambeau 2008; Ford et al. 2009; DFO 2010c). Trans 19 Mountain made reference to this fact in Volume 8A, Table 4.3.7.1 of the Application (Filing ID 20 A3S4Y3). In the humpback whale Recovery Strategy, DFO identified humpback whale critical 21 habitat in the area surrounding Swiftsure Bank (DFO 2013; as shown by Trans Mountain on 22 Volume 8A, Figure 4.2.22 of the Application; Filing ID A3S4X9). While humpback whales are 23 therefore known to occur in other parts of the Marine RSA, based on DFO’s boundaries of 24 critical habitat, it is Trans Mountain’s expectation that the highest numbers of humpback whales 25 in the Marine RSA would be found in the westernmost portion of this region. In making its 26 determination of significance for humpback whales, Trans Mountain considered that the 27 predicted residual effects will affect a relatively small, localized component of the overall North 28 Pacific (or Canadian) humpback whale population and only during periods of the year that they 29 are present within the Marine RSA. Trans Mountain also recognized that, although a SARA 30 Threatened species, the humpback whale population is large and increasing. As a result of 31 these considerations, effects of increased Project-related marine vessel traffic on humpback 32 whales were deemed to have a negative impact balance, but are not considered significant 33 (Filing ID A3S4Y3).

55.2.3 Southern Resident Killer Whale Indicator 34 Southern resident killer whales were selected by Trans Mountain as the indicator to represent 35 odontocetes (i.e., toothed whales), and many intervenors concentrated their evidence 36 specifically on this species. Raincoast Conservation Foundation (Raincoast) for example 37 commissioned two reports to analyze potential Project effects on southern resident killer whales 38 (Filing IDs A4L9G0 and A4L9G2). Raincoast’s review of Trans Mountain’s assessment of 39 effects of underwater noise on this species (Filing ID A4L9G0) is discussed in greater detail 40 below (refer to Section 55.4.2).

41 Reduction in the amount of time that southern resident killer whales spend feeding as a result of 42 vessel noise was raised as a concern for Board of the FER (Filing ID A4L6Y2), Metro 43 Vancouver (Filing ID A4L8C2) and Raincoast (Filing ID A4L9G0). This issue was addressed in 44 Volume 8A, Section 4.3.7.6.1 (Filing ID A3S4Y3). For southern resident killer whales, it was 45 determined that the current status of that population meant that any residual effect beyond

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1 current levels was undesirable, and furthermore, the entire population spends much of its time 2 in the Marine RSA. For that reason, residual effects of sensory disturbance on southern resident 3 killer whales were determined to be significant. 55.3 Accidents and Malfunctions (Vessel Strikes) 4 Pacheedaht First Nation (Filing ID A4L5F3), T’Sou-ke First Nation (Filing ID A4L5T0) and 5 Lyackson First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0H9) identified marine mammal vessel strikes as a 6 concern. The potential increase in marine mammal vessel strikes as a result of the Project was 7 addressed in the Accidents and Malfunctions section of the Application (Volume 8A, 8 Section 4.3.13; Filing ID A3S4Y3). DFO questioned Trans Mountain’s inclusion of vessel strikes 9 as accidental events (i.e., rather than as a result of routine operations; Filing ID A4L7D4). Trans 10 Mountain would like to clarify that while they agree that vessel strikes can occur during any 11 normal vessel’s operations, vessel strikes differ from routine effects in that their occurrence is 12 uncertain. For example, while all vessels (Project-related or not) transiting the Marine RSA will 13 output some degree of underwater noise, they will not all strike a marine mammal. For any 14 individual vessel, the probability of its striking a marine mammal is low.

15 Trans Mountain’s Application (filed in December 2013) presented a qualitative vessel strike 16 assessment that determined that the potential effect of accidental physical injury or mortality of 17 an individual marine mammal due to a vessel strike was not significant due to the low probability 18 of the event (Volume 8A, Section 4.3.13; Filing ID A3S4Y3). The magnitude of the effect ranged 19 from low to high depending on injury level and the species considered, with mortality of a SARA- 20 listed species considered a high magnitude effect. DFO, in their evidence, suggests that this 21 qualitative assessment may underestimate the true ship strike risk to marine mammals in the 22 Marine RSA (Filing ID A4L7D4). However, the need for a structured quantitative approach to 23 assessing ship strikes had been raised by DFO previously (Filing ID A4G5R8). In a follow-up 24 response to NEB IR No. 4.72, Trans Mountain filed a quantitative vessel strike risk analysis 25 (Filing ID A4K8Q0) that was available to intervenors for comment. Many of the concerns that 26 DFO identified during their previous IRs and their most recent evidence were addressed in the 27 new vessel strike risk analysis. Trans Mountain therefore considers that outstanding intervenor 28 (including DFO) comments relating to the original qualitative assessment have been 29 superceded and/or met by the filing of the quantitative study. The quantitative study concluded 30 that the overall probability of a Project-related vessel encountering19 a marine mammal in the 31 Marine RSA is considered very low. While encounter risk was predicted to be higher for 32 humpback whales and killer whales compared to the other species considered, this is largely a 33 factor of the much higher densities of humpback whales and killer whales in the study area. This 34 relationship also remains true with or without the addition of the Project.

35 In its evidence (concerning the qualitative assessment), DFO also noted that “high resolution 36 spatial data on the densities of marine mammal indicator species are lacking, particularly for the 37 Humpback Whale, which is the species most likely to be affected by ship strikes. Thus, an 38 accurate quantitative assessment of risk to Humpback Whales from existing shipping traffic is 39 not feasible at this time, nor is an estimate of the increased risk associated with Project-related 40 vessels.” Raincoast, in reviewing Trans Mountain’s 2015 quantitative vessel strike risk analysis, 41 likewise stated that although this quantitative study is the “most complete analysis to date,” it 42 lacks spatial densities of marine mammals. Trans Mountain does not disagree with this

19 Encounter risk refers to the probability that a whale and vessel share the same physical space at the same time. It does not predict whether actual contact between the whale and vessel is made.

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1 statement and acknowledged this limitation within their report: “a quantitative seasonal 2 accounting of densities is not publicly available for many of the marine mammal species 3 considered, nor for the entire Marine RSA; such information would greatly improve the 4 applicability and spatial resolution of the encounter model.” (Filing ID A4K8Q0).

5 Raincoast states that the strike analysis relies on occurrence data, primarily collected from 6 whale watchers, but this statement is inaccurate (Filing ID A4L9F2). The data to inform marine 7 mammal abundance and distribution in the vessel strike analysis included data collected by 8 Raincoast (Best and Halpin 2011; Williams and Thomas 2007), other published sources (e.g., 9 Dalla Rosa et al. 2012; Ford et al. 2010; Gregr et al. 2006) and data from the BC CSN. 10 Raincoast also incorrectly states that the uncertainty of the estimates was not quantified. 11 Confidence intervals are presented on Figure 8 of the study and a sensitivity analysis (which is 12 the same method used by Raincoast in their filed evidence [Filing ID A4L9G2]) was conducted 13 and presented in Section 4.2 of the report. Raincoast’s assertions that the assessment is 14 ‘possibly wrong’ are therefore not substantiated by the evidence provided. Assumptions and 15 potential sources of error and uncertainty associated with the model were clearly identified and 16 discussed within the report.

55.4 Additional Concerns Raised 55.4.1 Assessment Methodology and Appropriateness of Literature 17 In January 2015, DFO published a sufficiency review commenting on the methods and 18 conclusions presented in the Application (DFO 2015). While a few intervenors referenced this 19 report, or filed the report as an appendix to their own evidence (Filing IDs A4L6Y2, A4L5F3, 20 A4L5F8, A4L6A4), this report was never filed as evidence by DFO. Many of the concerns 21 identified in the report were addressed during the IR period, and Trans Mountain notes that the 22 majority of these concerns do not re-appear in DFO’s actual filed evidence (Filing ID A4L7D4). 23 For example, as discussed in Section 54.3 above, the lack of a structured quantitative vessel 24 strike analysis has since been addressed.

25 A number of intervenors identified that certain “key references” were lacking from the 26 Application. Evidence filed by the Board of FER referenced several presentations given during 27 the Salish Sea Conference held April 30 to May 2, 2014. Trans Mountain remains highly 28 supportive of conferences and research programs that improve understanding of marine 29 mammals in this region and may in the future rely on such information in the development and 30 refinement of its MMPP. However, the referenced conference was held after the Application was 31 filed on December 17, 2013; therefore information presented could not be included in the 32 assessment. Trans Mountain notes that other research on the subject of the presentations 33 (e.g., the effects of masking and underwater noise levels in southern resident killer whale critical 34 habitat) were included in the ESA (e.g., Bain and Dahlheim 1994; Erbe 2002; Clark et al. 2009; 35 Williams et al. 2013).

36 The acoustic report filed by Raincoast (Filing ID A4L9G0) asserts that Trans Mountain “ignores” 37 a paper by Miller et al. (2014) and suggests that “the best available science that vessel noise 38 will elicit a behavioural response” was not included in the assessment (citing Williams et al. 39 2014). While Raincoast seems to imply that this omission may have been intentional on Trans 40 Mountain’s part, both of these studies were published in 2014 (i.e., after the Application was 41 filed on December 17, 2013), and thus this literature was not available for inclusion in the 42 Application. Trans Mountain notes that in the absence of this research, other research

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1 discussing behavioural responses of killer whales was considered in the assessment 2 (e.g., Williams et al. 2002a,b; Williams et al. 2006; Lusseau et al. 2009).

3 The Raincoast acoustic report also asserts that the Proponent “ignored” an important study by 4 Williams et al. (2006), which showed that killer whales may reduce time feeding in the presence 5 of vessels. In fact, Volume 8A of the Application cites Williams et al. (2006) in more than one 6 location and devotes an entire paragraph to the subject of this study:

7 “Increases in sensory disturbance may also act additively with other stressors in 8 the environment. One of the primary concerns associated with the effects of 9 acoustic disturbance is that it can reduce the amount of time spent feeding. A 10 study by Williams et al. (2006) examined the effects of disturbance from boat 11 traffic in Johnstone Strait, BC, on the population of northern resident killer 12 whales. The researchers found that in the presence of boats, killer whales spent 13 a statistically-significant less amount of time feeding. The potential energetic cost 14 associated with this loss in feeding opportunity may have resulted in an 15 estimated 18 per cent decrease in energy intake (Williams et al. 2006). The 16 vessels in Williams et al.’s 2006 study were primarily commercial fishing traffic, 17 which would have been transiting the area tangentially to the killer whales. 18 Similar results were observed by Lusseau et al. (2009), who measured a 19 statistically significant negative effect on foraging for southern resident killer 20 whales in the presence (i.e., within 100 m and 400 m) of vessel traffic. Whales 21 were statistically significantly less likely to be foraging (and significantly 22 statistically more likely to be travelling) when boats were nearby (within 100 m; 23 Lusseau et al. 2009). The long-term consequences of reduced foraging in the 24 presence of vessels could be exacerbated for populations that are already prey- 25 limited, as may be the case for southern resident killer whales (Lusseau et al. 26 2009; DFO 2011a; Williams et al. 2011).” (Filing ID A3S4Y3).

27 In contrast to the above intervenor assertions regarding purported deficiencies in Trans 28 Mountain’s inclusion of relevant literature, DFO concluded that: “The Proponent has provided a 29 comprehensive review of the current literature on underwater noise and its potential effects on 30 marine mammals.” (Filing ID A4L7D4).

55.4.2 Underwater Noise Modelling and Assessment 31 General concerns about the effects of underwater noise on marine mammals were raised by 32 Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing ID A4L6A4), Lyackson First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0H9), 33 Pacheedaht First Nation (Filing ID A4L5F3), Tsawout First Nation (Filing ID A4Q1D4), and the 34 T’Sou-ke First Nation (Filing ID A4L5T0). The effects of underwater noise and sensory 35 disturbance as a result of residual effects from shipping associated with the Project were 36 assessed in detail in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.7 (Filing ID A3S4X9), using thresholds defined by 37 NOAA, and recognized by DFO (Filing ID A4L7D4). The Board of FER claim that “chronic 38 sources” of underwater noise (i.e., from shipping traffic) were not assessed (Filing ID A4L6Y2); 39 however, Trans Mountain devoted much of its assessment of effects to marine mammals to this 40 topic (refer to Volume 8A, Section 4.3.7.5.1 Filing ID A3S4Y3).

41 Raincoast criticizes the JASCO Applied Sciences (JASCO) acoustic modelling report (Volume 42 8B, Technical Report 8B-1, Marine Resources – Marine Transportation Technical Report, 43 Appendix A; Filing ID A3S4J5) for using a ‘dose-response’ approach in its modelling exercise,

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1 arguing that this approach is not based on the “most recent and best available science,” as it 2 does not consider the context (i.e., an animal’s activity state at the time of exposure; Filing ID 3 A4L9G0). However, Raincoast also acknowledges that this approach is the traditional scientific 4 procedure for estimating and predicting biological impact from noise exposure. Trans Mountain 5 notes that the acoustic approach taken in the Application is commonly used, including by many 6 of the researchers referenced in the Raincoast evidence, as well as by DFO themselves (Filing 7 ID A4L7D4). Trans Mountain further notes that there are currently no quantitative Canadian 8 thresholds with respect to assessing sensory disturbance for marine mammals associated with 9 underwater noise. There are also no recommended Canadian standards or guidelines with 10 respect to what would be appropriate ambient sound levels for southern resident killer whale 11 critical habitat. The approach applied in the Application is the approach for which regulatory 12 thresholds used in the US for assessing behavioural effects on marine mammals are based. 13 While the context or behaviour of the animal at the time of hypothetical exposure may not have 14 been explicitly incorporated into the model, the potential range of responses that marine 15 mammals have to underwater noise under different contexts was discussed and assessed 16 qualitatively in the Application.

17 Trans Mountain’s assessment agreed with Raincoast’s evidence in determining that existing 18 acoustic conditions in the Marine RSA were already adverse. While Raincoast was critical of the 19 ‘dose-response’ aspect of Trans Mountain’s acoustic model, they also argued that conducting 20 any underwater acoustic modelling in an environment such as this (i.e., that is already “too 21 noisy”) was not necessary, as “any additional noise will exacerbate this situation.” Trans 22 Mountain nevertheless opted to conduct underwater acoustic modelling, believing it to be 23 beneficial to the assessment process. This modelling allowed Trans Mountain to determine the 24 extent of the Project-specific potential for residual effects of underwater noise on marine 25 mammals. Despite the aforementioned criticisms, later in their written evidence, Raincoast 26 acknowledged that the inclusion of the acoustic model was very helpful (Filing ID A4L9G0).

27 As discussed in Section 55.4.1 (above), Raincoast’s evidence cites a paper that was not 28 available at the time of filing, and suggests that Williams et al. (2014) is “the best available 29 science that vessel noise will elicit a behavioural response.” The study statistically tested 30 whether variability in whale behaviour was better explained by audiogram-weighted or 31 unweighted (broadband) received sound levels. The broadband noise level was selected as the 32 better predictor. Based on this, Raincoast asserts that the methodology used in the Project’s 33 acoustic modelling is not a reliable predictor for estimating response. However, while Raincoast 34 is correct that the JASCO modelling considered audiogram-weighted levels of underwater noise, 35 the broadband noise levels also predicted by the model were determined to be more 36 conservative (i.e., predicted a larger effect). These more conservative broadband levels were 37 used in assessing and determining potential effects on southern resident killer whales (and 38 other marine mammals) in the Application. Broadband values were not downplayed as 39 suggested by Raincoast, but instead were used in the Application when concluding that the 40 Project may cause sensory disturbance to southern resident killer whales within 4 to 7 km of the 41 shipping lanes.

55.5 Mitigation Measures 42 A few intervenors, such as Métis Nation British Columbia (Filing ID A4Q2H2), had questions 43 regarding the potential for implementing construction-related mitigation measures for Project- 44 related effects on marine mammals. Trans Mountain’s framework mitigation plan for marine 45 mammals during construction of the Westridge Marine Terminal was outlined in its MMPP

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1 (Filing ID A3W9H8). DFO’s evidence (Filing ID A4L7D4) was supportive of the measures 2 proposed: “DFO is of the view that the implementation of mitigation measures specific to pile 3 driving activities, e.g., deployment of bubble curtains and acoustic monitoring via hydrophone, 4 will largely mitigate the residual effects of construction-related underwater noise on marine 5 mammals. The use of trained marine mammal observers to halt works in the event that 6 acoustically sensitive marine mammals are observed should further reduce the potential 7 residual effects on marine mammals. The construction-related mitigation measures proposed in 8 the MMPP framework are standard measures that are technically feasible and have 9 successfully been implemented previously in other marine development projects.”

10 Board of FER was critical of the lack of marine transportation-related mitigation measures 11 included within the Application (Filing ID A4L6Y2) and recommended that measures be taken 12 during the operations phase “so that there is no addition from their operation to the interference 13 in the soundscape of the area.” While Trans Mountain is committed to the development of 14 reasonable solutions to improve the current and future state of southern resident killer whale 15 habitat (see below), it is unlikely that any commercially-viable mitigation measures will be 16 developed that can completely eliminate the introduction of underwater noise from marine traffic 17 into the marine environment. Likewise, Board of FER’s suggestion that Trans Mountain must 18 demonstrate to the NEB that their operational practices “guarantee zero collisions with marine 19 mammals” is simply not realistic. DFO stated that they were: “not aware of specific mitigation 20 measures that the Proponent can directly implement to mitigate the effects of underwater noise 21 and ship strikes on marine mammals.”

22 PMV recommended that Trans Mountain contribute to regional monitoring efforts for cumulative 23 impacts, including efforts that monitor marine noise (Filing ID A4L8C2). They also recommend 24 that Trans Mountain determine, in consultation with appropriate agencies, additional mitigation 25 measures and requirements that could be placed on tankers to reduce the risk of spills or other 26 marine impacts and suggest that this could be accomplished through the stipulation of 27 conditions of operation within Trans Mountain’s contract with the shipping companies, such that 28 they would only accept those operators willing to meet these conditions. As stated in PMV’s 29 evidence (Filing ID A4L6Q7), PMV has established the ECHO Program, which seeks to better 30 understand and manage potential effects on cetaceans (i.e., whales, porpoises and dolphins) 31 resulting from commercial vessel activities throughout the southern coast of BC. The ECHO 32 Program’s long-term goal is to develop mitigation measures that will lead to a quantifiable 33 reduction in potential threats to whales as a result of shipping activities.

34 Trans Mountain has little direct control over the operating practices of the tankers or tugs as 35 Project-related marine vessels are owned and operated by a third party. However, on 29 July 36 2015, Trans Mountain entered into a funding agreement with Vancouver Fraser Port Authority, 37 wherein Trans Mountain agreed to contribute $1.6 million to the ECHO program to support its 38 research initiatives. Trans Mountain’s funding of this agreement is not contingent on receipt of a 39 CPCN (i.e., Project approval).

40 Through the ECHO program, PMV will work in collaboration with government agencies, First 41 Nations, marine industry users (including Trans Mountain), non-government organizations and 42 scientific experts, to examine threats to at-risk cetaceans in the region. These threats, as 43 identified by DFO in relevant Recovery Strategies and/or Action Plans, will broadly encompass 44 the four primary concerns that were raised by intervenors and that were considered by Trans 45 Mountain in the Application (i.e., physical disturbance [vessel strikes], acoustic disturbance 46 [underwater noise], environmental contaminants, and reduced prey availability).

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1 Under the umbrella of the ECHO Program, a series of individual short-term projects, scientific 2 studies and education initiatives are being considered to better understand potential threats 3 associated with commercial vessel-related activities. As discussed on the PMV website20, 4 projects currently under consideration by the ECHO Program that relate to underwater noise or 5 vessel strikes include the following:

6 Acoustic Disturbance (Underwater noise)

7 · Monitoring baseline regional ambient underwater noise conditions through a 8 network of hydrophones

9 · Identifying and quantifying the underwater noise contributions from various 10 vessel sectors to overall regional ocean noise

11 · Assessing the impacts of different underwater noise levels on southern resident 12 killer whales and other marine mammals

13 · Use of computer modelling to predict how various mitigation methods will 14 reduce underwater noise, then testing these predictions in the ocean

15 · A potential partnership with Transport Canada to install a vessel underwater 16 noise listening station in the Strait of Georgia where ships will “weigh in” as 17 they transit over the station providing a better understanding of the noise levels 18 coming from different vessels

19 · A potential partnership with Transport Canada to test an in-water hull cleaning 20 technology and measuring vessel underwater noise levels before and after 21 cleaning, to understand whether cleaning a vessel’s hull can reduce noise 22 emissions

23 Physical Disturbance (Ship Strikes)

24 · Continuing to support DFO’s work to survey large whale distribution off 25 southwestern Vancouver Island using aerial surveillance, to help identify large 26 whale habitat. The next phase of this work will use the aerial surveillance and 27 whale sighting data, in conjunction with information on vessel locations and 28 movement, to identify key areas where the risk of physical disturbance or 29 collision is greatest. This information will help determine which, if any, 30 mitigation measures may be required to reduce the risk of physical disturbance.

31 · Development of a vessel notification system of whales in the area

32 · Development of an educational guide for mariners to identify marine mammals

33 · Exploration of new technologies to identify whale locations in real time

34 These types of projects will provide a better understanding of vessel-related cumulative regional 35 threats, with the aim of informing potential mitigation options and developing innovative 36 solutions to reduce underwater noise levels in the region. Potential mitigation measures that the

20 http://www.portmetrovancouver.com/en/environment/initiatives/marine-mammals

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1 ECHO program may research and/or recommend include such things as incentives or 2 recognition for the use of green vessel technology, changes to operational activities of ocean 3 going vessels, a certification program for quiet vessels, and/or the development of noise criteria 4 for vessels entering the port. DFO (Filing ID A4L7D4), Raincoast (Filing IDs A4L9F2 and 5 A4L9G0) and Board of FER (Filing ID A4L6Y2) suggested that reduction of vessel speeds may 6 be a means of reducing ship strike risk and noise in the Marine RSA. Trans Mountain intends to 7 review the results and recommendations of the ECHO Program studies with a view to 8 incorporating them into its MMPP.

55.6 References 9 Bain, D.E. and M.E. Dahlheim. 1994. Effects of masking noise on detection thresholds of killer 10 whales. Pp. 243-256 in Marine Mammals and the Exxon Valdez. T.R. Loughlin (Ed.). 11 Academic Press. N.Y.

12 Clark, C.W., W.T. Ellison, B.L. Southall, L. Hatch, S.M. Van Parijs, A. Frankel and D. Ponirakis. 13 2009. Acoustic masking in marine ecosystems: Intuitions, analysis, and implication. 14 Marine Ecological Progress Series 395: 201–222.

15 Erbe, C. 2002. Underwater noise of whale-watching boats and potential effects on killer whales 16 (Orcinus orca), based on an acoustic impact model. Marine Mammal Science 18(2): 17 394-418.

18 Fisheries and Oceans Canada. 2010a. Population Assessment Pacific Harbour Seal (Phoca 19 vitulina richardsi). Fisheries and Oceans Canada Canadian Science Advisory Secretariat 20 Science Advisory Report. 2009/011.

21 Fisheries and Oceans Canada. 2010b. Management Plan for the Steller Sea Lion (Eumetopias 22 jubatus) in Canada [Final]. Species at Risk Act Management Plan Series. Fisheries and 23 Oceans Canada, Ottawa, ON. vi + 69 pp.

24 Fisheries and Oceans Canada. 2010c. Advice Relevant to the Identification of Critical Habitats 25 for North Pacific Humpback Whales (Megaptera novaeangliae). Canadian Science 26 Advisory Secretariat Science Response 2009/016. 14 pp.

27 Fisheries and Oceans Canada. 2013. Recovery Strategy for the North Pacific Humpback Whale 28 (Megaptera novaeangliae) in Canada [Final]. Humpback Whale (North Pacific 29 Population). Species at Risk Act Recovery Strategy Series. Ottawa, ON. 77 pp.

30 Fisheries and Oceans Canada. 2015. Sufficiency review of the information on effects of 31 underwater noise and the potential for ship strikes from Marine Shipping on Marine 32 Mammals in the Facilities Application for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project. DFO 33 Can. Sci. Advis. Sec. Sci. Resp. 2015/007.

34 Ford, J.K.B., A.L. Rambeau, R.M. Abernethy, M.D. Boogaards, L.M. Nichol and L.D. Spaven. 35 2009. 34 An Assessment of the Potential for Recovery of Humpback Whales off the 36 Pacific Coast of 35 Canada. DFO Can. Sci. Advis. Sec. Res. Doc. 2009/015. iv + 33 p.

37 Lusseau, D., D.E. Bain, R. Williams and J.C. Smith. 2009. Vessel traffic disrupts the foraging 38 behavior of southern resident killer whales Orcinus orca. Endangered Species 39 Research 6: 211-221.

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1 Miller, P.J.O., R.N. Antunes, P.J. Wensveen, F.I.P. Samarra, A.C. Alves, P.L. Tyack, 2 P.H. Kvadsheim, L. Kleivane, F-P.A. Lam and M.A. Ainslie. 2014. Dose-response 3 relationships for the onset of avoidance of sonar by free-ranging killer whales. The 4 Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 135: 975-993.

5 Rambeau, A.L. 2008. Determining abundance and stock structure for a widespread migratory 6 29 animals: the case of humpback whales (Megaptera novaeangliae) in British 7 Columbia, Canada. M.Sc Thesis. University of British Columbia.

8 Williams, R., D.E. Bain, J.K.B. Ford and A.W. Trites. 2002a. Behavioural responses of male 9 killer whales to a ‘leapfrogging’ vessel. Journal of Cetacean Research and Management 10 4(3): 305-310.

11 Williams, R., A.W. Trites and D.E. Bain. 2002b. Behavioural responses of killer whales (Orcinus 12 orca) to whalewatching boats: Opportunistic observations and experimental approaches. 13 Journal of Zoology 256(2): 255-270.

14 Williams, R., D. Lusseau and P.S. Hammond. 2006. Estimating relative energetic costs of 15 human disturbance to killer whales (Orcinus orca). Biological Conservation 133: 16 301-311.

17 Williams, R., C.W. Clark, D. Ponirakis and E. Ashe. 2013. Acoustic quality of critical habitats for 18 three threatened whale populations. Animal Conservation (early view).

19 Williams, R., C. Erbe, E. Ashe, A. Beerman and J. Smith. 2014. Severity of killer whale 20 behavioral responses to ship noise: A dose-response study. Marine Pollution Bulletin 79: 21 254-260.

22

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56.0 MARINE BIRDS 1 Several intervenors submitted written evidence that commented on the assessment of potential 2 effects of construction and operation of the TMEP on marine birds. Generally, key issues raised 3 in these submissions include concerns over:

4 · adequacy of baseline data collection and long-term monitoring commitments 5 for marine birds;

6 · adequacy of the Westridge Marine Terminal and Marine Transportation 7 assessments on:

8 - marine bird key indicator species;

9 - marine bird species at risk;

10 - collision risk; and,

11 - sensory disturbance;

12 · adequacy of the ERA for addressing:

13 - areas of increased ecological sensitivity for marine birds;

14 - species-specific sensitivities to oil and recovery time; and,

15 - acute and chronic lethal effects of an oil spill on marine birds.

16 The following provides Trans Mountain’s response to the above issues as they relate to marine 17 birds.

56.1 Baseline Data and Monitoring 56.1.1 Insufficiency of Baseline Data 18 General concerns were raised by several intervenors over the sufficiency of baseline data used 19 by Trans Mountain to support the assessment of Project effects on marine birds in Volume 8A, 20 Marine Transportation assessment (Filing ID A3S4Y3).

21 BC Nature and Nature Canada (Filing ID A4L8K8), the City of Port Moody (Filing IDs A4L6J2 to 22 A4L9E8), and Environment Canada (Filing ID A4L8Y6) note that inadequate baseline data on 23 annual and seasonal marine bird abundance and distribution prevent Trans Mountain from 24 properly evaluating effects from an oil spill (Filing ID A3S4K7), thereby limiting Trans Mountain’s 25 ability to develop appropriate response plans and other recovery initiatives. All of these 26 intervenors recognize that such data are particularly limited for offshore areas in the Marine 27 Transportation RSA, likely resulting in under-representation of some species or species groups. 28 Environment Canada provides a list of several key information gaps that could be better 29 informed by additional baseline data, including: distribution of species at risk (including potential 30 marine critical habitat); distribution of pelagic species; habitat use patterns in offshore areas; 31 and key moulting and staging areas.

32 In response to BC Nature and Nature Canada IR No. 1.03 (Filing ID A3Y2C5), Trans Mountain 33 describes the limitations of data available to characterize abundance and distribution of species

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1 expected to occur in offshore habitats. In this response, Trans Mountain acknowledged that 2 standardized surveys in offshore areas would be preferable, but that incidental observations 3 available from public datasets provide some information about marine birds in areas that might 4 otherwise be entirely undocumented. In the absence of comprehensive data in offshore areas, 5 Trans Mountain used available data to describe the occurrence of marine birds in the Marine 6 Transportation RSA and along the marine shipping route, where possible, supplemented with 7 knowledge of habitat and species ecology.

8 Table 4.4 of Volume 8B (Filing ID A3S4J6) summarizes the available data for the species in the 9 Marine Transportation RSA. As with most survey data, these data represent a sampling of the 10 population rather than a thorough census. Trans Mountain believes that the results reflect 11 relative differences in abundance among species; however, pelagic species are likely to be 12 under-represented due to survey effort weighted to shoreline surveys. While there are gaps in 13 knowledge regarding the abundance of marine bird indicators, this was not a limitation with 14 respect to assessment of potential effects. The assessment considered Project effects 15 pathways based on available data and an understanding of species-specific ecology and 16 behaviour.

17 Trans Mountain recognizes that the collection of additional baseline marine bird data can 18 contribute to coordinated planning initiatives. Trans Mountain has therefore provided support to 19 several initiatives to collect additional marine bird data in the Marine Transportation RSA; these 20 are detailed in response to GoC IR No. 2.047a (Filing ID A4H6A5). Trans Mountain is also 21 exploring additional options to contribute toward the collection of long-term monitoring data for 22 marine birds that may be affected by the Project and other industrial activities, in cooperation 23 with regulatory authorities, industry, local communities, Aboriginal groups, and other 24 stakeholders. Please refer to Trans Mountain’s Reply to Environment Canada’s Written 25 Evidence, Section 2.0: Species at Risk, Migratory Birds and Wetlands, Recommendation 2-16, 26 for further details.

56.1.2 Long-term Monitoring 27 BC Nature and Nature Canada, Environment Canada, FER, and Métis Nation BC 28 recommended that additional monitoring be conducted on marine birds to obtain long-term 29 continuous datasets at appropriate spatial and temporal scales for measuring long-term 30 changes in marine bird species or communities that could contribute to several monitoring 31 initiatives in southern BC (Filing IDs A4L8K8, A4L8Y6, A4Q2T7, and A4Q2H2, respectively).

32 Trans Mountain is exploring options to support the collection of long-term monitoring data for 33 marine birds that may be affected by the Project and other industrial activities, in cooperation 34 with regulatory authorities, local communities, Aboriginal groups, and other stakeholders (GoC 35 EC IR No. 2.047a [Filing ID A4H6A5]).

36 Please refer to Trans Mountain’s Reply to Environment Canada’s Written Evidence, Section 2.0: 37 Species at Risk, Migratory Birds and Wetlands, Recommendation 2-16, for further details.

56.2 Westridge Marine Terminal and Marine Transportation Assessments 56.2.1 Key Indicators 38 The written evidence submitted by BC Nature and Nature Canada (Filing ID A4L8K8) and FER 39 (Filing ID A4Q2T7) identify concerns over the rationale for selection of marine bird indicator

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1 species used to represent Project-related effects from vessel traffic in the Marine Transportation 2 RSA. Intervenors contend that the indicator species presented in the Westridge Marine Terminal 3 and Marine Transportation assessments do not adequately reflect the extent of marine bird 4 species and habitat usage in the Marine Transportation RSA, or best support an assessment of 5 Project effects.

6 Volume 5A, Section 7.6.12.1 and Volume 8A, Section 4.3.8.1 provide detailed descriptions of 7 the rationale used by Trans Mountain for selection of marine bird indicator species (Filing 8 IDs A3S1R0 and A3S4Y3). The final suite of marine bird indicator species represent a group of 9 birds with different ecological niches that were selected to represent the effects to a broad range 10 of marine bird species, consistent with standard environmental practice (Lindenmayer et al. 11 2000, Mallory et al. 2010). Selection of indicators for the assessment of effects to marine birds 12 considered a) species known to be present seasonally within Project study areas, and b) 13 patterns in use of marine areas existing marine habitats and associated bird species affected by 14 Project-related marine activities. In consultation with appropriate regulatory agencies, indicator 15 species were determined to represent a subset of the diverse assemblage of resident and 16 migrant marine birds that use distinct niches within the matrix of marine and coastal habitats of 17 the Marine Birds LSA. Indicators were selected to fit all or most of the following criteria:

18 · species that are resident, or seasonally use habitats within the Marine Birds 19 LSA for foraging and/or breeding;

20 · species with life requisites shared by a broad group of other marine bird 21 species;

22 · SCC, with restricted ranges, or associated with a confined or sensitive 23 ecological community;

24 · species for which there is an established baseline to describe their biology, 25 population abundance and distribution;

26 · species that have been documented as susceptible to anthropogenic 27 disturbances;

28 · species whose extirpation could alter or disrupt the function of the ecosystem;

29 · species identified as being important to one or more coastal Aboriginal 30 communities; and

31 · species that have previously been useful indicators in regional effects-based 32 assessments and, therefore, have been the focus of academic and/or 33 regulatory studies within the Marine Birds LSA.

34 Additional rationale for the selection of indicators used in the Westridge Marine Terminal and 35 Marine Transportation assessments has been detailed in several IR responses. A thorough 36 review of the appropriateness of indicator species was provided in response to BC Nature and 37 Nature Canada IR No. 1.01 and 1.02 for the marine transportation and Westridge Marine 38 Terminal assessments, respectively (Filing ID A3Y2C5). Trans Mountain explained in this 39 response how each of the indicator species used in the assessment represents other marine 40 bird groups, clarified how the criteria listed above were applied to the selection of indicator

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1 species, and addressed questions raised by BC Nature and Nature Canada about how pelagic 2 species, alcids, waterfowl, shorebirds, and raptors are covered by selected indicator species in 3 the assessment.

4 Further evidence on the representativeness of selected indicators for waterbirds (including 5 ducks, alcids, and shorebirds) was provided in response to Black J IR Nos. 1.1.2d, 1.1.2e, 6 and 1.1.2f (Filing ID A3Y2D1), and BC Nature and Nature Canada IR 2 (e.g., 2.05a, 2.06a.1, 7 2.11a, 2.25b) (Filing ID A4J5C4). Additional evidence supporting the selection of shorebird 8 indicator species was presented in response to Environment Canada Pre-Hearing Order IR 9 No. 20 (Filing ID A3Y2L0), NEB IR No. 1.58b (Filing ID A3W9H8), and FER IR No. 1.04.6 (Filing 10 ID A3Y2D7).

56.2.2 Species at Risk 11 Several intervenors contend that the Westridge Marine Terminal and Marine Transportation 12 assessments should have assessed potential Project effects on a larger suite of federally or 13 provincially designated species at risk.

14 In the Application, indicator species were determined to represent a subset of the diverse 15 assemblage of resident and migrant marine birds (refer to Section 55.2.1). Conservation status 16 is included in the criteria considered in the final selection of indicator species, in part, because 17 of the potential for increased sensitivity to Project effects for species with small, unstable, or 18 declining populations. Species at risk were among the indicator species considered in both the 19 Westridge Marine Terminal and Marine Transportation assessments. In general, potential 20 effects on species at risk are described through the key indicator approach. However, additional 21 assessment of species at risk was integrated into the assessment, where applicable, if there 22 was additional species-specific information (e.g., in published literature) relevant to 23 characterizing potential Project effects (refer to Volume 5A, Section 7.6.12.4 and Volume 8A, 24 Section 4.3.8.4; Filing IDs A3S1R0 and A3S4Y3). Trans Mountain completed additional 25 assessment for species at risk, on a per species basis, in response to GoC IR No. 2.035 (Filing 26 ID A4H6A5). Based on the approach applied in the Application and subsequent assessment of 27 species at risk completed in response to GoC IR No. 2.035, Trans Mountain has provided an 28 accurate characterization of residual Project effects and significance determinations for marine 29 bird species at risk.

56.2.3 Marine Bird Collision Risk 30 Both BC Nature and Nature Canada and Environment Canada expressed concern that the 31 Westridge Marine Terminal assessment may underestimate light-induced mortality of migratory 32 birds, including marine bird species (Filing IDs A4L8K8 and A4L8Y6).

33 As described in the responses to BC Nature and Nature Canada IR No. 1.11c (Filing 34 ID A3Y2C5), BC Nature and Nature Canada IR No. 2.16a.3 (Filing ID A4H7Y8), and GoC EC IR 35 No. 2.050b (Filing ID A4H6A5), Trans Mountain is committed to implementing several mitigation 36 measures to reduce potential for light-induced incidental take of migratory birds at the Westridge 37 Marine Terminal facility or from Project-related marine transportation activities (refer to 38 Table 7.6.12-2 in Volume 5A, Filing ID A3S1R0; and Table 6.1 in Technical Report 5C-14 of 39 Volume 5C, Marine Birds – Westridge Marine Terminal Technical Report, Filing ID A3S2R8).

40 Please refer to Trans Mountain’s Reply to Environment Canada’s Written Evidence, Section 2.0: 41 Species at Risk, Migratory Birds and Wetlands, Recommendation 2-18, for further details.

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56.2.4 Sensory Disturbance 1 BC Nature and Nature Canada and Métis Nation BC expressed concerns over the variation in 2 response to sensory disturbance by different marine bird species (Filing IDs A4L8K8 and 3 A4Q2H2). BC Nature and Nature Canada note that some species are expected to be more 4 sensitive and/or unlikely to habituate to sensory disturbances caused by activities at the 5 Westridge Marine Terminal and/or marine vessel traffic.

6 In Environment Canada Pre-Hearing Order IR No. 24 (Filing ID A3Y2L0), Trans Mountain 7 acknowledged that several marine bird species exhibit responses to sensory disturbance from 8 vessel traffic through behavioural adjustments. The magnitude of the effect varies by species 9 and setting, as well as type and frequency of disturbance. Trans Mountain assessed potential 10 effects from vessel disturbance in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.8 (Filing ID A3S4Y3). To further 11 demonstrate the range of species-specific responses that might be expressed by marine birds 12 present in the Marine Transportation RSA, Trans Mountain presented an additional detailed 13 literature review of marine bird response to shipping activity in Environment Canada 14 Pre-Hearing Order IR No. 24 (Filing ID A3Y2L0). As summarized in GoC EC IR No. 2.050c, 15 studies indicating marine birds may habituate to human disturbance include Ward and Stehn 16 (1989), Steidl and Anthony (2000), Speckman et al. (2004), Agness et al. (2008), Bellefleur et 17 al. (2009), and Chatwin et al. (2013) (Filing ID A4H6A5). In summary, Trans Mountain maintains 18 that the Application and subsequent IR responses provide an accurate characterization of 19 residual Project effects and significance determinations from sensory disturbance on marine 20 birds.

21 Trans Mountain acknowledges that the construction and operation of the Westridge Marine 22 Terminal and Project-related increases in marine vessel traffic have the potential to act in 23 combination with existing activities and reasonably foreseeable developments to contribute to 24 cumulative impacts on marine birds through sensory disturbance (refer to Volume 5A, 25 Section 8.14.3 [Filing ID A3S1R2] and Volume 8A, Section 4.4.6.3 [Filing ID A3S4Y3]). 26 However, ships will be travelling at reduced speeds as they approach the Westridge Marine 27 Terminal, using pilots and tug assistance, in addition to mandatory compliance with safe 28 shipping practices under Canada Shipping Act, 2001 regulations. Trans Mountain is also 29 committed to the mitigation measures for sensory disturbance and injury or mortality to marine 30 birds at the Westridge Marine Terminal listed in Table 7.6.12-2 in Volume 5A, Section 7.6.12.4 31 (Filing ID A3S1R0). Trans Mountain maintains that the Project is not expected to contribute 32 significantly toward residual cumulative effects of sensory disturbance to marine birds.

56.3 Ecological Risk Assessment 33 Trans Mountain submitted four separate reports as part of the Application to describe the 34 potential environmental effects of accidents and malfunctions on the natural environment. These 35 are:

36 · Qualitative Ecological Risk Assessment of Pipeline Spills (Technical Report 7-1 37 of Volume 7, Stantec Consulting Ltd., December 2013; Filing IDs A4S4W9 and 38 A3S4X0);

39 · Ecological Risk Assessment of Westridge Marine Terminal Spills (Technical 40 Report 7-2 of Volume 7, Stantec Consulting Ltd., December 2013; Filing 41 ID A3S4X1);

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1 · Ecological Risk Assessment of Marine Transportation Spills (Technical 2 Report 8B-7 of Volume 8, Stantec Consulting Ltd., December 2013; Filing IDs 3 A3S4K7, A3S4K8, A3S4K9, A3S4L0, A3S4L1, A3S4L2, A3S4L3, A3S4L4, 4 A3S4L5, A3S4L6, A3S4L7, A3S4L8, A3S4L9, A3S4Q0, A3S4Q1, A3S4Q2, 5 A3S4Q3, A3S4Q4, A3S4Q5, A3S4Q6, A3S4Q7, A3S4Q8, A3S4Q9, and 6 A3S4R0); and

7 · Detailed Quantitative Ecological Risk Assessment for Loading Accidents and 8 Marine Spills (Response to NEB IR No. 1.62d, Stantec Consulting Ltd., May 9 2014; Filing IDs A3W9K1, A3W9K2, A3W9K3, A3W9K4, A3W9K5, A3W9K6, 10 A3W9K7, A3W9K8, A3W9K9).

11 These reports present information on potential effects of oil spill scenarios on marine birds 12 through stochastic modelling. These components of the Application provide the primary support 13 to Trans Mountain’s response to the issues raised by intervenors, below. Additional information 14 on Trans Mountain’s ERAs and assessment of potential effects to marine organisms is provided 15 in Trans Mountain’s reply to the City of Vancouver, Tsleil-Waututh Nation, City of Burnaby, 16 Living Oceans Society: Fate and Effects of Oil Spills from the Trans Mountain Expansion Project 17 in Burrard Inlet and the Fraser River Estuary, and Fate and Effects of Oil Spills from the Trans 18 Mountain Expansion Project in the Gulf Islands, Strait of Juan de Fuca, and Fraser River 19 (Attachment 1.09).

56.3.1 Ecological Sensitivity 20 Several intervenors identified concerns with the approach used by Trans Mountain to assess 21 ecological risk of an oil spill on marine birds, as presented in the Ecological Risk Assessment of 22 Marine Transportation Spills (Filing ID A3S4K7). BC Nature and Nature Canada, Environment 23 Canada and Living Oceans Society also contend that factors other than the size of a spill can 24 influence rates of marine bird mortality (Filing IDs A4L8K8, A4L8Y6, and A4L9R7). Intervenors 25 recommend that additional assessments be completed that incorporate, for example, 26 information on marine bird abundance and distribution and include an ecologically relevant 27 “worst-case” spill scenario. Both Environment Canada and Living Oceans Society also describe 28 in their written evidence that an oil spill in several key habitats for marine birds could have 29 greater effects than are estimated in the ERA, depending on the seasonal timing and 30 abundance of birds in a given area during a spill event. Living Oceans Society further 31 recommends that prey-mediated effects to marine birds be assessed through the ERA.

32 Results of the ERA for marine birds are presented in the Ecological Risk Assessment of Marine 33 Transportation Spills (Technical Report 8B-7, Filing IDs A3S4K7 to A3S4R0). Trans Mountain 34 applied a stochastic approach to modelling the fate and transport of spilled oil, as well as 35 ecological consequences of spilled oil, in consideration of evidence provided by Environment 36 Canada (2011) during the Enbridge Northern Gateway Hearings process. Environment Canada 37 recommended at that time that previous and ongoing spill modelling and risk assessment 38 studies for similar project types be considered, naming the example of the AIRA Project (AIRA 39 2010 in Environment Canada 2011).

40 In the ERA, potential effects to marine birds were assessed using a two-fold habitat-based 41 approach. Trans Mountain has provided a comprehensive description on the rationale for this 42 approach in response to BC Nature and Nature Canada IR No. 1.05 (Filing ID A4D3G2) and BC 43 Nature and Nature Canada IR Nos. 2.08 and 2.09 (Filing ID A4H7Y8), as summarized below.

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1 The habitat-based approach fundamentally stems from the assumption that if habitat is 2 protected, then species that use that habitat will also be protected; and conversely, that if 3 habitat is damaged, then species that use that habitat may be harmed. An analysis of likely 4 spill-related effects based on the habitat approach also assures complete coverage of the 5 marine environment in the context of potential crude oil spills; in contrast, an assessment 6 approach focusing on particular species could be criticized for neglecting some species or 7 populations.

8 The first approach taken in the ERA assumes that marine birds could generally be present 9 anywhere within the Marine Transportation RSA, and thus shorebirds and other marine birds 10 are assessed using the stochastic probability contours for oiling representing shoreline or 11 surface water habitats, respectively. The ERA describes the probability of oil affecting shoreline 12 and near shore habitats, as a function of seasons, shoreline type, and sensitivity to oil impacts, 13 and the length of such habitat within the Marine Transportation RSA. Additional information 14 about potential effects of an oil spill to shoreline habitat and shorebirds is provided in Trans 15 Mountain’s Reply to Environment Canada’s Written Evidence, Section 2.0: Species at Risk, 16 Migratory Birds and Wetlands, Recommendation 2-17.

17 The second approach considers the potential for spilled crude oil to come into contact with 18 known bird colonies, as well as designated IBAs. Trans Mountain has previously indicated that 19 an alternative approach to conducting an ERA study could overlay oil distribution upon the 20 seasonal distribution and abundance information for individual species of birds. However, Trans 21 Mountain maintains that there are a number of drawbacks to this approach that include but are 22 not limited to:

23 · the very large number of individual species to be assessed if all species 24 occupying habitat in the Marine Transportation RSA are to be considered 25 (particularly if this is not limited to bird species);

26 · inconsistent coverage (seasonally or spatially within the study area) in the 27 abundance and distributional information available for the individual species;

28 · inconsistent availability of abundance and distributional information between 29 species (i.e., some species are relatively well studied, and others are poorly 30 studied); and

31 · absence of detailed abundance and distributional information for many species 32 limiting the potential for a complete assessment.

33 Based on these limitations, Trans Mountain concludes that relative to the effort required, there is 34 limited value in completing an ERA to address all potential ecological receptor species in the 35 manner advocated by the intervenors. Habitat-based approaches adopted for the ERA allow 36 potential effects on marine birds and other species to be evaluated in a transparent and 37 defensible manner. It is Trans Mountain’s opinion that this approach provides a conservative 38 and broadly-based ecosystems approach to evaluating the potential environmental effects of 39 crude oil spills on marine habitat and associated biota, which is suitable for the purposes of the 40 NEB decision.

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56.3.2 Marine Bird Sensitivity to Oil Spills 1 Several intervenors expressed concerns over the accuracy of information on sensitivity to oil 2 spills, and expected recovery periods of marine birds following an oil spill event in the Marine 3 Transportation RSA. In the submission from BC Nature and Nature Canada, the written 4 evidence of Anne Harfenist notes that the assessment should have considered other spill 5 events, in addition to that of the Exxon Valdez, to produce a more comprehensive evaluation of 6 species-specific sensitivities and recovery estimates for marine birds (Filing ID A4L8K8). 7 Environment Canada provides additional review of species that the agency expects to have 8 higher vulnerability to oil spills based on several life history traits that increase risk of exposure 9 (Filing ID A4L8Y6).

10 Assessment of effects of an oil spill on marine birds, and associated recovery periods, is 11 summarized in the Ecological Risk Assessment of Marine Transportation Spills (Technical 12 Report 8B-7, Filing ID A3S4K7 to A3S4R0) and in the DQERA (Filing ID A3W9K1). Trans 13 Mountain has also provided supplemental information on the range in species-specific 14 sensitivities to oil spills, as well as the estimated recovery periods among marine bird species 15 and the degree of confidence associated with those estimates (refer to responses to BC Nature 16 and Nature Canada IR No. 1.05 and 1.07, Filing ID A3Y2C5; and BC Nature and Nature 17 Canada IR No. 2.07 and 2.18, Filing ID A4H7Y8). Based on the information provided to date, 18 Trans Mountain maintains they have adequately considered available information on marine 19 bird sensitivity to oil spills to inform the assessments presented in the ERA and DQERA.

56.3.3 Acute Lethal Effects 20 In the DQERA, Trans Mountain provides evidence from scientific literature that the threshold 21 thickness of an oil spill, to result in a 350 mL lethal oil exposure for marine birds, is 10 µm (Filing 22 ID A3W9K1). In their written evidence, BC Nature and Nature Canada reiterate many of the 23 concerns raised previously by the intervenor in BC Nature and Nature Canada IR No. 2.22 24 (Filing ID A4G6C8). The intervenor places emphasis on literature supporting a lower threshold 25 of lethal exposure limits for marine birds, based on the potential for small volumes of oil to alter 26 marine bird metabolism and capacity to thermoregulate, resulting in potentially lethal 27 consequences. It is BC Nature and Nature Canada’s position that Trans Mountain’s conclusions 28 of the ecological consequences of an acute oiling event to marine birds underestimate potential 29 Project effects.

30 Section 3.3.2.2 of the DQERA identifies marine birds as a relevant ecological receptor with 31 sensitivity (Filing ID A3W9K1). Trans Mountain acknowledges “Birds and mammals [may be] 32 exposed to crude oil on the surface of the water, leading to harmful effects on these species as 33 a result of either hypothermia (caused by loss of insulating characteristics of fur or feathers) or 34 ingestion of crude oil as a result of grooming or other behaviours following such exposure.” 35 Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 of the DQERA describe the approach taken to evaluate potential for 36 harm to marine birds exposed to spilled crude oil on the surface of water and on the shoreline 37 and intertidal zone. For the purposes of the DQERA, a surface water slick thickness of 10 μm 38 was assumed as a threshold thickness for oiling mortality. In their written evidence, BC Nature 39 and Nature Canada continue to focus on a volume of oil, although Trans Mountain has applied 40 the slick thickness as a benchmark for acute lethality in birds in the DQERA.

41 Trans Mountain has provided a comprehensive response to BC Nature and Nature Canada IR 42 No. 2.22 regarding acute lethal effects on marine birds (Filing ID A4H7Y8). Trans Mountain

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1 referenced analyses and thresholds consistent with French McCay (2009) and the CERCLA 2 Type A Natural Resource Damage Assessment Model for Coastal and Marine Environments 3 (United States Department of the Interior 1997) which states: “If the volume of the spillet is less 4 than 20 ml, no effects are assumed. If the diameter of the spillet is less than 230 m, a thickness 5 of 100 μm is assumed as a threshold thickness for oiling mortality. If the spillet is larger than 230 6 m in diameter, 10 μm is assumed as a threshold thickness for oiling mortality.” Since the 7 DQERA deals with the CWC and smaller spill volumes, both of which are expected to result in 8 large slicks, the threshold slick thickness of 10 μm was the only consideration.

9 Acute adverse effects (i.e., death due to hypothermia caused by oiling) are assumed to occur to 10 marine birds and fur-bearing semi-aquatic mammals (e.g., mink, otters, sea otters) if the 11 estimated slick thickness equals or exceeds 10 μm in any model grid square, at any time step, 12 in the oil spill fate and transport simulation. Birds exposed to a slick having a thickness of 13 greater than 10 μm at any time during the oil spill simulation were assumed to die, given the low 14 probability for timely capture, treatment, and rehabilitation. Maps showing the areas affected by 15 slicks having a thickness of greater than 10 μm at any time during the oil spill simulation are 16 provided in Figure 5.6 (for the smaller oil spill [Filing ID A3W9K4]) and Figure 5.13 (for the CWC 17 oil spill [Filing ID A3W9K6]) of the DQERA. Trans Mountain maintains that it has applied a 18 conservative approach for evaluating acute exposure pathways (e.g., oral ingestion through 19 preening).

20 Based on the rationale provided in the response to BC Nature and Nature Canada IR No. 2.22, 21 Trans Mountain believes that the approach applied in the DQERA is likely to over-state rather 22 than under-state the actual adversity of outcomes. The spill scenarios evaluated at 23 representative locations are also considered to have a low probability of occurrence (i.e., the 24 scenarios considered and formally evaluated are not likely to unfold).

56.3.4 Chronic Spills 25 BC Nature and Nature Canada assert that Trans Mountain failed to include effects from chronic 26 oil spills in the assessment on marine bird habitat and mortality risk in the Application. In their 27 written evidence, BC Nature and Nature Canada present a literature review of the extent of 28 marine bird mortality caused by exposure to chronic oiling, suggesting that effects from chronic 29 spills are largely undetected (Filing ID A4L8K8).

30 In response to Raincoast IR No. 1.11a (Filing ID A3Y3C0), BC Nature and Nature Canada IR 31 No. 1.09c, 1.09d, and 1.09e (Filing ID A3Y2C5), and BC Nature and Nature Canada IR No. 2.23 32 (Filing ID A4J5C4), Trans Mountain explained that, as part of its Tanker Acceptance Standard, it 33 will require Project vessels to not discharge any bilge water while within the territorial waters of 34 Canada (the Marine Transportation RSA). Similarly, escort tugs will discharge bilge water, if 35 required, in compliance with the Canada Shipping Act Vessel Pollution and Dangerous 36 Chemicals Regulations, which states that discharged bilge water must contain no more than 37 15 mg/L oil and discharges must be made when the vessel is underway. The requirement to 38 treat bilge water is contained in the International Maritime Organization’s International 39 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and in Canada is enforced 40 through the Vessel Pollution and Dangerous Chemicals Regulations (annexed to the Canada 41 Shipping Act, 2001) (International Maritime Organization 2013). These regulations were put in 42 place to prevent the recognized adverse effects of oil on water and sediment quality and on the 43 health of marine birds and mammals.

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1 As indicated in response to BC Nature and Nature Canada IR No. 1.09e (Filing ID A3Y2C5), the 2 basic premise behind the Vessel Pollution and Dangerous Chemicals Regulations and 3 concentration level is that releases <15 mg/L do not produce a sufficiently thick layer of oil and 4 sheen to affect marine wildlife or their habitat. It follows that as long as operators of vessels and 5 the Westridge Marine Terminal follow these regulations, that no adverse effect on marine birds 6 or their habitat is anticipated. The vessels calling on the Westridge Marine Terminal are required 7 by law to follow the Vessel Pollution and Dangerous Chemicals Regulations made under the 8 Canada Shipping Act, 2001. Transport Canada will ensure that all tankers will comply with this 9 regulation and Trans Mountain will provide reception facilities at the Westridge Marine Terminal 10 to service the needs of the Project-related marine vessels. Trans Mountain will also screen the 11 tankers calling on the Westridge Marine Terminal to check for malfunctions to pollution 12 prevention equipment or history of non-adherence to provisions of the Canada Shipping Act, 13 2001 and MARPOL (Filing ID A3Y2C5). Given enforcement by Transport Canada and the 14 commitments already made by Trans Mountain described above, an accidental release of bilge 15 water is not anticipated.

56.4 References 16 Agness A.M., Piatt J.F. Ha J.C., and G.R. Vanblaricom. 2008. Effects of vessel activity on the 17 near-shore ecology of Kittlitz's Murrelets (Brachyramphus brevirostris) in Glacier Bay, 18 Alaska. The Auk 125(2): 346–353.

19 Bellefleur D., Lee P., and R.A. Ronconi. 2009. The impact of recreational boat traffic on Marbled 20 Murrelets (Brachyramphus marmoratus) off the west coast of Vancouver Island, British 21 Columbia. Journal of Environmental Management 90(1): 531-538.

22 Chatwin T.A., Joy R., and A.E. Burger. 2013. Set-Back Distances to Protect Nesting and 23 Roosting Seabirds Off Vancouver Island from Boat Disturbance. Waterbirds 36(1): 24 43-52.

25 Environment Canada. 2011. Written Evidence Submission of Environment Canada to the Joint 26 Review Panel, December 2011. NEB Hearing Order OH-4-2011 for the Northern 27 Gateway Pipelines Inc. Enbridge Northern Gateway Project.

28 French McCay D.P. 2009. State-of-the-Art and Research Needs for Oil Spill Impact Assessment 29 Modeling. In Proceedings of the 32nd AMOP Technical Seminar on Environmental 30 Contamination and Response, Emergencies Science Division, Environment Canada, 31 Ottawa, ON, Canada. 601-653.

32 International Maritime Organization. 2013. Port State Control.

33 Lindenmayer D.B., Margules C.R., and D.B. Botkin. 2000. Indicators of biodiversity for 34 ecological sustainable forest management. Conservation Biology 14(4): 941-950.

35 Mallory M.L., Robinson S.A., Hebert C.E., and M.R. Forbes. 2010. Seabirds as indicators of 36 aquatic ecosystem conditions: A case for gathering multiple proxies of seabird health. 37 Marine Pollution Bulletin 60(1): 7-12.

38 Speckman S.G., Piatt J.F., and J.M. Springer. 2004. Small boats disturb fish-holding marbled 39 murrelets. Northwestern Naturalist 85: 32–34.

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1 Steidl R.J. and R.G. Anthony. 2000. Experimental effects of human activity on breeding bald 2 eagles. Ecological Applications 10(1): 258–268.

3 United States Department of the Interior. 1997. The CERCLA Type A Natural Resource 4 Damage Assessment Model for Coastal and Marine Environments (NRDAM/CME) 5 Technical Documentation Volume I - Part 1 Model Description. April 1996, Revision I, 6 dated October 1997.

7 Ward D.H. and R.A. Stehn. 1989. Response of Brant and other geese to aircraft disturbances at 8 Izembek Lagoon, Alaska. Final Report 14-12-0001-30332. US Fish and Wildlife Service. 9 Anchorage, AK. 207 pp.

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57.0 ABORIGINAL TRADITIONAL MARINE USE 1 Written evidence relating to TMRU was received from Adam Olsen (Filing ID A4L6V3), an 2 individual community member from Tsartlip First Nation, and the following Aboriginal groups:

3 · Cowichan Tribes (Filing ID A4L9Y9);

4 · Ditidaht First Nation (Filing IDs A4L5D3 to A4L5D6);

5 · Esquimalt Nation (Filing ID A4L5L4);

6 · Hwlitsum First Nation (Filing ID A4Q1H5);

7 · Lyackson First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0H9 and A4Q0I2);

8 · Maa-nulth Treaty Society (Filing IDs A4L6D5 and A4L6D8 to A4L6E8);

9 · Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q2F9);

10 · Pacheedaht First Nation (Filing IDs A4L5F3, A4L5K2, A4L5Q6 to A4L5Q9);

11 · Pauquachin Nation (Filing IDs A4L6I4 to A4L6I5);

12 · Scia’new First Nation (Filing IDs A4Q1L0 to A4Q1L1);

13 · Snuneymuxw First Nation (Filing ID A4Q2R7);

14 · Squamish First Nation (Filing IDs A4L7E3 to A4L7E4);

15 · Stz’uminus First Nation (Filing IDs A4Q0E6 and A3W4K6);

16 · Tsartlip First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0K0);

17 · Tsawout First Nation (Filing IDs A4Q1D4, A4Q1F0 to A4Q1F6);

18 · Tsawwassen First Nation (Filing IDs A4L7T2 and A4Q1W3);

19 · Tsleil-Waututh First Nation (Filing IDs A4L5Z3, A4L5Z7); and

20 · T’Sou-ke First Nation (Filing IDs A4L5T0 and A4L5U3).

