Rise of Militancy in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) After 9/11

Home , High Courts of Pakistan, Kohat Pass

Rise of Militancy in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) after 9/11:

Problems and Prospects

Muhammad Zaher Shah

Department Of History Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad 2012-2015

Rise of Militancy in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) after 9/11:

Problems and Prospects

Research Supervisor Prof. Dr. RAZIA SULTANA

Researcher Muhammad Zaher Shah

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN THE PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Doctor of Philosophy IN HISTORY

Department of History Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad 2012-2015

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My Family

CONTENTS

Acknowledgement vii

CHAPTER NO. 1

Introduction 1

Hypothesis 7

Theoretical Framework 7

Significance and Scope of the Study 10

Key Questions 11

Review of Literature 12

Methodology and Organization 21

CHAPTER NO. 2

Understanding FATA 24

Terrain and People 30

Climate 35

Social System of Tribesmen 35

Socio-Economic Condition in FATA 39

Legal and Constitutional Status of FATA 41

Judicial Structure of FATA 44

Administrative Hierarchy of FATA 48

Local Administration 48 v

FCR Jirga 49

Due Process 51

CHAPTER NO. 3

The Rise of Militancy in FATA 53

The Afghan Factor in the Rise of Militancy 56

After the Saur Revolution 1978 60

Mujahideen Groups and Their Social Bases 63

The Fundamentalists 64

The Traditionalists 65

Rise of Militancy in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan 68

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and FATA 73

Aftermath of the Soviet Withdrawal 77

CHAPTER NO. 4

Causes for the Rise of Militancy in FATA:

An Application of Path-Dependency and Relative Deprivation Theories 87

Path Dependence and Relative Deprivation Theories and FATA 90

Repressive Institutions and Laws Remained Intact 91

Status of Tribal Areas in Pakistan’s Political System & Militancy 95

Repressive Federal Laws 95

FATA and the Anachronistic Frontier Crimes Regulations 98

Maliki and Khassadari Systems 101

Encouraging Tribesmen to Fight Kashmir Jihad 103

Faqir of Ipi Movement and its Repercussions 106

Pak-Afghan-India and Militancy 108

Pakhtunistan Movement 111

Legacy of partition 113

Challenges after the creation of Pakistan and its Repercussion 116

Weak governance 117

Institutional stability and reforms in FATA 120

Turmoil in Afghanistan and the impact on FATA 125

CHAPTER NO. 5

Impact, Challenges and the Way Forward 129

Price of the Present Militancy for Pakistan 129

Challenges Faced by Pakistan 144

Policy Recommendations and the Way Forward 148

Conclusion 161

Bibliography 171

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

All praises be to Allah, the most Merciful and most Mighty, Who gave me the courage, passion and mental approach to conduct this research work and made each difficulty easier for me in the way of its completion.

I would like to record my immense debt of gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Dr. Razia

Sultana, whose inspiring guidance, kind assistance; expert advice, thoughtful comments, full-fledged support and co-operation enabled me to complete this research work. She will always remain a source of inspiration for me throughout my life because, besides her kindness, her scholarly input, her openness in the sharing of ideas regarding the research, has left deep imprints upon me. Her critical analysis of my ideas and her support for the main arguments enabled me to bring this particular research work to the present shape. It was the blessing of this motivation that I finally succeeded to complete this dissertation.

I am highly indebted to Thomas E. Gouttierree, Director for International Studies and Director of

Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska, Omaha, USA and my co-supervisor for his expert guidance in my research work. He was always available and let a helping hand whenever I needed him and kept me on the right track and provided me with a right direction. My good wishes are also to Dr.

Patrick McNamara, Professor of Political Science in University of Nebraska, Omaha, USA. I will always remember his friendly and lovely attitude. My thanks are also due for all the members of the teaching staff of the Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, for their moral and intellectual support. I highly appreciate the cooperation of all the staff members of Center for Afghanistan Studies

(CAS) University of Nebraska at Omaha, USA and others from different disciplines.

I am much grateful to Dr. Aman Ullah Marwat, Assistant Professor of History, Department of

History, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad for his help at every juncture of my stay at the department.

I am very thankful to Sher Jan Ahmadzai, Research Associate at the Center for Afghanistan Studies,

University of Nebraska Omaha USA, and former aide to President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan who viii helped and guided me at every moment of my stay in USA. Similarly, I am grateful to Pir Zubair Shah, a journalist from South Waziristan Agency, FATA, who not only guided me in USA but also provided me some useful materials.

I am deeply thankful to Dr. Azmat Ullah, Assistant Professor in the Department of History,

Government College University, Faisalabad. He helped me greatly in making my synopsis and guided me to accomplish this complicated task. I am also grateful to him for proofreading and thoroughly checking my thesis.

I would like to appreciate all my class fellows and friends who encouraged me in going through this process. My special thanks are to Dr. Akbar Ali, Assistant Professor of English at Hazara University,

Mansehra.

It would be quite unfair if I do not mention the various institutions, institutes, archives, libraries and their staff that made it possible for me to accomplish the task and bring it in the present form and shape. In this regard, Peshawar Archives, Bannu Archives and their staff provided me with the related documents that were available there. Paul Arthur collections in the Criss Library at University of

Nebraska Omaha, USA were an important asset for my research as well. I also utilized Libraries of

History Department and Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar. The Central Library of Peshawar

University is of immense importance to be mentioned here, wherein I spent most of the time to study. The

Government Post Graduate College Bannu’s Library was another useful place for studying and consulting books. The Library of Pakhto Sanga (Pashto Department), Peshawar University provided very rare materials. The Central Library, Quaid-i-Azam University, is also important to be mentioned as it provided me all those rare materials which could not be found anywhere else. The elders from different localities of

FATA who helped me in completion of my research are appreciated.

I am highly thankful to Mr. Muhammad Ali Usman, Associate Professor of English, Mr. Saad

Ullah Jan, Associate Professor of English, Mr. Hazrat Ullah Lecturer in English and Mr. Sher Abdullah,

Lecturer in English, of the Department of English, Government Post Graduate College Bannu, for going through the draft of this thesis and for making necessary corrections.

Lastly, I am most indebted to my family members whose love, courage and emotional support have been the moving force behind me.

Muhammad Zaher Shah Wazir

Chapter-1

Introduction

British departure, as a colonial power from the sub-continent, had given birth to two successor states,

Pakistan and India. The tribal areas were incorporated as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and placed under the direct control of the central government of Pakistan. FATA has been administered through the same old colonial rules and regulations since then. Apart from some changes, introduced by

PPP government in FCR, no basic change of policy and laws regarding the tribal region took place since then. However, the tribesmen of FATA have not only remained peaceful and calm but have also rendered valuable services to Pakistan e.g. in the first Indo-Pakistan war of 1947, on the issue of Kashmir, the tribesmen invaded the Kashmir valley. The Maharaja's troops were defeated and reached even Srinagar, the capital. Similarly, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 the tribesmen offered strong resistance to prevent Russian access to the warm waters of Arabian sea. Throughout 20th century, the tribesmen as a whole remained peaceful and have hardly resorted to militant activities.

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 80s directly affected the Pashtuns of Pakistan particularly the tribesmen, though due to common ethnic, religious, social and political background, the tribesmen alongside their Afghan brethren fought against the occupation of the Soviet occupied forces.

The Afghan refugees, who left Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation, were accommodated by the government of Pakistan in various parts of the country, especially in the Pashtun/tribal belt which resulted in the development of matrimonial alliances between them. The back down of the Soviet forces from

Afghanistan in February 1989 did not prove attractive even for the Afghan refugees, because the whole country was turned into a mess due to a civil war among the various ethnic and Islamist groups.

The emergence of Taliban (previously the students of the religious madrassas) movement on the political scene of Afghanistan for the imposition of Islamic law in the country not only

1 attracted Afghans but also the Pashtuns of Pakistan, particularly the tribesmen. The Taliban were hailed as the forces of God who were created for putting an end to the post-Soviet social and political anarchy in Afghanistan. The Taliban set out to enforce Islamic sharia by introducing a revolutionary form of Muslim culture at the cost of human freedom. Keeping beards were made compulsory for men. Television, music, photography, etc. were declared unlawful. Punishments like amputation of the hands of thieves, stoning to death of women convicted of adultery were common under the Taliban. Women were not allowed to work outside their homes, and were compelled to wear burka, a head-to-toe covering, and could not leave the home without a male guardian. Such issues annoyed ordinary Afghans and drew criticism from the international community.

However, after the incident of 9/11, Al-Qaeda and its supporting Taliban militia was held responsible for facilitating the Al-Qaeda led attacks on the US World Trade Center and Pentagon, which caused the United States of America and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) forces to attack Afghanistan. As a result, the Taliban regime collapsed. It embittered the Pashtuns of the tribal areas of FATA besides the Pashtuns of Afghanistan as they have mutual ethnic, historical and religious connections.

The present phenomenon of the rise in militant and extremist activities in FATA is the direct outcome of the Afghan wars with Soviet Union in the twentieth century and with the United States of

America in the twenty first century, and also the past policies made by the British and later on adopted by the successor state of Pakistan which, since its birth has ill treated the tribal region. This ill treatment developed the sense of deprivation among the tribesmen, who looked for exploring alternative ways of survival. In addition, regional and international factors contributed to the phenomenon of militancy as well.

Militancy like terrorism is an ambiguous term. It is taken in the sense of acts of groups, parties or individuals, who are engaged in violence for religious, political, ideological, economic or social reasons.

Nowadays, both of the terms, militancy and terrorism, are used interchangeably. In modern times, militancy is used as a tool for solving complex issues by deprived individuals, social groups, and communities or they strive to use it for the rationalization of their solutions of different issues and problems. From the late nineteenth century, a militant was sensed as one who was active in pursuing a social or political cause using force, aggression and violence.1 Militancy is an English word which is used in the sense of using an aggressive and vigorous force to achieve desired objectives, usually political ones. Here, not only physical force is applied but other means like media is also used as a tool for propagating a particular cause. Sometimes media and other informative sources take it as a neutral term in comparison to terrorism and guerrilla tactics, while at others, it is taken as a parallel discourse to terrorism. The term is applied to movements using terrorist tactics.2 Similarly, a militant is defined as someone who wants to use force for trying to resolve issue or issues by fighting.3

FATA is the tribal region of Pakistan which is in the eye of the storm since the incident of 9/11. It is adjacent to Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province and lies contiguous to the western border with

Afghanistan. It is a legacy of the British Empire and the laws through which FATA is governed, the

Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR), were promulgated in 1901 by the Colonial Raj. It has assumed much more importance after 9/11 due to the rise of militancy in FATA, activities which serve as a menace for

1 Research Report, “Understanding Religious Militancy and Terrorism in Bangladesh” (Dhaka: Dhaka Institute of Cultural Affairs, December 2011), 22-28. See also Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, revised edition, 2006), 1-42. 2Mark Juergensmeyer, “Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence”, Comparative Studies in Religion and Society, 13 (California: University of California Press, 2003), 9. See also Richard Jackson, Jeroen Gunning and Marie Breen Smyth, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda (London: Rutledge, 2009), 162. See also Vincent C. Peloso, Work, Protest, and Identity in Twentieth-Century Latin America (Delaware: Jaguar books on Latin America, no. 26, Scholarly Resources, 2003), 238.

3 Khalid Aziz, “Swat: The Main Causes of the Breakdown of Governance and Rise of Militancy”, Research Report (RIPORT: Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs), 14.

3 the government, military and civilians of Pakistan, Afghanistan, US and others. However, this has come as no surprise as in South Asian history the strategic alignment of FATA on the northwest have always been of critical importance to South Asian and Central Asian states and empires. Yet our understanding of this region is driven by the lack of awareness of broader history and deeper cultural forces that have shaped the mindset of the people of this region.

Since independence till date, the tribal region is governed under the same British laws and regulations by the government of Pakistan. FCR is still the law of the tribal region. So, the tribesmen have been treated as aliens and the basic fundamental civil-cum-political-cum-economic rights and equal opportunities are negated to them. Resultantly, the tribal region of FATA is driven by rampant poverty and dismally low literacy rates. Despite its isolation, this region had generally remained a peaceful region and the tribesmen did not resort to militant activities and never posed serious threat to the integrity of the country. Pakistani authorities, unfortunately, never tried to bring them into the mainstream state and consider them as integral and significant part of Pakistan. That’s why, the tribal areas have been used for different vested interests and extremist and militant groups and organizations.

At present, militancy is the direct outcome of depriving the tribesmen from their fundamental rights and the historically ill-treatment of the region by the successive Pakistani governments. Similarly, the way of life of the tribesmen, unfortunately, has historically been miss-presented, misunderstood and miss- comprehended, regionally as well as internationally. No serious effort has been made to develop the area or to solve their problems through amicable ways. The only solution adopted was stick diplomacy which further increased mistrust and anarchy. Besides, it is the result of many other inter-related causes for the rise of militancy in FATA. These include the political alienation of the region driven by the state’s policy of seeking “Strategic Depth” in Afghanistan, misunderstanding and misrepresentation of the tribesmen and the unique socio-cultural makeup of the region, the Afghan factor and the current scenario of instability in the region due to the US presence in Afghanistan after 9/11. In addition, it is also claimed that the repeated unilateral actions in FATA from across the border played an important role in 4 deteriorating the situation as well. These disruptions led to resentment and lack of trust among the tribesmen which further aggravated the situation there.

The Musharraf’s regime, allied itself with US after the incident of 9/11, in the ongoing ‘war on terror’, which consequently embittered the religious section of the Pashtun tribal society against the government’s policies that resulted in the formation of various militant organizations, whom were head bent to oust US and NATO forces from Afghanistan and also to end up US influence on the government of Pakistan. The militants in order to pressurize the government have targeted the common masses, the civil servants and the security forces. They resorted to violent activities and conducted suicide attacks throughout the length and breadth of the country. After the end of the Military government of General

Pervez Musharraf in 2008, the popularly elected government of Pakistan People Party (PPP) continued the same policies of Musharraf’s regime that exacerbated an atmosphere of mistrust between the government and the radicalized tribesmen. It worsened law and order situation in the country. Resultantly, the government took another extreme step by using force to combat terrorism and militancy that resulted in heavy losses of lives and collateral damages on both sides.

In fact, Militancy in the tribal areas, though, actually started with Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, yet, most importantly, it is the direct outcome of the policies pursued by the successive Pakistani governments in FATA. The tribal region was isolated from the mainstream country which deprived the tribesmen from developmental programmes leading to a sense of rebellion among them. The tribesmen were used for different purposes by successive Pakistani governments in the past. The government of

Pakistan remained locked in its past and policies. This state of affairs increased militancy to its peak after the incident of 9/11 particularly after the US and NATO invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the

Taliban regime. It resulted in a heavy loss of Afghan civilians’ lives which directly became the prime cause of fueling militancy.

To counter this phenomenon of insurgency as well as to remove the sanctuaries and safe havens of militants in the tribal region, a comprehensive strategy must be adopted. Pakistan should mend its policy of negligence towards the tribal region and restate its foreign policy especially vis-a-vis

Afghanistan. It is important for US to keep a close eye on the relationship between Islamabad and

Afghanistan. Similarly, Afghanistan should mend its ways vis-a-vis Pakistan. The international community should assist Pakistan to crush militancy. It is urgently needed to develop the areas to put

FATA on the fast track of peace and prosperity like other parts of the country. The old and obsolete black laws of Frontier Crimes Regulations need to be repealed and equal national laws must be enforced upon the region. The region needs to be economically prosperous and equal educational opportunities should be provided. The foreign players need to pay due heed to the development of the tribal region so that to prevent the tribal areas from being used by terrorist, extremist and fundamentalist groups.

Hypothesis

The rise of militancy in FATA after 9/11 is the outcome of the Afghan wars and the adopted policies in the tribal areas by the successive governments of Pakistan since its inception and the conflicting interests of international powers in the region resulted in the deprivation of the people of the region, provided favourable environment for the rise and proliferation of extremism and militancy.

Theoretical Framework

Theoretical framework will encompass Paul Pierson Theory of ‘Path Dependency’ and Ted Robert Gurr’s

Theory of ‘Relative Deprivation’.

The research focuses on the theory of ‘Path Dependence’ particularly its two main components that is to say "history matters" and "increasing returns" as the analytical framework.4 Path Dependence theory

4Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, 2000, 251-267.

6 became famous in 1980s as a form of investigation. It is largely applied to the field of law and economics, and is evenly applied now to other disciplines of life as well.5 It is used in the sense that "history matters”, which simply means that the present situation is the result of what we have done in the past. More fashionably, it is argued that "the capital stock is path dependent". Though it is hard to give a single definition to the approach yet it is often argued that it suits the area under focus.

The theory of path dependency emphasizes the point that as a result of decisions taken and choices made in the past certain established paths become behavioral standards for institutions of the state structure. After long usage of these established paths, they are institutionalized then.6 Thus, they cannot easily be pulled back from the selected paths as it involves a high cost.7 So, the theory emphasizes the influence of the past on the emergence of a certain path.

To give up an established path is very difficult and expensive. The paths once chosen cannot be ceased out completely but can be modified as expressed by Paul Pierson.8 He cites a prominent example that makes the theory stand out, namely the continued use of the ‘QWERTY’ keyboard. After naming the first six keys on the left, the 'QWERTY' keyboard has come to be recognized as the standard computer keyboard,9 not because of its performance or ease of use, but because it is the first standard and has

5Martin Stack & P Myles Gartland, “Path Creation, Path Dependency, and Alternative Theories of the Firm”, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2003, 487-494. See also Pierson, “Increasing Returns”, 251-267.

6Gerard Alexander, “Institutions, Path Dependence and Democratic Consolidation”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Sage Publications California, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2001, 249-70. See also Mota Mariana Prado & J Michael Trebilock, “Development and the Dynamics of Institutional Reform”, Legal Studies Research Series, No. 09-04, 2009, University of Toronto Law Journal.

7Pierson, “Increasing Returns”.

8 Paul Pierson, “When Effects Become Cause: Policy Feedback And Political Change”, World Politics, Vol. 45, 1993, 595-628.

9 Taylor Boas, “Conceptualizing Continuity and Change, The Composite- Standard Model of Path Dependence”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2007, 33-54.

7 become institutionalized.10 So, the path dependence theory tells that despite the creation of more advanced keyboards, it cannot be easily replaced.11

The path dependency approach, according to Pierson, has broad and narrow concepts. According to the broader view, history has superior power and influence over the present. The institutions, according to the narrow view, are self-reinforcing.12 The concept of path dependence rests on two important beliefs.

The first belief is the initial stage when a certain course of action is adopted due to events taking place-the history of selection. The second stage is when forces stabilise the ‘path’ based on decisions taken in the past-the reinforcing period.13

Both of the aspects of the dependency theory qualify for the problems in FATA since they are the net result of history. The problems in the tribal region are the result of what we had done in the past. We cannot, therefore easily depart from our chosen paths.14 This is because successive governments in

Pakistan have followed the same British model of economic, political and social systems of administration.

In the same way, Ted Rober Gurr’s theory of ‘Relative Deprivation’ is employed. The pith of his philosophy is discussed in his book Why Men Rebel (1970) wherein he has given prominence to social psychological factors, relative deprivation and ideology as the basic causes of uprising. He put forward

10Paul A. David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 75, 1985.

11 Ibid.

12Paul Pierson, Politics in time: history, institutions, and social analysis (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004).

13B. Arthur, “Urban systems and historical path dependence”, in ed. J. Ausubel and R. Herman, Cities and their Vital Systems: Infrastructure, Past, Present and Future, (Washington: National Academy Press, 1988).

14Margaret Levi, “A Model, a Method and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis” in Mark I. Lichbach and Allan S. Zuckerman ed., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 19-41.

8 the ‘Relative Deprivation’ theory (psychological frustration-aggression theory) wherein he contends that frustration-aggression mechanism is the primary source of the human capacity for violence. As a result of modernization all over the world, uneven levels of development exist. Sharing of benefits among different ethnic groups and discrimination in terms of development creates disequilibrium in a society. According to Gurr, in this situation, under privileged ethnic groups may develop a perception of relative deprivation.15 Schaefer defines it as "the conscious experience of a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and present actualities”.16

Frustration does not necessarily lead to violence, Gurr says, but when it is sufficiently prolonged and sharply felt, it often does result in anger and eventually lead to violence and extremist activities.17 It equally qualifies for the region of FATA because the tribesmen feel frustration for their neglect on the part of the successive governments of Pakistan since its inception in all fields of life.

Significance and Scope of the Study

This study encompasses the real geo-strategic nature of the tribal region and the way of life of the tribesmen. It mainly concentrated on the past policies and decisions regarding the region by the Pakistani governments in historical context which resulted in developing a sense of deprivation among the tribesmen, and the Afghan wars by Soviet Union and USA that led to the rise of militant tendencies in

FATA, its repercussions and the possible solutions.

15 F. Ahmad, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 68-72. See also Ayesha Shehzad, “The Issue of Ethnicity in Pakistan: Historical Background”, Pakistan Vision Vol. 12 No. 2,126-127.

16Richard T. Schaefer,Racial and Ethnic Groups 11th Ed. (Pearson Education, 2008), 69.

17Ted Robert Gurr, “Why Men Rebel”, Review by Charles Tilly in Journal of Social History Vol. 4, No. 4, Summer, 1971, 416-420 (accessed on Jstor March 20, 2013).

It highlights the grave problems as well, faced by the government of Pakistan in dealing with militancy in FATA and how to eliminate it. It will help in understanding roots of the problem. Besides academic purposes, it can be utilized for curbing militancy and insurgent elements in FATA.

Key Questions

 What is the real picture of the traditional Pashtun society in FATA and its links with the prospects

of the rise of militancy there?

 How the historical treatment of the tribal region by the successive Pakistani governments leads to

the rise of militancy in the region?

 What is the status of FATA in the political set up of Pakistan, its consequent impact on the social

and economic makeup of the region and its links with the rise of militancy?

 How the situation in Afghanistan after the fall of Taliban has impacted the Pashtuns of FATA?

 Why FATA has been alienated from the mainstream national progress of Pakistan that led to its

exploitation by the militants?

 Why FATA became the central breeding ground for the militants and caused the rise of militancy

in the tribal area?

 Why did the government of Pakistan show no concern with the rise of militancy among the

Pashtuns of FATA in the initial stages?

 What policy measures were adopted by the government to counter militancy in FATA?

 What are the problems faced by the government of Pakistan in dealing with militancy in FATA

and what is the possible way forward?

Review of Literature

In this respect, the tribal region of FATA has been declared by Arnold J. Toynbee as the cross-roads of civilizations. In his book, Between Oxus and Jumna, due to its strategic location, Toynbee declared the

10 tribal region as one of the most sensitive region in the world. Azmat Hayat Khan in his book, The Durand

Line –Its Geostrategic Importance highlights the different passes and routes between Pakistan and

Afghanistan and their uses and importance. In addition, the book, Social and Economic Change in the

Tribal Areas (1972-76) by Akbar S. Ahmed throws light on the geographical position of FATA in a very decent way. He also gives a very vivid picture of the social and economic way of life of the area.

Farah Taj is another renowned writer on the topic. She completed her Ph. D recently from Oslo

University and being the resident of the tribal areas, it gives her the advantage of having familiarity with the real politic involved in the topic under research. In her book, ‘Talibam and Anti-Taliban’, she has challenged many narratives which present the fictitious picture of FATA. She highlighted the real picture that how the situation was manipulated by Pakistani rulers in FATA presenting the fictional picture by fusing the state-managed Taliban insurgency as being the tribesmen’s’ revolt in the support of Taliban.

She asserts that the objective is the same, to have influence in Afghanistan. She has done a good research but she had ignored the historical past and the deprivation of the people of the said area from the facilities of twenty first century. FATA: Voice of the unheard-path-dependency and Why History Matters is another useful source produced by Amina Khan, in which she has given a very vivid historical narration of the use and abuse of the region of FATA connected with the present militant situation there. She has only touched the past of the issue but ignored the deprivation and Afghan factors which are equally responsible for the rise of militant activities there.

In the Line of Fire: A Memoir by Pervez Musharraf is an important primary account, written by the former President of Pakistan. Besides his personal background, the memoir deals with the circumstances under which Pakistan was compelled to join United States of America in her ‘war against terrorism’. It provides valuable information regarding militancy in the Pashtun particularly the tribal areas. The memoir also elaborates government’s policy in dealing with militancy and terrorism. Here he tries to justify his decisions and policies regarding Taliban and the tribal region and ignoring the popular sentiments of the tribesmen. Hussain Haqqani’s work under the title, Pakistan: Between Military and 11

Mosque, very beautifully explains the tussle between the religious cadres and the army. The author enumerates the role played by both the army and the religious forces in the affairs of the state.

Hassan Abbas’ book, Pakistan’s Drift towards Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror explains very beautifully that how Pakistan is going into the hands of the extremists? In this book the author describes the ideology of the country and the response of the people to it, Pakistan’s alliance with the US in her war against terrorism and the institution of the army. Here the author is also very critical about Pakistan’s alliance with the US because to him, it is this alliance that compels a considerable section of the people to resort to extremism and militancy. Pakistan: In the Eye of the

Storm, is a work by Owen Bennett Jones that describes the situation regarding Pakistan. This account elaborates not only the central role of Pakistan in the war against terrorism but also its grave situation in the light of the terrorist and militants’ storm that has overshadowed it. The author explains that it is

Pakistan which has became the main target of the terrorists-extremists.

Pakistan and the Emergence of Militancy in Afghanistan by Rizwan Hussain is another well attempt. It explains Pakistan’s Afghan policy characterized by regional security complex which has added substantially to the rise of militant Islam in Afghanistan with its implications not only for Pakistan but the region and the world at large. The author is of the view that Pakistan has been instrumental in provoking militancy in the tribal region. He also referred to the ‘Double Game’ played by Pakistan first in 1979 and then 2001.

Then Ahmad Rashid who has written a lot about talibanization and who is a celebrated expert on

Afghanistan and Central Asia has produced a good account in the shape of a book, ‘Taliban’. It throws light extensively on all aspects of the Taliban, its rise, composition, its leadership, etc. and then its emplacement in the strategic calculus of Pakistan’s Afghan policy. He describes the relationship of

Taliban with the militant groups in Pakistan during their reign in Afghanistan in 1990s as well. He is of the view that Pakistan still considers Taliban as the best option for its strategic concerns in Afghanistan.