21 Ditidaht First Nation (Filing IDs A4L5D4 to A4L5D6), Lyackson First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0I2), 22 Maa-Nulth Treaty Society (redacted) (Filing IDs A4L6D8 to A4L6E8), Pacheedaht First Nation 23 (redacted) (Filing IDs A4L5Q6 to A4L5Q9), Pauquachin Nation (Filing ID A4L6I5), Scia’new First 24 Nation (Filing ID A4Q1L1), Squamish First Nation (redacted) (Filing IDs A4L7E3 to A4L7E4), 25 Stz’uminus First Nation (redacted) (Filing ID A3W4K6), Tsawout First Nation (Filing IDs A4Q1F3 26 to A4Q1F6), Tsawwassen First Nation (Filing ID A4Q1W3), Tsleil-Waututh First Nation 27 (redacted) (Filing IDs A4L5Z4 to A4L5Z7) and T’Sou-ke First Nation (Filing ID A4L5U3) 28 submitted TMRU studies as part of their written evidence. The information in the Pacheedaht 29 First Nation TMRU report and Stz’uminus First Nation TMRU report were summarized in 30 Section 5.7 and Section 5.11, respectively, of the Supplemental Traditional Marine Resource 31 Use - Marine Transportation Technical Report filed with the NEB in July 2014 (Filing ID

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1 A3Z4Z1). The information in the Ditidaht First Nation TMRU report and Lyackson First Nation 2 TMRU report were summarized in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2, respectively, of the 3 Supplemental Traditional Marine Resource Use - Marine Transportation Technical Report No. 2 4 filed with the NEB in December 2014 (Filing ID A4F5D2). The information in the remaining 5 studies and new information in the maps provided by Ditidaht First Nation have been reviewed 6 and incorporated into Supplemental TMRU – Marine Transportation Technical Report No. 3 to 7 be filed with the Reply Evidence. Responses to specific concerns regarding Project effects on 8 TMRU raised by these communities are also included in the Supplemental Traditional Marine 9 Resource Use – Marine Transportation Technical Report No. 3. The written evidence from 10 affidavits and other non-TMRU specific reports, and general issues identified in the evidence 11 are discussed in this response.

12 Trans Mountain has reviewed the findings of the supplemental TMRU studies in the context of 13 the ESA - Marine Transportation (Volume 8A), and has determined that the significance 14 conclusions of the ESA with regard to TMRU remain unchanged by the results of the 15 supplemental TMRU information received for both Project-related effects (Section 4.3.10.6 of 16 Volume 8A) and the Project’s contribution to cumulative effects (Section 4.4.8.3 of Volume 8A) 17 (Filing ID A3S4Y3).

57.1 Project-related Effects 18 All Aboriginal communities and Adam Olson explained in their written evidence that they 19 continue to exercise their Aboriginal rights to fish, harvest, and hunt throughout their respective 20 traditional territories and that the land, water, and resources within the Marine RSA are 21 important for their ability to do so. Trans Mountain acknowledges the importance of the marine 22 environment and the resources within it to Aboriginal communities and understands that the 23 ability to participate in TMRU activities is an important component of the ability to exercise of 24 these rights. Trans Mountain’s methodology for assessment of potential adverse effects of the 25 Project on VCs that support Aboriginal rights and interests can be found in Volume 8A, Section 26 4 (Filing ID A3S4Y3). A summary of recommended mitigation measures can be found in Table 27 6.1 of Volume 8B-5, Marine Traditional Resource Use Technical Report (Filing ID A3S4K3). The 28 mitigation measures are based on applicable federal regulations and other guidelines pertinent 29 to marine shipping activities as overseen by Transport Canada, the CCG, PMV, and Pacific 30 Pilotage Authority. Trans Mountain considered the potential effects of spills on elements of the 31 environment that support Aboriginal rights and interests including TMRU in Section 5 of 32 Volume 8A (Filing IDs A3S4Y3 to A3S4Z0).

33 All Aboriginal communities that provided written evidence identified the importance of the ocean 34 and Burrard Inlet as travelways, connecting them to resource harvesting sites, habitation sites, 35 gathering sites and sacred areas, and to other Aboriginal communities. Lyackson First Nation 36 (Filing ID A4Q0H9) refers to the ocean as their “highways” and Squamish First Nation (Filing ID 37 A4L7E5) notes that the ability to move freely over the waters in Squamish territory, which 38 includes Burrard Inlet, is integral to Squamish First Nation identity and culture. Several 39 Aboriginal groups identified concerns with respect to accessing marine harvesting sites on the 40 south arm of the Fraser River, which require crossing of the shipping lanes. “Without change to 41 the regulations or better management of traffic flow the increased traffic will affect community 42 members’ ability to fish and raises safety concerns.” (page 6 of Cowichan Tribes written 43 evidence [Filing ID A4L9Y9]). Trans Mountain is not responsible for regulations controlling 44 shipping lanes, but did consider these effects in the effects assessment. Trans Mountain 45 identified the potential residual effect of alteration of traditional marine resource users’ vessel

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1 movement patterns in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.10 (Filing ID A3S4Y3). This effect is concluded to 2 be long term in duration, periodic in frequency, reversible in the short to long term, low to 3 medium in magnitude, and not significant. Some marine vessels may only be temporarily 4 inconvenienced by the presence of Project-related marine vessels (low magnitude), but for 5 others, fishing activities may be delayed (medium magnitude) since routes to fishing grounds 6 may need to be altered, or fishers may not be able to fish in preferred locations due to increased 7 Project-related marine vessel traffic. While Trans Mountain acknowledges the importance of 8 travelways to Aboriginal communities and recognizes the effect, the additional information 9 provided as written evidence does not change the assessment conclusions.

10 Tsawout First Nation (Filing ID A4Q1F3 to A4Q1F6) submitted written evidence stating that 11 areas of traditional use within the Marine RSA would become inaccessible due to Project- 12 related marine vessel traffic. Trans Mountain believes the relatively small contribution of the 13 increase in Project-related marine vessel traffic would not result in the inability to access 14 traditional use areas. While the traffic to Westridge Marine Terminal is planned to increase, the 15 internationally recognized shipping lanes are currently used by a wide variety of traffic including 16 cargo ships, tugs and tankers, ferries, and fishing vessels. For example, in the Strait of Georgia, 17 the Project-related tanker contribution would represent only 3.9% of 2012 vessel traffic (refer to 18 Table 4.4.1.2 of Volume 8A [Filing ID A3S4Y3] for more information). Tsawout First Nation also 19 notes that larger vessels may be used if the Project is approved, which is inaccurate. Aframax 20 tankers are already used and will continue to be used to serve the Westridge Marine Terminal. 21 Further information regarding safety aspects is included in Section 59 (Marine Transportation).

22 Trans Mountain identifies the potential residual effect of disruption of marine access and use 23 patterns in Volume 5B, Section 7.6.4 in the context of the Westridge Marine Terminal (Filing ID 24 A3S1S9). The Application notes that there are anticipated effects on use of traditional territories 25 related to changes in marine access and sensory disturbance for Aboriginal users. Traditional 26 users may be deterred from using certain parts of Burrard Inlet to navigate between land-based 27 traditional use areas. In order to lessen the potential negative effects, Trans Mountain will 28 communicate construction activities and schedule to the marine communities of Burrard Inlet 29 which will allow users to consider alternate movement patterns during the construction window. 30 The effect is concluded to be negative, short-term in duration, reversible in the short term, 31 isolated, of low to medium magnitude, and not significant. This conclusion has not changed with 32 the additional information provided in written evidence.

33 In their written evidence, Tsawout First Nation (Filing IDs A4Q1F3 to A4Q1F6), Pacheedaht 34 First Nation (Filing IDs A4L5Q6 to A4L5Q9), Ditidaht First Nation (Filing IDs A4L5D4 to 35 A4L5D6), Lyackson First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0I2), Esquimalt Nation (Filing ID A4L5L4) and 36 Scia’new First Nation (Filing ID A4Q1L1) discussed the potential for Project-related marine 37 vessel traffic to affect the environment and individuals in the marine environment through vessel 38 wake. Trans Mountain acknowledges the safety concerns related to vessel wake identified by 39 Aboriginal groups while on the water, and this issue was considered in the assessment of 40 potential effects in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11 (Filing ID A3S4Y3). Vessel wake calculations are 41 presented in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.6.6.1 (Filing ID A3S4Y3). Due to the average channel 42 width of 22-28 km in the Strait of Georgia and Juan de Fuca Strait, and the relatively rapid rate 43 at which wake waves decrease in height away from the transiting tankers and escort tugs, 44 vessel wake is not expected to be detectable from existing wave conditions along most of the 45 shoreline in the Marine RSA. Shoreline erosion from vessel wake typically only occurs in cases 46 where the heights of vessel wake waves are different from those of natural waves. While vessel

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1 wake has the potential to affect marine users while on the water, predicted wake wave height 2 diminishes rapidly as distance increases from the vessel (Volume 8A, Tables 4.3.6.4 and 3 4.3.6.5; Filing ID A3S4Y3). Therefore, this evidence does not change the assessment 4 conclusions in the Application.

57.2 Assessment Methodology 5 Several Aboriginal groups, including Squamish First Nation, Lyackson First Nation, Pacheedaht 6 First Nation, Stz’uminus First Nation, Tsawout First Nation, and T’Sou-ke First Nation felt that a 7 more specific effects assessment should have been conducted specific to their areas of interest 8 (e.g., traditional territories, prima facie areas of title). Trans Mountain is of the view that separate 9 First Nation specific evaluations are not required to allow the NEB to reach conclusions on 10 whether or not the Project is in the public interest, and whether unjustified significant adverse 11 effects would be likely to occur as a result of the Project.

12 Squamish First Nation submitted as evidence a review and comments on the assessment 13 methodology used in the Application. Squamish First Nation contends that the “conclusions 14 regarding severity of effects and significance [in Volume 8A, p8A-370] are not supportable with 15 respect to the Squamish’s specific interests” (page 5) since they fail to include the potential 16 effects of increased Project-related marine vessel traffic on coastal habitation sites, and do not 17 include Squamish-specific traditional use information. Trans Mountain did not include the 18 potential effects of increased Project-related marine traffic on coastal habitation sites since, as 19 stated in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.10.4 (Filing ID A3S4Y3), the normal operation of Project- 20 related marine vessel traffic is not considered to interact with land-based activities.

21 Squamish First Nation requested “a full assessment of specific adverse effects to environmental 22 components of value to the Squamish, and a determination of significance of those effects as 23 stipulated by CEAA 2012” on PDF page 6. Trans Mountain did not conduct an assessment 24 specific to Squamish First Nation as it is not a requirement of the NEB Filing Manual or the 25 CEA Act, 2012 to conduct community specific effects assessments, and a regional assessment 26 of effects on traditional marine resource use is an established methodology for assessing 27 Project-related effects on TMRU. Furthermore, Trans Mountain believes that the assessment 28 addresses the potential interactions identified by Squamish First Nation through the assessment 29 of the likely effect of the Project on the environment and TMRU. Squamish First Nation has had 30 numerous opportunities to provide input to Trans Mountain, and elected to provide TMRU 31 information directly to the NEB as part of written evidence (Filing IDs A4L7E3 to A4L7E4). At the 32 time of filing of the Application, based on publically available information, Trans Mountain 33 concluded that likely effects of the Project on TMRU would not be significant. Trans Mountain 34 has reviewed the findings of the TMRU report submitted by Squamish First Nation in the context 35 of the assessment and determined that the significance conclusions with regard to TMRU 36 remain unchanged by this evidence.

37 Tsawout First Nation (Filing ID A4Q1F3 to A4Q1F6) submitted as evidence an evaluation of the 38 assessment methodology used in the Application. Tsawout First Nation expressed concerns 39 that there is no assessment methodology section in the Application. The assessment 40 methodology section, including development of significance criteria and discussion of what each 41 criterion means, is provided in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.1 (Filing ID A3S4Y3). Tsawout First 42 Nation discusses the qualitative method of effects assessment in their evidence and criticizes 43 the approach for not providing evidence relating to the absence of established standards or 44 thresholds. Trans Mountain did review existing marine assessments, rulings from regulatory

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1 bodies, books, reports and academic literature and no existing standards or thresholds were 2 discovered in this literature search or in discussions with regulatory authorities. While Tsawout 3 First Nation implies that standards and thresholds exist, they do not provide any examples of 4 these. Further, they suggest that in the absence of such established thresholds, feedback from 5 Aboriginal groups should be used but note that “the perspective will shift with the subject.” In the 6 absence of established standards, Aboriginal perspectives, based on evidence from 7 engagement activities, were incorporated into the effects characterization where available. 8 Therefore, the assessment of magnitude of effects under the qualitative method used in this 9 assessment included input from previous projects accepted by regulatory bodies, literature 10 review and research, and feedback from stakeholders and Aboriginal groups.

11 Tsawout First Nation expressed concerns about the spatial scope identified for the Project. With 12 respect to the size of the study areas that were used in the ESA, the spatial extent of the Marine 13 RSA represents a trade-off between choosing too large an area that would mask Project effects 14 versus choosing an area too small where the effects on the population under consideration 15 might no longer be meaningful at a landscape scale. Trans Mountain acknowledges that 16 different practitioners may use different approaches to define RSAs; however, the ESA is based 17 on methodologies that have been used and accepted by regulators across Canada (including 18 the NEB) and provides sufficient information for the NEB to make informed predictions about the 19 likely environmental effects of the Project and its contribution to cumulative effects in the region. 20 Spatial boundaries were refined in consultation with technical experts and regulatory agencies. 21 T’Sou-ke First Nation (Filing ID A4L5U3) also submitted as evidence a review and evaluation of 22 the assessment methodology used in the Application. T’Sou-ke First Nation contends that the 23 mitigation measures provided in the Application and technical reports are not sufficient to 24 reduce the effects on the traditional marine use of T’Sou-ke First Nation. As a result of these 25 gaps they assert that the assessment does not fully account for all of the residual effects on the 26 TMRU of T’Sou-ke First Nation. T’Sou-ke First Nation conducted their own assessment of the 27 effects on TMRU and determined that the effects on fishing, coastal gathering and hunting, and 28 marine travel are all significant. Trans Mountain has reviewed the evidence provided by 29 T’Sou-ke First Nation and believes that the assessment provided in the Application addresses 30 the potential interactions identified by T’Sou-ke First Nation through the assessment of the likely 31 effects of the Project on the marine environment and TMRU. Mitigation measures will reduce 32 the effects to the extent that the significance conclusions with respect to TMRU in the 33 Application remain unchanged.

34 Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing ID A4L5Z9 to A4L6A5) conducted an effects assessment as part of 35 their written evidence according to the Tsleil-Waututh Stewardship Policy. The assessment 36 concluded that “the Project does not represent the best use of Tsleil-Waututh Nation territory 37 and its water, land, air and resources to satisfy the needs of our ancestors, and the needs of 38 present and future generations.” Tsleil-Waututh Nation concluded that the Project will add to 39 negative cumulative effects in Burrard Inlet, undermine Tsleil-Waututh Nation’s ability to harvest 40 and eat abundant, safe marine foods from Burrard Inlet, prevent recovery of the subsistence 41 economy, and undermine their ability to engage in cultural activities in clean water with visual 42 quality, privacy and quiet (PDF page 71). The majority of the effects identified by Tsleil-Waututh 43 Nation are based on the assumption of the occurrence of a spill, but increased tanker traffic is 44 also considered to result in negative effects to the environment. Trans Mountain conducted their 45 assessment according to the requirements of the NEB Filing Manual and the CEA Act, 2012. 46 Trans Mountain has reviewed the evidence provided by Tsleil-Waututh Nation and the 47 assessment conducted under the Tsleil-Waututh Stewardship Policy. Trans Mountain believes

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1 that the Application addresses the Project interactions identified by Tsleil-Waututh Nation 2 through the assessment of the likely effect of the Project on the marine environment and TMRU, 3 and has determined that the significance conclusions remain unchanged.

4 Esquimalt Nation, Tsawout First Nation, Tsartlip First Nation, and Pacheedaht First Nation 5 questioned the lack of assessment of the effects of increased tanker traffic on habitation sites 6 and archaeological sites. Squamish First Nation contends failure of the assessment to 7 determine the effects of Project-related increased tanker traffic on habitation sites. Trans 8 Mountain did not include the potential effects of increased Project-related marine traffic on 9 coastal habitation sites or land-based archaeological sites. As stated in Volume 8A, 10 Section 4.3.10.4 (Filing ID A3S4Y3), the normal operation of Project-related marine vessel 11 traffic is not considered to interact with land-based activities.

57.3 Cumulative Effects 12 Cowichan Tribes (Filing ID A4L9Y9), Scia’new First Nation (Filing ID A4Q1L1), Ditidaht First 13 Nation (Filing IDs A4L5D4 to A4L5D6), Esquimalt Nation (Filing ID A4L5L4), Pacheedaht First 14 Nation (Filing IDs A4L5Q6 to A4L5Q9), Lyackson First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0H8), Tsawout First 15 Nation (Filing ID A4Q1D4), T’Souke First Nation (Filing ID A4L5U3), Squamish First Nation 16 (Filing ID A4L7E5), Musqueam First Nation, Tsartlip First Nation and Tsleil-Waututh First Nation 17 (Filing ID A4L5Z9 to A4L6A5) discuss cumulative effects in their written evidence. These 18 Aboriginal groups report that their traditional territories have already been subject to change as 19 the result of development and in turn, this has affected their ability to practice TMRU activities. 20 For some communities, the concern is with respect to the cumulative effects of increased vessel 21 traffic on their ability to access and use fishing sites, and to travel throughout their traditional 22 territory. Others are concerned about the effects of existing development on the health of the 23 ecosystems and resources harvested and their cultural and spiritual well-being. Trans Mountain 24 acknowledges these concerns, and in the context of the cumulative effects assessment 25 has considered existing conditions, which reflect past alterations to the environment. Trans 26 Mountain has conducted a cumulative effects assessment related to marine transportation in 27 Volume 8A, Section 4.4 (Filing ID A3S4Y3). The scope of the cumulative effects assessment is 28 a Project-specific cumulative effects assessment as required under the CEA Act, 2012, which is 29 appropriate for the scale of the marine transportation component of the Project. Through the 30 implementation of mitigation measures, the residual cumulative effects associated with the 31 Project-related increase in marine transportation on the TMRU indicators were considered to be 32 not significant.

33 Existing Baseline versus Pre-Industrial Baseline 34 Several Aboriginal groups, including Squamish First Nation, Stz’uminus First Nation, 35 Pacheedaht First Nation and Tsawout First Nation raised concerns that the cumulative effects 36 assessment should have been conducted using pre-industrial (i.e., pristine) conditions instead 37 of existing conditions as the baseline. Current accepted practice for NEB applications is to use 38 current conditions as the baseline for pipeline cumulative effects assessment (Antoniuk 2000, 39 URS Corporation 2002), an approach consistent with guidance provided in the NEB Filing 40 Manual, which defines the baseline that should be considered in the cumulative effects 41 assessment as “the existing environmental and socio-economic setting within the study area” 42 (NEB 2015). This baseline information provides a backdrop against which a project's effects are 43 assessed, including the cumulative effects of a project. The approach of using existing 44 conditions of disturbance as baseline provides an effective method for identifying, evaluating,

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1 and mitigating the Project’s contribution to cumulative effects. This approach does not discount 2 or overlook pre-industrial conditions, as the assessment is framed within the context of existing 3 cumulative impacts that have already occurred on the landscape/watershed. An assessment of 4 total cumulative effects was conducted for all environmental and socio-economic elements 5 considered in the assessment provided in the Application, and is provided in the response to 6 NEB IR No. 2.041a (Filing ID A3Z4T9).

7 Cumulative Effects Assessment Scope 8 Several Aboriginal groups, including Squamish First Nation, Lyackson First Nation, Pacheedaht 9 First Nation, Stz’uminus First Nation, Tsawout First Nation, and T’Sou-ke First Nation felt that a 10 more specific cumulative effects assessment should have been conducted specific to their 11 areas of interest (e.g., traditional territories, prima facie areas of title). Trans Mountain is of the 12 view that separate regional significance evaluations are not required to allow the NEB to reach 13 conclusions on whether or not the Project is in the public interest, and whether unjustified 14 significant adverse effects would be likely to occur as a result of the Project. As explained in 15 more detail in the response to NEB IR No. 2.041c (Filing ID A3Z4T9), the methodology applied 16 in the ESA is appropriate for considering the variability in total cumulative effects risk between 17 regions/areas/segments, and how these differences should inform design and selection of 18 technically and economically feasible mitigation measures that avoid, mitigate, or compensate 19 for any residual Project contribution to cumulative effects. As listed in the response, Trans 20 Mountain applied a number of complementary approaches to balance the influences of setting 21 and project specifics when conducting the cumulative effects assessment.

22 Tsleil-Waututh Nation identified cumulative effects of development in Burrard Inlet as a central 23 reason for the development and implementation of the Marine Stewardship Program. Tsleil- 24 Waututh Nation contends that the health of the subsistence economy is a key indicator of 25 cumulative effects and/or the environmental integrity of Burrard Inlet. Tsleil-Waututh Nation 26 evaluates cumulative effects within the framework of environmental carrying capacity. Trans 27 Mountain acknowledges that existing urban, commercial, and industrial development has 28 affected Tsleil-Waututh Nation’s ability to conduct traditional marine resource harvesting 29 activities. Trans Mountain evaluated the Project’s contribution to these cumulative effects in the 30 Application considering all existing and reasonably foreseeable developments and activities and 31 concluded that the Project contribution to the cumulative effects on TMRU is long term in 32 duration, reversible in the short to long term, low in magnitude (with the exception of the effect 33 on southern resident killer whales which is expected to be high), and therefore not significant.

34 Tsawout First Nation describes how total cumulative effects have changed the marine 35 environment and describes the need for a regional cumulative effects assessment. While Trans 36 Mountain agrees that regional cumulative effects assessments are critical for understanding 37 changes to the environment and planning development, the scope of the Application was to 38 assess the Project’s contribution to cumulative effects. Nevertheless, Trans Mountain did 39 complete an assessment of total cumulative effects for the marine environment as part of the 40 response to NEB IR No. 2.041 (Filing ID A3Z4T9). Cowichan Tribes raised concerns with 41 respect to the cumulative effects of increased vessel traffic on their ability to access and use 42 fishing sites and to travel throughout their traditional territory. In particular, Cowichan Tribes 43 expressed concern about eight deep water anchorages that exist in and about Cowichan Bay, 44 very close to Cowichan Tribes reserves. With the existing level of tanker traffic, fishing practices 45 are restricted and Cowichan Tribes asks “to be assured that such anchorages will not be used 46 to manage increased marine traffic associated with the Project” (page 5 of Cowichan Tribes

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1 written evidence; Filing ID A4L9Y9). Trans Mountain has reviewed anchorages in Volume 8C, 2 TERMPOL 3.5/3.12, Section 10 (Filing ID A3S4T7). There are additional potential anchorages 3 along the shipping route; however, Trans Mountain does not expect a Project tanker to use 4 anchorages except under extraordinary circumstances. Trans Mountain is not aware of an 5 occasion when a tanker bound for or leaving Westridge has anchored in an anchorage in the 6 Gulf Islands. However, it is noted that anchorages are restricted based upon vessel size and 7 draft only.

57.4 Spills 8 All Aboriginal groups submitted in their evidence concerns about the potential for a marine spill 9 and the adequacy of spill response procedures and mechanisms. The connectivity of marine 10 currents between the shipping corridor, southern Vancouver Island, the Gulf Islands, and the 11 mouth and south arm of the Fraser River is outlined in the evidence provided by Cowichan 12 Tribes. Tsawout First Nation provides information about tides, currents, and weather patterns in 13 their evidence. Maa-Nulth Treaty Society is concerned about the effects of a spill reaching their 14 Barkley Sound Domestic Fishing Area. Trans Mountain acknowledges the importance of marine 15 resources to Aboriginal groups and understands the concerns should a spill occur during tanker 16 transit through their traditional territories. Trans Mountain considered the potential effects of 17 spills on elements of the environment that support Aboriginal rights and interests including 18 TMRU and proposed mitigation in Section 5 of Volume 8A (Filing ID A3S4Y3 to A3S4Z0).

19 In their written evidence, Cowichan Tribes, Lyackson First Nation, Stz’uminus First Nation 20 Pacheedaht First Nation, Ditidaht First Nation, Musqueam Indian Band, Tsawout First Nation, 21 and T’Sou-ke First Nation expressed concerns about the ability to respond in the event of an 22 emergency or oil spill and the locations of spill response centres. Pacheedaht First Nation and 23 Ditidaht First Nation are concerned that an emergency in the Juan de Fuca Strait would be 24 difficult to respond to due to the potential for rough seas and limited access to the communities 25 by road. There is no emergency response equipment in these communities. Ditidaht First Nation 26 and Pacheedaht First Nation are concerned that escort tugs alone will not be able to effectively 27 respond to urgent situations, such as the possibility that a disabled ship, and that rescue 28 vessels will not be available to tow tankers back to safety. These communities request that 29 emergency response resources be made available in their traditional territory and state a 30 willingness to discuss emergency response procedures with Trans Mountain and WCMRC. 31 Squamish First Nation is concerned about emergency response capacity in Burrard Inlet. Trans 32 Mountain is committed to continued engagement with these communities.

57.5 Mitigation 33 Aboriginal groups including Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID A71228), Lyackson First Nation 34 (Filing ID A71256), Cowichan Tribes (Filing ID A71232), Snuneymuxw First Nation (Filing ID 35 A71230), Squamish First Nation (Filing ID A71223), Tsartlip First Nation (Filing ID A71236), 36 Tsawout First Nation and T’Sou-ke First Nation (Filing ID A71224) expressed concerns 37 regarding mitigation measures and stated that mitigation measures to avoid or reduce effects on 38 TMRU and monitoring programs should be developed in consultation with Aboriginal groups. 39 Consultation with Aboriginal groups allows for the development of measures specific to 40 Aboriginal groups. Tsawout First Nation proposed specific mitigation measures including 41 changes to vessel scheduling, routing, monitoring programs development of communication 42 methods and community loan programs. Trans Mountain has identified mitigation to reduce the 43 magnitude and duration of potential effects, where feasible. However, as Trans Mountain does

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1 not own or operate tankers, Trans Mountain has a limited ability to commit to actions conducted 2 by tankers while in transit to or from the Westridge Marine Terminal. In addition, as the shipping 3 industry follows internationally and federally regulated guidelines and rules (such as the use of 4 the international shipping lanes for routing and the use of pilots during transit), there is limited 5 ability for any tanker or vessel to alter route or schedule. All Aboriginal groups will be invited to 6 attend regional EPP workshops where mitigation measures and monitoring programs will be 7 discussed.

8 Lyackson First Nation and Tsawout First Nation requested mitigation meetings be held with their 9 communities. Lyackson First Nation notes in their evidence that they did not provide mitigation 10 measures in their TMRU report as they were expecting that mitigation meetings would be held. 11 Trans Mountain is committed to a meeting to discuss the results of their TMRU report. Tsawout 12 First Nation proposed mitigation measures in their written evidence and requested that a forum 13 to develop mitigation measures be held with Trans Mountain and Tsawout First Nation. Trans 14 Mountain is committed to hosting a regional EPP workshop to discuss mitigation measures, 15 Tsawout First Nation, and Lyackson First Nation will be invited to attend.

57.6 Stewardship 16 The evidence provided by Aboriginal groups includes a sacred duty to act as the stewards of 17 their traditional territory (Tsleil-Waututh Nation, Squamish First Nation), and their duty to care for 18 and manage resources in a sustainable way to ensure resources are available for future 19 generations (T’Sou-ke First Nation, Pacheedaht First Nation, Stz’uminus First Nation). Trans 20 Mountain acknowledges the intimate connection that Aboriginal groups have with the lands and 21 waters within their traditional territories and the importance of this relationship to their cultures. 22 Trans Mountain also acknowledges the efforts Aboriginal groups have made to ensure the 23 sustainability of their resources, and has developed mitigation measures to minimize the effects 24 of the Project on these resources.

57.7 Swiftsure Bank 25 Ditidaht First Nation and Pacheedaht First Nation identified Swiftsure Bank as an extremely 26 important harvesting site for community members in their written evidence. Swiftsure Bank has 27 been a prime fishing and sea mammal hunting area and a historical site for trade with other First 28 Nations. The site is rich in marine life and has special significance to these Aboriginal groups. 29 Swiftsure Bank is within the shipping lanes and Ditidaht First Nation and Pacheedaht First 30 Nation are concerned that increased tanker traffic will reduce access to Swiftsure Bank, 31 especially in low visibility conditions, and increase the risk of collisions with tankers. Ditidaht 32 First Nation is also concerned that the waves and noise from the increased tanker traffic may 33 affect the traditional utilization by fish and marine resources. Trans Mountain acknowledges the 34 importance of Swiftsure Bank to these communities and recognizes that the shipping lanes 35 cross over Swiftsure Bank. Trans Mountain does not own or operate tankers but will raise 36 awareness amongst Project tankers about conditions near Swiftsure Bank in its Port Information 37 and Terminal Operations Manual.

57.8 Reporting of Information 38 In their written evidence, Esquimalt Nation, Pacheedaht First Nation and Lyackson First Nation 39 expressed concerns about the way in which their information was reported by Trans Mountain 40 and their consultant, CH2M, in technical reports submitted to the NEB. Esquimalt Nation

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1 clarifies the following three issues with respect to the CH2M reporting on Esquimalt Nation 2 TMRU on page 5 of their written evidence (Filing ID A4L5L4):

3 · “there may be other TMRU areas in the vicinity of the proposed marine 4 shipping lane for the Project beyond those identified in the TMRU study 5 that have the potential to be impacted by the Project, including 6 archaeological sites;”

7 · “while no mitigation measures were requested by Esquimalt Nation 8 during the study, Esquimalt Nation community members were not 9 specifically asked for mitigation;” and

10 · While the TMRU study indicated that Esquimalt Nation community 11 members no longer harvest clams and oysters due to concerns 12 regarding pollution, there are other species that are not harvested due 13 to contamination and other barriers to the exercise of harvesting rights. 14 “Esquimalt Nation members have further indicated that despite the fact 15 that current use of Marine Resources does not reflect past use, Marine 16 Resources remain an integral element of their culture and way of life 17 and that they have a desire to restore their use of marine resources to 18 past levels.”

19 Trans Mountain has reviewed the evidence and the attachments providing additional TMRU 20 information from Esquimalt Nation (Filing ID A4L5L6 to A4L5L8), and acknowledges that 21 Esquimalt Nation may have other TMRU sites near the shipping lanes that were not identified in 22 the TMRU study, that Esquimalt Nation was not specifically asked for mitigation measures and 23 that Esquimalt First Nation may wish to participate in TMRU activities in the future that they are 24 not currently engaged in. Trans Mountain has reviewed this information and has determined that 25 this does not alter the assessment conclusions in the Application.

26 Pacheedaht First Nation indicated in their written evidence that the information included in the 27 technical report submitted to the NEB from their TMRU study did not reflect Pacheedaht First 28 Nation’s information in a substantive way and dismissed their concerns. Trans Mountain 29 reviewed the report submitted by Pacheedaht First Nation and the Supplemental TMRU - 30 Marine Transportation Technical Report filed with the NEB in July 2014 (Filing ID A3Z4Z1) and 31 Pacheedaht First Nation’s concerns are listed in the report under the categories of trails and 32 travelways, plant gathering, fishing, and gathering places. Mitigation was provided for their 33 concerns in Table 6.1-2 of the Supplemental TMRU - Marine Transportation Technical Report 34 filed with the NEB in July 2014 (Filing ID A3Z4Z1). Additional issues of concern, traditional use 35 sites, or features identified through ongoing engagement with Pacheedaht First Nation will be 36 considered for incorporation into Project planning under the guidance of existing marine 37 transport regulations and mitigation recommendations made to date.

38 In their evidence, Pacheedaht First Nation criticized Trans Mountain for not conducting an 39 impact assessment on Pacheedaht First Nation’s Aboriginal rights. Trans Mountain did not 40 conduct an assessment of the Project on Pacheedaht First Nation’s Aboriginal rights in the 41 supplemental TMRU report filed in July 2014 for two reasons. First, the purpose of the TMRU 42 technical report is to provide information describing the characteristics of TMRU for the marine 43 transportation component of the Project, and to identify and respond to TMRU concerns raised 44 by Aboriginal groups, such as Pacheedaht First Nation, not to conduct an assessment. Trans

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1 Mountain filed a letter updating the assessment conclusions based on the information in the 2 supplemental report with the NEB on August 11, 2014. The letter states that “TERA has 3 reviewed the findings of the supplemental TMRU report in the context of the Environmental and 4 Socio-economic Assessment (ESA) - Marine Transportation (Volume 8A), and has determined 5 that the significance conclusions of the ESA with regard to TMRU remain unchanged by the 6 results of the supplemental report for both Project-related effects (Section 4.3.10.6 of 7 Volume 8A [Filing ID A3S4Y3]) and the Project’s contribution to cumulative effects 8 (Section 4.4.8.3 of Volume 8A [Filing ID A3S4Y3]). Our confidence in the assessment has 9 changed to high since more baseline information has been gathered from the marine 10 communities listed above.” Pacheedaht First Nation’s TMRU information, included in the 11 supplemental TMRU report, was considered in this assessment update.

12 Pacheedaht First Nation also criticized Trans Mountain in their evidence for not conducting an 13 impact assessment specific to the potential impacts on Pacheedaht First Nation’s TMRU. Trans 14 Mountain did not conduct an assessment specific to Pacheedaht First Nation since Trans 15 Mountain is of the view that separate regional significance evaluations are not required to allow 16 the NEB to reach conclusions on whether or not the Project is in the public interest, and whether 17 unjustified significant adverse effects would be likely to occur as a result of the Project. Trans 18 Mountain acknowledges the importance of the marine environment and the resources within it to 19 Pacheedaht First Nation and understands that the ability to participate in TMRU activities such 20 as fishing, hunting, and marine harvesting is an important component of the exercise of 21 Pacheedaht First Nation’s rights. Trans Mountain’s methodology for assessment of potential 22 adverse effects of the Project-related marine transportation on VCs that support Aboriginal 23 rights and interests can be found in Section 4.3.1 of Volume 8A (Filing ID A3S4Y3). The 24 methodology for assessment of cumulative effects is explained in detail in Section 4.4.1 of 25 Volume 8A and the response to NEB IR 2.041c (Filing ID A3Z4T9). Trans Mountain believes 26 that the assessment conducted addresses the potential interactions of the Project with TMRU 27 identified by Pacheedaht First Nation in their written evidence through the assessment of the 28 likely effects of the Project on the environment and TMRU. A summary of recommended 29 mitigation measures can be found in Table 6.1 of Volume 8B-5, TMRU Technical Report (Filing 30 ID A3S4K3). The mitigation measures are based on applicable federal regulations and other 31 guidelines pertinent to marine shipping activities as overseen by Transport Canada, CCG, PMV, 32 and Pacific Pilotage Authority. Trans Mountain also considered the potential effects of spills on 33 elements of the environment that support Aboriginal rights and interests including TMRU in 34 Section 5 of Volume 8A (Filing IDs A3S4Y3 to A3S4Z0).

35 Pacheedaht First Nation also indicated that they felt that Trans Mountain had misrepresented 36 and misinterpreted their oral evidence regarding the potential impacts of tanker traffic on 37 Swiftsure Bank and how Trans Mountain would address their concerns outlined at their hearing 38 with the NEB on November 27, 2014. Trans Mountain has reviewed the hearing transcripts and 39 the summary of concerns letter sent to Pacheedaht First Nation and apologizes for the 40 reference to the pipeline in the responses provided to concerns identified at the oral hearing. 41 The table in the summary and concerns letter that contained references to the pipeline has been 42 redrafted and provided to Pacheedaht First Nation. Additional issues of concern, traditional use 43 sites, or features identified through ongoing engagement with Pacheedaht First Nation will be 44 considered for incorporation into Project planning under the guidance of existing marine 45 transport regulations and mitigation recommendations made to date.

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57.9 Summary of New Commitments 1 · Trans Mountain is committed to holding meetings with Lyackson First Nation to discuss 2 mitigation measures for the increased marine shipping.

3 · Trans Mountain will raise awareness amongst Project tankers about conditions near 4 Swiftsure Bank with Project tankers in its Port Information and Terminal Operations 5 Manual.

57.10 References 6 Antoniuk T. 2000. Cumulative Effects Assessment of Pipeline Projects. In: Cumulative 7 Environmental Effects Management Tools and Approaches, Alan J. Kennedy (Ed). 8 Papers from a symposium held by the Alberta Society of Professional Biologists. 9 Calgary, Alberta.

10 National Energy Board. 2015. Filing Manual. Inclusive of Release 2015-01 (June 2015). 11 Calgary, Alberta.

12 URS Corporation. 2002. Topical Report: Cumulative Effects Assessment for Gas Pipeline 13 Projects. Prepared for GRI, Des Plaines, Illinois. GRI Report No. GRI-02-0104.

14

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58.0 MARINE COMMERCIAL, RECREATION AND TOURISM USE 1 A range of assertions and information related to marine commercial, recreational and tourism 2 use associated with marine transportation (i.e., Project-related marine vessels in transit) were 3 identified in intervenor evidence. Trans Mountain acknowledges the additional sources of 4 information about marine use patterns, and notes that all potential effects noted by intervenors 5 are addressed in the Application and/or other evidence filed by Trans Mountain. Further 6 discussion by category is presented below.

58.1 Economic Importance of Commercial Fisheries and Marine Tourism 7 Intervenors emphasized the social and economic importance of commercial fisheries to 8 Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities. Several intervenors (Adam Olsen [Filing ID 9 A4L6V3], Cowichan Tribes [Filing ID A4L9Y9], Lyackson First Nation [Filing IDs A4Q0H9, 10 A4Q0I4], Maa-Nulth Nations [Filing ID A4L6D5], Musqueam Indian Band [Filing ID A4Q2F9], 11 T’Sou-ke First Nation [Filing ID A4L5T0], Tsawout First Nation [Filing ID A4Q1D4], Unifor [Filing 12 ID A4L6C6], and US Tribes [Filing IDs A4L7G2, A4L7G3, A4L7G5, A4L7G7, A4L7G8]), 13 described the scope and extent of commercial fishing activities, including historical context, 14 descriptions of organizations that manage the fisheries, and numbers of commercial and 15 communal commercial licences, revenues and quotas by fishery type.

16 Trans Mountain recognizes the overall value that commercial fishing has to many communities 17 and individuals located in coastal British Columbia and the importance of assessing and 18 minimizing any Project-related interactions with all commercial fishing activities and other 19 marine users. Further detail is presented in the discussion of commercial fishing and 20 aquaculture in Volume 8B, Technical Report 8B-6, Marine Commercial, Recreational and 21 Tourism Use – Marine Transportation Technical Report (Vista Strategy Corp. and TERA 22 December 2013; Filing IDs A3S4K4, A3S4K5, A3S4K6).

23 Current or planned aquaculture operations were specifically identified by intervenors (Lyackson 24 First Nation [Filing IDs A4Q0H9, A4Q0I4] and Maa-Nulth Nations [Filing ID A4L6D5]) for 25 economic importance to communities. As noted in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11 (Marine 26 Transportation Assessment, Marine Commercial, Recreational and Tourism Use, 27 Filing ID A3S4Y3), potential effects on aquaculture operations were considered in the ESA for 28 the proposed Project. However, the results of desktop analysis determined that no active 29 aquaculture operations are present within the Marine LSA in Canadian waters. The Marine LSA 30 includes the inbound and outbound marine shipping lanes, the area between the shipping lanes, 31 where it exists, and a 2 km buffer extending from the outermost edge of each shipping lane. The 32 effects of vessel wake on fish and fish habitat is described in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.6 (refer to 33 Table 4.3.6.4; Filing ID A3S4Y3, PDF page 60 of 294), and it was determined that the effects of 34 vessel wake from Project-related marine vessels on fish and fish habitat would be negligible at a 35 distance of approximately 2 km. As such, no potential effects on aquaculture from the Project 36 are anticipated.

37 Marine tourism was identified in the evidence of several intervenors (Lyackson First Nation 38 [Filing IDs A4Q0H9, A4Q0I4], Maa-Nulth Nations [Filing ID A4L6D5], NS NOPE [Filing IDs 39 A4L5Y0, A4L5Y7, A4L5Y9]) as an increasingly important economic driver, playing a key role in 40 supporting the economies of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities. Trans Mountain 41 recognizes the economic importance of marine tourism and other commercial marine uses in 42 the Canadian and US waters of the Marine RSA as defined in Section 4.2 (Filing ID A3S4X5)

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1 and shown in Figure 4.2-2 (Volume 8A, Filing ID A3S4X6). Potential effects of Project-related 2 marine vessels on marine tourism users is addressed in the Application. Please refer to the 3 effects assessment of Project-related marine vessels on marine commercial, recreational and 4 tourism use provided in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11.4.2, Table 4.3.11.2 (Filing ID A3S4Y3). No 5 significant adverse residual effects are identified with respect to routine operations of Project- 6 related marine vessels on marine commercial, recreational and tourism use by Aboriginal and 7 non-Aboriginal users in the Marine LSA or RSA. The combined effects of increased Project- 8 related marine vessel traffic on marine commercial, recreational and tourism use indicators are 9 periodic in frequency, long-term in reversibility, low to medium in magnitude and not significant 10 (refer to Volume 8A, Table 4.3.11.2; Filing ID A3S4Y3, PDF pages 162-165 of 294).

58.2 Disruption of Fishing Activities and Access to Commercial Fishing Areas 11 Intervenors noted concern that the increase in Project-related tankers and tugs in the shipping 12 lanes may further restrict the times and locations in which commercial fishing activities can take 13 place and may obstruct or otherwise impede the ability of fishers to travel to and access fishing 14 areas. Intervenors who submitted evidence stating general concerns about access to fishing 15 areas include Adam Olsen (Filing ID A4L6V3), Cowichan Tribes (Filing ID A4L9Y9), Lyackson 16 First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0H9), Maa-Nulth Nations (Filing ID A4L6D5), Musqueam Indian Band 17 (Filing ID A4Q2F9), Tsawout First Nation (Filing ID A4Q1D4), T’Sou-ke First Nation (Filing ID 18 A4L5T0), Unifor (Filing ID A4L6C6), and US Tribes (Filing IDs A4L7G2, A4L7G3, A4L7G5, 19 A4L7G7, A4L7G8).

20 Cowichan First Nation fishers travel from southeast Vancouver Island across the designated 21 shipping lanes to the area around the mouth of the Fraser River. Musqueam First Nation stated 22 a concern that increased tanker traffic into Burrard Inlet and the Strait of Georgia would limit 23 access to fishing areas in the Strait of Georgia. Further, Tsawout First Nation were concerned 24 about disruption to their travel routes in Haro Strait and near Saturna Island. Cowichan Tribes 25 further stated that “Current marine traffic regulations would seem to give cargo and tanker traffic 26 priority over Aboriginal fishing vessels. Without change to the regulations or better management 27 of traffic flow, the increased traffic will affect members’ ability to fish…” Evidence submitted by 28 Unifor states concerns that fisheries in the Strait of Georgia may be closed to ensure that 29 tankers are not impeded in any way by small fishing vessels.

30 Evidence from Lyackson First Nation stated that the incremental increase in the magnitude and 31 frequency of tanker traffic should be viewed within a context “where existing impacts to 32 Lyackson use of and access to marine areas is already high and significant and approaching 33 thresholds of effect.” Lyackson First Nation and others stated a concern that the incremental 34 addition to the existing deep draft traffic in the shipping lanes would increase interference with 35 navigation of small craft. Cowichan First Nation stated that small fishing vessels are already 36 affected by tankers anchoring in Cowichan Bay as they await access to mainland ports.

37 The potential for Project tankers to disrupt Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal fishing vessels while in 38 transit to fishing areas or actively engaged in fishing activities is discussed in the Application 39 and is addressed in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11, which identified and determined the 40 significance of the potential adverse residual effects: Disruption of Commercial Fishing Activities 41 and Alteration of Existing Marine Vessel Movement Patterns. Mitigation measures related to 42 these potential residual effects are provided in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11.4.2, Table 4.3.11.2 43 (Filing ID A3S4Y3) and include that Trans Mountain will: provide regular, updated information on

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1 Project-related marine vessel traffic to fishing industry organizations, Aboriginal communities, 2 and other affected stakeholders; and will initiate a public outreach program before the Project 3 operations phase, where possible, through the COSBC or other applicable agencies. In 4 addition, Trans Mountain notes that Project-related marine vessels will be fully compliant with all 5 applicable navigational, communications and safety regulations as outlined in Volume 8A, 6 Section 1.1 and Table 4.3.11-2 (Filing ID A3S4Y3). Fishing vessels are permitted to cross and 7 fish within shipping lanes if the area is clear; however, fishers are not permitted to impede the 8 passage of other vessels. CCG Notices to Mariners acknowledge that fishing vessels may be 9 present in the shipping lanes during specific fishery openings, and advise other vessels to 10 exercise caution at these times (CCG 2013). The potential residual effect of Disruption to 11 Commercial Fishing Activities related to marine shipping activity is anticipated to be periodic in 12 frequency, low in magnitude and not significant. The potential residual effect of Alternation of 13 Marine Vessel Movement Patterns in relation to marine shipping activities is anticipated to be 14 periodic in frequency, low to medium in magnitude and not significant.

15 It is important to note that Project-related tankers will constitute an incremental addition to an 16 existing hazard. Disruptions to fishing activities are equally likely to occur in relation to all large 17 vessels currently using the shipping lanes, and Project-related marine vessels will make up only 18 a small portion of the total marine traffic. For example, Table 4.4.1.2 in the cumulative effects 19 assessment in Volume 8A (Filing ID A3S4Y3) estimated that the increased traffic of 20 approximately 720 tanker movements per year (i.e., approximately 30 tankers a month in round 21 trips to Westridge Marine Terminal) constitutes a relative increase of Project tankers, as a 22 percentage of total vessel traffic in the shipping lanes, of 3.2% in the Strait of Georgia to 5.9% in 23 Haro Strait in 2030. In the highly unlikely event that all other marine traffic remains at current (as 24 of 2012) levels, the relative increase in tankers in these two areas of the Marine RSA would still 25 constitute only 7.6% of all vessel traffic in the Strait of Georgia and 13.9% in Haro Strait.

58.3 Damage to or Loss of Fishing Gear 26 Intervenors stated that the increase in Project-related marine vessels, both in transit and while 27 at anchor, would increase the potential for vessels to run afoul of fishing gear and cause 28 damage or destruction to gear (intervenors include Adam Olsen [Filing ID A4L6V3], Maa-Nulth 29 Nations [Filing ID A4L6D5], Musqueam Indian Band [Filing ID A4Q2F9], T’Sou-ke First Nation 30 [Filing ID A4L5T0], and US Tribes [Filing IDs A4L7G2, A4L7G3, A4L7G5, A4L7G7, A4L7G8]). 31 For example, US Tribes evidence stated that tankers currently run through fishing grounds and 32 have damaged gill nets in the past, also highlighting concerns about safety of small vessel 33 operators. Further, evidence from Musqueam Indian Band noted concerns that fishing nets take 34 considerable time and effort to move and reset, which further restricts the time that fishers can 35 fish in the shipping lanes. These concerns are addressed in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11 (Filing 36 ID A3S4Y3), which evaluates the potential adverse effects of Damage or Loss of Gear as well 37 as Damage to Marine Vessels and/or Injury, for all fishers present in or near the transboundary 38 shipping lanes. The potential residual effect of Damage or Loss of Gear related to marine 39 shipping activity is concluded to be accidental in frequency, short-term in reversibility, low to 40 medium in magnitude, and not significant. The potential residual effect of Damage to Marine 41 Vessels and/or Injury in relation to marine shipping activities is anticipated to be accidental in 42 frequency, short-term to permanent in reversibility, high in magnitude and not significant.

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58.4 Risk of Collision Between Tankers and Other Marine Vessels 1 A number of intervenors highlighted concerns about Project-related tankers increasing the risk 2 of collisions with small vessels including fishing vessels, water taxis, recreational craft, and 3 marine tourism operators (Adam Olsen [Filing ID A4L6V3], Lyackson First Nation [Filing ID 4 A4Q0I4], Maa-Nulth Nations [Filing ID A4L6D5], Musqueam Indian Band [Filing ID A4Q2F9], 5 NS NOPE [Filing IDs A4L5V1, A4L5Y0, A4L5Y4], Tsawout First Nation [Filing ID A4Q1D4], 6 T’Sou-ke First Nation [Filing ID A4L5T0], US Tribes [Filing IDs A4L7G2, A4L7G3, A4L7G5]). 7 Pacheedaht First Nation (Filing ID A4R3Y0) stated concern about increased cost (e.g., to get 8 radar or charter a boat) due to increased safety concerns associated with the increase in 9 tankers.

10 Tsawout First Nation stated that current marine traffic is already busy and that it is hard for 11 harvesters to find places to fish and to stay safe. Trans Mountain notes that only a small 12 proportion of marine vessel traffic in the study area is attributable to current operations at 13 Westridge Marine Terminal (i.e., approximately one vessel weekly), and that Project-related 14 operations will increase this amount to approximately one daily transit in the shipping lanes. The 15 Application considers the potential socio-economic effects of non-spill marine vehicle collisions 16 in the assessment of effects on marine commercial, recreational and tourism use. Relevant 17 potential residual adverse effects are noted above in Section 60.3 of this Reply Evidence and 18 discussed and characterized in full in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11 (refer to Volume 8A, 19 Table 4.3.11.3; Filing ID A3S4Y3, PDF page 162 of 294). The risk of collisions and other 20 incidents occurring for Project-related tankers is calculated in TERMPOL 3.15, General Risk 21 Analysis and Intended Methods of Reducing Risks (Section 7, TERMPOL 3.15; 22 Filing ID A3S5F6).

23 Evidence submitted by NS NOPE stated concerns about the increased risk of collision near 24 Westridge Marine Terminal due to the expanded docks and increased tanker traffic. However, 25 the shortest distance that will occur between a tanker docked at Westridge Marine Terminal 26 and:

27 i. the navigation beacon at Roche Point will be approximately 850 m; 28 ii. the high tide line at the boat launch at Cates Park will be approximately 29 1,020 m; and 30 iii. the southeast corner of the dock at Cates Park will be approximately 1,000 m.

31 The siting of the dock and the clearances noted above will not impede recreational boaters or 32 commercial traffic.

33 Volume 5B, Section 7.6.4 (Filing ID A3S1S9) and Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11.4.2 (Filing ID 34 A3S4Y3) assess the potential effects of the construction phase of the proposed Project 35 (i.e., construction of the expanded dock complex at Westridge Marine Terminal), and of the 36 Project-related increase in marine vessel traffic on other marine users throughout Burrard Inlet, 37 respectively. The assessment of potential effects is considered to apply equally to all marine 38 users (e.g., marine commercial users, tourism users, and recreational users such as boaters, 39 fishers, kayakers, and scuba divers). Mitigation measures to avoid and mitigate potential 40 impacts are also provided in the above noted effects assessments.

41 Recommendations proposed by Trans Mountain have been accepted by the TRC that will 42 further enhance the safety of all mariners in the central harbour (refer to Response to NEB IR

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1 regarding TERMPOL report and Outstanding Filings; Filing ID A4G3U5). Therefore, additional 2 safeguards already considered in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11.4.2 (Filing ID A3S4Y1) and in 3 Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.15 are considered to be sufficient. The information and assessment 4 provided is considered to be an appropriate level of detail to inform the development of Project- 5 specific mitigation measures and to assist in federal-level decision-making.

58.5 Wake Effect on Small Vessels 6 The potential for vessel wake from Project tankers and tugs to damage shoreline areas, private 7 property, and endanger small vessels was mentioned by several intervenors (Lyackson First 8 Nation [Filing ID A4Q0I4], Musqueam Indian Band [Filing ID A4Q2F9], NS NOPE [Filing ID 9 A4L5Y6], Tsawout First Nation [Filing ID A4Q1D4], T’Sou-ke First Nation [Filing ID A4L5T0], 10 US Tribes [Filing ID A4L7G2]). As discussed in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.6.6.1 (Filing ID 11 A3S4Y3), wake waves generated by Project-related tankers and tugs transiting the shipping 12 lanes are predicted to be < 0.1 m in height at the shoreline, which is well within the range of 13 natural wave conditions. In addition to wind-generated waves, which can be substantial in height 14 especially during the winter months, the shipping lanes are heavily utilized by vessel traffic. For 15 example, in 2012 a total of 8,896 vessels were recorded transiting through Haro Strait (refer to 16 Volume 8A, Table 4.4.1.2; Filing ID A3S4Y3). This included 391 tankers, 4,506 cargo carriers, 17 and 975 tugs. Wake waves from these vessels would be similar in height to those generated by 18 Project-related vessels. In addition to the commercial vessels, large numbers of pleasure craft 19 transit the nearshore waters along the shipping lanes. These vessels are particularly numerous 20 in the summer months. Given the existing volume of vessel traffic, and considering the natural 21 wave environment, the addition of Project-related vessel traffic will have a minimal effect on the 22 frequency of waves interacting with shoreline habitats, private property, and other small vessels.

23 The potential effects of the Project on other marine users from increased Project-related marine 24 vessel traffic associated with the Project include Disruption of Marine User Activities from 25 Project-related Marine Vessel Wake. This potential residual effect related to marine shipping 26 activity is concluded to be occasional in frequency, short-term in reversibility, low to medium in 27 magnitude, and not significant. Refer to Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11 (Filing ID A3S4Y3) for the 28 full assessment of the potential effects on marine commercial, recreational, and tourism users.

58.6 Sensory Disturbance from Transiting and Anchored Tankers 29 Sensory disturbance from increased tanker noise, odour, and vibration to residents or users of 30 surrounding foreshore and waters was stated as a concern by various intervenors (i.e., 31 Lyackson First Nation [Filing ID A4Q0I4], Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q2F9), 32 NS NOPE [Filing ID A4L5V1], US Tribes [Filing ID A4L7G2). Intervenors noted that the increase 33 in Project vessels is likely to contribute to decreased enjoyment of marine activities, and may 34 result in marine users opting to change the location of their travel routes or activities. 35 Intervenors stated that the increased use of commercial anchorages in the Central Harbour area 36 of Burrard Inlet and English Bay would detract from the experiences of other marine users and 37 would also negatively affect residents in nearby communities, in terms of increased noise and 38 light. Others stated that the increase in activities in other areas of the Marine RSA, such as 39 bunkering and increased use of escort vessels would increase noise and air pollution and 40 associated sensory disturbance for other users of the area.

41 The potential residual adverse effect with respect to Project-related marine vessels in active 42 transit, Increased Sensory Disturbance to Marine Users, has been assessed in Volume 8A,

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1 Section 4.3.11 (Filing ID A3S4Y3). This potential residual effect is considered to be periodic in 2 nature due the transitory presence of Project-related tankers, low magnitude (i.e., sensory 3 disturbance would be temporary, site-specific, and reversible, and the nuisance effect would 4 occur only when Project-related marine vessels are actively transiting areas where other marine 5 users are present) and not significant. Though not related to marine users on Burrard Inlet, 6 Trans Mountain acknowledges that this effect, similarly characterized, would also apply to 7 certain shore-based residents and land users, with the same mitigation measures applying.

8 With respect to Project-related use of anchorages, Trans Mountain plans to operate Westridge 9 Marine Terminal in a manner that will reduce the time that vessels bound for the terminal would 10 spend at the designated anchorages in Burrard Inlet and also help mitigate the effects of noise 11 and light from vessels at anchor. KMC’s Tanker Acceptance Standard (the Standard) is included 12 as Trans Mountain’s response to Belcarra IR No. 1.9 – Attachment 1 (Filing ID A3X6W2). 13 Section 4.8.1 of the Standard states, “All vessels shall conduct operations within Canada, 14 specifically PMV, in accordance with any additional guidance provided by the Terminal, and 15 always respectful of the rights of the residents in surrounding neighbourhoods to not be 16 unnecessarily disturbed by noise, odours and health or other concerns from vessel operations. 17 Such additional instructions may be verbal or written in nature and shall be issued by the 18 Loading Master.” Trans Mountain has been actively working with PMV to develop guidance for 19 the vessels to minimize the effects of light and noise on residents around the Port. Please refer 20 to Trans Mountain’s response to Belcarra IR No. 1.9 – Attachment 2 (Filing ID A3X6W3).

21 The Tsleil-Waututh Nation also noted concern about impaired views related to increased tanker 22 and tug traffic (Filing ID A4L6A4). Anticipated tanker traffic associated with the Project 23 represents an incremental increase to the daily marine vessel traffic that currently occurs in 24 Burrard Inlet. As stated in Trans Mountain’s response to NEB IR No. 3.74a (Filing ID A4H1V2), 25 based on 2012 AIS data, vessels (tankers and barges) calling at the Westridge Marine Terminal 26 currently constitute 3% of all traffic (refer to Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.2; Filing IDs A3S4R7, 27 A3S4R8). This number is expected to increase to 11% of all traffic in the future, should the 28 Project be approved. The percentage of Project-related marine vessels is relatively conservative 29 because it is possible that other terminals in this area might expand their vessel calls beyond 30 what has been forecasted. This incremental increase due to the proposed Project is only a 31 portion of the projected cumulative increase in marine traffic, based on likely industry 32 developments. Trans Mountain notes that Project-related tankers are one of many kinds of 33 vessels that may be anchored or in transit at any given time. Project-related tankers are not 34 permanent fixtures on the marine landscape and are transitory in nature.

58.7 Loss of Livelihood for Fishers or Marine Tourism Operators 35 Intervenors stated concerns regarding sensory disturbance from the presence of Project tankers 36 which could lead to economic loss from any impacts to commercial fisheries or planned tourism 37 activities, including “preparatory investments for economic development opportunities” 38 (e.g., Lyackson First Nation [Filing ID A4Q0H9]). Intervenors stated that capital investments in 39 tourism (e.g., kayak tours, ecotourism) and aquaculture may be adversely affected by increased 40 tanker traffic, with the mechanism identified as a decline in the available tourism market due to 41 related risk perceptions. Tsleil-Waututh Nation also stated concern about on-water hazards 42 leading to loss of revenue for contemporary businesses (e.g., on-water cultural tours of Burrard 43 Inlet) (Filing IDs A4L6A4, A4L6A3). The potential residual effect of lost or reduced economic 44 opportunity for marine commercial users is identified and discussed in the Application (refer to 45 Table 4.3.11.3 and associated discussion in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11; Filing ID A3S4Y3),

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1 which applies to commercial fisheries, marine transportation, and marine tourism users. This 2 effect considers the event of a non-spill accident involving a Project-related marine vessel 3 curtailing the use of the marine vessel and its users’ associated livelihood. This effect is 4 characterized as accidental in frequency, short- to medium-term in reversibility, low to high in 5 magnitude, low in probability, and not significant. Trans Mountain acknowledges the distinct 6 concern about sensory disturbance leading to loss of livelihood. However, given that the 7 sensory disturbance associated with Project-related marine vessels is not anticipated to be a 8 significant adverse effect for marine commercial, recreational, and tourism users, Project- 9 specific contributions to livelihood disruption associated with sensory disturbance is also 10 considered not significant.

11 Trans Mountain also recognizes the potential for perceptions of risk to influence the 12 perspectives and behaviours of marine tourism users. Trans Mountain discusses the potential 13 residual effect, Negative User Perspectives of Increased Project-related Marine Vessel Traffic, 14 in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11 (Filing ID A3S4Y3, page 8A-413). The potential residual effect of 15 Decrease in Marine Tourism is discussed and characterized in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11 16 (Filing ID A3S4Y3, page 8A-417). The probability that this effect will occur is considered to be 17 low, as tankers have been transiting in the Marine RSA for 60 years, co-existing with the tourism 18 industry. Any decrease in tourism and associated livelihoods could have any number of 19 contributing factors and it is unlikely that increased Project-related marine vessel traffic could be 20 directly attributed to a decline. As noted in Volume 8A, Table 4.3.11.3 (Filing ID A3S4Y3, 21 page 8A-394), no significant adverse effects are anticipated for commercial fisheries and 22 aquaculture or marine tourism use.

58.8 Effects on Marine Recreational Use in Burrard Inlet 23 Evidence from NS NOPE (Filing IDs A4L5V1, A4L5Y0) states that recreational use in the 24 Burrard Inlet is high and asserts that the Project Application and the supplemental recreational 25 boat survey (Technical Update #2; Filing IDs A4A4I4, A4A4I5, and A4A4I6) underestimate the 26 use of recreational craft in the vicinity of Westridge Marine Terminal. Trans Mountain 27 acknowledges the additional sources of information provided by the intervenor about marine 28 recreational use in Burrard Inlet. This information supports Trans Mountain’s understanding, as 29 discussed in the Application in Volume 8A, Section 4.11.2 (Filing ID A3S4Y3), that marine 30 recreation in Burrard Inlet is diverse and important, that use of Burrard Inlet is highly variable, 31 seasonal and also depends on time of day, time of week and whether events are occurring. The 32 recreational boat survey which was submitted by Trans Mountain provided a snapshot of marine 33 activities of small craft in Burrard Inlet. Small recreational vessels are not typically fitted with AIS 34 transponders, and so these vessels were not accounted for in the quantitative marine risk 35 assessment (Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.15; Filing IDs A3S5F4, A3S5F6, and A3S5F8). The 36 recreational vessel survey concluded that current safeguards and proposed future additional 37 safeguards are sufficient to comprehensively mitigate potential effects of TMEP on marine 38 recreational vessels. Recommendations proposed by Trans Mountain have been accepted by 39 the TRC that will further enhance the safety of all mariners in the central harbour (refer to 40 Response to NEB IR regarding TERMPOL report and Outstanding Filings; Filing ID A4G3U5). 41 Therefore, additional safeguards beyond those already considered in Volume 8A, Section 42 4.3.11.4.2 (Filing ID A3S4Y3) and in Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.15 are not necessary.

43 Evidence submitted by Transport Canada also specifically addresses the concerns from 44 Aboriginal communities, fishers and non-commercial boaters that Project-related tankers may 45 limit their ability to access important marine areas, impact their safety on the water, or

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1 damage fishing gear (please refer to Section 2.4 of Transport Canada’s Submission to the 2 National Energy Board Review Panel for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project; 3 Filing ID A4L7K1).

4 Further baseline information on existing marine recreational use in Burrard Inlet and throughout 5 the Marine RSA is provided in Technical Report 8B-6, Volume 8B, Marine Commercial, 6 Recreational and Tourism Use Technical Report – Marine Transportation (Vista Strategy Corp. 7 and TERA 2013; Filing IDs A3S4K4, A3S4K5, A3S4K6). Potential effects of Project-related 8 marine vessels on marine recreational use in the Marine RSA, including Burrard Inlet, are 9 discussed and characterized in Section 4.3.11 of Volume 8A (Filing ID A3S4Y3). No significant 10 adverse effects on marine recreational use are identified.

11 NS NOPE further notes that the recreational craft accessing marinas and other destinations in 12 the Central Harbour and areas east must also wait for slack tide to transit through the Second 13 Narrows. The increase in Project tanker traffic is considered by NS NOPE to be likely to reduce 14 the time available for other vessels to transit the Second Narrows. This concern was considered 15 as a key contribution to the potential adverse residual effect, Alteration of Existing Marine 16 Vessel Movement Patterns (for further detail, refer to Volume 8A; Filing ID A3S4Y3). This 17 potential adverse effect is concluded to be periodic in frequency, reversible in the short to long- 18 term, low to medium in magnitude, and not significant.

58.9 Light Pollution from Increased Anchorage Use 19 Evidence submitted by NS NOPE stated concerns that the increased use of commercial 20 anchorages near Westridge Marine Terminal and at other anchorages in the Marine RSA will 21 increase the negative effect of lighting, especially at night. Sensory disturbance to marine users 22 assessed in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11 (Filing ID A3S4Y3) also includes consideration of the 23 visual effects of tankers while in transit. As stated in Section 60.6, Trans Mountain has been 24 actively working with PMV to develop guidance for the vessels to minimize the effects of light 25 and noise on residents around the Port (refer to the response to Belcarra IR No. 1.9 [Filing ID 26 A3X6W1] and Belcarra IR No. 1.9 – Attachment 2, which notes the proposed addition of 27 Section 4.5.3.1, Noise and Light Guidelines to Vancouver Fraser Port Authorities’ practices and 28 procedures document, the Harbour Operations Manual [Filing ID A3X6W3]).

58.10 Assessment of US Fisheries 29 A review of shipping, navigation, and fishing submitted by US Tribes states that US fisheries in 30 the study area may be more substantial than BC fisheries, with more vessels, greater 31 employment, and higher economic value. US Tribes evidence questions the significance 32 evaluation on potential impacts on commercial fishing, collision risk, gear loss, and wake effects 33 (specifically Volume 8A, 4.3.11.2; Filing ID A3S4Y3). The main concerns of the intervenor 34 appear to be that the assessment is qualitative rather than quantitative, and it does not include 35 detailed baseline information on US Tribal fishing activities. US Tribes evidence also notes that 36 the assessment of marine transportation (Volume 8A) acknowledges gaps in Canadian fisheries 37 data and states that the resolution of the spatial data (i.e., commercial fishing data from DFO) is 38 not precise enough to estimate the amount of fishing and transit in shipping lanes.

39 Technical Report 8B-6, in Volume 8B, Marine Commercial, Recreational and Tourism Use 40 Technical Report – Marine Transportation (Vista Strategy Corp. and TERA; Filing IDs A3S4K4, 41 A3S4K5, A3S4K6) provides information regarding existing marine use in and near the shipping

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1 lanes from Westridge Marine Terminal to the 12 nautical mile limit of Canada’s territorial sea, 2 and includes discussion of commercial fisheries and aquaculture, marine transportation, marine 3 recreational use and marine tourism use in United States waters (refer to Section 4.6; Filing ID 4 A3S4K6). The complete analysis of potential effects of the increase in Project-related marine 5 vessels on other marine users is separate from the Marine Commercial, Recreational and 6 Tourism Use Technical Report and is provided in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11 (Filing ID 7 A3S4Y3). As noted in the assessment, the potential residual effects discussed in Volume 8A, 8 Section 4.3.11 apply equally to marine commercial, recreational and tourism users in both 9 Canadian and US waters within the Marine RSA, due to the transboundary nature of the 10 shipping lanes. The designated shipping lanes for deep draft vessels cross over the 11 international boundary throughout much of the southern Strait of Georgia, Haro Strait and Juan 12 de Fuca Strait. For example, in Juan de Fuca Strait the shipping lane for all deep draft inbound 13 vessels is fully in US waters, while the outbound lane is in Canadian waters.

14 Trans Mountain acknowledges the further information provided by US Tribes regarding 15 commercial fishing in US waters, which supports the Application’s conclusion that Project- 16 related effects related to marine transportation apply equally to marine users in US waters. The 17 conclusions of the effects assessment on marine commercial, recreational, and tourism use 18 associated with marine transportation covered in Volume 8A are unchanged in light of US 19 Tribes evidence; and potential effects on commercial fishing of concern to the intervenor are 20 already included in Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11. With regards to Trans Mountain’s use of 21 qualitative methodologies, where there are no standards, guidelines, objectives, or other 22 established and accepted thresholds to define quantitative rating criteria, the qualitative method 23 is considered appropriate for determining significance of effects as per the NEB Filing Manual 24 (NEB 2014). Precise numbers of commercial fishing vessels present in the shipping lanes, by 25 ownership type, are not required to understand and characterize potential Project interactions 26 with fishing vessels and potential residual effects. Trans Mountain considers the assessment as 27 provided to be at an appropriate level of detail to identify and characterize potential Project- 28 related interactions with other marine users, to inform the development of Project-specific 29 mitigation measures applicable to other marine commercial, recreational, and tourism users, 30 and to assist in federal-level decision-making.

58.11 Cumulative Effects Associated with Past Development 31 Lyackson First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0H9) notes that their territory has been the subject of 32 dramatic changes due to colonial settlement, forestry, land privatization and commercial fishing, 33 and that scale of these changes has affected their traditional mode of life, including the ability to 34 maintain the sustainability of traditional marine resources and a cultural connection to their 35 territory. Trans Mountain acknowledges these concerns, and understands this as part of the 36 baseline context of the Project and context for the cumulative effects assessment. Trans 37 Mountain has conducted a cumulative effects assessment related to marine transportation in 38 Volume 8A, Section 4.4 (Filing ID A3S4Y3). The scope of the cumulative effects assessment is 39 a Project-specific cumulative effects assessment as required under the CEA Act, 2012, which is 40 appropriate for the scale of the marine transportation component of the Project. Through the 41 implementation of the mitigation measures, the residual cumulative effects associated with the 42 Project-related increase in marine transportation on the socio-economic elements were 43 considered to be not significant. The underlying concern of Lyackson First Nation related to 44 normal Project operations is that it could impair the harvesting economy, which could in turn 45 have an impact on band members who have low cash incomes and rely on foods from the 46 traditional harvest. The Application notes that there will be no significant adverse impacts to the

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1 biophysical resources used by Aboriginal communities as a result of routine Project operations 2 and the associated increase in transits of Project-related tankers and tugs (with exception of 3 sensory disturbance to southern resident killer whales due to underwater noise). As such, the 4 Project would not result in significant adverse effects on the ability of Aboriginal and non- 5 Aboriginal communities to continue to use lands, waters, or resources for traditional purposes. 6 TMRU is discussed further in Section 57 (Aboriginal Traditional Marine Use) of this Reply 7 Evidence.

58.12 References 8 Canadian Coast Guard (CCG). 2013. Annual Edition Notices to Mariners 1 to 46: April 2013 to 9 March 2014. Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Website: 10 http://www.notmar.gc.ca/eng/services/annual/annual-notices-to-mariners-eng.pdf. 11 Accessed: April 2013.

12 National Energy Board. 2014. Filing Manual. Inclusive of Release 2014-03 (November 2014). 13 Calgary, Alberta.

14

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59.0 MARINE TRANSPORTATION 59.1 Introduction 1 A number of intervenors and commenters have raised issues associated with the potential 2 impacts of marine transportation resulting from Trans Mountain Expansion Project. This section 3 of the Reply Evidence addresses evidence submitted by the City of Burnaby (Filing ID A4L8F8), 4 City of Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7V8), City of Port Moody (Filing ID A4L7Q5), Cowichan Tribes 5 (Filing ID A4L9Y9), Environment Canada (Filing ID A4L8Y6), David Farmer (Filing ID A4L6R8), 6 FER (Filing ID A4Q2T7), Friends of the Earth United States (FOE US) (Filing ID A4L9W4), 7 Lyackson First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0H8), Makah Tribal Council (Filing ID A4Q2A4), Elizabeth 8 May (Filing ID A4L8Q9), Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q2F9), NS NOPE (Filing IDs 9 A4L5Y4, A4L5Y5, A4L5Y6, A4L5Y7, A4L5Y8, A4L5Z0), Adam Olsen (Filing ID A4L6V3), 10 Pacheedaht First Nation (Filing IDs A4L5F3, A4L5F4, A4L5F5, A4L5F6, A4L5F7, A4L5F8), 11 Squamish Nation (Filing ID A4L7E5), Tsawwassen First Nation (Filing ID A4L7T2), T'Sou-ke 12 First Nation (Filing IDs A4L5U0, A4L5T0), US Tribes (Filing ID A4L7G7), Upper Nicola Band 13 (Filing ID A4Q1T7), Vancouver Fraser Port Authority (PMV) (Filing ID A4L6Q7), Village of 14 Belcarra (Filing ID A4L5G5), and Washington State Department of Ecology (WSDOE; Filing ID 15 A4Q1X6).

16 This section should be read in conjunction with Sections 25 (Fate and Behaviour), 52 (Marine 17 Spill Modelling), 60 (Marine Risk Assessment), 61 (Marine Spill Liability Compensation), and 18 62 (Marine Emergency Preparedness and Response) of this Reply Evidence.

59.2 Common Intervenor Concerns 19 A majority of intervenors shared common concerns as part of their submitted evidence 20 (e.g., Adam Olsen [Filing ID A4L6V3], Cowichan Tribes [Filing ID A4L9Y9], Elizabeth May [Filing 21 ID A4L8Q9], Makah Tribal Council [Filing ID A4Q2A4], NS NOPE [Filing IDs A4L5Y4, A4L5Y5, 22 A4L5Y6], Pacheedaht First Nation [Filing IDs A4L5F3, A4L5F4, A4L5F5, A4L5F6, A4L5F7, 23 A4L5F8], Squamish Nation [Filing ID A4L7E5], Tsawwassen Nation [Filing ID A4L7T2], and US 24 Tribes [Filing ID A4L7G7]). For example, the Makah Tribal Council has stated that the “addition 25 of this amount of vessel traffic means an increase in risk of collision …resulting in the potential 26 spill...” (Filing ID A4Q2A4). Common concerns include the following.

27 · What are the potential economic and environmental effects of the increased marine traffic 28 associated with this project? 29 Response: Please refer to Volume 8A, Section 4.3 of the ESA (Marine Transportation 30 Assessment, Filing ID A3S4Y3), which identifies the potential environmental and socio- 31 economic effects of the incremental increase in Project-related marine vessel traffic. 32 Section 58 and many other sections of the Reply Evidence provide further information.

33 · What is the likelihood that a spill would take place given the increase of marine traffic? 34 Response: The likelihood of a marine cargo oil spill in the region has been fully analyzed by 35 a comprehensive quantitative risk assessment (Volume 8C, Technical Report TR 8C-12 36 TERMPOL 3.15, General Risk Analysis and Intended Methods of Reducing Risk, Filing IDs 37 A3S5F4, A3S5F6, A3S5F8) carried out by DNV. DNV is a marine classification society 38 recognized for its expertise in marine risk assessment. According to DNV the tanker regime 39 in this area employs “controls (that) are in line with global best practices.” Further 40 information on the marine risk assessment is provided in Section 60.

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1 · What would be the impact of an oil spill on the environment and economy? 2 Response: The potential environmental impacts have been assessed in the Ecological Risk 3 Assessment (Volume 8B, Filing ID A56022). The potential economic costs of an oil spill are 4 addressed in Section 27.

5 · Is the spill response regime in place sufficient to mitigate the most harmful effects of a spill? 6 Response: Trans Mountain has proposed an enhanced oil spill response regime in 7 Volume 8A, Table 5.5.3 (Filing ID A3S4Y6). Further information is provided in Section 62 on 8 Marine Emergency Preparedness and Response.

9 To this end, Trans Mountain, in its initial submission, and through several rounds of IRs, has 10 provided extensive answers to such questions during the public hearing process. Although the 11 information that follows in this section has been provided earlier, it is again discussed in this 12 section of the Reply Evidence in order to assist intervenors who might not have fully reviewed 13 that information prior to submitting their evidence. 59.2.1 Concerns Specific to Burrard Inlet 14 Specific to Burrard Inlet, intervenors raised concerns including the following.

15 · Safety at the Second Narrows (NS NOPE, Filing ID A4L5Y4, A4L5Y6). This is discussed in 16 Volume 8C, Technical Report TR 8C-05 Supplemental TR S4 (Filing ID A3S4T0). Various 17 mandatory restrictions have been established by PMV and published in its Port Information 18 Guide (Filing ID A4F8Z7).

19 · Fire on a tanker (City of Port Moody, Filing ID A4L7Q5). The measures to reduce the risk of 20 fires and explosions on double hulled tankers are discussed in the response to City of 21 Vancouver IR No. 1.10.12a (Filing ID A3Y2G6). Vessel fire detection and extinguishing 22 systems are described in Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.9 (Filing ID A3S4T2).

23 · Increased use of anchorages (Cowichan Tribes, Filing ID A4L9Y9 and NS NOPE, Filing 24 IDs A4L5Y6, A4L5Y7, A4L5Z0). This is discussed in Volume 8C, Technical Report 25 TR 8C-10 TERMPOL 3.5 and 3.12 (Filing ID A3S4T7) and in the response to Miller B IR 26 No. 2 (Filing ID A4H8V0). Information is also provided in this section of Reply Evidence, 27 Section 59.2.6.2.

28 · Potential impacts on residents due to noise, light and odour issues from loading tankers 29 (NS NOPE, Filing IDs A4L5Y4, A4L5Y6, A4L5Y7, A4L5Y8, A4L5Z0). Trans Mountain has 30 made extensive and diligent efforts to minimize and mitigate such impacts. The footprint of 31 the marine terminal has been kept to a minimum, Trans Mountain’s Tanker Acceptance 32 Standard (Filing ID A3X6W2) requires that visiting tankers adhere to best practices and 33 PMV has published guidance through its Port Information Guide (Filing ID A4F8Z7) on 34 minimizing noise and light impacts. Section 58 of the Reply Evidence provides a response to 35 intervenor evidence regarding the potential socio-economic effects of Project-related marine 36 vessel traffic.

59.2.1.1 Pre-booming of the Tanker at Westridge Marine Terminal 37 Intervenors accept pre-booming as an effective strategy to limit and reduce the impact of an oil 38 spill at berth, should such a low likelihood event take place. However, Village of Belcarra (Filing 39 ID A4L5G5) stated concerns about the type and efficiency of the booms that will be used for the

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1 future dock. As noted in the Trans Mountain response to NEB IR No. 3.66 (Filing ID A4H1V2), 2 the type and size of boom that will be deployed around the tankers at Westridge Marine 3 Terminal (Westridge) is not yet selected; Trans Mountain will select the type of boom after 4 reviewing boom options. Considerations in the selection of booms will include:

5 · The sea area surrounding a berthed Aframax tanker that will be within the boom has been 6 calculated as 20,000 m2. Please refer to Figure 59-1.

SECOND BOOM TO DEPLOY IN EMERGENCY

PRE-DEPLOYED BOOM

EXISITNG BERTH – WILL BE REMOVED

7 8 Figure 59-1 Proposed General Arrangement of Berths at Westridge Marine Terminal 9 Showing Oil Spill Boom Contours

10 · The amount of oil that the booms will theoretically be able to hold depends on: 1) the height 11 of the boom above water to prevent splashover, and 2) the depth of the skirt to prevent oil 12 from escaping from under the boom.

13 · The boom will be expected to at least be of similar robust construction and high efficiency to 14 that used currently for existing operations.

15 · Should a 36” (90 cm) boom be selected, approximately 24” (60 cm) will be underwater and 16 will form the containment. In such circumstances, the deployed boom would theoretically be 17 able to hold a spill volume of 12,000 m3. In practical and conservative terms, the holding

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1 capacity will be influenced by site-specific environmental factors, which may reduce that 2 volume to less than the theoretical maximum.

3 Trans Mountain’s risk assessment has not identified any viable circumstance that could require 4 the containment to hold more than 103 m3, which is the CWC spill volume during cargo transfer.

5 In addition, in case of an oil spill accident, a second boom would be quickly deployed to ensure 6 that any oil that might escape the pre-deployed boom is prevented from spreading outside the 7 immediate vicinity of the terminal. 59.2.1.2 Emergency Response 8 The City of Vancouver, as part of filed evidence, asserts that no appropriate ERP is in place 9 from appropriate provincial and federal government agencies and that capacity has been 10 reduced in recent years (Filing ID A4L7V8).

11 Canada’s pollution response regime is based upon polluter pays principles and is a well- 12 recognized industry and government partnership. In that respect, industry ensures resources 13 are in place to effectively and efficiently respond to incidents where industry has caused an oil 14 spill. An example of this is WCMRC, which is the industry owned, Transport Canada certified, 15 marine oil spill Response Organization on the west coast of Canada. WCMRC capacity has 16 increased over the years and will increase further if the Project is approved. When the polluter is 17 unknown, incapable or does not undertake response, government may undertake its own 18 response or require such industry organizations as WCMRC to undertake response and 19 subsequently recover the cost of the response from the SOPF. Table 59-1 provides information 20 on Trans Mountain’s responses to City of Vancouver’s assertions. Further information on the 21 marine emergency response regime is provided in Section 62.

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1 TABLE 59-1 2 3 CITY OF VANCOUVER ASSERTIONS AND TRANS MOUNTAIN RESPONSES

City of Vancouver assertion Trans Mountain response The City of Vancouver, its residents and Along with response resources, under the polluter businesses are not indemnified against all pays principles, industry is also required to have financial loss associated with a spill from current insurance in place to pay all appropriate claims in or proposed shipments. case of oil pollution. More information is provided in Section 61. Full recovery funding is not guaranteed for all See previous point. affected parties. Kinder Morgan and other responsible agencies The City of Vancouver is incorrect. As described have not invested in appropriate mitigation efforts in the Application and TERMPOL studies, in to avoid a spill of current shipments. response to various IRs and as part of Trans Mountain’s Reply Evidence: Kinder Morgan, industry such as local tug companies and other responsible agencies, including the Pacific Pilotage Authority (PPA) (see the PPA Letter of Comment [Filing ID A4Q7T1]) and WCMRC have indeed invested, and continue to invest, in appropriate mitigation efforts to prevent a spill of current shipments. Trans Mountain has proposed additional measures to ensure that prevention measures as well as response measures remain strong and appropriate to the needs of the Project. 4

5 Trans Mountain does not condone spills of any size and takes every precaution during 6 construction, operation, and maintenance of the pipeline system to prevent spills from 7 happening. Although Trans Mountain does not own or operate vessels calling at Westridge, it is 8 an active member of the maritime community and has demonstrated commitment to past and 9 current initiatives for the improvement of the safety and efficiency of marine transportation and 10 protection of the environment. 59.3 Tanker Safety Improvements Initiated by Government 11 In evidence submitted by intervenors (e.g., Adam Olsen [Filing ID A4L6V3], Cowichan Tribes 12 [Filing ID A4L9Y9], Elizabeth May [Filing ID A4L8Q9], Makah Tribal Council [Filing ID A4Q2A4], 13 NS NOPE [Filing IDs A4L5Y4, A4L5Y5, A4L5Y6], Pacheedaht First Nation [Filing IDs A4L5F3, 14 A4L5F4, A4L5F5, A4L5F6, A4L5F7, A4L5F8], Squamish Nation [Filing ID A4L7E5], 15 Tsawwassen Nation [Filing ID A4L7T2] and US Tribes [Filing ID A4L7G7]), a common concern 16 is about risk and safety, and in particular marine safety. This section provides information on 17 Government of Canada initiatives, which are designed to improve tanker safety. The tanker 18 safety improvements are based on three main principles: prevention of oil spills, cleaning spills 19 up quickly if they do occur, and making sure polluters pay. These improvements are listed 20 below.

21 Establishment of the Tanker Safety Expert Panel

22 In December of 2013, The Tanker Safety Expert Panel, an independent panel appointed to 23 review Canada's current tanker safety system and to propose measures to strengthen it,

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1 released its report, A Review of Canada's Ship-Source Oil Spill Preparedness and Response 2 Regime—Setting the Course for the Future (Tanker Safety Panel Secretariat 2013). The report 3 aims to improve Canada's system for ship-source oil spill preparedness and response in order 4 to better protect the public and the environment.

5 On May 13, 2014, the Government of Canada announced it would further strengthen Canada's 6 tanker safety system with additional measures based on recommendations from the Tanker 7 Safety Expert Panel and other studies.

8 Amendments to CSA 2001 as part of legislating into law Safeguarding Canada’s Seas and 9 Skies Act

10 The amendments to CSA 2001 do the following:

11 · strengthens the current requirements for pollution prevention and response at 12 oil handling facilities;

13 · increases Transport Canada’s oversight and enforcement capacity by 14 equipping marine safety inspectors with the tools to enforce compliance;

15 · classifies new offences to be considered as contraventions of the Act and 16 extend financial penalties relating to pollution; and

17 · enhances response to oil spill incidents by removing legal barriers that could 18 otherwise block agents of Canadian response organizations from participating 19 in cleanup operations.

20 Increased Foreign Tanker Inspections

21 As of 2010, large crude oil tankers can no longer operate in Canadian waters without a double 22 hull. A double hull is a type of hull where the bottom and sides of a vessel have two complete 23 layers of watertight hull surface. Transport Canada currently has a requirement for all Canadian- 24 flagged tankers to be inspected at least once a year to ensure they are compliant with current 25 legislation and regulations. These inspections now extend to foreign tankers, which means that 26 every foreign tanker is inspected on its first visit to a Canadian port, and annually thereafter.

27 Expansion of the National Aerial Surveillance Program

28 Long-term funding has been provided to support the National Aerial Surveillance Program 29 (NASP). The enhanced program boosts surveillance efforts in areas such as northern British 30 Columbia and Newfoundland and Labrador. A watchful eye is kept over ships transiting waters 31 under Canadian jurisdiction through the NASP. Three aircraft strategically placed across the 32 country monitor shipping activities over all waters under Canadian jurisdiction using 33 sophisticated state of the art remote sensing equipment, including Environment Canada’s 34 Integrated Satellite Tracking of Pollution Program (ISTOP), which can identify potential spills 35 from satellite images. Investigations have led to numerous successful prosecutions against 36 marine polluters over the years, with some cases resulting in significant financial penalties.

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1 Adoption of Incident Command System

2 As the lead federal agency to ensure an appropriate response to a ship-source spill, the CCG 3 works with other partners to ensure the protection of the marine environment and public safety. 4 The CCG is adopting the ICS, which allows for a more effective response to a major spill and 5 integrate its operations with key partners, such as Canada’s private-sector response 6 organizations. The ICS is an internationally accepted emergency management system used for 7 the command, control, and coordination of emergency response operations.

8 Improved and Modified Aids to Navigation

9 Aids to navigation and hydrographic charts and safety information are important elements of 10 Canada’s marine navigation system. Aids to navigation warn of obstructions and are used to 11 mark the location of shipping routes. The Canadian Hydrographic Service is conducting 12 hydrographic surveys and is incorporating the aids to navigation information along with other 13 safety information to improve navigational charts and other related safety products.

14 New Science Research into Petroleum Products

15 Environment Canada, DFO and Natural Resources Canada have conducted scientific research 16 on non-conventional petroleum products, such as dilbit, to enhance the understanding of these 17 substances and how they behave when spilled in the marine environment. Results of this 18 integrated scientific research led to better decision-making in the areas of spill response 19 technologies and countermeasures, enabling identification of best practices with regard to the 20 selection of the best response tools in a given situation. This research also provides a better 21 understanding of the effect of products, such as dilbit, on marine ecosystems. For example, 22 Natural Resources Canada is launching the OSRS Program. The OSRS Program is a 23 conditionally repayable contribution program that will provide $5 million over three years (2016- 24 2019) for RD&D projects focused on improving current mechanical recovery technologies and 25 processes for the cleanup of heavy oil products spilled in marine environments.

26 Area Response Planning

27 Reflecting the independent Tanker Safety Expert Panel’s main recommendation in its 28 November 2013 report, A Review of Canada’s Ship-Source Oil Spill Preparedness and 29 Response Regime—Setting the Course for the Future (Tanker Safety Panel Secretariat 2013), 30 the Government of Canada is working collaboratively with WCMRC and other key stakeholders 31 to develop and implement tailored response plans in the southern portion of British Columbia.

32 Building Marine Safety Capacity in Aboriginal Communities

33 This initiative by the Government of Canada will assist Aboriginal communities with accessing 34 training and equipment to allow for their participation in marine emergency preparedness. These 35 measures will have inter-related benefits: they will support a strong safety system through 36 Aboriginal participation; and provide skill enhancement opportunities.

37 Alternative Response Measures

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1 As noted by the Tanker Safety Expert Panel, mechanical recovery (booming and skimming) is 2 the predominant spill response measure used in Canada. The panel also noted that there are a 3 number of federal laws that currently limit the use of alternative response measures such as 4 using spill-treating agents, even though using these tools can provide a net environmental 5 benefit. The Government of Canada gave Notice on July 4, 2015, that the Minister of the 6 Environment, pursuant to Section 14.2 of the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act, proposes to 7 make Regulations Establishing a List of Spill-treating Agents (Canada Oil and Gas Operations 8 Act).

9 Liability and Compensation: Ensuring Polluters Pay

10 The Government of Canada will enhance the liability and compensation regime by introducing 11 legislative and regulatory amendments as follows.

12 · The full balance of the SOPF, currently about $400 million, will be available in the event of 13 an oil spill.

14 · In the event that all available sources of funds have been exhausted by spill-related claims, 15 the Government of Canada will ensure compensation is provided to eligible claimants, and 16 then recover those payments from the marine oil transport industry through a levy.

17 · The SOPF will be aligned with international funds by covering pure economic losses 18 suffered by people who have had a loss of earnings but whose property has not been 19 contaminated by an oil spill.

59.4 Context of Marine Transportation Relevant to the Project 20 FER (Filing ID A4Q2T7) in its evidence stated that Trans Mountain “is not interested in 21 participating in acquiring knowledge in the marine environment nor being involved in 22 incremental improvements to tanker traffic and risk reduction strategies.” FER also stated in 23 their evidence that they see TMEP “…as a very major increase (>360 per cent) in oil tanker 24 traffic.” Although Trans Mountain has answered intervenor requests in detail through several 25 rounds of the IR process, such statements as the ones made by FER suggests that intervenors 26 have not fully understood the manner by which shipping activities are undertaken in the region 27 and Trans Mountain’s role in marine transportation. The following is provided in an effort to 28 provide context to the many discussions on the role of marine transportation as it pertains to 29 TMEP.

30 As noted in the Application, the TMPL system was constructed almost 60 years ago and 31 currently has a capacity of 47,700 m3/d (300,000 bbl/d). The pipeline transports a range of 32 petroleum from western Canada to locations in central and southwestern British Columbia, 33 Washington and to offshore markets via its Westridge Marine Terminal.

34 The Westridge Marine Terminal (Westridge) is the only oil handling facility (OHF) that is 35 connected to a pipeline system on the west coast of Canada. It is the only facility that provides 36 access for Canadian oil production to markets in the Pacific Rim: California, Washington State, 37 and Asia.

38 In response to requests for service from western Canadian oil producers and west coast refiners 39 for increased pipeline capacity, Trans Mountain proposes to expand the existing TMPL system

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1 to 141,500 m3/d (890,000 bbl/d). The NEB decision RH-001-2012 reinforces market support for 2 the proposed expansion and provides Trans Mountain the necessary economic conditions to 3 proceed with design, consultation, and regulatory applications. The proposed TMEP (or “the 4 Project”) will comprise the following:

5 · Pipeline segments that complete a twinning of the pipeline in Alberta and BC 6 with about 987 km of new buried pipeline.

7 · New and modified facilities, including pump stations and tanks.

8 · Three new berths at the Westridge Marine Terminal in Burnaby, BC, each 9 capable of handling Aframax class vessels.

10 Currently, in a typical month, five vessels are loaded with heavy crude oil (including dilbit) at 11 Westridge. The expanded system will require approximately 34 Aframax class vessels per 12 month, with actual demand driven by market conditions. The maximum size of vessels (Aframax 13 class) served at the terminal will not change as part of the Project. Similarly, the future cargo will 14 continue to be crude oil, primarily dilbit or synthetic crude oil. Of the 141,500 m3/d (890,000 15 bbl/d) capacity of the expanded system, up to 100,200 m3/d (630,000 bbl/d) may be delivered to 16 Westridge for shipment.

17 The vessel forecast for the proposed Project can be found in Trans Mountain response to NEB 18 IR No. 3.74 (Filing ID A4H1V2). Trans Mountain tankers currently comprise 3% of all vessel 19 transiting the Iron Workers Memorial Bridge to Westridge under the existing conditions, which is 20 forecast to increase to 11% in 2018, if the Project is approved.

21 Table 59-2 shows the current and forecast large vessel traffic in the region and the Project’s 22 contribution to overall large vessel traffic. This information is based on the number of vessels 23 entering the Juan de Fuca Strait and derived from information submitted in the Application 24 (Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.2, Table 6-6, Filing ID A3S4R8). Table 59-2 shows that Trans 25 Mountain tanker traffic will be about 6.6% of all large vessel traffic trading in the region, should 26 the Project proceed.

27 TABLE 59-2 28 29 CURRENT AND FORECAST LARGE VESSEL TRAFFIC IN JUAN DE FUCA STRAIT

Vessel Type Current Vessel Traffic Vessel Traffic with TMEP (2018) All Large Vessels ~5,500 ~6,200 All Tankers ~600 ~1,000 TMEP Tankers (part laden Aframax) 60 408 Percentage of TMEP Tankers 1.1% 6.6% 30

31 Trans Mountain has handled crude oil, including dilbit, in its pipeline system and safely loaded 32 tankers from Westridge Marine Terminal since the early 1950s. The size and number of tankers 33 handled at Westridge has varied over the many decades that the dock facility has been in 34 existence, but in recent years has averaged about 60 tankers a year, with a combination of 35 Panamax size and Aframax size tankers. Since 1961 when reporting to the NEB began, records 36 of historical TMPL spills at Westridge Terminal (Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.15, Section 10.3,

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1 Filing ID A3S5F8) show three small spills at Westridge of which two can be allocated to cargo 2 transfer.

3 · April 1982 – Spill Size: 0.045 m3 [45 L] - operations related; 4 · March 1990 – Spill Size: 0.005 m3 [5 L] - not operations related; and, 5 · March 1998 – Spill Size: 0.04 m3 [40 L] - operations related.

6 Marine transportation of product by tankers from Westridge is regulated under the Canada 7 Shipping Act, 2001 (CSA 2001) and carried out under the oversight, direction and guidance of 8 several agencies including Transport Canada, CCG, PMV, PPA, and the BC Coast Pilots. While 9 Trans Mountain does not own or operate the vessels calling at Westridge, it is responsible for 10 ensuring the safety of the terminal operations. In addition to Trans Mountain’s own screening 11 process and terminal procedures, all vessels calling at Westridge must operate according to 12 rules established by the IMO, Transport Canada, the PPA, and PMV.

13 Trans Mountain’s robust Tanker Acceptance Standard (Filing ID A3X6W2) ensures that only 14 tankers meeting stringent physical and operating requirements are handled at Westridge. Under 15 this process, older tankers, those with a history of poor operating records in the various 16 international databases and those not passing a physical inspection based upon tanker industry 17 best practices are not deemed acceptable and will not be loaded. The Tanker Acceptance 18 Standard is a dynamic document that sets out requirements of acceptance, and encourages the 19 application of best practices by tanker owners and crews. The process is flexible and will be 20 modified to incorporate future requirements such as, items that support Trans Mountain’s 21 commitments related to the Project.

22 Laden tankers already have to adhere to a tanker escort program and this will be increased 23 should the Project receive approval to proceed. One escort tug will accompany the laden tanker 24 to the extent of Canada’s territorial sea (Buoy J) at the western entrance to Juan de Fuca Strait. 25 For this purpose, tankers will have to engage a proper sized tug based upon a tug matrix that is 26 under development (response to NEB IR No. 1.59 [Filing ID A3W9H8]). The benefits to marine 27 safety and other local opportunities as a result of increased tug usage are mentioned in the 28 Letter of Comment filed by Smit Marine Canada Inc. (Filing ID A4R5H7).

29 As required under the CSA 2001, the Westridge Terminal is designated as an OHF and is 30 required under law to have suitable oil spill prevention and response plans in place. These plans 31 are reviewed regularly by Transport Canada. Trans Mountain adheres to established safe oil 32 handling industry practices, and spill prevention measures. Trans Mountain assigns a Loading 33 Master to each vessel during cargo transfer at berth and the transfer of oil to or from a ship or 34 barge is only allowed to take place after the vessel has been enclosed within a floating oil spill 35 boom. Pre-booming ensures that should a spill take place during cargo transfer, the spilled oil 36 would be kept contained and easily recoverable. The entire operation is always overseen by the 37 Loading Master, appointed by Trans Mountain (response to Province of BC IR No. 1.1.46 [Filing 38 ID A3Y2Z1]).

39 Although Trans Mountain is not responsible for vessel operations, it is an active member in the 40 maritime community. Trans Mountain works with BC maritime agencies to promote best 41 practices and facilitate improvements to ensure the safety and efficiency of tanker traffic in the 42 Salish Sea. In this respect, Trans Mountain works closely and cooperatively with agencies and 43 other marine stakeholders in order to ensure safety and efficiency of marine transportation

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1 related to its facilities. Trans Mountain is a shareholder of WCMRC and maintains an 2 arrangement with WCMRC for spill response services at the Westridge Marine Terminal, as 3 legislated under CSA 2001. Trans Mountain’s response to PIPEUP Network TERMPOL IR 4 No. II.bv b) (Filing ID A4J7T7) lists past examples of Trans Mountain’s cooperative marine 5 safety endeavours, which include:

6 · Participation in PMV’s review of the Movement Restriction Area (2004-2010);

7 · Contribution for expert review of escort techniques (2007);

8 · Contribution and logistics for live trial of escort techniques (2007);

9 · Contribution for improved pilotage equipment (portable pilotage units) (2009);

10 · Support for joint Pilot and Tug Master training (2009);

11 · Support for improved Navigational Aids (2010);

12 · Contribution for British Columbia Institute of Technology (BCIT) Marine 13 Simulator Upgrade (2011); and

14 · Participation in the Chamber of Shipping Navigation & Pilotage Committee.

59.5 Required Assessment of Potential Impacts of Marine Transportation 15 In the Project’s List of Issues, the NEB included marine effects (Filing ID A3V6I2):

16 · The potential environmental and socio-economic effects of marine shipping 17 activities that would result from the proposed Project, including the potential 18 effects of accidents or malfunctions that may occur.

19 · Potential impacts of the Project on Aboriginal interests.

20 · Contingency planning for spills, accidents or malfunctions, during construction 21 and operation of the Project.

22 It is incorrect and highly misleading on the part of intervenors like City of Vancouver (Filing 23 ID A4L7V8) to make such assertions as, “Trans Mountain’s application excludes study segment 24 2 (Vancouver Harbour area) and study segment 3 (English Bay) from its risk assessment.” 25 Trans Mountain assessed current levels of marine traffic in the Project area and undertook a 26 comprehensive marine risk assessment, including a quantitative marine risk assessment by 27 DNV with forecasts for all traffic, including forecast Trans Mountain tankers. The quantitative 28 marine risk assessment (Filing IDs A3S5F4, A3S5F6, A3S5F8) determined the impact of the 29 Project on oil cargo spill risk, and identified mitigation measures as required.

30 The Project’s ESA includes assessment of the cumulative effects of marine transportation 31 associated with the Project (Section 4.4 of Volume 8A, Filing ID A3S4Y3), including the potential 32 effects of accidents and malfunctions.

33 Trans Mountain also voluntarily submitted to a Technical Review Process of Marine Terminal 34 Systems and Transhipment Sites (TERMPOL) review and completed the various studies 35 recommended in the TERMPOL process. TERMPOL is a voluntary review that a proponent

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1 submits to, which focuses on the marine transportation components of a project. As part of the 2 TERMPOL process, Transport Canada chairs a committee of federal agencies to review and 3 report on the submission. The TERMPOL studies form a key element of Trans Mountain’s 4 assessment of the overall risk from marine transportation.

5 The TRC report (Filing ID A4F8Z4) was submitted to NEB in December 2014, and now forms 6 part of the record for the NEB hearing. Trans Mountain responded to a number of IRs about the 7 TERMPOL report and in some cases referred requests to Transport Canada for additional 8 comments and response.

9 Further Reply Evidence related to the marine risk assessment is provided in Section 60.

59.6 Shipping Route and Marine Weather Conditions 10 A number of intervenors (e.g., Adam Olsen (Filing ID A4L6V3), Cowichan Tribes (Filing 11 ID A4L9Y9), Lyackson First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0H9), Maa-Nulth Nations (Filing ID A4L6D5), 12 Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q2F9), Tsawout First Nation (Filing ID A4Q1D4), T’Sou-ke 13 First Nation (Filing ID A4L5T0), Unifor (Filing ID A4L6C6), US Tribes (Filing IDs A4L7G2, 14 A4L7G3, A4L7G5, A4L7G7, A4L7G8), Tsawwassen First Nation [Filing ID A4L7T2], Squamish 15 Nation [Filing ID A4L7E5], and US Tribes [Filing ID A4L7G7]) shared their concern about the 16 impact of additional Project tankers on established shipping routes. The concerns included the 17 possible increase in close quarter interactions between vessels, especially the effects on small 18 vessels such as fishing vessels and recreational vessels.

19 An overview of the shipping routes to and from the Westridge Terminal is shown on Figure 59-2. 20 For the study, the route was divided into seven individual segments covering the area from the 21 Westridge Terminal to the Pacific Ocean via the Port of Vancouver, English Bay, Strait of 22 Georgia, Boundary Pass, Haro Strait, Victoria (Race Rocks), and the Juan de Fuca Strait to 23 Swiftsure Bank, as shown. Details of the shipping route are found in Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.5 24 and 3.12. (Filing ID A3S4S9).

25 The shipping routes are used by all large vessels destined to and from PMV, including current 26 Trans Mountain tanker traffic. These routes are suitable for safe transit by current and future 27 Trans Mountain tankers. The route is approximately 160 nautical miles (296 km) in total 28 between Westridge and the 12 mile limit off the east end of the Juan de Fuca Strait. The 29 passage will take approximately 14 to15 hours to navigate, including about 8 hours transit time 30 from the pilot boarding station near Victoria, BC to Westridge. The vessel speed will vary 31 between 6 to 14 knots, depending on the route segment and on whether the tankers are empty 32 or laden. These vessel speed profiles and transit times are consistent with existing Aframax 33 vessels travelling to and from the Westridge site, and have proven to be both safe and efficient 34 over many years of operating practice. Further details can be found in Volume 8C, 35 TERMPOL 3.7 (Filing ID A3S4T7).

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1 2 Figure 59-2 TMEP Shipping Route

3 The TERMPOL Review Process Report on the Trans Mountain Expansion Project (Filing ID 4 A4F8Z4) accepted that the route is deep and wide enough to ensure that geographic and 5 geological factors are not a concern. In addition, weather conditions and oceanographic factors 6 along the route are considered to be mild and should not cause delays or alterations to the 7 vessel route, except for reduced visibility due to fog. With respect to the oil tanker transits, there 8 are no restrictions in place along the proposed route aside from those within PMV’s Movement 9 Restricted Area (MRA), where vessels are not permitted to continue transit if weather prevents 10 them from staying on course (Filing ID A4F8Z8).

11 CFN and other intervenors (Ditidaht First Nation [Filing ID A4L5D3], Pacheedaht First Nation 12 [Filing ID A4L5F3]), Cowichan Tribes [Filing ID A4L9Y9], Maa-Nulth Nations [Filing ID A4L6D5], 13 and T’Sou-ke First Nation [Filing ID A4L5T0]) expressed concerns regarding weather on the 14 west coast and its ability to impact the safety of marine shipping. Concerns included extremes in 15 local weather and tidal conditions along the shipping routes. Trans Mountain completed a 16 thorough analysis of weather and environmental conditions affecting marine shipping within the 17 study area and provided this information within the Application and TERMPOL studies. The

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1 information was shared and reviewed with different stakeholders, including First Nations, during 2 two rounds of IRs (for examples, refer to Trans Mountain’s response to Cowichan Tribes IR 3 No.1, Filing ID A3Y2I8).

4 Wind speeds are generally higher at the more exposed western entrance to Juan de Fuca 5 Strait. During winter (October to March), wind speeds exceed 12 m/s (23 knots or 43 km/h) over 6 20% of the time at Tatoosh Island at the entrance to the strait. Winter season wave heights at 7 the Neah Bay buoy (at the mouth of the Juan de Fuca Strait) are reported to exceed 4.0 m 8 approximately 7% of the time, but do not exceed 4.0 m at the New Dungeness buoy, which is 9 located 20 km southeast of Victoria. The winds experienced are entirely within the capability of 10 large commercial ocean going vessels such as Aframax tankers.

11 Evidence submitted by Environment Canada indicated it was satisfied with the meteorological 12 and oceanographic information submitted by Trans Mountain (Filing ID A4L8Y6). Environment 13 Canada confirmed that “sheltering by geographic features along the shipping route and the 14 somewhat limited fetches for winds over open water limit wave heights along most of the route 15 compared to the open ocean” (page 132, Filing ID A4L8Y6). Environment Canada mentions that 16 winds greater than 15.4 m/s (30 knots, 55.6 km/h) were measured at the Race Rocks light 17 station (20 km southwest of Victoria) 4% of the hours from February 1994 through April 2015. 18 Environment Canada also said that wind of 35.0 m/s (68.0 knots, 126 km/h) was measured at 19 Race Rocks on 15 December 2006. As shown in the wind rose (Figure 59-3), such winds at 20 Race Rocks are rare, transitory in nature and aligned with the general shape of the channel, 21 which limits its impact on in-transit tankers.

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1 2 Figure 59-3 Wind Rose at Race Rocks (Winter)

3 It can be expected that if weather conditions are such that they limit the ability to embark or 4 disembark a pilot (which would take place in the area of Race Rocks and Victoria), the vessel 5 would be delayed from arriving at the location, and therefore its exposure to such winds would 6 be further reduced.

7 Since its inception, the PPA has not had to abort a transit due to poor weather, and ensures its 8 pilots exercise the practices of good seamanship in adverse weather conditions. The PPA 9 submitted a Letter of Comment to the NEB that describes the PPA’s role and highlights the 10 contributions of local pilots (British Columbia Coastal Pilots) and tug escort towards enhancing 11 marine safety (Filing ID A4Q7T1).

12 Makah Tribal Council (Filing ID A4Q2A4) submitted evidence requesting Trans Mountain 13 contribute financially to the Emergency Response Towing Vessel in Neah Bay. Trans Mountain 14 is confident in the extra ordinary preventive measures proposed by the Project, including the 15 use of an escort tug in the Juan de Fuca Strait extending to the 12 nautical mile limit, and does 16 not believe that financial contribution by the Project to another tug in Washington would 17 increase safety or is justified under the Project.

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59.6.1 Gulf and San Juan Islands 1 As described earlier, all ships going to and from Vancouver pass between the Gulf and San 2 Juan Islands travelling through Boundary Pass and Haro Strait (Figure 59-2). The confluence of 3 these two water bodies is Turn Point and that location has been identified as a more complex 4 portion of the route. FER (Filing ID A4Q2T7) voiced concerns about increased shipping 5 activities at this location and the potential increased likelihood of incidents and oil spill 6 accidents.

7 It is worth noting that in line with the many risk control measures mentioned in Section 59.3, 8 there are several risk control measures already in place for all vessels, e.g., Vessel Traffic 9 Services (VTS), radar monitoring, pilots with Portable Pilotage Unit (PPU), call-in protocols, and 10 special operating area (SOA) regulations. The SOA restricts overtaking or passing of vessels in 11 the vicinity of Turn Point. Besides having two pilots, tankers over 40,000 metric tons (mt) are 12 also required to have a tethered tug escort. More details have been provided by the PPA in its 13 Letter of Comment (Filing ID A4Q7T1).

59.7 Shipping Related Common Concerns 14 Intervenor concerns specific to marine shipping are addressed in the following subsections.

59.7.1 Bilge and Ballast Water 15 Maa-Nulth Nations (Filing ID A4L6D5) and Pauquachin First Nation (Filing ID A4L6I4) have 16 identified concerns regarding releases of bilge water and ballast water. Ballast water is required 17 to be exchanged mid-ocean in accordance with Transport Canada (TC) regulations to avoid 18 introduction of invasive alien species at a terminal (as discussed in Section 7.6 of Volume 5A 19 [Filing ID A3S1R0]). FER evidence (Filing ID A4Q2T7) discusses the impact of “chronic oil 20 releases” without detailing what this constitutes; however, assuming that this is with reference to 21 bilge water release by vessels, it should be noted that in accordance with TC and global 22 regulations, bilge water must be treated to remove oils and grease prior to discharge. Therefore, 23 any releases of oily water would be due to an accident or malfunction (Section 4.3.13 of Volume 24 8A [Filing ID A3S4Y3]) and not routine operations. Marine transportation in Canadian waters is 25 authorized and regulated through the CSA 2001, and related legislation and regulations are 26 administered by TC and the CCG for all vessels.

59.7.2 Use of Anchorages 27 Trans Mountain has reviewed anchorages in Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.5 and 3.12, Section 10 28 (Filing ID A3S4T7). There are additional potential anchorages along the shipping route; 29 however, Trans Mountain does not expect a Project tanker to utilize those except under 30 extraordinary circumstances. Trans Mountain is not aware of an occasion when a tanker bound 31 for or leaving Westridge has anchored in an anchorage location in the Gulf Islands. However, it 32 is noted that anchorages are restricted based upon vessel size and draft only.

33 Intervenors such as Cowichan Tribes (Filing ID A4L9Y9) and NS NOPE (Filing IDs A4L5Y4, 34 A4L5Y5, A4L5Y6, A4L5Y7, A4L5Y8, A4L5Z0) have voiced concerns about vessel anchorages, 35 including the placement of in general, and the impact of anchored vessels (including but not 36 limited to Project tankers) on all anchorages in the study area. It should be noted that all 37 designated anchorages are available to all vessel types; however, as part of its Project planning 38 and future operating strategy, Trans Mountain intends to manage the flow of Project tankers in a

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1 manner that will minimize use of the available anchorages. No additional anchorages are 2 required for the Project. Project tankers are not expected to go to anchor at locations outside of 3 PMV boundaries. More likely anchorages are the four located east of Second Narrows.

4 Unlike what is current practice where tankers wait at anchor for their scheduled loading window, 5 it is expected that Project tankers shall proceed directly to berth whenever any one of the three 6 proposed berths is available. When possible to do so and in keeping with the dock schedule, 7 vessels shall leave the berth directly to transit Second Narrows. In Trans Mountain’s response 8 to Miller B IR No. 2.01a (Filing ID A4H8V0), Trans Mountain provided a table that showed 9 analysis of forecasted anchorage utilization by all vessels east of Second Narrows on a monthly 10 basis. That table is copied below (Table 59-3). The analysis shows that based upon the plan, 11 subject to the current status of anchorage locations available east of the Second Narrows, 12 annually about 70% of arriving tankers will go directly to berth and about 50% departing tankers 13 shall pass directly through the Second Narrows MRA.

14 TABLE 59-3 15 16 ESTIMATED POST-TMEP ANCHORAGE UTILIZATION BY ALL VESSELS (EAST OF 17 SECOND NARROWS)

Number of % of Time Anchorages Utilized Annually Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 0 45.5% 34.0% 30.8% 40.4% 52.8% 51.0% 56.1% 57.8% 52.4% 38.5% 40.4% 46.3% 44.7% 1 28.1% 28.2% 27.3% 27.7% 28.0% 28.7% 26.6% 27.9% 28.2% 27.3% 27.7% 30.3% 29.3% 2 17.0% 22.1% 23.6% 18.8% 13.3% 13.9% 11.9% 11.4% 13.7% 22.0% 20.3% 16.2% 17.2% 3 7.8% 12.9% 14.6% 10.6% 5.1% 5.5% 4.7% 2.8% 5.0% 9.9% 9.9% 6.3% 7.0% 4 1.6% 2.8% 3.7% 2.5% 0.8% 0.9% 0.7% 0.1% 0.7% 2.3% 1.7% 0.9% 1.8% Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 18

19 Several photographs have been submitted by North Shore NOPE (Filing ID A4L5Y6), which 20 suggests that there is insufficient area for vessels to anchor safely east of Second Narrows. 21 Trans Mountain is not aware of any event where a commercial vessel anchored east of Second 22 Narrows has to date faced an issue anchoring at any of the designated anchorages in the 23 Westridge area. PMV has jurisdiction over the anchorages and intends to review the anchorage 24 locations to best reassure that any vessel going to anchor would be able to do so safely (refer to 25 Finding 11 of the TERMPOL Review Process Report on the Trans Mountain Expansion Project 26 [Filing ID A4F8Z4]).

27 Environment Canada analyzed the current time spent by Westridge calling tankers at anchor 28 and within Vancouver Harbour. Environment Canada commented in their evidence that 29 “…tankers that would otherwise wait at anchor while laden would instead ‘anchor’ at berth once 30 the Project was operational. This could free up anchorages for other tankers but will not reduce 31 emissions in the LSA” (Filing ID A4L8Y6). This analysis by Environment Canada based on 32 current practices is assuming that the status quo remains. Such an assumption is incorrect 33 because operating practices will change to the tanker arrival and departure processes described 34 earlier. Any waiting time at anchor after loading at Westridge will only be for making the next 35 outbound Second Narrows MRA window, and that wait is generally much shorter than for a 36 tanker currently waiting for cargo readiness date. As such, Trans Mountain analysis indeed

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1 shows that the future management of anchorage and berth use shall reduce overall vessel port 2 call time and thus mitigate future ship emissions in the LSA. Refer to Section 33 for detailed 3 responses to recommendations from Environment Canada.

4 Evidence submitted by WSDOE (Summary 14a, Filing ID A4Q1X6) has assumed that 50% of 5 the tankers calling at Westridge will bunker and that some will anchor on “state-owned 6 tidelands.” Trans Mountain notes that currently only a very small portion of tankers that call 7 Westridge bunker in the region and those that do, anchor in Canadian waters. Should a vessel 8 seek to bunker in a US jurisdiction, it will have to notify and seek permission from US 9 authorities. Further, it is important to note that while WSDOE asserts that some tankers will 10 anchor on “state-owned tidelands” the term “tidelands” typically refers to the section between 11 the line of ordinary high tide and the line of extreme low tide within which a tanker would never 12 anchor.

13 PMV responded to NEB IR:

14 “The anchorage utilization assessment does not include the amount of time 15 project tankers may spend at anchorages west of Second Narrows, a factor that 16 should be included in calculating total air emissions from vessels at anchor.”

17 Trans Mountain is not the owner or operator of tankers, and therefore, cannot dictate, but only 18 influence, the movement pattern of Project-related tankers. Upon arrival at Vancouver Harbour, 19 every Westridge-destined vessel will be advanced to berth as soon as possible provided that its 20 designated berth was available and all weather conditions (i.e., daylight, wind, visibility, and 21 current) were satisfactory. If its berth was occupied, but MRA conditions were suitable, the 22 vessel would necessarily look for an available anchorage east of the Second Narrows where it 23 could wait for the berth to become available. However, if MRA conditions did not allow the 24 vessel to proceed to an anchorage east of Second Narrows, it would look for an anchorage west 25 of Second Narrows. Trans Mountain expects that vessels will time their arrivals (by slow 26 steaming) based on known or anticipated First Narrows and MRA transit windows, to avoid 27 waiting time west of the MRA and shall be actively scheduling berths at Westridge Marine 28 Terminal accordingly.

29 Trans Mountain believes that the conditions modelled are reflective of typical future operating 30 conditions and also wishes to point out that even if a Project tanker should require to anchor 31 west of the Second Narrows for a short while in order to await suitable MRA transit conditions, 32 the conservatism built into time estimates in the response to Government of Canada IR 33 No. 2.065 (Filing ID A4H6A5) suitably compensates for such anomalies during actual 34 operations. As such, no additional emissions and any associated impacts on air quality are 35 envisaged, and therefore, an additional assessment is not deemed to be necessary.

59.7.3 Emissions During Loading 36 Pauquachin First Nation (Filing ID A4L6I4) identified concerns regarding venting of tankers. As 37 shown in the schematic figure (Figure 59-4) the entire loading is carried out under “closed 38 condition,” which is with the tanks entirely closed and all the vapours generated in the cargo 39 tanks during loading being collected and returned to shore for processing in an appropriate 40 manner.

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1 2 Figure 59-4 Closed Loading of Tankers (Modified from Korean Registry)

3 The figure highlights the fitted pressure regulating valves that ensure that none of the vapours in 4 the cargo tanks are vented to the atmosphere, the overfill indicator and radar remote tank 5 gauging system that ensures that the cargo levels in the tanks can be safely monitored without 6 opening any of the tank ports. Whereas, the returned vapours are currently combusted and 7 destroyed, in future, when possible to do so, the collected vapours shall be treated and any 8 recovered hydrocarbon will be returned to the tanker as cargo. This was explained in Trans 9 Mountain’s response to GoC EC IR No. 2.071e. (Filing ID A4H6A5). In addition tankers are 10 required under regulation to carry a ship specific VOC Management Plan and operate 11 accordingly.

12 Inferences drawn from emissions data for a period of time when closed loading and tanker 13 emissions was not the norm or from locations where closed loading is not practiced cannot be 14 used to compare the situation at Westridge.

59.7.4 Use of Boilers 15 In evidence filed by Environment Canada (Filing ID A4L8Y6) it is stated that “main and auxiliary 16 boilers are used for reasons other than preheating HFO, such as running the ship’s machinery 17 and various services,” which is a true statement. However, it is an inaccurate interpretation of 18 TMEP’s responses to EC during the IR process to state that Trans Mountain has said that 19 “boilers on tankers do not operate within the Marine Regional Study Area.” To put in context, the 20 “boiler consumption” and corresponding boiler emissions by a tanker in a loading port, 21 especially in a loading port in Canada, is almost negligible; this is the case for Project tankers. 22 The following outlines the manner of use of boilers on tankers, which will help explain further.

23 Ships are provided with boilers of different types and sizes that are used to generate steam for 24 various purposes on board the ship. There are different terms used to describe these boilers. 25 Common terms when referring to boilers are:

26 · Main boiler: Large boilers that are used to generate propulsion steam. Tankers receive their 27 propulsion power from a large diesel engine; therefore, tankers are not fitted with Main 28 boilers.

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1 · Auxiliary boiler: Medium size boilers that are used for onboard service other than ship’s 2 propulsion; e.g., driving the cargo oil discharge pumps on a tanker.

3 · Exhaust gas economizer: This is a waste heat recovery unit connected to the main engine 4 exhaust system.

5 · Composite boiler: A small boiler partially operated by exhaust gas and fuel that can be used 6 flexibly depending upon steam demand; e.g., steam for onboard heating and hot water.

7 · Auxiliary engine economizer: This is a waste heat recovery unit fitted to the exhaust system 8 of the ship’s generators.

9 The majority of Aframax tankers are fitted with two auxiliary boilers and one composite boiler. 10 The two auxiliary boilers of an Aframax tanker generally each have a steam generation capacity 11 of between 35 to 40 t/h and the composite boiler by comparison is small with rated steam 12 generation capacity between 1.7 to 2.5 t/h only depending on whether it is operating on waste 13 heat or being oil fired. Typically the auxiliary boilers are only used when it is necessary to 14 operate the steam driven cargo pumps and generate inert gas, which is the case at the 15 discharge port; Westridge Marine Terminal is a crude oil loading terminal.

16 Modern tankers are normally fitted with electric ballast pumps and the cargo tanks are already 17 filled with inert gas prior to a tanker arriving at the loading port. Therefore there’s little reason to 18 fire the auxiliary boilers in a loading port, whether at anchor or at loading terminal. Rather, in 19 port, the composite boiler is occasionally fired for steam to heat fuel, maintain engine 20 temperature when stopped and to augment accommodation heating and hot water needs.

21 Heating and conditioning of HFO is typically the major use of steam onboard. However, in ports 22 such as Vancouver where ships typically meet their fuel needs using distillate fuels due to 23 Emission Control Area regulations, the need for fuel heating is absent. In addition, many tankers 24 are also fitted with auxiliary engine economizers that further reduces need to fire the composite 25 boiler.

26 In its response to a NEB IR PMV has commented that:

27 “The 2005 – 2006 BC Ocean Going Vessel Emissions Inventory published by the 28 BC Chamber of Shipping indicates that boiler emissions of ocean going vessels 29 represent up to 46% of vessel emissions while at berth and up to 50% of vessel 30 emissions while at anchor, depending on the pollutant (page 55, table 41). These 31 rates are not negligible and, in the absence of appropriate references to support 32 alternative boiler emission rates for tankers calling at Westridge Terminal, it is 33 PMV’s view that emissions from boilers should not be excluded from Trans 34 Mountain’s marine air emissions assessment.”

35 Although the COSBC carried out a detailed “2005-2006 BC Ocean Going Vessel Emissions 36 Inventory,” operating practices have changed due to the advent of new regulations such as 37 implementation of the North America Emissions Control Area and strict marine vessel fuel 38 sulphur restrictions have changed operating practices onboard ocean going vessels, not 39 confined to tankers alone. At the same time, the combined inventory of emissions for tankers in 40 this report makes it difficult to differentiate between those that are loading compared with those 41 that have conducted discharging operations. However, it must be noted that many tankers

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1 discharge their cargoes from overseas and Alaska at US ports and terminals. This requires the 2 continuous use of the large auxiliary boilers, which means that boiler emissions comprise a 3 large percentage of the total emissions in port for tankers in the U.S. As such, these studies 4 cannot be used to compare the situation at Westridge.

5 When the tanker is underway the composite boiler works both on waste heat from the main 6 engine exhaust and depending on the engine load it might also be fired with fuel oil. Technical 7 details were provided for Project-related marine traffic in Section 3.4.2.1 of the Marine 8 Supplemental Report 2 (dated November 2014, Filing IDs A4F5H8, A4F5H9, A4F5I0, A4F5I1 9 and A4F5I2). Please also refer to Trans Mountain response to NEB IR No. 6.04a (Filing 10 ID A4R6I4).

59.7.5 Bunkering 11 In their evidence, the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community state that Project tankers will bunker 12 at Vendovi Island, which is located near Bellingham, WA (Filing ID A4L7G5). There is 13 established tanker traffic calling into Washington State ports largely to serve the existing four 14 large refineries near Anacortes and Cherry Point WA, which may result in bunkering activity 15 near Vendovi Island. However, Trans Mountain has observed that it is not the current practice 16 for tankers calling at Westridge to bunker locally including WA and does not expect this to 17 change as a result of TMEP. Trans Mountain does not own or operate tankers and also does 18 not arrange bunkers for tankers. Trans Mountain is not aware of any current or future plans for 19 Project tankers to bunker at this location in the United States either prior to or after loading at 20 Westridge.