Pakistan: Can U.S Secure an Insecure State? is another good attempt by Christine Faire and others which helps in updating our understanding about the problem under investigation. She is of the view that

Pakistani state relation with militant proxies is both out of choice which has been necessitated by and incapability of the state to deal with militants, at least those who are fighting the Pakistani state. She also believes that militants’ resistance to America in Afghanistan is ‘Pashtun’ insurgency in the Pak-Afghan region.

Then there is an edited book by Christophe Jaffrelot ‘Pakistan: Nation, Nationalism and the State’ is a good endeavour which explains the nature of Pakistani state and nation. The author says that Pakistan is a migratory state which imposed a “migrant idea”, ethnic-cum-language-cum-religious. Then these migratory Muhajir ruling elite soon lost power to the Punjabi elites who were influential in the military and bureaucracy. The Punjabi elites promoted then the religion-based identity and thus transformed the state into an ideological state. In addition, there was added the sectarian tension (Saeed Shafqat) by

General Zia’s Islamization policy. Then this phenomenon was fuelled by changing scenario in the region

(Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and revolution in Iran) which transformed Pakistan, particularly the tribal region, into “the battle field of a new proxy war” for America and Saudi Arabia and for pursuing its own

(Pakistan) strategic interests (Abuzahab). So, Islam was used as a militant religion as an instrument of policy by Pakistan. The “Indian Syndrome” (Racine) is guiding principle both for internal and external politics of Pakistan. Further, the unstable regional environment has decreased the input of the public in foreign policy making and thus strengthened the close and security nature of the state (Waseem).

The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of Big One by David Kilcullen describes the importance of the guerrilla warfare fought by the militants in the tribal belt of FATA and that how the small guerrilla wars are serving the cause of the big war of religious ideology. Though his effort in the shape of the book is appreciable yet he is driven by the lack of the knowledge about the tribal region, the way the tribesmen think and the reasons for the present rise of militancy, etc. there. A combined work of Maryam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan 13

Connection highlights the militant networks in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. It describes the activities carried out against the states in both the countries by these religious cadres and shows their mutual links.

Jagmohan Meher’s work under the title of America’s Afghanistan War: The Success that Failed, deals with the US role in Afghanistan since the time of the Soviet occupation. This work also focuses on the role played by Pakistan and other outside actors in Afghanistan. The author is very critical about the role of Pakistan in the America’s Afghan war and shows its repercussions for Pakistan. The edited work of K.

Warikoo under the title, The Afghanistan Crisis: Issues and Perspectives contains a chapter that particularly deals with the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and its security implications for the region and the world. The author especially gave attention to the role played by Pakistan during the war and chaos in Afghanistan and also the implications of the events and situation in Afghanistan for the former. Another important work under the title, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass

Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region by Neamatullah Nojumi deals not only with the emergence of Taliban and the chaotic situation in Afghanistan but it also describes the role of Pakistan in the rise of Taliban over there and the consequences she had faced later on.

Amir Mir’s Talibanization of Pakistan: From 9/11 to 26/11is a book worth mentioning covering militant Islam and jihadi organizations in Pakistan, especially after the terrorist attacks on Bombay on

26/11. He highlights the links of the local militants with the international terror groups like Al-Qaeda as well. He is of the view that the militancy in FATA is now spreading to other parts of the country which must be of grave concern for Pakistan.

To grasp the issue, many research papers have been reviewed which include; Olivier Roy’s

‘Pakistan and Taliban’, Bornett Rubin ‘Saving Afghanistan’, Seth. G. Jone’s ‘The Rise of

Afghanistan Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad’, Mariam Mufti’s ‘Religion and Militancy in

Pakistan and Afghanistan’, Khadim Hussain’s ‘Terrorism in the Pashtun belt: Analytical framework for finding solutions through people’s voices’, Sabina Khan’s ‘FATA’s Political Status: What Are the Consequences and Options for Pakistan’?, C. Christine Fair and others ‘The Roots of Militancy: 14

Explaining Support for Political Violence in Pakistan’, M. Maqbool Khan Wazir’s ‘Geo-Politics of

FATA after 9/11’ Kiran Firdous’ ‘Militancy in Pakistan’, Umbreen Javaid’s ‘Partnership in War on

Terror and Mounting Militant Extremism in Pakistan, Nazia Fiaz’s ‘Policy Intervention in FATA:

Why Discourse Matters’, Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah’s ‘Political Reforms in FATA of Pakistan: Will it

End the Current Militancy’, Zahid Anwar’s ‘The Rise and Fall of Insurgency in North West of

Pakistan’, Zafar Nawaz Jaspal’s ‘Threat of Extremism and Terrorist Syndicate Beyond FATA’, etc.

All of them, with some differences, agree on the point that the present militant situation in FATA is the result of Afghan wars, mishandling of the tribal region since the British Raj and the deprivation of the tribal people of all modern facilities. In addition, it is the result of security concerns of

Pakistan since the Afghan Jihad when Pakistan tried supporting and implanting in Afghanistan the

Pashtun-dominated militant and Jihadi proxies for mitigating its security threats.

Similarly, several monographs and research papers have been consulted for covering the regional aspect of the topic of research. The monograph edited by Ashley J. Telis “Is a Regional Strategy Viable for Afghanistan?” is of prime importance. Here the strategies and interests of different players on the theater of Afghanistan and how it contributes to the rise of militancy in the tribal region have been analysed. The interests and position of Pakistan has been highlighted in his expert opinion by Frederic

Grare. He argues that no doubt Pakistan has genuine concerns and interests in Afghanistan but to get those interests by using non-state actors (militants) is pushing Pakistan towards isolation in the community of nations. He asserts that if Pakistan is successful to get its objectives by using non-state actors then it would lead to the impression that “terrorism pays” and so, this would become the pattern and every nation in the world would use it as an instrument of policy. Dr. Muhammad Waseem supports

Frederic Grare’s argument. He asserts that Islamabad is increasingly losing its image because of the collective dislike felt for Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The weak area of the monograph is its being short on suggesting a way out of the quagmire about which many others have also shown naivety.

Haider H. Mallick’s monograph, ‘Pakistan Security paradox: Countering and fomenting

Insurgency’ considers Pakistan’s strategic behavior in terms of geostrategic interests of the country. He asserts that this strategic behavior has taken a new dimension after the US invasion of Afghanistan and the ongoing Al-Qaeda-influenced Taliban insurgency. Though Pakistan and America considers Al-Qaeda as a collective threat to both yet Pakistan endorses Afghan Taliban as leverage due to strategic interests in the region and particularly in Afghanistan and counter Pakistani Taliban (beyond state control) as the enemy of the state which results in what Mallick calls “Security Paradox”. Unless changing this paradox, with consideration of Pakistan’s genuine interests, Pakistan and Afghanistan will further “descent into chaos”. The narrative of the author is supported by many other renowned experts on the issue and can be agreed to on many other accounts. However, his view to consider the insurgency in Afghanistan as

Pashtun insurgency is a strongly disputed one and is challenged by a plethora of ground realities both in

Pak-Afghan Pashtun areas along the Durand Line.

I have also discussed the issue with some elders from FATA and the experts on the topic like

Alamgir Khan Wazir, Ex-MPA from KP, the incumbent chief of Wazir Khati Khel tribe. Sakhi

Mohammad and my grandfather, a participant of the Spina Tangi War18, who died in 1998. He told me about the story of the war personally. Similarly, Badam Khan Mohmand, the participant in the first war of

Kashmir between Pakistan and India also shared his views about the topic. Dr. Fazl-ur-Rahim Marwat, ex-Vice Chancellor of Bacha Khan University Charsadda, KP, who has also remained my supervisor in conducting the thesis in Master in Pakistan Studies and renowned journalist and expert on the region,

Rahim Ullah Yousafzai, also informed my understanding with their valuable knowledge.

18Spina Tangi is the name of a place in F.R. Bannu (FATA), located at a distance of about 14 or 15 kilometers from district Bannu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, at which a historical war was fought between local Pashtuns particularly Khati Khel Wazirs and the British forces on August 24, 1930. Discussion with Sakhi Mohammad, Participant of Spina Tangi War, F. R. Bannu (FATA). See Shamsher Ali, Ban Boss (Peshawar: Decent Publishers, 1999), 313.

Under International Research Support Initiative program (IRSIP), Higher Education Commission of Pakistan, I went to Center for Afghanistan Studies (CAS) University of Nebraska at Omaha USA. I worked under the supervision of Thomas E. Gouttierree there. I met all the CAS staff members and others from different disciplines and discussed the issue under probe with them. I attended there the Immersion

Seminar on the Language, Culture and History of Afghanistan conducted by the Center for Afghanistan

Studies University of Nebraska at Omaha, USA held from 12-30th May, 2014 as well. It was of an immense importance for my research work. Different scholars held from different countries shared their views about the topic under discussion. Many US army officers also shared their personal experiences about the issue of terrorism, militancy and extremism in Afghanistan particularly and the Pashtun and tribal areas of Pakistan generally. Paul Arthur collections in the Criss Library at UNO were an important asset for my research as well. Then, I visited many renowned persons in New York as well and got their valuable suggestions to enrich my research work.

In a nutshell, from the existing literature, we learn about the strategic location, the geostrategic importance and the social and economic ways of life of the tribal areas. Similarly, the manipulation of the situation by Pakistani rulers in FATA has been learnt. The literature provides valuable information regarding militancy in the Pashtun, particularly, the tribal areas, and the government’s policy in dealing with it. Pakistan’s Afghan policy characterized by regional security complex which has added substantially to the rise of militant Islam in Afghanistan with its implications not only for Pakistan but the region and the world at large has been known.

Then the literature throws light extensively on all aspects of the Taliban, its rise, composition, its leadership, etc., and the role of Pakistan in the rise of Taliban over there and the consequences she had faced later on. The guiding principle both for internal and external politics of Pakistan is highlighted.

Then the importance of the guerrilla warfare fought by the militants in the tribal belt and how the small guerrilla wars have been serving the cause of the big war of religious ideology is known. It equally highlights the militant networks in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. It describes the activities carried out 17 against the states in both the countries by these religious cadres and shows their mutual links. The US role in Afghanistan since the time of the Soviet occupation is known. The strategies and interests of different players in the theater of Afghanistan and how it contributes to the rise of militancy in the tribal region have been analysed.

From the existing literature, we learnt many aspects of militancy in FATA, but it is silent about how historical treatment in the tribal region by the successive Pakistani governments has played its role in militancy there. Similarly, isolation of FATA from the mainstream of the country which deprived its people from the developmental programmes leading to the rise of rebellion among the previous literature review is neglected. Most of the writers are driven by the lack of true picture of the tribal region, the way the tribesmen think and the reasons for the present rise of militancy there. So, here in my research an endeavour is made to show that the present militant situation in FATA is the result of Afghan wars, mishandling of the tribal region since the British Raj and the deprivation of the tribal people of all modern facilities. Similarly, some viable solutions have been presented.

Methodology and Organization

The research was conducted in a descriptive and analytical way. In order to argue this case, this study rely upon primary sources such as, cabinet records, private papers, interviews, state reports and publications as well as memoirs, and secondary sources such as, books and academic studies, and also the researcher's first hand knowledge and familiarity of the culture and people of FATA. It endeavors also to examine all the aspects of the topic in the light of the available material and sources. Similarly, this particular study tries to reach on logical conclusions about the topic and tries to have an objective approach toward the events and circumstances. It is hoped that this study will provide a new dimension to the students, researchers and teachers in the future research work on the problem under probe.

Apart from conclusion and bibliography, this dissertation is comprised of five chapters. Each chapter contains section and sub-sections. The tentative chapterization is as following.

Chapter-1 is an introduction to the whole topic and it reflects whatever has been discussed in the whole dissertation. It highlights the methodology used, the theoretical framework applied, the scope and significance of the research topic and its organization as well as literature review.

Chapter-2 deals with FATA in its historical perspective so that a better understanding of the issue is presented by highlighting the ground realities and the situation prevailing there. It highlights the

Pashtun culture, their social structure, their previous movements of resistance against the invaders, etc. It provides basis for the main subject.

Chapter-3 describes the rise of militancy in the tribal belt since past. It describes also how the policies of Pakistan and the international actors have affected the tribesmen of FATA and their counter response to those developments. Here an Afghan factor has been taken into consideration in the rise of militancy in the tribal areas. It throws light basically on the retrospective study of the rise of militancy in

FATA after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the US attack after 2001.

Chapter-4 brings to light the main causes for the rise of militancy by applying the Paul Pierson’s

‘Path Dependency’ theory and the Ted Robert Gurr’s ‘Relative Deprivation’ theory. It brings to light how the tribal region has been dealt upon since past. In the same way, here an attempt has been made as well to highlight that the ill treatment of the tribal region by different actors particularly Pakistan that led to relative deprivation of the tribesmen. Then the historical treatment of the tribesmen and their relative deprivation has been linked to the rise of militancy in FATA.

Chapter-5 enumerates the impact of militant resistance on the Pakistani society in general and the tribal areas in particular. Here it has been seen how change has occurred in the administration and the

19 social fabric of the society in FATA. In this chapter, suggestions, policy recommendation as well as the ways has been suggested to tackle this menace of militancy in the tribal region of FATA.

Last, the chapters are followed by conclusion and bibliography. In fine, the current chapter is an introduction to the whole topic and it reflects whatever has been discussed in the whole dissertation. It highlights the methodology used, the theoretical framework applied, the scope and significance of the research topic and its organization as well as literature review. It makes foundation for understanding the rise of militancy in the tribal region after 9/11.

Chapter-2

UNDERSTANDING THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FATA)

FATA is under international focus since the incident of 9/11. It is considered as the breeding ground of terrorism which is considered to be a serious threat for peace not only in Pakistan, Afghanistan but also the whole world. Also, it is considered the hub of many militant organizations like Tehrik-e-Taliban

Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), etc. Here the basic and pertinent questions about FATA, its geography, its history, society and its system of administration are of crucial importance and need to be probed.

Very little is known about the tribal region now called FATA, particularly about its people and their way of life, its mores and goods, beliefs, ideals, administrative apparatus, etc. To have a proper understanding of the area, it is essential to go through its historical background, legal and constitutional status as well as the many facets of tribal society and its people.

The areas that now constitute FATA were the centre of many decisive events in the history of mankind. Professor Arnold J. Toynbee depicts the tribal region as the “cross-roads” of civilizations.19 Due to its geo-strategic position, FATA is not only the most sensitive area in Pakistan but also the whole

South Asian region.20

The tribal region known as FATA was once the bone of contention between imperial powers of

Great Britain and Czarist Russia in 19th century. It was important for Britain to defend their ‘jewel in the

British crown’ (India) on the one hand and on the other; she wanted to counter the Russian expansionist

19 Abubakar Siddique, The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2014), 15. See also Arnold J. Toynbee, Between Oxus and Jumna (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

20 Akbar S. Ahmed, Social and Economic Change in the Tribal Areas (1972-76) (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1977), 1.

21 policy in Central Asian region. In the same way, it was important for Russia to keep Britain at bay from the lands under Russian influence.

The story of tribesmen is no less attractive in the pages of history. They have faced many invaders and have seen and experienced many revolutions and the development and degeneration of several societies and nations. Their history obligate great revolutionaries to reiterate their past dignity and glorification. So, understanding the history of this area is very much essential while studying the root causes for the rise of militant activities in FATA.21

Historically, the region of FATA was the most violent and fickle frontier of the Indo-Pak subcontinent and having major passable ways to Indian subcontinent and was thus vulnerable to most of the invaders. The tribal hilly areas had some very important routes and passes which served as the gate ways of trade and invasion between the plains of Subcontinent and central Asia.22 From Aryans to Ahmad

Shah Abdali, almost all the invaders invaded and conquered India using these routes.

“The first migration of which we have evidence is that of the Aryan-speaking peoples who established themselves on the Punjab plains in prehistoric times. Centuries later, within historical times, successive waves of invaders swept like devastating torrents through the mountain passes of the northwest. Persian, Greeks, and Afghans, the forces of Alexander and the armies of Mahmud of Ghazni, the hosts of Timur, Babur and Nadir Shah, and the troops of Ahmad Shah Durrani, all advanced by these routes to lay waste the fair and smiling plains of Hindustan.”23

The tribal region throughout history remained independent of the empires established in the

Indian sub-continent. The invaders and conquerors never cared about the hilly and barren tribal region

21 Shafi Muhammad Sabir, Tarikh-e-Suba-e-Sarhad (Urdu) (Peshawar: University Book Agency, 1986), 15-16.

22 Lal Baha, N-W.FP Administration Under British Rule 1901-1919 (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), 3.

23 C. Collin Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908: with a Survey of Policy Since 1849 (London: Curzon Press, 1975), 37.

22 because it was of no importance in term of revenue generating source to the ruling dynasties.24 The

Mughals invaded and seized the Indian Sub-continent however the tribal region mostly remained independent of their authority. Thus the ruling dynasties used the tribal areas as the strategic outpost for their overstretching interests in Afghanistan and Indian Subcontinent. The area was used as a source of communication and trading route and a barrier against further invasions as well.

The tribesmen shocked and spared none of the invaders. They revolted and harassed the Turkish sultans of Delhi, Timur’s armies in 1399, the Mughals25 and dragged and ousted Man Singh and Rajputs from Peshawar.26 Nadir Shah also became the victim of the tribesmen returning to Kabul after he devastated Delhi.27 The tribal areas plunged into total chaos during the Sikh rule and traveling through the passes was unsafe. When the Sikhs became custodians of the Frontier, Khyber passes had virtually ceased for trade.28

In the line, the British succeeded Sikhs and became keepers of the frontier. During this period,

Punjab frontier was in total anarchy.29 They (the British) applied all type of economic, social, political and military tactics to control the tribesmen and secure their interests in the tribal region. But they were unable to secure permanent pacification in the region even till their retreat from India. Many expeditions were sent in the tribal region in this respect but in vain.30 Indeed,

24 Ainslie T. Embree, ed., Pakistan’s Western Borderlands: The Transformation of a Political Order (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1977; reprint, Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1979), xiv.

25 Ibid., 4.

26 James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963), 32.

27 Ibid., 35.

28 Embree, Pakistan’s Western Borderlands, 6.

29 Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908, 21-22.

30 Ibid., 27.

“With the curious exceptions of 1857 (the Sepoy Mutiny), 1878-80 (the Second Anglo-Afghan War), and 1914-1918 (World War I), there is hardly a single one of the 98 years during which the British held the Frontier that they did not have to mount an expedition to put down revolt. The troops employed ranged from a few companies to 60,000 regulars in 1897-98.”31

The written records of the tribal areas date back to the invasions of Alexander the great in 326

BC.32 Since his appearance in the Pashtun regions, this area had to confront with a large number of foreign invaders and military forces in different shapes including the Persians, Scythians, Kushans, Sakas,

Huns, Arabs, Turks, Mongols, British, Russians and recently Americans.33 He was followed by the reign of Mauriyan dynasty under Ashok that lasted until 250 BC. Then the Muslim invaders from Central Asian states came in the shape of Mahmood of Ghazna in 9th and 10th century AD. Mahmood defeated the

Hindu Rajput, Raja Jaypal in Peshawar. He remained in power from 1000-1026 AD but he never tried to consolidate India. Then Sultan Muizzuddin Muhammad of Ghor conquered the northern part of the Indian

Subcontinent and founded Muslim supremacy in Delhi in1206 AD. Muhammad was followed by Changiz

Khan in 1212 AD. In the same way, Amir Timur conquered and ruled the area in 1398 AD. Then the area came under the rule of Mughals 1526 onward. The area had been also conquered by Ahmad Shah Abdali upto Kashmir from Oxus in the North. The area was then ruled by the Sikhs for a brief period from 1823-

1849 when Britain finally defeated them. The two Anglo-Afghan wars of 1839-1842 and 1878-1879 were a major setback and fiasco for the British but they got the control of most strategically important passes of

Khyber, Kurram and Bolan.34

31 Spain, The Pathan Borderland, 04.

32 Alison Behnke, The Conquests of Alexander the Great (Breckenridge: Twenty-First Century Books, 2007), 99.

33 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton, N. J: Princeton University Press, 1978), 415.

34 www.understanding fata.org or www.camp.org.pk, 16-17. See also Spain, The Pathan Borderland, 4. See also Embree, Pakistan’s Western Borderlands, xiv, 04 and Major-General J. G. Elliott, The Frontier 1839-1947: The Story of the North-West Frontier of India (London: Cassell & Company Ltd, 1968), 12.

The areas of present day Khyber Pashtunkhwa were made as part of the province of Punjab.

These Pashtuns areas were administered like other parts of the domain but certain specific administrative tools and laws were introduced and adopted in the area and even continued after it was given the separate status of province of North West Frontier in November 1901.35

When the British annexed tribal region, they tried to dub the tribesmen as killers, dacoits, un- social, etc. in written records.36 They adopted different means and policies to subdue the tribesmen but in vain.37 However, inspite of all this, FATA remained the constant source of disturbance during the British era because north western boundary of the newly created province was drawn along the foothills of the mountainous region on the border with Afghanistan. That is why almost fifty eight military campaigns were launched in the tribal regions from 1849-1939.38 In the J. G. Elliott’s words:

“Stretches of inhospitable stony hills, the home of fiercely independent tribesmen who bow to no man, not even their own elders; magnificent fighting men who on their home ground are a match for any army in the world”.39 Similarly, he says again:

“No attempt was made to advance into the highlands, or even secure the main passage through the mountains such as the Khyber Pass. As in the Peshawar valley, so in Bannu and the Darajat, the line of administration stopped likes a tide almost at the first contour of rough country. Beyond that lay Yaghistan-the land of the rebels”.40

35For details, see Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier, Chapter 6; and Lal Baha, N-W.FP Administration Under British Rule 1901-1919, Chapter 1 and Chapter 7 of this book.

36 Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, Vol. 1 (Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1979), 14-15.

37 Aziz Javed, Sarhad Ka Aayeni Irtiqa (Urdu) (Peshawar: Idara-e-Tahqiq-wa-Tasnif, 1975), 23-24.

38 www.understanding fata.org, 16-17.

39 Elliott, The Frontier 1839-1947, 87.

40 Ibid.

The British Raj agreed to give autonomous status to the tribal region for their loyalty to the Raj.

For this purpose, the internal affairs and independence of the tribal areas, however, were not disturbed by the British and they enjoyed their age-old independent status. It has been stated in Governor’s report:

The administration of tribal areas and formulation of tribal policy has constantly engaged attention of British Empire ever since the border alignment. From ‘Close Door’ to ‘Forward’ policy, the British Empire carried out many moves in this direction supported by military expeditions, but kept its options open till finally evolving the policy of ‘non-interference’ in accordance with the customs and traditions of tribal society and its governance through the tribal hierarchy of chieftains, maliks, sectional elders by entering into treaties with the tribes. The Crown strengthened its hold through an evolutionary process of making inroads into the tribal society and expanded its area of influence by establishing communication links in closed areas and studded them with posts, picquets and forts at strategic points.41

Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) was introduced in six Pashtun populated area in 1848 which paved the way for full-fledged promulgation of the FCR in 1871 and later on with minor modifications in

1876.42 The introduction of FCR was due to the social system of tribal way of life. Malik Niamat Ullah expressed his views that FCR was the most suitable governing law for the tribal region of FATA as well.43

TERRAIN AND PEOPLE

It is very difficult to describe the Pashtun area geographically yet it is at best considered as a long narrow fortification running parallel in two belts, a ditch (moat) and a bulwark (rampart) along the line of

41 “Tribal Areas: Status, Border Control and Policy”, Governors Committee Report (Unpublished) (Government of North-West Frontier Province, Home and Tribal Affairs Department, September-October 1997), 10.

42 Ibid., 17.

43 Malik Niamat Ullah, Interview by the author, South Waziristan Agency (SWA), Dated: 31-01-2015. Malik Niamat Ullah is the brother of (Late) Senator Malik Faridullah (Hilal-i-Imtiaz) and Chief of Aspirka Wazir, Shakai South Waziristan Agency. It’s the most renowned family in SWA and their lineage can be traced back to Malik Sowhan Khan.

26 the Indus.44 The bulwark running between Pakistan in the northwest of the Himalayas and along the

Sulaiman Mountains in the southwest is roughly considered the tribal region of FATA. The Indus River or the moat is a mean for irrigating the plains between the fingers of the mountains running upto the

Indus. Due to its fertility and suitability for farming, these plains besides the Peshawar plains were settled and integrated by the people since long till now. The rugged hills and mountains, mostly making currently

FATA, were of little value except the passes used for communication with the Indian Sub-continent or the

Central Asian states. The tribal region is naturally an unattractive place that is either extremely cold or hot in winter and summer seasons and is an uninviting place and offers nothing to the governing power other than a few passes. Caroe describes that it was strictly due to environmental reasons that the rulers of the several empires attempted domination in Delhi and Kabul by controlling the plains and a few transit routes through the mountains.45 It must be noted that even for security reasons the passes were subsidized by paying from the tribes.

The people living here are called Pashtuns, Pakhtuns or Pathans. Very little is known about their ancient past in the written available records. Herodotus is considered to be the first who wrote about

Pashtuns. He writes that “their mode of life is almost the same as that of Baktrians [people of Balkh].

They are the most courageous and hawkish among all the Indians….”46 The people who are to be found around Paktuike (Peshawar) are “the bravest ones among all the people living in those parts.”47

Alberuni’s Tarikh-al-Hind is considered the first authentic reference about Pashtuns. He describes

Pashtuns as “malcontent, barbarian races occupying the frontiers of India towards the west”.48 Similarly,

23Olaf Caroe, The Pathans (London, UK: Macmillan Company Ltd., 1983), xix.

45Ibid., xxiii.

46Olaf Caroe, The Pathans 550 B.C.- A.D. 1957 (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1958), 29.

47 Ibid., 42.

48Alberuni, Tarikh-al-Hind, Sachau’s translation, 1910, I, 21-22, 199, 208, 259, 317, 320 cited in ibid., 112-13.