21 22 Figure 59-5 Vendovi Island, Wa, USA. (Google map)

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59.7.6 Potential Impacts on Fishing Activities 1 A number of intervenors, including Adam Olsen (Filing ID A4L6V3), Cowichan Tribes (Filing ID 2 A4L9Y9), Lyackson First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0H9), Maa-Nulth Nations (Filing ID A4L6D5), 3 Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q2F9), Tsawout First Nation (Filing ID A4Q1D4), T’Sou-ke 4 First Nation (Filing ID A4L5T0), Unifor (Filing ID A4L6C6), US Tribes (Filing IDs A4L7G2, 5 A4L7G3, A4L7G5, A4L7G7, A4L7G8), Tsawwassen First Nation [Filing ID A4L7T2], and 6 Squamish Nation [Filing ID A4L7E5], have submitted evidence highlighting that interference with 7 fishing activities may be currently caused by shipping in the area. Concerns include disruption of 8 fishing activities and disruption of access to fishing grounds. The First Nations listed above also 9 voiced concerns regarding additional impediments and infringement of First Nations treaty 10 rights. Trans Mountain has not found any evidence that shows that tankers calling at Westridge 11 (currently or in the future) have or shall pose issues to fishing vessels. Issues regarding 12 Aboriginal traditional use are addressed in Section 57. Issues and concerns related to marine 13 commercial, recreational and tourism users are addressed in detail in Section 58.

14 As noted in the recommendations of the TRC (Filing ID A4F8Z4), Trans Mountain is supporting 15 and assisting the PPA in raising awareness amongst targeted sectors of the marine community 16 including fishermen and recreational boaters in a bid to improve marine safety. TC, in their 17 evidence Section 2.4 (Filing ID A4L7K1), has summarized the concerns they heard about the 18 Project. To quote on this topic from evidence submitted by TC:

19 “TC understands that Aboriginal communities, fishers and non-commercial 20 boaters are concerned about interactions with tankers. We have heard that small 21 vessel operators believe that tankers may limit their ability to access important 22 marine areas, impact their safety on the water, or damage fishing gear. TC 23 administers the Collision Regulations under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, 24 which establish the rules about how to safely operate one’s vessel in the vicinity 25 of other vessels, and these rules apply to every type of vessel from small self- 26 propelled boats to large international vessels (see Section 4.2.5 in Appendix A 27 and TERMPOL Review Process Report pages 20 and 30 at filing A64923). 28 These rules cover key aspects of marine safety including safe speeds, 29 minimizing risks of collisions and the interaction of fishing activities in traffic 30 separation schemes (commonly known as shipping lanes). All waterway users 31 must comply with the Collision Regulations and play a part in reducing the risk of 32 vessel incidents” (emphasis added).

33 First Nations in particular (e.g., Cowichan Tribes [Filing ID A4L9Y9], Ditidaht First Nation [Filing 34 ID A4L5D3], and Pacheedaht First Nation [Filing ID A4L5F3]) highlighted the importance of the 35 Swiftsure Bank to fishers and the issues faced by those who fish at that location with respect to 36 passing large vessels, especially in fog. The Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) in the vicinity of 37 the Swiftsure Bank has been established jointly by Canada and the United States, and 38 confirmed by the IMO (Figure 59-6). This arrangement places the area of confluence of all large 39 commercial vessels to a relatively unrestricted location at the territorial waters edge of both 40 countries. Globally, TSSs have been determined as highly effective in reducing navigation 41 incidents and thereby avoiding potential oil pollution as a result.

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1 2 Figure 59-6 Traffic Separation Scheme near Swiftsure Bank (Canadian Hydrographic 3 Service Chart 3602)

4 As part of its commitments to marine safety (Filing ID A4G3U5), Trans Mountain intends to 5 support fitting of AIS and radar reflectors to small vessels and to fund this endeavour through 6 WCMRC’s Fisherman Oil Spill Emergency Team (FOSET) program. Trans Mountain has 7 explained the benefits of fitting such items to First Nation fishing vessels during one-on-one 8 meetings with First Nations, including Pacheedaht First Nation and Cowichan Tribes, among 9 others. Trans Mountain shall continue to provide such information to First Nations fishers and 10 others, and fund the supply of such equipment to small vessels enrolling to the FOSET 11 program.

12 Trans Mountain does not own or operate tankers but will raise awareness amongst Project 13 tankers about conditions near Swiftsure Bank in its updated Port Information and Terminal 14 Operations Manual, which is under development. 59.8 Potential Impacts on Marine Mammals 15 General concerns about the effects of underwater noise on marine mammals were raised by 16 Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing ID A4L6A4), Lyackson First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0H9), 17 Pacheedaht First Nation (Filing ID A4L5F3), Tsawout First Nation (Filing ID A4Q1D4), and the 18 T’Sou-ke First Nation (Filing ID A4L5T0). A detailed response is provided in Section 55 of the 19 Reply Evidence.

20 If TMEP is approved, Project tankers in future will comprise only 6.6% of all large commercial 21 vessels trading in the study area. As such, rather than Project-specific efforts, industry-wide 22 efforts are necessary to mitigate the effects of maritime commerce and other activities on the 23 marine environment and marine mammals in the region. Trans Mountain is actively supporting 24 and funding the ECHO Program led by PMV, which is a multiple party initiative focused on 25 undertaking research and exploring solutions to offset effects of underwater noise from marine 26 vessel traffic on the Endangered Southern Resident Killer Whale population and associated

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1 traditional use of this population. The ECHO Program is also investigating technological 2 solutions such as real time whale detection technologies that may provide means to reduce ship 3 strikes while simultaneously allowing maritime commerce and other activities to proceed with 4 limited biological and economic impact.

5 Some intervenors (Pacheedaht First Nation [Filing ID A4L5F3], T’Sou-ke First Nation [Filing 6 ID A4L5T0], and Lyackson First Nation [Filing ID A4Q0H9]) have included in their evidence 7 concern about interaction of marine mammals with Project-related vessels. Although records 8 show that marine mammal vessel strikes are infrequent, Trans Mountain has committed to 9 include information about reporting marine mammal vessel strikes and marine mammals in 10 distress in its Port Information and Terminal Operations Manual guidance for Project tankers. 11 This commitment is noted in Trans Mountain response to NEB IR No. 4.09 (Filing ID A69475). 12 Additional information about Trans Mountain’s work with industry to mitigate shipping effects on 13 marine mammals can be found in Section 55.

14 KMC is a member of Green Marine. In furtherance of the Memorandum of Cooperation that 15 Green Marine and TC signed in 2012 it has been recently announced that Green Marine will 16 research and develop a report for TC to provide insight on underwater noise generated by 17 shipping and its effects on marine life, along with potential solutions. The report is expected to 18 help TC to make informed decisions on how to minimize the underwater impacts of our marine 19 transportation system.

20 Green Marine is a voluntary environmental certification program for the North American marine 21 industry. It is a rigorous, transparent and inclusive initiative that addresses key environmental 22 issues through its 11 performance indicators. Participants are shipowners, ports, terminals, 23 Seaway corporations and shipyards based in Canada and the United States. 24 To receive their certification, participants must benchmark their annual environmental 25 performance through Green Marine environmental program’s exhaustive self-evaluation guides. 26 They also need to have their results verified by an accredited external verifier and agree to 27 publication of their individual results. 28 The program encourages its participants to reduce their environmental footprint by taking 29 concrete actions. Together with a number of industry and environmental stakeholders, KMC is a 30 participant of Green Marine’s west coast advisory committee. 59.9 Requests for Further Trans Mountain Commitments 31 Intervenors including FER (Filing ID A4Q2T7), WSDOE (Filing ID A4Q1X6), and Makah Tribal 32 Council (Filing ID A4Q2A4) filed evidence highlighting regional issues and seeking further 33 commitments by Trans Mountain. The issues called to attention by these intervenors are a 34 result of the region’s diverse activities and are not specific to the Project. Trans Mountain has 35 made marine safety commitments on record that will protect the region from oil spill accidents 36 during the transit or loading of Project tankers. Specific to marine transportation, these 37 commitments closely follow the recommendations and findings of the TRC and details can be 38 found in the TERMPOL Review Process Report on the Trans Mountain Expansion Project 39 (Filing ID A4F8Z4), as well as in Trans Mountain’s Response to NEB IR regarding the 40 TERMPOL Report and Outstanding Filings dated December 17, 2014 (Filing ID A4G3U5).

41 In Trans Mountain’s opinion, the additional efforts suggested by intervenors would be better 42 addressed through joint arrangements and actions by the region’s industry, governments,

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1 regulators, ports and other stakeholders and not as commitments by Trans Mountain alone as 2 part of hearings for a single project. It should be noted that Trans Mountain traffic currently 3 constitutes 1.1% of large vessels trading in the study area. Subject to TMEP reaching full 4 operational status, this percentage will increase to 6.6%, still only constituting a small portion of 5 commercial vessel traffic in the study area.

6 Trans Mountain is supportive of national and regional collaborative efforts aimed at continual 7 improvements that will help enhance marine safety and encourage environmental improvement 8 initiatives. For example, the Ministry of Transportation, along with marine shipping experts, 9 non-government organizations and other officials, recently announced the launch of Canada’s 10 first independent research organization to examine marine shipping in Canada, Clear Seas 11 Centre for Responsible Marine Shipping, based in Vancouver. Clear Seas is an independent, 12 not-for-profit organization that will provide impartial and evidence-based research to inform the 13 public and policy makers about marine traffic in Canadian waters, including risks, mitigation 14 measures, and best practices worldwide for safe and sustainable marine shipping. It is funded 15 by grants from the Federal and Provincial Governments and industry.

16 Although Trans Mountain does not own or operate vessels calling at Westridge, it is an active 17 member of the maritime community and has demonstrated commitment to past and current 18 initiatives for the improvement of the safety and efficiency of marine transportation and 19 protection of the environment as described earlier in Sections 59.4 and 59.8. Should regulators 20 propose or enact fresh measures applicable to all vessels that are designed to further improve 21 maritime safety, Trans Mountain would be supportive of such measures.

59.10 Summary of New Commitments 22 · Trans Mountain does not own or operate tankers but will raise awareness amongst 23 Project tankers about conditions near Swiftsure Bank with Project tankers in its Port 24 Information and Terminal Operations Manual. 59.11 References 25 Tanker Safety Panel Secretariat. 2013. A review of Canada’s Ship-source Oil Spill 26 Preparedness and Response Regime: Setting the Course for the Future. Ottawa, ON. 27 71 pp.

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60.0 MARINE RISK ASSESSMENT 60.1 Introduction 1 A number of intervenors and commenters have raised issues associated with the marine risk 2 assessment conducted for the TMEP. This section of the Reply Evidence addresses evidence 3 submitted by the following:

4 · City of Burnaby (Filing ID A4L8F8);

5 · City of Vancouver (Filing IDs A4L7V8, A4L7X9, A4L9C4, A4L9C6, A4L7L1, 6 A4L7L3, A4L7L2, A4L7L4, A4L7L5, A4L7L6, A4L7L7, A4L7L8, A4L7L9, 7 A4L7Q0, A4L7Q1, A4L7Q2, A4L7U5, A4L7U6, A4L7U7, A4L7U8, and 8 A4L7U9);

9 · Cowichan Tribes (Filing IDs A4Q0U9, A4Q0V0, A4L9Z8, A4Q1L5, and 10 A4Q2R3);

11 · Environment Canada (Filing ID A4L8Y6);

12 · David Farmer (Filing IDs A4L6R8 and A4L6R9);

13 · FER (Filing IDs A4Q2T7, A4Q2T8, and A4Q2T9);

14 · FOE US (Filing IDs A4L9W4, A4L9W5, A4L9W6, A4L9W8, A4L9W9, and 15 A4L9X2);

16 · Georgia Strait Alliance (Filing IDs A4Q1K1, A4Q1K2, and A4Q1K3);

17 · Lyackson First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0H9);

18 · Living Oceans (Filing IDs A4L9R7 and A4L6A8);

19 · Makah Tribal Council (Filing ID A4Q2A4);

20 · Elizabeth May (Filing ID A4L8Q9);

21 · Metro Vancouver (Filing IDs A4L7Y3 and A4L7Y7);

22 · Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q2F9);

23 · NS NOPE (Filing IDs A4L5Y4, A4L5Y5, A4L9Q7, and A4L5V1);

24 · Adam Olsen (Filing ID A4L6V3);

25 · Pacheedaht First Nation (Filing IDs A4L5F3, A4L5K2, A4L7D1, A4L7F3, 26 A4L7F4, A4L7F5, A4L7F6, and A4L7F7);

27 · Squamish Nation (Filing ID A4L7E5);

28 · Tsawout First Nation (Filing IDs A4Q1D4 and A4Q1G5);

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1 · Tsawwassen First Nation (Filing ID A4L7T2);

2 · Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing IDs A4L6A6 and A4L6A7);

3 · T'Sou-ke First Nation (Filing ID A4L5T9);

4 · U.S. Tribes (Filing IDs A4L7G2, A4L7G3, and A4L7G4);

5 · Upper Nicola Band (Filing ID A4Q1T7);

6 · Vancouver Fraser Port Authority (PMV) (Filing ID A4L6Q7);

7 · Village of Belcarra (Filing ID A4L5G5); and

8 · WSDOE (Filing IDs A4Q1X6, A4Q2D4, A4Q2D6, and A4Q2D8).

9 This section should be read in conjunction with Sections 59 (Marine Transportation), 25 (Fate 10 and Behaviour of Oil), 61 (Marine Spill Liability Compensation), and 62 (Marine Emergency 11 Preparedness and Response) of this Reply Evidence.

60.2 Concerns Expressed by Intervenors 12 In evidence submitted by intervenors, the common concern of risk and safety, and in particular 13 marine safety, came up frequently. A majority of intervenors shared common concerns as part 14 of their submitted evidence. These intervenors included Adam Olsen, Cowichan Tribes, 15 Elizabeth May, Makah Tribal Council, NS NOPE, Pacheedaht First Nation, Squamish Nation, 16 Tsawwassen Nation, and US Tribes.

17 · What are the potential economic and environmental effects of the increased marine traffic 18 associated with this project?

19 - Response: Please refer to Volume 8A, Section 4.3 of the ESA (Marine Transportation 20 Assessment, Filing ID A3S4Y3), which identifies the potential environmental and 21 socio-economic effects of the incremental increase in Project-related marine vessel 22 traffic. Further information is provided in many of the other sections of the Reply 23 Evidence, including, among others, Section 58 (Marine Commercial, Recreation and 24 Tourism Use) and Section 59 (Marine Transportation).

25 · What is the likelihood that a spill would take place given the increase of marine traffic?

26 - Response: The likelihood of a marine cargo oil spill in the region has been fully 27 analyzed by a comprehensive quantitative risk assessment (QRA; Volume 8C, Technical 28 Report TR 8C 12 TERMPOL 3.15, General Risk Analysis and Intended Methods of 29 Reducing Risk [Filing IDs A3S5F4, A3S5F6, and A3S5F8]) carried out by DNV. 30 According to DNV, the tanker regime in this area employs “controls (that) are in line with 31 global best practices.” More information on the marine risk assessment is provided 32 below.

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1 · What would be the impact of an oil spill on the environment and economy?

2 - Response: The potential environmental impacts have been assessed in the Ecological 3 Risk Assessment (Volume 8B, Filing ID A56022). The potential economic costs of an oil 4 spill are addressed in Section 27.

5 · Is the spill response regime in place sufficient to mitigate the most harmful effects of a spill?

6 - Response: Trans Mountain has proposed an enhanced oil spill response regime in 7 Volume 8A, Table 5.5.3 (Filing ID A3S4Y6). Further information is provided in Section 62 8 on Marine Emergency Preparedness and Response.

9 · How does the Project impact safety in the Burrard Inlet and the Second Narrows?

10 - This is discussed in Volume 8C, Technical Report TR 8C 05 Supplemental TR S4 (Filing 11 ID A3S4T0). Various mandatory restrictions have been established by PMV and 12 published in its Port Information Guide (Filing ID A4F8Z7).

13 The Makah has stated that the “addition of this amount of vessel traffic means an increase in 14 risk of collision… resulting in the potential spill…” (Filing ID A4Q2A4). To this end, Trans 15 Mountain, in its initial submission, and through several rounds of IRs, has provided extensive 16 responses to such questions during the public hearing process.

60.3 Intervenor Evidence Gaps 17 All intervenors who addressed the marine risk assessment in their evidence agreed that risk is a 18 combination of probability and consequence. However, none of the intervenors provided their 19 own comprehensive risk assessment with their own data and unique quantitative analysis.

20 The City of Burnaby, the City of Vancouver, Cowichan Tribes, Living Oceans, Metro Vancouver, 21 NS NOPE, Tsawout First Nation, Tsleil-Waututh Nation, and Upper Nicola Band did refer to 22 other risk assessments in the area, and submitted partial comparisons and comments as part of 23 their evidence (refer to Table 60-9, Third Party Reports, for filing IDs). Many intervenors focused 24 solely on the review of consequences and otherwise critiqued Trans Mountain on the risk 25 assessment submitted in the Application.

26 For example, Ecofish submitted evidence on behalf of Cowichan First Nation and wrote:

27 “Our review focused on the potential impacts to ecological health should an oil spill 28 occur. We did not review potential consequences to human health, or the probability of a 29 pipeline or Marine Transport oil spill occurring [emphasis added]” (Filing ID A4Q0U9, 30 page 2).

31 Environment Canada clearly does not have a mandate to review probability and writes:

32 “Risk is commonly defined as the product of the probability of an accident occurring and 33 the consequence should an accident occur. For the purposes of this submission, it 34 should be noted that EC does not have the mandate to comment on the probability of a 35 spill event; however, EC’s submission relates to the marine bird values and the potential 36 consequences of a spill to marine birds” (Filing ID A4L8Y6, Section 2.4.2.1, page 54).

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1 The City of Vancouver has undertaken large-scale oil spill simulations of scenarios that are 2 neither credible nor viable, in order to highlight the consequence of tanker spills and do so 3 without considering the likelihood of such an accident occurring in Burrard Inlet. Please refer to 4 Attachment 1.08 (Reply to “Oil Spill Trajectory Modeling Report in Burrard Inlet for the Trans 5 Mountain Expansion Project” Genwest Systems Inc. Edmonds, Washington, USA 98020 6 [Genwest Report]) and Attachment 1.13 (Reply to City of Vancouver, Tsleil-Waututh Nation, 7 Metro Vancouver “Air Quality Impacts from Simulated Oil Spills in Burrard Inlet and English 8 Bay”) for full responses to these concerns.

9 Various intervenors have referenced the Genwest Report and the Levelton Report in their 10 evidence (City of Vancouver, City of Burnaby, Metro Vancouver). These intervenors have 11 focused only on perceived risk and highlighted consequence, rather than developing a 12 comprehensive risk assessment with an objective review of probability and consequence as 13 was done by Trans Mountain. A number of such reports are briefly discussed in Section 60.12.

14 By focusing on consequences, these reports do not consider the presence (or lack) of hazards 15 that might cause such accidents, nor the engineering and procedural controls and safety 16 management systems which are applied to reduce their likelihood, nor steps that might be taken 17 to mitigate the consequences. The absence of any objective discussion of risks, which includes 18 a proper assessment of likelihood, negates the credibility and usefulness of such evidence. In 19 such cases the consequences estimated in the evidence are deemed as purely speculative.

60.4 Det Norske Veritas’ Role 20 Cowichan Tribes, through their Glosten and EnviroEmerg Consulting reports (see Table 60-9 for 21 filing IDs), Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing IDs A4L6A9, A4L6C0, A4L6C1, A4L6C2, and A4L6C3), 22 and Tsawout First Nation (Filing ID A4Q1G5) questioned the results of the DNV study 23 (TERMPOL 3.15; Filing IDs A3S5F4, A3S5F6, and A3S5F8) after having submitted extensive 24 IRs during the several rounds of the public hearing process, which were answered by Trans 25 Mountain. DNV is a marine classification society recognized for its expertise in marine risk 26 assessment. DNV has executed many marine risk projects globally, including on the Pacific 27 coast of North America. As these projects could have come relevance to the work done for 28 TMEP, links have been provided where they are publicly available (refer to Trans Mountain’s 29 response to Tsawout FN IR No. 1.30n; Filing ID A3Y3U4).

30 Despite the additional information provided during several rounds of IRs, intervenors have 31 continued to submit their concerns about DNV’s work. For example, Cowichan Tribes states in 32 their evidence that they, “…are highly concerned that Trans Mountain’s application does not 33 properly consider the risks associated with this Project” (Filing ID A4L9Y9).

34 All DNV project reports have been scrutinized by clients, governmental and non-governmental 35 agencies, or peers. Lessons learned from each project review have been reflected and 36 incorporated in future projects and studies by DNV, where possible. In addition, Trans 37 Mountain’s responses to the following IRs provide detail on the application of the Marine 38 Accident Risk Calculation System (MARCS) model for TMEP, including description of updates 39 to the MARCS model which have resolved previously documented weaknesses:

40 · Tsawout FN IR No.1.30 (Filing ID A3Y3T9);

41 · Tsawout FN IR No. 2.09 (Filing ID A4H9H1); and,

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1 · Tsawwassen FN IR. No. 2.5 (Filing ID A4H9H9).

2 However, given filed evidence, such as that from Elizabeth May who writes that “A spill 3 anywhere along this stretch would empty the contents of these tankers onto the shores of my 4 constituents” and that Trans Mountain has taken an “inadequate and insufficient approach to 5 assessing the risks of the proposed project” (Filing ID A4L8Q9), and City of Vancouver: “is 6 concerned that the application does not present a comprehensive risk assessment” (Filing 7 ID A4L7V8), it is apparent that intervenors might not have fully reviewed or considered, or have 8 chosen to simply ignore the diligently produced risk assessment related to marine transportation 9 relevant to the Project. It is for this reason that Trans Mountain, besides addressing specific 10 issues and concerns in Reply Evidence, has provided a summary recap of the comprehensive 11 marine and navigational risk assessment that was undertaken for TMEP in Annex 3 12 (Section 60.19).

60.5 Risk Acceptability 13 The City of Vancouver wrote in its evidence that the “risk analysis does not include 14 consideration of the local population’s view of what is an acceptable level of risk” (Filing 15 IDs A4L7V8 and A4L7X9). This matter is discussed in this section together with various risk 16 comparisons.

17 In the absence of any proposed or widely accepted risk acceptance criteria for marine oil spills, 18 on the marine transportation aspects of the Project, Trans Mountain and DNV have adopted a 19 process to identify all manner of hazards and issues, and consider those through the risk 20 analysis; and, having identified specific concerns, address those in a manner so as to ensure 21 minimum increase of risk compared to present day operations, which reflects current activities 22 and therefore must be acceptable. The adoption of such an approach has resulted in the 23 number of proposed extraordinary precautionary measures undertaken during tanker loading 24 and transit, as well as the proposal to significantly enhance oil spill response in the region. 25 Adopting these measures mean that there is a substantial reduction of risks, on a risk per cargo 26 transported basis.

27 To illustrate that the DNV analysis is conservative (i.e., it over-predicts the actual risk of cargo 28 oil spill) the NewCase 0 results for the current operations using a 60 year period are presented 29 in Table 60-1. When reviewing this information, it is important to keep in mind that preventive 30 measures have advanced considerably over the past 60 years. Trans Mountain notes again that 31 the Joint Review Panel for the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project reflected that “Risk 32 assessments based solely on historical incident records provide poor insight into future 33 performance since incident records do not account for new technology and learnings that occur 34 from the incident investigations” (NEB 2013; Views of the Panel, page 80).

35 As such, the probability of occurrence would actually have been higher in the past than is shown 36 by the estimate using current preventive measures. As is well known and recorded, there have 37 not been any tanker spills in transit from tankers associated with Westridge Marine Terminal. 38 Since records are available, the total volume of oil spilled in two minor cargo transfer operations 39 related incidents is only 0.085 m3 [85 L]); the last incident having occurred in 1998 (refer to 40 Application Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.15, Section 10.3; Filing ID A3S5F8). The information in 41 Table 60-1 is shared as a means to provide perspective on the conservative nature of the 42 marine risk assessment undertaken for TMEP.

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1 TABLE 60-1 2 3 MARCS RISK RATES FOR MODELLED SPILL SCENARIOS

Probability in 60 Scenario MARCS Risk Rate Actual Years Any TM Tanker Spill (in transit) with 1 accident in 613 years 9.3% Nil existing risk controls Any TM Tanker CWC oil spill (in transit) 1 accident in 6,130 years 1.0% Nil with existing risk controls Total of 0.085 m3 Westridge spill of < 10 m3 1 accident in 234 years 22.7% [85 L] only; none since 1998 Westridge CWC oil spill (Terminal) 1 accident in 1,655 years 3.6% Nil

60.5.1 Results of Quantitative Risk Assessment 4 Risk is defined as the combination of likelihood and consequence. The Project will require an 5 expansion of a current operating terminal, but will not require larger vessels; vessels will use the 6 same routes and the type of proposed cargo is already transported in the region. As such, any 7 incremental change in risk is reflected in the change in likelihood of marine incidents, some of 8 which might lead to cargo oil spill.

9 The results of the marine risk assessment are available in Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.15 (Filing 10 IDs A3S5F4, A3S5F6, and A3S5F8) and in Trans Mountain’s response to NEB IR TERMPOL 11 Rpt and Outstanding Filings (Response c; Filing ID A4G3U5). The results indicate that 12 implementing the proposed Project with additional risk-reducing measures for Project tankers 13 would be expected to have the following impacts:

14 · There is a low likelihood of major oil spills occurring in the study area.

15 · The oil cargo spill accident frequency for an oil cargo spill of any size, from any oil cargo 16 carrying vessel in the study area during transit, will increase from one in every 113 years to 17 one in every 92 years.

18 · The oil cargo spill accident frequency for a spill of any size from a Project tanker during 19 transit will increase from one in every 613 years to one in every 284 years.

20 · The increase in contributions to potential spill accidents in the study area during transit by a 21 tanker associated with TMEP will increase from 18% to 32%.

22 · The likelihood of a CWCS during transit (calculated by DNV to be 16,500 m3 or 15,500 23 tonnes) will increase from one in every 6,135 years to one in every 2,841 years.

24 · The two most likely causes of tanker oil spills are grounding and collision.

25 · A very low likelihood of major oil spills within Burrard Inlet and English Bay means that no 26 credible large oil spill scenarios in these segments of the transit were identified.

27 With regard to the terminal operation, DNV found that implementing the Project will increase the 28 likelihood of a small scale spill up to 10 m3 in volume from one in every 234 years to one in

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1 every 34 years. The likelihood of a large-scale spill, including the CWCS during cargo handling 2 of 103 m3, is expected to increase from one in every 1,655 years to one in every 234 years.

3 In consultation with Trans Mountain, DNV provided the probability (i.e., equivalent likelihoods) of 4 oil spills as annual frequencies and/or return periods, similar to the approach of the Tanker 5 Safety Expert Panel (TSEP; Tanker Safety Panel Secretariat 2013). In contrast, a number of 6 intervenors expressed the likelihood values for specific periods of time, other than per-annum, 7 by expressing DNV’s spill likelihood as a percentage probability of occurrence within a defined 8 period of a time, typically a number of years. This has been explained in Trans Mountain 9 Response to NEB IR No. 4.13 (Filing ID A4K4W3).

10 The results of the marine risk assessment were first presented in Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.15 11 (Filing IDs A3S5F4, A3S5F6, and A3S5F8). Further modelling was then necessary to answer 12 intervenor IRs and to address recommendations of the TRC. The results of this further 13 assessment and refinement of risk controls was subsequently presented in response to NEB IR 14 TERMPOL Rpt and Outstanding Filings (Response c, Filing ID A4G3U5). Specifically, these 15 refinements were as follows.

16 · Research by DNV into the VTS capabilities for the marine study area for TMEP (Evaluation 17 of VTS Capabilities for TERMPOL 3.15; Filing IDs A4A2Z7 and A4A2Z8), which determined 18 that VTS capability was far more than what had been modelled.

19 · Fast time simulation study of tanker drift in Juan de Fuca Strait (Summary Report of 20 Manoeuvring Assessment: Juan de Fuca Strait Proposed Tug Escort; Filing ID A4A7R2).

21 · Strait of Georgia proposed tug escort simulation study (Filing ID A4G3U7). This and the 22 previous study were carried out and provided to the TRC upon their request.

23 · Detailed assessment of collision risk in Segment 2 (Burrard Inlet); refer to response to PMV 24 IR No. 1.8.1 (Filing ID A3X6V4).

25 · Upgraded the bollard pull of tugs used in the MARCS model (40 tonnes to 70 tonnes), which 26 better reflects the tugs available in the region for escorting laden tankers as shown in 27 Evaluation of Local Escort and Rescue Tug Capabilities (Filing ID A3S5G0). More capable 28 tugs can reduce the probability of vessel grounding.

29 · The recommendations and findings of the TRC, including the effect of Enhanced Situational 30 Awareness (Response to NEB IR TERMPOL Rpt and Outstanding Filings No. Ac 31 Attachment 1; Filing ID A4G3U6).

32 The refined results were submitted as “NewCases” results in Trans Mountain’s Response to 33 NEB IR TERMPOL Rpt and Outstanding Filings, Table A-8 (Filing ID A4G3U5), which is 34 reproduced below (Table 60-2). The future benefits of expanding use of AIS and radar reflectors 35 on smaller vessels were not modelled and therefore contribute to the conservative nature of the 36 model results.

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1 TABLE 60-2 2 3 ANALYSIS OF OIL CARGO SPILL PROBABILITY COMPARING NEWCASE AND 4 APPLICATION CASE CONDITIONS

Oil Cargo Spill Probability (Any Size) Oil Cargo Spill Return Period (years) All Oil Trans Mountain Other Oil Cargo All Oil Cargo Traffic Cargo Trans Mountain Tankers Tankers Traffic Conditions Traffic Mean Credible Frequency Frequency Frequency Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Any Size Any Size Worst- Worst- (/year) (/year) (/year) change Case Case NewCase 0 0.00163 18% 0.00721 82% 0.00884 100% 113 613 1227 6135 NewCase 1 0.01110 61% 0.00724 39% 0.01835 100% +108% 54 90 180 901 NewCase 1c 0.00352 32% 0.00736 68% 0.01087 100% +23% 92 284 568 2841

Case 0 0.00323 20% 0.01301 80% 0.01624 100% 62 310 619 3093 Case 1 0.02191 63% 0.01313 37% 0.03505 100% +116% 29 46 91 456 Case 1a 0.00754 36% 0.01313 64% 0.02067 100% +27% 48 133 265 1326 Case 1b 0.00423 24% 0.01313 76% 0.01736 100% +7% 58 236 473 2366

5 Table 60-2 illustrates that while the probability of oil cargo spill in the region increases with 6 increased oil cargo marine traffic, this increase can be largely eliminated by implementing 7 risk-reducing (precautionary) measures.

8 Specifically, Table 60-1 demonstrates that, provided the identified additional risk-reducing 9 measures are implemented, overall incremental oil cargo spill risk as a result of the increase in 10 tanker transits can be effectively mitigated and maintained close to its current level.

11 As mentioned earlier in this narrative, the risk of a cargo oil spill is an existing one in the region 12 and Table 60-2 also shows that the change to the region’s cargo oil spill likelihood (synonymous 13 with change in risk) is small (the difference between .00884 and .01087). This means that the 14 existing probability of an oil cargo spill of any size in the region will remain comparable in the 15 future with what it is currently; a once in 113 years event will increase its likelihood to a future 16 once in 92 years event. At the same time, the future contribution of Project tankers to the 17 region’s overall oil spill risk profile will continue to remain a small proportion (32%) of the total oil 18 cargo spill risk profile of the region.

60.5.1.1 Comparison with Global Oil Spill Data 19 The records show that there have been no major oil spills in the study area. In TERMPOL 3.15, 20 Section 7.5.2 (Filing ID A3S5F8), DNV compared the TMEP risk analysis results against global 21 spill data.

22 DNV’s standard assumptions are that total sailed distance for an oil tanker per year is 74,000 23 nautical miles (NM). Only 20% of that distance is assumed to be sailed near land and in 24 trafficked areas. Thus, a shipyear is assumed to be equal to 14,800 NM, or approximately 25 15,000 NM, sailed in areas where collisions and grounding may occur. Based on this 26 assumption, the accidental oil spill frequency from ITOPF can be estimated as approximately 27 0.0016 accidents per 15,000 NM sailed in coastal waters. Analysis based on the ITOPF data for 28 10 years, between 2002 and 2012, the global frequency of accidental oil spills over 7 tons is 29 0.0016 per shipyear. This frequency will vary in each area depending on the risk-reducing 30 measures in place, weather and current conditions, and navigability of the sailing route.

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1 Project tankers are only part of the oil spill likelihood in the region. Data shows that Project 2 tankers are less prevalent (130,163 ship miles) than other tankers (202,889 ship miles) and 3 Table 60-1 shows that with all current and future risk controls, Project tankers have a much 4 lower cargo oil spill likelihood (0.00352) than other tankers (0.00736) in the region. This equates 5 to a total cargo oil spill likelihood in the region per 15,000 NM (or shipyear) of 0.00041 for 6 Project tankers, which is the calculation shown in Table 60-3 below.

7 TABLE 60-3 8 9 TMEP OIL SPILL ACCIDENT FREQUENCIES PER SHIPYEAR

(NewCase 1C) Oil Spill Accident Frequency Other Cargo Oil with Additional TMEP Risk Controls TMEP All Cargo Oil Traffic Vessels (Mitigation) Applied to Project Tankers Oil Spill Accident Frequency (per year) 0.00352 0.00736 0.01087 NM sailed 130163 202889 333052 Oil Spill Accident per shipyear (15,000 NM) 0.00041 0.00054 0.00049

10 The analysis also serves to highlight that due to the number of extraordinary risk-reducing 11 measures applied to Project tankers, these tankers are expected to maintain a reduced risk of 12 oil spills compared with that posed by other cargo oil carrying vessels in the study area.

60.5.1.2 Comparison with Results of Risk Assessment for Marine Spills in Canadian Waters (WSP 2014) 13 Intervenors referenced the TSEP (Tanker Safety Panel Secretariat 2013) and the Risk 14 Assessment for Marine Spills in Canadian Waters (WSP 2014). Trans Mountain supports all 15 recommendations of the TSEP. It is important to point out that the TSEP’s work only covered 16 Canada’s preparedness and response regimes, and the panel’s mandate did extend to review 17 of the prevention regime currently in place. Trans Mountain’s risk assessment reviewed 18 prevention, preparedness and response, and proposed enhancements as deemed necessary to 19 mitigate TMEP effects and risks.

20 The initial release of the Phase 1 report of the TSEP, together with the risk assessment 21 conducted by WSP, took place only a few weeks prior to Trans Mountain submitting its own 22 Application to the NEB. These reports were not available during the time when Trans 23 Mountain’s own risk assessment study was being completed. Trans Mountain initially compared 24 the results of the two risk assessments (i.e., WSP and TMEP/DNV) in Response to Allan R IR 25 No. 1.21c (Filing ID A3X5V9), which highlighted the similar results from both studies.

26 However, none of the experts retained by intervenors (including Gunton and Broadbent; Filing 27 ID A4L6A6) have compared DNV results with those from the WSP analysis. Had they done so, 28 they would have seen remarkably close correlation between the two study results, within 29 expected margins of error when comparing two different risk models with similar (not same) 30 geographic area, different approaches to risk calculation with different scope and objectives of 31 work, data, models, and analyst choices.

60.5.1.2.1 Methodology and Analysis 32 The WSP study estimates the risk of pollution from marine oil spills in Canadian waters south of 33 the 60th parallel. A total of 77 zones were allocated a frequency of spill and an environmental

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1 sensitivity (derived from environmental geographic layers describing the physical, biological, 2 and human environments in each of the 77 zones), which were then applied to generate a risk 3 estimate. The study showed that the probability of spills varies greatly across the country. 4 Among its conclusions, it mentions that the largest marine traffic volumes are observed in the 5 Pacific Coast sector where the probability of small size fuel spills is the highest. It calculates that 6 in case of a spill of cargo oil, 86% of spills would be less than 1,000 m3 in volume.

7 The WSP study shows that, annually, close to 53,000,000 m3 (Tables 3.8 and 3.9 of WSP 2014) 8 of oil cargo moves through the south BC coastal region. TMEP is expected to increase this by 9 about 32,000,000 m3 of annual oil cargo.

10 The WSP report provides summaries of the estimated spill frequency for the Pacific Coast 11 sector and its sub-sectors. Tables 5.1 to 5.3 in the report indicate the potential spill frequency 12 for each of the three oil types (crude oil cargo, refined oil cargo, and oil carried as fuel), for each 13 of the four spill size ranges, with a breakdown per sub-sector and zone (nearshore, 14 intermediate, and deep-sea). The Pacific Coast nearshore part of Segment 5 in sector 1 is 15 closest in comparison with the marine study area of TMEP and the area for which a QRA was 16 completed by DNV (refer to the Application, Volume 8C - TERMPOL 3.15; Filing ID A3S5F4).

17 To carry out the comparison the return period of small, medium, large, and extra-large oil spills 18 of crude and refined oils cargo is first converted to frequency. Upon analysis, it shows that WSP 19 calculated the return period of an oil spill accident of any oil (crude or refined) occurring on the 20 BC nearshore (within 12 NM from the coast) region based on present traffic to be a 1 in 78 year 21 occurrence.

22 The calculation shows that the addition of about 32,000,000 m3 of crude oil cargo by TMEP 23 would result in the return period of an oil spill accident of any oil (crude or refined) occurring on 24 the BC nearshore (within 12 NM from the coast) region based on present risk controls to reduce 25 to a 1 in 61 year occurrence.

26 As part of this calculated result it is interesting to see that with the risk assumptions used in the 27 WSP study, the accident return period of a Trans Mountain tanker will be comparable, if not 28 less, than that of other crude oil tankers in the region. That will only improve with 29 implementation of the number of extraordinary precautionary measures proposed by the 30 Project.

31 The calculations are shown in the tables below (Tables 60-5 and 60-6).

32 Note:

33 i. The spill sizes are labelled as in the WSP study. 34 ii. The likelihood for “all oil cargo w/o TMEP” is obtained by combining the WSP likelihood 35 for “crude” and the likelihood for “refined.” This scenario is equivalent to DNV’s 36 NewCase 0 - existing oil cargo quantity and existing risk controls. 37 iii. It is assumed that the increase in frequency of TMEP crude oil spill of a given size will be 38 directly proportional to that for the existing crude oil cargo in WSP. 39 iv. After first estimating the volume of increase in crude oil marine transportation resulting 40 from TMEP, the proportionate frequency of oil spills of different sizes is calculated using 41 corresponding WSP results. 42 v. The additional oil spill frequency calculated in iv. is added to the original WSP 43 frequencies and summed to calculate the likelihood for “all oil cargo with TMEP”

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1 vi. In this scenario the cargo quantity and risk controls are equivalent to DNV’s NewCase 1 2 - existing oil volumes, plus TMEP cargo quantity and with existing risk controls.

3 TABLE 60-4 4 5 WSP OIL SPILL ACCIDENT RETURN PERIOD 6 (Reproduced from WSP and Allan R IR No. 1.21c [Filing ID A3X5V9] for convenience)

Cargo Annual Return Period for Cargo Spill Quantity Cargo Quantity Small Medium Large X large Any size 3 (m ) (10 to 99 m3) (100 - 999 m3) (1,000 - 9,999 m3) (> 10,000 m3) spill (m3) Existing Crude Oil (Table 3.8, 35,304,199 719 1074 800 3,758 261 WSP 2014) Existing Refined Oil 17,692,359 135 811 3423 112 (Table 3.9, WSP 2014) All Oil Cargo w/o TMEP 52,996,558 114 462 648 3,758 78 (Equiv to NewCase 0) 7

8 In Table 60-5, the return periods from Table 60-4 have first been converted to frequency, and 9 the total oil spill accident frequency has been calculated for the additional quantity of crude oil 10 cargo from TMEP.

11 TABLE 60-5 12 13 WSP OIL SPILL ACCIDENT FREQUENCY RECALCULATED WITH TMEP CARGO 14 QUANTITY

Frequency for Cargo Spill Quantity Cargo Any size Cargo Quantity Small Medium Large X large spill (m3) 3 (m ) (10 to 99 m3) (100 to - 999 m3) (1,000 to – 9,999 m3) (> 10,000 m3) (sum of the row) Existing Crude Oil (Table 3.8, 35,304,199 0.00139 0.00093 0.00125 0.00027 0.00384 WSP 2014) Existing Refined Oil (Table 3.9, 17,692,359 0.00741 0.00123 0.00029 0.00893 WSP 2014) All Oil Cargo w/o TMEP (Equiv to 52,996,558 0.00880 0.00216 0.00154 0.00027 0.01277 NewCase 0) TMEP Only 32,206,855 0.00127 0.00085 0.00114 0.00024 0.00350 All Oil Cargo With TMEP 85,203,413 0.01007 0.00301 0.00268 0.00051 0.01627 (Equiv to NewCase 1) 15

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1 In Table 60-6, the results from Table 60-5 have been converted back and shown as return 2 period for convenience.

3 TABLE 60-6 4 5 WSP OIL SPILL RETURN PERIOD RECALCULATED WITH TMEP VOLUME

Return Period for Cargo Spill Quantity Cargo Any size Cargo Quantity Small Medium Large X large 3 3 3 3 3 spill (m ) (10 to 99 m ) (100 to - 999 m ) (1,000 to – 9,999 m ) (> 10,000 m ) 3 (m ) Existing Crude Oil (Table 3.8, 35,304,199 719 1074 800 3758 261 WSP 2014) Existing Refined Oil 17,692,359 135 811 3423 112 (Table 3.9, WSP 2014) All Oil Cargo w/o TMEP 52,996,558 114 462 648 3758 78 (Equiv to NewCase 0) TMEP Only 32,206,855 788 1177 877 4119 286 All Oil Cargo With TMEP 85,203,413 99 332 373 1965 61 (Equiv to NewCase 1)

6 The recalculated WSP results are compared with DNV in Table 60-7 below.

7 TABLE 60-7 8 9 COMPARING DNV RESULTS WITH RECALCULATED WSP OIL SPILL RETURN PERIOD

Return Period (Years) Any size oil cargo DNV WSP All oil cargo w/o TMEP; Equiv to NewCase 0 113 78 All oil cargo with TMEP; Equiv to NewCase 1 54 61 TMEP only (with current risk controls) Equiv to NewCase 1 90 286 Expect similar or TMEP only (with addn risk controls) Equiv to NewCase 1c 284 better All oil cargo with TMEP (with addn risk controls) Equiv to Expect similar or 92 NewCase 1c better

10 It is interesting to see that both risk assessments, conducted independent of each other, using 11 separate methodologies, provided similar results on the probability of a cargo oil spill accident 12 within a similar (not same) area.

13 Remarkably, this comparison also shows that NewCase 1c (2018 with TMEP and additional risk 14 controls) results are highly similar to recalculated WSP results for 2018 for TMEP but using 15 current risk controls.

16 Besides validating DNV’s work, this comparison therefore helps to further highlight that:

17 · The TMEP marine risk analysis is of conservative nature;

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1 · Oil spill risk in the region will remain similar to what exists today;

2 · As shown previously in Allan R IR No. 1.21c (Filing ID A3X5V9), both risk 3 assessments indicate that the majority of cargo oil spill volumes will be 4 relatively small; and,

5 · Implementing the additional risk controls will make a positive contribution to the 6 level of marine safety.

7 Below, in Table 60-8 and Figure 60-1, the comparison in Table 60-7 has been shown in a 8 similar manner as Gunton and Broadbent (Figure ES2).

9 TABLE 60-8 10 11 COMPARING DNV RESULTS WITH WSP

Return Probability % in 30 and 50 Condition Period years (Any size oil spill) (Years) 30 50 NewCase 0 – All oil cargo (w/o TMEP) 113 23 36 NewCase 1 – All oil cargo (w/o TMEP) 54 43 61 NewCase 1c – All oil cargo (TMEP addn risk controls) 92 28 42 WSP 2014 – All oil cargo (w/o TMEP) 78 32 47 WSP 2014 – All oil cargo (with TMEP) 61 39 56 NewCase 1 – TMEP only (with current risk controls) 90 28 43 NewCase 1c – TMEP only (with addn risk controls) 284 10 16 WSP 2014 – TMEP only (with current risk controls) 286 10 16 12 13

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Any Size Oil Spill Probability %

Probability % in 30 years (Any size oil spill) Probability % in 50 years (Any size oil spill)

1 2 Figure 60-1 Comparing DNV Results with WSP

60.5.2 TERMPOL Review Process Report 3 The TRC reflected in their report that:

4 · the current and proposed navigation risk-reducing measures in the study area 5 are of a high level, in comparison with those typically applied in global coastal 6 waters; and,

7 · the level of marine safety in the study area is expected to remain high in the 8 future, should the Project be allowed to proceed.

9 The TRC, after reviewing Trans Mountain’s studies and taking into account Trans Mountain’s 10 commitments:

11 · identified several findings and recommendations in response to the 12 submission, and has proposed actions for Trans Mountain that will provide for a 13 high level of safety for tanker operations;

14 · did not identify regulatory concerns for the tankers, tanker operations, the 15 proposed route, navigability, other waterway users, and the marine terminal 16 operations associated with tankers supporting the Project; and,

17 · stated that Trans Mountain commitments and enhancements to the existing 18 marine safety regime will provide for a higher level of safety for tanker 19 operations appropriate to the increase in traffic.

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1 Key measures the TRC supports, which will reduce risk and enhance awareness include:

2 · extended use of tethered and untethered tug escort;

3 · extension of the pilot disembarkation zone;

4 · safety calls by laden tankers when in transit;

5 · guidance on communication between masters and watchkeeping personnel to 6 support strong communication between tankers and their escort tugs;

7 · clear guidance to industry on enhancements to the marine safety regime that 8 will impact their operations; and,

9 · an engagement and awareness strategy to promote safe navigation and 10 interaction between Project tankers and recreational boaters, fishing vessel 11 operators, and operators of small vessels.

12 In response to an IR from the NEB (Response to NEB IR TERMPOL Rpt and Outstanding 13 Filings; Filing ID A4G3U5), Trans Mountain confirmed that it has accepted all recommendations 14 and findings issued by the TRC and provided information on how it intends to meet those 15 requirements. Trans Mountain also began discussions with the PPA on several of the items, 16 which has resulted in an updated Notice to Industry, with clear guidance and implementation 17 timelines, which has been filed by the PPA as part of the PPA’s Letter of Comment (Filing ID 18 A4Q7T1). Other TRC recommendations and findings are being addressed with the aim to have 19 those in place prior to TMEP becoming operational.

60.6 Credible Worst-Case Oil Spill 20 In their evidence, FER states: “FER remains concerned with the Credible Worse Case Scenario 21 (CWCS) that assumes only 14 per cent of an Aframax tankers capacity (16,500 T)” (Filing 22 ID A4Q2T7).The City of Vancouver has stated in their evidence that “Trans Mountain’s 23 application excludes study segment 2 (Vancouver Harbour area) and study segment 3 (English 24 Bay) from its risk assessment” (Filing ID A4L7X9).

25 From such statements it has become apparent that intervenors have not fully appreciated the 26 process by which CWC oil spill scenarios used by Trans Mountain, in various marine oil spill 27 studies, were developed. As such, the process used by Trans Mountain to identify and assess 28 potential effects at representative and credible spill scenarios covering the entire route is 29 explained below.

30 Section 19(1)(a) of the CEA Act, 2012 requires environmental assessments of designated 31 projects to take into account “the environmental effects of the designated project, including the 32 environmental effects of malfunctions or accidents that may occur in connection with the 33 designated project and any cumulative effects that are likely to result from the project in 34 combination with other physical activities that have been or will be carried out” [emphasis 35 added]. The CEA Act, 2012 does not, however, necessitate an assessment of every 36 conceivable accident and malfunction scenario. Rather, the Responsible Authority under the 37 CEA Act, 2012 (in this case, the NEB) must determine the appropriate scope of that 38 assessment.

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1 The NEB issued Filing Requirements Related to the Potential Environmental and 2 Socio-economic Effects of Increased Marine Shipping Activities, Trans Mountain Expansion 3 Project (Filing ID A3K9I2). These Filing Requirements specified that (emphasis added):

4 “The assessment of accidents and malfunctions related to the increase in marine 5 shipping activities must include an assessment of potential accidents at the 6 Terminal and at representative locations along the marine shipping routes. 7 Selection of locations should be risk informed considering both probability and 8 consequence. The assessment must include a description of:

9 · measures to reduce the potential for accidents and malfunctions to occur, including 10 an overview of relevant regulatory regimes; 11 · credible worst case spill scenarios and smaller spill scenarios; 12 · the fate and behavior of any hydrocarbons that may be spilled; 13 · potential environmental and socio-economic effects of credible worst case spill 14 scenarios and of smaller spill scenarios, taking into account the season-specific 15 behavior, trajectory, and fate of hydrocarbons spilled, as well as the range of weather 16 and marine conditions that could prevail during the spill event; 17 · ecological and human health risk assessments for credible worst case spill scenarios 18 and smaller spill scenarios, including justification of the methodologies use; and, 19 · preparedness and response planning and measures, including an overview of the 20 relevant regulatory regimes.”

21 As explained in TERMPOL 3.15, Section 9.15 (Filing ID A3S5F6), the definition of a CWCS is 22 not provided in the TERMPOL Review Process 2001 Guidelines (TRP 743), but is determined 23 by the risk assessor and then evaluated by the TRC. DNV recommends that a CWCS should be 24 defined as representing a very low likelihood scenario which would have a significant impact.

25 There is no precedent of complete loss of all cargo from a double hull tanker. The Monte Carlo 26 simulations of tanker damage carried out by DNV on a representative double hull Aframax 27 tanker did not produce a single case of complete loss of all oil cargo. The 90 percent highest 28 volume was 16,500 m3, which corresponds to the low probability 90th percentile size loss of 29 cargo oil resulting from a collision (refer to the side impact oil outflow model in Figure 60-2). The 30 90th percentile size loss of cargo oil resulting from a grounding is less (bottom impact oil outflow 31 model in Figure 60-2). This also means that 90% of all simulated spill sizes are covered by the 32 scenario.

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1 2 Figure 60-2 Project Tanker - Oil Outflow Model

3 Source: Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.15, Figures 34 and 35 (Filing ID A3S5F6)

4 Based on overall conditions and traffic of the route from Westridge to Buoy Juliet, DNV defined 5 a CWC sized spill as 16,500 m3, which is based on 90th percentile size loss of cargo oil resulting 6 from a side impact (collision). This is a conservative approach. It should also be noted that the 7 input data for the modelling is based on the IMO’s accident and damage data that also includes 8 single hull tankers. The conversion of these damages onto a double hull tanker potentially leads 9 to overestimation of the oil spill volume.

10 Using a 90th percentile oil spill outflow as the CWC oil spill volume is a conservative approach, 11 compared with WSP (2014) and Vessel Traffic Risk Assessment (VTRA) 2010 Final Report 12 (Van Dorp & Merrick 2014; also refer to Trans Mountain Response to Tsawout FN IR No 2.09 13 [Filing ID A4H9H1]).

14 The volume of oil spilled during an accident is directly related to the severity of the incident and 15 the type and extent of damage caused. Therefore, the probability of a very large oil volume to 16 be released during a tanker incident must be assessed, in the first place, based upon the 17 probability of the selected location being capable of hosting such a severe incident.

60.6.1 Vancouver Harbour Oil Spill 18 DNV did not consider 16,500 m3 spill volume as a CWC oil spill scenario in Vancouver Harbour 19 as realistic and relevant for the risk analysis study. The CWC oil spill volume for an oil spill 20 within Vancouver Harbour area was determined by DNV as 103 m3, based upon a credible oil 21 spill scenario during cargo transfer whereby there is complete break of one of three loading 22 arms.

23 Following an IR from PMV (refer to Trans Mountain Response to PMV IR No. 1.8; Filing ID 24 A3X6V4), DNV made a more detailed assessment of the collision risk in the Vancouver Harbour 25 area based on energy levels of the traffic in the area. In studies for the Dutch Department of 26 Transport, DNV has established energy thresholds for breaking the cargo tank of a tank vessel. 27 The energy to make a small hole is 9 MJ, while the energy to make a large hole is 18.7 MJ, 28 given that the collision is 90 degrees on the tanker vessel. DNV conducted a detailed analysis of 29 the traffic in Segment 2 and calculated the energy of all vessel transits in the segment over 30 1 year, based on the vessels’ deadweight tonnage and the speed restrictions in the area.

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1 The detailed analysis (Filing ID A3X6V4) shows that 73% of the vessel transits in this area are 2 so small that they will not cause any breakage of the cargo tank in case of a collision, while 2% 3 of the vessel transits can cause a small hole in the case of a collision 90 degrees on the tanker. 4 The remaining 25% of vessel transits in the Vancouver Harbour area are vessels that have the 5 energy to exceed 18.7 MJ and make a large hole in the cargo tank. However, these vessels are 6 over 51,000 DWT with an average length of approximately 200 m. Because such large vessels 7 are under pilotage and must follow the rules of the harbour, these vessels cannot approach a 8 laden tanker moving through the harbour from the Westridge Marine Terminal to sea.

9 As such, DNV’s detailed analysis shows that the large majority of the collisions will not have the 10 energy to break the cargo hull, and that only small hole sizes are possible in the case of 11 breakage of a cargo tank. Thus, in the rare event of a collision that might cause an oil spill, only 12 potential smaller oil spills than the estimated CWC size spill will occur. As well, the detailed 13 analysis shows that the probability for a collision causing an oil spill of any size is 1 in 19,286 14 years. By this measure, a CWC volume outflow (16,500 m3) would be a 1 in 190,286 year event.

60.7 Marine Oil Spill Scenario Locations 15 FER in evidence states that “Understanding and developing world class spill preparedness for a 16 worst case scenario off Oak Bay Islands will be needed” (Filing ID A4Q2T7). Trans Mountain 17 disagrees.

18 Spill modelling was carried out at several hypothetical locations between Westridge Marine 19 Terminal and Buoy J. AIS data of regional marine traffic was used to develop a picture of the 20 marine network of the study area. It was observed through that process that, within the 21 study area, there are a number of marine traffic network focal points where traffic lanes 22 meet, cross, or make sharp direction changes, therefore requiring heightened navigational 23 focus. As an oil spill from a tanker would necessarily be caused as a result of a collision or 24 grounding, each of the eight key network focal points was reviewed for possible risk of oil 25 spill due to accidents and five locations were selected for spill modelling, including one at 26 Westridge Marine Terminal.

27 It should be noted that the inclusion of Project tankers to the marine network only 28 marginally increases the probability of an oil spill in the region when compared with the 29 existing probability. Thus, current marine traffic patterns are valid for evaluating regions of 30 elevated collision probability.

31 The selection of scenarios for oil spill modelling considered information from the QRA 32 (TERMPOL 3.15, Table 18; Filing ID A3S5F6). Both probability and consequence of oil spill 33 were evaluated in order to arrive at a final list of locations for spill modelling. Some of the 34 considerations were as follows:

35 a) Likelihood of an oil spill occurring in any one of the route sections, and in consideration of 36 existing and future measures to reduce navigation issues, chances of grounding, etc.

37 b) Possible size of oil spill that could occur at the location as a result of an incident given the 38 types of vessels encountered at the location by the tanker, the speed of the vessels 39 involved, room available for the vessels to maneuver in order to reduce striking impact, etc.

40 c) Ability of the oil spill to spread over a large area.

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1 d) Extent to which oil could impact shorelines.

2 e) Biological values at risk from an oil spill at the location. For this purpose, a heat map was 3 developed that aggregated several biological attributes from government websites 4 (Figure 60-3).

5 f) Socio-economic values at risk from an oil spill at the location. A similar map as in item e. 6 was used for this purpose (Figure 60-3).

7 g) Ensure sufficient locations are selected to provide oil spill fate and behaviour information 8 that would be representative of all sections of the shipping route from Westridge Marine 9 Terminal to Buoy J.

10 h) Ability to use the results of spill modelling in determining future oil spill response needs.

11 Sites E, F, and G are in close alignment with areas of higher biological and socio-economic 12 attributes (see Figure 60-5); that is, these locations are in the midst of regions that are 13 characterized by many overlapping types of biological or socio-economic resources. Spills at 14 Site D have an opportunity to affect both the eastern side of the Gulf Islands as well as Roberts 15 and Sturgeon Banks. Initial oil spill modelling stochastic results showed that oil spills at other 16 sites would also impact areas with a number of biological and socio-economic attributes, thus 17 validating that the consequences of an oil spill were being adequately considered in the site 18 selection process.

19 Finally, oil spill simulations were carried out at the five selected locations: Westridge 20 Marine Terminal plus four locations along the tanker route (please refer to TERMPOL 3.15, 21 Figure 39; Filing ID A3S5F6). Location A (Westridge Marine Terminal) was modelled based 22 on an oil spill occurring during cargo transfer. As noted in Section 60.4, the credible oil spill 23 volume for Site A was determined by DNV as 103 m3, based upon a credible oil spill 24 scenario during cargo transfer whereby there is complete break of one of three loading 25 arms. For sites D, E, G, and H, credible oil spill volume was assumed as 16,500 m3 due to 26 a vessel grounding or collision.

27 Detailed information on the marine spill modelling is provided in Section 52. Trans 28 Mountain has also responded separately, and in detail, to specific third-party reports which 29 address this topic, listed in Section 60.12.

30 Locations B, C, and F were not modelled for the following reasons:

31 · Site B near the western entrance to English Bay was not modelled because of the very low 32 probability of a viable navigation incident at this location leading to a tanker oil spill, due to 33 the low speed of the tanker and other vessels while moving through this area.

34 · Site C in the Strait of Georgia near routes to and from the North Arm of the Fraser River was 35 not modelled because the traffic here is mainly barge traffic, and there is low probability of a 36 viable navigation incident given the available sea room to either evade or reduce impact. 37 Also, Site D (also in the Strait of Georgia) was deemed more appropriate and representative 38 of the Strait of Georgia.

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1 · Site F at the pilot boarding point off Victoria was not modelled because Site G was being 2 modelled due to higher environmental values at that location (Race Rocks). A spill modelled 3 at either of these locations would be representative.

4 Based on this selection of scenarios, the Preliminary Quantitative Ecological Risk 5 Assessment (Volume 8B, Filing ID A56022) was able to draw estimates of varying 6 consequences such as the resulting levels of shoreline oiling and recovery times for key 7 ecological components that were resolved both spatially (spill source location) and 8 temporally (seasonality). Because of the large area that a spill can cover, the credible site 9 selection process that was used caused the distinction between spills at one location 10 versus another to be largely obliterated. Analyses of spills at additional locations would not 11 significantly alter the findings of the Quantitative Ecological Risk Assessment. Evaluation of 12 potential effects at the less credible sites would not have changed assessment conclusions, or 13 identified the need for additional preparedness and response planning measures.

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1

2 Figure 60-3 Biological and Socioeconomic Heat Maps (Filing IDs A4H6F3 and A4H6F4)

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60.8 Tanker Incidents 1 Intervenors such as the City of Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7V8), Elizabeth May (Filing 2 ID A4L8Q9), and others listed in Section 60.1 have included examples of past shipping and 3 tanker incidents, regardless of clear evidence that tanker oil spill accidents have declined 4 sharply, primarily as a result of the advent of double hulls in tankers. That record is entirely 5 available on international databases. NS NOPE (Filing ID A4L5W1) pointed out that the Bunga 6 Kelana 3, a double hull tanker, did indeed suffer a collision with another vessel and an oil spill 7 did occur in the Singapore Straits, in an area that is deemed the busiest marine traffic route in 8 Asia. Trans Mountain and DNV believe that although a double hull on a tanker cannot entirely 9 safeguard against oil spills, using double hull tankers as well as applying all the current and 10 proposed extraordinary risk-reducing measures will ensure that a major oil spill will continue to 11 remain a low likelihood event in the study area. In the instance of the Bunga Kelana 3 incident, it 12 appears from website review that neither vessel had a pilot onboard.

13 City of Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7L2) and Elizabeth May (Filing ID A4L8Q9) are concerned 14 about possible underreporting of shipping incidents globally and inferred that the risk 15 assessment undertaken for TMEP was deficient as a result. Tran Mountain has previously 16 responded (Trans Mountain Response to May E IR No. 2.2l, Filing ID A4H8U6) that the primary 17 intent of the quantitative marine risk assessment is to evaluate the risk of oil spills from 18 Project-related tankers and the risk of such an oil spill becoming “uncontrolled” (TERMPOL 19 Procedure Guidelines). Volume 8A of the Facilities Application focused on CWC and smaller 20 spills consistent with guidelines issued by the NEB “Filing Requirements Related to the Potential 21 Environmental and Socio-Economic Effects of Increase Marine Shipping Activities, Trans 22 Mountain Expansion Project” dated September 10, 2013 (Filing ID A3V6I2). In her submission, 23 Elizabeth May (Filing ID A4L8Q9) takes issue with Trans Mountain having mentioned in its 24 response that “It is logical to suggest that underreporting of tanker incidents occurs primarily 25 when the incident could be classified as ‘not serious’.” It appears that the intervenor has not 26 understood the definition of “not serious” as it pertains to the IHS database and mentioned in 27 TERMPOL 3.8, Section 4.1 (Filing ID A3S4T1). In the IHS database, “Serious” is defined as a 28 breakdown resulting in the ship being towed or requiring assistance from ashore; flooding of any 29 compartment; or structural, mechanical, or electrical damage requiring repairs before the ship 30 can continue trading. In this context, serious incident does not result in total loss. “Not serious” 31 is defined as any event reported to IHS database and included in the database, not being 32 categorized as serious or total loss. Only a small fraction of reported incidents are also 33 associated with oil spills. Tanker incidents or spilling accidents of the type that the risk 34 assessment is meant to evaluate are by their very nature very public and so there is a very low 35 likelihood of such events going unreported. As it is, the review of past incidents has also 36 included a review of incidents from United States Coast Guard (USCG), TSB, and PPA.

37 Trans Mountain notes that the Joint Review Panel for the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project 38 reflected that “Risk assessments based solely on historical incident records provide poor insight 39 into future performance since incident records do not account for new technology and learnings 40 that occur from the incident investigations” (NEB 2013; Views of the Panel, page 80).

60.9 Vessel Traffic Risk Assessment 2010 (Van Dorp & Merrick 2014) 41 Makah Tribal Council (Filing ID A4Q2A4), WSDOE (Filing ID A4Q2D4), and FOE US (Filing 42 ID A4L9W4) have discussed results of the VTRA 2010 study and drawn conclusions related to 43 the TMEP/DNV study. The George Washington University (GWU) method, as well as DNV

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1 MARCS, have been peer-reviewed by the NAS. Similarly, both methods have been used in 2 previous risk assessments. While GWU has been used in a number of North American studies, 3 the MARCS model has been used in North America and globally.

4 While the GWU VTRA 2010 has focused on a smaller subset of the overall geographic scope 5 area of the DNV study area, it has also looked at oil spill risk of a number of focus vessels, 6 including tankers. At the same time, while the DNV study intended to determine both absolute 7 risk and relative risk change in order to understand the oil spill risk from the Project’s marine 8 transportation needs, VTRA 2010 started as a means to assess the change in risk levels due to 9 changes in traffic density and traffic patterns. The published GWU VTRA 2010 study does not 10 provide information on the absolute risk of oil spills in the VTRA 2010 study area. As such, both 11 methods are not wholly comparable.

12 About 27% of the Project tanker route is outside the VTRA 2010 study area. Several factors that 13 decrease the risk of oil spill in most of the Canadian portion of the TMEP route are not 14 accounted for in VTRA 2010, for example: lower traffic density; more restrictions of traffic that 15 improve safety (Segments 1 and 2) in terms of navigation; and lower energy of collision due to 16 co-flow traffic and cross-flow traffic. The VTRA takes some risk controls, but not as many as 17 those in the DNV study. In addition, VTRA applies risk controls to a category of ships and no 18 detailed study of the many risk controls has been made for the TMEP tankers.

19 Trans Mountain and DNV believe that both MARCS and VTRA give similar ranges of results 20 despite different assumptions and models, and that the differences in results are explainable 21 based on natural differences between the two models (e.g., the risk controls and the study 22 area). However, given the above weaknesses, Trans Mountain and DNV believe it is not 23 possible to compare results of the two studies; efforts to do so would be misleading.

24 FOE US (Filing ID A4L9W4) mention in their evidence (Filing ID A4L9W4) that “the Trans 25 Mountain project would result in a 12-fold increase in the volume of oil transiting the region by 26 ship.” According to the risk assessment conducted by WSP in 2014 as part of their work for 27 TSEP, the total amount of crude and refined oil moved through the region is approximately 28 53,000,000 m3 annually (see Tables 3.8 and 3.9 of the WSP 2014 report [WSP 2014]). TMEP, 29 operating at full designed capacity, would add approximately 550,000 bbls per day or about 30 32,000,000 m3 annually. Thus TMEP, if approved, is expected to lead to approximately a 61% 31 increase to cargo oil volume in the region and in the final analysis contribute to approximately 32 38% of all cargo oil moved in the area. Given this large discrepancy in basic cargo volumes 33 transported in the region in FOE US’s evidence, this evidence cannot be relied upon.

60.10 Human Error 34 The City of Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7V8) submitted evidence citing the contribution of human 35 error in shipping incidents and accidents. DNV included human error considerations in the risk 36 assessment. As part of its Letter of Comment (Filing IDs A4Q7T1, A4A7R4, and A4A7R5), the 37 PPA provides an excellent explanation of how pilots and escort tugs contribute to preventing 38 human error during navigation of commercial vessels in the local area. Trans Mountain provided 39 further details about how the regime mitigates risk of human error in the response to City of 40 Vancouver IR No. 2.8.1g (Filing ID A4H8I9). In addition, a Trans Mountain appointed Loading 41 Master oversees the entire cargo loading operation onboard the tanker. Trans Mountain is 42 confident that the risk assessment conducted for TMEP, which includes the ESA, properly and

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1 comprehensively evaluates potential environmental effects for the entire shipping route and 2 fulfills NEB requirements (Filing ID A3V6I2).

60.11 Sabotage 3 The City of Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7V8), Gunton et al (in a report submitted by the 4 Tsleil-Waututh Nation, Tsawout First Nation, and Upper Nicola Indian Band [refer to Table 60-9 5 for filing IDs]), and Matsqui First Nation (Filing ID A4L8J3, PDF page 193-4 and accompanying 6 Table 2) have suggested that sabotage, civil disobedience, terrorism attacks, or other forms of 7 illegal disruption or protest may or will escalate if the Application is approved. The intervenors 8 submit that such activities will impose additional risks to society, which should be considered as 9 part of any Project costing.

10 Trans Mountain assumes that the rule of law would apply and that legal behaviour prevails; 11 disruptions would be treated through normal policing and legal procedures. Moreover, Trans 12 Mountain believes that it is methodologically incorrect to consider such risks or impacts in 13 determining whether the Project is in the public interest. Such risks cannot and should not be 14 included in a determination of the public interest because it implies that anybody with the 15 resources to illegally stop a project would effectively have a way to veto any project simply by 16 employing such tactics.

60.12 Third-party Reports 17 A number of intervenors have either referred to or submitted third-party expert reports 18 (Table 60-9). Trans Mountain has reviewed these reports and a short review of items 1 through 19 6 is provided below results. In-depth discussion of items 1 through 6 is provided in separate 20 standalone reports.

21 Discussion of the reports included in items 7 through 10 is provided in this Sections 60.11.6 to 22 60.11.9.

23 TABLE 60-9 24 25 THIRD-PARTY REPORTS

Sr. Intervenor(s) Report Title Report Author(s) Filing ID 1 Living Oceans Society Fate and Effect of Oil Spills from the J. Short A4L9R7 Trans Mountain Expansion Project in the Gulf Islands, Strait of Juan de Fuca and the Fraser River, British Columbia (Short 1) 2 Tsleil-Waututh Nation, City Fate and effect of oil spills in Burrard J. Short A4L6A8 of Vancouver and Living Inlet and Fraser River Estuary Oceans Society (Short 2) 3 Tsawout First Nation, Upper An Assessment of Spill Risk for the T. Gunton, S. A4L6A6 Nicola Band and Trans Mountain Expansion Project Broadbent Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Gunton and Broadbent) 4 City of Vancouver, Air Quality Impacts from Simulated Levelton A4L7Y8 Tsleil-Waututh Nation, and Oil Spills in Burrard Inlet & English Consultants Ltd. Metro Vancouver Bay (Levelton) 26

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TABLE 60-9

THIRD-PARTY REPORTS (continued) Sr. Intervenor(s) Report Title Report Author(s) Filing ID 5 City of Vancouver Technical Analysis of Oil Spill Nuka Research A4L6A9 Response Capabilities and and Planning A4L6C0 Limitations for Kinder Morgan Trans Group, LLC A4L6C1 Mountain Expansion Project (Nuka) A4L6C2 A4L6C3 6 City of Vancouver Oil Spill Trajectory Modeling Report Genwest Systems A4L7Y7 in Burrard Inlet for the Trans Inc. Mountain Expansion Project (Genwest) 7 Cowichan Tribes Expert Opinion on Marine Transport The Glosten A4L9Z8 Risk Analysis (Glosten) Associates (E. Kirtley) 8 Cowichan Tribes A Technical Evaluation of Project EnviroEmerg A4Q1L5 Application Related to Marine Consulting A4Q1L6 Transportation Submitted to the (Stafford Reid) A4Q1L7 National Energy Board for the A4Q1L8 Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion A4Q1L9 Project (EnviroEmerg) A4Q1Q0 A4Q1Q1 A4Q1U2 A4Q1U3 A4Q1U4 A4Q1U5 A4Q1U6 A4Q1U7 A4Q1X0 A4Q1X1 A4Q1X2 A4Q1X4 A4Q1X5 A4Q1X8 A4Q1Y3 A4Q1Y4 A4Q1Y6 A4Q1Z0 A4Q1Z3 A4Q1Z4 9 City of Vancouver Written Direct Evidence of David D. Etkin A4L7Y0 Etkin (Etkin) 10 North Shore NOPE Review of “TERMPOL 3.15: General K. Edmonds A4L9Q7 Risk Analysis and Intended Methods of Reducing Risks” (Edmonds) 1

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60.12.1 Short Reports 1 Dr. Jeffrey Short prepared two documents including commentary on the ecological risk 2 assessment(s) conducted in support of the Trans Mountain Project. These are:

3 · Report #1: Fate and Effect of Oil Spills from the Trans Mountain Expansion 4 Project in Burrard Inlet and the Fraser River (prepared for the Tsleil-Waututh 5 Nation, City of Vancouver and Living Oceans Society); Exhibit number 6 C214-18-2; Filing ID A4L9R7; and,

7 · Report #2: Fate and Effect of Oil Spills from the Trans Mountain Expansion 8 Project in the Gulf Islands, Strait of Juan de Fuca and the Fraser River, British 9 Columbia (prepared for Living Oceans Society); Exhibit number C214-18-3; 10 Filing ID A4L9R8.

11 The two documents prepared by Dr. Short both speak to essentially the same key concerns, 12 and as such, Trans Mountain’s responses to both reports have been combined in this reply.

13 Dr. Short’s critical comments appear to be based on only a partial reading of the evidence 14 submitted by Trans Mountain (i.e., a single document, Technical Report 8B-7, the Ecological 15 Risk Assessment of Marine Transportation Spills [Filing IDs A3S4K7 through A3S4R0]).

16 Trans Mountain does not agree with the conclusions of Dr. Short’s reports because Dr. Short’s 17 opinions of the range of effects potentially associated with such spills consistently lean towards 18 the worst imaginable case without limitation or qualification as to likelihood of occurrence, or the 19 spatial extent over which such worst possible conditions might occur. At the same time, there is 20 no allowance made for spill response, especially given the enhanced oil spill response regime 21 proposed in the Application.

22 Trans Mountain submits that, while the raw information presented by Dr. Short is generally 23 factual, the absence of any objective discussion of likelihood negates the credibility and 24 usefulness of all of the above evidence. The consequences estimated in these reports are 25 purely speculative. Essentially, it removes any potential benchmark for determining whether the 26 risks associated with an event can be credibly linked to the activities contemplated in the 27 Application. This leaves the intervenor with an open field to hand-select high-consequence 28 improbable or impossible scenarios that are not relevant to the Application and describe those 29 as risks of the Project.

30 More details can be found in Attachment 1.09, the reply to two reports regarding fate and effects 31 of oil spills submitted by the City of Vancouver, Tsleil-Waututh Nation and Living Oceans 32 Society.

60.12.2 Gunton and Broadbent 33 Trans Mountain does not agree with conclusions provided in the Gunton and Broadbent report 34 (paragraph 6, page I; paragraph 18, page vii; paragraph 19, pages viii-ix) that the assessment of 35 accidents and malfunctions provided in the Facilities Application does not comply with 36 environmental assessment and risk assessment standards of practice or legal requirements. 37 Regarding the marine risk assessment conducted by the report authors, Trans Mountain takes 38 exception to several aspects of the report.

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1 This report either discounts or chooses to ignore the various updates and refinements provided 2 to the public domain resulting from the extensive public hearing process undertaken through the 3 NEB review process. Similar to their review of Enbridge’s Northern Gateway Pipeline Project, 4 the authors use a table of “international risk assessment best practices” to rate Trans 5 Mountain’s methodology and summarily rank it as ‘very poor’ and ‘not met’ in all categories. The 6 authors suggest that the categories are risk assessment best practices; however, there is no 7 verification provided that the list is indeed considered as best practice by the risk assessment 8 community. At the same time, although the authors mention the evaluation criterion under CEA 9 Act, 2012, the ranking list appears to focus more on introducing what the authors believe is 10 social acceptance of risk and a proposed benefit cost analysis approach for major projects in 11 Canada.

12 No attempt has been made to gather independent data and carry out a structured and well 13 thought-out risk assessment as has been done by DNV for TMEP, or by WSP for the 14 Government of Canada. In fact, no attempt was made to even compare the DNV results with 15 those in WSP 2014. If a comparison was made, as discussed in the standalone response, it 16 would have shown that their criticism of DNV and TMEP had no merit and that in fact the risk 17 results are not only similar and comparable, they also highlight the very conservative manner in 18 which the risk assumptions have been set and applied. This is a major gap in Gunton and 19 Broadbent’s work.

20 More details can be found in Attachment 1.07, Reply to An Assessment of Oil Spills Risks for 21 the Trans Mountain Expansion Project.

60.12.3 Levelton 22 The spills Levelton modelled were assumed to occur in Burrard Inlet (English Bay, First 23 Narrows, Second Narrows, and Westridge Marine Terminal) and to result in the instantaneous 24 loss of containment of the entire contents of either one tank (8,000 m3) for Westridge, or two 25 tanks (16,000 m3) for the other three sites. Levelton used CALPUFF, an air dispersion model 26 approved by the BC Ministry of Environment, as well as oil spill simulations conducted by 27 Genwest using the GNOME trajectory and OilWx weathering models. Although several 28 hydrocarbon components were modelled, the CALPUFF output was presented in terms of 29 maximum airborne benzene concentration since benzene has the greatest ratio of emission rate 30 to acute inhalation exposure limit (580 µg/m3, or 0.58 mg/m3).

31 The intervenor evidence is a set of hand-selected high-consequence improbable or impossible 32 scenarios that are not relevant to the Application. Again, the approach has been to highlight the 33 consequence of tanker spills but do so without considering the likelihood of such an accident 34 occurring. In addition, a number of errors have been identified in the Levelton report, the most 35 significant of which are:

36 1. The oil spill volumes modelled were much larger than what is viable or credible in the 37 selected locations.

38 2. Levelton overstates the amount of benzene available for evaporation by a factor of 5.4 39 compared to the reference for benzene described in the report and the online 40 crudemonitor.ca database.

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1 3. Approximately 84% of the simulations are not realistic since they do not adhere to the 2 day-time departure rule for laden ships leaving the Westridge Marine Terminal, and 3 consequently, this further overstates benzene concentrations in the air as dispersion is 4 occurring under night-time meteorological conditions. Night time conditions, with lower winds 5 and a lower mixing height, favour higher airborne concentrations of evaporated volatiles.

6 4. Based on various factors identified above, it is clear that Levelton significantly 7 over-estimated higher airborne concentrations of evaporated volatiles, by two orders of 8 magnitude.

9 5. In addition to the calculation errors describe above, the figures shown in Levelton grossly 10 overstate the potential air emissions risk of any specific oil spill by presenting multiple spills 11 at once.

12 More details can be found in Attachment 1.13, Reply to Air Quality Impacts from Simulated Oil 13 Spills in Burrard Inlet and English Bay.

60.12.4 Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC 14 The Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC (Nuka) report is presented in three sections:

15 1. the impact of environmental conditions on marine oil spill response at five locations in the 16 study area

17 2. an assessment of total capacity for mechanical recovery of major marine oil spills at 18 scenario locations in coastal Southern BC

19 3. response measures in case of a low likelihood event such as a pipeline rupture on the 20 Lower Fraser River between the Port Mann Bridge and the mouth

21 Trans Mountain does not agree with substantial portions of the Nuka report because Nuka’s 22 authors have chosen to overlook the Project’s commitment to a systematic approach to tanker 23 and pipeline safety and spill preparedness. Rather, the authors have decided to draw their 24 conclusions using improbable scenarios solely based on computer analysis that is clearly 25 flawed. As such, the Nuka report cannot be considered a credible assessment of the Project’s 26 “Oil Spill Response Capabilities.”

27 This is apparent from the Nuka Report for the following reasons:

28 1. Unlike the evidence presented, Trans Mountain has applied a systematic approach to tanker 29 safety and spill preparedness. Separately analyzing each component as a standalone 30 measure ignores the benefit and integrity of the combined system and appears to be written 31 to present it with an unfavourable bias.

32 2. The Nuka report has not presented credible oil spill scenarios that have been developed 33 with proper assessment of likelihood.

34 3. The analysis uses sub-optimal weather and oceanographic data and inaccurate 35 interpretation of data.

36 4. Nuka does not objectively consider the proposed enhanced oil spill response regime.

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1 Analysis of the quality of work carried out by Nuka has revealed that the Nuka methodology 2 lacks diligence (regarding the number, type, and use of data sources; methodological 3 definitions; and knowledge of up-to-date recovery techniques) and that has led to errors 4 (regarding the processing and interpretation of wave and visibility data) and omissions 5 (regarding the gap in the response limit specification) in the analysis.

6 For marine response, after correcting these errors and omissions the resulting information is 7 comparable to that presented by Trans Mountain in response to NEB IR No. 1.65 (Filing 8 ID A3W9H8). This means that, on an annual basis, on-water response can be carried out for 9 between 78% (TMEP presented results) and 72% (reanalyzed Nuka data) of the time at Neah 10 Bay.

11 Finally, in the Nuka report’s Assumptions and Limitations section (Section 4.2.6, Filing 12 ID A4L6C2), it indicates all of the assumptions that make the analysis in the report appear 13 optimistic, but fails to recognize the assumptions that make the analysis overly conservative 14 such as the pipeline design, construction, and maintenance methods that make a pipeline leak 15 into the Fraser River a low likelihood event. Furthermore, there is no consideration of early 16 detection of a leak with action taken by the control centre, low flow releases, a low or null flow in 17 the river due to tidal conditions, faster transport times for equipment to reach the affected 18 locations, etc.

19 Given the lack of a credible assessment of likelihood and the various errors and omissions 20 found in it, the evidence as presented is flawed and cannot be relied upon.

21 More details can be found in Attachment, 1.10, Reply to Technical Analysis of Oil Spill 22 Response Capabilities and Limitations for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project.

60.12.5 Genwest 23 The modelling method used in the Genwest Report presents major shortcomings, which are 24 primarily due to the choice of the models and environmental data. The model used by Genwest 25 is a recognized model for quickly providing basic information on spill movement on-the-fly, and 26 was not used in a manner consistent with a detailed desktop study. As a result, wind inputs are 27 overly simplified; oil weathering is non-existent; and shore retention and oil re-floatation are 28 conservative in a direction focused on on-water response rather than carefully defining potential 29 effects. The model is suitable for generating a conservative map of oil on water to first 30 responders when information on the oil type is not yet available. However, the study of 31 hypothetical spills for the purpose of a regulatory process involving a detailed and 32 comprehensive environmental and socio-economic study is of a different nature. The model 33 presented in the evidence was not designed to support a detailed spill study with stochastic and 34 deterministic modelling, as used to inform an ESA of the type carried out for TMEP. Trans 35 Mountain believes that the spill modelling that was conducted for the TMEP and presented in 36 the Application is wholly appropriate.

37 Genwest has stated that the beaching algorithm is a major flaw of the Application. However, the 38 very thorough approach to oil-shoreline interaction in the Application uses the BC Government 39 Shoreline database, which contains shore type, and specific studies of oil retention by various 40 shore types for dilbit. All aspects of shore retention are described in a detailed report of the 41 Application (Appendix C in Volume 8C, Technical Report TR 8C 12 Supplemental TR S9; Filing

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1 IDs A3S5I0 and A3S5I1). On the other hand, Genwest proposes an alternative approach, much 2 more simplistic and with no rationale presented regarding the selection of the parameters.

3 More details can be found in Attachment 1.08, Reply to Oil Spill Trajectory Modeling Report in 4 Burrard Inlet for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project.

60.12.6 Glosten Associates 5 Although Glosten Associates (Glosten) initially found no “apparent weaknesses or flaws” in the 6 work carried out by DNV (Filing ID A4L9Z8) a second review was carried out. This second 7 review focused on the limitations and assumptions of DNV’s work. Again, Glosten found that the 8 “fault tree method is sound and follows industry accepted practice.” However, in their second 9 review the authors listed a number of issues that have all been addressed in evidence or 10 responded to through several rounds of IRs. The specific issues are addressed below:

11 · Glosten states that: “DNV’s quantitative risk assessment for the Project elects to discard or 12 ignore the local data available.”

13 - Response: in this respect, reliable local data was taken into account such as local traffic, 14 wind, visibility, shoreline type, risk-reducing measures, etc. However, knowing the local 15 incident history does not give a reliable incident rate.

16 · Glosten is critical of the use of assumptions and adjustments in the work carried out by 17 DNV.

18 - Response: The use of assumptions and adjustments is common in risk assessments 19 where the level of sophistication cannot be supported by historical data-derived methods 20 alone. Thus, the choice is either to use very approximate data based on historical 21 incident frequencies (which will not fully represent the risk controls to be applied) or to 22 use assumptions and adjustments. It is worth mentioning that the TSEP (in A Review of 23 Canada’s Ship-source Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Regime - Setting the 24 Course for the Future; Tanker Safety Panel Secretariat 2013) notes on page 10 that it 25 too had to apply certain assumptions and adjustments and “use international spill rates 26 to calculate the probability of medium and large-scale spills. If only historical spill data 27 from Canada had been used, the probability of a spill over 1,000 tonnes would have 28 been zero as Canada has not experienced any spills over this volume in the last ten 29 years. Similarly, there would also be zero probability for crude spills of any size as 30 Canada has had no major crude spills in the timeframe examined.” Clearly a risk 31 analysis with zero probability result would not be deemed adequate or wholly credible.

32 · Glosten makes a valid point in that the rescue tug based at Neah Bay has not been included 33 in the risk assessment.

34 - Response: Trans Mountain and DNV decided during its risk assessment that having an 35 escort tug with the tanker would ensure that tug support was 100% available with the 36 vessel during her entire laden passage through Canadian territorial seas. However, as 37 an additional benefit to all vessels, the escort tug will also increase the availability of tugs 38 of opportunity in the region. It may be inferred that inclusion of the Neah Bay tug would 39 further reduce the risk from levels provided by the escort tugs.

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1 · Glosten points out that DNV did not explore options in traffic routing in the study area such 2 as implementing a “one-way traffic loop.”

3 - Response: The waterway is jointly managed by Canada and USA. Trans Mountain 4 tankers will follow current and future direction from the Cooperative Vessel Traffic 5 Service. Trans Mountain and DNV have not reviewed alternate routing strategies and 6 does not deem that as a short coming in the study. The QRA results clearly show that 7 cargo oil spill risk is highly mitigated under the current established routing mechanism by 8 applying the extraordinary risk-reducing measures committed to by Trans Mountain.

60.12.7 EnviroEmerg 9 Stafford Reid, author of the EnviroEmerg report, has listed a number of issues, which, if 10 addressed effectively, would, in his opinion, help improve the conduct of safe transportation of 11 heavy crude oils on Project tankers. Trans Mountain appreciates the contribution of the author. 12 These issues were all considered during the comprehensive risk assessment process and, 13 applying a risk-based approach, Trans Mountain has addressed each of those that can be 14 credibly linked to the activities contemplated in the Application using a risk-based 15 decision-making process. In doing so, Trans Mountain has remained focused on prevention, 16 preparedness, and response. The extraordinary risk-reducing measures proposed by the 17 Project will ensure that cargo oil spill risk in the region will remain comparable to current levels. 18 All items in the report have been suitably addressed in the Application as well as during several 19 rounds of IR responses with the Cowichan Tribes (Filing IDs A3Y2I8 and A4H8L1).

60.12.8 Etkin 20 David Etkin (Associate Professor of Disaster and Emergency management at York University) 21 was retained by the City of Vancouver to provide his “opinion on whether the exclusion of 22 Segment 2 and Segment 3 from the risk assessment was reasonable” (page 2 Line 14). Trans 23 Mountain emphasizes that the entire shipping route was assessed for marine navigation and oil 24 spill risk; Segment 2 and Segment 3 are included in the risk assessment submitted with the 25 Application. The City of Vancouver has therefore provided Mr. Etkin with incorrect information 26 on which to base his assessment.

27 Etkin indicates that because oil spills ranked by size from 1967 to 2014 can be distributed so as 28 to appear to follow a power law distribution, the rare and very large spills represent a greater 29 proportion of the overall risk and therefore should be included in the risk analysis (page 6, 30 Line 21), or that spill modelling must use very large estimates of spill volumes. It is impossible to 31 tie these large historical oil spills either conceptually or analytically to the risks or costs 32 associated with Project-related spills in the region.

33 Trans Mountain and DNV do not agree with Etkin’s observation that because “rare, very large 34 spills have happened historically” in a global context under much different conditions, such 35 types of spills should be modelled in the LSA as part of the TMEP risk assessment. In fact, 36 there are sufficient contradictions in Etkin’s work to conclude that the assumptions are selected 37 without defensible rationales except that they serve to increase the range of possible spills 38 sizes, without any manner of likelihood assessment into what is credible and not.

39 Etkin carries out various theoretical considerations in order to force a comparison between oil 40 spill risk from a tanker in the LSA with that of risk from global natural hazards such as 41 earthquakes and weather disasters. Trans Mountain and DNV do not view such comparisons as

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1 relevant risk assessment techniques when assessing marine oil spill risk in the local area. In 2 conclusion, there is no logical flaw in the risk assessment methodology applied by Trans 3 Mountain and DNV.

4 More details can be found in Annex 2 below (Section 60.18).

60.12.9 Edmonds 5 Dr. Edmonds was engaged to review and critique DNV’s risk assessment model, MARCS. None 6 of Dr. Edmonds criticism is valid and Trans Mountain does not agree with conclusions in the 7 Edmonds report. Detailed response to all of Dr. Edmonds’ criticism has been provided in 8 Annex 1 below (Section 60.17).

9 DNV has executed many marine risk assessments globally and on the Pacific coast of North 10 America. Publicly available links to relevant project reports and reviews of DNV’s work, including 11 the 2010 peer review of the AIRA and the 1998 review of the Prince William Sound Risk 12 Assessment, were provided in Tsawout FN IR No.1.30n – Attachment 1 and Attachment 2 13 (Filing IDs A3Y3U3 and A3Y3U4, respectively). Further, Trans Mountain’s responses to the 14 following IRs provide detail on the application of the MARCS model for the Project, including 15 description of updates to the MARCS model which have resolved previously documented 16 weaknesses:

17 · Tsawout FN IR No.1.30 (Filing ID A3Y3T9);

18 · Tsawout FN IR No. 2.09 (Filing ID A4H9H1); and,

19 · Tsawwassen FN IR No. 2.5 (Filing ID A4H9H9).

20 Trans Mountain and DNV are confident of the predictive value and reliability of the MARCS 21 model. The TMEP QRA report is absolutely capable of and should be used to assess the risk of 22 an oil spill pertaining to marine transportation of oil as part of TMEP.

60.13 General Recommendations by Intervenors 23 Intervenors such as Environment Canada (Filing ID A4L8Y6), Georgia Straight Alliance (Filing 24 ID A4Q1K1), Makah Tribal Council (Filing ID A4Q2A4), and FER (Filing ID A4Q2T7) filed 25 evidence highlighting regional issues and seeking a variety of further commitments by Trans 26 Mountain, including recommendations on mitigating impacts outside of Canada. The issues 27 called to attention by these intervenors are a result of the region’s diverse activities and are not 28 specific to the Project. Trans Mountain has made marine safety commitments on record that will 29 protect the region from oil spill accidents during the transit or loading of Project tankers. Specific 30 to marine transportation, these commitments closely follow the recommendations and findings 31 of the TRC and details can be found in the TERMPOL Review Process Report on the Trans 32 Mountain Expansion Project (Filing ID A4F8Z4), as well as in Trans Mountain’s Response to 33 NEB IRs dated December 17, 2014 (Filing ID A4G3U4). The TMEP marine risk assessment 34 shows that implementing the additional risk-reducing measures as well as the proposed oil spill 35 response regime shall have a positive effect on the overall prevention, preparedness, and 36 response regime across the entire region, including beyond Canada. A major cargo oil spill will 37 remain a low likelihood event for the study area with similar level of oil spill risk as today.

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1 In Trans Mountain’s opinion, the additional efforts suggested by intervenors would be better 2 addressed through joint arrangements and actions by the region’s industry, governments, 3 regulators, ports, and other stakeholders and not as commitments by Trans Mountain alone as 4 part of hearings for a single project. It should be noted that Trans Mountain traffic currently 5 constitutes 1.1% of large vessels trading in the study area. Subject to TMEP reaching full 6 operational status, this percentage will increase to 6.6%, still only constituting a small portion of 7 commercial vessel traffic in the study area.

8 Trans Mountain is supportive of national and regional collaborative efforts aimed at continual 9 improvements that will help enhance marine safety and encourage environmental improvement 10 initiatives. For example, the Ministry of Transportation, along with marine shipping experts, 11 non-government organizations, and other officials, recently announced the launch of Canada’s 12 first independent research organization to examine marine shipping in Canada, Clear Seas 13 Centre for Responsible Marine Shipping. Based in Vancouver, Clear Seas is an independent, 14 not-for-profit organization that will provide impartial and evidence-based research to inform the 15 public and policy makers about marine traffic in Canadian waters, including risks, mitigation 16 measures, and best practices worldwide for safe and sustainable marine shipping. It is funded 17 by grants from the federal and provincial governments, and industry.

18 Trans Mountain’s response to PIPEUP Network TERMPOL IR II.bv b) (Filing ID A4J7T7) lists 19 past examples of Trans Mountain’s cooperative marine safety endeavours, which include:

20 · participation in PMV’s review of the Movement Restriction Area (2004-2010);

21 · contribution for expert review of escort techniques (2007);

22 · contribution and logistics for live trial of escort techniques (2007);

23 · contribution for improved pilotage equipment (PPUs) (2009);

24 · support for joint Pilot and Tug Master training (2009);

25 · support for improved Navigational Aids (2010);

26 · contribution for BCIT Marine Simulator Upgrade (2011); and,

27 · participation in the Chamber of Shipping Navigation & Pilotage Committee.

28 In addition, Trans Mountain facilitates provision of the Bulk Oil Cargo Fee (BOCF) that provides 29 90% of funding to WCMRC. As well, Trans Mountain is contributing funds to the ECHO 30 Program. A special BOCF for TMEP has been approved by the NEB and has been implemented 31 in order to provide the additional funding necessary to commence buildup of the proposed future 32 oil spill response regime described in Volume 8A, Section 5.5.2, Table 5.5.3 (Filing ID A3S4Y6).

60.14 Oil Cargo Fate and Behaviour 33 In her filed evidence, Elizabeth May (Filing ID A4L8Q9) voiced concerns about the properties of 34 dilbit, and highlighted perceived risk of the product separating into bitumen and condensate, in 35 case of a marine oil spill, and sinking. Trans Mountain has carried out meso-scale tests 36 (Gainford Study, Filing ID A3S5G2) as well as desktop research to confirm that dilbit is a single 37 phase product that floats on water, which allows oil spill responders to act in a timely fashion to

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1 carry out on-water response using conventional oil spill response equipment. Further 2 information is provided in Section 25.

60.15 Oil Spill Response 3 This topic is dealt with in Section 63.

60.16 Liability and Compensation 4 Information on liability and compensation in case of a ship-source oil spill has been provided in 5 Section 61. The compensation process for damages from tankers caused by fire or explosion is 6 part of the vessel insurance. Details of the effect of the future ratification of the Hazardous and 7 Noxious Substances (HNS) Convention, and the appropriate section of Safeguarding Canada's 8 Seas and Skies Act related to HNS can be found in Trans Mountain response to the City of 9 Vancouver IR No. 2.12.1a (Filing ID A4H8I9). 10

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60.17 Annex 1: Response to NS NOPE (K. Edmonds) 1 The following is Tran Mountain’s Response to evidence submitted by NS NOPE: Review of 2 “TERMPOL 3.15: General Risk Analysis and Intended Methods of Reducing Risks,” by Dr. K. 3 Edmonds (Filing ID A4L9Q7). 60.17.1 DNV MARCS Model: Previous Applications, Validation and Peer Review (Article 1) 4 DNV has executed many marine risk assessments globally and on the Pacific coast of North 5 America. Publicly available links to relevant project reports and reviews of DNV’s work, including 6 the 2010 peer review of the AIRA and the 1998 review of the Prince William Sound Risk 7 Assessment, were provided in Tsawout FN IR No.1.30n – Attachment 1 and Attachment 2 8 (Filing IDs A3Y3U3 and A3Y3U4, respectively). Further, Trans Mountain’s responses to the 9 following IRs provide detail on the application of the MARCS model for the Project, including 10 description of updates to the MARCS model which have resolved previously documented 11 weaknesses:

12 · Tsawout FN IR No.1.30 (Filing ID A3Y3T9);

13 · Tsawout FN IR No. 2.09 (Filing ID A4H9H1); and,

14 · Tsawwassen FN IR. No. 2.5 (Filing ID A4H9H9).

60.17.2 MARCS - Quantitative vs. Qualitative Application (Article 1.1, 2nd para.) 15 Based upon the conditions and quality of information available to those who worked on the 16 AIRA Phase A report, MARCS was indeed used as a “semi-quantitative risk assessment” tool. A 17 tool can be used to both make approximate measurements and accurate measurements, 18 depending on how it is used. Using a tool to make approximate estimates does not invalidate 19 the suitability of the tool to make accurate measurements. In the current work for TMEP, 20 MARCS has been used to make accurate measurements. 60.17.3 Spill Model and Accident Severity (Article 1.1, 2nd para.) 21 DNV agrees that MARCS is capable of applying different probabilistic spill models to different 22 accident severities. The data to drive such a calculation can be produced for specified locations. 23 For example, DNV made a more detailed assessment of the relationship between collision risk 24 and breakage of the cargo tank for Segment 2 (Vancouver Harbour area). The collision risk in 25 Segment 2 was based on the energy levels of vessel traffic in the area. Please refer to Trans 26 Mountain’s response to PMV IR No.1.8 (Filing ID A3X6V4) for further detail. 60.17.4 Use of AIS Transponders (Article 1.1, 4th para) 27 It is true that not all ships carried AIS transponders at the time of the AIRA study; however, such 28 is not the case in 2012 when the TMEP work was being conducted. At this time, all significantly 29 sized ships relative to the TMEP tankers are required to carry AIS transponders. Any vessel 30 with non-operational AIS would be required to report this to CCG MCTS prior to the vessel 31 entering Canadian waters.

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60.17.5 Seasonal Variation (Article 1.1, 5th para.) 1 Distributions of meteorological data were used in representative categories. The modelling 2 techniques used were appropriate. Meteorological and oceanographic information used in the 3 model was based on information provided in Technical Report TR 8C 10 Supplemental TR S02, 4 Volume 8C, Meteorological and Oceanographic Data (Filing ID A3S4U6). 60.17.6 Ship Speed (Article 1.1, 6th para.) 5 Ship speed for each ship type in each sea area and ship speed variation is an input to the 6 model. Please refer to Trans Mountain’s response to Tsawwassen FN IR No. 2.5A (Filing ID 7 A4H9H9) for detail on the updated MARCS approach used for TMEP work. 60.17.7 Collision Risk and Vessel Traffic Density (Article 1.1, 7th para.) 8 DNV believes that it is entirely reasonable that pilots and ships’ crews will take more care in 9 areas where hazards are common, such as densely trafficked sea areas. In DNV’s opinion this 10 leads to over-prediction of the risk for such areas, which Dr. Edmonds (NS NOPE) accepts 11 when stating that “over prediction of risk is not a concern.” 60.17.8 MARCS Model Methodology - General (Article 1.1, 8th para.) 12 The resolution of space used in the MARCS model for the TMEP study was about 1/8 NM and 13 was appropriate for the area being evaluated. 60.17.9 MARCS - Uncertainty (Article 1.1, Final para). 14 It is agreed that the risk values contain uncertainties and possibly some bias towards higher 15 risks. Conservative assumptions are used where a choice exists. However, the data and 16 methods used are appropriate to support the conclusions drawn. It is not possible for anyone to 17 precisely predict the actual risk for a future operation. An illustration of the conservative nature 18 of the marine risk assessment is provided in response to Article 4 evidence. 60.17.10 MARCS - Updates to Model (Article 1.2) 19 The methods and data used by MARCS were comprehensively revised under the Safety of 20 Shipping in Coastal Waters (SAFECO I and SAFECO II) programme. All reference to the peer 21 review following the Prince William Sound project performed between 1995 and 1997 is no 22 longer relevant. The improvements have been described in various responses during earlier IR 23 rounds (please refer to Tsawout FN IR No.1.30 [Filing ID A3Y3T9]; Tsawout FN IR No. 2.09 24 [Filing ID A4H9H1]; and Tsawwassen FN IR. No. 2.5 [Filing ID A4H9H9]). 60.17.11 Peer Review of MARCS Model (Article 1.3) 25 Dr. Edmonds (NS NOPE) states that “each new risk study requires a new review of the MARCS 26 model specific to each region,” which is entirely inaccurate. The MARCS model itself has been 27 proven successful and used in many global jurisdictions. The model for the region used for 28 TMEP has been appropriately set up and tuned to the local tanker shipping route, including 29 navigational hazards, local traffic patterns, existing and future risk-reducing measures, and 30 other local conditions.

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60.17.12 TERMPOL Review Committee Report (Article 2) 1 The TRC’s report on TMEP has been published (Filing ID A4F8Z4). Trans Mountain has 2 accepted all recommendations and findings and committed to enact those under its control 3 (Filing ID A4G3U5).

60.17.13 MARCS - Model Outcomes and Estimates of Precision (Article 3) 4 Predictions or forecasts are often quoted without error ranges (e.g., economic growth, weather 5 forecasts). This does not eliminate the value or utility of such forecasts. Trans Mountain is 6 confident that the evaluation of potential environmental effects applying this methodology fulfills 7 NEB requirements (Filing ID A3V6I2) and describes the range of environmental effects that 8 could result from an oil spill along the marine shipping route. The assertion made in Article 3 of 9 Dr. Edmond’s evidence for NS NOPE is therefore rejected. The MARCS results, without error or 10 uncertainty ranges, are appropriate to support the conclusions drawn. Please refer to Trans 11 Mountain’s response to Tsawwassen FN IR No. 2.5Bi for further detail (Filing ID A4H9H9). 12 Evaluation and assessment conclusions of potential environmental effects have identified the 13 need for additional measures that reduce navigation risk as well as preparedness and response 14 planning measures, which have been proposed as part of the enhanced oil spill response 15 regime (Volume 8A, Table 5.5.3; Filing ID A3S4Y6). 60.17.14 MARCS - Analysis of Results (Article 4) 16 In refining the oil spill probability calculations, DNV has estimated the average accident rate of 17 one accident with cargo spill in 284 years (assuming TMEP is operational and all proposed risk 18 reduction options are implemented). Oil spills of this nature are low likelihood and the risk 19 assessment cannot predict when this accident might occur.

20 Dr. Edmonds (NS NOPE) assumes a Poisson distribution to try to represent and quantify this 21 uncertainty. The analysis appears appropriate. Based upon calculations by DNV, there is a 22 3.5% chance of a spill of any size within the next 10 years using NewCase 1c results (refer to 23 Table 60-10 below).

24 TABLE 60-10 25 26 OIL SPILL ACCIDENT RATE (PROBABILITY % IN 10 YEARS)

Scenario MARCS Risk Rate Probability % in 10 years Any size TMEP Tanker Spill (in transit) with 1 incident in 284 years 3.5% current risk controls A TMEP CWC oil spill (in transit) with 1 incident in 2,841 years 0.4% current risk controls TMEP Terminal spill of <10 m3 1 incident in 34 years 25.8% TMEP CWC oil spill at Terminal (103 m3) 1 incident in 234 years 4.2%

27 Trans Mountain stresses that there are no proposed or widely accepted risk acceptance criteria 28 for marine oil spills. If criteria were defined, the proposed operations could be either acceptable 29 or not acceptable. The quantitative marine risk assessment shows a substantial reduction of 30 risks, on a risk per cargo transported basis. This was achieved by adopting an informal risk 31 acceptance criterion for marine oil spills of “minimum increase of risk compared to present day 32 operations.”

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1 To further illustrate that the DNV analysis is conservative (it over-predicts the absolute risk of 2 cargo oil spill) the NewCase 0 results for the current operations using a 60 year period are 3 presented below (Table 60-11). When reviewing this information it is important to keep in mind 4 that the preventive measures have advanced greatly over the past 60 years and as such the 5 probability of occurrence would actually have been higher in the past than that estimated using 6 current preventive measures. As is well known and recorded, there have not been any 7 Westridge Marine Terminal tanker spills in transit, and since records are available the total 8 volume of oil spilled in two minor cargo transfer operations related incidents is only 0.085 m3; 9 the last incident having occurred in 1998 (see Application Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.15, Section 10 10.3; Filing ID A3S5F6). As such, the below information is only shared as a means to provide 11 perspective on the conservative nature of the marine risk assessment undertaken for TMEP.

12 TABLE 60-11 13 14 OIL SPILL ACCIDENT RATE (PROBABILITY % IN 60 YEARS)

Scenario MARCS Risk Rate Probability % in 60 years Any TM Tanker Spill (in transit) with 1 incident in 613 years 9.3% existing risk controls A TM Tanker CWC oil spill (in transit) with 1 incident in 6,130 years 1.0% existing risk controls Westridge spill of <10 m3 1 incident in 234 years 22.7% Westridge CWC oil spill (Terminal) (103 3 1 incident in 1,655 years 3.6% m )

60.17.15 Review and Validation of MARCS Model (Author Comment and Summary) 15 While stating that “the MARCS model appears to be out of date” in referring to MARCS results, 16 Dr. Edmonds comments that “this does not imply the risk values given are incorrect.” Based 17 upon review of a number of risk reviews conducted globally using MARCS (referenced in 18 Tsawout FN IR No.1.30n Attachment 2; Filing ID A3Y3U4), Trans Mountain and DNV are 19 confident of the predictive value and reliability of the MARCS model. The DNV risk assessment 20 reported is absolutely capable of and should be used to assess the risk of an oil spill pertaining 21 to marine transportation of oil as part of TMEP.

22 Dr. Edmonds (NS NOPE) also comments on specific elements of Burrard Inlet such as the 23 bridges. MARCS does address the safe movement of ships through the entire Burrard Inlet and 24 takes into account the specific risk-reducing measures in place for all vessels, including tankers, 25 to safely navigate the Second and First Narrows. These risk-reducing measures include the 26 special restrictions imposed by PMV as part of the Marine Restricted Area rules. MARCS also 27 accounts for movements of the TransLink Seabus, via incorporation of AIS data, and takes into 28 account the conditions imposed on all harbour traffic when other vessels (including tankers) are 29 intending to transit eastbound or westbound through the Marine Restricted Area. Trans 30 Mountain met with TransLink before completing the risk assessment and remains assured that, 31 given the conditions of vessel movement in the harbour and adherence to ColRegs, the Seabus 32 service and Project tankers do not pose concerns for each other.

33

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60.18 Annex 2: Response to City of Vancouver (Appendix 22: Written Evidence of David Etkin, Filing ID A4L7Y0) 1 David Etkin (Associate Professor of Disaster and Emergency management at York University) 2 was retained by the City of Vancouver to provide his “opinion on whether the exclusion of 3 Segment 2 and Segment 3 from the risk assessment was reasonable” (page 2 Line 14). Trans 4 Mountain emphasizes that the entire shipping route was assessed for marine navigation and oil 5 spill risk; Segment 2 and Segment 3 are included in the risk assessment submitted with the 6 Application. The City of Vancouver has therefore provided Mr. Etkin with incorrect information 7 on which to base his assessment.

8 Trans Mountain and DNV’s review was carried out in accordance with the NEB’s List of Issues 9 (Filing ID A3V6I2) and included risk assessment of both small and large oil spills based upon 10 the credibility of such events occurring in various locations along the tanker shipping route. Both 11 probability and consequence were considered in the selection of credible scenarios. It is 12 important to note that in the case of TMEP, the risk is an existing one, and the consequences of 13 an oil spill will not change as a result of expanded operations. What is expected to change is the 14 probability (frequency) of incidents, which might influence the overall risk. Potential cumulative 15 impacts of the Project’s marine transportation have been addressed through the ESA (refer to 16 Volume 8A, Section 4.4; Filing ID A3S4Y3).

17 In determining risk Etkin mentions that “values play a large role in determining costs and 18 benefits, and acceptable levels of risk.” In this respect it should be noted that Trans Mountain is 19 a member of the Burrard Inlet community of marine stakeholders and businesses, and as 20 such shares the values of the residents of this area and has long-standing relationships with 21 these communities. Trans Mountain has undertaken a comprehensive ESA of the marine 22 component of the proposed Project, which identified potential adverse effects and appropriate 23 mitigation. As far as acceptable marine risk, Trans Mountain stresses that there are no 24 proposed or widely accepted risk acceptance criteria for marine oil spills. If criteria were defined, 25 the proposed operations could be either acceptable or not acceptable. The quantitative marine 26 risk assessment shows a substantial reduction of risks, on a risk per cargo transported basis. 27 This was achieved by adopting an informal risk acceptance criterion for marine oil spills of 28 “minimum increase of risk compared to present day operations.”

29 With respect to Etkin’s comments on perceived risk: perceived risk is the subjective judgment 30 that people make about the characteristics and severity of a risk, sometimes equating a hazard 31 with a risk, and often exacerbated by dissemination of misinformation or less objective 32 information. For TMEP, DNV conducted a comprehensive and thorough QRA (Volume 8C 33 Technical Report TR 8C 12 TERMPOL 3.15, General Risk Analysis [Filing IDs A3S5F4, 34 A3S5F6, and A3S5F8]) of the incremental addition to marine transportation risk. Based on the 35 findings of the risk assessment, preventive and precautionary risk mitigation measures have 36 been proposed. For the purpose of risk management, real, quantifiable risks have to be 37 identified, understood, and mitigated, which is the approach taken by Trans Mountain and DNV. 38 Trans Mountain recognizes the need to address perceived risks and to counteract the effects of 39 misinformation by transparently communicating objective information about risks associated 40 with the Project in an ongoing basis.

41 The method used by DNV to determine the CWC oil spill volume has been fully described in the 42 Application Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.15, Sections 2.1 and 9.1.1 (Filing IDs A3S5F4 and 43 A3S5F6). The credible in-transit worst-case oil spill size was determined from Monte Carlo

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1 simulation as 16,500 m3, which is equivalent to the complete loss of two cargo oil tank contents 2 of a partly loaded double hull Aframax tanker. In TERMPOL 3.15, Section 9 (Filing ID A3S5F6) 3 DNV describes this scenario as “An extreme outflow or credible worst case scenario has been 4 defined as the 10 % highest outflow (P90) given an accident that causes an oil spill.”

5 In order to demonstrate how oil spills at sea fit the Power Law, Etkin has “ranked from largest 6 (rank 1) to smallest (rank 131)” using ITOPF statistics; however, Etkin also notes that “as yet I 7 have no data for ranks 107 to 130 and have therefore interpolated values.” Etkin acknowledges 8 that “there are obvious problems with using this data to infer probabilities, the most important of 9 which is that over the past few decades there have been significant decreases in spill 10 frequencies due to the use of double hulled ships and improved technology.” Further to this, the 11 actual ITOPF spill data is displayed as below (Figures 60-4 and 60-5) on the ITOPF website:

12 13 Figure 60-4 Major Oil Spills Since 1967 (ITOPF)

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1 2 Figure 60-5 Quantities of Oil Spilt 7 Tonnes and Over, 1970 to 2014 (ITOPF)

3 The ITOPF data clearly shows an overall trend of declining oil spillage from tankers, on a global 4 basis. It is also noted that none of the highlighted spills occurred in the RSA.

5 Etkin indicates that because oil spills ranked by size from 1967 to 2014 can be distributed so as 6 to appear to follow a power law distribution, the rare and very large spills represent a greater 7 proportion of the overall risk and therefore should be included in the risk analysis (page 6 8 Line 21) or that spill modelling must use very large estimates of spill volumes. It is impossible to 9 tie these either conceptually or analytically to the risks or costs associated with Project-related 10 spills.

11 At the same time Etkin comments that one “should not discount the premise of DNV that a 12 14,000 ton (equivalent to a spill of 16% of tanker capacity) spill represents a credible worst case 13 scenario” (page 6 Line 7). Note that DNV used 16,500 m3 to represent a CWC spill (equivalent 14 to about 15,000 mt). Trans Mountain and DNV do not agree with Etkin’s observation that 15 because “rare, very large spills have happened historically” in a global context under much 16 different conditions, such types of spills should be modelled in the LSA as part of the TMEP risk 17 assessment. In fact, there are sufficient contradictions in Etkin’s work to conclude that the 18 assumptions are selected without defensible rationales except that they serve to increase the 19 range of possible spills sizes, without any manner of risk assessment into what is credible and 20 not.

21 Etkin carries out various theoretical considerations in order to force a comparison between oil 22 spill risk from a tanker in the LSA with that of risk from global natural hazards such as 23 earthquakes and weather disasters. In brief, the entire analysis in this report is based upon 24 speculative selection of a range of historical (1967 to 2012) tanker oil spill events that have no 25 analogs to the existing Application.

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1 Again Trans Mountain and DNV do not view such comparisons as relevant risk assessment 2 techniques when assessing marine oil spill risk in the local area. In conclusion, there is no 3 logical flaw in the risk assessment methodology applied by Trans Mountain and DNV.

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60.19 Annex 3: Marine and Navigation Risk Assessment Recap 1 Trans Mountain undertook a comprehensive marine risk assessment for the TMEP, including a 2 QRA by DNV. DNV is a marine classification society recognized for its expertise in marine risk 3 assessment and was engaged by Trans Mountain to conduct the General Risk Analysis and 4 Intended Methods of Reducing Risk (TERMPOL 3.15, Filing IDs A3S5F4, A3S5F6, and 5 A3S5F8). The goal of the marine risk assessment was to determine the impact of the TMEP on 6 oil cargo spill risk, and identify mitigation measures if required. The marine risk assessment was 7 required as part of the TERMPOL Review Process. TERMPOL is the “Technical Review 8 Process of Marine Terminal Systems and Transhipment Sites” and is a voluntary review that 9 focuses on the marine transportation components. As part of the TERMPOL Process, TC chairs 10 a committee of federal agencies to review and report on the submission. The TRC report was 11 submitted by TC to the NEB (Filing ID A64923) in December 2014 and now forms part of the 12 record for the NEB hearing. Trans Mountain has responded to a number of IRs about the 13 TERMPOL report and has also referred some IRs to TC for additional comments and response. 14 The TERMPOL studies form a key element of Trans Mountain’s assessment of the overall risk 15 from marine transportation.

16 The ESA for TMEP includes assessment of the cumulative effects of marine transportation 17 associated with the Project (Volume 8A, Section 4.4; Filing ID A3S4Y3) including the potential 18 effects of accidents and malfunctions.

19 The Ecological Risk Assessment of Marine Transportation Spills evaluated the potential 20 environmental effects of a marine oil spill at representative locations, and describes the range of 21 environmental effects that could result from a tanker oil spill along the marine shipping route 22 (Filing ID A56022).

23 Evaluation of potential environmental effects identified the need for additional preparedness and 24 response planning measures, which have been proposed and are presented in Volume 8A, 25 Table 5.5.3 (Filing ID A3S4Y6).

26 The risk-based approach employed by Trans Mountain to assess the potential effects of 27 accidents and malfunctions for the Westridge Marine Terminal and Project-related marine 28 shipping activities was undertaken in consideration of this guidance. Results of the assessment 29 for the Westridge Marine Terminal were provided in Volume 7, Section 8.0 (Filing ID A3S4V6). 30 Results of the assessment for marine shipping activities were provided in Volume 8A, Section 5 31 (Filing IDs A3S4Y3, A3S4Y4, A3S4Y5, A3S4Y6, A3S5Q3, A3S4Y4, A3S4Y8, A3S4Y9, and 32 A3S4Z0).

60.19.1 Tanker Safety Regime and Marine Risk Assessment 33 In terms of tanker movements in the west coast waters, public feedback gathered in the 34 engagement process indicated that the tanker safety regime in Canada is not well understood or 35 appreciated. Trans Mountain found that stakeholders asked questions about the relative roles of 36 TC, the CCG, PMV, PPA, Environment Canada, the Government of BC, and industry. TC and 37 CCG, as part of their filed evidence (Filing ID A4L7K1), explained the regimes and programs 38 that regulate and manage all shipping activities in Canada.

39 In the Application and in response to various IRs, Trans Mountain explained that global shipping 40 is highly regulated and tankers receive special focus in the regime. Regulatory management, 41 design, and technology; and a suite of preventive measures form part of the shipping regime. A

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1 number of these items are listed in Table 60-12 below (this is not an exhaustive list). Details on 2 most of these have been provided to interested intervenors during several rounds of IRs.

3 TABLE 60-12 4 5 EXAMPLES OF GLOBAL SHIPPING REGULATIONS AND PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH

Regulatory & Management Focus Design & Technology Prevention

- IMO Conventions - Design and construction - Operate under a Certified - Class Society Rules o Double hull Safety Management System - Flag State Rules multi-compartment - Use of Best Practices - Strict liability regime o Protected bunker tanks - Ship vetting (e.g., SiRe - Construction supervision - Redundant systems Program) - Surveys and Inspections o Power - Port State Control - Crew training o Propulsion management - VTS - Safe handling practices o Steering - Aids to navigation - - Industry organizations Integrated Navigation System - TSS OCIMF o Digital charts - Communication protocols o - - Terminals are built and Automation - Voluntary exclusion zones managed to global standards o Cargo system - Pilots with PPU - Continual improvement is a o Integrated systems - Escort/tethered tugs requirement o Fire/gas detection, fire suppression o Alarms and shutdowns.

6 A review of Canadian and international tanker casualty data showed that there have been no 7 major oil spills in Canada, let alone the local area (Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.8; Filing 8 ID A3S4T1). In the international realm, tanker industry statistics highlight the industry’s strong 9 safety record and the sharply declining trend in tanker oil spills globally (Figure 60-6).

60.19.2 Marine Quantitative Risk Assessment Methodology 10 DNV’s QRA included a comprehensive review of the entire shipping route, together with 11 forecasted traffic increases to 2018 and 2028. The risk assessment used AIS data of marine 12 vessel traffic as input to a model in its proprietary MARCS. Trans Mountain notes that it is not 13 mandatory for small vessels (e.g., small fishing vessels and recreational craft), to be fitted with 14 AIS transponders and therefore some smaller vessels might not be represented in the AIS data. 15 Small vessel traffic does not pose a hazard for oil spill risk, but are considered as a general 16 navigation hazard. Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11 evaluates the potential adverse effects of the 17 increase in Project-related vessels on other marine vessels (Marine Transportation Assessment, 18 Marine Commercial, Recreational and Tourism Use; Filing ID A3S4Y3).

19 The assessment included consideration that all marine vessels are required under law to follow 20 Collision Regulation rules, and avoid close interactions and incidents amongst vessels. DNV 21 held two hazard identification workshops (Filing IDs A3S5F4 and A3S5F6) with local marine 22 stakeholders to help identify navigational hazards that could contribute to the likelihood of an 23 incident. The workshops included a sailing route review; an onboard assessment of the portion 24 of the route from Westridge Marine Terminal to the Victoria Pilot Boarding Station to identify 25 hazards and navigational complexities.

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1 The model included:

2 · relevant environmental data (e.g., visibility, wind characteristics) from the 3 information submitted in the Application;

4 · current risk-reducing measures (measures that prevent occurrence of marine 5 incidents and oil spill accidents); and,

6 · ability to identify additional measures to reduce risk.

7 DNV reviewed local, Canadian, and international tanker casualty data from the International 8 Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF), which showed that there have been no major oil 9 spills in Canada, let alone the local area (Volume 8C, TERMPOL 3.8; Filing ID A3S4T1). In the 10 international realm, tanker industry statistics highlight the industry’s strong safety record and the 11 sharply declining trend in global tanker oil spills (Figure 60-6).

12 13 Figure 60-6 Improving Trend in Number of Global Tanker Oil Spills (ITOPF)

14 DNV conducted the quantitative marine risk analysis using MARCS to determine risk, based on 15 the probability and consequence of a spill. DNV has used the MARCS model previously to 16 undertake risk assessments for private and government clients (For a list of previous projects, 17 see Trans Mountain’s response to Tsawout FN IR No. 1.30n; Filing ID A3Y3U4). DNV’s analysis 18 for TMEP determined:

19 · calculated frequencies of five types of incidents (i.e., collision, powered 20 grounding, drift grounding, structural failure, and fire and explosion) through the 21 MARCS model; and,

22 · the volume of cargo that may be released in each type of incident 23 (consequence), through Monte Carlo simulations.

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1 The proposed route was divided into several segments, covering the area from Westridge 2 Marine Terminal to Buoy Juliet. DNV then used MARCS to estimate oil cargo spill accident 3 frequency for each segment of the proposed route due to one of the five types of events. The 4 MARCS model accounted for the current risk mitigation measures, and the additional benefits 5 from risk-reducing measures proposed in the Application.

6 7 Figure 60-7 Shipping Routes Applied in the MARCS Modelling (Filing ID A3S5F6)

8 In Figure 60-7, the blue and red lines denote the respective inbound and outbound routes 9 followed by Project tankers and other vessels; the green lines depict routes of other vessels that 10 ply the study area. These routes were all modelled in MARCS for the purpose of carrying out 11 the QRA.

60.20 References 12 National Energy Board (NEB). 2013. Considerations: Report of the Joint Review Panel for the 13 Enbridge Northern Gateway Project (Volume 2). Website: 14 http://gatewaypanel.review-examen.gc.ca/clf-nsi/dcmnt/rcmndtnsrprt/rcmndtnsrprtvlm2-e 15 ng.pdf. Accessed: July 2015.

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1 Tanker Safety Panel Secretariat. 2013. A review of Canada’s ship-source oil spill preparedness 2 and response regime: setting the course for the future. Tanker Safety Panel Secretariat: 3 Ottawa, ON. 71pp.

4 Van Dorp, J.R. and J. Merrick. 2014. VTRA 2010 Final Report: Preventing Oil Spills from Large 5 Ships and Barges in Northern Puget Sound & Strait of Juan de Fuca (Prepared for Puget 6 Sound Partnership - 1/22/2014). The George Washington University: Washington D.C.

7 WSP. 2014. Risk Assessment for Marine Spills in Canadian Waters Phase 1: Oil Spills South of 8 60th Parallel. Website: 9 http://wcel.org/sites/default/files/file-downloads/131-17593-00_ERA_Oil-Spill-South_150 10 116_pp1-124.pdf. Accessed: July 2015.

11

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61.0 MARINE SPILL LIABILITY COMPENSATION 61.1 Compensation 61.1.1 General 1 A number of intervenors and commenters have addressed issues associated with the liability for 2 and compensation related to the costs of a potential oil spill arising from Project operations of 3 the pipeline, from activities at a facility, or from operations of Project-related tankers calling at 4 the Westridge Marine Terminal. This section of the Reply Evidence addresses evidence 5 contained in the following documents, some of which are referenced only as background 6 documents:

7 Friends of Ecological Reserves. “C33-6-1. Friends of Ecological Reserves Final Evidence 8 Report, May 2015.” Filing ID A4L6Y2.