27 he says, “Various tribes of Afghans live in the western frontier mountains of India and extend up to the neighbourhood of the Sind valley.”49

In the old records, no distinction is made between Afghan and Pashtun. The distinction between them exists, though not distinct “long before arrival of the British to draw most of the tribes east of the

Sulaiman watershed within the orbit of their dominion.”50 The Afghans are usually under Persian influence and speak Darri (Afghani Persian) language. The Pashtuns or Pathans, on the other side, are not affected so much by Persian influence as they were in more interaction with the Mughal Empire of Delhi, which ruled over them from Peshawar, Kabul or Qandhar.

The Pathans are:

…proud to a degree, self-reliant only as their life can make them, hardy beyond measure and absolutely tireless. Their physical fitness would be incomprehensible if one did not consider the climate and country they live in, which allows no weaklings to survive. … Taken as a whole, the frontier tribes are unquestionably among the hardiest men on earth, and so much the more redoubtable foes when war is afoot.51

The parentage of Pashtuns is not clearly traced. Unlike hypothesis have been propounded. Some propounded that they come from “Afghana, the son of Jeremiah, the son of Saul, who was Solomon’s

Commander-in-Chief and builder of his temple.”52 Others considered them as one of the lost tribes of

49 Ahmad Hassan Dani, Alberuni’s Indica (Islamabad: University of Islamabad, 1973), 24.

50 Caroe, The Pathans 550 B.C.- A.D. 1957, 419.

51 Arthur Vincent, The Defence of India, India of Today Series, Vol. II (London: Oxford University Press, 1922), 45.

52 Major R.T.I. Ridgway, Pathans (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, India, 1910), 1.

Jews. But some considered them as Aryans. In the same way, some present them as “Turko-Iranian.”53 A few are of the opinion that they are Arabs:

If the origin of a race can be determined on the basis of customs and traditions then Pukhtoon would be closer to Arabs. The study of Arabian and Pashtun society presents a remarkable resemblance particularly in their tribal organization and social usages. To both hospitality is one of the finest virtues, retribution a sacred duty and bravery an essential pre-requisite for a honourable life. Love of independence, courage, endurance, hospitality and revenge were the supreme virtues of pre-Islamic Arabs. … these attributes are considered as pillars of the Pukhtoon code of honour or Pukhtoonwali.54

In the writings of Herodotus and before him, Pashtuns, on both sides of the Durand line, are considered culturally identical.55 Some live in plain and some in hilly areas. Caroe makes a distinction among the Pashtun of plain areas and those of mountainous areas. He is of the view that those who live in the plains “have always been viewed as the senior branch of the race” chiefly due to their interaction with those who ruled over the parts of India, modern day Afghanistan and the areas of Pakistan.56 The

Pashtuns who lived in the rampart like the Afridis, Orakzais, Waziris, and Mehsuds, etc. were never completely subdued by any recorded imperial authority and now they are the mainstream of the tribal region.57 Their nature (Pashtuns of rampart and Pashtuns of moat) is described very beautifully by the

53 Azmat Hayat Khan, The Durand Line –Its Geostrategic Importance (Islamabad: Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar and Hanns Seidal Foundation, 2000), 30.

54 Azam Afridi, Pashtuns: Land and People, online (accessed January 10, 2014).

55 Razia Sultana and Saira Aquil, “The Pakistani Pashtuns and the End Game in Afghanistan”, International Journal on World peace, USA, Vol. XXIX No. 4 December 2012, 13.

56 Afridi, Pashtuns: Land and People., xvi.

57 Ibid., xvii.

Pashtun proverb that describes the Pashtun self-belief as, “taxes ate up the plains; honor ate up the mountains.”58

The flattened tribal structure of the Pashtun is enhanced by the terrain of the highlanders. A flat tribal structure means equality at all level-both individual and tribal level. It is why, in the formulation of diplomacy in the FATA negotiations must be held sometimes with literally every village. No doubt, some tribal structures are hierarchical where one elder can make decisions for an entire group. Anyone trying to work with Pashtun tribes usually has difficulty in negotiations due to the consensus required to come to a decision due to the flattened structure of the Pashtun, especially in the FATA. Generally, each Pashtun tribe is the constituent unit of the larger tribal group, but the individual Pashtun’s allegiances are best described by M. Jamil Hanifi as quoted from Johnson:

The Afghan individual is surrounded . . . by concentric rings consisting of family, extended family, clan, tribe, confederacy, and major cultural-linguistic group. The hierarchy of loyalties corresponds to these circles and becomes more intense as the circle gets smaller . . . in case of crisis, his recourse is to the kinship and, if necessary, the larger cultural group. National feelings and loyalties are filtered through the successive layers.59

The Pashtuns generally wear loose shirt and trousers and a large turban and cap on their head.

They kept a chaddar and a rifle on their shoulders as well. The tribeswomen generally wear coloured cloth. They use wheat, maize, barley, rice with meat and vegetable as staple food. They live in big houses

58 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 28.

59 Thomas Johnson and Chris M. Mason, “No Sign Until the Burst of Fire”, International Security 32, US, no. 4, Spring 2008, 51–53.

30 in the shape of fortresses. Literacy rate is generally very low but they are staunch Muslims and could be easily excited by their religious figures. They are brave, good fighters and freedom loving people.60

All invaders who conquered South Asia failed to subdue them. They have defied Persians,

Greeks, Turks, Mughals, Afghans, Sikhs, British, etc. These tribes and sub-tribes and clans defended their territories and honour bravely and persistently. Pashtuns geneology is presented in the following table:

Source: Sher Jan Ahmadzai, “Tribal Dynamics and engagement in Afghanistan”, Immersion Seminar on Language, Culture and History of Afghanistan, Center for Afghanistan Studies University of Nebraska USA, 12-30th May, 2014.

60See 1998 Census Report of F.A.T.A. (Islamabad: Population Census Organization Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan, 2001), 13-15.

Climate:

The climatic situation in the tribal region is extreme. It is extreme cold in the mountainous areas and sultry and hot in the plain areas. It is hottest in the months of May, June and July and coldest in

December, January and February. The winters are very cold while summers are warm, but in some of the areas the summers are pleasant and winters are extremely cold as in North Waziristan, Orakzai agency, etc. There is dry climate generally both winter and summer especially in Mohmand Agency. Rainfall is low here and varies from about 60 inches in the highlands to 15 inches or even less in the plains in a year.61 The mountains are rich in forest wealth.

SOCIAL SYSTEM OF TRIBESMEN

The people living in the tribal region of FATA are mostly Pashtuns. Their social system is based on the62 ‘Code of Pashtunwali’-an unwritten and flexible code of behaviour that a Pashtun is supposed to abide by.63 It is a worldview which covers social, religious, political and economic life of Pashtuns. It also

61 The topography of each agency is given in 1981and 1998 Census Reports of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan, 1984 and 2001). Also see Afridi, Pashtuns: Land and People (retrieved on January 13, 2014).

62 Imtiaz Gul, The Al-Qaeda Connection (New Delhi: Viking/Penguin, 2009), 267-270.

63 Farhat Taj, Taliban and Anti-Taliban (UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 1.

32 guides them for peaceful coexistence with alien-social, religious, economic, etc. groups. Similarly, it is a sign of equality among all Pashtuns. It is a centuries old conduct of life even much before the birth of

Islam. This code of Pashtunwali remained the same even after the introduction of Islam in Pashtun area.64

In this context, it is no surprise when someone hears a Pashtun saying:

“I am a Pashtun for 5000 years, a Muslim for 14 centuries and a Pakistani for 64 years. Where do you think my identity lies?”65

Pashtunwali/Pashtunwali is based on some longstanding tribal traditions which are:

Nikat: It is the name given to the share of each tribe given by the government which depends upon the area under the control of a particular tribe. Nikat is still the same as set by the British Raj.66

Muajib: It denotes the special allowances and privileges given to the privileged class within a tribe. In return, Maujib ensures the loyalty of his tribesmen to the state.67 These allowances are sometimes misunderstood as ‘dole-money’. But this notion is not appropriated. Izzat Awan has expressed about this point as:

64 Dr Babri Gul Wazir, The Faqir of Ipi’s true Jihad Against the British Government of India 1936-1947 (Peshawar: The Aays Publishers, 2003), 7.

65Taj, Taliban and Anti-Taliban, 1.

66See “Tribal Areas: Status, Border Control and Policy”, Governors Committee Report, 20-21, 64, 65. Also see Izzat Awan, Pattern of Administration in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan (Peshawar: Provincial Civil Services Academy, 1972), 20.

67 Awan, Pattern of Administration in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, 33. Also see Elliott, The Frontier 1839-1947, 71. Also see Arthur Swinson, North-West Frontier: People and Events, 1839-1947 (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1967), 251.

If one travel through the tribal area, one will at once realises that the best cultivable land or land with water facilities was taken over by the British for an army camp or for a post or for a road or for an air- field. In a mountainous area where plain land is difficult to find and where water facilities are practically non-existent, it was indeed a great hardship for the tribe who were deprived of these. One must not forget that in these inhospitable areas there are no alternative means of livelihood. So the British, in order to secure the goodwill of the people, arranged a fix annual payment for the things taken rather than making an outright lump sum payment as compensation.68

Maliki/Lungi Allowance: During the British Raj, the tribes were controlled and dealt through their elders. It is the hereditary allowance given to a head or influential figures of a tribe. Maliki is granted by the political agent with the consent of the governor while lungi is granted by political agent himself which is a lower rank in privileges. Both of the ranks ensure peace and provide information about the ups and downs in their area. It is still in practice in post-independence period in Pakistan.69

What is unique in the tribal social system is their unwritten and un-codified set of rules and regulations which runs the affairs of life of tribesmen. These rules and regulations as has been mentioned earlier are called Pashtunwali. It is one of the reasons for Al-Qaeda and Taliban who have influence in the tribal region because they exploited Pashtuns and the code in their favour. The main constituents of the code of Pashtunwali are70 :

Nanawati: It literally means appeal for forgiveness for any wrong done. As a mark of repent, the family members of accused person go to the house of victim to beg for mercy. The party may be accompanied by sheep along with family women and the Quran. Nanawati may be accepted or rejected by the family members and relatives of the victim but generally mercy is expected from the victim’s

68Awan, Pattern of Administration in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, 33.

69“Tribal Areas: Status, Border Control and Policy”, Governors Committee Report, 64-65.

70 www.Understandingfata.gov, 20.

34 family.71

Milmastia: It means hospitality to any one whether demanded or not. In tribal region hospitality is even extended to enemies if needed.72

Badal: It means taking revenge. It is an important obligation in the code of Pashtunwali. Pashtuns apply the principle of ‘Eye for an eye’ and ‘tooth for tooth’ in revenge. They had to take revenge even at the cost of their lives.73

Ghayrat/Nang: It means self-respect, chivalry or bravery. Pashtuns feel pride in this tenet of

Pashtunwali and love to fight like a lion even at the cost of their lives.74

Purdah: It is used for gender separation by tribal women using veil.

Namus: All Pashtuns particularly tribesmen take pride in their ethos and defense of honour is considered mandatory at all costs.75

Hujra: It is a place of meeting among males. All issues of life ranging from marriage parties,

funeral rituals, dance parties, folk dance-attan, etc., are performed here.76 The Code of Pashtunwali has

been described very beautifully by scholar Dilip Hiro as:

71 Wazir, The Faqir of IPI, 7.

72Alamgir Khan Wazir, Interview by the author, F. R. Bannu: Azim Killa, April18, 2013. Alamgir Khan Wazir is the chief of the tribe of Wazir Khati Khel, Khandar Khan Khel F. R. Bannu. He was also the Ex-MPA of the Provincial Assembly, KP.

73 Victoria Schofield, Afghan Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia (London: Taurus Park, 2003), 116-117.

74 Robert D. Kaplan, Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Toronto: Vintage Books, 2001), 136.

75 Ibid. See also Victoria Schofield, Afghan Frontier, 116-117.

76 Interview with Alamgir Khan Wazir, Op. Cit.

To avenge blood; to fight to death for a person who has taken refuge with me no matter what his lineage; to defend to the last any property entrusted to me; to be hospitable and provide for the safety of the person and property of guests; to pardon an offense (other than murder) at the intercession of a woman of the offender’s lineage, a sayyid or a mullah; to punish all adulterers with death; to refrain from killing a man who has entered a mosque or the shrine of a holy man.77

Itebar: It means trust, guarantee or assurance. Here, transactions are mostly done just on the basis of words of mouth exchanged between the concerned parties.78

Peghor and Sharam: It means taunt and shame for anything done wrong.79

So, pashtunwali is a complex mixture of usages, practices, traditions and conventions that governs the conduct of the pashtuns. It is not as strong as it used to be in the past. Extreme religio- political ideologies negatively affected Pashtunwali during the last 30 years.80 It is imperative for all sorts of elements to understand the mindset of Pashtuns while dealing with them.

It must be known also though tribesmen enjoy their life yet they have no exposure of life outside the boundaries of their tribal region. Due to this lack of exposure of the outside world, they have developed a very narrow worldview. This is why they are exploited by different vested interests.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITION IN FATA

FATA is the most economically backward region of Pakistan as stated in the 1998 census report. More than half of its population is below the national poverty line. Per-capita income is only half of the national

77 Dilip Hiro, War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response (New York: Routledge, 2002), 181.

78 Sher Jan Ahmadzai, “Tribal Dynamics and engagement in Afghanistan”, Immersion Seminar on Language, Culture and History of Afghanistan, Center for Afghanistan Studies University of Nebraska USA, 12-30th May, 2014.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

36 per-capital income which is more or less or around 470 dollars. Public developmental expenditure is one third/capita of the national average.

Development indicators in the social sectors are very low. Literacy rate is 17.42% compared to the national literacy rate which is 56%. Literate males are 29%. Female literacy is hardly 3% as compared to the national 32% for females. Malik Gohar Ayub told that the ratio of education is nominal. Those people who are matriculated, they cannot write their names only. They pass their exams mostly by unfair means.81 Similarly, there are only 41 hospitals available for a population of 3.1 million. Per doctor ratio is

1:6,762 as compared to the national 1:1,359.82

Natural resources are still under explored. Tribesmen depend mostly on agriculture subsistence as there is little industrial activity and availability of jobs. Shockingly, this situation is made bitterer by the fact that about 15% of the population is of young age.83

In the same way, the economy is completely in a poor condition due to the thriving trade in drugs, arms and other cross-border smuggling as well. Nothing is done in this respect to stop this cross-border smuggling, but, on the other hand, this trade provides with funds and arms to the militants in the tribal region which makes it more destabilize.84

81 Interview by the author, Malik Gohar Ayub, North Waziristan Agency, Dated: 30-01-2015. Malik Gohar Ayub belongs to Spalga. He is the son of (Late) Malik Mamoor Khan and the incumbent chief of clan of Tori Khel Wazir, North Waziristan Agency.

82 “FATA Development Statistics 2005”, Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, government of NWFP, Peshawar.

83 Khalid Aziz, “Causes of Rebellion in Waziristan,” in Policy Report (Peshawar: Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training, 2007), 37.

84Ahmed Rashid, “Who’s winning the war on terror,” in Yale Global Online, Sept.5, 2003.

Selected Development Indicators for Pakistan, KP and FATA

Indicator Pakistan KP FATA

Literacy Ratio, both sexes, % 43.92 35.41 17.42

Male Literacy Ratio (%) 54.81 51.39 29.51

Female Literacy Ratio (%) 32.02 18.82 3.00

Population/doctor 1226 4916 7670

Population/bed in health Institutions 1341 1594 2179

Road/sq km 0.26 0.13 0.17

Source: http://www.fatagov.com . Accessed on July 13, 2013.

Legal and Constitutional Status of FATA

The Government of India Act 1935 defines the tribal areas as “the areas along the Frontier of

India or in Baluchistan which does not make the part of Burma or of British India or of any foreign states or of Indian state”.85 The British did not make the tribal areas the part of British India because it was neither acquired through conquest nor through accession but rather through different type of treaties, compromises, etc.86 Due to this fact, the British granted and maintained special status to the tribal region situated on the North-Western Frontier till the end of the Raj.87

After joining Pakistan, the tribesmen were made sure that they would be allowed to retain their status quo as they enjoyed during the British reign. So, it was left to the choice of Pakistani government to

85 PLD, Vol. 59 (2007), Peshawar, 45-46.

86 Ibid., 46 and 49.

87 Ibid., 45-49.

38 enter into such agreements with the tribal areas as what they were enjoying during the British Raj.88

Consequently the Army was recalled from the tribal region and a special ministry for the said region namely, Ministry of State and Frontier Regions was created of which Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali

Jinnah acted as the head.89 He himself assured the tribesmen about the continuation of allowances given by the Raj.90 Resultantly, the government of Pakistan and the tribesmen ratified the same old treaties and agreements of the British Raj.91

Therefore, the special status of FATA remained the same as it was during the British Raj in the subsequent constitutional documents and so was made an integral part of the dominion of Pakistan with effect from August 15, 1947 by the notification issued by the Governor-General of Pakistan on June 27,

1950.92 Though, The ‘Establishment of West Pakistan Act 1955’ incorporated the tribal areas in the province of West Pakistan yet their special status was retained in Article 2 of the Act. According to the same article no change could be made in the tribal administration until the tribesmen of the concerned region were not taken into confidence.93

88 Ibid., 49.

89 A.M. Bangash, Political And Administrative Development of Tribal Areas: A Focus on Khyber & Kurram (Peshawar: Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Peshawar, 1996), 339.

90 “The Frontier Policy of Pakistan”, M. A. Jinnah‘s Address to the Tribal Jirga at Government

House, Peshawar , 17 April 1948, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Speeches and Statements as Governor General of Pakistan 1947-48 (Islamabad, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting Directorate of Films & Publications, 1989), 239. Also see Tribal Areas: Status, Border Control and Policy; Governors Committee Report, 11, 15, 60.

91Ibid.

92 PLD, Vol. 59 (2007), Op. Cit.

93 See “Establishment of West Pakistan Act 1955”, in PLD, Vol. 7 (1955), Central Acts and Notifications, 273-274. Also see PLD, Vol. 59 (2007), Op. Cit. 51.

The Special status of Tribal areas was retained in the Article 104 section (1) to (4) of the constitution of 1956 of Pakistan. This Article deals with all procedures for the administrative, regulation, law, etc. of the tribal areas and declares:

The President, may at any time, by order, direct that the whole or any part of a Special Area shall cease to be Special Area, and any such order may contain such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to be necessary and proper:

Provided that before making any Order under this clause, the President shall ascertain, in such manner as he consider appropriate, the views of the people of the area concerned.94

In the constitution of 1962 article 223 kept tribal areas outside the jurisdiction of Pakistani, both central and provincial laws due to their special status. Sections (1) and (2) of the same article deals with the procedure of any regulations made or extension of any law to the tribal region.95 Thus the special status of FATA could only be changed by the procedures written in Article 247 (6) of the constitution.96

The Governor of KP was given special powers, even all in all in the legislative field with the approval of the President for the tribal areas.97 In Ayub Khan’s era, the system of Basic Democracy was extended to tribal areas.

According to the Article 1 clause (2) sub-clause (C) of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan FATA constitute the territories of Pakistan98 and according to Article 246 FATA is comprised of seven agencies,

94 See “Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1956”, in PLD, Vol. 8 (1956), Central Acts and Notifications, 88-89 and 120-121.

95 See “Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan 1962”, in PLD, Vol. 14 (1962), Central Statutes, 206, 215.

96 Tribal Areas: Status, Border Control and Policy; Governors Committee Report, 13.

97 Bangash, Political And Administrative Development of Tribal Areas, 339.

98 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, Article 1 clause (2) sub-clause (C).

40 namely; Bajaur Agency, Orakzai Agency, Mohmand Agency, Khyber Agency, Kurram Agency, North

Waziristan Agency and South Waziristan Agency and six Frontier Regions (FR), namely; FR Peshawar,

FR Kohat, FR Bannu, FR Dera Ismail Khan,99 FR Lakki Marwat100 and FR Tank.101

According to Article 247 of the Constitution of 1973 of Pakistan, the affair of FATA comes in the jurisdiction of the Federation. The said article gives administrative powers with respect to FATA to the

President of Pakistan. The Governor of KP, appointed by the President, act as his Agent for the FATA. In the President’s Order No.1 of 1975 called, the “Preparation of Electoral Rolls (FATA) Order, 1975”, the right of universal adult franchise was denied to the tribes. Under this order only Maliks and Lungi holders could use the right to vote.102 The old political administration of the Raj was continued even strengthened with slight changes. The system of Adult Franchise was introduced in FATA in 1996 but on non-party basis.103 Political Parties Act was extended by President Asif Ali Zardari on the eve of 62nd Independence

Day of Pakistan.104

The political structure of the tribal region was deteriorated day by day after the Soviet invasion.

The situation drastically changed after the US invasion of Afghanistan and the deployment of Pakistan army in the tribal region. The situation is further deteriorated due to drone attacks from across the border by US forces.

Judicial Structure of FATA

99The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, Article 246.

100 Inserted by the Constitution (Nineteenth Amendment) Act 1 of 2011.

101 Ibid.

102Bangash, Political And Administrative Development of Tribal Areas, 107.

103 Dr Noor ul Haq, Dr Rashid Ahmed Khan and Dr Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, “Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan”, IPRI Paper 10, (ISLAMABAD: Asia Printers, March 2005). See also Dr Rashid Ahmad Khan, “Reforms in FATA”, The Nation, August 25, 2009.

104 Rashid, The Nation, August 25, 2009.

The law in the tribal society is basically Riwaj-customs and traditions. The cases are generally decided in jirgah through riwaj. The decision of the jirgah is binding and its breach can lead to severe punishment. The crime is treated as a kind of tort.105 Sang-e-Marjan Khan (Ex-Chief Secretary Northern

Areas) expressed:

“In tribal areas whenever an offence occurs or a dispute crops up the Jirgaof local elders, through intensive negotiations with the parties, prevails upon them to settle the same either in accordance with Sharia or in accordance with the tribal customary law and traditions or through arbitrators to whom the parties give Waak (unconditional authority) for decision in their discretion. The beauty of the system is that it ensures speedy and cheaper justice, which still remains a cherished but elusive dream not only in Pakistan but in most of the states in the world”.106

Judicial Structure of FATA is run by the old colonial law-Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), enacted in 1901 which is the mixture of tribal customs and traditions and executive discretion.107 The

British enacted this black law to control and manage the tribesmen and run the affairs of the tribal region.

FCR was drafted for the first time in 1872 and later on promulgated with amendments in 1901. It is composed of sixty four sections and seven chapters. The British Raj promulgated these black and strange laws in the tribal region to serve their ends. No doubt the laws of FCR seem strange but these laws were more suitable to the areas as compared to other laws in the rest of India. Many of the tribal traditions were distorted and politicized to justify imperial repression against the tribesmen.108 Some of the relevant

105 Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, 355.

106 Sang-e-Marjan Khan, “Tribal system of administrative justice and FCR” in FCR: A Bad Law Nobody can Defend (Lahore: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, July 2005), 65.

107 Francois Teney-Renaud, “Post-Colonial Pluralism, Human Rights and the Administration of Criminal Justice in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan”, Singapore Journal of Comparative and International Law, 6, 2002. See also International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militant”, Asia Report No. 125 (Brussels: 2006), 5.

108 Maira Hayat, “Still ‘taming the turbulent frontier’? The State in the Federally Areas of Pakistan”, JASO-online N.S. Vol. I, no. 2 (Winter, 2009), 186.

42 sections and contents of FCR which states the tone of state forcible subjugation are as under:109 In the first place, the British dubbed the Pashtuns and Baluchs as uncivilized and barbarous and proclaimed that they require severe treatment which is contradictory to the principle of rule of law.

Section 21 of FCR, gives dictatorial powers to Political Agent by which he can do to a person or a whole tribe what he thinks suitable and even can restrict persons or tribes from inter-tribes interactions and communications. His highness political agent, for doing all these, needs no proofs and evidences.110

In the same way, under section 29, a person can be arrested and imprisoned for five years on suspicion alone. Similarly, section 32 of the FCR empowers the political agent to dislocate a village and, more surprisingly, he, under section 38 (4), can cause a death of a person. To continue with the same, under section 40, he can ask a person or tribe for provision of security bond for good conduct. If he is not satisfied with surety bonds, then FCR confers powers on him to arrest a person or the whole tribe for three years and that can be extended to another term of three years.111

FCR provides legal base to the oppressive political administration in tribal region. Both, as mentioned earlier, the executive as well as the judicial authority are conferred on the political administration under FCR in the tribal area. Both, criminal and civil cases are decided through FCR Jirga constituted for the said purpose. The Jirgais constituted by the Political Agent and its decision is not binding upon him. The right of appeal to the tribesmen against the decision passed by the Political Agent is given and they can appeal to the Commissioner; however it is only in name and the latter has no

109 Khalid Aziz, “the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) and Administration of the Tribal Area of Pakistan”, in Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Maqsudul Hasan Nuri ed., Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute. 2005), 124-125.

110 A Report, “Understanding FATA: Attitudes towards Governance, Religion and Society in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas”, Op. Cit., 57.

111 Tribal Areas: Status, Border Control and Policy; Governors Committee Report, 65. See also Awan, Pattern of Administration in The Tribal Areas of Pakistan, 20. Also see Sher Mohammad Mohmand, FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan): A Socio-Cultural and Geo-Political History (n.p., n.d.), iv.

43 authority to overrule the decision of Jirga.112 The principle of collective responsibility under section 40 of

FCR is much cruel and harsh in nature and no example can be found in the modern time’s law. Under the jurisdiction of this principle political administration has power to arrest and imprison a tribesman for any crime committed by his family member or co-villager or even his tribesman.

It was applied by Pakistan since independence to the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas

(PATA) of NWFP until 1963. Unlike FATA, the regular court system of Pakistan is equally applied in

PATA.113

In FATA, FCR confers all executive, judicial and police powers on PA. FATA is divided into three types of areas:114

1. Inaccessible/Non-Protected Areas: These are those tribal areas which are under loose

control of Pakistani Government. The day-to-day affairs of life are run by the tribesmen

themselves. Basically, these are those areas which are administered indirectly by the local

tribes.115

2. Administrative Areas: These are those administrative areas which are under the jurisdiction

of the PA like government offices, roads, and other installations, etc.