9 City of North Vancouver. “C73-5-1. Affidavit of Dorit Mason, Director of North Shore Emergency 10 Management Office (NSEMO).” Filing ID A4L6L4.

11 City of Port Moody. “C74-11-3. Evidence of Paul Rockwood, Port Moody.” Filing ID A4L7Q6.

12 City of Vancouver, Tsleil-Waututh Nation, Tsawout First Nation, and Upper Nicola Indian Band. 13 “An Assessment of Oil Spill Risks for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project,” by 14 Dr. Thomas Gunton and Dr. Sean Broadbent (School of Resource and Environmental 15 Management, Simon Fraser University) (Filing ID A4L6A6) Referred to here as the 16 “Gunton & Broadbent Report” (Also filed as Upper Nicola Indian Band. “C363-21-22 An 17 Assessment of Oil Spill Risks for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project,” Prepared by 18 Gunton T & Broadbent S. Filing ID A4Q1T7.) (Also filed as Volume 5 of Tsleil-Waututh 19 Nation’s Record of Written Evidence.)

20 City of Vancouver. “C77-27-01 Written Evidence of the City of Vancouver.” Filing ID A4L7V8.

21 City of Vancouver. Appendix 81. “C77-30-06 Local Government Impacts of Oil Spills: A Study of 22 Potential Costs for the City of Vancouver.” Prepared by Jeremy Stone. Filing ID A4L8E9. 23 Referred to here as the “Stone Report.”

24 City of Vancouver. Appendix 82. “C77-30-07 Brand Valuation.” Prepared by Edgar Baum Brand 25 Finance (Canada) Inc. Filing ID A4L8F0. Referred to here as the “Brand Finance 26 Report.”

27 City of Vancouver. Appendix 83. “C77-31-08 Direct Written Evidence of Rashid Sumaila, May 28 19, 2015: Appendix B: Potential Economic Impact of a Tanker Spill on Ocean-dependent 29 Activities in Vancouver, BC,” Prepared by Sumaila R, Hotte N, Bjarnason H. Filing 30 ID A4L9G4. Referred to here as the “Sumaila Report.”

31 City of Vancouver. “C77-31-09. Appendix 84. IOPC Publications, Incidents involving the IOPC 32 Funds 2013 - Hebei Spirit. Note by the Secretariat.” Filing ID A4L9G6.

33 City of Vancouver. “C77-31-10. Appendix 85. IOPC Publications, Incidents involving the IOPC 34 Funds 2013 - Prestige. Note by the Secretariat.” Filing ID A4L9G7.

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1 City of Vancouver. “C77-31-11. Appendix 86. Garza et al. 2009. Indirect assessment of 2 economic damages from the Prestige oil spill: consequences for liability and risk 3 prevention. Disasters, 2009, 33(1): 95- 109.” Filing ID A4L9G8.

4 City of Vancouver. “C77-31-12. Appendix 87. IOPC Fund - Criteria for admissibility - Review of 5 Decisions 1979-1993. 4 January 1994. 7th Intersessional Working Group Agenda Item 2. 6 Note by the Director.” Filing ID A4L9G9.

7 City of Vancouver. “C77-31-13. Appendix 88. IOPC Fund Review - Criteria for admissibility. 4 8 January 1994. 7th Intersessional Working Group Agenda Item 2. Note by the Director.” 9 Filing ID A4L9H0.

10 City of Vancouver. “C77-31-14. Appendix 89. Alternate Risk Financing Mechanisms - Trans 11 Mountain Pipeline Application.” Prepared by Karen MacWilliam. Filing ID A4L9H1. 12 Referred to here as the “MacWilliam Report”

13 District of North Vancouver. “C106-8-22. Affidavit of Dorit Mason, Director of North Shore 14 Emergency Management Office (NSEMO).” Filing ID A4Q0H6.

15 District of West Vancouver. “C107-10-1. Affidavit of Dorit Mason, Director of North Shore 16 Emergency Management Office (NSEMO).” Filing ID A4L6L2.

17 Catherine Douglas. “C112-2-5 Economic Costs and Benefits of the Trans Mountain Expansion 18 Project (TMX) for BC and Metro Vancouver, 2014.” Prepared by Goodman I & Rowan B, 19 The Goodman Group Ltd. In Collaboration with the Centre for Public Policy Research, 20 Simon Fraser University. Filing ID A4Q0C1. Referred to here as the “Goodman Report.”

21 Lyackson First Nation. “C219-6-2. Written Evidence of Lyackson First Nation (May 27, 2015).” 22 Filing ID A4Q0H9.

23 Maa-nulth Nations. “C411-1-01. Written Evidence of the Maa-nulth Nations.” Filing ID A4L6D5.

24 Makah Tribal Council. “C223-3-1. Written Evidence Makah Tribal Council 27 May, 2015.” Filing 25 ID A4Q2A4.

26 Tofino-Long Beach Chamber of Commerce (TLBCC). “C350-3-1 TLBCC Intervenor Evidence 27 May 27th submission.” Prepared by Emery Hartley, Dave Mills & Jen Dart. Filing 28 ID A4Q2G1

29 Washington State Department of Ecology (WSDOE). “C376-8-1. WSDOE Written Evidence with 30 Cover Letter May 27, 2015.” Filing ID A4Q1X6.

61.1.2 Summary of Intervenor Concerns 31 Trans Mountain notes that the evidence filed sometimes does not treat or specify whether the 32 costs are associated with pipeline, facility, or tanker spills. Similarly, the evidence at times does 33 not specify whether the spills originate in the terrestrial or marine environment. Therefore, for 34 the purposes of this section of the Reply Evidence, compensation costs from all sources 35 (pipeline, facility, and tanker) into either the terrestrial or marine environments are addressed. 36 Trans Mountain notes that it is not the Responsible Party in the event of a tanker-based spill. 37 Nevertheless, Trans Mountain is interested in addressing concerns about the safety of tankers, 38 prevention of oil spills, and ensuring that adequate and efficient response means are available,

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1 should a low likelihood event such as an oil spill take place. Trans Mountain’s efforts in these 2 areas have been discussed in other sections of Reply Evidence.

3 Trans Mountain further notes that the nature of the issues addressed by intervenor evidence 4 include (i) evidence relating directly to magnitude of spill costs and the various components of 5 these costs; (ii) evidence relating to the general adequacy or sufficiency of the compensation 6 regimes; (iii) evidence relating to the eligibility of specific spill costs for compensation under the 7 applicable liability and compensation regimes; and (iv) evidence associated with compensation 8 related to emergency response preparation costs (as opposed to actual emergency response 9 costs). The scope of this section includes issues associated with compensation adequacy, 10 eligibility, and timing. Section 27 (Economic Costs of an Oil Spill) treats issues associated with 11 the magnitude of oil spill costs; the compensation regimes are also summarized in Section 27.

61.1.3 Organization of this Reply 12 This section of Reply Evidence addresses intervenor concerns under two general headings, as 13 follows:

14 · Adequacy: Compensation funds available are inadequate given the intervenor’s 15 understanding of total spill costs.

16 · Eligibility: Even if compensation funds are available, funds will not cover the 17 type of costs that intervenors believe they will bear. The eligibility concerns also 18 cover those where available funds may be pro-rated and place them as a lower 19 priority claimant in the event of costs exceeding liability limits or funding 20 capabilities of the compensation regimes.

61.2 Compensation Adequacy 21 Some intervenors are concerned because their evidence shows spill costs to range into billions 22 of dollars while existing compensation schemes will fall short of this amount. City of Vancouver 23 (Filing ID A4L7V8), among others, have expressed such concerns in their evidence. Tsawout 24 First Nation, in their Response to Government of Canada IRs relating to a draft issues tracking 25 table indicate that “there will be damages from potential oil spills of between $2.3 and 26 $18.6 billion that will only be partially mitigated by existing spill compensation mechanisms. 27 (Filing ID A4R4G4, PDF pages 15-16).

28 Intervenors have relied on evidence such as the Goodman Report (Filing ID A4L6A6), the 29 Sumaila Report (Filing ID A4L9G4), observations by Mr. Jeremy Stone (Filing ID A4L8E9), and 30 submissions by Brand Finance (Filing ID A4L8F0). City of Vancouver specifically relies on a 31 subset of these to state:

32 Taking the costs to Vancouver identified in Mr. Stone’s report, together with the 33 impairment to Vancouver’s brand value assessed by Brand Finance and the 34 costs to Vancouver’s ocean-based economy assessed by Dr. Sumalia, the 35 economic impact of a large oil spill in the Burrard Inlet on Vancouver and its 36 ocean-based economy could exceed $2 billion (Filing ID A4L7V8, PDF page 37 107).

38 All of these reports have been addressed in stand-alone expert reports appended to this Reply 39 Evidence or in Reply Evidence Section 27. The evidence in these reports typically does not pay

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1 attention to risk profiles, especially the likelihood of such an occurrence in the region, and the 2 reports thus implicitly ignore the credibility of the scenario, the outflows, or the costs associated 3 with outflows. Moreover, the evidence typically relies on selective, high-cost incidents that are 4 not applicable to this Application. The scenarios routinely refer to incidents such as the Exxon 5 Valdez single-hull tanker oil spill, the Deepwater Horizon well blowout, or the Kalamazoo oil spill 6 in Michigan, among others. All of these cases are simply not analogs for a spill associated with 7 the TMEP. Costs are exaggerated, outflows are over-stated, and the incident likelihood or 8 credibility is not addressed.

9 The Gunton & Broadbent Report makes the most aggressive case for stating that compensation 10 systems are inadequate. When the authors include items such as passive use values, their 11 speculative spill costs “could increase up to $25.5 billion” (Filing ID A4L6A6, PDF page 13).

12 The Gunton & Broadbent estimates of costs and resulting conclusions regarding the adequacy 13 of the compensation regimes are unfounded. The authors consistently select the highest 14 multipliers or spill values in the literature, and ignore any assessment of whether it is reasonable 15 or correct to transfer values from the “selected case studies” (Kalamazoo in this instance) or 16 literature values for damage multipliers (Etkin [2004; Filing ID A3W9I6] in this instance). 17 Interestingly, the authors accepted five key spill cost parameters from Etkin (2004), yet ignore 18 her one finding - that unit costs decline with volume spilled - that would have reduced estimated 19 costs. To compute tanker spill costs, they also incorrectly transfer values from the 20 Wright-Mansell Research (WMR) Report (WMR study of July 2012 entitled “Public Interest 21 Benefit Evaluation of the Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline Project: Update and Reply 22 Evidence” Prepared by Eglington P, Mansell R, Ruitenbeek J, and Schlenker R; Exhibit 23 C112-2-4, Filing ID A4Q0A9). They ignore the facts that the WMR Report used such values for 24 a different purpose (CBA sensitivity analyses), in a different context (greenfield circumstances), 25 and for a different project (Northern Gateway). In drawing faulty inferences from the WMR 26 Report, they ignored the one piece of peer-reviewed evidence (Kontovas et al. 2010) that might 27 have generated defensible costs as it provided regression estimates of spill costs based on 28 IOPCF data. Had the authors accepted the Kontovas et al. regressions, their spill costs 29 estimates would have been an order of magnitude lower and fallen well within currently 30 available compensation limits under the Compensation Regime applied in Canada. Calculations 31 in the Reply to “An Assessment of Oil Spill Risks for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project,” by 32 Dr. Thomas Gunton and Dr. Sean Broadbent (School of Resource and Environmental 33 Management, SFU; [Attachment 1.07]) demonstrate that, based on the Kontovas et al. 34 regressions, spill costs would be no more than $455 million for the scenario Gunton & 35 Broadbent described. For that same scenario, Gunton & Broadbent inferred a cost of 36 $4.4 billion. As a consequence, their conclusions are neither realistic nor conservative.

37 Moreover, as described in the stand-alone Reply Evidence reports (attached), their statements 38 regarding environmental services and passive use values are misinformed. Most of these costs 39 are not measurable, as stated in Trans Mountain’s evidence, and are not compensable for a 40 variety of reasons (most significantly, that the valuations are not attachable to any owned right 41 by a legal entity; hence, the damages are specious and there is no single entity capable of 42 receiving payment). Moreover, Gunton & Broadbent incorrectly use values to derive their 43 passive use estimates: they used source values (by Carson et al. [2004]) for oil spills in Alaska 44 and California, and transferred them using inappropriate methods (see Attachment 1.07 - Reply 45 to “An Assessment of Oil Spill Risks for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project”). Carson et al. 46 (2004) specifically note their Alaska values cannot be extrapolated due to the style of statistical

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1 distribution used (page 192) and that their California results are applicable only within California 2 (page 243) because of sampling methods, which concentrated on English-speaking California 3 households. They more generally advocate the use of their survey methods as a model 4 (page 6): “The techniques reported here may be reported as a reference for other researchers 5 by providing a model for generating a robust estimate of damages.” They clearly note that 6 numerical results cannot be compared even for the two spill scenarios they investigated 7 (pages 191 and 197): “… neither the populations sampled, the location of the injuries, the 8 relationship between the location of the injuries and the population sampled, or the nature of the 9 injuries avoided are directly comparable. … EVOS values the prevention of a very large spill 10 geographically distant from most of the population sampled whereas COS [California Oil Spill] 11 values preventions of a series of smaller spills in relatively close proximity to the population 12 sampled. … A statistical analysis … demonstrates that the distributions of WTP [willingness to 13 pay] in the two studies are quite different.” TMEP would require a different survey relevant to a 14 BC location and Canadian residents (including BC), which has not been done, and for which 15 COS and EVOS cannot act as substitutes. Also, such a survey would need to reflect realities in 16 Canadian waters. The wording of the COS and EVOS surveys polled respondents’ WTP for a 17 scenario which mandated an end-point of double hulled tankers with escorts; at the time, such 18 mitigation procedures were not in place. That mitigation scenario already describes the current 19 situation in Canada: by definition, the same survey presented in Canada today would generate 20 a result of zero.

21 Trans Mountain acknowledges that many intervenors have simply accepted their concern over 22 the adequacy, without undertaking their own analyses or going through any speculative 23 exercises. The City of Port Moody, for example, is concerned with the “Potential socio-economic 24 effects of marine shipping of the Project” (Filing ID A4L7Q6). Its evidence succinctly indicates 25 that it “does not have the financial capacity or the resources to respond to major spills.” Trans 26 Mountain takes these concerns seriously, and reiterates that the financial regimes available for 27 spill response will comprehensively cover documented costs that can be connected to the spill.

28 In contrast to the assumptions and methods used in some intervenor evidence, the assumptions 29 and approaches on which Trans Mountain has relied for assessing spill costs are conservative 30 and reasonable. They suit the purpose (estimating potential liability), the location (as defined by 31 the Application), and the circumstances (that the Application is an expansion of existing 32 operations that have been ongoing for 60 years). Significant evidence has already been placed 33 on the record through Trans Mountain’s Application and supplemental filings, through Trans 34 Mountain’s responses to IRs, and through independently prepared material (e.g., TERMPOL 35 Review Process Report on the Trans Mountain Expansion Project [Filing ID A4F8Z4]). This 36 evidence illustrates that adequate financial resources are available to meet claims in the event 37 of a spill.

38 The Application provides Trans Mountain’s evidence relating to oil spills for which it is the 39 Responsible Party. For an assessment of costs of hypothetical land-based spills, please see 40 “Potential Cleanup and Damage Costs of a Hypothetical Oil Spill: Assessment of Trans 41 Mountain Expansion Project” in Application Volume 7, Appendix G (Filing ID A3S4W8). The 42 assessment indicates that a CWC spill would have a cost of the order of $100 million to $300 43 million. Additional sensitivity analyses are reflected in Trans Mountain’s Response to NEB IR 44 No. 1.10b (Page 32 of 481 in Filing ID A3W9H8); that response indicates that a large spill 45 (4,000 m3) affecting a HCAs would have a cost of the order of $340 million. A full description of

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1 the model with all assumptions and equations was provided as part of Follow-Up Response to 2 NEB Ruling 33, Allan R F-IR No. 1.18c (Filing ID A4D3G4).

3 Trans Mountain has also documented the resources available to address any such costs. Trans 4 Mountain has access to $750 million in insurance for a land-based spill. Compensation 5 frameworks and insurance covering a land-based spill are described in responses to NEB IR 6 No. 1.08b to 1.08h (Page 24 of 481 in Filing ID A3W9H8). In the event that a liability occurs that 7 is in excess of its insurance, Trans Mountain expects that any losses and claims would be paid 8 out of cash reserves and cash flow from operations, which are illustrated in the response to 9 NEB IR No. 1.09a and 1.09b (Page 24 of 481 in Filing ID A3W9H8). Moreover, recent 10 promulgation of the 2015 Pipeline Safety Act - An Act to amend the National Energy Board Act 11 and the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act will see its various provisions in force by June 12 2016. The Act reinforces the polluter pays principle, and confirms that the liability of companies 13 that operate pipelines is unlimited if an unintended or uncontrolled release of oil, gas, or any 14 other commodity from a pipeline that they operate is the result of their fault or negligence.

15 Trans Mountain is not liable for a tanker-based marine spill, and has not estimated any costs. 16 Responsibility for such an event lies with the tanker owner. Trans Mountain also notes that, 17 because each spill is different, it is not possible to provide breakdowns or aggregates of costs 18 for a hypothetical event. The NEB articulated (September 2013) the filing requirements 19 regarding environment and socio-economic effects for increased marine shipping activities and 20 specified that “The assessment of accidents and malfunctions must also provide a description of 21 the liability and compensation regime that would apply in the case of a spill.” Such a description 22 is found in Volume 8A, Section 1.4.1.6 (Filing ID A3S4X3) of the Application. Procedures in 23 Canada are defined under the Marine Liability Act and guidance for claims is provided under the 24 IOPCF Claims Manual (Filing ID A3X5W1) and Canada’s SOPF Claims Manual 2014 (Filing ID 25 A4H8G6). Canada’s SOPF considers claims as stipulated in Part 7 of the Marine Liability Act.

26 Through these proceedings, Trans Mountain has explained, in response to various IRs, that 27 Canada’s marine compensation regime is among the most comprehensive in the world, and that 28 aspects of it (such as treatment of fishers and income derived from fishing) are designed 29 specifically with Canadian conditions in mind. Moreover, Trans Mountain believes that ongoing 30 improvements in this regime - identified and recommended in the TSEP - will continue to see 31 the regime improve.

32 Many intervenors that have presented evidence saying the marine regime is inadequate focus 33 on ineligible costs, which they believe should be eligible. The analysts are also prone to select 34 case studies, which have little to no application to the circumstances of the TMEP, and 35 misinterpret IOPCF records on claim eligibility within those cases. Trans Mountain treats these 36 below by looking more closely at intervenor concerns regarding eligibility in relation to 37 compensation regime fund availability.

61.3 Compensation Eligibility 61.3.1 Summary of Intervenor Positions 38 A number of intervenors have expressed concerns related to the eligibility or 39 comprehensiveness, rather than adequacy, of compensation funding. The style of evidence is 40 that even if there are sufficient funds available in theory, they will not be released because the 41 types of claims that may be important to the intervenor are not covered by compensation. Most 42 of the evidence on this account is related to marine claims.

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1 The specific interventions generally fall into the following categories:

2 a) Evidence from First Nations suggesting that their resource values will not be adequately 3 compensated either because they are not eligible under the international regime [fishery 4 resource values], cannot be expressed in monetary terms [cultural values], are involved 5 with subsistence uses rather than anything marketed or commercially driven, or involve 6 losses that may be uncertain and extend beyond claim periods.

7 b) Evidence referring to studies or IOPCF documents demonstrating that some claims are 8 routinely disallowed, causing the intervenor to infer either that funding is inadequate or 9 that claims are generally ineligible. The evidence refers to disallowed claims or to 10 uncertainty in claims relating to IOPCF/SOPF, often linked to specific spills (e.g., the 11 Hebei Spirit spill in South Korea, and the Prestige spill off the coast of Western Europe).

12 c) Evidence from US intervenors that costs of their involvement in spill cleanup or damage 13 prevention are not adequately covered.

14 d) Evidence asserting that Canada does not have a World Class regime for compensating 15 spill cleanup.

16 e) Evidence that intervenors are required to bear direct risks but receive no direct benefits. 17 Others are compensated by employment or local income stimuli, but they are not.

18 f) Evidence asserting that local communities will face the risk of an oil spill yet have no 19 access to appropriate risk reduction instruments to address the financial risks of a spill in 20 the event that existing compensation mechanisms are inadequate.

61.3.2 Compensation for First Nations Claims 21 Matsqui First Nation, elsewhere in the evidence, seeks to establish monetary values for items 22 including, for example, physical health, use and enjoyment, psychological/emotional health, 23 S’ólh téméxw (Keepers of the land), trust in government, cultural traditions/practices, and 24 community autonomy (PDF page 64ff of Filing ID A4L8J3).

25 The Maa-nulth Nations also identify a broad range of economic, social and cultural values that 26 would be impacted in event of a spill in their territory. Their concerns stem from impacts “Project 27 Tankers may have on their Treaty Lands, economic development interests, Domestic 28 Harvesting Rights and Commercial Harvesting Rights” (PDF page 10f of Filing ID A4L6D5).

29 Lyackson First Nation has similar concerns, but also relates these to the potential duration of 30 impacts: “Pahalicktun [Hereditary Chief] wanted to know if I can make it right in the event of an 31 accident.” The Lyackson First Nation evidence further describes the importance of fisheries in 32 traditional commercial practices, and asserts that “in a catastrophic event, the effects could last 33 20 years, maybe even 50, maybe even more” (PDF page 10 of Filing ID A4Q0H9).

34 First, Trans Mountain maintains that normalizing all factors into dollar terms is not necessarily 35 useful in terms of the decision-making processes required of the NEB: a quantification of 36 environmental (including social) externalities is not needed to evaluate whether the TMEP is in 37 the public interest (Response to Allan R IR No. 1.01x [Filing ID A3X5V9]). Indeed, the NEB has 38 itself been confronted by such propositions within this sector. For example, evidence put 39 forward before the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project Joint Review Panel (JRP) involved

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1 valuation of various EGS, as well as cultural values. The JRP concludes that many of such 2 losses simply cannot be estimated:

3 An example … relates to certain impacts on aboriginal culture that regulators 4 often regard as non-compensable and can only be considered qualitatively. For 5 example, the Joint Review Panel for Northern Gateway (Government of Canada, 6 2013, p.362) observed: “Regarding the Office of the Wet’suwet’en’s concern 7 about potential cultural losses, the Panel agrees that some aspects of cultural 8 activity cannot be described in economic terms. To the extent that activities 9 contribute to a culture, and monetary values can be attributed to these activities, 10 the Panel should take these into account (Trans Mountain Response to Tsawout 11 IR No 1.38, PDF Page 128 of Filing ID A3Y3T9).

12 This is not to say that all of the values listed by the Matsqui First Nation, or identified by other 13 First Nations, elude estimation or valuation. In some instances, where acceptable substitute 14 goods are readily available, then fairly precise monetary equivalences can be estimated, even 15 for non-marketed items. A subsistence fishery as a food source is a case in point. If there are 16 local closures to a fishery, then the costs associated with purchasing the same product, or with 17 relocating temporarily the fishery to another location, are regarded as eligible costs in valuing 18 any specific claims. In Canada, there is also considerable latitude in defining who is dependent 19 on a fishery: Canadian legislation that addresses compensation for marine spills, for example, 20 was specifically written to circumvent the more restrictive provisions in international 21 compensation regimes to which Canada is a party. Where cultural or similar values can be 22 monetized using acceptable methodologies, compensation can be provided.

23 Similarly, for marine spills, Matsqui First Nation again maintains that hypothetical marine spill 24 impacts would potentially result in the following financial or economic losses (PDF page 55 of 25 Filing ID A4L8J3).

26 · The cost of replacement food from lost fishing, hunting, and gathering 27 opportunities (e.g., salmon, deer, moose, and berries).

28 · Lost opportunities to profit from Economic Opportunity fisheries. This impact is 29 most severe while fishing on the river is closed but persists for some years 30 after the river is reopened to fishing, due to stigma associated with potentially 31 contaminated fish.

32 · Lost opportunities to produce and sell value-added fisheries products (smoked 33 or candied fish).

34 Trans Mountain acknowledges that losses such as those noted above could occur in the 35 unlikely event of a marine spill. However, it must be noted here that Trans Mountain has 36 proposed extraordinary measures to further improve prevention, preparedness, and response to 37 marine oil spills; such measures have been endorsed after review by the TRC. It also notes that 38 Canada has among the most comprehensive oil spill compensation regimes in the world, and 39 that parts of it are specifically targeted to compensating losses associated with a broad set of 40 damages that may be sustained by the commercial and subsistence fishery sector. Any losses 41 that can be connected to a spill event are eligible for compensation. Moreover, although time 42 limits of claims are specified as 7 years from the time of the incident, claims may also be 43 submitted before that cut-off date for forecast losses that extend into the future, provided that

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1 adequate documentation is provided. Concerns relating to timing and impacts beyond the 7 year 2 cut-off, such as those expressed by Lyackson First Nation, can be handled through such 3 procedures.

4 At this stage, Trans Mountain reiterates its approach to dealing with claims as described in 5 Response to Matsqui FN IR No. 2.03e (PDF Page 10 of Filing ID A4H8U3):

6 Trans Mountain prides itself on working closely and cooperatively with its First 7 Nations’ partners, stakeholders, landowners, municipalities and others along its 8 pipeline corridor. This includes a commitment to work to address any releases or 9 environmental concerns affecting any of the above, and to discuss and negotiate 10 compensable losses where Trans Mountain is the responsible party. Trans 11 Mountain concedes that it is often difficult to determine the appropriate 12 compensation for “social, cultural or psychological wellbeing.” Despite this 13 difficulty, Trans Mountain agrees with the general approach of Canadian courts 14 and the common law that while it may be difficult, the intent is to place the 15 damaged party back to the non-damaged state to the extent possible. While the 16 preferred approach is for the parties involved to work toward mutually satisfactory 17 resolution of any claims or losses, regulators, courts and alternative dispute 18 resolutions are available to assist on losses that the parties cannot resolve.

61.3.3 Uncertainty of Eligibility for IOPCF Claims 19 A number of intervenors have undertaken research to look into actual claim settlements paid 20 through the IOPCF regime. Their research is taken from what they regard as comparable spills 21 in comparable situations. Their evidence then suggests that a significant number of claims are 22 not paid, or the costs are pro-rated because of fund limits. Specific examples put forward 23 typically relate to the Hebei Spirit spill in South Korea (Filing ID A4L9G6), and the Prestige spill 24 off the coast of Western Europe (Filing IDs A4L9G7 and A4L9G8). In addition, the City of 25 Vancouver provides its interpretation in a tabular summary of the types of claims that are 26 definitely covered, are definitely not covered, or are “unclear” (PDF pages 105-106 of Filing 27 ID A4L7V8).

28 First, Trans Mountain notes that the indicated cases should not generally be regarded as 29 corollaries for a hypothetical spill in Canadian waters. None of the spills listed happened in 30 Canada, hence, in no instance was the SOPF involved. The SOPF is regarded as a fund “of first 31 resort and last resort,” implying that its intent is to be early on the scene to pay potential claims; 32 it then subsequently obtains reimbursement from the ship owner’s insurer or from the IOPCF.

33 Second, neglect of the SOPF in the tabular analysis by the City of Vancouver causes it to 34 misrepresent the relevant regime in Canada. For example, the SOPF will compensate those 35 businesses and individuals that are connected to a fishery, whereas the tabular summary 36 indicates that such businesses are ineligible. In fact, the table misrepresents how claims are 37 payable to businesses in general: there is no distinction made in claims whether businesses are 38 regulated or unregulated, as the tabular summary suggests. Individuals or businesses are 39 eligible to submit claims.

40 Third, a number of the spills involved vessels which themselves had dubious histories. The 41 Prestige, for example, would never have met TC regulations or passed Trans Mountain’s 42 Tanker Acceptance Standard. The Prestige was a single-hulled tanker with possible structural

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1 deficiencies when it undertook its voyage. A 2008 report by the Ship Structure Committee, of 2 which the USCG and TC are Member Agencies, states (page 5) “According to their technical 3 analyses, ABS [American Bureau of Shipping] believes that ‘a weakened section in the side 4 shell or supporting framing in the vicinity of frame 71’ caused the initial damage and flooding.”

5 Fourth, the analyses do not reflect the regimes to which the nations were signatory. In the case 6 of the Hebei Spirit, for example, South Korea was signatory only to the first tier of funding of the 7 IOPCF. This implied that it had access to the 1992 Fund (equivalent approximately to 8 C$345 million) but not to the second tier of IOPCF: the Supplementary Fund (equivalent 9 approximately to C$932 million). Claims were therefore pro-rated. Canada is signatory to the 10 Supplementary Fund, hence the situation would not have arisen in Canada.

11 Fifth, the City of Vancouver does not provide the full context of the work by Garza et al. (Filing 12 ID A4L9G8), even though it relies on it. Garza et al. focus on European findings relating to 13 uncompensated social losses. They also consider the Prestige spill as an example. Their overall 14 analysis includes the statement that: “These social, non-marketed damages go uncompensated 15 because they have no market value and therefore no monetary estimate of losses” (PDF page 3 16 of Filing ID A4L9G8). Garza et al. include various recreational values and passive uses as 17 among those that are not marketed. They also include certain fishery losses which, as 18 described above, would be compensated under SOPF. The analysis by Garza et al. thus 19 provides no new evidence. The inadmissibility of passive use values, and of non-measurable 20 ecosystem services, has been addressed elsewhere in Trans Mountain evidence and within this 21 Reply Evidence section.

22 Sixth, the analyses do not take into account that numerous claims are inadmissible because 23 they do not follow IOPCF basic claim manual guidelines for eligibility. Claims must be connected 24 to the spill and have proper documentation. Trans Mountain notes that none of the analysts 25 have inspected claims themselves. This causes them to misconstrue the interpretations of the 26 evidence on which they rely or have discovered in their research. Numerous IOPCF claims are 27 rejected simply because of improper documentation (or falsified documents) or because the 28 claims are not associated with the spill event. It is not uncommon for individuals or businesses 29 to send in receipts for lost income, for example, with dates that pre-date the spill; these may be 30 deliberate attempts to mislead the insurer or they may be honest mistakes. The role of the claim 31 inspector is to look at every claim and determine its admissibility and reasonableness. 32 Claimants are given opportunities to defend or correct their claim but if they choose not to 33 defend or correct it then it may be dismissed.

34 Finally, Trans Mountain notes that the City of Vancouver has not acknowledged the broad level 35 of claims that are allowed for bona fide losses connected to a spill, and that transparent appeal 36 processes exist for claimants to challenge any findings. Portions of Trans Mountain’s 37 comprehensive response to City of Vancouver IR No. 2.11.1a (PDF pages 397-398 of Filing 38 ID A4H8I9) are relevant in this context:

39 Moreover, IOPCF documentation [regarding Hebei Spirit] further shows that 40 payments for natural resource damages and related income losses that were 41 assessed as bona fide were allowed by the IOPCF; March 2014 documentation 42 from the IOPCF Secretariat (City of Vancouver IR No. 2.11.1a - Attachment 1 43 [Filing ID A4H8K6]) shows that 32,420 claims had been paid as at October 2013, 44 of which 29,456 were related to “fisheries and mariculture” and 2,768 were 45 related to “tourism and other economic damages.”

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1 Trans Mountain notes that only certain selected claims relating to the Prestige spill were 2 disallowed. Many of these were because of lack of documentation, and some because of 3 ineligibility based on “abstract quantification” consistent with the Claims Manual (reference i). It 4 is worth highlighting that the IOPCF Claims Manual (Section 3.6 page 38 in Filing ID A3X5W1) 5 deals comprehensively with such matters and clearly specifies that a broad class of claims for 6 environmental damage and post-spill studies are eligible including (i) loss of profit for 7 impairment of the environment; (ii) economic losses in the fisheries, mariculture, and processing 8 sectors; and (iii) tourism sector losses. Costs for some offsets are also permitted because 9 “reinstatement measures taken at some distance from, but still within the general vicinity of, the 10 damaged area may be acceptable so long as it can be demonstrated that they would actually 11 enhance the recovery of the damaged components of the environment.” Other costs are also 12 eligible, including those preventing further damage from occurring, those that accelerate 13 recovery, and those supporting studies that potentially contribute to the global knowledge base 14 on environment recovery methods.

15 Trans Mountain further notes that various arbitration processes exist for both the IOPCF and the 16 SOPF. For example, Canada’s SOPF Claims Manual (City of Vancouver IR No. 17 2.11.1a - Attachment 2 [Filing ID A4H8G6]) specifies that “If the Administrator and a fisheries 18 claimant cannot agree on the amount of compensation of the claim, the matter will be referred to 19 the Minister of Transport. Consequently, an assessor will be appointed to report on the amount 20 at which the claim is assessed and must be paid by the Administrator to the fishery claimant. 21 [Page 20]”

22 In brief, the IOPCF regime provides extensive coverage for a wide range of losses that are 23 important to stakeholders in Canada. The SOPF improves on that regime by increasing total 24 funds available for coverage and also covering certain claims (e.g., those associated with 25 fisheries) with greater scope. Some items for which claims have been sought, such as anxiety 26 or environmental damages with no accepted basis for monetization (such as payments for 27 ecosystem services described elsewhere in this Reply Evidence), are not compensable: this 28 was specified as early as 1994 by the IOPCF as documented in evidence put forward by the 29 City of Vancouver (PDF page 6 of Filing ID A4L9G9).

61.3.4 World Class Regime 30 Some concerns have been expressed with whether Canada has a “World Class” regime in 31 place to handle spill costs. The Stone Report (PDF page 8 of Filing ID A4L8E9) opines:

32 [T]he current Canadian standards for oil spill response and recovery are 33 insufficient for establishing the cost of a "world class system". … Moreover, the 34 1992 Civil Liability Convention (CLC 1992), to which Canada is a signatory, is 35 generally sub-standard to the US-equivalent Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 36 1990). Numerous studies have detailed the CLC 1992’s inferior environmental 37 protections, lower clean-up standards, and smaller compensation coverage than 38 that of OPA 1990 (Mason, 2003; Kim, 2003; Jacobsson 2007; Kiran 2010; 39 Schoenbaum, 2012). Thus, studies that claim Canada's cost of oil spill response 40 is cheaper than the United States are not reporting cost-savings or economies of 41 scale, but are instead describing the lower response and recovery standards that 42 characterize the Canadian system.

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1 “World Class” is a term that is an effective means to express a worthy objective which Trans 2 Mountain supports. However, it must be recognized that because of differences in geographic, 3 commercial, technical, and political settings around the world, there is no single formula or 4 example of "World Class" that can be copied from another regime and directly applied to the 5 Canadian context.

6 In addition, it is not necessarily meaningful to compare legislative contexts in different countries. 7 For example, Trans Mountain Response to Allan R IR No. 1.18b (PDF page 178 of Filing 8 ID A3X5V9) elaborates:

9 “Trans Mountain did not create a detailed comparison of the US Oil Pollution Act 10 (OPA) 1990 to all of the regulatory and legislative requirements in Canada, in 11 developing its evidence. Such comparison is not necessary. The data shows that 12 spills costs in the US are higher than other countries. The evidence contained in 13 reference (i) [Volume 7 of Application] is that such differences exist and have 14 been documented.

15 Etkin (1999) is cited as opining that these differences can be partially attributed 16 to response requirements in OPA 1990. In Etkin (1999) she elaborates with the 17 observation that “Especially in the United States, fear of future litigation often 18 impels spillers to mount massive response operations-at considerable 19 expense-to dispel any notions of ‘irresponsibility.’ In some cases, public and 20 government pressure for the responsible party to undertake radical-and 21 expensive-cleanup procedures may not always be in the best interest of 22 environmental protection, even if it is well intentioned.” Her last point is very 23 important. More expensive response does not imply better response. She 24 continues: “While a beach might look clean after aggressive cleanup efforts, the 25 procedures employed may actually result in more environmental damage than 26 the spilled oil itself.”

27 There are many variables in cleanup costs with key aspects being spill location, 28 oil type, and initial containment and removal. Response is focused on spill source 29 control and mitigation, preventing or minimizing any oil from entering into a 30 waterbody, and prompt removal. Trans Mountain is committed to responding to 31 any spill in a manner that respects Canadian regulations and reflects best 32 available practice for environmental remediation.”

33 Finally, comparisons relating to liability caps may also not be an indicator of what is “best.” Each 34 country chooses what it regards as appropriate for its local circumstances. Mr. Stone’s 35 juxtaposition of the CLC (1992) and the US OPA (1990) without further context of the IOPCF 36 and the SOPF provides a misinformed and misleading comparison. The IOPCF consist of two 37 tiers, which backstop the funding available to the ship owner’s insurance required under the 38 CLC. Countries can opt in or out of the second tier. Some countries subscribe to just the first tier 39 (the 1992 Fund); some countries also subscribe to the second tier (Supplementary Fund). 40 Canada subscribes to both, and also has an additional tier through the SOPF, which provides 41 incremental funding and coverage for some spills (e.g., ghost spills from unknown sources) that 42 are not addressed by the IOPCF. Together, this regime provides over $1.4 billion of coverage. 43 Moreover, under the CLC, to which Canada is a party, ship owner liability is unlimited in event of 44 negligence. The SOPF is indexed annually. The Government of Canada will enhance the

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1 liability and compensation regime by introducing legislative and regulatory amendments as 2 follows.

3 · The full balance of the SOPF, currently about $400 million, will be available in 4 the event of an oil spill.

5 · In the event that all available sources of funds have been exhausted by 6 spill-related claims, the Government of Canada will ensure compensation is 7 provided to eligible claimants, and then recover those payments from the 8 marine oil transport industry through a levy.

9 · The SOPF will be aligned with international funds by covering pure economic 10 losses suffered by people who have had a loss of earnings but whose property 11 has not been contaminated by an oil spill.

12 As described in WSDOE Evidence (PDF page 12 of Filing ID A4Q1X6),

13 “The US Coast Guard and US Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires double-hulled 14 tank vessels over 3000 gross tons to have Certificates of Financial Responsibility 15 of at least the greater of $1,900 per gross ton [GT] or $16,000,000 available per 16 incident. For owners or operators of a tank vessel the amount of financial 17 responsibility required is one billion dollars.

18 Note: GT is a unitless index related to a ship’s overall internal volume. It is not to 19 be confused with the vessel’s cargo carrying capacity, which is normally 20 expressed in metric tonnes as Deadweight (DWT).”

21 Given the above, a typical Aframax tanker (approximate GT of 58,000), is required to have at 22 least US$120 million dollars available per oil spill accident. This level is comparable to liability 23 required by ship owners under the CLC.

61.3.5 Compensation for Asymmetric Risk/Benefit Distribution 24 TLBCC evidence generally expresses concern that if the Project is approved then it will be 25 bearing direct risks without realizing any direct compensating benefits. It notes that the burden 26 of this risk may never be adequately compensated (Filing ID A4Q2G1).

27 There is no compensation for being exposed to a hazard. The likelihood of a spill from a Project 28 tanker impacting the area of concern to TLBCC is extremely low, and in any event, the hazard 29 and risk currently exist as a result of tanker and non-tanker operations in the Port of Vancouver 30 and in US ports to the south. The hazards have also been present from the military operations 31 at Esquimalt, and from ongoing offshore traffic on the West Coast of Vancouver Island that is 32 not necessarily associated with the Salish Sea. The historical precursor to what we now know 33 as the West Coast Trail was specifically put in place as a mitigation measure to improve safety 34 and provide a lifeline for shipwrecked sailors. In brief, the hazard already exists: residents and 35 businesses have been living with this hazard for over a century.

36 Mitigation measures to reduce the likelihood of a tanker spill have been described in Section 59 37 (Marine Transportation) in the Reply Evidence. Compensation measures in the event of a spill 38 have been elaborated above in this Section.

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61.3.6 Burden on Municipalities if there is a Funding Gap - the MacWilliam Report 1 Evidence submitted by the City of Vancouver asserts that in the event of a spill there will be a 2 financing gap that the city will be forced to bear. With that assumption, it contracted the 3 MacWilliam Report (Filing ID A4L9H1) to identify potential mechanisms for the City to bridge 4 any such gap. The Report explicitly seeks to determine the availability in the market of up to 5 $1 billion in insurance or similar to cover any incremental damages.

6 First, as noted previously, Trans Mountain does not believe the City of Vancouver has 7 embarked on this work under the correct premise. As described previously, the scenario 8 described and the costs associated with it are not credible. Seeking additional insurance or 9 similar to cover such a rare eventuality is at best a modest expenditure of money on an 10 unnecessary study. At worst it is an exaggeration that contributes to the social amplification of a 11 perceived risk which itself interferes in the marketplace.

12 Second, the parameters under which Ms. MacWilliam carried out her study were inconsistent 13 with the legal realities relating to responsibility. As described in “§2 Assumptions and 14 Constraints,” the MacWilliam Report states (PDF page 17 of Filing ID A4L9H1):

15 Because of the existence of multiple stakeholders, each of which has financial 16 and other interests that are not exactly aligned, it is assumed that the City of 17 Vancouver wishes to control, but not fund, a risk financing mechanism 18 which may be used to compensate third parties who may sustain losses as a 19 result of a spill event. The options discussed in this report assume that the City of 20 Vancouver will be the arranging and controlling organization and that the 21 pipeline proponent and possible other stakeholders, will fund the cost of 22 the risk financing mechanisms as a condition of approval being granted by 23 the National Energy Board.

24 As the author of this report, I do not have the experience or the expertise to draw 25 definitive conclusions about restrictions or permissions pursuant to the 26 Vancouver Charter and accordingly, no such investigation has been carried out. 27 It is my opinion that legal advice should be sought in this regard if alternate risk 28 financing mechanisms to fund a marine-based oil spill are arranged.

29 …

30 Because of the nature of the risk financing marketplace, it is not appropriate to 31 assume that the information contained herein will remain valid for any 32 significant duration. [Emphasis added]

33 The above suggests that the financing mechanism would apply to a marine-based spill 34 triggering event (i.e., from a tanker). In such instances, Canadian law and International 35 Convention clearly state that the tanker owner is the Responsible Party. It is inconceivable that 36 the pipeline proponent or anybody else would assume that responsibility and it is not within the 37 NEB jurisdiction to require such conditions.

38 Third, the 2015 Pipeline Safety Act received assent in June 2015. Ms. MacWillliam was not in 39 her terms of reference asked to opine on what influence the Act (i.e., Bill C-46) would have on 40 her results. The nature of the Act provides clear guidance to industry and regulators as to the 41 liability of various stakeholders. Trans Mountain notes that Ms. MacWilliam’s evidence was

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1 prepared and submitted prior to the Act receiving assent, and that her findings are already out of 2 date. As noted in her comment above, the nature of the risk marketplace changes quickly and 3 the coming into force of this Act would change the terms of any such eventual placement.

4 Fourth, the extract above from the Report itself speaks to the potential role of “other 5 stakeholders.” Trans Mountain submits that the City of Vancouver is itself a Stakeholder, and in 6 this case - as described - seeks “to control, but not fund,” the mechanism. Other stakeholders 7 also presumably include other municipalities with marine exposure; some of those municipalities 8 have indicated that they will not dedicate emergency response resources under selected 9 circumstances. These facts themselves introduce elements of moral hazard into the calculations 10 of any underwriter. Moral hazard occurs if the owner and beneficiary of a policy may not have 11 the incentive to reduce damages; or may have declared that they would not act in a way to 12 reduce damages. Insurance beneficiaries are expected to act reasonably to minimize damage in 13 case a triggering event occurs. The conditions under which an owner or stakeholder may or 14 may not act are known only to the owner or stakeholder, and this results in asymmetric 15 information, which will increase the cost of any insurance product. In this case, the City of 16 Vancouver has simply specified the terms to force a higher cost of the product, or to increase 17 the likelihood that it cannot obtain the product.

18 Finally, the specific findings of this study show that the cost of a $1 billion bond would be up to 19 $70 million, and that annual fees would be up to $400,000 after a triggering event. The 20 underwriting of the bond in the insurance marketplace normally needs to have some 21 assessment of risks associated with the event. The MacWilliam Report does not specify 22 whether that risk was communicated, and if so, what was communicated. Other evidence 23 presented by the City of Vancouver assumes that such a spill event will occur with 100% 24 certainty sometime during the Project lifetime. The Sumaila Report makes that assumption, the 25 Goodman Report makes that assumption, and the Brand Finance Report makes that 26 assumption. Any underwriter of an alternate risk financing mechanism - if given the same 27 information or asked to make that assumption - would charge high fees or would simply choose 28 to not underwrite the risk (as Ms. MacWilliam implies in stating that there is only a 20% chance 29 that a $1 billion bond could be obtained). Trans Mountain’s evidence demonstrates that such a 30 triggering event - a worst-case marine spill - is far from a certainty. It is a one in 2,841 year 31 event for the entire Project along the entire tanker route (this corresponds to New Case 1c: see 32 Trans Mountain Response to NEB IR No. 4.13b [PDF pages 69-71 of Filing ID A4K4W3]). The 33 likelihood of such a spill occurring within the Vancouver harbour is considerably lower and 34 effectively nil.

35 As such, this evidence and the opinions contained therein are not supported and should not be 36 relied on by the Board.

61.4 Other 37 Some intervenors have raised other compensation-related concerns that are based more on 38 funding principles or timing. Trans Mountain has identified the following as being of concern: 39 (i) pre-spill costs incurred in planning; (ii) compensation for damages to EGS; (iii) volunteer 40 compensation; and, (iv) compensation associated with acts of sabotage or terrorism.

61.4.1 Pre-spill Costs 41 The Makah have requested support for funding local costs in their territory to prepare for spills. 42 Specifically, the Makah identify that the Emergency Response Towing Vessel stationed at Neah

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1 Bay in the US is a worthy project for financing (PDF page 5 of Filing ID A4Q2A4). WSDOE 2 evidence re-iterates this request, or suggests that it may be replaced by a clause in the 3 Applicants Tanker Acceptance Criteria that would “require vessels to pay to maintain the tug on 4 station” (PDF page 13 of Filing ID A4Q1X6). Also, affidavits have been submitted by Ms. Dorit 5 Mason, Director of NSEMO to support the positions of the District of North Vancouver (Filing 6 ID A4Q0H6), District of West Vancouver (Filing ID A4L6L2), and City of North Vancouver (Filing 7 ID A4L6L4). These positions relate to representations in the filed documents that “compensation 8 should be provided to local governments which reflects the significant impacts and true costs to 9 planning, responding and recovering from a spill event” (PDF page 16 of Filing ID A4L6L4). In 10 addition, FER (PDF page 6 of Filing ID A4L6Y2) recommends that the conditions of approval for 11 the TMEP include an endowment fund:

12 “Establish a Research and Monitoring Endowment Fund to provide stable long term 13 funding for research and monitoring over the life of the project (30+years), to learn how 14 to make incremental improvements to practices, plans, marine ecosystem restoration, 15 etc. The Endowment needed is estimated to be at least $450 million. This could be 16 achieved with a 1% environmental levy or the equivalent of an environmental surcharge 17 equal to ($0.25/barrel of oil). Such a levy would accrue the Endowment fund within a 6 to 18 10 year time period based on expected forecasted oil exports. This Endowment 19 conservatively invested (2% return on investment) provides stable secure funding for a 20 $9 million marine research and monitoring program annual budget over the life of this 21 project.”

22 All of these include, in some form, spending that is not connected to a specific spill. Trans 23 Mountain regards that, in considering hypothetical Project spills, these types of expenditures are 24 better addressed through engagement than through compensation or funding. For example, 25 WCMRC is already engaging with communities along the shipping route for their Geographic 26 Response Plan program. Additional detail on such engagement can be found in this Reply 27 Evidence relating Marine Emergency Preparedness and Response (Section 62) and to 28 emergency management at the Westridge Facility (Section 63).

29 Trans Mountain is supportive of national and regional collaborative efforts aimed at continual 30 improvements that will help enhance marine safety and encourage environmental improvement 31 initiatives. For example, the Ministry of Transportation, along with marine shipping experts, 32 non-government organizations, and other officials, recently announced the launch of Canada’s 33 first independent research organization to examine marine shipping in Canada, Clear Seas 34 Centre for Responsible Marine Shipping, based in Vancouver. Clear Seas is an independent, 35 not-for-profit organization that will provide impartial and evidence-based research to inform the 36 public and policy makers about marine traffic in Canadian waters, including risks, mitigation 37 measures, and best practices worldwide for safe and sustainable marine shipping. It is funded 38 by grants from the federal and provincial governments and industry.

39 Regarding research expenditures, Trans Mountain notes that baseline monitoring and 40 assessment as described by FER is not the responsibility of a single stakeholder. The areas of 41 interest are already subject to existing hazards and risks, and this Project imposes only a 42 marginal incremental risk to the existing hazards. Funding of endowment funds of the sort 43 contemplated by the intervenor, by a single project proponent, is neither equitable nor logical. 44 Trans Mountain notes that, as described in response to FER IR No. 2.18 (PDF page 26 of Filing 45 ID A4H8R3), research and study costs are covered under IOPCF protocols if an area is 46 subjected to a tanker spill.

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61.4.2 Compensation for Damages to Ecosystem Goods & Services 1 Many intervenors include EGS values into spill cost estimates and then also assert that these 2 should be covered by compensation. The IOPCF claims manual - and other documents 3 proffered by intervenors noted above - clearly states that for spill claims to be eligible they must 4 be monetized and be connected to the spill through some economic loss to an identifiable 5 individual. For example, evidence placed on the record by the City of Vancouver from the 6 IOPCF shows that this has been a clear direction of the IOPCF since 1994 (PDF Page 8 of 7 Filing ID A4L9H0):

8 7.3 It is submitted that the IOPC Fund should maintain its position that claims relating to 9 the impairment of the environment should be accepted only if the claimant has sustained 10 a quantifiable economic loss, and that the loss must be such that it can be quantified in 11 monetary terms.

12 Most jurists regard this as a reasonable approach, because it implies that compensation is 13 associated with a right or entitlement that may be damaged by a spill. For EGS, such rights and 14 entitlements are not entrenched, hence compensating such values is elusive. The IOPCF adopt 15 a reasonable approach that simply requires good documentation, an acceptable methodology, 16 and a demonstrated connection to the spill event.

17 Trans Mountain notes, however, that monetization is not always possible. The Enbridge 18 Northern Gateway Project JRP concludes similarly that many of such losses simply cannot be 19 estimated:

20 Based on the hearing record, the Panel finds that the estimated costs for 21 damages to ecosystem goods and services are neither well developed nor 22 currently broadly accepted (Government of Canada, 2013, page 362, quoted in 23 Trans Mountain Response to Allan R IR No. 1.18(l), PDF page 180-181 of Filing 24 ID A3X5V9).

61.4.3 Volunteer Compensation 25 Some intervenors have noted that volunteers often play an important role in oil spill cleanup 26 efforts. The intervenors assert that the volunteers are not properly valued in the accounting of 27 spill costs and, even if their services are attributed a nil value, there are real costs incurred by 28 spill response organizers to coordinate, equip, and supervise such volunteers. Trans Mountain 29 acknowledges that volunteers can have a role to play provided that their efforts are consistent 30 with the safety protocols, priorities, and cleanup end-points established by the ICS. However, 31 Trans Mountain asserts that it is not possible to determine in advance either the amount of 32 volunteer effort or the total costs of such effort; such costs will be spill-specific and cannot be 33 known in advance.

34 Trans Mountain notes that costs associated with volunteers are consistently treated as eligible 35 expenses in any subsequent insurance claims arising from a spill. The conditions for eligibility of 36 such costs are essentially similar to those of any cost: the costs must be directly connected to 37 the spill, and they must be reasonable. Incremental overhead costs incurred by NGOs, informal 38 interest groups, and others in accessing volunteers are normally reflected in compensable spill 39 costs. The cost of non-durable or semi-durable materials (for example, personal protection 40 equipment, shovels, tarpaulins, solvents, etc.) would typically be eligible if they involved 41 activities consistent with the priorities of the ICS. Volunteers that participate in activities that

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1 minimize damages or protect at-risk areas from damage would typically be eligible (e.g., boom 2 deployment). Costs that are reasonably associated with transportation and subsistence of 3 volunteers are routinely covered. In all instances, any costs claimed require proper 4 documentation. Depending on spill-specific conditions, as with other costs, advances may be 5 made by the Responsible Party, their insurer, or their agent. In the event of a tanker-based spill, 6 the Canada’s SOPF is also available to provide such advances with a view to future 7 reconciliation against submitted documentation.

61.4.4 Compensation Related to Protests, Sabotage or Terrorism 8 A number of intervenors have expressed concerns that costs related to terrorism or sabotage 9 directed at the Project have not been included in project cost estimates, or cannot be covered 10 adequately by existing insurance regimes because of exclusion clauses. In their cost-benefit 11 analysis of the project, for example, Gunton et al. also draw attention to costs associated with 12 conflict and opposition to the pipeline (PDF pages 71-72 of Filing ID A4L9S2). Matsqui First 13 Nation (PDF pages 193-194 and accompanying Table 2 of Filing ID A4L8J3) indicate that costs 14 will be associated with protests. The City of Vancouver has also expressed its concern on these 15 matters.

16 As indicated in Reply Evidence Section 27, Trans Mountain has not included such costs into 17 any of its estimates. Trans Mountain assumes that the rule of law would apply and that 18 everybody behaves legally; disruptions would be treated through normal policing and legal 19 procedures. Moreover, Trans Mountain believes that it is methodologically incorrect to consider 20 such costs or impacts in determining whether the project is in the public interest. Such costs 21 cannot and should not be included in a determination of the public interest because it implies 22 that anybody with the resources to illegally stop a project would effectively have a way to veto 23 any project simply by including all such costs: such costs should not be included.

24 Please also refer to Trans Mountain’s response to City of Vancouver IR No. 2.11.1d (PDF 25 page 400 of Filing ID A4H8I9).

61.5 References 26 Carson RT, Conaway MB, Hanemann WM, Krosnick JA, Mitchell RC, Presser S. 2004. Valuing 27 Oil Spill Prevention: A Case Study of California’s Central Coast, Kluwer. 257 pp & D. 28 [Referred to as “California Oil Spill Study (COSS)”]

29 Government of Canada. 2013. Considerations. Report of the Joint Review Panel for the 30 Northern Gateway Project. Volume 2. December 2013.

31 Kontovas CA, Psaraftis HN, Ventikos NP. 2010. An empirical analysis of IOPCF oil spill cost 32 data. Marine pollution bulletin, 60(9): 1455-1466.

33 Ship Structure Committee. 2008. Ship Structure Committee Case Study - Prestige: Complete 34 hull failure in a single-hull tanker. US Coast Guard, Washington DC. Website: 35 http://www.shipstructure.org/case_studies/Prestige.pdf. Accessed: July 2015.

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62.0 MARINE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 62.1 Introduction 1 A number of intervenors and commenters have expressed issues associated with marine 2 emergency preparedness and response from activities at the Westridge facility, or from 3 operations of Project-related tankers calling at the Westridge Marine Terminal (the Terminal). 4 Trans Mountain notes that the evidence documents do not always treat or specify whether the 5 concerns are about terminal operations associated with the Trans Mountain Expansion Project 6 (the Project) or the potential for oil spills from Project-related tankers. Further, these documents 7 do not specify whether the concerns relate to spills originating in the terrestrial or marine 8 environment.

9 This section of the Reply Evidence collectively addresses evidence submitted by intervenors 10 including the City of North Vancouver, City of Port Moody, City of Vancouver, City of Victoria, 11 Cowichan Tribes, District of North Vancouver, District of West Vancouver, Ditidaht First Nation, 12 Dorothy Doherty, David Farmer, FER, FOE US, Georgia Strait Alliance, Living Oceans Society, 13 Metro Vancouver, Musqueam Indian Band, NS NOPE, Pacheedaht First Nation, TLBCC, 14 Tsawout First Nation, Tsleil-Waututh Nation, T'Sou-ke First Nation, US Tribes, Village of 15 Belcarra, WSDOE and others.

16 This section should be read in conjunction with sections 52 (Marine Spill Modelling), 59 (Marine 17 Transportation), 25 (Fate and Behaviour of Oil), 61 (Marine Spill Liability and Compensation), 63 18 (Emergency Management Program), and 60 (Marine Risk Assessment) of this Reply Evidence.

19 In addition, reports submitted by Genwest, Levelton, Nuka, and Short have been treated as 20 stand-alone responses.

62.2 Intervenor Concerns 21 Section 62 is topically organized to discuss intervenor concerns as they pertain to emergency 22 preparedness and response associated with marine transportation. Emergency preparedness 23 and response pertaining to Westridge Marine Terminal is covered in Section 63. Trans Mountain 24 notes that the vessel owner is the responsible party in the event of a ship-source spill, for 25 example when the tanker is in transit to or from the Terminal.

26 Each of the following sections is preceded by a reference table that provides necessary context 27 and links intervenors to the topics and sub-topics addressed thereafter.

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62.2.1 Review of Emergency Management in Canada

District of City of Village City of City of Cowichan Pacheedaht T’Souke Intervenor North Port FER of WSDOE Vancouver Victoria Tribes FN FN Vancouver Moody Belcarra A4Q1L6 A4Q1L7 A4Q1Q0 A4Q1U6 A4L7V8 A4L6J3 A4Q1U7 Filing ID A4L7V1 A4Q0E9 A4L8Y1 A4L7F9 A4Q2T7 A4L5T0 A4L5G5 A4Q1X6 A4L7Q5 A4Q1X0 A4L8E7 A4Q1X1 A4Q1X2 A4Q1X4 A4Q1X5

1 Many intervenors expressed concerns and confusion over the Canadian emergency 2 management system with respect to marine oil spills. For example, the City of Vancouver, as 3 part of filed evidence, asserts that no appropriate ERP is in place from appropriate provincial 4 and federal government agencies and that capacity has been reduced in recent years (Filing ID 5 A4L7V8). Similarly, the City of Victoria states in their evidence “the role that City of Victoria staff, 6 other regional emergency responders and/or local volunteers would play in an oil spill event is 7 unclear at this time” (line 47, page 17, Filing ID A4L8Y1). Some have also raised concerns 8 about the ability of response organizations (ROs) and federal, provincial, and municipal 9 emergency resources to cope with a major oil spill in the region. Marine oil spills are low 10 likelihood events, and the risk assessment carried out by DNV for Trans Mountain has 11 confirmed there is low likelihood of a major oil spill in this region (Section 60, Marine Risk 12 Assessment provides further information). The risk assessment shows that there are stringent 13 regulations and practices undertaken by the shipping industry, authorities, and ROs. Tankers 14 are under more scrutiny compared with other vessels and this has resulted in a continuing 15 downward trend in the number of spill incidents worldwide. Trans Mountain has provided 16 information on oil spill response as part of the Marine ESA (Volume 8A, Sections 5.5 - 5.7, Filing 17 IDs A3S4Y6, A3S5Q3, A3S4Y8, A3S4Y9, A3S4Z0), and has responded to a large number of 18 IRs as part of several rounds of the public hearing of the Project.

19 Trans Mountain has addressed the risk assessment of spills in other sections of the Reply 20 Evidence (Sections 23 and 24 address land-based spills and Section 60 addresses marine 21 based spills). Trans Mountain notes that many of the intervenor reports speculate on 22 consequences and spill response but do not consider spill likelihood in their discussions.

23 As described throughout the NEB hearing process, emergency management in Canada is a 24 shared responsibility, which relies on ongoing cooperation and communication between all 25 levels of government. Within Canada's constitutional framework, the provincial and territorial 26 governments and local authorities provide the first response to the vast majority of emergencies. 27 Typically these agencies and organizations undertake the response within an ICS structure with 28 an active UC in charge of the response.

29 Canada’s pollution response regime is based upon polluter pays principles and is a 30 well-recognized industry and government partnership collaboration. In that respect, industry 31 ensures resources are in place to effectively and efficiently respond to incidents where industry 32 has caused an oil spill. An example of this government-industry partnership collaboration is 33 WCMRC, which is the industry owned, TC certified, marine oil spill Response Organization on 34 the west coast of Canada. WCMRC capacity has increased over the years and will further

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1 increase if the Project is approved. When the polluter is unknown, incapable, or does not 2 otherwise undertake a response, government may direct its own response or require such 3 industry organizations as WCMRC to participate in a response.

4 The National Emergency Response System (NRES) is a component of Canada's emergency 5 response management system and incorporates the principles for emergency management, 6 which are aligned with Trans Mountain and WCMRC’s approach to emergency preparedness 7 and response.

8 Canada’s principles for emergency management are:

9 · Emergency management responsibility in Canada is shared by federal, provincial, and 10 territorial government and their partners.

11 · Federal, provincial, and territorial governments have respectively adopted a 12 comprehensive approach to emergency management, which includes balanced efforts 13 across prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery functions.

14 · Emergency management involves good partnerships at all levels of government as well as 15 with the private sector, first responders, communities, municipalities, and individual citizens.

16 · Emergency Management relies on coherency of action and on the existence of clear and 17 appropriate roles, responsibilities, authorities, and capacities of partners to ensure the most 18 effective use of resources and execution of activities.

19 · A risk-based approach emphasizes the importance of assessing vulnerability to all hazards 20 at the outset to determine the optimal balance and integration of functions to address 21 vulnerabilities and risks.

22 · Emergency management adopts an all-hazards approach in every jurisdiction in Canada by 23 addressing vulnerabilities exposed by both natural and human-induced hazards and 24 disasters.

25 · Emergency management aims to strengthen the resiliency of citizens, responders, 26 organizations, communities, governments, systems, and society to keep hazards from 27 becoming disasters.

28 · Clear communications by appropriate authorities are critical before, during, and after an 29 emergency.

30 · Emergency management is striving for systematic continuous improvement, including 31 incremental and transformational change, at all levels, as appropriate, to minimize the 32 recurrence of problems.

33 When actions may save lives, preserve the environment or protect property and the economy, 34 the immense impacts of these decisions must be weighed carefully within the context of 35 emergency management ethics and values (NRES Principles; refer to Section 62, 36 Appendix 62A).

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62.2.2 Role of Transport Canada 1 TC is the lead regulatory agency responsible for Canada's Marine Oil Spill Preparedness and 2 Response Regime. The agency implements regulations and sets rigorous standards for ROs 3 and OHFs, and ensures the required national preparedness capacity for the regime. TC 4 evidence (Filing ID A4L7K1) provides further information on the role of TC in preventing and 5 mitigating oil spills. Government and industry work together under the leadership of TC to 6 protect Canada's marine environment from negative effects of spills arising from the marine 7 transportation of oil products. This collaborative approach:

8 · fosters best preventive practices;

9 · ensures immediate and effective response to a potential spill anywhere in 10 waters under Canadian jurisdiction;

11 · maintains in a state of readiness, a supply of appropriate preparedness 12 equipment, along with plans and a network of trained personnel;

13 · supports international efforts to protect and enhance the marine environment 14 worldwide; and

15 · implements necessary adjustments to continue the development of the system.

16 Under the regime, OHF and vessels of a prescribed class are required to have an arrangement 17 with a TC-certified RO for the provision of a response in the event of a pollution incident. The 18 regime also requires vessels operating in waters under Canadian jurisdiction to develop a Ship 19 Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) and enter into an arrangement with a certified RO.

62.2.2.1 Role of the Canadian Coast Guard 20 The CCG is a Special Operating Agency of DFO. In Canadian waters and the Exclusive 21 Economic Zone, the CCG is the operational arm of the Government of Canada, and is 22 responsible for:

23 · ensuring an appropriate response to ship-source and mystery-source pollution 24 incidents;

25 · providing aids to navigation and waterways management services; and

26 · providing marine communication and traffic services.

27 Further information on the CCG’s roles is available in the CCG’s Evidence (Filing ID A4L7D5).

28 The CCG National Response Team concept of operations provides the framework for a 29 coordinated national response to a marine pollution incident, a natural disaster, or a manmade 30 disaster through the cascading of human and material resources from all CCG regions. This 31 concept applies when the CCG serves as the On Scene Commander, Federal Monitoring 32 Officer, or resource agency to another government department.

33 The implementation of the ICS will increase the CCG’s ability to respond to marine pollution 34 incidents and other incidents together with key partners and ROs. The ICS methodology creates 35 a centralized, controlled approach enabling the CCG to collaborate with federal and provincial

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1 partners, First Nations, and the private sector to respond quickly and safely. The system, which 2 will be fully implemented in the CCG by 2018, allows multiple stakeholders to participate in 3 important decision-making processes simultaneously and allows for effective planning and 4 response initiatives to address all marine pollution and all-hazard incidents in a predictable and 5 structured fashion.

6 In addition, the CCG is undertaking Area Response Planning with a wide range of marine 7 stakeholders, which will further define the roles of local government, communities, and First 8 Nations.

9 62.2.2.1.1 The Canada-United States Marine Pollution Contingency Plan 10 Canada and the United States share a common maritime international boundary and take joint 11 responsibility of large sections of the waters, including the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Vessels 12 entering and exiting the Port of Metro Vancouver travel through the waters of both Canada and 13 the United States. The coast guards of both countries have a long-standing relationship of close 14 cooperation, including preparedness and response for cross-boundary spills.

15 The Canada-United States Marine Pollution Joint Contingency Plan provides a coordinated 16 system for planning, preparedness, and responding to harmful substance incidents in 17 contiguous waters. If an incident occurs that affects waters in both countries, the plan 18 supplements the existing national response system of each party for areas covered by the plan 19 by ensuring cooperative bilateral response planning at the local and national levels. Joint 20 exercises are conducted on a regular basis to test the system and ensure that it remains 21 adequate and efficient.

62.2.2.2 Role of Local Governments

District of North District of West City of Port City of Georgia Straight Pacheedaht Intervenor Vancouver Vancouver Moody Victoria Alliance FN Filing ID A4Q0H6 A4L6L2 A4L7Q4 A4L8Y1 A4Q1K1 A4L5K2

22 In BC, local governments lead the initial response to emergencies and disasters in their 23 communities. As required by law, local governments prepare emergency plans and maintain an 24 emergency management organization to ensure the safety of citizens when a situation 25 escalates beyond the first responder level. Emergency Management BC (EMBC) is the 26 provincial coordinating agency for emergency management activities in BC. EMBC works with 27 local and federal government, First Nations, industry, non-governmental organizations, and 28 volunteers to support risk assessment, mitigation, preparedness, planning, response, and 29 recovery.

30 In its evidence, the Georgia Strait Alliance (Filing ID A4Q1K1) made several recommendations, 31 all aimed at strengthening the marine oil spill regime applicable to the Georgia Strait region. The 32 Georgia Strait Alliance recommended enhancing local government preparedness and improving 33 the definition and understanding of the roles and responsibilities of local governments as 34 partners with federal and provincial agencies, WCMRC, First Nations, and others.

35 Trans Mountain is supportive of a cooperative approach between all agencies involved in spill 36 response and believes the implementation of the ICS will increase the CCG’s ability to respond 37 to marine pollution incidents and other incidents together with key partners and ROs. The ICS 38 methodology creates a centralized, controlled approach enabling the CCG to collaborate with 39 federal and provincial partners, First Nations, and the private sector to respond quickly and

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1 safely. The system, which will be fully implemented in the CCG by 2018, allows multiple 2 stakeholders to participate in important decision-making processes simultaneously and allows 3 for effective planning and response initiatives to address all marine pollution and all-hazard 4 incidents in a predictable and structured fashion.

62.2.2.3 Role of WCMRC 5 The role of WCMRC is discussed in a number of IR responses, such as response to City of Port 6 Moody IR No. 2.3.26e (Filing ID A4H8G7).

7 WCMRC is the RO for the West Coast. Current planning standards require a minimum capacity 8 to respond to oil spills of up to 10,000 tonnes in specified time frames, which in some cases 9 currently allows up to 72 hours (plus travel time) to deliver response equipment. WCMRC 10 maintains capacity significantly in excess of the minimum planning standard requirements. The 11 preparedness capacities mentioned are a measurement against the RO standards developed 12 for RO certification.

13 Trans Mountain takes responsibility for the oil it transports through its pipeline network, 14 regardless of who is determined to be the responsible party causing the incident. In the unlikely 15 event of a spill or release during loading at the Westridge Marine Terminal, Trans Mountain will 16 respond immediately under the Terminal ERP. Once a tanker has completed loading and leaves 17 the Westridge loading facility and terminal, Trans Mountain is no longer considered responsible 18 for the cargo which in this case falls under jurisdiction of the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 and 19 associated marine transport regulation.

20 WCMRC’s primary funding mechanism is a per tonne charge applied to the loading or unloading 21 of petroleum at all oil handling terminals within WCMRC’s area of response (BOCF). This fee 22 applies not just to crude oil loaded at Westridge for export but also to all “oil” as defined in 23 MARPOL Annex 1 which includes refined products imported or transhipped for local market 24 consumption. In the case of Trans Mountain’s Westridge terminal, the BOCF charged by 25 WCMRC to Trans Mountain is recovered by Trans Mountain as a flow-through of cost to the 26 pipeline shippers that use Westridge under the terms of Trans Mountains NEB approved tariff.

27 Although Trans Mountain has an ownership position in WCMRC, it does not profit from their 28 provision of spill response services. Under terms of the WCMRC shareholder agreement, Trans 29 Mountain receives an annual dividend from its shareholding calculated based a benchmark rate 30 for return on equity and a fixed nominal value for each share. By convention the Rate of Return 31 on Common Equity (ROE) per Discontinued RH-2-94 Formula published by the NEB is used by 32 WCMRC as the benchmark rate for calculating return on equity. The shareholder equity in 33 WCMRC is not affected by revenue and has not changed since the organization’s inception. 34 Under terms of the WCMRC shareholder agreement, the proportion of shares held among 35 shareholders is adjusted periodically so as to match the proportion of oil handled by shareholder 36 facilities with the result that the number of shares held by Trans Mountain varies over time. 37 While the dividend paid to Trans Mountain may vary over time due to changes in the benchmark 38 ROE and the number of shares held by TM, it is independent of spill response activity. Net 39 proceeds from spill response services are used to reduce the BOCF charged to WCMRC 40 members in future periods. In the case of Trans Mountain, the cost of this fee flows through to 41 and is paid by its pipeline shippers under terms of its pipeline tariff.

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1 In addition, if the Project proceeds, enhancements to WCMRC’s existing resources (Volume 8A, 2 Table 5.5.3) shall entail an investment of approximately $100 million through an additional 3 BOCF (Bulk Oil Cargo Fee) initiated by Trans Mountain. This would result in doubling of 4 planning standards for marine emergency response capacity, hiring of about 100 new WCMRC 5 staff and the opening of five new bases along the shipping route at locations in South BC (some 6 of which will operate 24 hours per day). WCMRC’s main base is in Burnaby and WCMRC is 7 considering areas near Deltaport, Nanaimo, Sidney, Sooke and Ucluelet for the new base 8 locations. Trans Mountain’s commitment to enhancing marine spill response capacity in the 9 region will benefit the entire shipping community in the Salish Sea.

10 62.2.2.3.1 Geographic Response Plans

City of District of District of Cowichan Intervenor District of North Vancouver Port FER North Vancouver West Vancouver Tribes Moody A4Q1L6 A4Q1L7 Filing ID A4Q0E9 A4Q0H6 A4L6L2 A4L7Q4 A4Q2T7 A4Q1L9 A4Q1Q0

11 WCMRC, in collaboration with federal government agencies, local governments, First Nations, 12 and other stakeholders, has been developing new coastal Area Plans to prepare responders for 13 the unique aspects of the BC coastline (also refer to Section 62.4.6.2). Each Area Plan includes:

14 · logistical information unique to the defined area (e.g., Incident Command Post 15 (ICP) location, accommodations, ground transportation, and local contacts);

16 · notification process for personnel (local and cascaded);

17 · equipment within the area and mobilization of additional equipment;

18 · general description of area sensitivities and/or the process to identify them;

19 · links to the ICS key command staff positions and associated activities; and

20 · response strategies and GRPs.

21 A subset of the Area Plans is the GRPs, a collection of site-specific strategies in a geographic 22 area used for the initial response to an oil spill on water. In an Affidavit of Ms. Dorit Mason, filed 23 as evidence by City of North Vancouver, District of North Vancouver, and District of West 24 Vancouver, it is stated that GRPs are “critical in determining how to respond to an oil spill and 25 must involve significant input from the communities to identify sensitive environmental areas, 26 high public use areas, culturally significant areas, and other features that are important” (line 27 4.2, page 5, Filing ID A4Q0H6). GRPs are created to significantly reduce the time needed to 28 make decisions during the initial response. A GRP provides responders with essential 29 information about the site and strategies needed to ensure that the response to a spill is fast 30 and effective, and that sensitive resources are protected.

31 In 2013, WCMRC initiated the development of a new coastal mapping system. This new 32 system, which is still under development, will house not only coastal sensitivities and associated 33 Geographic Response Strategies (GRS) but also all associated logistical support information. 34 GRS is a detailed plan used for the initial nearshore response in an emergency situation. The 35 program utilizes local knowledge to assist in shoreline sensitivity classification to possible oiling.

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1 As for shoreline protection strategies, these are built, in conjunction with and/or reviewed with 2 local stakeholders (e.g., Emergency Planners, First Nations) to address the sensitivities that 3 have been identified as part of the coastal mapping project. Each sensitivity has a 4 corresponding geographic response strategy and protective assignment developed and ready to 5 be implemented in the event of a spill. Each feature is then field-tested and a two-page 6 reference document is developed and reviewed with government agencies. The goal of a GRS 7 is to protect sensitive natural and cultural features while reducing decision-making time during 8 an actual spill. The GRS is designed to provide all the necessary information required to carry 9 out an efficient and rapid shoreline response.

62.2.3 Proposed Enhanced Response Regime

Cowichan Pacheedaht Intervenor City of Vancouver FOE Village of Belcarra Tribes FN A4Q1X0 A4Q1X1 Filing ID A4L7L3 A4L9W4 A4L7F3 A4L5G5 A4Q1X2 A4Q1Y3 10

11 In all Application documents and public forums, Trans Mountain has stated that the enhanced 12 response regime would be implemented on or before the Project becomes operational, should it 13 be approved. These enhancements include not only increased equipment and response 14 personnel but also the establishment of new response bases along the shipping route. Evidence 15 that uses current response forces as a metric to evaluate the future Project is misleading.

16 To support the Project, Trans Mountain has proposed an enhanced response regime detailed in 17 Volume 8A, Section 5, Table 5.5.3 (Filing ID A3S4Y6) that exceeds legislated standards. This 18 regime will be based on a simplified division of WCMRC’s Geographic Area of Response that 19 combines their Primary Area of Response and their Enhanced Response Area into one region 20 to be referred to as the Increased Response Area (IRA).

21 As described in response to Province of BC TERMPOL IR No. T.5b, under the current 22 regulatory regimes governing marine spill response (Canada Shipping Act) and governing Trans 23 Mountain operations (NEB Act) the provision of marine spill response capacity is, in the case of 24 Westridge, ultimately borne by Trans Mountain’s pipeline shippers that use the terminal. 25 Specifically, the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 allows WCMRC to recover the cost of its 26 mandatory membership agreements and Trans Mountain recovers the cost of WCMRC’s fees 27 from its Westridge shippers as a flow-through of cost allowed under its NEB approved tariff. On 28 May 29, 2015, in a separate proceeding, the NEB issued Order TOI-001-2015, providing interim 29 approval for amendments to the Trans Mountain tariff that allow similar flow-through treatment 30 for the supplemental BOCF now being charged to Trans Mountain by WCMRC.

31 In keeping with its principle that marine spill response should be enhanced within the existing 32 regime, Trans Mountain is committed to working with WCMRC and its Trans Mountain shippers 33 to establish funding for the enhancements based on continuation of the existing funding regime 34 for Westridge. The financing structure of WCMRC is described in response to Allan R IR 35 Nos. 1.25b through 1.25g (Filing ID A3X5V9). WCMRC funded on a cost-of-service basis and is 36 almost entirely debt financed. Continued investment in this manner ensures the marine spill 37 response capacity WCMRC provides for the benefit of all its members is provided at low cost. 38 Since WCMRC’s financing framework ensures a low cost structure, it is the most cost efficient 39 means to fund in the enhancements.

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1 The WCMRC board has resolved to implement the enhanced planning standards subject to 2 implementation of an appropriate funding mechanism and WCMRC has established this funding 3 mechanism through a supplemental BOCF that is now being charged on crude oil loaded at 4 Trans Mountain’s Westridge terminal with the intention that revenue from this fee will be used to 5 implement the enhanced planning standards described in Volume 8A, Section 5.5.2, Table 5.5.3 6 of the Application (Filing ID A56025).

7 Recovering the enhancement costs over WCMRC’s pre-TMEP billing volume would result in a 8 significant increase in the BOCF for all WCMRC BOCF rate payers until such time as the TMEP 9 expansion volumes are realized, if the Project is approved. Since the supplemental BOCF is 10 only charged to Westridge crude oil loading, it does not unduly burden other WCMRC BOCF 11 rate payers with carrying costs and volume risk during the pre-expansion implementation of the 12 TMEP enhancements. In effect, only Trans Mountain shippers will pay the supplemental BOCF 13 during the years before expansion. This mechanism is meant to protect other WCMRC 14 members from costs associated with investments by WCMRC in enhanced marine spill 15 response procedures, equipment, and resources.

16 With the onset of TMEP volumes, the increased WCMRC billing volume relative to its increased 17 cost base is expected to result in a BOCF that is comparable to the current rate. Therefore 18 WCMRC members, which include all OHFs and large vessels calling in BC, would benefit from 19 the protection provided by the enhanced response capacity and reduced response times without 20 incurring higher costs.

62.2.3.1 Response Capacity Design 21 While many intervenors (refer to table at the beginning of Section 74.3.4) voiced concerns over 22 oil spill response, the Ditidaht (Filing ID A4L5D3, Exhibit C, Exhibit D), a First Nation with 23 traditional territories along the Pacific Coast and adjacent to the tanker route, expressed 24 concern over the sufficiency of the proposed response regime given the remoteness of their 25 territory. In his affidavit, Chief Jack Thompson recounted the experience the Ditidaht had 26 following the 1988 Nestucca spill off the coast of Washington: “Ditidaht members were the first 27 ones out on the shore to clean up, filling garbage bag barrels with oil, which was eventually 28 carried away by helicopter. We worked on our own for about a week before any help arrived.” 29 Chief Thompson went on to note that “…there is no paved road from Lake Cowichan to the 30 coastline in our territory, which would make it difficult for first responders to access our territory 31 in the event of an emergency or oil spill.” These concerns were similarly reflected in the 32 evidence supplied by Chief Arliss Daniels of the Pacheedaht First Nation (Filing ID A4L5K2, 33 A4L7F3) who stated, “Our concerns include the lack of capacity to reach Pacheedaht Traditional 34 Territory in a timely way to deal with the immediate and long-term effects of a spill.” Evidence 35 filed by the Ditidaht and Pacheedaht First Nations are examples of intervenor concerns that 36 highlight that delays in responding to a spill, especially for remote communities, can have 37 deleterious effects on the outcome of a response.

38 Trans Mountain and WCMRC believe that next to prevention, rapid response and minimization 39 of delays are the best defensive actions against an oil spill. As such, a practical way of 40 preparing for a delay in spill response is to: 1) analyze areas along the tanker route for risk; 41 2) site forward response bases according to the outcomes of those risk assessment; 3) staff key 42 response bases on a 24/7 level; and 4) undertake training exercises. This is exactly the method 43 proposed by Trans Mountain in the Future Oil Spill Response and Approach Plan (Filing 44 ID A3S5I9).

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1 The WCMRC study the Future Oil Spill Response Approach Plan (WCMRC 2013) describes an 2 enhanced response regime that will be capable of delivering 20,000 tonnes of capacity within 3 36 hours from dedicated resources staged within the study area. This enhanced response 4 regime represents a response capacity that is double and a delivery time that is half the existing 5 legislated planning standards. These enhancements will reduce times for initiating a response to 6 two hours for the Burrard Inlet and six hours for the remainder of the study area and parts of the 7 West Coast of Vancouver Island. These reduced times will be achieved by creating new base 8 locations along the tanker route. Meeting the response capacities within the designated times 9 requires redundancy of equipment; as a result, the overall capacity of dedicated response 10 equipment resident in the area will be in excess of 20,000 tonnes. The WCMRC report is 11 available as a supplementary report supporting the TERMPOL submission.

12 The following times have been proposed for commencing onsite spill counter measures, which, 13 together with the proposed distribution of response resources at bases close or adjacent to the 14 shipping route, are designed to significantly reduce initial response time:

15 · two hours to commence response to a spill up to 2,500 tonnes in size within 16 the Port of Vancouver (existing boundaries including Delta Port);

17 · six hours to commence response to a spill up to 2,500 tonnes size outside the 18 Port of Vancouver to the sea buoy (Buoy “Juliet”); and

19 · additional equipment necessary to deal with a 20,000 tonne oil spill will be 20 cascaded in within 36 hours of initial notification for entire IRA.

21 Figure 62-1 (TERMPOL 3.15, Figure 46, Filing ID A3S5F6) shows the 6-hour coverage from the 22 proposed new base locations.

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1

2 Figure 62-1 Extended 6 Hour Coverage from Possible Spill Base Locations

62-1 August 2015 Page 62-11 Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 62.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Marine Emergency Preparedness and Response Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

1 Deploying response equipment and manpower during a spill will typically be undertaken as part 2 of a carefully thought out response plan under direction of a UC working in an ICS structure. It is 3 clarified that the initial response is considered as arrival and deployment of response resources, 4 including containment boom, at the spill site. Further response resources will follow. As can be 5 seen in Figures 62-2 and 62-3, locating spill response equipment in forward locations will 6 ensure that communities such as those of the Ditidaht and Pacheedaht, that currently do not 7 have spill resources in close proximity, shall in future have such resources nearby to deal with 8 spills in their immediate locality of both known and mystery origins. Therefore, even 9 communities that are more distant from the tanker route will also benefit from the proposed 10 enhancements.

11 There have been continual improvements in the design of spill response equipment that have 12 made them, as well as the entire response system, more effective in different weather 13 conditions. Operational thresholds may be increased through the deployment of more recently 14 developed dual purpose containment and recovery devices such as Current BustersTM that offer 15 more effective countermeasures under stronger wind, wave, and current conditions. 16 Additionally, experiences in other locations have shown that during deteriorating weather 17 conditions, large storage vessels can be used as extended deployment platforms to shelter 18 smaller on-water assets so that those units may continue to remain close to the response site 19 awaiting improved conditions to resume operations. Conventional general purpose booms are 20 the most commonly used floating barriers designed to contain, concentrate, and reduce the 21 spreading of spilled oil, but become less effective when moored in areas with higher tidal 22 currents. To restore some of the performance lost to fast moving water, tactics can be adjusted 23 from containment to the angled diversion of oil to a collection point. Likewise, additional 24 deployments of boom, such as double booming techniques, and use of purpose-designed 25 booms have been shown to increase effectiveness. Evidence from other responses has 26 indicated that Current BustersTM , with their high rates of encounter, have demonstrated 27 enhanced performance over conventional booms in containing and recovering oil in higher 28 current speeds. Such techniques have been used as part of WCMRC’s systems-based spill 29 response.

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1 2 Figure 62-2 4 Hour Circles from Future Possible Spill Base Locations (WCMRC 2013)

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1 2 Figure 62-3 4 Hour Circles from Future Possible Spill Base Locations (WCMRC 2013)

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62.2.3.2 Supplemental Response Resources 1 In line with recommendations made by the TSEP, additional contributions to a rapid and 2 sufficient oil spill response are made through supplemental contract assets and mutual aid 3 partners. Private contractors and industry cooperatives maintain a large inventory of oil spill 4 response equipment and personnel on the west coast of North America. Access to this 5 inventory is facilitated through the Western Response Resource List, a Web-based database of 6 regional oil spill response equipment. This uniform system expedites mutual aid through the 7 location and ordering of response equipment from multiple sources during a spill (WDOE 2015).

62.2.3.3 Response Techniques Including Response to Submerged and Sinking Oil

District of City of Cowichan Living David Musqueam Pacheedaht US Intervenor North WSDOE Vancouver Tribes Oceans Farmer FN FN Tribes Vancouver A4Q1L5 A4Q1L6 A4Q1L7 A4Q0E9 A4Q1L8 A4L9R6 A4L7G Filing ID A4L7V8 A4L6R8 A4Q2F9 A4L5K2 A4Q1X6 A4Q0I1 A4Q1Q1 A4L9S1 2 A4Q1U2 A4Q1U3 A4Q1X5 8

9 A number of intervenors had concerns about the response techniques that would be applied 10 and their effectiveness on spills of all oil types, including heavy crudes such as dilbit. In their 11 evidence, the City of Vancouver states that “the potential for diluted bitumen to submerge when 12 spilled … [has] implications for the speed and effectiveness of any oil spill response and 13 recovery measures” (lines 18-22, page 45, Filing ID A4L7V8). Trans Mountain has discussed 14 this in its Application (refer to Volume 8A, Sections 5.5 to 5.7, Filing IDs A3S4Y6, A3S5Q3, 15 A3S4Y8, A3S4Y9, A3S4Z0) and responded through many IRs on this subject (e.g., Trans 16 Mountain Response to Katzie FN IR No. 1.11b, Filing ID A3X6L7).

17 In the unlikely event of a spill, the responsible party (i.e., Trans Mountain for a pipeline spill, and 18 the tanker owner for a tanker spill) would work with WCMRC and regulatory agencies in a UC to 19 determine both response and remediation strategies appropriate for the specific circumstances 20 of the event. To ensure efficient response, the responders would focus on:

21 · controlling the source of the spill;

22 · preventing oil from entering/encroaching on a water body or sensitive area;

23 · containing, intercepting, and promptly removing oil from the water surface; and

24 · removing stranded oil that could be remobilized from the shoreline.

25 Prompt response is important, given that the weathering process is partially related to the time 26 over which oil is exposed to the environment (Section 66 provides further information on the fate 27 and behaviour of dilbit).

28 Should a portion of spilled oil sink, through a combination of factors, and not easily be recovered 29 during the response phase (such as oil in shallow water or along shorelines), it would be treated 30 as a post-emergency response function. Remedial actions, including actions required to recover

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1 sunken oil, would be developed by the responsible party and regulatory authorities working as 2 part of a UC and would be guided by a NEBA.

62.2.3.4 Alternate Response Methods 3 Some intervenors have noted that alternate response methods such as the use of dispersants 4 could be harmful to the marine environment. The Living Oceans Society evidence reflects 5 conclusions in the Short Report, including that “dispersants should only be used as shoreline 6 cleaning agents if their use is determined to be effective and not unacceptably harmful to plants 7 and animals” (line 17, page 8, Filing ID A4L9R6). In the event of a spill response, strategies 8 would be developed under an ICS structure and approved by UC. This structure is expected to 9 include Environment Canada and the BC Ministry of Environment, who would provide advice on 10 environmental priorities. Any decision to use dispersants or other alternate techniques would be 11 based on NEBA and would need approval of the appropriate regulatory authorities. 12 Dispersant use, not specific to dilbit, is an additional response strategy to mechanical spill 13 response, both of which can be used on a spill and are globally employed spill response 14 strategies. Additionally, the product in the pipeline is not exclusively dilbit. As such, dispersants 15 might very well be appropriate for other types of pipeline product. In all situations, it will require 16 a case-by-case assessment under the current regulations. 17 Results of the Gainford meso-scale tests (Volume 8C, TERMPOL reports, TR 8-C-12, S7 A – 18 Study of Fate and Behavior of Diluted Bitumen Oils on Marine Waters, Filing ID A3S5G2) 19 indicated that dispersants tested were only marginally effective on free-floating dilbit for up to 6 20 hours. The dispersants tested were not effective on dilbit that had weathered for over one day, 21 although King (2015) in his presentation to the RSC reports various degrees of dispersant 22 efficiency on dilbits artificially weathered (evaporated) to 7-8%. 23 Similarly, ISB is a valid spill response strategy used the world over and was proven feasible in 24 trials on CLB weathered up to 24 hours. 25 Although the use of alternate response techniques are being investigated by Environment 26 Canada, at this time regulations governing their use are yet to be established. 62.2.3.5 Wildlife

Intervenor City of Vancouver District of North Vancouver Cowichan Tribes A4L7V8 A4Q1L6 A4L7V4 A4Q1L7 A4L9F6 A4Q1Q1 Filing ID A4Q0E9 A4L9F7 A4Q1Y3 A4L9F8 A4Q1Y4 A4L9G1 A4Q1Y6 27

28 Several intervenors provided evidence regarding oiled wildlife response planning standards and 29 responsibility in the event of an oil spill. In their evidence, the City of Vancouver states that “[t]he 30 City understands that there is no legislative requirement for oiled wildlife response, and that 31 there is limited capacity to mount a response to oiled wildlife in the region, given the lack of 32 permanently staged resources and region specific planning, limited funding for the agencies 33 with authority in this area, and a heavy reliance of non-profit volunteer organizations to maintain 34 a state of readiness and respond in the event of a spill” (lines 10 to 14, page 70, Filing 35 ID A4L7V8).

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1 Under the enforcement oversight of the CCG, the polluter, or Responsible Party (RP), is 2 ultimately responsible for all aspects of a marine oil spill, including wildlife. Experience has 3 shown that through the ICS, the RP will engage an established rehabilitation group, such as 4 Focus Wildlife, to address emergency wildlife issues. Wildlife response activities are permitted 5 and supervised by the resource trustee agencies. Within the ICS, this group will adapt the 6 general wildlife response guidelines of Federal agencies (Environment Canada/Canadian 7 Wildlife Services and DFO), the Provincial Government (Ministry of the Environment), and 8 WCMRC to the specific incident to ensure impact on marine birds and wildlife is managed in a 9 responsible manner. Please also refer to Trans Mountain Response to Hackett A IR No. 1.4f 10 and 1.4h (Filing ID A60812).

62.2.3.6 Role of Volunteers

District of City of Cowichan Intervenor City of Vancouver District of North Vancouver West Port Victoria Tribes Vancouver Moody A4L7V8 A4L7V5 A4L7V6 A4Q0E9 Filing ID A4L9F6 A4L6L2 A4L7Q4 A4L8Y1 A4Q1X0 A4Q0H6 A4L9F7 A4L9F8 A4L9G1 11

12 Some intervenors have noted that volunteers often play an important role in oil spill cleanup 13 efforts. For example, the District of North Vancouver notes that “[m]any volunteers are 14 interested in being involved and contributing” to cleanup efforts in the event of a marine spill 15 (line 10, page 17, Filing ID A4Q0E9). Trans Mountain acknowledges that volunteers can have 16 an important support role to play, outside of operations, provided that their efforts are consistent 17 with the safety protocols, priorities, and cleanup end-points established by the Incident 18 Command Structure. Trans Mountain again asserts, however, that it is not possible to determine 19 in advance the amount of volunteer effort that might be required or acceptable; these will be 20 spill-specific and cannot be known in advance.

21 As part of its EMP enhancement process, KMC will develop guidelines for managing volunteers 22 and consider the Planning Guidelines for Convergent Volunteers, June 2008. Pacific States Oil 23 Spill Task Force. Please refer to Section 70.1.5 for further discussion of volunteers.

62.2.3.7 Tanker Safety Expert Panel 24 In December of 2013 the TSEP, an independent panel appointed to review Canada's current 25 tanker safety system and to propose measures to strengthen it, released its report, A Review of 26 Canada's Ship-Source Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Regime: Setting the Course for 27 the Future (Tanker Safety Panel Secretariat 2013). The report aims to improve Canada's 28 system for ship-source oil spill preparedness and response in order to better protect the public 29 and the environment. The Panel was not mandated to look into the role of prevention in 30 ensuring marine and tanker safety.

31 The Panel undertook a risk review that showed that Canada needs to tailor its preparedness 32 efforts in each region of the country. For example, in the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Canada should 33 be prepared for a spill of crude oil due to the volumes being moved (including tanker traffic to 34 Washington State) and the environmental and socio-economic sensitivities present. Upon

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1 review of the Panel’s recommendations, it is found that Trans Mountain’s commitment to a 2 systematic approach to tanker safety and spill preparedness is well aligned with the direction 3 indicated by the Panel. A number of the report’s elements are either already in place or are 4 being implemented by government and industry. Trans Mountain supports the proposed 5 measures.

6 On May 13, 2014, the Government of Canada announced it would further strengthen Canada's 7 tanker safety system with additional measures based on recommendations from the TSEP and 8 other studies.

62.2.4 Emergency Management Support

Cowichan Intervenor WSDOE Makah Tribal Council Tribes A4Q1L5 A4Q1L6 Filing ID A4Q1X6 A4Q2A4 A4Q1L7 A4Q1Q0 9

10 Select intervenors provided evidence and comments on the need for emergency response 11 towing vessels, as well as salvage companies and equipment. The Cowichan Tribes evidence 12 states that “[w]orld-class (leading) coastal protection cannot be accomplished without a 13 purpose-built emergency tug for high-sea rescue that is supported by rigorous training and 14 exercising and is strategically located along British Columbia’s coast” (PDF pages 57-58, Filing 15 ID A4Q1L5).

16 Trans Mountain has proposed additional tug escort for a loaded tanker through its entire 17 passage through the territorial waters of Canada, which includes the Salish Sea. The escort tug 18 shall ensure that suitable and timely support will be available to the laden tanker should it 19 become necessary. As such, rescue tugs have not been considered in the risk assessment. 20 Please also refer to response to NEB IR No.1.59b - Attachment 1 (Filing ID A3W9J9).

21 In case of a tanker casualty, salvage is a consideration for UC under ICS. As per the Tanker 22 Acceptance Standard (response to NEB IR No. 1.59a - Attachment 1, Filing ID A3W9J8), the 23 master of a project tanker has the authority to enter into a salvage agreement without recourse 24 to the vessel’s owner. All situations are different, and any salvage plan would need to be 25 developed within the overall ICS and cannot be provided here. The salvage industry is 26 represented in this region of North America by a number of companies, which have globally 27 recognized salvage divisions within their organizations. These organizations would be able to 28 mobilize resources within North America within a short period of time.

29 Makah Tribal Council (Filing ID A4Q2A4) submitted evidence requesting Trans Mountain 30 contribute financially to the Emergency Response Towing Vessel in Neah Bay. Trans Mountain 31 is confident in the extra ordinary preventive measures proposed by the Project, including the 32 use of an escort tug in the Juan de Fuca Strait extending to the 12 nautical mile limit, and does 33 not believe that financial contribution by the Project to another tug in Washington would 34 increase safety or is justified under the Project.

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62.2.4.1 Places of Refuge 1 TC is responsible for the National Places of Refuge Contingency Plan (PORCP) - TP 14707 E. 2 The most suitable place of refuge can only be determined after the details of the specific 3 incident are known and thoroughly considered. Should a place of refuge become a necessity for 4 any vessel, it can be expected that TC will engage with appropriate stakeholders such as the 5 province, local governments, and First Nations.

6 The likelihood of a Project tanker requiring to avail of a place of refuge on the BC coast is an 7 extremely low likelihood event, given the results of the QRA conducted by DNV (refer to 8 TERMPOL 3.15, Filing IDs A3S5F4, A3S5F6, and A3S5F8) and extra ordinary prevention 9 measures have been proposed, including the extension of escort tug use in the Juan de Fuca 10 Strait.

62.2.4.2 Area Response Planning 11 Area Response Planning is a new collaborative, transparent, and risk-based approach to 12 planning and preparing for marine oil spills. As the lead federal agency for ensuring an 13 appropriate response to ship and mystery-source marine pollution incidents, the role of the CCG 14 in Area Response Planning is to bring together local stakeholders and representatives from 15 Aboriginal communities, industry, various federal government departments and varying levels of 16 government to develop Area Response Plans. The collaborative approach is a means of gaining 17 a common understanding of the key planning elements, and to further improve the 18 decision-making process.

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62.2.5 Oil Spill Response Analysis

District of Cowichan Living Ditidaht Dorothy David Metro Pacheedaht US Tsawout FN Village of Intervenor City of Vancouver FER TLBCC WSDOE North Vancouver Tribes Oceans FN Doherty Farmer Vancouver FN Tribes Tsleil-Waututh Belcarra A4L7V8 A4Q1L5 A4L7V0 A4Q1L7 A4L9F1 A4Q1L8 A4L9F5 A4Q1L9 A4L9F6 A4Q1Q0 A4L9F7 Please refer to stand-alone A4Q1Q1 A4L9F8 responses for A4Q1U3 A4L9G1 A4L7Y3 A4L5K2 Genwest, (Attachment 1.08), Filing ID A4Q0I1 A4Q1U4 A4L9R6 A4L5D3 A4L8U3 A4L6R8 A4Q2T7 A4L7G2 A4Q2G1 A4L5G5 A4Q1X6 A4L7Y6 A4L7F8 Levelton (Attachment 1.13), A4Q1U6 Please also refer to Nuka (Attachment 1.10), and A4Q1U7 stand-alone Short (Attachment 1.09) A4Q1X0 responses for A4Q1X4 Genwest (Attachment 1.08), A4Q1X8 Levelton (Attachment 1.13), A4Q1Y6 Nuka (Attachment 1.10), A4Q1Z0 and Short (Attachment 1.09)

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1 A number of intervenors have provided evidence that comments on, discusses, or analyses the 2 oil spill response capacity and capability in the region.

3 Trans Mountain’s commitment to a systematic approach to tanker safety and spill preparedness 4 was first presented in the Application (Volume 8A, Table 5.5.3, Filing ID A3S4Y6). This 5 interrelated system, which is risk-based and risk-informed, provides a self-buttressed structure 6 that incorporates tanker safety with spill preparedness. Intervenors analyzing marine emergency 7 response as a stand-alone measure overlook the benefit and integrity of the combined system. 8 This systematic approach which also considers the physical properties of the oil, its fate and 9 behaviour, and the environmental conditions where the risk of a release is heightened, is fully 10 within the widely accepted concept of Best Achievable Technology/Best Achievable Protection 11 defined as “Best achievable technology means the technology that provides the greatest degree 12 of protection” (Washington Administrative Code 173-182-030[3]; Washington State Legislature 13 2015), for the operating area.

62.2.5.1 Analysis by Nuka Research 14 A report was submitted by the City of Vancouver, Tsleil-Waututh Nation, and Tsawout First 15 Nation titled “Technical Analysis of Oil Spill Response Capabilities and Limitations for the Trans 16 Mountain Expansion Project,” (“Nuka Report”) prepared by Nuka Research and Planning Group, 17 LLC (Nuka) (Nuka 2015). A number of the technical input assumptions are unsubstantiated and 18 Trans Mountain does not agree with significant portions of the Nuka Report. The report has 19 chosen to overlook the Project’s commitment to a systematic approach to tanker safety and spill 20 preparedness (Volume 8A, Table 5.5.3, Filing ID A3S4Y6); rather, the authors have decided to 21 draw their conclusions solely based on a computer analysis of current and proposed response 22 capacity. As such, this section of the Evidence cannot be considered a credible assessment of 23 the Project’s “Oil Spill Response Capabilities.”

24 Trans Mountain has reviewed the Nuka Report in detail (Filing ID A4L7Y6) and key 25 observations can be summarized as follows.

26 1) Unlike the Nuka Report, Trans Mountain has applied a systematic approach to tanker safety 27 and spill preparedness. Separately analyzing each component as a stand-alone measure 28 ignores the benefit and integrity of the combined system and presents it with an 29 unfavourable bias.

30 2) The Nuka Report has not presented credible oil spill scenarios that have been developed 31 with proper assessment of probability and risk.

32 3) The Nuka Report analysis uses patchy weather and oceanographic data and inaccurate 33 interpretation of data.

34 4) It does not objectively consider the proposed enhanced oil spill response regime.

35 Further detail is provided in a separate response to the Nuka Report from Trans Mountain 36 (Report 1.10, “Technical Analysis of Oil Spill Response Capabilities and Limitations for the 37 Trans Mountain Expansion Project”).

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62.2.5.2 English Bay Oil Spill Response

District of District of City of NS Dorothy T’Sou-ke Intervenor City of Vancouver North West Port Victoria NOPE Doherty FN Vancouver Vancouver Moody A4L7V8 A4L9D3 A4Q0E9 A4L5U0 Filing ID A4L9D4 A4L6L2 A4L7Q4 A4L5Y8 A4L8Y1 A4L8U3 A4Q0H6 A4L5T0 A4L9D8 A4L8E8 1

2 Various intervenors such as the City of North Vancouver, City of Vancouver, and District of 3 North Vancouver have in their evidence made reference to the April 8, 2015 English Bay fuel 4 spill from a bulk carrier (M/V Marathassa). An Affidavit of Ms. Dorit Mason, filed as evidence by 5 City of North Vancouver, District of North Vancouver, and District of West Vancouver provides 6 an account of the experience gained by these municipalities during the response (Filing 7 ID A4L6L4). Although the incident remains under investigation by authorities, the CCG has 8 recently published a report evaluating the response (CCG 2015). In the report, WCMRC is 9 commended for its response, e.g. “The operational fuel oil spill clean-up was successfully 10 executed by the WCMRC under the direction of CCG” and “WCMRC took a proactive posture 11 early on in the incident, and as a result was able to respond swiftly.” The report also highlights 12 that certain assertions in the Nuka Report present an incomplete and misleading picture of the 13 incident facts. These assertions are responded to and corrected in the following sections, in 14 order to avoid undermining confidence in existing spill preparedness and response.

15 62.2.5.2.1 Booming 16 The Nuka Report states, “Nearly 13 hours elapsed before response crews had boomed off the 17 leaking vessel. Incident records are unclear about when skimming operations commenced 18 (Wright 2015b).” (Nuka Report lines 1184-1185, page 52, Filing ID A4L7Y6).

19 Without fully explaining the circumstances of the Marathassa release, the authors imply that 20 response crews (i.e., WCMRC) were idle or inept in deploying a containment boom around the 21 Marathassa. The facts refute that implication insomuch as, initially, the spill had: 1) no positively 22 identified source to boom, and 2) no cognizant RP with whom to interact. After the CCG 23 authorized a response on the evening of April 8, WCMRC was onsite and skimming well within 24 the federal response time standard. Because the release from the ship was fugitive and 25 intermittent, a number of competing scenarios presented probable spill causes including oil 26 migrating from an unidentified outfall in Burrard Inlet. It was only after WCMRC positively 27 identified the M/V Marathassa as the source on April 9 that the ship was boomed. As mentioned 28 in the CCG report, booming operations by “WCMRC ….. began at 04:36h and was completed 29 by 05:53h” and “Skimming then continued at the scene and inside the boom surrounding the 30 vessel.”

31 62.2.5.2.2 Halt to Response Operations 32 The Nuka Report states:

33 “During the April 2015 response to the M/V Marathassa incident in English Bay, 34 the only reported safety incident involved a responder becoming seasick while 35 cleaning oil from the hull of the M/V Marathassa because of sea swell generated 36 by westerly winds, which is a typical spring/summer weather pattern for the

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1 Burrard Inlet. This swell, which was most significant in the afternoons, caused 2 responders to halt operations on several occasions during the week of April 14” 3 (Nuka Report footnote 7, page 13, Filing ID A4L7Y6).

4 The use of the term “swell” is incorrect in the authors’ statement. Waves in the Strait of Georgia 5 and Burrard Inlet are exclusively wind waves, and are highly correlated with local winds. 6 Offshore waters, such as those at Buoy J and the entrance to Juan de Fuca Strait, are 7 characterized by two types of waves: sea and swell. Sea waves are generated by local winds. 8 Their periods are generally between 2 and 10 seconds. Swell waves are generated at remote 9 locations, such as the middle of the Pacific Ocean, that then propagate toward shore. During 10 this propagation, the wave field simplifies so that only long period waves (i.e., 10 to 24 second 11 periods) remain. While waves at the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca consist of both sea 12 and swell, swell attenuates as it travels down into the Strait of Juan de Fuca, resulting in 13 significantly reduced swell farther into the Strait, for instance at New Dungeness. The 14 wavelength of swell is much longer than the wavelength of sea.

15 As established above, there is no swell in Burrard Inlet. Response operations associated with oil 16 recovery were not shut down by environmental conditions. WCMRC continued to operate their 17 skimming vessels throughout the response. There were, however, occasions when cleaning the 18 adhered “bathtub rings” on the hulls of affected ships were stopped due to environmental 19 conditions (i.e., wind waves or chop), but hull wipe-down was a non-critical peripheral action. It 20 is misleading and somewhat mischievous to equate halting the wipe-down of a hull with ceasing 21 response operations.

62.3 Liability and Compensation

District of City of City of NS Cowichan Metro Pacheedaht Intervenor North Port Victoria TLBCC Belcarra Vancouver NOPE Tribes Vancouver FN Vancouver Moody A4Q1L5 A4Q1L6 A4Q1X4 A4L7V8 A4Q1X5 Filing ID A4L8E6 A4Q0H7 A4L7Q4 A4L5V1 A4L8Y1 A4L7Y3 A4L5K2 A4Q2G1 A4L5G5 A4Q1X8 A4L8E9 A4Q1Z0 A4Q1Z3 A4Q1Z4 22

23 A number of intervenors had concerns about liability and compensation for pollution resulting 24 from a tanker-based marine spill. In their evidence, the City of Vancouver states that “[f]unding 25 limits are inadequate and many categories of losses remain uncompensated” (lines 3 to 4, 26 page 106, Filing ID A4L7V8). Similarly, NS NOPE states in their evidence that “the cost of an oil 27 spill from a tanker could be greater than the tanker liability fund could cover” (lines 8 to 9, PDF 28 page 20, Filing ID A4L5V1).

29 The existing regime comprising the IOPCF and Canada’s SOPF together provide in excess of 30 $1.44 billion of funding to compensate eligible spill costs in the event of an incident.

31 Trans Mountain is not liable for a tanker-based marine spill. The responsibility for such an event 32 lies with the tanker owner. The NEB articulated the filing requirements regarding environment 33 and socio-economic effects for increased marine shipping activities and specified that “The 34 assessment of accidents and malfunctions must also provide a description of the liability and

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1 compensation regime that would apply in the case of a spill” (September 2013, Filing 2 ID A3K9I2). Such a description is found in Volume 8A, Section 1.4.1.6 (Filing ID A3S4X3) of the 3 Application.

4 Information has been provided to intervenors including the City of Vancouver about Trans 5 Mountain’s response plans (refer to Section 63). The compensation process for damages from 6 tankers caused by fire or explosion is part of the vessel insurance. Details of the effect of the 7 future ratification of the HNS Convention, and the appropriate section of Safeguarding Canada's 8 Seas and Skies Act related to HNS can be found in response to the City of Vancouver IR No. 9 2.12.1a (Filing ID A4H8I9). 62.4 Further Research in Oil Properties 10 A number of intervenors have voiced concerns about possible lack of information about the 11 properties and behaviour of dilbit. A full response to these concerns is provided in Section 25 of 12 this Reply Evidence. Each product proposed for transport via TMEP must meet the NEB tariff 13 specifications for pipeline transport. Trans Mountain recognizes that ongoing characterization of 14 oil sands products are provided through crudemonitor.ca and that additional properties tested 15 can add to improved knowledge regarding potential risks.

16 In addition to industry, Environment Canada, DFO, and Natural Resources Canada (2013) have 17 conducted scientific research on non-conventional petroleum products, such as dilbit, to 18 enhance the understanding of these substances and how they behave when spilled in the 19 marine environment. Their results have helped corroborate the findings from the Gainford study 20 (Filing ID A3S5G2). This research also provides a better understanding of the effect of products, 21 such as dilbit, on marine ecosystems. Trans Mountain and other experts believe that knowledge 22 about dilbit properties is sufficient to allow for an effective response to be undertaken in case of 23 a low likelihood event such as an oil spill (e.g., refer to CRREL/SLRoss 2015, Government of 24 Canada 2013, King et al. 2015, SLRoss 2012, Zhou et al. 2015).

25 Continued integrated scientific research is expected to lead to improved decision-making in the 26 areas of spill response technologies and countermeasures, enabling identification of additional 27 best practices with regard to the selection of the best response tools in a given situation. For 28 example, Natural Resources Canada is launching the OSRS Program. The OSRS Program is a 29 conditionally repayable contribution program that will provide $5 million over 3 years (2016- 30 2019) for RD&D projects focused on improving current mechanical recovery technologies and 31 processes for the cleanup of heavy oil products spilled in marine environments.

32 As acknowledged in the NEB Review for Enbridge Northern Gateway:

33 “Although there is some uncertainty regarding behaviour of dilbit spilled in water, 34 the Panel finds that the weight of evidence indicates that dilbit is no more likely to 35 sink to the bottom than other heavier oils with similar physical and chemical 36 properties. The Panel finds that dilbit is unlikely to sink due to natural weathering 37 processes alone, within the timeframe in which initial, on-water response may 38 occur, or in the absence of sediment or other particulate matter interactions. The 39 Panel finds that a dilbit spill is not likely to sink as a continuous layer that coats 40 the seabed or riverbed.” (NEB 2013, page 99)

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62.5 Impacts Outside of Canada 1 Intervenors including FER (Filing ID A4Q2T7), WSDOE (Filing ID A4Q1X6), and Makah Tribal 2 Council (Filing ID A4Q2A4) filed evidence highlighting regional issues and seeking further 3 commitments by Trans Mountain. The issues called to attention by these intervenors are a 4 result of the region’s diverse activities and are not specific to the Project. Trans Mountain has 5 made marine safety commitments on record that will protect the region from oil spill accidents 6 during the transit or loading of Project tankers. Specific to marine transportation, these 7 commitments closely follow the recommendations and findings of the TRC and details can be 8 found in the TERMPOL Review Process Report on the Trans Mountain Expansion Project 9 (Filing ID A4F8Z4), as well as in Trans Mountain Response to NEB IR TERMPOL Rpt and 10 Outstanding Filings, dated December 17, 2014 (Filing ID A4G3U5).

11 In Trans Mountain’s opinion, the additional efforts suggested by intervenors would be better 12 addressed through joint arrangements and actions by the region’s industry, governments, 13 regulators, ports, and other stakeholders and not as commitments by Trans Mountain alone as 14 part of the NEB hearings for a single project. It should be noted that Trans Mountain vessel 15 traffic currently constitutes 1.1% of large vessels trading in the study area. Subject to TMEP 16 reaching full operational status, this percentage will increase to 6.6%, still only constituting a 17 small portion of commercial vessel traffic in the study area.

18 Trans Mountain is supportive of national and regional collaborative efforts aimed at continual 19 improvements that will help enhance marine safety and encourage environmental improvement 20 initiatives. For example, the Ministry of Transportation, along with marine shipping experts, 21 non-government organizations, and other officials, recently announced the launch of Canada’s 22 first independent research organization to examine marine shipping in Canada, Clear Seas 23 Centre for Responsible Marine Shipping. Based in Vancouver, Clear Seas is an independent, 24 not-for-profit organization that will provide impartial and evidence-based research to inform the 25 public and policy makers about marine traffic in Canadian waters, including risks, mitigation 26 measures, and best practices worldwide for safe and sustainable marine shipping. It is funded 27 by grants from the Federal and Provincial Governments and industry.

28 Trans Mountain’s response to PIPEUP Network TERMPOL IR II.bv b) (Filing ID A4J7T7) lists 29 past examples of Trans Mountain’s cooperative marine safety endeavours, which include:

30 · participation in PMV’s review of the Movement Restriction Area (2004-2010);

31 · contribution for expert review of escort techniques (2007);

32 · contribution and logistics for live trial of escort techniques (2007);

33 · contribution for improved pilotage equipment (PPUs) (2009);

34 · support for joint Pilot and Tug Master training (2009);

35 · support for improved Navigational Aids (2010);

36 · contribution for BCIT Marine Simulator Upgrade (2011); and

37 · participation in the Chamber of Shipping Navigation & Pilotage Committee.

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62.6 References 1 Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation. 2006. Best Available Technology, 2004 2 Conference Report. Anchorage, AK. 257. Website: 3 http://dec.alaska.gov/spar/ipp/docs/16799-6%20BAT%20Final%20Report.pdf. 4 Accessed: November 10, 2014.

5 ASTM Standard F625/F625M-94. 2011. Standard Practice for Classifying Water Bodies for Spill 6 Control Systems. ASTM International, West Conshohocken, PA, 2011; www.astm.org.

7 Canadian Coast Guard (CCG). 2015. Independent Review of the M/V Marathassa Fuel Oil Spil 8 Environmental Response Operation. Victoria, BC.

9 CRREL/SLRoss. 2015. Investigation of the Behaviour of Diluted Bitumen and Heavy 10 Conventional Crude Oil Spills. Final Report prepared for the American Petroleum 11 Institute. 125pp plus appendices.

12 Dettman H. and G. Irvine. 2015. Comparison of Oil-in-Water Emulsion Stability of Diluted 13 Bitumen, Light, and Heavy Crude Oils. Proceedings of the Thirty-eighth AMOP Technical 14 Seminar, Vancouver, BC.

15 Dollhopf R.H., Fitzpatrick F.A., Kimble J.W., Capone D.M., Graan T.P., Zelt R.B., and R. 16 Johnson. 2014. Response to Heavy, Non-Floating Oil Spilled in a Great Lakes River 17 Environment: A Multiple-Lines-Of-Evidence Approach for Submerged Oil Assessment 18 and Recovery. International Oil Spill Conference proceedings May 2014, 2014(1), 434 - 19 448. Web December 15, 2014; http://ioscproceedings.org/doi/pdf/10.7901/2169-3358- 20 2014.1.434.

21 EBA/Tetra Tech. 2013. Trans Mountain Expansion Project Oil Spill Response Simulation Study 22 Arachne Reef and Westridge Marine Terminal. Report prepared for Trans Mountain 23 Pipeline ULC.

24 Environment Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Natural Resources Canada. 2013. 25 Federal Government Technical Report: Properties, Composition and Marine Spill 26 Behaviour, Fate and Transport of Two Diluted Bitumen Products from the Canadian Oil 27 Sands. Web December 3, 2014; http://www.ec.gc.ca/scitech/6A2D63E5-4137-440B- 28 8BB3-E38ECED9B02F/1633_Dilbit%20Technical%20Report_e_v2%20FINAL-s.pdf.

29 Government of Canada. 2013. Federal Government Technical Report: Properties, Composition 30 and Marine Spill Behaviour, Fate and Transport of Two Diluted Bitumen Products from 31 the Canadian Oil Sands. Web December 3, 2014; 32 http://www.ec.gc.ca/scitech/6A2D63E5-4137-440B-8BB3- 33 E38ECED9B02F/1633_Dilbit%20Technical%20Report_e_v2%20FINAL-s.pdf.

34 Lehman S. 2006. Case Studies in Submerged Oil Spills. Submerged Oil Workshop. Coastal 35 Response Research Center.

36 National Energy Board. 2013. Considerations: Report of the Joint Review Panel for the 37 Enbridge Northern Gateway Project (Volume 2). National Energy Board. Calgary, AB. 38 425 pp.

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1 Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC. 2015. Technical Analysis of Oil Spill Response 2 Capabilities and Limitations for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project. Report prepared 3 for the Tsleil-Waututh Nation; the City of Vancouver; and the Tsawout First Nation.

4 Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC. 2013. West Coast Spill Response Study Volume 3: 5 World-Class Oil Spill Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery System. 6 Report prepared for British Columbia Ministry of Environment.

7 SLRoss. 2012. Meso-scale Weathering of Cold Lake Bitumen/Condensate Blend. Report 8 prepared for Enbridge Northern Gateway. Filed with the National Energy Board, 9 February 6, 2013, Exhibit B193; Filing ID A3F2W1.

10 Tanker Safety Panel Secretariat. 2013. A review of Canada’s ship-source oil spill preparedness 11 and response regime: setting the course for the future. Tanker Safety Panel Secretariat: 12 Ottawa, ON. 71 pp.

13 Washington State Legislature. 2015. Washington Administrative Code (WAC) Chapter 173 - 14 182. Web November 10, 2014; http://app.leg.wa.gov/wac/.

15 Washington Department of Ecology (WDOE). 2015. Western Response Resource List (WRRL). 16 Web July 05, 2015; 17 http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/spills/preparedness/WRRL/WRRL.htm.

18 Western Canada Marine Response Corporation (WCMRC). 2013. Review of Trans Mountain 19 Expansion Project Future Oil Spill Response Approach Plan Recommendation on Bases 20 and Equipment. Report prepared for Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC.

21 Zhou J., Dettman H., and M. Bundred. 2015. A Comparative Analysis of Environmental 22 Behaviour of Diluted Bitumen and Conventional Crudes. Proceedings of the Thirty-eighth 23 AMOP Technical Seminar, Vancouver, BC.

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63.0 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 1 Evidence filed by a number of intervenors contained concerns about one or more aspects of the 2 EMP. The concerns expressed by those intervenors are grouped by sub-topic and addressed in 3 the sections that follow. Background information regarding the EMP and the process for TMEP 4 enhancements to it are described below for context in addressing intervenor concerns.

5 The following table provides a summary of the intervenors whose filed evidence contained 6 concerns about various aspects of Trans Mountain and KMC’s approaches to emergency 7 response and/or emergency management. The listing is not intended to be exhaustive but 8 rather representative of the evidence filed on the topic.

Evidence Evidence Intervenor Intervenor Filing ID Filing ID

Cheam and Chawathil First Nations A4Q2C6 Graduate Student Society at Simon A4L9R4 Fraser University

City of Abbotsford A4L6D4 Metro Vancouver A4Q2R0

City of Abbotsford A4L6D7 Metro Vancouver A4L7Y3

City of Abbotsford A4L6D3 Metro Vancouver A4L8C5

City of Burnaby A4L8G5 Metro Vancouver A4L8C6

City of Coquitlam A4Q0I9 Senichenko, Geoffrey A4L6Q9

City of New Westminster A4Q0L5 Simon Fraser University A4Q5Z1

City of Port Moody A4L6J2 Simon Fraser University A4Q0Y2

City of Port Moody A4L7Q4 Simon Fraser University A4Q0Z3

City of Port Moody A4L7Q5 Simon Fraser University A4Q5Z1

City of Port Moody A4L7Q6 Simon Fraser University A4Q5Z0

City of Surrey A4L9S6 Shxw'owhamel First Nation A4L9U9

City of Surrey A4L9U4 Shxw'owhamel First Nation A4Q1A0

City of Surrey A4L9S5 Shxw'owhamel First Nation A4Q1A2 City of Surrey A4Q2K1 Shxw'owhamel First Nation A4Q2L2

City of Vancouver A4L7V6 Shxw'owhamel First Nation A4Q2L4

City of Vancouver A4L7X6 Taplay, Calvin A4L9H5

City of Vancouver A4L7X7 Township of Langley A4L7S1

City of Vancouver A4L9C7 Township of Langley A4L7R7

City of Vancouver A4L7V2 Township of Langley A4L7R8

City of Vancouver A4L7V3 Township of Langley A4L7S0

City of Vancouver A4L8E6 Tsawout First Nation A4Q1D3

City of Vancouver A4L8E7 Tsleil-Waututh Nation A4L6A9

City of Vancouver A4L8E8 Tsleil-Waututh Nation A4L5Z8

City of Vancouver A4L8E5 Tsleil-Waututh Nation A4L5Z9

Craig, Lisa A4L6S1 Unifor A4L7F0

Doherty, Dorothy A4L8U3 Upper Nicola Band A4Q1T6

Enoch Cree A4L5F0 Upper Nicola Band A4Q1T3

Fraser Valley Regional District A4L8W3 Upper Nicola Band A4Q1T4

Fraser Valley Regional District A4Q9I1 Upper Nicola Band A4Q1T5

Fraser Valley Regional District A4Q9I2 Yarrow Ecovillage A4Q1L3

Fraser Valley Regional District A4L8W2

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63.1 Emergency Management Plan 1 A number of intervenors, including those indicated below, expressed concerns about aspects of 2 the EMP.

Evidence Intervenor Filing ID

City of Burnaby A4L8G5

City of Coquitlam A4Q0I9

City of Surrey A4L9S6

City of Vancouver A4L7X6

Fraser Valley Regional District A4Q9I1

Simon Fraser University A4Q0Y2

Tsleil-Waututh Nation A4L5Z8

3 Those concerns are addressed below.

4 KMC has a comprehensive and robust EMP in place for the existing pipeline and terminal 5 network, which, as discussed within the TMEP Application Volume 7, Section 4 (Filing 6 ID A3S4V5), will form the basis for the enhanced TMEP EMP.