112 Azmat Hayat Khan, “FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan)”, Op. Cit., 99.

113 Crisis Group Asia Report No. 86, “Building Judicial Independence in Pakistan”, 10 November 2004, i.

114 ICG Report No. 125, 6.

115“Khyber Pashtunkhwa & Federally Administered Tribal Areas”, A survey conducted by Post-Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA), September 2010.

3. The Protected Areas: These are those areas where Jirga (council of elders)116 deals with all

types of cases according to the tribal norms and traditions. These areas are under the direct

control of the government.

Administrative Hierarchy of FATA

The political and foreign department of the government of India exercised the administrative authority over the tribal areas during the British rule. Governor of Punjab was the executive head of the tribal region who was responsible to the governor-general of India. When the Province of N-W.F.P. was created in 1901, the executive authority was shifted to the governor of N-W.F.P. who was also responsible to the governor-general.117

After the emergence of Pakistan, the affairs of the tribal areas were run by the federal government under SAFRON which was formerly a separate ministry called Ministry of States and Frontier Regions and now part of the Ministry of Kashmir and Tribal Areas.118 The executive authority still exists with the governor of the province of KP (formerly NWFP) who is responsible to the President of Pakistan. At the provincial level, Home Department runs the administration of the tribal areas under Home Secretary who is responsible to the governor of KP. After 9/11, 2001, a special secretariat- FATA secretariat has been established and the affairs of the tribal areas are conducted by that secretariat under the governor of KP.119

116The Jirga relies on the Pashtun code of honour (Pakthunwali), based on melmastia (hospitality), nanawati (hospitality cannot even be denied to a criminal or enemy) and badal (the right of revenge). The greatest tests of honour involve zar (gold), zun (women) and zamin (land). Settlements and punishments are derived from narkh (tribal precedent); the Jirga can impose strong sanctions and punishments, including excommunication of a noncompliant person or clan, confiscation or girvi (mortgage) of property, fines and formation of a laskhkar (tribal militia) to punish the accused party.

117 Dr Muhammad Anwar Khan, The Role of N-W.F.P. in the Freedom Struggle (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 2000), 5.

118 Mohmand, FATA: A Socio-Cultural and Geo-Political History, ii, iii.

119 Sultan-e-Rome, The North West Frontier (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) (Essays on History) (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 358. 45

Local Administration

Tribal areas, FATA, for convenience of administration, are divided into political agencies and frontier regions. Every agency or frontier region is an administrative unit with territorial limits.120 The administration at the agency level is run by a special official-the Political Agent (PA), who is the administrative head of the respective agency. He exercise vast powers in the Agency and practically he is the fountain of all powers in the agency. He is assisted by the Assistant Political agent (APA), Tehsildars,

Naib Tehsildars and Moharirs. The Political Agents are provided with huge funds and interestingly without any audit of these resources. He spends it for whatever purposes he wants to. And even a large share goes to the tribal maliks, called as Lungi (turban).121 Similarly the administration of Frontier

Regions (FR) is run by the Deputy Co-ordination officer (DCO) who is assisted by Assistant Political

Agent, Tehsildar and Naib Tehsildar. Both the PAs and DCOs are under the Governor’s Secretariat. The system of ‘Collective Responsibility’ and ‘territorial responsibility of the tribe’ is the base of the system political administration. These two principles are executed with the help of maliks.122

FCR Jirga:

The creation of Jirga is not something formal but it is rather an informal institution which has far reaching effects on the Pashtun society in general and on tribal society in particular. It is one of the most

120 Ibid.

121 Lal Baha, N-WFP Administration Under British Rule 1901-1919 (Islamabad, National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), 34. See also Awan, Pattern of Administration in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, 29-31. Also see Mohmand, FATA: A Socio-Cultural and Geo-Political History, iii.

122 Colonel Coke, the officer in charge of the Kohat Pass, first enunciated the notion of Collective responsibility for Afridis. He prescribed the procedure in case of trouble thus; “to close the Pass at once, seize all the Afridis to be found in the Peshawar and Kohat Districts, put the men in jail, sell their cattle, stop all Pass allowances held by the Afrdis, and, when the matter is settled, cause all losses to be made good, not from their confiscated allowances, but from the allowances made from the time they may commence”. See, Government of India, Central Asia, Part-I, 1, 6.

46 prestigious institutions in the tribal region and it has become the part of their culture.123 FCR preserve the custom of Jirga. Mostly the cases-both civil and of criminal nature, are referred to the Jirga by the PA.124

Though the Jirga decide the dispute according to the tribal norms yet the PA retains the ultimate powers.125 Basically, the FCR is to keep on the premise of cohabitation between both the Jirga and the

Political Agent for the provision of quick justice in accordance with tribal norms and traditions but the

British distorted the institution by making it submissive to the PA and thus its decisions are non- binding.126 Pakistan adopted and retained this old and obsolete colonial system by placing the PA all in all and above the Jirga without even the possibility of revision or challenging in a regular court of law.127

Most of the tribesmen supported the Jirga as an efficient agent and source of providing justice. In those cases where the government does not interfere, the process can be much speedier and the disputants can air their grievances more freely and negotiate as compared to an ordinary court trial.128 But this is also a fact that unfortunately Jirga verdicts often favour influential ones at the expense of the haves not of the

123 Lt. Col. (R) Alam Zeb, “The Jirga System”, PARD, Vol. No. 2 (spring, 2001), 15.

124 A case is referred when the political agent believes a crime has been committed or a civil dispute can lead to a blood feud or breach of peace. FCR (1901) sections 8, 11.

125 The political agent may convict the accused in accordance with the jirga’s decision, refer the case back to the Jirga for review or appoint a new jirga. He may acquit or discharge the accused at his discretion in criminal cases (Section 11, clauses 3 a-c) or halt proceedings arbitrarily in civil cases (chapter III, section 8, clause 3-e). See also Khan Zeb Burki, “Inhuman Justice”, The Frontier Post, Online (accessed December 12, 2013).

126 Faqir Hussain, “Testing FCR on the Touchstone of the Constitution”, paper presented at the FCR consultation organized by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), Islamabad, 4-5 October 2004.

127 Crisis Group interview, Latif Afridi, lawyer and former member of the National Assembly from Khyber Agency, Peshawar, 11 May 2006.

128 Ibid.

47 society, particularly women,129 who cannot directly participate in the system and suffer especially when male members of their families are confined.

Due Process

FCR does not provide the accused with due process of law.130 The accused has no right to legal counsel or to present any type of material as evidence to prove his innocence or more witnesses to be cross examined.131 The convicted under FCR has no right of appeal to the Higher Courts of

Pakistan.132An appeal can only be made to the FCR Commissioner who is appointed by the KP governor, who can only revise the decision made by the PA.133 Revision can be made only if there is “material irregularity or defect” in the proceedings or on an “occasion [of] a miscarriage of justice”.134Last, an appeal can be made to an FCR tribunal comprising of the Home Secretary, the Provincial Law Secretary and the Chief Secretary of the province, who decide the case by decisive vote in case of a split over the case. By studying the true nature of FRC rules, it gives the limited right of appeal to the accused one.135

Basically, the convicted parties have no reach to an impartial court of law but they must have to rely on bureaucratic discretion. As the right of appellate authority under FCR is vested in the executive branch of

129 See “State of Human Rights in 2003”, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Lahore, 2004, 33-37. Also see “Pakistan: The Tribal Justice System”, Amnesty International, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA330242002 (accessed December 12, 2013).

130 (law) the administration of justice according to established rules and principles; based on the principle that a person cannot be deprived of life or liberty or property without appropriate legal procedures and safeguards. See Article 10-A of the constitution of 1973 of Pakistan, See also Inserted by the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act 10 of 2010.

131 Crisis Group interview, former judge, Peshawar, 12 May 2006.

132 “No appeal shall lie from any decision given, decree or sentence passed, order made or act done, under any of the provisions of this Regulation”, FCR (1901), section 48.

133 Ibid., section 49.

134 Ibid., section 50.

135 Crisis Group Report, “Building Judicial Independence in Pakistan”, November 10, 2004.

48 the government, it is a clear violation of the safeguard of an independent judiciary as provided in Articles

2-A and 175 of the constitution of 1973 of Pakistan.

The bottom line is that very little is known about the tribal region now called FATA, particularly about its people and their ways of life, its mores and values, beliefs, ideals, administrative apparatus, etc.

Here the basic and pertinent questions about FATA, its geography, its history, society and its system of administration are of crucial importance and has been probed. To have a proper understanding of the area, its historical background, legal and constitutional status as well as the many facets of tribal society, its people and its links with the prospects of the rise of militancy has been highlighted. The status of FATA in the political set up of Pakistan, its consequent impact on the social and economic makeup of the region and its links with the rise of militancy is highlighted as well.

Chapter-3

The Rise of Militancy in FATA

Violence has become a fixture in Pakistan which has affected the safety and well-being of the people. Its impact is huge particularly for those living in the most vulnerable Northwestern parts of the country.136

Suicide bombings have become the day today affair. The U.S based National Counterterrorism Center mentions 8,614 casualties in Pakistan in 2009 whereas there were 4,232 in Afghanistan the same year.

The tribal belt in Pakistan is the most affected region due to its border with Afghanistan and has borne the brunt of violence, with 1,322 of 1,915 terrorist attacks in 2009 occurring in FATA and its adjacent settled areas of Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwha.137 Therefore, it is not surprising that extremism and violence now rank as the top concern of the Pakistanis. Around 90% Pakistanis are of the view that terrorism, militancy and violence are the most serious challenges faced by their country, and 8 out of 10 are worried about the rise of Islamic extremism and militancy. In Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, 75% are worried that the country might not be taken over by the extremist groups.138

The ratio of violence has not only increased in Pakistan but more militant groups have also surfaced across the country, having developed a complex network of relationship with each other. The groups are involved in violence both within Pakistan and beyond its borders. They have turned FATA

136 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2009: “Armaments, Disarmament and International Security”, Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2009, 73. http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/files/SIPRIYB09summary.pdf (accessed April 1, 2014).

137 All the data are from the National Counter Terrorism Center’s Worldwide Tracking System https://wits.nvtv.gov/FederalDiscoverWits/index.do?N=0 ((accessed April 1, 2014).

138 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Pakistani Public opinion: Growing Concerns about Extremism, Continuing Discontent with U.S.”, Washington: Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2009, 8, http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/08/13/pakistani-public-opinion/ (accessed April 1, 2014).

50 into their safe haven from where they strike all over the world.139 Though the substantial portion of its core leadership in Pakistan has been either killed or arrested, yet Al-Qaida remains powerful enough and retains the capability to strike anywhere at will.140 In addition to Al Qaeda, a large number of other militant factions operate within the country as well and have developed a bond with each other. Similarly, the tribal region has been incubated by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In the same way, other militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, etc., also operate in Pakistan. The Balochistan

Liberation Army is another set of paramilitary groups which have secessionist ambitions, and struggle for autonomy from the federal government in Islamabad.

It has become difficult to draw sharp distinctions between these militant factions in Pakistan due to the growing number of links among them. It is reported that Al-Qaida is now supporting various sectarian factions to carry out attacks within Pakistan.141 Most Kashmiri militant outfits and traditional sectarian groups support the TTP to take over or assume control of local government structures through

Talibanization.142

Likewise, the militant attitudes and the actual use of violence of Pakistan’s various militant factions are two different things. Christine Fair of Georgetown University has tried to highlight the popular bases of support for these groups. Her survey research shows that most Pakistanis adhere to the concept of “Jihad” that it is the duty of each and every Muslim to protect fellow Muslims through war or

139 National Intelligent Council, “The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland”, Director of National Intelligence’s National Intelligence Estate, www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf (accessed May 2, 2014).

140 “Al-Qaeda Weakened as Key Leaders are Slain in Recent Attacks”, Associated press, September 19, 2009. See also “Setbacks Weakened Al-Qaeda Ability to Mount Attacks, Terrorism officials Say”, Los Angeles Times, October 17, 2009.

141 Jayshree Bajoria, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://relooney.fatcow.com/SI_Expeditionary/Pakistan-Crisis_76.pdf (accessed May 3, 2014).

142 Daud Khan Khattak, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in the Swat Valley”, New America Foundation Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/the_battle_for_pakistan_swat_valley (accessed May 3, 2014).

51 militarized means.143 This type of attitude provides favorable environment for militants, paramilitary groups and the increase in violence. Her report gives an expansive definition of militancy, the scope of which is enormous, and includes support both for violent militants and participation in their violent activities.

The War on Terror in Afghanistan was conducted by US and allies to eliminate Al-Qaida and its leaders, particularly Osama-bin-Laden, has brought about enormous backlash in the region. Pakistan has had profound implications for its domestic and foreign policies due to its role as a front-line state in the

War on Terror. Pakistan took a U-turn on its Afghan policy and had to crack down on internal extremism and terrorism. A strict policy was adopted against the so-called terrorist factions in tribal areas and some parts of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP). KP, with a majority Pashtun population, was a target of the War on

Terror due to its social structure, cultural restraints and a long boundary with Afghanistan. The geographical proximity and socio-cultural similarities with Afghans have made it a sanctuary for militants and Al-Qaida members. The War on Terror in the tribal region and KP has had negative repercussions for the region and thus is the cause of a lot of grievances among the Pashtuns. In this chapter, a critical survey of the events since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 are underscore. It provides key factors leading to the rise of militancy in the Pashtun dominated areas of KP and FATA. Similarly, it analyzes the role of Pakistan for using ethnicity in the creation of Jihadi groups since the Soviet-Afghan war until

9/11. In the same way, it analyzes the U-turn in Pakistan’s policy towards the Taliban.

The Afghan Factor in the Rise of Militancy

Afghanistan was put on the tract of modernization in all fields of life like education, commercialization, industrialization, technology, and general economic development by its government

143 C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Islam, Politics and Militancy in Pakistan: Inside from a National Sample”, Unpublished Manuscript, May 2010, 21 http://www.princeton.edu/~jns/publications/Islam,%20Militancy%20and%20Politics,%20Pakistan.pdf (accessed May 5, 2014).

52 before World War II. Due to foreign influences, an assertive middle class was generated in the post-

World War II era. The middle class increased with the strengthening of the modern state apparatus and development of the bureaucratic infrastructure and military during 1950s.144 Educational facilities were noticeably increased. The number of schools and students increased by 400% from 1950-1965.145

Likewise, in the same period, the number of students’ enrollment in the Kabul University increased tenfold.146 The educated middle class, who mostly alienated from the religious elements in politics and the old customs and tribal traditions, was critical of the Afghan political, economic, and social conditions.

Moreover, the monarchy was thought to be the root of all evils and a hopeless institution to cope with their country's problems.147

During the constitutional period from 1963-1973, four major ideological groups flourished: (1) the conservatives such as the business elites and religious elements, who mainly were supportive of the ruling elite, wanted to maintain the status quo; (2) the second group was that of the liberals or social democrats, comprised of westernized upper class and some sections of the middle class, who were in favor of reformist approach and pleaded for mixed economy; (3) the third group was that of the leftists, who mainly came from the educated middle class (who were divided into four major groups-the Khalq,

Parcham, Sholoai-ye-Jawveid (pro-Chinese), and the Setem-e-Meli (splinter radical group), were in favour of a socialist revolution; (4) the fourth one was the fundamentalist group, coming from some

144 Hasan Kakar, "Trends in Modern Afghan History," in Louis Dupree and Linette Albert, Afghanistan in the 1970s (New York: Praeger, 1974). See also Louis Dupree, “The Emergence of Technocrats in Modern Afghanistan”, American Universities Field Staff Reports, vol. 18, no. 5 (Hanover, N.H., 1974).

145 Ralph Magnus, "The Constitution of 1964: A Decade of Political Experimentation," in Dupree and Albert, Afghanistan, 60.

146 Ibid.

147 Hasan Kakar, "The Fall of the Afghan Monarchy," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 9, 1978), 195-216.

53 sections of the educated middle and the lower middle classes, was in favour of an Islamic revivalism.148

The Soviet influence started to increase in Afghanistan in 1955. The Muslim scholars and intellectuals started to worry about the Soviet influence of communism. To counter this influence, the first nucleus of a fundamentalist movement was formed by a group of professors in 1957, among them the most prominent were Professor Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, Professor Ghulam M. Niazi, Professor

Burhanuddin Rabbani and Dr. Saeed M. Musa Tawana. The group asserted limited influence because its activities were mainly confined to intellectual discussions. The concept of the Muslim Brotherhood in

Egypt and the Jammat-i-Islami in Pakistan deeply influenced some of its members.149 The first serious attempt in political sphere was made by a student Abul Rahim Niazi in 1968. He organized and formed students union, the Jawanan-i-Musalman (Muslim Youth) in Kabul University. His other important supporters were Dr. Muhammad Umar, Engineer Habib-ur-Rehman, Ghulam Rabbani Ateesh and

Engineer Gulba-deen Hikmatyar.150

It is pertinent to mention here several features of this movement. First, this group was a reactionary movement against both the increasing influence of communist groups in Afghanistan and the supportive and conservative elite of King Zahir Shah’s government. The objective of this group was to reconstruct Afghan society according to the norms of Islamic traditions.151 Second, the movement was not in agreement with the upper class religious elements who, they considered, to be supportive of the

148 In Louis Dupree's and in Nancy and R. S. Newell's works, one finds occasional references but not consistent and detailed views of this group's activities, although the Newells note that the constitutional period provided "fertile ground for the emergence of antigovernment movements on both the Marxist Left and Islamic right"; they also briefly describe the persecution of the fundamentalists at the hands of the Daoud and Khalqi regime. See Nancy P. Newell and R. S. Newell, The Struggle for Afghanistan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 48-55, 77.

149 Tahir Amin, “Afghan Resistance: Past, Present and Future”, Asian Survey (California: 1984), 377.

150 Fathur-Rehaman and Bashir A. Qureshi, Afghans Meet Soviet Challenge (Peshawar: Institute on Regional Studies, 1981), 48-58.

151 Baqui Yousaf Zai, "Kabul University Students: A Potential Political Force", in Dupree and Albert, Afghanistan, 175.

54 exploitative establishment that used Islam as a tool for their mutual interests. Third, the movement made strong connections with other similar fundamentalist movements in Muslim countries, particularly with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Jammat-i-islami in Pakistan, and the Islamic groups in Iran, and used modern Islamic literature for this purpose. Fourth, the movement mainly targeted the educated intelligentsia of Afghanistan, which was coming slowly and gradually under the influence of communism.

It sought the help of the detribalized middle class across ethnic lines. A lot of urban middle class and the rural classes’ ulemas (religious scholars) joined this fundamentalist movement as well, though they gave preference to form their own separate groups.

The students were influenced much by the fundamentalists. The Gaheez and the Nida-yi-Haq, were the two main weeklies of the movement. In a short span of time, within five years, the fundamentalists got two-third majority of the seats in the Kabul University Students Union elections of

1973.152 But the situation took a turn at once after Sardar Daoud's coup d’état in 1973. The government, in active support with the Parcham, started a joint attack on the fundamentalists. In the period from 1973-78, according to one estimate, more than 600 active members of the movement were killed by the communists.153 The fundamentalists were persecuted due to two reasons. First, they had become a serious rival for power and were planning to remove the government by joining the army. Second, Daoud was in collaboration with the Parcham, who considered the fundamentalist group as the only effective rival and enemy on the campuses. The active leaders and followers of the movement fled to Pakistan in 1974-75 for their safety and so, the movement became silent for a time being in Afghanistan.

The underground phase of the fundamentalist movement started at that time (in the late seventies of the 20th century). The PPP government under Bhutto worried about Sardar Daoud's anti-Pakistan activities, particularly his Pushtunistan campaign. Similarly, Bhutto’s government also worried about the

152 For the background, see Richard Nations, "The Muslims' Divided Alliance", Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), Hong Kong, February 19, 1980.

153 Amin, “Afghan Resistance”, 377.

55 possible infiltration of guerrillas to Pakistan trained by the Afghan government. As a counter strategy,

Pakistan welcomed the fundamentalist leaders from Afghanistan and started providing them all types of help, including training to those fundamentalists to fight against the Daoud regime. Pakistan secretly trained more than 5000 Afghan opponents of the Daoud government at underground camps in Peshawar.

The objective for the training of the Afghans was twofold: first, to neutralize intentions of the Daoud government about pro-Pushtunistan issue; second, to bring Daoud to terms on the issue of the disputed

Durand line.154 The fundamentalist movement, with the secret support of the Pakistani establishment, started an insurgency movement in four provinces of Afghanistan. The insurgency launched in Panjsher on July 21, 1975, was particularly important that shook the complacency of many power elite in Kabul.

However, a wide and general uprising did not take place as the people ignored to believe the announcement by the fundamentalists that Kabul was ruled by a 'godless, communist-dominated' regime.155 Consequently, Daoud’s government sensed that the situation was willing to come to terms with

Pakistan in 1976. In fact, his decision was influenced by many factors. One of the prominent factors was his recognition of the fact of the potential of the fundamentalists supported by Iran and Pakistan. An agreement was inked among Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran in 1976, which included softened stance over the issue of the Durand line. Softening stance over the issue of the Durand Line was an extraordinary U- turn on the part of Daud.156 One analyst aptly said:

154 Lawrence Lifschultz, "Afghanistan: The Not-So-New Rebellion," FEER, Hong Kong, January 30, 1981, 32-33. See also Barnett Rubin. Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 100. Also see Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 78. See Also Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 81-82. Also see A.Z. Hilali, U.S.-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 104. See also Iqbal Khattak, “Kabul Trained Baluch, Pashtuns Youth in 1970s: Ex-ANP Leader”, Daily Times (Pakistan), February 15, 2010.

155 Ibid. See also T.H. Rigby, “The Afghan Conflict and Soviet Domestic Politics,” in: Amin Saikal and William Maley, eds. The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 72.

156 Hafizullah Emadi, “Durand Line and Afghan-Pak Relations”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 25, No. 28 (Jul. 14, 1990),1515-1516. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4396497 (Accessed May 10, 2014). Also see W. Howard 56

The carrot of the agreement was a massive aid program for Afghanistan. The Shah committed himself to nearly $3 billion in aid for Kabul. That was more than the total foreign aid Afghanistan had received from all donors in the previous 30 years. . . On the Pakistani side the stick remained. It was implicitly understood that should Kabul go back on the new agreement vis-a-vis the Durand line and Pushtoonistan issues, Pakistan would be prepared to unleash the forces it had set in motion in the Panjsher valley in July 1975.157

After the agreement, both Pakistan and Afghanistan stopped interfering in each other’s internal affairs. Pakistan suspended its support of the Afghan fundamentalists. On the other hand, Afghanistan stopped its support to the Pakistani Pashtun nationalists.

After the Saur Revolution 1978

A widespread mass revolt started against the Khalqi regime on April 26, 1978. Two factors played a major role in the revolt: the Communist character of the regime and the social reforms undertaken by the regime. In the beginning, the Taraki government consciously avoided the communist label and tried to adopt traditional legitimacy in theory if not practically. Taraki proclaimed and called the policy of the new regime as Afghan nationalism, economic and social justice as enunciated by Islam, and nonalignment policy in international arena. They claimed to be the followers of King Amanullah's reform programs.158 Nevertheless, the Marxist character of the regime soon became clear to the public. The

Khalqi leaders proclaimed always that they were following the Soviet “Great October Revolution”.159

Wriggins, Pacific Affairs, Univ. of British Columbia, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Summer, 1984), 287. See also Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “The Afghanistan Crisis and Pakistan's Security Dilemma”, Asian Survey, University of California Press, Vol. 23, No. 3 (March, 1983), 227.

157 Rigby, “The Afghan Conflict and Soviet Domestic Politics, 72.

158 See Louis Dupree, “Red Flag Over the Hindu Kush: The Accidental Coup or Taraki in Blunderland”, American Universities Staff Reports, no. 45 (Hanover: N. H., 1979).

159 Ibid.

Louis Dupree describes the PDPA160 enthusiasm in these words:

Communist or not, revolution or not, the PDPA factions, the PDPA factions considered their Saur Revolution as following in the footsteps of the Russia’s Glorious October Revolution. In order to successfully have revolution, “a past path must be established”. Tarakai declared, “it was on this basis that the great October Revolution triumphed with the help of workers’ powerful party, and we have the path. The Soviet Union after the October Revolution has always been the friend of people of Afghanistan. If the great Revolution rocked the whole world, the great Saur Revolution, which triumphed under the inspiration of the great October Revolution, also jolted the toiling people of the world.161

The communist character of the new regime was clear to the Afghan intelligentsia from the

Soviet communist bloc extension, recognition and economic aid to the new regime. In a short span of time, within six months, thirty agreements were signed between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, and twenty five with the COMECON countries. The soviet bloc policies were appreciated and broadcasted in

Afghan newspapers and from radio stations respectively. The soviet position was always appreciated faithfully by Afghan representatives at the U.N. and at nonaligned meetings. The communist character of the regime came to the fore when the regime adopted the Soviet pattern of primary and secondary education and replaced English with Russian as the required foreign language for secondary school students, and adoption of a national flag modeled after those of several Soviet Republics.

The land reforms, abolition of the purdah (the traditional veil for women), the bride price, and

160 Khalq Party was established in Jan. 1, 1965. The disagreement between the leaders spilt the party to Khalq & Parcham in 1966. The Khalq was then led by Noor Mohammad Taraki and majority of its members were rural Pashtuns from non-elite classes and they supported radical changes. The Parcham was led by Babrak Karmal in 1967 and majority of its members were mostly Dari speakers, urban population and all the ethnic groups supported gradual changes. In July 1977 under the Soviet pressure the Khalq and Parcham Communist parties re- united and formed the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Shaista Wahab, “Cultural History and Constitutional Democracy in Afghanistan”, Immersion Seminar on Language, Culture and History of Afghanistan, Center for Afghanistan Studies University of Nebraska at Omaha, 12-30th May, 2014.

161 Louir Dupree, “Red Flag over Hindu kush: Rhetoric and reforms or Promises! Promises", American Field Flag Staff Reports, No. 46, 1980, 2.

58 power reduction of the religious leadership devalued traditional customs and laws based on Islamic beliefs about land, sex, money, and religion. The reforms represented communist character of the regime, which added fuel to fire and precipitated the revolt. The communist regime was unacceptable to nearly all layers of Afghan society except a small portion of urban middle class. The aim of the radical land reforms was to break the traditional social structure, formation of rural cooperatives on the Marxist pattern, endeavoured to shift authority of the local elite to the regime's own party bureaucracy. Massacres and widespread arrests, torture and executions of opponents provoked wide spread resistance in the country.