7 Throughout the regulatory process, and in response to multiple IRs, including, for example, City 8 of Burnaby IR No. 2.011d (Filing ID A4H8A1), FVRD IR No. 2.03a (Filing ID A4H8S0), and City 9 of Abbotsford IR No. 2.3.15d (Filing ID A4H7Z9), Trans Mountain presented the following 10 information regarding the status of the enhanced EMP for the TMEP:

63.1.1 EMP Consultation 11 “It is KMC’s intent to continue to share unredacted versions of the EMP 12 documents with agencies tasked with ensuring public safety. KMC's EMP is 13 shared, tested and regularly exercised with federal, provincial and local agencies. 14 The EMP meets regulatory requirements and KMC works with emergency 15 planners and emergency responders to maintain relationships and to ensure their 16 awareness of KMC’s system, as well as mutual awareness of joint exercises and 17 programs.”

18 “The Application, Volume 7, Section 4.8 outlines the process to enhance Kinder 19 Morgan Canada’s (KMC) existing emergency management programs (EMP) as 20 they relate to the Trans Mountain Pipeline system to address the needs of the 21 Project (Filing ID A3S4V5). The final programs will be developed in a manner 22 consistent with the National Energy Board’s (NEB or Board) draft conditions 23 related to emergency response (Filing ID A3V8Z8).”

24 “…Since the updated EMP depends upon the final detailed design of the Project, 25 a process which will not be carried out unless the Project receives approval and 26 until KMC has an opportunity to review the conditions of such approval, the 27 updated EMP cannot be provided during the NEB’s regulatory review of the 28 Project. However, to ensure affected parties have the opportunity to express 29 concerns and provide input which will inform the updated EMP, KMC will conduct 30 a consultation program as part of developing the updated EMP as described in 31 the NEB draft conditions related to emergency management.”

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1 “Following receipt of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the 2 Project, KMC will file with the NEB a consultation plan related to KMC’s EMP 3 review that will include consultation scope, objectives; preliminary lists of 4 regulatory authorities, communities, Aboriginal groups with whom KMC will 5 engage, and a preliminary list of consultation locations and timing, as well as any 6 other information that the NEB requires. The consultation plan will describe the 7 methods that will be used to track commitments made during consultation and to 8 incorporate them into KMC’s EMP, including its Emergency Response Plans. As 9 part of this program KMC will periodically file reports with the NEB on progress of 10 its EMP review including summaries of interested parties consulted and how their 11 comments were considered.”

12 “KMC will file with the NEB the revised Emergency Response Plan for the 13 pipeline as part of the approval conditions for the Project. The plan will 14 demonstrate KMC’s ability to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate 15 the potential effects of emergencies of any type related to the Trans Mountain 16 Pipeline system. Filing of the Emergency Response Plan will include, for the 17 NEB’s consideration, a final report on the consultation process as well as 18 confirmation that an independent third party has reviewed and assessed the 19 Emergency Response Plan and that KMC has considered and incorporated the 20 comments generated by the independent review and assessment into the plan.”

21 “Ultimately, updates to the EMP incorporating feedback from consultation 22 activities must result in an EMP that continues to meet the requirements of the 23 National Energy Board Onshore Pipelines Regulations (2013) (OPR). As it does 24 for the existing system, the OPR provides lifecycle regulation for all aspects of 25 the Project operation including requirements for emergency response programs. 26 KMC must maintain and update the EMP throughout the lifecycle of the 27 expanded Trans Mountain Pipeline System. As well, throughout the life of the 28 expanded system, NEB staff will continue to conduct emergency response 29 exercise evaluations and emergency procedures manual reviews to verify that 30 companies are prepared to anticipate, prevent, manage, and mitigate emergency 31 situations.”

32 In addition, the enhancement of KMC’s EMP Trans Mountain will take into account the British 33 Columbia Emergency Response Management System.

63.1.2 EMP Review and Revision 34 All elements of KMC’s EMP undergo regular review and revision to reflect:

35 a) regulatory requirements regarding frequency of review; 36 b) lessons learned through regular exercises and deployments; 37 c) lessons learned through response to actual incidents; and, 38 d) changes and updates in response equipment technology, and accepted response 39 protocols.

40 This ongoing review and revision process ensures that the KMC EMP is current and meets, or 41 exceeds, regulatory and jurisdictional requirements. Updated documents are distributed to

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1 parties who have received the ERP to ensure that all personnel potentially involved in an 2 incident response have the current documents and protocols.

63.1.3 Emergency Planning Standards 3 As part of the consultation plan outlined above, KMC will consult on its Emergency Planning 4 Standards, which is a guideline used to establish emergency management response resources, 5 procedures, and associated processes. The Emergency Planning Standards will provide 6 rationale for determining key factors such as resourcing, training, and protocols, amongst 7 others.

8 The Emergency Planning Standards will address planning and preparation items including, but 9 not limited to:

10 a) Equipment resource analysis to assess location, type, and quantity of equipment in the 11 response network.

12 b) Personnel resource analysis to assess the number and location of trained personnel and 13 the training requirements for personnel specific to the location. The resource analysis for 14 the overall network focuses on KMC personnel in combination with specialized service 15 providers who are contracted to KMC.

16 c) Target response times required to shut down operations, conduct initial site assessment, 17 mobilize response personnel, and commence mitigation.

18 d) Document creation, maintenance, and update as part of the ISLMS to ensure the 19 standards used by KMC are current.

63.1.4 Emergency Resources 20 In the unlikely event of a spill or release, KMC derives emergency resources, as necessary, 21 from:

22 a) Internal KMC resources including trained personnel and specialized response equipment 23 throughout its network;

24 b) Specialized response contractors who hold current Master Service Agreements with 25 KMC, such as Tervita and Quantum Murray;

26 c) Mutual aid relationships; and,

27 d) Industry co-operatives such as Western Canada Spill Services (WCSS) and WCMRC.

28 KMC currently has mutual aid agreements in place with Canadian Energy Pipeline Association 29 (CEPA) and Strathcona District Mutual Aid Partnership. KMC continues to explore opportunities 30 to develop additional mutual aid agreements with rail companies, amongst others. In addition, 31 through the consultation program for enhancement of the EMP, KMC will be seeking 32 opportunities to establish mutual aid agreements with public safety agencies potentially affected 33 by the TMPL system. The mutual aid relationships with industrial partners typically involves 34 direct sharing of equipment and resources appropriate to the emergency.

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1 In addition, KMC has actively engaged with the BC MOE on their Land-Based Spill 2 Preparedness and Response in BC initiative, whose goals include the development of a 3 provincially-regulated and industry-funded provincial preparedness and response organization.

4 As noted above, WCSS and WCMRC are industry cooperatives in which KMC holds 5 memberships. WCSS is a non-profit cooperative that gains revenue from membership fees and 6 equipment rentals to fund readiness costs. In response to an IR (City of New Westminster IR 7 No. 2.E.2iv; Filing ID A4H8F6), KMC indicated that WCSS provides a number of services to its 8 members including:

9 · Provision of oil spill contingency plans for the members of the cooperatives; 10 these plans are supplemental to a member’s corporate ERP.

11 · Access to initial spill response equipment, area-specific equipment, and other 12 specialized equipment.

13 · Maintenance and insurance for oil spill equipment.

14 · Access to training including annual WCSS exercises and custom-designed 15 courses for both members and non-member companies.

16 · Communication programs and public awareness initiatives.

17 · QA through the WCSS field improvement program.

18 · Assistance with initial spill response and contractor resource lists.

19 Some intervenors have suggested that Trans Mountain benefits financially from the use of 20 WCSS or WCMRC.

21 Although Trans Mountain has an ownership position in both WCSS and WCMRC, it does not 22 profit from their provision of spill response services. In the case of WCSS, Trans Mountain does 23 not receive any form of revenue from the organization. Net proceeds received by WCSS from 24 spill response activities are normally reinvested by WCSS in equipment. In the case of 25 WCMRC, under terms of the WCMRC shareholder agreement Trans Mountain receives an 26 annual dividend from its shareholding calculated based a benchmark rate for return on equity 27 and a fixed nominal value for each share. By convention the Rate of Return on Common Equity 28 (ROE) per Discontinued RH-2-94 Formula published by the NEB is used by WCMRC as the 29 benchmark rate for calculating return on equity. The shareholder equity in WCMRC is not 30 affected by revenue and has not changed since the organization’s inception. Under terms of the 31 WCMRC shareholder agreement the proportion of shares held among shareholders is adjusted 32 periodically so as to match the proportion of oil handled by shareholder facilities with the result 33 that the number of shares held by Trans Mountain varies over time. While the dividend paid to 34 Trans Mountain may vary over time due to changes in the benchmark ROE and the number of 35 shares held by Trans Mountain, it is independent of spill response activity. Net proceeds from 36 spill response services are used to reduce the BOCF charged to WCMRC members in future 37 periods. In the case of Trans Mountain, the cost of this fee flows through to, and is paid by, its 38 pipeline shippers under terms of its pipeline tariff.

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63.1.5 Emergent Volunteer Management 1 KMC’s current protocol for handling emergent volunteers is discussed within a number of IR 2 responses (i.e., City of Port Moody IR No. 2.3.04b, [Filing ID A4H8G7], City of North Vancouver 3 IR No. 2.2.6 [Filing ID A4H8G1], and Province of BC IR No. 2.37e [Filing ID A4H8W6]).

4 In summary, the IR responses provided discuss that under the ICS the incident response would 5 be guided, in part, by a safety plan developed to address the specific conditions of the incident. 6 A perimeter would be established to control against theft or tampering, and to ensure 7 responders who are admitted into the incident site are authorized and have the appropriate level 8 of training and PPE. Volunteers who show up on scene unrequested by Unified or Incident 9 Command would not be admitted on site. In the event that emergent volunteers were identified 10 or anticipated to engage in unsafe “free-lancing” activities outside the managed response 11 efforts, the ICS Information Officer, working with the Safety Officer, would be tasked by Unified 12 or Incident Command to develop and deliver messaging, education, and other proactive 13 measures to address the situation.

14 While volunteers would not be used, situations could arise where emergent volunteers present a 15 potential pool from which to hire and train response workers. In the event that external 16 resources (general labour or particular skills) were required to meet objectives established by 17 Unified or Incident Command, emergent volunteers would be directed to the procurement 18 function of ICS which is responsible for sourcing any additional labour, supplies, or equipment 19 required for the response. ICS procurement would establish a process to inventory applicants, 20 hire, and train them as needed.

21 As part of its EMP enhancement process, KMC will develop guidelines for managing volunteers 22 and consider the Planning Guidelines for Convergent Volunteers, June 2008. Pacific States Oil 23 Spill Task Force.

63.2 EMP Distribution 24 A number of intervenors, including those indicated below, expressed concerns about aspects of 25 the EMP distribution.

Evidence Intervenor Filing ID City of New Westminster A4Q0L5 Taplay, Calvin A4L9H5 Yarrow Ecovillage A4Q1L3

26 Those concerns are addressed below.

27 Throughout the regulatory process, and in response to multiple IRs (i.e., City of Burnaby IR 28 No. 2.001a to 2.001i (Filing ID A4H8A1), KMC presented the following response, in whole or in 29 part, regarding the current status of sharing the details of the EMP for the Trans Mountain and 30 TMEP:

31 “Sharing Details of EMP

32 …It is KMC’s intent to continue to share unredacted versions of the EMP 33 documents with agencies tasked with ensuring public safety. KMC's EMP is

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1 shared, tested and regularly exercised with federal, provincial and local agencies. 2 The EMP meets regulatory requirements and KMC works with emergency 3 planners and emergency responders to maintain relationships and to ensure their 4 awareness of KMC’s system, as well as mutual awareness of joint exercises and 5 programs.

6 KMC is willing to provide copies of the EMP documents to local, provincial and 7 federal authorities who satisfy the following conditions:

8 · The authority has/is willing to participate in consultations with KMC;

9 · The authority could be called upon to respond to an event associated 10 with the Trans Mountain Pipeline system within their jurisdiction;

11 · The authority has requested a copy and/or requires a copy by 12 legislation, and

13 · The authority has signed a confidentiality agreement and/or has a 14 method by which the document can be filed confidentially.

15 Although the full details of the EMP documents are not appropriate to include as 16 part of public filing, KMC is willing to meet with to discuss KMC’s 17 existing and updated EMP documents.”

18 Trans Mountain and KMC intend to continue to be as transparent as possible with affected First 19 Nations, communities, and institutions with respect to emergency response. The enhanced EMP 20 and constituent ERPs, once completed, will be shared with the public safety agencies of 21 affected communities and institutions. While it may be necessary to redact certain specific 22 sections in the enhanced EMP and constituent ERPs which contain sensitive information, the 23 redactions are not expected to negatively affect the availability of the types of information that 24 First Nations, communities, or institutions will require to update or develop their own emergency 25 planning documents.

63.2.1 Canadian Energy Pipeline Association: Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Disclosure Guidelines 26 By copy of a letter dated February 5, 2015, to Enbridge Pipelines Inc. (2015) relating to the 27 request for non-disclosure agreements from municipalities receiving Enbridge’s emergency 28 procedures manuals, the NEB requested that the CEPA review the matter of emergency 29 response information disclosure will all members of its association. In a letter to the NEB dated 30 March 2, 2015, CEPA advised the NEB that it intended on striking a task force to consider and 31 recommend means for appropriate disclosure of emergency response information to 32 municipalities and the public (CEPA 2015a). In a press release dated March 23, 2015 33 (CEPA 2015b), CEPA confirmed the formation of the executive task force. The goal of the task 34 force is to establish “clear principles and guidelines that seek to find the right balance between 35 the public’s right to know, the privacy of personal information and the security considerations 36 also required for public safety. This will help ensure all information that municipalities require are 37 shared in written form without a non-disclosure agreement.” Concurrent with the CEPA task 38 force formation, the NEB initiated a public process on similar topics to obtain public comment 39 and input.

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1 KMC is supportive and actively working with CEPA and other CEPA member companies to 2 determine ERP Disclosure Guidelines that balance requirements for transparency and security 3 (i.e., accepted information redaction protocol). KMC will adjust its disclosure policy based on the 4 outcome of the CEPA task force.

63.3 Emergency Management Training 5 A number of intervenors, including those indicated below, expressed concerns about aspects of 6 the Emergency Management Training.

Evidence Intervenor Filing ID

Cheam and Chawathil First Nations A4Q2C6

Doherty, Dorothy A4L8U3

Enoch Cree A4L5F0

Metro Vancouver A4L7Y3

Tsawout First Nation A4Q1D3

7 Those concerns are addressed below.

8 Emergency management training was the subject of evidence and IRs from a number of 9 intervenors. Typical IR responses that are referred to in the following sections include, as 10 examples: Province of BC IR No. 2.30 (Filing ID A4H8W6), Sto Lo Collective IR No. 2.2 (Filing 11 ID A4H9E3), and City of North Vancouver IR No. 2.2.4 (Filing ID A4H8G1).

63.3.1 Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) 12 The NEB Onshore Pipeline Regulations (OPR; SOR/99-294) Section 35 states, “A company 13 shall develop a continuing education program for the police, fire departments, medical facilities, 14 other appropriate organizations and agencies and the public residing adjacent to the pipeline to 15 inform them of the location of the pipeline, potential emergency situations involving the pipeline 16 and the safety procedures to be followed in the case of an emergency.”

17 As part of its ongoing operation, KMC has been involved in multi-modal emergency training 18 activities with communities and responders along the pipeline route. KMC provides CAER 19 sessions to first responders along the pipeline system. These sessions provide information with 20 regard to the type and properties of petroleum transported through the pipeline and how to 21 respond safely. The sessions are typically 3 hours in length, and are focused on key information 22 transfer between KMC and emergency responders along the route. KMC covers the costs 23 associated with instruction of the program, but does not cover attendance costs, such as 24 responder wages, benefits, and employment costs. These programs recognize that local first 25 responders will likely assist in some aspects of incident management.

63.3.2 Exercises 26 A full listing of exercises conducted in the past 5 years is provided in the response to NEB IR 27 No. 1.69a (Filing ID A3W9H8). Classroom training was also conducted on various topics, 28 including but not limited to:

29 · Incident Command Training;

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1 · Incident Safe Approach;

2 · Fire Systems Trainings;

3 · Specialized equipment training;

4 · Jet boat operation;

5 · Security systems training;

6 · Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response; and,

7 · Course refresher training as needed.

8 KMC sets the exercise priorities on an annual basis in accordance with the requirements by 9 regulatory bodies (e.g., OPR, NEB) and the EMP management system. The exercise schedule 10 for TMEP will take into consideration draft NEB conditions related to emergency management.

11 Local government and external agencies are invited to many training events. These groups will 12 continue to be invited to take part in the planning and execution of the exercise within their 13 respective jurisdictions, where exercises take place.

14 Application Volume 7, Section 4.8 (Filing ID A3S4V5) outlines the process to enhance KMC’s 15 existing EMPs as they relate to the TMPL system to address the needs of TMEP. The final 16 programs will be developed in a manner consistent with the NEB’s Draft Conditions 42, 52, 53, 17 and 54 (Filing ID A3V8Z8).

63.3.3 Unified Command 18 KMC invites local authorities that may be affected by an emergency event to participate in the 19 ICS response organization along with other stakeholders such as pertinent regulatory bodies. 20 The directly affected local authority is invited to participate in UC. UC is responsible for overall 21 management of the incident, directing incident activities, including development and 22 implementation of overall objectives and strategies. While knowledge of the ICS structure is 23 valuable for participants in UC, it is not essential and significant contributions are made by 24 members of UC who are not incident commanders. This is particularly salient for First Nations 25 leaders who are able to provide significant knowledge of the land and the environmental and 26 human health considerations within their territory.

63.3.4 Municipal First Responders Role 27 Municipal First Responders are directly responsible for those aspects of an emergency that are 28 within their legislated mandate. For example, TMEP cannot legally order a public evacuation 29 and this role must be provided by local responders. When a local authority participates directly 30 in UC, their participation may include deployment and use of their available resources, and their 31 participation within UC helps ensure efficient coordination of available resources.

32 For those local authorities that do not wish to participate in UC, or are indirectly affected by the 33 incident, opportunities exist for participation in the ICS organization in many areas depending on 34 training and expertise. Examples of potential areas of participation include: field response 35 labour, security, site control, environment unit, wildlife unit, logistics, catering, supply 36 businesses, etc.

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63.4 Emergency Response Plans 1 A number of intervenors, including those indicated below, expressed concerns about aspects of 2 the ERPs.

Evidence Intervenor Filing ID

Cheam and Chawathil First Nations A4Q2C6

City of Abbotsford A4L6D4

City of Surrey A4L9S6

Craig, Lisa A4L6S1

Enoch Cree A4L5F0

3 Those concerns are addressed below.

63.4.1 NEB OPR Compliance of Emergency Response Plans 4 Throughout the regulatory process, KMC has discussed its compliance with the NEB OPR 5 (SOR/99-294), for example, NEB IR No. 2.108a and 2.108e (Filing ID A3Z4T9).

6 KMC has developed and maintains current ERPs for its pipeline and terminal facilities.

7 The NEB requirements for Emergency Preparedness and Response programs are summarized 8 on the NEB website at: http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/sftnvrnmnt/mrgnc/index-eng.html and state, in 9 part:

10 “… The NEB's top priority is the safety and security of people, and the protection 11 of the environment and property.”

12 “Each NEB regulated company must have an emergency management program 13 that anticipates, prevents, manages and mitigates conditions during an 14 emergency. The company's management system and processes must also be 15 evident in its emergency management program.”

16 “An emergency management program must include:

17 · the identification and analysis of potential hazards

18 · the evaluation and management of risks associated with all hazards

19 · an up-to-date emergency procedures manual that is filed with the NEB

20 · liaising with agencies that may be involved in an emergency situation

21 · taking all reasonable steps to inform all persons who may be associated 22 with an emergency response activity on the pipeline of the practices 23 and procedures to be followed

24 · having a continuing education program for the police, fire departments, 25 medical facilities, other appropriate organizations and agencies and the 26 public residing adjacent to the pipeline to inform them of the location of

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1 the pipeline, potential emergency situations and the safety procedures 2 to be followed in case of an emergency

3 · procedures for the safe control or shutdown of the pipeline system in 4 the event of an emergency

5 · sufficient response equipment

6 · training to instruct employees on the emergency procedures and 7 emergency equipment

8 · a verifiable capability to respond to an emergency demonstrated 9 through emergency response exercises.”

10 “If an incident does occur, the NEB will verify that there is adequate and 11 appropriate clean-up and full remediation of any environmental effects resulting 12 from the incident. The company must conduct, to the Board’s satisfaction, a 13 complete clean-up and remediation of any adverse environmental effects. For 14 more information on how the NEB responds to emergencies, please see the 15 Responding to Emergencies pamphlet…”

63.4.2 KMC Emergency Response Plan Updates 16 KMC has internal document control and update processes in place to regularly monitor for 17 changes to regulatory requirements, and updates its EMP and ERPs as necessary. A recent 18 example is KMC’s response to the amended requirements for Section 40 of the NEB OPR 19 (SOR/2013-49, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-99-294), which required 20 implementation of an ISLMS within each regulated company. KMC implemented its ISLMS as 21 required by the changed regulations within the mandated timeframe. The ISLMS is described 22 more fully in Volume 7, Section 4.2.1 (Filing ID A3S4V5).

23 The NEB conducts audits and inspections of its regulated companies periodically. KMC ensures 24 that any audit inspection findings or corrective action items are thoroughly addressed within the 25 required time periods. To continuously improve its plans, KMC also periodically monitors the 26 emergency response planning requirements of other jurisdictions and, if warranted, may 27 incorporate innovations, advances, or enhancements into its own planning documents, and will 28 continue to fully comply with NEB requirements.

29 KMC believes that the ERPs, which form part of the current KMC EMP, have been written and 30 organized to fully comply with NEB requirements in terms of structure and content. Over the 31 past number of years, Federal and Provincial regulatory personnel, as well as local first 32 responder representatives have attended KMC emergency response training exercises and 33 actual spill responses, and have had a chance to get acquainted with and use KMC ERPs.

63.4.3 ERP Training 34 KMC prepares an emergency response training schedule each year and conducts its exercises 35 based on this plan. A listing of all emergency response training exercises completed for the past 36 5 years, including a description of the scenario used in the exercise and external participants, 37 can be found in the response to NEB IR No. 1.69a (Filing ID A3W9H8). Learnings from the 38 above-referenced exercises can be found in the response to NEB IR No. 1.69b (Filing

August 2015 Page 63-11 Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 63.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Emergency Management Program Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

1 ID A3W9H8). The NEB is acquainted with KMCs emergency response personnel, training, 2 response systems, manuals, and procedures and no outstanding concerns from past exercises 3 currently require KMC action.

4 The NEB OPR Sections 33 and 34 (http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-99-294) 5 require regulated companies to establish and maintain liaison with the agencies that may be 6 involved in an emergency response, and shall consult with them in developing and updating the 7 emergency procedures manual. In addition, a company shall take all reasonable steps to inform 8 all persons who may be associated with an emergency response activity on the pipeline of the 9 practices and procedures to be followed, and make available to them the relevant information 10 that is consistent with that which is specified in the emergency procedures manual.

11 As TMEP becomes aware of additional emergency ROs that require relevant information about 12 TMPL facilities, operations, and its current and future ERPs, it initiates information sharing and 13 works cooperatively with the organization or institution to provide input which will assist them in 14 updating their own emergency planning documents so that they can incorporate contingency 15 planning for potential impacts that might occur during an incident at a nearby Trans Mountain 16 facility. For example, commencing in September 2014, TMEP initiated a process of working with 17 SFU emergency planning and response personnel to provide information as the university 18 contemplates updates to its ERPs that reflect the nearby Trans Mountain Burnaby Mountain and 19 Westridge Marine Terminal facilities, and the proposed Burnaby Terminal expansion. The initial 20 meetings were the first of what Trans Mountain hopes and expects will be a series of meetings 21 intended to provide SFU with relevant information for updating its emergency planning 22 documents. Additional meetings between TMEP and SFU are expected to be scheduled in the 23 coming months to provide further information exchange. Through these meetings, it is KMC’s 24 intention to share relevant information regarding the enhanced ERPs with SFU emergency 25 planning and response personnel. In addition, this engagement serves to inform SFU of the 26 practices and procedures that should be followed in the event of an incident at Burnaby 27 Terminal or along the pipeline.

28 As stated in the responses to several IRs, including City of Vancouver IR No. 1.10.02d (Filing 29 ID A3Y2G6) and District of North Vancouver IR No.1.5.07a (Filing ID A3Y2J7), it is KMC’s view 30 that the responsibility for development and maintenance of the respective ERPs for 31 municipalities, institutions, schools, and others continues to rest with these organizations. As 32 stated in the response to Amy C IR No. 1.7m (Filing ID A3X5Y6) and BROKE IR No. 1.2g (Filing 33 ID A3Y2D3), as well as in a number of other responses, KMC remains willing and able to work 34 cooperatively with municipalities, institutions, and others reviewing their respective ERPs and 35 providing relevant information on TMPL facilities, operations, potential incident types, and KMC 36 ERPs.

63.4.4 ERP Consultation 37 Volume 7, Section 4.8.2 (Filing ID A3S4V5) describes how the enhanced EMP and constituent 38 ERPs and other documents will be developed if a CPCN is issued and the project proceeds. As 39 described in GoC IR No. 2.02.2 (Filing ID A4H6A5), to ensure affected parties have the 40 opportunity to express concerns and provide input which will inform the updated EMP, KMC will 41 conduct a consultation program as part of developing the updated EMP as described in the NEB 42 draft conditions related to emergency management. TMEP will develop a plan describing how 43 commitments made by TMEP during consultation will be incorporated into KMC’s EMP, 44 including its ERPs.

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1 Following receipt of the CPCN for TMEP, KMC will file a consultation plan with the NEB related 2 to KMC’s EMP review. The consultation plan will include consultation scope, objectives, 3 preliminary lists of regulatory authorities, communities, Aboriginal groups with whom KMC will 4 engage, and a preliminary list of consultation locations and timing, as well as any other 5 information that the NEB requires. The consultation plan will describe the methods that will be 6 used to track commitments made during consultation and to incorporate them into KMC’s EMP, 7 including its ERP. As part of this program, KMC will periodically file reports with the NEB on 8 progress of its EMP review, including summaries of interested parties consulted and how their 9 comments were considered.

63.4.5 Risk Scenarios Used are Credible Worst-case Scenarios 10 The ERPs used by KMC on the TMPL system consider risks as identified in the various risk 11 analyses and modelling studies that have been completed for the current operation and for the 12 proposed expanded system. For terminal facilities and the linear right-of-way of the pipeline, the 13 CWCS’s used are based upon identified hazards and the range of transported products that risk 14 professionals have systematically identified, analyzed, and documented in support of the 15 Facilities Application.

16 The TMEP risk analyses were prepared by qualified professionals for the Facilities Application 17 and for subsequent IR responses. Examples of the emergency scenarios and risk analyses 18 performed are contained in the response to NEB IR No. 1.98a (Filing ID A3W9H9), and deal 19 with the level of risk to the surrounding community relative to MIACC guidelines and mitigation 20 measures for the expanded Burnaby Terminal, as well as the existing Westridge Marine 21 Terminal and the expanded Westridge Marine Terminal.

22 The Burnaby Terminal Risk Analysis concludes that the level of risk to the surrounding 23 community for the future expanded facility will be within the MIACC guidelines, using the risk 24 analysis CWCS models in which it was assumed that mitigation features were not deployed. In 25 reality, KMC would use all required fire suppression systems in the event of a fire, and its 26 response will be conducted in accordance with the enhanced EMP.

27 Pipeline spill outflow modelling completed for the Facilities Application, described in Volume 7, 28 Section 3.1.6 (Filing ID A3S4V5) and associated technical submissions, also considered 29 CWCS’s, modelling individual full-bore (pipeline bottom, equal to internal diameter of the 30 pipeline) pipeline ruptures at four different locations along the pipeline system with 10 minutes 31 required for pump shutdown.

32 The TMEP ERP, when developed, will prudently incorporate planning, training, and 33 infrastructure for response to what have been independently identified as credible worst-case 34 events in accordance with risk analyses conducted by qualified professionals for individual 35 facilities or contemplated incidents.

63.5 Geographic Response Plans 36 A number of intervenors, including those indicated below, expressed concerns about aspects of 37 the GRPs.

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Evidence Intervenor Filing ID

City of Abbotsford A4L6D4

City of New Westminster A4Q0L5

City of Vancouver A4L7X6

Senichenko, Geoffrey A4L6Q9

Tsleil-Waututh Nation A4L5Z8

Upper Nicola Band A4Q1T3

Unifor A4L7F0

1 Those concerns are addressed below.

2 A number of intervenors have provided comments, questions, or evidence related to the level of 3 detail of the ERPs, and the availability of equipment and personnel to respond to future 4 emergency events. This section provides information on the comprehensive strategy and plan 5 that KMC will use to revise and update the existing ERPs and address the concerns expressed 6 in the intervenor evidence.

7 The existing EMP includes a number of documents, including facilities and pipeline ERPs, Field 8 Guide, Control Points, and Incident Command System Guide. As part of the TMEP, the ERP 9 information included in the Field Guide, Control Points, and other information specified by the 10 NEB will be consolidated into GRPs. As with other elements of the EMP, the GRPs will undergo 11 regular review and revision to ensure that the information contained therein is complete and up 12 to date.

13 KMC intends to create four GRPs that align with TMPL administrative boundaries: Sumas 14 District (Burnaby to Coquihalla Summit); Kamloops District (Coquihalla Summit to Clearwater); 15 North Thompson District (Clearwater to Alberta border); and Alberta District (Alberta border to 16 Edmonton). Each GRP will provide detailed information within the District. The GRPs will 17 include an update to the field information for both the existing line and the new line.

18 Maps and data will be collected and consolidated for each segment followed by ground-truthing 19 of the pipeline route to assess the information and collect additional information on site 20 conditions. KMC has identified and documented control points in its Control Point Manual, part 21 of its EMP. The control points are locations along the pipeline where KMC can apply mitigation 22 measures in response to a spill or release. As part of the GRP program, KMC will confirm the 23 existing control points and develop additional control points, where required, to ensure the 24 planning standard is met for the TMPL system.

25 The GRP project will include:

26 · A review of both Line 1 (the existing pipeline system) and Line 2 (the proposed 27 expansion) to assess response capability.

28 · Development of four GRPs covering both Lines 1 and 2. The analysis of 29 response capability above will serve as a key foundational element for the new 30 GRPs that will be developed. The GRPs will provide KMC and first responders 31 with guidance and detailed information on access, deployment, and product 32 recovery, as well as strategies and tactics relevant to environmental conditions 33 throughout the year.

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1 · Guidance for KMC responders on other unique geographical and 2 environmental hazards such as full or partial ice cover of rivers, streams and 3 lakes, forest fire and smoke, avalanche, and flooding conditions.

4 · A full review of control points along rivers and streams for spill control 5 countermeasure deployment including river boom for spill capture and 6 recovery.

7 · Engagement and incorporation of First Nations, local and regional 8 governments, as well as CP Railway and CN Railway response capabilities 9 and mutual aid, in addition to KMC’s existing mutual aid partners.

10 · Shoreline characterization around unique control points; the extent and details 11 of this will be determined in consultation with local aboriginal groups and 12 stakeholders, and will be finalized before the GRP project commences. GRPs 13 will be developed and ready for application to any spills that may potentially 14 occur, before the expanded pipeline system commences operations.

15 In addition to the above, the GRP project will analyze the existing quantities, locations, and 16 types of spill response equipment, such as the river response jet boats, river boom, skimmers, 17 and portable storage tanks. It will also identify any adjustments required to ensure that adequate 18 inventory levels and types exist for the expanded pipeline system, and the specific locations 19 where they are required to meet the planning standard. Reviews of equipment inventory levels 20 and locations will be an ongoing activity that will support spill response readiness.

21 Following is a provisional list of the information that will be collected:

22 · Distance of control point from pipeline;

23 · Distance of control point to next larger body of water downstream;

24 · Control points nearby of other operators including railways;

25 · Type and condition of road to gain entry to site;

26 · Presence of overhead wires and suitability for helicopter landing;

27 · Relative size and nature of work area;

28 · Water depth issues, obstructions, rocks;

29 · Nearby sensitive shoreline protection zones - wetlands, vegetation, spawning 30 areas;

31 · Peoples and groups at risk;

32 · First Nations concerns;

33 · Nearest response equipment (including mutual aid) and response time to 34 control point;

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1 · Condition and material of construction of boat ramp or launch (if present);

2 · Cell phone coverage;

3 · KMC radio coverage;

4 · Amount of boom, equipment, and personnel required to meet suggested 5 strategies and tactics;

6 · Hospitals or health centre locations;

7 · Details of response strategies and equipment;

8 · Notes on any alternative strategies and tactics that could potentially be used;

9 · Geological, meteorological, and geographical hazards (e.g., snow avalanche, 10 mud slides, rock slides, and steep slopes; and,

11 · Critical infrastructure (e.g., water intakes).

12 The ground-truthing will be supported by an integrated engagement program with stakeholders 13 along the route including:

14 · Municipalities and municipal first responders;

15 · Aboriginal communities;

16 · Provincial emergency response agencies;

17 · Regional districts;

18 · Provincial parks personnel;

19 · BC MOE;

20 · Alberta Environment;

21 · Land owners;

22 · Other industry partners (CP and CN Rail); and,

23 · Contractors.

24 When completed, each GRP will include, as a minimum, information on:

25 · Access (including specialized access to remote and challenging areas, and 26 weather conditions);

27 · Preliminary response strategies;

28 · Deployment locations for spill control and emergency equipment on land and 29 water;

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1 · Environmental conditions;

2 · Response equipment needs;

3 · Local resources and contact information;

4 · Preliminary Shoreline characterization, where applicable; and,

5 · Response time and factors affecting response time.

6 The GRP information will be developed and available to regulatory authorities and responders in 7 paper and electronic form.

63.6 Spill Response Equipment and Procedures 8 A number of intervenors, including those indicated below, expressed concerns about aspects of 9 the spill response equipment and procedures for TMEP.

Evidence Intervenor Filing ID

City of Abbotsford A4L6D4

Tsawout First Nation A4Q1D3

Upper Nicola Band A4Q1T3

Unifor A4L7F0

10 Those concerns are addressed below.

11 The KMC EMP provides a documented, structured approach to ensuring readiness to respond 12 to credible emergency incidents that may occur on the TMPL system. Adequate emergency 13 response procedures are in place, which, in conjunction with trained personnel and equipment 14 inventories in key locations, are critical elements of the EMP and ERP.

15 TMEP will be completing additional emergency planning and associated response procedures 16 for oil spills and other potential emergency conditions before the expanded pipeline system 17 commences operations. In addition to commonly used oil spill response tactics and equipment, 18 potential non-conventional oil spill response techniques are discussed in Volume 7, Appendix F 19 Special Tactics for Spill Response (Filing ID A3S4W7). As is currently the case, 20 non-conventional oil spill response techniques such as ISB or the use of dispersants in the 21 enhanced EMP will only be considered by UC for use in unique situations, and only after 22 consultation with appropriate regulatory authorities. Environment Canada has conducted 23 scientific evaluations of spill-treating agents such as dispersants and surface cleaning agents. 24 The Government of Canada, in the recently released document titled Regulations Establishing a 25 List of Spill-treating Agents (Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act), Regulatory Impact Analysis 26 Statement, states that it is proposing that two spill-treating agents be added to the regulations 27 based upon extensive long-term study and because “…these products possess favourable 28 characteristics as oil spill countermeasures and offer the potential for high efficacy coupled with 29 limited toxicity to biota in the marine environment…” (Canada Department of Environment 2015)

30 The enhanced EMP will reflect the changed requirements of the expanded pipeline system in 31 respect to responding to fires, particularly at terminal facilities where relatively large quantities of 32 petroleum are stored. Fire pre-plans, fire safety plans, types and quantities of fire suppression

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1 equipment, and supplies will all undergo review and will be updated to reflect future needs and 2 to ensure continued adequate response capabilities. Updated response procedures and training 3 programs for fire suppression, using the enhanced fire suppression capabilities included in the 4 design of the expanded terminal facilities, will be developed as part of the enhanced EMP.

5 The enhanced EMP work will also include the development of GRPs. Once the GRPs are 6 developed, they will form an important part of the KMC EMP and ERP.

7 GRPs will enhance KMC planning and response capability for incidents that may occur under 8 the various environmental conditions that can exist at various times of year, at any point along 9 the pipeline system. The GRPs will provide important information for emergency planning 10 activities in terms of the required equipment and specialized responder training that may be 11 required at various points along the pipeline system. Please see the description of GRPs to be 12 developed as part of the enhanced EMP in this document.

13 An important related review that will be undertaken as part of the development of an enhanced 14 EMP will be an analysis of the required geographic locations and inventories of the KMC Oil 15 Spill Containment and Response (OSCAR) units, a review that will be completed before TMEP 16 operations.

17 KMC currently maintains seven OSCAR units at strategic locations along the pipeline system in 18 Alberta and British Columbia. They contain extensive inventories of emergency and spill 19 response equipment specifically selected for land and water-based spill containment and 20 recovery. The units are kept in readiness for mobilization to emergency incidents, as and when 21 needed. Their contents are configured so that they can safely be flown to deployment sites in 22 purpose-built helicopter baskets when this is required due to poor road access conditions.

23 In IR No. 1, KMC provided a detailed listing of the OSCAR contents at each location in the 24 response to Province of BC IR No. 1.1.10a (Filing ID A3Y2Z1). The types of spill response 25 equipment currently carried on the OSCAR units are summarized in Table 1.1.10a-1 from that 26 response (Table 63-1 below). These lists reflect current operations; the number, location, and 27 the contents of these units will be adjusted based on the EMP enhancement program, including 28 public consultation.

29

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1 TABLE 63-1 2 3 KMC DEDICATED SPILL RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

Westridge Terminal OSCAR Trailer Burnaby OSCAR Trailer Hope OSCAR Trailer 2 Marker Buoys 22 Anchors 8 Anchors 1 Boom Bridles/Paravanes 4 Boom Vanes 1 Cable Assemblies 300 ft Containment Boom 35 Cable Assemblies 20 lengths Chain (additional 550 ft stored at Terminal 20 lengths Chain 12 Drive-In Pins location) 43 Drive-In Pins 13 Marker Buoys 2 Valves/Fittings 20 Marker Buoys 23 Shackles 16 Hand tools 34 Shackles 750 ft Containment Boom 3 lengths Hose 1,200 ft Containment Boom 6 Boom Bridles/Paravanes 14 lengths Rope 5 Boom Bridles/Paravanes 3 Boom Ancillaries 7 bales Sorbents 10 lengths Rope 18 Valves/Fittings 1 Oil Skimmer 60 Boom Ancillaries 5 Rope 100 Miscellaneous 63 Valves/Fittings 26 Hand tools 12 sets PPE 18 Hand tools 18 lengths Hose 25 Miscellaneous Safety Equipment 53 lengths Hose 100 Miscellaneous 1 Oil Skimmers 100 Miscellaneous 12 Sorbents 1 Jon Boat and Ancillaries (Boat is 15 Bales Sorbents 4 Storage Tanks not stored in the Trailer) 4 Storage Tanks 5 Transfer Pumps 1 boom deployment boat (moored in 7 Transfer Pumps 12 PPE water at Dock 59) 20 Sets PPE 63 Miscellaneous Safety Equipment 140 Miscellaneous Safety Equipment 3 Oil Skimmers 3 Oil Skimmers 1 Jon Boat and Ancillaries (Boat is 1 Jon Boat and Ancillaries (Boat is not stored in the Trailer) not stored in the Trailer) 2 Winter Response Equipment Kamloops OSCAR Trailer Blue River OSCAR Trailer Jasper OSCAR Trailer 24 Anchors 24 Anchors 23 Anchors 4 Cable Assemblies 3 Cable Assemblies 30 Cable Assemblies 23 lengths Chain 20 lengths Chain 48 lengths Chain 36 Drive-In Pins 49 Drive-In Pins 16 Marker Buoys 13 Marker Buoys 12 Marker Buoys 16 Shackles 18 Shackles 16 Shackles 900 ft Containment Boom 1,100 ft Containment Boom 1,200 ft Containment Boom 6 Boom Bridles/Paravanes (additional 4,150 ft of boom stored at 6 Boom Bridles/Paravanes 43 Boom Ancillaries the station site) 50 Boom Ancillaries 10 lengths Rope 5 Boom Bridles/Paravanes 33 Valves/Fittings 32 Valves/Fittings 79 Boom Ancillaries 10 lengths Rope 32 Hand tools 6 Valves/Fittings 27 Hand tools 38 lengths Hose 10 lengths Rope 30 lengths Hose 50 Miscellaneous 34 Hand tools 100 Miscellaneous 10 bales Sorbents 37 lengths Hose 17 Sorbents 3 Storage Tanks 100 Miscellaneous 3 Storage Tanks 9 Transfer Pumps 14 bales Sorbents 7 Transfer Pumps 10 sets PPE 6 Storage Tanks 12 sets PPE 120 Miscellaneous Safety Equipment 7 Transfer Pumps 114 Miscellaneous Safety Equipment 3 Oil Skimmers 10 sets PPE 3 Oil Skimmers 1 Jon Boat and Ancillaries (Boat is 106 Miscellaneous Safety Equipment 1 Jon Boat and Ancillaries (Boat is not stored in the Trailer) 3 Oil Skimmers not stored in the Trailer) 63 Winter Response Equipment 1 Jon Boat and Ancillaries (Boat is 1 Jet Boat and Ancillaries (Boat is not stored in the Trailer) not stored in the Trailer) 10 Winter Response Equipment 68 Winter Response Equipment

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1 TABLE 63-1 2 3 KMC DEDICATED SPILL RESPONSE EQUIPMENT (continued)

Stony Plain OSCAR Trailer 23 Anchors 6 Cable Assemblies 16 lengths Chain 36 Drive-In Pins 13 Marker Buoys 1200 ft Containment Boom 6 Boom Bridles/Paravanes 42 Boom Ancillaries 75 Valves/Fittings 10 lengths Rope 37 Hand tools 30 lengths Hose 80 Miscellaneous 12 bales Sorbents 2 Storage Tanks 5 Transfer Pumps 10 sets PPE 110 Miscellaneous Safety Equipment 3 Oil Skimmers 1 Jet Boat and Ancillaries (Boat is not stored in the Trailer) 62 Winter Response Equipment

4 TMEP believes that the enhanced EMP, once completed, will provide high levels of readiness 5 for emergency incidents that may occur along the expanded pipeline system.

63.7 Oil Spill Response - Water 6 A number of intervenors, including those indicated below, expressed concerns about aspects of 7 the oil spill response capabilities for water-based incidents.

Evidence Intervenor Filing ID

Cheam and Chawathil First Nations A4Q2C6

City of Vancouver A4L7X6

Metro Vancouver A4L7Y3

Tsawout First Nation A4Q1D3

Upper Nicola Band A4Q1T3

8 Those concerns are addressed below.

9 WCMRC is federally legislated to provide marine response in BC navigable waters. As such, 10 KMC relies on WCMRC to augment its own capacity to respond to spills from the Westridge 11 terminal. This is discussed in a number of IR responses, such as City of Port Moody IR 12 No. 2.3.26e (Filing ID A4H8G7), which states, in part:

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1 “1) As a condition of operating in Canadian waters, the Canada Shipping Act, 2 2001 (CSA) requires that all large vessels and all Oil Handling Facilities (OHF), 3 including Trans Mountain’s Westridge Terminal have a contractual arrangement 4 with certified oil spill Response Organizations (RO) that maintain a prescribed 5 level of preparedness to respond to a spill on the polluter’s behalf, whatever the 6 cause. The CSA 2001 and the current RO and OHF regulations outline the 7 procedures, equipment and resources of response organizations and OHF’s for 8 use in an oil pollution incident. OHF’s must also meet Oil Handling Facilities 9 Standards, TP 12402. Transport Canada’s regional Pollution Prevention Officers 10 enforce the OHF regulations by reviewing their plans for compliance, inspecting 11 the facilities and response resources to ensure an adequate level of 12 preparedness and by attending their exercises.

13 …Western Canada Marine Response Corporation (WCMRC) is the Transport 14 Canada certified spill response organization for the navigable waters of British 15 Columbia. A summary of WCMRC’s current and future roles, responsibilities and 16 actions can be found in the Application, Volume 8A Section 5, Table 5.5.3. (Filing 17 ID A3S4Y6). This table also lists proposed improvements to WCMRC capacity, 18 which includes the capacity to respond to a 20,000-tonne and a future Port Metro 19 Vancouver response base that will be staffed on a 24/7 basis.

20 2) A primary containment boom is always pre-deployed during tanker loading 21 operations at Westridge Marine Terminal. There is sufficient secondary boom 22 on-site to protect the shoreline in the immediate vicinity of WMT. Trans Mountain 23 terminal personnel, with access to pre-staged response equipment and trained to 24 be first responders in the event of an incident, will be on-site at all times during all 25 loading operation. Trans Mountain staff will activate the Westridge Emergency 26 Management Plan (WMT ERP: Filing ID A4D3F1), which includes deployment of 27 a secondary boom. Additional WCMRC equipment (including a spill response 28 vessel) is kept at Westridge for quick deployment.”

29 As with all incidents, KMC takes responsibility for the oil it transports through its pipeline 30 network, regardless of who is determined to be the responsible for causing the incident. In the 31 unlikely event of a spill or release during loading at Westridge Marine Terminal, KMC will 32 respond immediately under the Westridge Marine Terminal ERP referenced above.

63.8 Aquifer Protection 33 A number of intervenors, including those indicated below, expressed concerns about aspects of 34 the aquifer protection after a release or incident.

Evidence Intervenor Filing ID

Shxw'owhamel First Nation A4Q1A0

Township of Langley A4L7R7

35 Those concerns are addressed below.

36 The preferred method of protecting water, soil, and groundwater aquifers is to prevent the 37 product from entering those environments. The enhanced ERP planned as part of TMEP will 38 include the development of GRPs. Each GRP will include information on drinking water and

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1 other valuable resources that require protection. Where a vulnerable aquifer is present, this will 2 be indicated in the GRP and spill response tactics will provide protection to the aquifer.

3 The consultation processes used for GRP development and ERP enhancement will create 4 opportunities for municipalities and other drinking water suppliers to highlight the value and 5 vulnerability of the aquifer to ensure it is accurately reflected in the GRPs and ERP.

63.9 Evacuation Plans 6 A number of intervenors, including those indicated below, expressed concerns about evacuation 7 plans after a release or incident.

Evidence Intervenor Filing ID

City of Burnaby A4L8G5

City of Coquitlam A4Q0I9

Craig, Lisa A4L6S1

Graduate Student Society at SFU A4L9R4

Simon Fraser University A4Q0Y2

Shxw'owhamel First Nation A4Q1A0

Yarrow Ecovillage A4Q1L3

8 Those concerns are discussed below.

9 A number of intervenors have expressed general and specific concerns regarding the 10 responsibility for, the necessity of, and the logistics of conducting evacuations from their location 11 near a TMPL or terminal facility in the event of an emergency. While emergency incidents on 12 the pipeline system are very rare, KMC understands and appreciates the concerns expressed 13 by the intervenors and agrees that contingency planning is a prudent activity for all types of 14 incidents, both natural and man-made, that may affect a given community. The response to 15 Province of BC IR No. 2.30c (Filing ID A4H8W6) summarizes KMC’s role in resident 16 evacuations, in the rare event that they become necessary:

17 “…Although KMC is not responsible for the emergency planning of other 18 organizations, it welcomes the opportunity to work collaboratively with 19 organizations and responders in developing a plans to ensure a safe and timely 20 response to incidents at its facilities and along the pipeline, including evacuations 21 should that be required to ensure the safety of nearby residents. KMC will 22 continue to offer to review emergency response plans (ERP), educate their 23 personnel on our operations, and provide advice on proper response techniques. 24 KMC prefers to jointly manage incidents with the local, provincial and federal 25 authorities in the jurisdiction of the emergency using Unified Command within the 26 Incident Command System (ICS)...”

27 Unlike KMC, municipal governments have the authority to order evacuations. The respective 28 roles of KMC and municipal governments are discussed in the response to City of Burnaby IR 29 No. 2.058c (Filing ID A4H8A1):

30 “…Kinder Morgan Canada Inc. (KMC) expects to work co-operatively with the 31 municipal emergency responders in the unlikely event of an emergency 32 occurring. KMC anticipates working collaboratively with the local first responders

August 2015 Page 63-22 Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 63.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Emergency Management Program Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

1 through an Incident Command System (ICS) structure to coordinate air 2 monitoring and other activities in the unlikely event the need arises. KMC would 3 consult with the local municipal authority to determine the best course of action to 4 protect the public. KMC will provide municipal emergency services with air quality 5 measurements as they are gathered to assist in their response. The decision as 6 to the best course of action and subsequent actions taken to evacuate residents 7 are the responsibility of local emergency services. KMC does not have the 8 legislative authority to undertake evacuations. KMC agrees with the federal, 9 provincial and municipal legislation dealing with emergency programs…”

10 KMC’s role in working with municipal officials who have the authority to issue an evacuation or 11 shelter-in-place order is explained in the response to City of Burnaby IR No. 2.058d (Filing 12 ID A4H8A1):

13 “…KMC’s role in notification of schools, businesses and residents will primarily 14 be to provide local emergency services agencies with air quality measurements 15 and other relevant status information on an ongoing basis through the ICS 16 Liaison Officer or other appropriate position in ICS as it becomes available to 17 assist them in their response in the local community. The decisions made as to 18 the best course of action and subsequent actions taken to direct residents to 19 shelter in place or to evacuate are the responsibility of local municipal emergency 20 services. This includes the communication of instructions for shelter in place…”

21 CAER sessions, described above, include sharing information with municipal first responders 22 about the actions taken by KMC during an emergency incident. If there is release of crude oil or 23 refined product, these actions include continuous air monitoring of the surrounding affected area 24 by KMC personnel. Air monitoring data is then provided via Incident Command to municipal first 25 responders to support their decisions regarding the necessity, timing, and extent of evacuations.

26 If a CPCN is granted and the Project proceeds, TMEP will conduct a consultation process to 27 collect input and information from communities along the pipeline system. Feedback, concerns, 28 and other input will be gathered by KMC and will be considered in the development of the 29 enhanced EMP for the expanded TMPL system. Information gathered may include: community 30 contact information for use in case of a TMPL system emergency incident; the concerns of 31 community members, including issues with possible evacuation routes; shelter-in-place 32 protocols; and other measures that may be required during an emergency. This information will 33 be gathered and documented by KMC and used to inform and improve the final version of the 34 EMP.

35 The response to City of Port Moody IR No. 2.3.38b to 2.3.38d (Filing ID A4H8G7) provides an 36 overview of the EMP consultation process:

37 “…The EMP Consultation process is outlined, in broad terms, below. The 38 Application, Volume 7, Section 4.8 (Filing ID A3S4V5) outlines the process to 39 enhance KMC’s existing emergency management programs (EMP) as they relate 40 to the Trans Mountain Pipeline system to address the needs of the Project. The 41 final programs will be developed in a manner consistent with the National Energy 42 Board’s (NEB or Board) draft conditions related to emergency response (Filing 43 ID A3V8Z8).”

August 2015 Page 63-23 Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 63.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Emergency Management Program Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

1 The KMC EMP contains contact information regarding appropriate emergency contacts in each 2 community. In the rare event that an incident occurs at a TMPL facility that may require 3 shelter-in-place or evacuation of nearby residents, businesses, or other institutions, KMC would 4 use the information to notify and liaise with local municipal emergency officials. KMC gathers 5 up-to-date community contacts for use in the event of an emergency as part of the maintenance 6 of its EMP documents. KMC plans to gather further community contact information during the 7 emergency planning consultation sessions described above, which will be scheduled if NEB 8 approval of the TMEP Facilities Application is received. Community emergency contact 9 information will form an important reference in the enhanced EMP, to be developed following 10 the consultation sessions.

63.10 Communication and Notification 11 A number of intervenors, including those indicated below, expressed concerns about 12 communication and notification associated with a release or incident.

Evidence Intervenor Filing ID

Doherty, Dorothy A4L8U3

Graduate Student Society at SFU A4L9R4

Senichenko, Geoffrey A4L6Q9

13 Those concerns are addressed below.

14 As discussed in the TMEP Application (Volume 7, Section 4, Pages 7-28 to 7-32 and 15 Table 4.3.1: Three-Tiered Response Structure: Page 7.29 [Filing ID A3S4V5[), KMC has an 16 established protocol that allows the response, and associated communications, to be tailored to 17 the size and nature of the incident, accommodating the need to scale up or down as required. 18 Each tier is managed by an escalating degree of management seniority and authority, and 19 assistance from outside the initial response organization. Where appropriate, the KMC Incident 20 Commander will invite the participation of federal, provincial, First Nations, and local agencies to 21 form a UC.

22 Level 1:

23 The Company has the capability to manage and control a Level 1 emergency using company 24 resources available within the area. The District Supervisor will assume the Incident 25 Commander position. Level 1 incidents include:

26 · Oil spills confined to company property (pipeline station, terminal, or scraper 27 trap);

28 · Public, contractor, or employee safety not endangered;

29 · Public property not endangered;

30 · Local response handled by district personnel;

31 · Notification may not be required to regulatory authorities; and,

32 · Little or no media interest.

August 2015 Page 63-24 Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 63.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Emergency Management Program Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

1 Level 2:

2 The Company has the capability to manage and control a Level 2 emergency using company 3 resources and expertise, with some assistance from local contractors. The Region Director or 4 designate may assume the Incident Commander position.

5 · Oil has migrated beyond company property (pipeline station, terminal, or 6 scraper trap) but not into a waterway;

7 · Emergency services may be required (e.g., fire, police, ambulance);

8 · Public, contractor, or employee safety and/or property may be endangered;

9 · Notification required to regulatory authorities;

10 · May use a UC organizational structure in the emergency; and,

11 · Local media interest.

12 Level 3:

13 The Company may request assistance from other industry, municipal, or agency personnel to 14 support the response to the incident. The Region Director will assume the Incident Commander 15 position.

16 · Major emergency condition such as:

17 - uncontrolled leak;

18 - spill on a watercourse;

19 - large fire at an operating facility or office building;

20 - fatality or serious injury to an employee, contractor, or the public; or

21 - spill of hazardous substances.

22 · Major off-site environmental impact has occurred;

23 · Public, contractor, or employee safety and/or property is endangered;

24 · Emergency services are required (e.g., police, fire, ambulance);

25 · Notification required to regulatory authorities;

26 · Use of a UC organizational structure in the emergency, as required, to facilitate 27 coordination of company, government, and other agency response to the 28 emergency; and,

29 · Local, provincial, and/or national media interest.

30 As discussed in numerous IR responses including City of Vancouver IR No. 2.04.02 (Filing 31 ID A4H8I9), KMC has an established protocol for communication with responders, regulatory

August 2015 Page 63-25 Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 63.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Emergency Management Program Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

1 agencies, municipalities, and others in the unlikely event of an incident such as a leak or spill. 2 As part of the EMP consultation plan, KMC will consult with municipalities, First Nations, and 3 other agencies on its communication and notification protocol.

63.11 Emergency Incident Financial Compensation 4 A number of intervenors, including those indicated below, expressed concerns about 5 emergency incident financial compensation associated with a release or incident.

Evidence Intervenor Filing ID

City of Burnaby A4L8G5

City of Port Moody A4L6J2

Fraser Valley Regional District A4Q9I1

Township of Langley A4L7R7

6 Those concerns are addressed below.

7 As discussed throughout the regulatory process, KMC confirms it is responsible for all of its 8 legal liabilities associated with emergencies. KMC will work with those affected by a pipeline or 9 terminal incident to provide compensation as quickly and efficiently as possible.

63.12 References 10 Canada Department of the Environment. 2015. Regulations Establishing a List of Spill-treating 11 Agents (Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act), Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement. 12 Website: http://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2015/2015-07-04/html/reg1-eng.php. Accessed: 13 July 2015.

14 Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA). 2015a. Non-Disclosure Agreement for 15 Emergency Procedures Manuals Reference. Letter from Jim Donihee, Acting CEO, 16 Canadian Energy Pipeline Association to Peter Watson, Chair and CEO NEB. NEB 17 Letter. March 2, 2015.

18 Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA). 2015b. “Pipeline operators coming together to 19 advance common approach to public disclosure of emergency response plans.” Media 20 Release. March 23, 2015

21 Enbridge Pipelines Inc. 2015. Enbridge Pipelines Inc. (Enbridge), Line 9B Reversal and Line 9 22 Capacity Expansion Project, Non-Disclosure Agreements for Emergency Procedures 23 Manuals. Letter from C. Peter Watson, Chair and CEO, NEB to Mr. Guy Jarvis, 24 President - Liquid Pipelines, Enbridge Inc. February 5, 2015.

25

August 2015 Page 63-26 Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 64.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Early Works Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

64.0 EARLY WORKS 1 In the Facilities Application submitted to the NEB in December 2013, Trans Mountain requested 2 that the NEB:

3 · issue a CPCN, pursuant to Section 52 of the NEB Act, authorizing the 4 construction and operation of the Project;

5 · issue an order, pursuant to Section 58 of the NEB Act, exempting Trans 6 Mountain from the requirements of subsections 31(c), 31(d) and 33 of the NEB 7 Act in relation to yet to be specified, select temporary lands or infrastructure 8 required for construction of the Project; and grant such further and other relief 9 as Trans Mountain may request or the Board may consider appropriate. (page 10 36 of 113; Filing ID A3S0Q7).

11 Trans Mountain also provided details of the activities and temporary infrastructure (i.e., “early 12 works”) it was proposing to undertake in advance of mainline construction in Volume 4B, 13 Sections 2.1 and 3.0, of the Application (Filing ID A3S1K5). At that time, Trans Mountain 14 specified that early works could include the development of camps, stock pile sites, access 15 roads, and clearing outside of the migratory birds restricted activity period. In Appendix A of 16 Volume 4B (Filing ID A3S1L0), Trans Mountain provided a proposed list of camp and stock pile 17 site locations, as well as lists of proposed existing and new temporary and permanent access 18 roads. Trans Mountain assessed the early works in the ESA and consulted affected Aboriginal 19 groups and stakeholders regarding the early works.

20 Since filing the Facilities Application, Trans Mountain made minor revisions to refine and 21 optimize the early works. In Technical Update No. 2, Trans Mountain filed revised pipeline 22 corridor maps, which illustrated the proposed (new and existing) access roads (Filing 23 ID A4A4A521).

24 Since the filing of the Facilities Application and Technical Update No. 2, Trans Mountain has 25 continued to plan for the construction of the Project, refining the scope of the early works 26 activities. As detailed in the filings referenced above, Trans Mountain proposes to undertake the 27 development of camp locations, stockpile sites, contractor staging areas (i.e., co-located with 28 camps or stockpile sites), access roads for the first 10 km of each pipeline spread (i.e., including 29 temporary, clear-span bridges associated with these access roads), and clearing activities 30 associated with the first 10 km of each pipeline spread, to be undertaken outside of the 31 migratory bird restricted activity period.

32 Trans Mountain evaluated its proposed activities to ensure: (1) that the conclusions of the 33 significance of the effects of early works on the environment remain unchanged; and, (2) the 34 requirements of a Section 58 application under the NEB Act have been met. As well, Trans 35 Mountain has identified site-specific mitigation measures for certain early works and commits to 36 developing and implementing an EPP for the proposed early works that includes all general and 37 site-specific mitigation measures.

21 Maps for Technical Update No. 2 can be accessed with these Filing IDs: A4A4A6, A4A4A7, A4A4A8, A4A4A9, A4A4C0, A4A4C1, A4A4C2, A4A4C3, A4A4C4, A4A4C5, A4A4C6, A4A4C7, A4A4C8, A4A4C9, A4A4D0, A4A4D1, A4A4D2, A4A4D3, A4A4D4.

August 2015 Page 64-1 Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 64.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Early Works Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

1 The proposed early works were identified in the Facilities Application, though the specific 2 locations were not known at the time the Facilities Application was submitted. Trans Mountain 3 concludes that the requirements of a Section 58 application have been met through the 4 information previously provided by Trans Mountain related to proposed early works.

5 Furthermore, Trans Mountain may be required to obtain provincial authorizations and municipal 6 permits for certain early works activities in advance of commencing early works construction.

7 Trans Mountain proposes to commence early works activities as soon as possible after the 8 issuance of a Certificate, if one is issued. Trans Mountain could be in the position to start early 9 works activities in mid-June 2016.

64.1 Summary of New Commitments 10 · Trans Mountain commits to developing and implementing an EPP for the proposed early 11 works that includes all general and site-specific mitigation measures.

12

August 2015 Page 64-2 Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 65.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Appendices Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

65.0 APPENDICES 1

August 2015