Around 30,000 people were put in jail by 1979 and 12,000 were executed. To achieve abrupt change, the regime never hesitated to strike at the strongholds of traditional power bases. The resistance movement was started at four fronts, the traditional elite, the religious class, the fundamentalist and nationalist groups in the rural areas. The first of such type of revolts started at Nooristan province, followed by

Hazarajat, Badakhshan, Kapisa, Uruzgon, Parwan, Bagdghiz,, Paktiya, Nangarhar, Bulkh, Ghazni, and

Farah. In this resistance movement, a considerable number of Russian advisors and their families were brutally murdered, and hundreds of Parchamis and Khalqis were assassinated in the rural areas. By

December 1979, according to one estimate, the resisting factions controlled 23 out of 28 provinces, on the eve of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.162

Mujahideen Groups and Their Social Bases

In the beginning the resistance against regime was widespread and unplanned. One observer aptly noted:

"Virtually all social groups joined in the rebellion. Ethnic groups, religious movements, tribal factions, regional groups, radical leftist factions. . . . Some rejected the regime for religious reasons, others because they resented its centralized authority. The rebellion was diverse and wholly uncoordinated, rising spontaneously among the people".163

162 Amin, “Afghan Resistance”, 380.

163 Gerard Chaliand, Report from Afghanistan (New York: Viking Press, 1981), 61. See also his article, "With the Afghan Rebels", New York Times, October 9, 1980.

After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Kabul also rose against the puppet and Marxist government of Babrak Karmal. Only in the last quarter of the month of February1980, more than 350 people were killed in Kabul, and more wounded and misplaced. More than 3000 people were officially admitted by Babrak Karmal to have been arrested.164

The resistance in Afghanistan was of two types: one was organized into certain established groups; the other was unorganized, spontaneous, and uncoordinated. The organized groups composed of educated middle class and drew its support from ethnic groups. The unorganized resistance was based on primordial loyalties- kinship, family, tribe, sub-tribe, and region. It comprised of about 200 or more small local groups, fighting against the Afghan and Soviet troops.

The organized resistance was started from the land of Pakistan after the Afghan refugees migrated to Pakistan in the middle of 1978. By the end of October 1979, more than 385000 registered Afghan refugees crossed border to Pakistan. Before the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, on the average, 60,000

Afghans left their country every month following Amin's takeover in September 1979. But after the

Soviet invasion a flow of refugees started migrating to Pakistan which seemed as "a torrent running through a mountainous region".165 By the end of 1981, the number of refugees reached up to 2.6 million.166 Pakistan recognized six influential groups of Mujahideen, which had merged into two major alliances: traditionalists and fundamentalists. The traditionalist groups were: (1) Jabha Nijat-i-Milli

(Sibghat- Ullah Mujaddidi); (2) Harakat-i-Islami (Nabi Mohammad Mohammadi), (3) Milli Islami Mahaz

(Pir Ahmad Gilani). The fundamentalist groups were: (1) Jamiat-i-Islami (Professor Burhanuddin

164 Richard Nations, "The Grassroots Challenge to Moscow," FEER, Hong Kong, March 7, 1980.

165 See a very detailed report on Afghan refugees in Pakistan, "Search for a Solution", Pakistan and Gulf Economist, April 3-9, 1982.

166 Ibid.

Rabbani); (2) Hizb-i-Islami (Younus Khalis group). (3) Hizb-i-Islami (Engineer Gulbadeen Hikmatyar);

(4) Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (Sayyaf).

THE FUNDAMENTALISTS

The fundamentalists played a very crucial role in various anti-government movements during the constitutional period (1963-73). They had an upper hand over rival organizations due to many factors.

First, they had acquired legitimacy by the time of the Soviet invasion because of launching the armed struggle in Daoud's time (1973-78). They were gaining the support of the refugees by telling them that they had started the armed struggle in 1975, and telling them that Marxism was Afghanistan's main enemy. Second, they had already formed trained and well-armed educated youth wings (mostly graduates from Kabul University). That was why they quickly assumed leadership, as a result a large number of refugees started joining the resistance movement. Third, their secret connections in Afghanistan, better organizational structure, and sources of income and supply attracted the younger refugees. Finally, the open support of Jammat-i-Islami and the covert support of the Pakistani government was a great source of motivation and strength to them. The Hizb-i-Islami (Gulbadeen Hikmatyar (Pashtun) established in

Pakistan in 1975167 group was the largest with best organized structure, internal electoral system, and the largest number of followers in Afghanistan.168

Jamiat-i-Islami (Burhanuddin Rabbani) was the second largest group among the resistance organizations. Rabbani’s group, like Hikmatyar's group, was composed of educated class-doctors, senior professors and engineers. He, himself a Tajik, commanded more respect and loyalty among the minorities- Uzbeks, Turkomans and Tajiks.

167 Wahab, “Cultural History and Constitutional Democracy in Afghanistan” Op. Cit.

168 For detail report see Tahir Amin, Afghanistan Crisis: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran and Pakistan (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1982). See also Nancy Peadbody Newell, Struggle for Afghanistan (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1981), 182. Also see "Analyzing Islam's Reactionary Movements," CDSP, 34:32 (September 8, 1982), 8-9.

Hizb-i-Islami (Younus Khalis (Pashtun) split from Hekmatyar group in 1979)169 was the third fundamentalist group and was influential in Jalalabad, Kunar, Paktia, and Nangrahar.170

THE TRADITIONALISTS

After the Saur Revolution, the traditionalist groups were formed. Their main hubs of support were the conservative religious elite, tribal chiefs, landlords, Pirs and Salifis. They strived for status quo in

Afghanistan and supported the leadership of King Zahir Shah.

Milli Islami Mahaz (Syed Ahmad Gilani) was the largest group whose main support came from the Pashtun areas bordering Pakistan. Gilani's family played an important role in the anti King

Amanullah's reforms. This group had not attracted enough followers and had poor organizational structure. The strong bases of the group were in Paktia and Paktika.

Jabba Nijat-i-Milli (Sibghat- Ullab Mujaddidi) was another traditionalist group. This group drew its support from religious circles and tribal chiefs. The group was mainly supported financially by Saudi

Arabia and the Persian Gulf states.

Harakat-i-Islami (N. M. Mohammadi) was the largest group among the traditionalists. It had a poor organizational structure. Its main following came from the rural population. Logar, Ghazni, Kabul,

Kandhar, and Baghlan were the main hubs of this group.

The monarchical government was overthrown in Afghanistan in 1973 and was replaced by national parliament. The moderate faction of the communist PDPA party dominated the parliament.

Muhammad Daoud became the prime minister. In the same way, here in Pakistan, a lot of changes took place after loss of its eastern wing, Bangladesh.

169 Wahab, “Cultural History and Constitutional Democracy in Afghanistan” Op. Cit.

170Amin, “Afghan Resistance”, 383.

In between 1963-1980, religion was steadily regularized in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Most of the religious leaders were marginalized during the constitutional development from 1963-1978. It was attempted to bring most of the religious centers under state control, even the old dargah of the Hadda

Mulla at Hadda Sharif.171 Religious law was started as an independent subject in government universities with the purpose to bring traditional education in line with modern education. Most of the religious scholars started to seek religious education in state owned faculties in Pakistan, India, Cairo, etc.172 These university trained religious scholars like Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani who appealed to the detribalized middle class across ethnic lines and were drawn into a wider Islamist networks through connections with the muslim brotherhood in Cairo and the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan.173

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 to support the pro-communist regime and advance its interests in the region. The Afghans were provided with arms within two weeks of the invasion to fight against the Soviet forces.174 When Pakistan felt its own insecurity, it joined hands with

US and the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet Union. The CIA and ISI exploited to the full the socio- cultural inclination of Pashtuns on both sides of the border. They came to the conclusion that the Pashtuns particularly the tribesmen would be a better choice to fight the Soviets and would be more willing to wage

Jihad (holy war) against the Red Army alongside their Pashtuns brethren in Afghanistan.175 A good start

171 David Edwards, Before Taliban-Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (California: University of California Press, 2002), 196.

172 Oliver Roy, “Modern Political Culture and Traditional Resistance” in BoHuldt and Erland Johnson, ed., The Tragedy of Afghanistan (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 106-112.

173 Amin, ‘Afghan Resistance: Past, Present and Future’, 375-377.

174 A.J. Kuperman, “The Stinger Missile and U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan”, Political Science Quarterly, 1999, 114(2), 219-263. See also Razia Sultana and Saira Aquil, “The Pakistan Pashtuns and the End Game in Afghanistan”, International Journal on World Peace, Vol. XXIX, no. 4 (December 2012), 17.

175 L. Ziring, “Pakistan: Terrorism in Historical Perspective”, In Veena Kukreja & M.P. Singh, Pakistan: Democracy, Development and Security Issues (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 2005), 187 and see also his article “Unraveling the Afghanistan-Pakistan Riddle”, Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 36, no. 2(2009), 64.

63 was given to establish several Madrassas and Mujahideen training camps in KP, Baluchistan and Punjab.

Besides, USA and some other states provided heavy funds and ammunitions to Pakistan for the holy fighters.

So, when talking about the issue of militancy, extremism and terrorism in the tribal areas of

FATA, one must have to take into account the developments occurring in the neighbouring Afghanistan.

Whatever has happened in Afghanistan has had its direct impact on Pakistan in general and the Pashtuns and tribal areas particularly and vice versa.

Rise of Militancy in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan

After the inception of Pakistan, a number of national and provincial organizations were formed for promoting the idea of a national religious curriculum and Sunni thoughts. Similarly, the religious parties were stressing for the enforcement of Islamic Sharia. Abul Ala Maududi and his party, Jamaat-i-Islami and other Islamic parties and Ulema stressed for Islamization process in Pakistan.176 The ulema of

Pakistan were active for strengthening the religious centers, masjids and madrassas. They also stressed that a religious expert would not be just educated in religious course but in the Dars-i-nizami of Deoband as well. The madrassas of Deoband school of thought were established in all parts of Pakistan. The

Deobandi madrassas established in KP and Baluchistan particularly FATA trained a considerable number of Afghan ulemas as well.177

Therefore Jamaat-i-Islami extended its support to the Afghan fundamentalists that migrated to

176 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulema in contemporary Islam, Custodians of Change (UK: Princeton University press, 2002), 102-110.

177 “Darul Ulum Haqqaniyya ka aik faizan: fazla-yi Afghanistan”, in Al-Haq (Abdul Haq Number, 1993), 658-681. See also Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution unending (London: Columbia University Press, 2005) and Amin, Afghan Resistance, 377-380.

Pakistan in 70s. After Saur Revolution, pro-Soviet military government under Nur Mohammad Tarakai was established in Afghanistan. Tarakai’s communist influenced reforms in the socio-economic field made him unpopular. A widespread anti-Tarakai’s government demonstrations started but were suppressed with Soviet assistance. However, the political demonstrations once again started in all parts of the country and anti-government tribal lashkars were formed who attacked military outfits and soon they would disperse and mingle in the local population made it hard to be traced.178

Under pressure from the public, Tarakai was removed and his deputy Hafiz Ullah Amin became the head of the state. But the situation could not be controlled by him and so the Soviet army intervened and occupied Afghanistan in December 27, 1979. Amin was removed and replaced by Babrak Karmal. To cut the roots of the tribal lashkars, Karmal’s government started a depopulation campaign along the eastern border. It led to the migration of the anti-Soviet groups and Afghan eastern Pashtun population to

Pakistan. The Afghan Islamist groups in Peshawar started political management of these migrating groups and people.

Likewise, a lot of changes took place in Pakistan as well. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was overthrown in a coup d’état by General Zia-ul-Haq. The narrow and bigoted religiosity plainly became a state policy of the General Zia’s military regime.179 Zia conceived a social order in which he sought all spheres of life to be regulated in accordance with Islamic injunctions. So, Zia began a radicalization of society which was referred to as Islamization process.180 In public offices, even education institutions, the afternoon prayer was made obligatory and special spaces were assigned for prayers. Fasting in Ramadhan was enforced

178 David B. Edwards, “Origins of the Anti-Soviet Jihad”, in Farr and Merriam (eds.), Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival (Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 1988), 22-50. Also see reports in the daily Dawn, March-October, 1979.

179 Hamza Alvi, “Social Forces and Ideology in the Making of Pakistan”, in Continuity and Change: Socio-political and Institutional Dynamics in Pakistan, edited by S. Akbar Zaidi, (Karachi: City Press, 2003), 37.

180 Ishtiaq Ahmed, “Radicalization and De-Radicalization in Singapore and Pakistan: A Comparison”, Conflict and Peace Studies, Vol. 2, Number 3, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2009), 54.

65 and eating and drinking in open public were penalized. Veil was made compulsory for women.181 In the light of Zia’s radicalized policies, the Pakistani society became more conservative over the last three decades.182

Zia increased government support for Islamist groups and madrassas. He implemented some aspects of Islamic criminal law and increased the ratio of ulemas in the Council of Islamic Ideology, a parliamentary advisory body.183 Islamic punishments for criminal cases were announced and enforced.

Punishments were publicly given to the criminals. In 1980, Shariah benches were established to enforce laws according to Islamic injunctions. Zakat and Usher Ordinance were promulgated in February 1979 to streamline economy on Islamic line and, so, 2.5% donation on annual income (Zakat) was made compulsory and 10% on agricultural products (Ushar). The Islamic banking system was introduced and was proclaimed as a major step to streamline economy on Islamic economic system.184

During Zia era some peculiar changes also took place in media. Women anchors had to cover their heads. Music and dancing along with Pakistani films and film songs were banned. Even the whole set up in media establishment underwent a change and a new one took over.185

The Islamization process led to sectarian violence. A paradigm shift took place in the sectarian violence from occasional local disputes about customs and religious beliefs in the pre-Zia era to attacks

181 Arif Hasan, “The Roots of Elite Alienation”, in S. Akbar Zaidi ed., Continuity and Change: Socio-political and Institutional Dynamics in Pakistan (Karachi: City Press, 2003), 120-122. See also Manzooruddin Ahmed, Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, and Society (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1980), 27-37.

182 Safiya Aftab, “Poverty and Militancy”, Conflict and Peace Studies, Vol. 1, Number 1, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2008), 65. See also Ahmad Rashid, “The Taliban Exporting Extremism”, Foreign Affairs, Nov-Dec 1999.

183 Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam, 89.

184 Ahmed, Contemporary Pakistan, 27-37.

185 Hasan, “The Roots of Elite Alienation”, 120-122.

66 on individuals and institutions of other sects in the post-Zia era.186 After Zia regime, Pakistan looked like a cultural wasteland both in intellectual and social terms. Zia was opposed essentially on political ground and no one noticed the social and cultural damage that Zia regime inflicted upon the society.187 The process of socio-cultural transformation is not yet over but is still going. Tariq Rehman describes it as:

“Complex processes of social transformation are underway. But the problem is the direction of change which is positive only partly, and negative in general. Something has gone wrong with the process of change. The change tends to be more in favour of the radical forces than peaceful socio- cultural agents”.188

In addition to Zia’s Islamization process, the ‘Jihadi’ sentiments during anti-Soviet war in

Afghanistan radicalized the Pashtuns/tribal society. The religious seminaries and refugee camps became the breeding grounds of Jihadi recruits in Pakistan and they were trained and sent to Afghanistan for

Jihad against the Soviet forces. Media played its due role as well for promoting the cause and message of

‘Jihad’ and to collect more financial and personnel support for the cause. Pro-Jihad publications were printed in different languages from Peshawar, Karachi and Quetta in Pakistan.189 The Islamic parties in

Pakistan like Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) published their pro-Jihad publications and rendered support to their favourite Jihadi groups. Weekly Asia, daily Jasarat and monthly Terjuman-

186 Muhammad Abdul Qadeer, Pakistan (London: Routledge, 2006), 179.

187 Hasan, “The Roots of Elite Alienation”, 122.

188 Tariq Rahman, quoted in Muhammad Azam, “Radicalization in Pakistan: Socio-cultural Realities”, Conflict and Peace Studies, Vol. 2, Number 1, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2009), 47.

189 “Jihad-e-Afghanistan Number”, Monthly Bedar Digest, (Urdu) Lahore, December 1989. See also Najam-U-Din, address in a seminar on “Assessing the Reporting, Approach and Impact of Militants Print Media in Pakistan” held by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) on 18 November 2009 in Lahore. And Hussain Naqi, address in a seminar on “Assessing the Reporting, Approach and Impact of Militants Print Media in Pakistan” held by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) on 18 November 2009 in Lahore, http://www.san-pips.com/index.php?action=events&id=58 (accessed at May 8, 2014). Also see Zafrullah Khan, a former journalist and Executive Director Centre for Civic Education, Pakistan, keynote address at a Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) seminar on “Understanding the Jihad Print Media in Pakistan and its Impact” held on 20 October 2009 in Islamabad, http://www.san- pips.com/index.php?action=events&id=56 (accessed at May 8, 2014).

67 ul-Quran of Jamat-e-Islami, Al-Jamiah of JUI and monthly Al-Haq of Darul Uloom Haqqania Akora

Khattak (JUI) are worth mentioning.190

In addition to the state-led ideological induction, the religious leaders and seminaries at societal level were also active in imparting religious education to the masses. Arabic-owing to be language of

Holy Quran, political use of religion and sectarian approaches were the three major problems in people’s understanding of Islam.191 The ulema and religious clerics promoted much more than mere interpreters of

Islam. They gave sect-oriented religious explanations of Islam. They were too much influential in both the state affairs and social order from the very beginning.

Like ulema, the case with religious seminaries, the madrassas, was the same. They were not confined to a sole purpose of imparting religious education but they had political affiliations as well.

About 59% of madrassas in Pakistan were affiliated with religio-political parties, 3% with other mainstream parties and 18% with sectarian or Jihadi organizations/ groups. However, more than 60% of the administration of madrassas held the opinion that it was their religious duty to play their due role in politics.192 However, educationists were of the view that despite its disciplinary merits, religious education had tendency to stop and cut critical thinking because in religion ‘why’ and questionings of

Divine plans were always discouraged. But in spite of the fact of discouragement of critical thinking, such tendencies and science had been allowed to flourish under moderate religious rule.193

190 Muhammad Amir Rana, “Jihadi Print Media in Pakistan: An Overview,” Conflict and Peace Studies, Issue 1, No. 1 (Islamabad: PIPS, 2008), 1-18.

191 Muhammad Azam, “Radicalization in Pakistan: Socio-cultural Realities”, Conflict and Peace Studies, Vol. 2, Number 1 (Islamabad: PIPS, 2009), 58. M. Azam is a researcher at the PIPS, Islamabad.

192 Muhammad Amir Rana, “Mapping the Madrasa Mindset: Political Attitudes of Pakistani Madaris”, Pak Institute for Peace Studies Vol. 2, Number 1 (Islamabad: PIPS, 2009), 31. See also Jamal Malik, Colonisation of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institution in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Ltd., 1996), 208-209.

193 Saleem H. Ali, Islam and Education (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 4.

No doubt, the Ulema are not the essential part or influential agents in the administrative setup, yet they have a considerable following in the general masses in Pakistan. This is why Pakistan’s pioneer party, Muslim League, also sought the help of the ulema for getting support of masses for its cause in the establishment of Pakistan. When Pakistan came into being, the Muslim League did not present a liberal or modern interpretation of Islam to the masses. So, the people eventually sought the help of the Ulema for understanding Islam and remained under their influence.194 All these developments had negatively impacted the region of FATA and radicalized the society.

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and FATA

Pashtuns are mostly followers of the Deobandi school of thought. To get their support, the

Madrassas established during the Soviet-Afghan war followed mostly Deobandi teachings. The number of Mujahideen was more than 1.6 million who were trained in Pakistan from 1982-1988 by the ISI and

CIA. The total number of Mujahideen training camps established in Pakistan was 92, of which forty were in Pashtun tribal region.195 Similarly in this period, about $3.5 billion in aid and 65,000 tons of weapons were provided to the Mujahideen to fight against the Soviets. Majority of the Mujahideen and that of

Islamic guerrilla groups like the Ittihad-i-Islami (Islamic Union) led by Abd al-Rabb al- Rasul Sayyaf were from Pashtun tribal race.196 More than 2.5 million Afghan refugees migrated to Pakistan during the war and the subsequent civil war. Almost 80% of the refugees migrated were Pashtuns.197 A total of

3,049,268 Afghans were reported to have migrated to Pakistan by 2005, of whom 62% resided in the

194 Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), 162.

195 A.Z. Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 121-122.

196 Barnett Rubin. Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 223-224.

197 Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (Aldershot: Ashgate Ashgate Ltd, May 30, 2005), 118.

69 tribal region and KP.198

Though Pakistan welcomed the Afghan refugees yet the government did not encourage direct attacks on Soviet forces. The government thought of the tribal areas as good place to be used for the said purpose and arms were supplied to anti-Soviet organizations stationed in the tribal region. The Afghan eastern regions and the Pakistani tribal areas were used as war fronts forward point for the Afghan

Jihad.199 From the tribal regions the mujahideen launched strikes on the Afghan and Soviet forces.200

Afghan forces, in response, made aerial bombardments on the tribal regions of Pakistan from where mujahideen were ambushing the Soviet and Afghan forces.201 Pakistan, on the other hand, lodged a complaint in UN against Afghanistan interfering in Pakistani territory.202

The migration of the refugees continued and they kept settling on the western border of

Pakistan.203 A symbiotic relationship developed between the Pakistani tribesmen and the refugees. The refugees provided cheap labour to the local tribals. In return the tribals provided a safe haven to the refugees.204 Just like Afghan refugees became a part of economic rise of the tribals, similarly, the tribesmen were inducted into the Afghan economy of resistance as well.

Pakistani tribesmen, encouraged by the mujahideen leaders, started cultivating poppy crops. By

1980s, the production of poppy doubled and a large number of heroin refineries were established

198 UNHCR, Global Report 2005. [online] http://www.unhcr.org/449267800.html (accessed September 4, 2013).

199 “3MIGS of Afghan Air Force Downed: Mujahideen’s claim”, Dawn, May 12, 1979.

200 Lelsay Grau and Michael Gress, The Soviet-Afghan War (Kansas: University Press, 2002), 62.

201 “Body-trapped toys kill many Afghan children”, Dawn, August 5, 1980.

202 “Pakistan letter to UN: Afghan attacks”, Dawn, November 8, 1980.

203 “Body-trapped toys kill many Afghan children”, Dawn, August 5, 1980.

204 Andre Singer, “Ahmed on the Afghan Refugees”, RAIN (London: 1980), Vol. 39 1-2.

70 in the tribal region of Pakistan.205 Besides, Darra Adam Khel Bazar became the main hub of selling of Russian arms captured by the mujahideen and American and Chinese arms given as assistance to the mujahideen.206 The arms in Darra not only strengthened the Afghan resistance but also equipped different organizations with arms from Kashmir to Karachi.

Since the Soviets invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan being the frontline ally state against the

Russian invasion, the Mujahideen used the tribal region of Pakistan as their front line against the

Soviet occupation forces. It had turned into the main base of Mujahideen, from where all kind of supplies were sent to Afghanistan. Accordingly, a considerable number of Afghan refugees migrated to the tribal region. By the year 1981, a large number of Afghan refugees migrated to

Pakistan and it was estimated that about 4,700 Afghan refugees per day migrated to Pakistan.207

By 1986, up to 350 refugee villages were established by the Pakistani government in three provinces along the borderline. The registered Afghan villages in KP were approximately 72% of the total, 24% in Baluchistan Province and 4% in Punjab province.208

After 1984, the Mujahideen were strong enough and so they took over positions on the Afghan side of the frontier. They only came to Pakistan for supplies and treatment. The refugees in Pakistan frequently visited Afghanistan for cultivation of their lands.209 A wide roads and passes were constructed in the region between tribal areas and Afghanistan. It was at that moment that bad blood surfaced between

205 Ikramul Haq, “Pak-Afghan Drug Trade in Historical Perspective”, Asian Survey (California: 1996), 954.

206 Amin, Afghan Resistance, 390.

207 W. B. Wood, “Long Time Coming: The Repatriation of Afghan Refugees”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 79, No. 3, September 1989, 350.

208 N. H. Dupree, “Demographic Reporting on Afghan Refugees in Pakistan”, Modern Asian Studies, Cambridge Univ. Press, London,Vol. 22, No. 4, 1988, 846.

209 Ibid., 848.

71 the refugees and the tribesmen. Pamphlets were distributed in South Waziristan for vacating the area by refugees as per tribesmen view they were disturbing the security of the region after Jandhola Bridge was destroyed. Such type of anti-refugees’ sentiments were backed by Afghan regime.210 The tension between them continued till the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1988.211 However, despite bad blood between the tribesmen and the refugees, the Afghan war enhanced the economic status of the tribesmen which made them independent of the government of Pakistan.

The independent position of the tribal region was evident from the fact that Pashtuns on the

Pakistani side of the border, with the lenient support of the government, were constantly trained and educated by madrassas for Afghan Jihad.212 Jihadi camps were established mostly in the tribal areas of

Pakistan.213 By the year 1986, Arabs also came to Afghanistan for Jihad and settled in the border area of

Khost.214 These mujahideen considered themselves as one ummah (Nation) and helped Afghan mujahideen both economically and in human resource.215 A large number of Arabs poured into

Afghanistan and mainly controlled by two leading figures, Abdullah Azam, a Palestinian and Osama bin

Ladden, a Saudi national. Relations developed between Pakistani and Arab mujahideen and a large number of Arabs enrolled in Pakistani madrassas particularly in tribal areas.

210 Ibid., 864.

211 Marvin G. Weinbaun, “Pakistan and Afghanistan: the Strategic Relationship”, Asian Survey (California: 1991), 503-505.

212 Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: the Afghan-Pakistan Connection (London: Columbia University Press, 2004), 27.

213 Arif Jamal, “Restart”, The News (Kirachi), July 11, 2004. See also Syed Vali Reza, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: the Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulema in Society and Politics”, Modern Asian Studies (UK: Univ. of Cambridge: 2000), 150. Also see Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan Between Mosque and Militancy (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 2005), 185-190, And Frederic Gare, Political Islam in the Indian Subcontinent (Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 2001), 89.

214 David Edwards, Geneologies, 18.

215 Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), 30.

The religious parties in Pakistan strongly supported the Afghan Jihad in spite of the fact that they were hostile to Zia military regime.216 The ulema announced the Afghan Jihad for the safety of Islam and

Pakistan’s borders.217 The Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Islam got its support for the Afghan Jihad through the ulemas and their religious seminaries.218 The Deoband is supportive of Jihad established their strong bases in Mirali and Wana in South and North Waziristan Agencies.219

The Mujahideen both Pakistani and Arabs origin contributed their support to Afghan Jihad through the Mujahideen leaders. Among whom the two were the Hizb-i-Islami led by Mohammad Yunus

Khalis group who was a graduate from Haqqaniya madrassa and so closely attached to the Pakistani

Islamists,220 and another group was led by Maulana Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf who was mostly liked by wealthy Arabs.221 Younis Khalis group got support of the eastern Pashtun tribal mullas around Kandahar including Abdul Haq, Amin Wardak and Jalaluddin Haqqani, etc.222 Abdul Rab Sayaf’s Ettehad-i-Islami made its center around Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and got a large number of volunteers by resources at his hands. Apart from them other small organizations were in operation in Pakistan like

Maulavi Hussain group at Bajaur, Badshah GulI’s Tehreek-i-Junud Allah, etc.223

Aftermath of the Soviet Withdrawal

216 For detail study see Sayyed Wali Reza, “Islamic Opposition to the Islamic State: The Jamaat-i-Islami, 1977-88”, International Journal of Middle East Studies (Cambridge: 1993).

217 Abdul Qaiyyum Haqqani, Sahbatay ba Ahl-i-Haq (Akora Khattak: 1990), 290.

218 Ibid., 358-406.

219 Jamal, ‘Restart’.

220 Haqqani, Sahbatay, 216.

221 Edwards, Geneologies, 266.

222 Ali Jalali and Lester Grau, Afghan Guerilla warfare (London: Zenith Imprint, 2001), 168, 213.

223 Haqqani, Sahbatay, 214.

The resistance movement completely drained out the Soviet energies. In his speech to the Communist

Party meeting, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev admitted that external interference of the states and counter revolutionaries had made Afghanistan for Soviet as bleeding wound. It brought heavy human, material and military losses for them.224 So, in order to save Soviet from complete collapse, they decided to withdraw after the Geneva Accord. Dr. Najib called the accord as the most important event in the history of Afghanistan. Zia declared it victory for the Pakistan and Afghan mujahideen. But the

Mujahideen rejected the accord. Gulbadin refuted the accord completely and announced that they were not bound by the accord and thus, they would continue their resistance movement against the infidel regime in Afghanistan.225 Though the accord provided the way for the withdrawal of Soviet forces yet the future of Afghanistan remained undecided.

This situation turned Afghanistan into lawlessness and anarchy. A bloody war started between the

Afghan regime in Kabul backed by the Soviet and the Afghan Mujahideen groups. The Mujahideen mostly controlled the countryside. Due to total insecurity, the Afghan refugees were unwilling to return to their country. Thats why, the tribal areas continued to be the home of millions of Afghan refugees as well as most of the Afghan commanders run their groups from the tribal region. It badly affected the tribal areas, further worsened security and law and order situation in the said area.

In the aftermath of withdrawal of Soviet forces, civil war broke out in Afghanistan. It was mainly fought among the southern Pashtun warlords, which deteriorated the situation and jeopardized the socio- political system in Afghanistan. Najibullah made a number of changes immediately in the aftermath of the

Soviet withdrawal. First of all, he held elections to the National Assembly-Mili Shuro, Wolasi Jirga

(lower house) and Masharano Jirga (upper house). He invited Mujahideen leaders also to participate in elections but they refused. All seats were filled except a few were placed vacant to be filled in future by

224 Sheikh Alik Tareen, “The Road to a Settlement: Afghanistan in Gorbacheve’s Foreign Policy”, Journal of European Studies, January, 1990, 30.

225 The Muslim, Islamabad: April 11, 1988.

74 the mujahideen. But in spite of all his efforts to calm the resistance against his government, nothing improved.226

The mujahideen continued their resistance struggle till the establishment of an Islamic government and refused any settlement with the Najib’s regime. In fact different factions of Mujahideen agreed to establish an Afghan interim government in Pakistan. So, they all agreed upon a formula and an interim government was established by seven different factions based in Pakistan.227 Mujadaddi became the head of the Interim Government and Abdul Rab Rasul sayyaf the Prime Minister.

Failure of Najib and especially of the Mujahideen government led to the rise of Taliban (a

Pashtun majority religious movement) in Afghanistan who were nurtured in the religious Madaris in

Pakistan. Taliban were expected to ensure the security of Afghanistan and to stop the civil war.228 Kabul fell into the hands of the Taliban on 27 September 1996. The Taliban government in Afghanistan was supported by Pakistan with the hope to turn it into a pro-Pakistan for achieving its economic and geostrategic goals.229 Pakistan considered Taliban the most reliable pro-Pakistan elements. That’s why,

Pakistan provided all type of assistance to the Taliban, and thus more than 12,000 recruits had joined them by the end of 1994.230 Pakistan provided heavy assistance in terms of arms, men and ammunition.

By late 1997 a huge number of recruits from the training camps and religious madrassas joined the

Taliban.231 These organizations were channels between the Arab and Pakistani Islamists and the eastern

226 Ayaz Naseem, “The Afghan episode: A Study in Soviet Threat Perceptions”, Central Asia, No. 24, summer 1989, 60.

227 The Frontier Post, Peshawar, April 15, 1992.

228 John Burns, “New Afghan Force Takes Hold, Turning to Peace”, The New York Times, February 16, 1995, 3.

229 Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, 201.

230 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London and New York: I.B. Tauris and Company, 2000), 29.

231 Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, 204.

Afghan Pakhtuns

At the time of Soviet withdrawal, the administrative setup of the Pashtun areas remained unaffected. The validity of Durand Line and non-administration of the Pashtun areas in the north-western frontier were maintained by Pakistan. But economically, demographically and socially everything changed. The Afghan Jihad not only disrupted the social insularity of the tribal region but also transformed it into the hub of arms and heroine industry. The socio-political containment and economic control of the region was abandoned by the Pakistani government for strategic reasons. Wealth increased in the region over night though, remained in the hands of a few.

Before the incident of 9/11 2001, the groups of Taliban in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the al-Qaida had united into one unit. They had become one block with little differences of key objectives.

Pakistan set up 900 check posts and stationed more than 100,000 troops to guard the porous Pak-

Afghan border. Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has put pressure on Pakistan to do more for eliminating the al-Qaida network in the tribal region of Pakistan. In response, one division army was deployed in Kurram and Khyber Agencies in June 2002 to block al-Qaida and other terrorists crossing the border to Pakistan. But in spite of this, terrorists were successful in gaining a significant foothold in the tribal region, especially in South and North Waziristan Agencies. The Pakistani army undertook all type of tactics-search-and-destroy missions to dismantle the terrorist networks. However, it was clear in 2008 that most of the top militant commanders grew and spread in FATA and KP.

The role of Army had a negative impact on the system of administration in the tribal areas.232 The

Army superseded the Governor KP, who, according to the constitution of Pakistan 1973, is the

President’s agent for the tribal region in administrative and policy matters. The role and authority of the

232 Aamer Ahmed Khan, “Pakistan Fights Its Own Taliban,” BBC News (Online), http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/southasia/4779476.stm, (accessed January 6, 2014).

Political Agent, the governor’s agent, was minimized. In addition, the military did not have knowledge of the tribal dynamics that exacerbated the problem. The military used stick rather than the diplomacy that a political agent normally used to attain his objectives. The sidelining of the political agent disturbed the whole structure of collective responsibility used for maintaining control in tribal region when it was needed the most. When the tribal system of control weakened, it provided space for the religious elements in FATA to extend their support to the Taliban to take over control. Similarly, the nature of the tribal areas also provided space for the foreign militants to mushroom there.

The stick policy adopted by the military undermined their local standing and alienated the locals.

The use of peaceful means to neutralize, contain and unarm the militants should have taken precedence over the use of force.233

Some of the tribal areas presented a replication of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan since the retreat of al-Qaida from Afghanistan in 2001. It has become the breeding ground of Islamist militants who undertook fresh operations from here and gradually imposed their writ on the tribal region. By 2007 the militants had become so powerful that they expanded their will and field of operation to the settled districts of Nowshera, Charsadda, Mardan, Swat, Dir, Kohistan, Tank, D.I Khan, Bannu, Lakki, Kohat and Peshawar. Inspired by the Taliban, the local clerics tried to imitate Taliban-style rule.234 The success of the Taliban in the tribal areas attracted banned militant groups like the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM),

Sipah-e-Suhaba and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).235 A large number of militants from all over the country

233 Interview quoted in International Crisis Group Asia Report, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” December 11, 2006, 11.

234 Qudsia Akhlaque, “Militants Find New Sanctuaries,” Dawn, December 11, 2004. See also Behroz Khan, “Militants Move Out of Troubled North Waziristan Areas,” The News, March 15, 2005; and Anwarullah Khan, “Regular Troops Deployed on Bajaur Border,” Nation, April 17, 2006.

235 International Crisis Group interview, Sailab Mehsud, Dera Ismail Khan, May 15, 2006. The Jaishe Mohammad is a Deobandi Jihadi group, operating mainly in Indian-administered Kashmir, which draws its manpower from Sipahe Sahaba, the radical Sunni extremist organisation, and JUI Madrassas. The Sipah and other radical sectarian organisations, many banned by the Musharraf government, have gained a foothold in parts of FATA, such as 77 started their journey to the tribal areas especially Waziristan.236 Corrupt administration and strange laws in addition to fear of the militants played its due role in the people’s acceptance of Taliban-style rule. The ability of the Taliban to prosecute criminals, restore order and provision of speedy justice was welcomed by many tribesmen who were fed up with insecurity and violence.237 The three agencies of North

Waziristan, South Waziristan and Bajaur were heavily targeted by Pakistani and allied forces, including

US drones from Afghanistan. It led to the rise of hatred among the tribesmen against the Pakistani and the

US and ISAF forces which stimulated the rise of militancy in the tribal areas. The tribesmen characterized the Pak army’s operation in the tribal region as “Washington’s war”. This situation created space for al-

Qaida to shift its emphasis to the tribal areas and KP in Pakistan. It provided them safe havens for conducting their militant activities in Afghanistan which ultimately increased the rate of radicalization of

Pakistani society particularly in the tribal areas.

Before the incident of 9/11, al-Qaida, Taliban and Kashmir Jihadi groups were being trained in the training camps in Afghanistan. Al-Qaida supported both the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Kashmiri

Jihadist groups materially and in human resource during the Afghan Jihad. So, it is no surprise that close linkage exist between the Taliban and the Kashmiri Jihadists238 which embarrassed the Pakistan establishment. It has also come to the notice that Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Sipah-e-Suhaba and

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) cadres, mostly belong to Punjab, are operating in Swat, Mohmand and Waziristan

Agency as well. They have extended their influence to the war zones in FATA, KP, Pashtun areas of

Baluchistan and eastern Afghanistan, and now even to Punjab where suicide bombings have increased as well.

Khyber and Orakzai agencies, and even in NWFP’s settled areas. See International Crisis Group Report, “The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan”, April 18, 2005.

236 International Crisis Group interview, Rahimullah Yousafzai, 9.

237 See interview of agency official from South Waziristan in International Crisis Group Asia Report, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants”, December 11, 2006, 13.

238 Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia, 88.

The use of force against the militants further strengthened the ranks of the militants. The reality is that as much as the use of military force was increased, it resulted in the growth of militancy.239 When it was realized that force was not the solution of the issue, both the federal and provincial governments resorted to peace talks with the militants. The political parties also realized as a political compulsion to end the hostilities. So, the government signed agreements with local militants in both South and North

Waziristan agencies in order to split the Islamists and get the better results. It led to achieve some success in 2003 and 2006 in Waziristan but not in the long run.

The Pakistan army launched the operation Rah-e-Nijat (Path to Salvation) to eliminate the militants in South Waziristan Agency on June 19, 2009;240 and subsequently on October 17, 2009. South

Waziristan was blockaded for three months and after small skirmishes with militants, the Pakistani military leadership finally launched a military operation in South Waziristan to eliminate extremism and terrorism.241 Pakistani officials declared the impending clash as "the mother of all battle". The army had to face a heavily entrenched force of 6,000–7,000 militants, including the foreign Uzbek, Chechan and

Arab militants and the local Taliban affiliated with al-Qaida.242 On 12 December 2009 the process was completed and the army had resumed control in most of the areas of the South Waziristan.243 Though most of the militants and their leaders survived by hiding in the remote mountainous and forested areas of

South Waziristan or to other parts of the tribal regions yet the operation deprived the Taliban of its centre of gravity in South Waziristan Agency and made its leadership scattered. The same type of tactics were applied in the recent bombardment in North Waziristan Agency in May-June 2014. The military and civil

239 Khalid Aziz, “Has Waziristan stabilized?,” The News, June 7, 2008.

240 “Troops Make Gains in Swat and South Waziristan,” Dawn, June 21, 2009.

241 Syed Irfan Raza, “Waziristan Operation Given Go-ahead,” Dawn, October 17, 2009.

242 Ismail Khan, “Battle for Waziristan Looms,” Dawn, October 2, 2009.

243 “Pakistan Anti-Taliban Offensive in S. Waziristan Over”, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8409486.stm (accessed January 10, 2014).

79 bureaucracy was claiming that the operation would soon uproot the militant bases and peace would restore.244 Yet, the operation in South and North Waziristan Agencies is unlikely to succeed in curbing the spread and rise of militancy in the tribal areas, until and unless political reforms are implemented there.

The foreign agencies played their due role in the ongoing insurgency in FATA as well. The

Pakistani intelligence agencies have found evidences of foreign actors creating anarchy in the region. The foreign elements were providing militants with financial, equipment, arms, and technical assistance.245

The Pakistani agencies have recovered a large number of arms and ammunition, literature, medical equipment and medicines from Sherawangi (name of a place) in South Waziristan Agency.246

The relationship between Taliban and Pakistan was a symbiotic/Pattern-Client relationship since long. This symbiotic relationship between the Taliban and the Pakistani establishment continued until

9/11 and afterwards. But this relationship got a setback when the Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin

Laden and his followers to the US. The request was considered against their tradition of asylum to the guest. The Taliban leader, Mullah Umar and other high ups of the Taliban government sought for proof to be given about al-Qaida involvement in the incident of 9/11 and further more that the trial to be held in

Afghanistan according to their own law of Sharia. “It is an issue of faith not to hand over Osama bin

Laden”, Mullah Abdus Salam Zaeef commented.247 Some of the analysts were of the opinion that the support of the Taliban to Bin Laden was due to material benefits. Michael Rubin commented that the

Taliban’s support for Bin Laden and his friends was for material purpose and not due to their tradition of

244 Akbar Mayo, “Operation Rah-e-Nijat and Beyond”, Frontier Post, October 22, 2009.

245 “Pakistan Has Evidence of Indian Involvement in Balochistan: FO”, Daily Times, January 10, 2006.

246 Rehman Malik, “Solid Evidences of Indian Involvement in Pak Provided to Foreign Office”, Nation, December 9, 2009.

247 Comments of Mullah Abdus Salam, Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan, Dawn, 19 October, 2001.

80 provision of asylum to foreigners.248 The Pashtuns particularly tribesmen enjoy freedom of interaction with their fellow Pashtuns across the border since the British Raj. It continued not only during the Soviet-

Afghan war but also during the Taliban rule and even after the US attack against the Taliban. At the same time, many Tajik, Arab, Chechen and Afghan militants migrated in large number into the tribal areas of

Pakistan, FATA.249 The process of Talibanization in Pakistan mainly began in 2004 and spread not only to the tribal regions of Bajaur, Orakzai, Mohmand, Kurram agencies but also got support even from the settled areas of Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Tank, Kohat, Buner and Swat.250

In fact, the conflict that kept FATA stewing has various ways to be explained but it is basically due to government’s policy of negligence towards the tribal region and its foreign policy especially vis-a- vis Afghanistan. It is important for the US to keep a close eye on the relationship between Islamabad and

Afghanistan. Pakistan’s strategic culture is traditionally inclined to dominate Afghanistan. Similarly,

Afghanistan takes stand opposite to Pakistan every time. Pakistani interests in the region dates back to the times before the Soviet occupation and in recent times Islamabad has been a determinant actor either supporting the Jihadists against USSR or promoting Taliban during the civil war in Afghanistan. It is need of the time that Afghanistan should mend its ways vis-a-vis Pakistan. It is important as well that the international community should assist Pakistan to crush the militancy. It is urgently needed to develop the areas to put FATA on the fast tract of peace and prosperity like other parts of the country. The old and obsolete black laws of Frontier Crimes Regulations need to be repealed and equal national laws must be enforced into the region. The region needs to be economically prosperous and equal educational opportunities should be provided. The foreign players need to pay due heed to the development of the

248 Michael Rubin, “Who is Responsible for the Taliban”? Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 6, no.1, 2002, 10, http://www.michaelrubin.org/1220/who-is-responsible-for-the-taliban (accessed on September 5, 2013).

249 Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia, 31.

250 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “A Who’s Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province: Part One— North and South Waziristan”, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, September 22, 2008, (online), (accessed on September 5, 2014).

81 tribal region. The tribal region needs humanitarian strategies to alleviate poverty and illiteracy so that to prevent the tribal areas from being used by terrorist, extremist and fundamentalist groups.

The current chapter tries to show the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan and its impact on the tribal belt. It equally tries to show how the situation in Afghanistan since long ago has impacted the Pashtuns of FATA. Similarly, it digs out the facts as to why the government of Pakistan showed no concern with the rise of militancy among the Pashtuns of FATA in the initial stages and what policy measures were adopted by the government to counter militancy in FATA.

Chapter-4

Causes for the Rise of Militancy in FATA: An Application of Path-Dependency and Relative

Deprivation Theories

In this chapter, the causes for the rise of militancy in FATA has been analysed by using Paul Pierson

Theory of ‘Path Dependency’ and Ted Robert Gurr’s Theory of ‘Relative Deprivation’. The theory of

‘Path Dependency’, particularly its two main components i.e. ‘history matters’ and ‘increasing returns’, is used here to dig out the hidden causes for the militant and extremist activities in the tribal region.251

Path Dependence theory became famous in 1980s as a form of investigation. It is largely applied to the field of law and economics, and is evenly applied now to other disciplines of life as well.252 It is used in the sense that "history matters”, which simply means that the present situation is the result of what we have done in the past. More fashionably, it is argued that "the capital stock is path dependent". Though it is hard to give a single definition to the approach yet it is often argued that it suits the area under focus.

The theory of path dependency emphasizes the point that as a result of decisions taken and choices made in the past certain established paths become behavioral standards for institutions of the state structure. After long usage of these established paths, they are institutionalized then.253 Thus, they can not easily be pulled back from the selected paths as it involves a high cost.254 So, the theory emphasizes the influence of the past on the emergence of a certain way/path.

251Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, 2000, 251-267.

252Martin Stack & P Myles Gartland, “Path Creation, Path Dependency, and Alternative Theories of the Firm”, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2003, 487-494. See also Pierson, “Increasing Returns”, 251-267.

253Gerard Alexander, “Institutions, Path Dependence and Democratic Consolidation”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Sage Publications California, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2001, 249-70. See also Mota Mariana Prado & J Michael Trebilock, “Development and the Dynamics of Institutional Reform”, Legal Studies Research Series, No. 09-04, 2009, University of Toronto Law Journal.

254Pierson, “Increasing Returns”.

To give up an established path is very difficult and expensive. The paths once chosen cannot be ceased out completely but can be modified as expressed by Paul Pierson.255 He cites a prominent example that makes the theory stand out, namely the continued use of the ‘QWERTY’ keyboard. After naming the first six keys on the left, the 'QWERTY' keyboard has come to be recognized as the standard computer keyboard,256 not because of its performance or ease of use, but because it is the first standard and has become institutionalized.257 So, the path dependence theory tells that despite the creation of more advanced keyboards, it cannot be easily replaced.258

The path dependency approach, according to Pierson, has broad and narrow concepts. According to the broader view, history has superior power and influence over the present. The institutions, according to the narrow view, are self-reinforcing.259 The concept of path dependence rests on two important beliefs.

When it comes to dependency approach, both of its facets are related to the problems in FATA because its origin lies in history. They are a result of relying on the past (i.e. policies, institutions,

255 Paul Pierson, “When Effects Become Cause: Policy Feedback And Political Change”, World Politics, Vol. 45, 1993, 595-628.

256 Taylor Boas, “Conceptualizing Continuity and Change, The Composite- Standard Model of Path Dependence”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2007, 33-54.

257Paul A. David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 75, 1985.

258 Ibid.

259Paul Pierson, Politics in time: history, institutions, and social analysis (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004).

260B. Arthur, “Urban systems and historical path dependence”, in ed. J. Ausubel and R. Herman, Cities and their Vital Systems: Infrastructure, Past, Present and Future, (Washington: National Academy Press, 1988).

84 principles of governance), and are therefore unable to diverge from chosen paths. 261 This is because successive governments in Pakistan have tread the same path the British did by exercising the same economic, social and political systems of administration.

While analyzing the causes of militancy in FATA, there is another aspect that needs to be taken into account. As a result of modernization all over the world, uneven levels of development exist. Sharing of benefits among different ethnic groups and discrimination in terms of development creates disequilibrium in a society. According to Ted Robert Gurr, in this situation, under privileged ethnic groups may develop a perception of relative deprivation.262 Gurr has published the essence of his doctrine in his book Why

Men Rebel (1970) wherein he emphasized the importance of socio-psychological factors, relative deprivation, and ideology as the root causes of rebellion. He propounded the ‘Relative Deprivation’ theory (psychological frustration-aggression theory) which argues that the primary source of the human capacity for violence is the frustration-aggression mechanism. Schaefer defines it as "the conscious experience of a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and present actualities”.263

Frustration does not necessarily lead to violence, Gurr says, but when it is sufficiently prolonged and sharply felt, it often does result in anger and eventually lead to violence and extremist activities.264 It equally qualifies for the region of FATA because the tribesmen feel frustration for their neglect on the part of the successive governments of Pakistan since its inception in all fields of life.

Path Dependence and Relative Deprivation Theories and FATA

261 Margaret Levi, “A Model, a Method and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis”, ed. Mark I. Lichbach and Allan S. Zuckerman, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 19-41.

262 F. Ahmad, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 68-72. See also Ayesha Shehzad, “The Issue of Ethnicity in Pakistan: Historical Background”, Pakistan Vision Vol. 12 No. 2,126-127.

263Richard T. Schaefer, Racial and Ethnic Groups 11th Ed. (Pearson Education, 2008), 69.

264Ted Robert Gurr, “Why Men Rebel”, Review by Charles Tilly in Journal of Social History Vol. 4, No. 4, Summer, 1971, 416-420 (accessed on Jstor March 20, 2013).

According to dependency approach, decisions are influenced by choices made in the past that Pierson calls ‘history matters’.265 He asserts that placing politics in time and focusing on moving pictures instead of snapshots greatly enhances our comprehension of complex social dynamics. Unfortunately, policies are mostly made and applied regarding any given situation or area without regard to their history and the consequences of those very decisions in future.

From the above point of view, lets take FATA as an example. FATA was once a relatively stable and peaceful region, but it turned into what the U.S. administration has labeled as ‘one of the world’s most dangerous areas’.266 But the shift and transition did not happen overnight. FATA's deprivation and instability may have a variety of reasons. The tribal region has not been integrated and has been neglected for decades by the Pakistani State. There has been a lack of economic, social and political development. The apathy of Pakistan to the events occurring in the remote and relatively unstable Afghanistan; apathy of the international community and, even, the tribals themselves; and now the arrival of United States in

Afghanistan, are all major causes for instability in FATA. By applying the path dependence and relative deprivation approaches, it can be easily figured out why FATA is the way that it is and why its people have been so prone to rebellious and extremist elements.

The above two approaches rightly point out the need to look at the causes behind the unrest in

FATA as implanted in history and its repercussion in the form of sense of deprivation. After the inception of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, the old and obsolete status and structure of FATA remained unchanged and it continued to operate even when it became part of Pakistan. At the beginning of the establishment of the state of Pakistan, the Quaid-i-Azam, being the first governor general of Pakistan, allowed the

265 Pierson, Politics in time: history, institutions, and social analysis.

266 Even MacAskill, “Barack Obama's war: focus on beating Taliban and al-Qaida”, The Guardian, 2009. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/28/barack-obama-foreign-policy- (accessed July 12, 2013).

86 tribesmen to live under the same administrative principles and structure with the same pre-existing concessions, royalties and special status as had existed during the Raj,267 but with the efforts to eventually integrate it with the mainstream of the country. The status of the tribal region was initially left intact with the hopes that with the passage of time and progress of the state, it would be integrated through political, economic and social development. But nothing changed and Pakistan still relies on the defunct and obsolete system of governance in FATA. This type of attitude with regard to the tribal region developed the sense of relative deprivation among the tribesmen and then they resorted to other means particularly extremist and militant activities.

Repressive Institutions and Laws Remained Intact

Five political agencies; Kurram, Khyber, Malankand, North Waziristan and South Waziristan were created by the British Raj. Soon after the inception of Pakistan, a Jirga of 200 Maliks of the tribal areas signed an allegiance of accession to Pakistan.268 A meeting held between the tribal Jirga and Quaid- i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah in April 1948 in which Jinnah assured them that Pakistan would respect and observe all those agreements which the British had concluded with the tribesmen and the same subsidies would be granted which were paid by the British to them.269 Afterwards, three more agencies were created by Pakistan and brought about territorial and geographical division of the area in the subsequent constitution of 1973 of Pakistan. Article 246 of the 1973 constitution divides the tribal areas

267M. Rafique Afzal, “Selected Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-AzamMohammad Ali Jinnah” (19ll-34 and 1947-48), Research Society of Pakistan (Lahore: University of the Punjab, 1966).

268A Report, “Understanding FATA: Attitudes towards Governance, Religion and Society in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas”, Vol. 4, Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme (CAMP), 57.

269 J. W. Spain, “Pakistan’s North West Frontier”, Middle East Journal, Vol.8, No. 1 (Winter, 1954), 30.

87 into Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA).

Presently FATA is comprised of six Frontier Regions (FRs) and seven political agencies. They are:270

S.No. Name of Political Agencies Name of Frontier Regions (FRs)

1. South Waziristan Agency Frontier Region of Tank

2. North Waziristan Agency Frontier Region of Dera Ismail Khan

3. Orakzai Agency Frontier Region of Lakki

4. Khyber Agency Frontier Region of Bannu

5. Kurram Agency Frontier Region of Kohat

6. Mohmand Agency Frontier Region of Peshawar

7. Bajaur Agency

So, the government of Pakistan made some territorial and geographical changes by creating three more agencies that are Orakzai, Bajaur and Mohmand agencies. The agency of Mohmand was created out of adjacent tribal area of Peshawar in 1951. Similarly, Bajaur agency was detached from Malakand

Agency in 1973 and the same year the agency of Orakzai was created.271 Though some administrative changes were made in the tribal areas but those were only of kind not of quality and it could not improve the plight of the tribesmen as the same draconian laws and repressive system of the British era was retained unchanged. Interestingly political system of the tribal area in the British era was based on the

‘Marchland Theory’. According to this theory, the administration of the tribal region was carried directly by the Central Government of British India, so as to handle the related strategic issues quickly. So, the

270 Ambassador (Retd) Humayun Khan, “The Role of the Federal Government and the Political Agent”, in Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Maqsudul Hasan Nuri ed., Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 104-105.

271 Dr. Azmat Hayat Khan, “FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan)”, in Cheema and Nuri ed., Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses, 88.

88 tribal area remained a discrete and separate part of India and an experimental laboratory in the imperial government and a training centre for colonial officers.272 The British adopted the short term policy of governance only to pacify the gateway to India and nothing more to adopt developmental program to improve the daily lives affairs of the tribesmen. The tribal region was bypassed and the blessings of better life and civilization were never fully extended to it.

As discussed earlier, the same black and oppressive colonial system in the tribal region was retained by Pakistan with the only change of masters and the external compulsions that proceeded after the British departure. The external outcomes after the British departure that got its roots are phobia of

Pakhtunistan, Indo-centrism and later on quest for strategic depth that necessitated to retain the same colonial system of administration to rule the tribesmen.273 It is why, FCR is still the anachronistic legal system in the tribal area and the head of an administrative unit there, Political Agent, is solely responsible to the central government. Literature on state repression proposes two models:274

In the first place, due to deficient political system repression is implied. It is that type of system in which law is not abided by both the ruling elites and citizens. Here the choices become limited and the decision makers resort to surveillance, torture, ban, harassment and large scale killing in the jurisdiction of their territory. Such type of situation was in vogue in Pakistan from 1950 to 1970. Secondly, the ruling elites and the stake-holders always think about the cost and benefit of the state subjugation and repression. If the outcome of subjugation and repression is more than its costs than it is applied against its own citizens. So, this kind of repression in Pakistan is evident since 1970s.

272Spain, “Pakistan’s North West Frontier”, 28.

273 Ross Masood Hussain, “Federally Administered Areas (FATA): A Modern-day Anachronism?” Journal of Political Studies, 72.

274Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order”, Annual Political Science, Vol. 10, 9, 2007.http://indicatorsinfo.pbworks.com/f/Davenport+Political+Order.pdf (accessed July 13, 2014).

Thus, history matters. The tribal areas have been treated badly. Now Paul Pierson theory can be equally applied. From the above discussion, both of the models; cost-benefit analyses of repression and deficiency of the political system are applicable to FATA as well.275 Careful study of history of events and systems in the tribal region shows that the odd policies that were implemented in FATA benefited the ruling elites of the state. In fact, the tribal region has been used as a tool since the inception of Pakistan for the promotion of state security. For the said purpose the government of Pakistan retained an entrenched policy of subjugation and repression of arrest, torture, surveillance, harassment, blockade, banning political organizations and assembly, seizure of others property and collective responsibility of tribes in the tribal areas and so on and so forth. Besides Pierson’s theory, here Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation qualifies equally to be applied in FATA. Due to an application of repression policy in the tribal region, it leads to the sense of deprivation among the tribesmen as well who then resort to militant and extremist activities because they see no other option. So, Ted Robert Gurr is right who propounded that relative deprivation leads to rebellion and alternate ways as is the case in FATA.

Status of Tribal Areas in Pakistan’s Political System & Militancy

The tribesmen of the FATA have been subjected to structural subjugation and repression since the rule of British raj. This type of repression and subjugation has been retained by the government of

Pakistan since its inception to achieve its foreign policy goals and to keep the region as a black hole as well. Harassment, arrest without any evidence, blockade and ban of political organizations and assembly were sanctioned in the tribal area. The system of political administration as well as Federal laws, FCR, constitutes structural subjugation and repression in FATA. Here both of the theory of ‘history matters’ and ‘relative deprivation’ equally stands for the said situation in FATA. Thus, the tribal region has been

275Zamin Khan, “Fata: from Turbulent Frontier to Safe Heaven” (M.Phil thesis (n.p), Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, 2012), 56.

90 alienated historically from the mainstream country and still the same situation is prevailing there. The tribesmen have been and are treated as aliens. It creates the sense of relative deprivation among the tribesmen which ultimately results in rebellion in the form of extremist and militant activities.

Repressive Federal Laws

After independence, the same type of colonial legacy of political arrangements with the tribesmen was retained by the state of Pakistan. Governor of the province of NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) was the administrative head of the tribal area, who was responsible to the Governor-General of Pakistan.

After the promulgation of the first constitution of Pakistan in 1956, however, complications sprang out.

Several petitions were registered in the courts of Pakistan against FCR like Toti Khan versus DM, Dosso versus state (PLD 1957, Quetta 9), etc. because laws of FCR were repugnant to fundamental rights as mentioned in the constitution.276 The constitutions of 1956 and 1962 looked as they were not meant for tribesmen. The colonial status of the tribal areas and political administration under FCR was left unchanged and retained in both of the constitutions of 1956 and 1962.277

Likewise in the 1973 constitution, unfortunately, this time too, the same type of system in the tribal region was retained as before. Though, the nomenclature of the tribal area, indeed, was changed from Tribal Areas to Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) yet the rest of the colonial system in relation to tribal areas remained unchanged. In Article 1 of the 1973 constitution, FATA is called an integral part of Pakistan. Article 246 divides the tribal areas into Provincially Administered Tribal Areas

276 Ibid.

277Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Peshawar Chapter, “FCR: A bad Law Nobody can Defend”, 59. http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/FCR%20Report.pdf (accessed on July 19, 2013).

(PATA) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).278 In the following articles and sections of

1973 constitution, the repressive order in FATA have been sustained and perpetuated:

In spite of being clearly mentioned in Article 8 of the 1973 constitution that any law or custom repugnant to the fundamental rights should be declared null and vide. But most of the sections of FCR are discrepant with the fundamental rights as mentioned in Articles 4, 9, 10, 13, 14, 24 and 25 of the constitution of 1973 of Pakistan.279 On the contrary, FCR is applicable still in FATA in spite of the fact that the tribal region is an integral part of Pakistan as mentioned in Article 1 of the constitution of 1973.

In the same way, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Court of Pakistan is restricted to the tribal area in Article 247 (7) of the same constitution. No petition can be registered against Fundamental rights violation in these courts.280 Both the judicial as well as executive powers are exercised by the political agent which is a clear violation of the spirit of Article 175 of the constitution which separates the two branches of government, executive and judiciary.281 No act or law passed in the parliament of the state can be extended to the ill-fated tribal areas.282 However, it is still an integral part of Pakistan.

Similarly, the constitution of 1973 of Pakistan withheld political rights to the tribesmen to take part freely in political activities. The adult franchise, even, was extended to FATA after 49 years in 1996.

Earlier, only selected Maliks had the right to vote. Before 2011, political parties were banned to hold political activities in the tribal area. Elections were held in FATA on non-party basis. After election, different parties particularly those with majority seats used to buy the loyalties of MNAs from FATA.283

278Humayun Khan, “The Role of the Federal Government and the Political Agent”, 104-105.

279Khadim Hussain, “The FCR Controversy”, Dawn, April 14, 2008.

280 Asia Report, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants”, 8.

281 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, “FCR: A bad Law Nobody can Defend”, 4.

282 Asia Report, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants”, 4.

283 Khan, “Fata: from Turbulent Frontier to Safe Heaven”, 59.

These MNAs from FATA present a paradox incarnate. They speak for the issues meant for nation but they are indifferent to the matters related to their communities and constituencies.284 So, in line with Paul

Pierson theory which states that ‘History Matters’, the region of FATA has been maltreated both in federal laws and the constitutions of Pakistan. The area has been treated just as stepmother and step sons even in the laws of the country. It is due to this factor the tribesmen feel deprivation which leads to rebellion. The incident of 9/11 proved to be an immediate factor that gave an impetus to militancy because the sense of deprivation was already prevailing there.

FATA and the Anachronistic Frontier Crimes Regulations

The legal system of Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) of the British period was retained by

Pakistan, even without making any modifications in its punitive clauses to make it human for their own people, the tribesmen. FCR was promulgated by British in 1901, often referred to as ‘black law’, which comprised of seven chapters and sixty four sections. The British government adopted these strange laws in the tribal region to cater to their own interests in the area.285 Some sections of the FCR are quoted which express the height of state subjugation and repression:286 In the first place, the British dubbed the

Baluchs and Pashtuns as barbarous and uncivilized creature which required harsh treatment which is nonsense and negation of the principle of rule of law-equality of all before law. They dubbed the Pashtuns

284Asia Report, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants”, 106.

285Maira Hayat, “Still ‘taming the turbulent frontier’? The State in the Federally Areas of Pakistan”, JASO-online N.S. Vol. I, no. 2, Winter, 2009, 186.

286 Khalid Aziz, “the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) and Administration of the Tribal Area of Pakistan”, in Cheema and Nuri ed., Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses, 124-125.

93 in the pages of history as dacoits, killers and un-social, and had tried to frighten the Indians with their wilderness.287

Section 21 of FCR confers dictatorial powers on the Political Agent by which he can arrest a person or a whole tribe and can confiscate their property as well. He can also restrict inter-tribes communications and interactions among tribes or persons. For using such type of powers, no evidences and proofs are needed.288 Similarly, under section 29 the state entity can arrest and imprison a person for five years on suspicion alone. In the same way, section 32 of the FCR empowers the Political Agent to dislocate a village. Surprisingly and astonishingly, under section 38 (4) the Political Administration can cause a death of a person. Lastly and more amazingly, section 40 empowers the Political Agent who can ask a tribe or person for provision of security bond for good conduct. If their surety bond does not satisfy the Political Agent, he then can use his dictatorial powers to arrest a person or tribe for three years and that can be extended to another three years.

FCR and Federal laws provide legal base for the dictatorial political system in the tribal region.

Under Article 247 (7) of 1973 constitution the Supreme Court and High courts of Pakistan are restricted to exercise their jurisdiction in the tribal region. As mentioned earlier, FCR confers both the judicial as well as executive authority on the political administration in the tribal area. Both civil and criminal cases are decided through a Jirga which is constituted for the said purpose. The Jirga is constituted by the

Political Agent but he is above it and its decisions are not binding upon him. An appeal can be made against the decision of the Political Agent to the Commissioner; however the Commissioner has no authority to declare null and vide the decision of Political Agent. In addition, the decision of

287Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, Vol. 1 (Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1979), 14-15.

288 A Report, “Understanding FATA”, 57.

Commissioner could be revised in a Tribunal, comprised of Secretary Law and Secretary Home departments of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.289

Under Section 40 of FCR, Collective responsibility runs parallel to the Article 8 of 1973

Constitution which is considered an anomaly in the modern world. Under the purview of collective responsibility, a person can be arrested and imprisoned by the respective political administration for any crime committed by his family member, villager or even his tribesman. In spite of the fact that FCR is a total negation of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, yet it remains in practice as it was in the British period.290 Malik Gohar Ayub told that FCR is the root of all evils. There is need to remove it completely from the tribal region but the government of Pakistan is silent to bring an end to or bring about significant changes in the FCR.291 On the other hand, Malik Niamat Ullah appreciated FCR that it was devised according to the temperament of the tribesmen. The problem is that the government of Pakistan has distorted it. It is never allowed to the fullest recently.292

The then President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari brought about some major changes in August 2011 in the infamous laws of FCR.293 For the first time Political Parties Order 2002 was extended to the tribal areas. In the same amendment, a Tribunal was constituted to hear appeals against the decisions of

289Khan, “FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan)”, 99.

290 See Pakistan’s Constitution of 1973.

291 Malik Gohar Ayub, Interview by the Author, FR Bannu, Dated 30-01-2015. Malik Gohar is the chief of Tori Khel Wazir, North Waziristan Agency.

292 Malik Niamat Ullah, Interview by the author, South Waziristan Agency (SWA), Dated: 31-01-2015. Malik Niamat Ullah is the brother of (Late) Senator Malik Faridullah (Hilal-i-Imtiaz) and Chief of AspirkaWazir, Shakai South Waziristan Agency. It’s the most renowned family in SWA and their lineage can be traced back to Malik Sowhan Khan, the then Malik in Mughal and Sikh rule. To see the lineage of their family maliks see Sir Olaf Caroe, The Pathan, Trans. Syed Mahboob Ali (Urdu) (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, July, 1967), 367. Also see Major Herbert B. Edward, CB, A Year on the Punjab Frontier Vol. I (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1851), 40.

293Nasir Iqbal, “Major Changes Made in FCR: FATA People Get Political Rights”, Dawn, August 13, 2011. http://www.dawn.com/2011/08/13/major-changes-made-in-fcr-fata-people-get-political-rights.html(13/08/2011) (accessed July 13, 2014).

Political Administration. In addition, some inconsequent changes have been brought in some sections of

FCR dealing with collective responsibility. In the amendment clause, men and women above sixty five years of age and children below sixteen years of age are exempted to be arrested. The powers of Political

Administration to confiscate the property were curtailed. In fine, the FCR is still a black and notorious law. The government is not willing to scrape it out completely and extend the common law that is applicable in the rest of the country. So, history matters. No one can say that such type of treatment with the tribesmen will not lead to frustration. The choices with the tribesmen are limited. They will be either exploited by terrorist and militant groups and organizations or they will resort to unlawful activities.

Maliki and Khassadari Systems

The common tribesmen have no direct say in the political affairs in the tribal areas. They are represented by a representative class called maliks in the area. They form the influential segment of the tribal society.

They are legitimized by the unpopular FCR. The maliksand other elders of the tribes are given handsome allowances and subsidies (muwajib). In the same way, the khassadar force, a local levy, was established in the British era for the purpose of policing the area which is still operating. Only the khassadars and not the army or militia could directly deal with the tribes and go to the villages for summons, etc. The

Khasaadars were recruited by the British in the later years of nineteenth and early twentieth century as a tribal police. The Khassadars are employed on basis of nikat (fixed share of a tribe in loss and gain).294

Thus Maliks are the privileged class in the tribal areas while the Khassadars form the base of the political system there. The Khassadari system was established in the tribal areas by the New Order of Lord

Curzon due to which regular military was withdrawn from the tribal areas in 1899 and 1901.295

294Khan, “FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan)”, 96. See also Teepu Mahabat Khan, The Land of Khyber, ed. Prof. Dr Qabil Khan (Peshawar: Uzbek Publishers, 2001), 41.

295Sarfraz Khan, “Special Status of the Tribal Areas”, 67.

The roots of Khassadari and Maliki systems can be traced back to the forward policy. Richard

Bruce, Commissioner of the Derajjat appointed a few influential pro-government and pro-administration elders from amongst the tribesmen as their Maliks for the purpose to exercise strong hold and influence over their tribes, on the footstep of Sandeman system which proved successful in Balochistan. These maliks worked as intermediaries between the administration and their tribes. The British administration extended patronage and allowances to the Maliks. The purpose of this policy was to control the common tribesmen through these people, the maliks. But this type of policy failed as the tribes on this part of the frontier were much different and more egalitarian in nature as compared to the Baloch tribes.296Maliki is hereditary and devolves to the son and his son, and so on.297 When Merk succeeded Bruce, he introduced an anti-thesis of Maliki system with more egalitarian model of Tuman. The Tuman system discouraged the system of paying allowances to selective figures but instead they were paid to the whole tribe and an equal status and weightage was given to the voices of every tribesman to take part in public deliberations.

This system had also some flaws and it became a difficult job to manage and give due head to such a huge gathering of tribesmen. However, when Johnston succeeded Merk, he synthesized and modified Bruce and Merk’s systems.298 In the Johnston’s system, the privileges of Maliks’ were retained and jobs were given to a common tribesman in the Khassadari system.

Pakistan complied with the given system and retained the same exploitative and undemocratic structure undisturbed. FCR, Khassadari and Maliki systems are still in practice in the tribal areas of

Pakistan despite the departure of its architect some sixty seven years ago. The policy makers have never made a serious attempt to change the fate of the area by even modifying the existing undemocratic laws and institutions on the plea that altering the mentioned bring chaos and open a Pandora box. The

296 R. O. Christensen, “Tradition and Change on the North-West Frontier”, Modern Asian Studies, Cambridge Univ. Press, London Vol. 16,No. 1 1982, 161.

297Khan, The Land of Khyber, 74-75. See also David Montgomery Hart, Guardians of the Khaibar Pass: The Sociological Organization and History of the Afridis of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1985), 77.

298Caroe, ThePathans, 403.

97 maltreatment of the tribesmen since developed the sense of deprivation among the tribesmen. They have no other option but resort to militant activities to make catharsis. So, the system of maliki and khassadari plays its due role in the rise of militant and extremist activities in the tribal region as well.

Encouraging Tribesmen to Fight Kashmir Jihad

Soon after independence of Pakistan and India, the Kashmir war broke out between them over the issue of amalgamation of the state of Kashmir. The tribesmen were encouraged who fiercely responded to the

Indian occupation of Kashmir and actively engaged in the war against India. Besides others, the Afridis,

Bajauris, Mehsuds and Wazirs from the tribal areas put their lives at stake for the unity and integrity of

Pakistan.299 Definitely, the tribesmen had no knowledge of the political and strategic implication of their participation in Kashmir. Basically two opinions and explanations are presented to their involvement in

Kashmir Jihad. One group of people had strong belief that the move of the tribesmen to Kashmir was due to their inborn tilt for Jihad and the long catered inclination for warfare and jihad. It was due to this reason that tribesmen both from eastern and western side of the Durand Line300 thronged and participated

299 Sana Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), 194.

300The Durand Line refers to the 2,640 kilometers (1,640 mi) long porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was established after an agreement in 1893 between Mortimer Durand of British India and Afghan ruler, Amir Adur Rahman Khan for fixing the limit of their respective sphere of influence as well as improving diplomatic relations. It is named after Mortimer Durand, a British diplomat and civil servant of colonial British India. Afghanistan was considered by the British as an independent princely state at the time, although the British controlled its foreign affairs and diplomatic relations. The single-page agreement which contains seven short articles was signed by Durand and Abdur Rahman Khan, agreeing not to exercise interference beyond the frontier Durand Line. When Pakistan became an independent state in 1947, it declared the line its international border with Afghanistan. Successive Afghan governments rejected this position, even though some of Afghanistan's actions have constituted de facto recognition of the line. Making the situation more complex is the existence of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) within the Northwest Frontier Province. These areas remain outside the direct control of Pakistan's national government and its residents cross the border without restriction. The deployment of international troops to Afghanistan in 2001 gave this old bilateral dispute a significant international dimension. The FATA region, long the major transit route for large-scale smuggling operations from Afghan territory into Pakistan, became a safe haven for Al Qaeda leaders and a base for the Taliban to conduct cross-border attacks on Afghanistan. Disputes over who has responsibility for dealing with these Al Qaeda and Taliban forces have soured relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and heightened their mutual distrust. Because the insurgents believe they will not be pursued or attacked across an international 98 in the Kashmir war against India.301 However, the fact is on the other side. The government of Pakistan whetted and encouraged their appetite for Jihad. It was openly confessed by the then Chief Minister of

NWFP that it was him, who had encouraged the tribal raider in January, 1948.302 Generally one understand and reach to the conclusion by analyzing Pakistan’s both national and foreign policy that violent non-state actors were the basic tools of its policy and they were kept to be used at when the need arise. Since independence, Pakistan used and encouraged such violent non-state elements to settle scores with neigbouring states particularly India and Afghanistan. And this stance was evident and manifested by sending and supporting the violent tribal lashkar to Kashmir to settle score with India in 1947-1948.303

Spain’s version was also supported by the local account and both of the views had striking similarities.

Badam Khan Momand told that when Pakistan came into being, the fugitive criminals of the British days were still hotly pursued by the Pakistani authorities for their earlier wrongs done. But when the war of

Kashmir broke out, they were offered the choices either to face the music of punishment or to redeem their sins by going to the war of Kashmir. So, it became crystal clear and appealed to the mind that state machinery encouraged and mobalised the tribesmen to go to Kashmir for Jihad. He went further by saying that initially rounds (cartridges) were provided by the Pakistanis authorities but later on they were refused the rounds. Usually the religious mentors supported the move to Kashmir; yet, Faqir of Ipi on the contrary went against the tribal participation in Kashmir war. He openly declared that the Kashmir war

boundary, the line's status and location now has practical consequences for American and NATO troops deployed there. The executive summary of the conference held from July 11 to 13, 2007, the American Institute of Afghanistan Studies (AIAS) and the Hollings Center convened in Istanbul a private conference on the history, consequences, and future of the Durand Line, the contested border between Afghanistan and Pakistan which has become among the most important borders in the world. Participants included prominent scholars, policy analysts, and former senior government officials from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Europe, and the United States (Available online at www.bu.edu/aias/reports/durand_conference.pdf. (accessed July 14, 2014).

301 James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland (Hague: Mouton & Co. Publishers, 1963), 209.

302Ibid.

303Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan”, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3, Winter 2009/10, 79.

99 was not Jihad but it was a struggle between two powers for a piece of land. That was the reason, the

Wazirs who were under his direct influence participated quite less in number in relation to other tribes.304

In return, Jinnah appreciated and thanked the tribesmen for their mobilization into Kashmir in April 1948 and declared their contribution as crucial to the creation of Pakistan and announced for the withdrawal of all regular army and garrison from the tribal region and some other allowances were given to them as a reward.305

The changing scenario in war-torn neighbouring Afghanistan and the policy of neglect on the part of

Pakistan to bring the tribal areas into the mainstream, the ensuing mistrust in communication continued to increase gap between government of Pakistan and the tribesmen leading to trust deficit between international communities as well. However, the tribal areas and its people continued to be ignored, that ultimately proved calamitous for Pakistan, US, the region and even the world as a whole. After the incident of September 11, the tribal areas became a global concern and both the U.S. and the government of Pakistan reached to the conclusion to redress the ambiguous status of FATA.

Both the government of Pakistan and international community came to the realization that change is urgently needed in the tribal area. So, here the ‘Path Dependency’ theory explains the militant situation in the tribal areas. The tribesmen have been encouraged since past by different actors including Pakistan for their vested interests to wage jihad. It should not come as a surprise that the recent militant and extremist activities in the tribal region are the outcome of the past policies.

Faqir of Ipi Movement and its Repercussions

304Badam Khan Momand, interview by the author, Mohmand: Mohmand Agency, FATA, May, 25, 2012. Interestingly, Badam Khan, now over hundred, was also among the wanted persons list of British on account of his attack and robbery of policemen in Qatlang, Mardan.

305Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland, 182.

100

Pakistan was created on the slogan of religion. But Pakistan as an independent Muslim state did not appeal to the spirit and sense of Faqir of Ipi.306 It is a fact that the Faqir had become so ambitious he hardly tolerated a check over his authority.307 On 12 August, 1949 a number of tribesmen from the clan of

Afridi tribe and their Sarishta Party met at a Tirah Bagh and stood in favour of Pakhtunistan. They hoisted the flag of “Independent Pukhtunistan” and the “Pukhtunistan National Assembly” and made the following famous declaration:

“We the Tirah branch of the National Assembly of Pukhtunistan,……….hereby express the hope that with the help of Allah Almighty and the support of the brave and freedom loving Pashtuns, this young plant will grow in a short time into a sturdy and fruitful tree which will not only benefit Pashtuns but will also fulfill its obligations towards the progress and peace of the world”.308

It urged the international community, UNO, particularly the Muslim community to extend recognition to their plea. In this move, they were greeted with great enthusiasm by Afghan government and it immediately extended support and recognition to the Pakhtunistan Movement.309 This move on the part of government of Afghanistan created a big gap of trust between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the former opted for some other means to tackle Afghanistan.

306 Haji Mirza Ali Khan, popularly known as the Faqir of Ipi, was born in 1897, in a village called Kirta near Khajuri Post in North Waziristan. His father name was Arsala Khan. He belonged to a famous Tori Khel clan of the Wazir tribe and its particular section of Maddi Khel, with sub section, Bengal Khel. He was a freedom fighter during the British era and teased them. After the inception of Pakistan, he also went against it and supported the Pushtunistan issue. Abdul Wali Khan, interview by the author, nephew of Faqir of Ipi, Razmak, North Waziristan Agency, 15 August 17, 2013. Abdul Wali Khan is nephew of Faqir Ipi. See also Jehanzeb khan, Faqir of IpI (Peshawar: University of Peshawar, 1983), 4,7. Also see Alan Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army: The North West Frontier Revolt of 1936-37 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 84.

307Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland, 194.

308Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat & Syed Wiqar Ali Shah Kakakhel ed., Afghanistan and the Frontier (Peshawar: Emjay Books International, 1993), 258-9.

309Jehanzeb, Faqir of Ipi, 65.

101

The Waziristan Branch of Pakhtunistan Assembly including tribesmen such as Bhettanis, Bannuchi,

Khattaks, Wazirs, Mehsuds, and Marwats convened a grand Jirga at Razmak on 11, 12, and 15 January

1950, for the election of National Assembly of Pakhtunistan and its head, president. The Jirga in its meeting unanimously elected/nominated the Faqir of Ipi its first Head/President.310 The Faqir then appealed the UNO for recognition and requested and urged the Afghan government for its publicity. He claimed to have control over 5000 square miles of land. He published the newspaper “Azad Pakhtun” and the pamphlet “The Ghazi”311 from Gorwek which remained the centre of Pakhtunistan Movement, from where the Afghan authorities strongly supported the Waziristan Branch of the Pakhtunistan National

Assembly. He used to receive a good sum of assistance from Afghan government to run smoothly the system of Pakhtunistan. The Faqir got maximum favour from Prime Minister Sardar Daud and King Zahir

Shah.312

Pakistan promulgated the One Unit scheme in its western wing on March 27, 1955.This move was looked upon by Afghan government as a deliberate attempt to destroy the identity of eastern

Pashtuns. In response, Sardar Daud delivered an inflammatory speech. The embassy of Pakistan located at Kabul was attacked and Pakistani diplomatic mission building located at Jalalabad and Kandahar were sacked. As a counter act Pakistan attacked Afghan consulate general located at Peshawar. Pakistan had strategic advantage and leverage as well to stop the supply of transit trade through the port of Karachi.313

310Ibid., 66.

311Marwat & Kaka Khel, Afghanistan and the Frontier, 261.

312 Warren, Waziristan: The Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army, 263.

313Marwat & Kaka Khel, Afghanistan and the Frontier, 262.

102

No doubt, at the last stage of his life, the Faqir of Ipi’s anti-Pakistan stance faded with each day passing. He passed away on April 16, 1960.314 The Times of London wrote on April 20, 1960:

“many retired army officers and political agents who served on this frontier will hear the news with tribute of wistful regret which is to the memory of a doughty and honorable opponent…..a man of principle and …a redoubtable organizer of tribal warfare”.

So, the struggle of Faqir against the British Raj and against the government of Pakistan has influence over the minds of tribesmen. Some of the tribesmen still consider themselves the disciples of the Faqir. Like the Faqir, the tribesmen resorted to the use of force and other means to gain their rights, etc. The present rise, besides other factors, is also the outcome of the Faqir’s movement. At any point, when the tribesmen feel some type of deprivation, they resort to adopt the tactics use by the Faqir, militant and extremist means which he used against authorities.

Pak-Afghan-India and Militancy

Due to its geographical location, Pakistan has some incessant implications on its strategic calculus. On the eastern side, Pakistan and India have hostile relations and mutual rivalries over the boundary related issues since their inception. On the western side, the relations between Pakistan and

Afghanistan remained strained due to the latter’s irredentist claim over the Pashtun territory of Pakistan and Kabul vehement support for Pakhtunistan movement. Similarly, there was geniality between

Afghanistan and India which Pakistani security saw with suspicion.315It is mostly considered that the foreign policy of Pakistan revolved around these two states and it became a sandwich among these two

314 Dr. Babri Gul Wazir, the Faqir of Ipi’s true Jihad Against the British Government of India 1936-1947 (Peshawar: The Aays Publishers, 2003),160.

315Marvi Memon, “Reorientation of Pakistan Foreign Policy After the Cold War”, in Mehrunnisa Ali ed., Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy 1971-1998 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 404.

103 unfriendly neighbours. That is why the foreign policy of Pakistan started not only on its eastern borders but also on its western border and due to irredentist claims of the Afghan government over Pashtun areas of Pakistan.316

The irredentist claim of Afghanistan over Pashtun’s territory of Pakistan further exacerbated

Pakistan’s geo-political handicaps. The first state who went against Pakistan’s membership in UN was

Afghanistan. The later also rejected the Durand line as an international boundary with Pakistan. The issue of Pakhtunistan became a permanent element of discord between the two states. Yet, it is also a fact that

Afghanistan is in extreme need of Pakistan for its transit trade and access to sea due to its land-locked geographical position. Similarly, it is also one of the facts that Afghanistan sponsored Pashtun’s separatist movement to appease nationalists in the Afghan regime.317 However, Afghanistan was never taken as a serious threat by the Pakistani authorities as the former’s military always remained strong enough to counter such kind of threat.318

Due to India and Afghan factor, Pakistan resorted to make alliances with big powers particularly

America and then applied violent non-state actors to wage proxy wars for strategic gains. During the hectic cold war era, the Western powers were busy in making friends for the containment of communism whereas Pakistan was also in search of friends to balance India in the power structure of South Asia. This two way move dragged Pakistan to join Western anti-Soviet block and alliances. That is, how, Pakistan became a member of CENTO and SEATO in 1950’s in order to procure economic and military aid. The

316Dr Hanif-ur-Rehman, Interview by the author, Islamabad: Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad, April 5, 2014. Dr Hanif-ur-Rehman belongs to Bajaur Agency, FATA. He did his PhD degree in History from Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad. He did his research on Afghanistan and FATA. Recently, he is assistant professor at the department of History, University of Peshawar. He teaches History, Pakistan Studies in different institutions in Pakistan. He has produced many good articles.

317Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: the Path to Catastrophe and the Killing of Benazir Bhutto (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2010), 30.

318Pervaiz. I. Cheema, “the Afghanistan Crisis and Pakistan Security Dilemma”, Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Mar., 1983), 238.

104 main concern of Pakistan was to strengthen its geo-strategic position against its hostile neighbours, India and Afghanistan.319

After the 1970s Saur Revolution and consequent Soviet intervention in Afghanistan significantly changed the strategic calculus within Pakistan. These earlier odd developments reversed the scenario for

Pakistan. At first Afghanistan was only an aggrieved and unfriendly neighbour but then posed a direct threat to the survival of Pakistan.320 When Pakistan was unable to find alternatives to the issue, he resorted to using violent non-state actors which eventually proved to be dangerous for Pakistan and seemed like shooting its own self in the foot. The foot is the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of

Pakistan.321 These violent no-state actors were entrenched and aboded in FATA for getting its trans- border strategic gains.

Since the inception of Pakistan, the tribesmen have been used and are being used in different ways for procuring gains by the state authorities and other powers particularly US. After 9/11, the same tribesmen are in front of the militant and terrorist activities who are the product of perpetual warfare. At one point, they were Mujahiden for Pakistan, US and other Powers. The same Mujahideen are now terrorist and militant for Pakistan, US and others. The tribesmen have been used since past for different purposes by different actors particularly its own state, Pakistan. Nothing was done for the civic development of the tribal areas. The present militant and extremist scenario in the tribal region is the net product of the past as mentioned by Pierson. The region has been deliberately used either due to Afghan or Indian threat and so kept it backward. The tribesmen are not aware of the facilities of modern world.

So, in line withGurr’s ‘Relative Deprivation’ theory, these tribesmen now feel deprivation which leads them to militant and extremist activities.

319Ibid., 237.

320Marvin G. Weinbaum, “Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship”, Asian Survey, California, Vol. 31, No. 6 (June, 1991), 496.

321Zamin Khan, “Fata: from Turbulent Frontier to Safe Heaven”, 67.

105

Pakhtunistan Movement

To counter Afghanistan’s support to the activities of Pakhtunistan Movement, the policy makers in Pakistan opted for sponsoring militants and Islamists within Afghanistan. The government of Pakistan extended its support to the Jawanan-e-Muslimeen, a hardliner group of Kabul University in 1973. After coup d’etat of Sardar Daud, most of the activists of the Jawanan-e-Muslimeen escaped to Pakistan where they were sheltered and some five thousand Afghans were trained in Pakistan.322 They were given commando training at Special Services Group (SSG) centre at Cherat. Gulbadin Hikmatyar was one among the recruits who later on became the leader of Mujahedeen. Pakistan adopted such type of policy to pressurize Daud’s government to accept Durand line and to deter Afghanistan from supporting

Pakhtunistan movement as well.323 In the meantime, the episode of Soviet intervention took place in

Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan posed a direct threat to Pakistan security and survival. Therefore, Pakistan opted for using these violent non-state actors to oust Soviets from

Afghanistan.324 In this move, Pakistan succeeded in ousting Soviets from Afghanistan with the help of these violent non-state actors and militant factions in collaboration with some big powers like US. But, after the withdrawal of Soviets from Afghanistan, Pakistan continued to support those militant groups.

The same type of policy was used against nationalist leader, Dr. Najibullah and later on Pakistan aspired and succeeded to install a proxy regime in Afghanistan with the help of those militant factions. Military and political authorities in Pakistan thought that such type of friendly state would provide strategic space deep inside Afghanistan. That was how the notion of strategic-depth got its roots.325 However, after the

322Olivier Roy, “Islamic Radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, 6.

323 Lawrence Lifschultz, “Pakistan: the Empire of Heroin”, in Alfred W. McCoy and Alan A. Block ed., War on Drugs: Studies in the Failure of U.S. Narcotics Policy (Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), 323.

324Rasul B. Rais, “Pakistan in the Regional and Global Power Structure”, Asian Survey Vol. 31, No. 4, April 1991, 390, (Accessed on JSTOR April 30, 2014).

325Marvin G. Weinbaum, “Pakistan and Afghanistan, 498-499 (Accessed on JSTOR April 30, 2014). See also A. Z. Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Aldershopt, Hants: Ashgate, 2005), 139-86.

106 fall of Najib’s government, an endless civil war started between different militant factions for power.

Pakistan opted to take side with Hikmatyar against other factions. Then Taliban emerged and they got most of the Pakistani government support.326 The Taliban got every type of assistance in the shape of training, equipment and funds, etc. from Pakistan. Mostly they got recruits from JUI’s Deobandi

Madrassahs of Pakistan.327

A rapid rise, indeed, in militancy and militarization of society took place during this period along with prevalence of Kalashnikov culture, radicalization, circulation of drugs and other lethal weapons, etc. in the Pashtun areas particularly the tribal areas of Pakistan. The tribal areas of FATA were hit hard by these tendencies due to its geography, culture and its position as a base and a geo-strategic outpost during anti Soviet struggle and later pursuance of strategic depth. Most of the networks of the militant factions and groups were operating from the tribal region of FATA which completely changed its status into a militarized zone. It led to the rise of nationalist tendencies among the tribesmen but the nationalist figures were crushed severely. So, the nationalist movements in the tribal society died down. The nationalist forces and figures were suspiciously viewed by Pakistani authorities and their activities were chased which put their lives at risk. Such type of policy was undertaken in cold blood by the Pakistani authorities.

So, in line with Paul Pierson theory, ‘History Matters’, the government of Pakistan adopted different policies to pursue its influence either in Afghanistan, or due to security reason or to crush the nationalist tendencies in Pashtun/tribal area, etc. The recent militant activities are the result of those very past policies. Though the Pakistani authorities were able to crush the nationalist tendencies that provided a space for the militants to penetrate there easily. Pakistan is now ‘stuck in’ in those policies and cannot

326Olivier Roy, “Islamic Radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, CNRS, Paris Written Paper No. 06/2001, 11.Available online at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3c6a3f7d2.pdf. (accessed July 20, 2014).

327Rushda Siddiqui, “The Islamic Dimension of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy”, in Efrain Inbar, Hillel Frisch ed., Radical Islam and International Security: Challenges and Responses (London & Newyork: Routledge, 2008), 162.

107 pull itself out of it easily. Though those policies can be reformed yet it cannot do away with them completely. Similarly, the region remained backward. When the tribesmen see the modern facilities of life outside their region, they feel deprivation. This phenomenon of deprivation in FATA has reached to its peak after 9/11. Its ultimate output is now in the shape of militant activities.

Legacy of partition

The effects of partition are still visible in Pakistan though 67 years have passed when the Indian subcontinent was divided into two independent states. Pakistan continues to suffer from the legacy of partition. Again, Paul Pierson’s theory of ‘Path Dependency’ holds true regarding the recent turbulent situation in FATA. The historical manner in which partition was conducted led to, in fact, one of the root causes behind the current turmoil and militant activities in FATA. The repercussions of instability and unrest in FATA have led to unrest and instability not only in Pakistan but also the neighbouring and regional countries. Similarly, the Militant activities led to the unrest of the whole world due to the fact that the world has now become a global village. While it is argued by some people that this is not an important factor behind the recent turbulence in FATA, it must be noted that many of the problems in

FATA and the rest of the country today are due to its historical maltreatment as the colonial heritage is essential in understanding Pakistani politics.328

Therefore, if the root cause of partition is resolved, FATA can move beyond its uneasy past and current instability.329 Taking into account the fragility of the situation at that time, the partition plan was devised in a short span of 37 days in a highly rude and ruthless manner.330The British, without sufficient

328 For detail study see Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History ed. (London: C Hurst & Co. 1988).

329For detail study see Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: the making of India and Pakistan (Yale University Press: New Haven, 2007).

330 For detail study see Jaswant Singh, Jinnah: India Partition Independence (New Delhi: Rupa and Co.,2009).

108 planning or foresight, did the partition in such a hurry that the helpless people were cut and chopped in pieces like butchers’ meat.331

The Muslims of Indian Sub-continent got Pakistan after much hardship and difficulty. The independence was made not only in hurry but the territory and resources were also disproportionately divided in hurry. According to Z. H. Lari, a Muslim League supporter, at the time of partition, Pakistan got a small share of its apportioned resources and it seemed that it would put the Muslims in such a serious hardships and difficulties that it would lead to a major catastrophe.332 Bettina Robotka highlighting this fact says that Pakistan got so much a less share of resources, economic, military assets and territory that it seemed that Pakistan literally had to start from scratch.333

On the other hand, India was in a dominant position as it got a relatively large share of the subcontinent‘s territory and resources. In addition, India also occupied the existing British administrative system and infrastructure.334

Therefore, according to Pierson’s path dependence theory, historical factors, such as those at the time of colonization, to a large extent affected the course of action a country intended to pursue.335 Besides, these factors are not limited to a specific period or event such as colonization alone; rather in the case of

Pakistan and India, the circumstances that existed at the time of partition or decolonization, to be precise, have also affected and influenced the future courses of action of the two countries. Though, both India

331Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition.

332 Ibid.

333C. Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan”, Policy Analysis, Asia Policy Volume 11, The National Bureau of Asian Research, January 2011 Seattle Washington.

334 Ibid.

335Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A Robinson, Pierre Yared, “Re-evaluating the Modernization Hypothesis”, NBER Working Paper No. 13334, 2007. Available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13334 (accessed July 20, 2014).

109 and Pakistan got independence in 1947, yet they chose different and separate institutional paths and reached varying degrees of social, economic and political prosperity.

Thus, the path dependency theory emphasizes the importance of historical factors that have largely hindered the ability of Pakistan to operate and prosper as a comprehensive country. Since independence,

Pakistan has faced numerous challenges because of the legacy of partition and the authorities had to overcome a lot of issues. Not only the resources and manpower of Pakistan at that time was limited, but it also faced security problems and hostility from its eastern borders, from India.336That was why Pakistan opted, mainly due to economic and security reasons, to coordinate with the West at different times as we have discussed earlier. The present law and order situation in Pakistan in general and Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa and FATA particularly is the net outcome of those past alliances and policies.

Challenges after the creation of Pakistan and its Repercussion

Shortly after partition, the war broke out between Pakistan and India over the issue of Kashmir in 1948 which ravaged the newly established state.337 Without resources, Pakistan had to resolve the problems of an inflow of refugees, the establishment of a government and a viable administrative structure in order to coordinate between its provinces, tribal agencies, and its eastern and western wings that were separated by 1000 miles of Indian territory. Ofcourse, Pakistan‘s viability was always questioned even after independence and this led to ill-planned policies.338 The country, prone to numerous challenges, lacked the vision and the desire to focus on FATA and to consider its integration.

The bad blood between Pak-India, besides other factors, resulted in three wars between them. This led

336 Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History.

337Wayne Wilcox, “Political Change in Pakistan: Structures, Functions, Constraints and Goals”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 3, 1968, 341-354.

338 For detail see Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan-Failure in National Integration (Bangladesh: University Press Ltd, 1995).

110 to an arms race which put strain on Pakistan to give due heed and focus on pivotal issues and areas. The arms race with India hampered the ability of Pakistan to grow as a progressive State. Due to poor relations with its neighbors, especially with India on the issue of Kashmir, or the role that India played in the separation of East Pakistan –policies and politics have always been seen through India-tinted lens.339

Since the government of Pakistan has been so focused on its Indian policy that it has forgotten about or even ignored its crucial and important issues, within its own border, including the tribal belt.

So, the government of Pakistan is stuck in its historical treatment of ignoring the tribal areas. As

Pakistan has not adopted due policies about its tribal region in past, now the complex situation in FATA is the result of that very failure to devise a farsighted policy in the tribal areas. Similarly, the tribesmen feel the sense of deprivation which led them to militant and extremist activities.

Weak governance

As a result of Pakistan's fragile and corrupt political system, institutions are unstable and there is no sign of making progress mainly due to the lack of consolidation of democracy in the country.340 The ruling parties and governments have failed to govern efficiently and thus failed to win the loyalties of the masses. They rule the country without any solid plans and vision. The country under such rulers has lost its integrity. The best example of the fact is that the state was run without constitution until 1956341 because the leaders and the members of the first Constituent Assembly were unable to frame a constitution due to divergent views, petty politics and self ambitions.342 The democratic process in

Pakistan can at best be described as chaotic and disorderly, characterized by instability, frequent change

339 For detail see Stephen Philip Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Brookings Institution Press, 2002).

340 Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History.

341 Pakistan‘s first constituent assembly cold not frame a constitution and was dismissed in 1954 therefore Pakistan‘s first constitution was framed in 1956.

342G.W, Choudhury, “Constitution making Dilemmas in Pakistan”, The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.8, No.4, 1955.

111 of loyalties and difficulties in reaching a consensual Constitution.343

This corrupt and weak democratic system also created space for the military's dominant position in the political environment. Thus, it led to making the Army a key decision maker, both in maintaining defense and devising all domestic, security and foreign policies. Since its inception, Pakistan has stuck between military and civilian rule, resulting in 32-years of military regimes. Pakistan is facing the issues of national identity, bureaucratic authoritarianism, and uneven development and imbalance in civil- military relations. All these issues can be traced back to the colonial era.344 Thus, the segmented heritage is one of the many reasons behind Pakistan‘s inability to develop into a complete, truly independent country. Notwithstanding all these challenges and thwarting situations, Pakistan and FATA have survived. But as has been pointed out by Wilcox, ‘the cause of establishing an orderly political system was put off for years and some aspects of public life have been permanently distorted’.345 FATA is, indeed, one such region that has been permanently distorted. As Pierson describes in path dependence, when a government uses a path or strategy regarding any region, whether successful or not, the costs of reversing or abandoning it are very high.346 The policy adopted by the government of Pakistan in the tribal areas is the same.

Since independence, both the civil-military elite in power have proclaimed numerous promises of integration, development and reforms in the tribal areas but all of them have not yet been achieved. The continued military intervention has weakened the political system of both Pakistan and FATA since the priority of the army has always been the defense of the country and countering the threats which have primarily emanated from India. So, the tribal areas have also been ignored by the Army, so by

343 Wayne Wilcox, “Political Change in Pakistan”, 341-354.

344 Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History.

345 Wilcox, “Political Change in Pakistan”, 341-354.

346 Pierson, “Increasing Returns”.

112 implication, they are responsible for the deteriorating state of affairs in the Tribal region as well. Like the civilian rulers, the Army has never favoured FATA’s integration into the mainstream of Pakistan too; instead, they feel at ease with a semi-autonomous status of FATA.347

In line with the path dependence theory, though it is difficult to forsake an established path, yet the institutional arrangements are possible and modifications can be made in the established paths.348 So, it means that mistakes can be amended in FATA and there are always options that can be taken, but the problem is that no government is serious in the case of FATA. While it is a hard process to completely replace the current system in the tribal areas, no sincere and serious efforts have been made to modify and improve matters there.

Given the complexity of situation in FATA and the nature of the tribesmen, sudden changes in the tribal system are neither desirable nor feasible since it would lead to complete confusion and disorder.

However, what can and has worked in the past, as demonstrated by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was the first leader to introduce social, economic and constitutional reforms in FATA, is the introduction of phased reforms, through consensus and dialogue, by taking the people on board.

Hence the existing structure of governance does not need to be replaced, but it can be modified and developed into a solid and effective system. Lack of interest, legislative support and infrastructural revival has left the region politically, economically and socially weak. Political will has been absent, and apart from one instance, no major initiative for better governance has been attempted. This maltreatment of the tribesmen has developed the sense of deprivation among them. So, it must not be a surprise for any one for the present rise of militant and extremist tendencies in FATA.

347 Ashley, J Tellis, “Pakistan and the War on Terror Conflicted Goals: Compromised Performance”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008.

348 Pierson, “Increasing Returns”.

113

Institutional stability and reforms in FATA

Paul Pierson and Douglass North have highlighted an interesting aspect of path dependency. They argue that after long periods of instability, reforms are introduced at institutional level at the opportune moments that can produce and lead to long periods of institutional stability.349 However, this period of institutional stability is limited since it will only continue until something erodes or swamps the mechanism that generates continuity.350

Applying this aspect of path dependency, one can say that during the period from 1971-77 institutional stability is witnessed in the tribal areas of FATA. It was during this period that Z. A. Bhutto

(1971-77) the then prime minister of Pakistan and chairman Pakistan People‘s Party (PPP) ,successfully brought FATA under the writ of federal government through the 1973 constitution. In order to develop the tribal areas, he established the FATA Development Corporation (FATADC). He was that person who really sensed the emotions of the tribesmen, and thus focused on economic and developmental reforms through the construction of hospitals, schools, industrial units, colleges and road networks. His focus not only involved the mainstreaming of FATA through infrastructural improvement, but also quotas were provided for the people of FATA in Pakistan’s educational institutions, civil service and federal jobs.

Similarly, a brief period of reforms and institutional stability was witnessed in FATA in 1996-97. It was during the period of Presidentship of Farooq Ahmed Leghari, who in his capacity as the President and chief executive of FATA amended the constitution and for the first time extended the universal principal of ‘Adult Franchise Act’. Under this amendment, all the adult, both sexes, tribesmen of FATA got the right to vote. Prior to this, only selected elites/Maliks had the right to vote-limited franchise.

However, the Political Parties Act of 2002 was hardly implemented in the tribal areas in 2012 elections.

349 Ibid.

350 Ibid.

114

In similar manner, General Pervaiz Musharraf, the head of the state and army, carried out some reforms in the tribal region under his local government initiative, but during the same period FATA witnessed unprecedented violent disturbance. This short phase in the recent and ongoing history of tribal areas is well defined by an aspect of Pierson theory of path dependency-that though change is an ongoing process, it is bounded until something erodes the system.351 This is exactly what happened in FATA after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, followed by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October that year. For the tribal belt and its people, this was the eroding period that Pierson refers to.352

FATA remained quiet after inception of Pakistan for 34 years. It has never witnessed as much violence and disintegration of society as it did after the Soviet invasion in which the tribesmen were militarized and again it happened under the rule of Pervaiz Musharraf. He is also held responsible for sending the Army into FATA for the first time since the inception of Pakistan. Though Musharaf send army there due to either some external pressure or regional political realities, yet the reality is that the events in FATA since 2001 have had numerous negative effects that continue to plague the tribal region as well as the Pakistani State.

However, even in such circumstances, the real challenge is to adopt a path that can best operate within this context of bounded change.353 Though in the case of FATA, this has never been an option.

Whenever there has been erosion of structures, the State has failed to deliver. It is observed and seen in its policies during and after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and its current policy following the U.S. intervention since October, 2001.

During the eleven years military rule of General Zia, the social structure of Pakistan, particularly the

351 Ibid.

352 Ibid.

353Mota Mariana Prado and Michael Trebilcock, “Development and the Dynamics of Institutional Reform”, Legal Studies Research Series, No. 09-04, 2009 University of Toronto Law Journal.

115 tribal region of FATA got damaged, which served as the frontline of the struggle against the Soviet

Union, giving birth to the former apple of eyes, mujahideen and freedom fighters and today‘s terrorists and militants.

The consequences of that era are still evident. The tribal areas were used as a training ground from where mujahideen from all over the Muslim world received religious and military training to wage Jehad

(holy war) against the Soviets. The sudden rise of religious institutions/madrasas imparting a strict

Wahhabi philosophy of Islam, influx of foreign fighters or mujahedeen,354 and the availability and the provision of arms and funds (both by the Arab states and US) transformed the tribal areas into hubs of militant and terrorist activities, and due to these the tribesmen suffered the brunt of the turmoil from across the border.

William Sewell’s assertion is right at this stage who elucidates on path dependency that what happens or is done in the past will affect the possible outcomes of a series of events in the near future.355

Therefore, taking into account the ethnic and historic ties between the masses living in the region, it is pertinent to note that what happens across the border in Afghanistan will undoubtedly have an impact on tribal region of Pakistan. This has been the reality in the past, and is even true now with U.S. presence in

Afghanistan since 2001 that has ensured that FATA and its people are directly affected as they are actively involved.

The tribal areas of FATA were the bases from where the Pakistanis fought the proxy war for U.S. which ultimately resulted in the Soviets’ withdrawal out of Afghanistan.356 But once the Soviet Union

354Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: the struggle with militant Islam (Columbia University Press, 2008), 1-8. Available at http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/5428.html/:pf_print (accessed July 20, 2014).

355For detail study see W. Sewell, “Three temporalities: toward an eventful sociology”, in T. McDonald ed., The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor,1996).

356 Ibid.

116 was defeated and subsequently withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the international community and the

United States withdrew as well, and left the tribal areas without assistance and aid.357 There is no doubt that the U.S. had achieved its goal of defeating the Red Army, becoming a unilateral superpower but the

Pak-Afghan border, which was of no use any more, was abandoned and its people forgotten,358 at least until the next time they provided strategic benefits. The area has once again become the center of attention ten years later.

If one applies the concepts of path dependency and relative deprivation, it makes perfect sense to see how the past events, decisions, and policies seriously affects the current situation.359 The crises in

Afghanistan and FATA are indeed the result of what happened two decades ago during the period spanning from 1979 to 1989. When the tribesmen were left alone after the Soviet withdrawal from

Afghanistan, they remained backward in all fields of life except in the field of using the technique of arms. It developed the sense of deprivation among the tribal people, paving the way for militant and extremist tendencies.

If the root causes were resolved, FATA and even persistent instability in Afghanistan was easy to avoid. The mistake made all too often is focusing on short-term success by dealing with the immediate challenges and thus only temporarily suppression of threats – as in this case.360 But if the root of the problems is not resolved, then the challenges will continue to come back. All major stakeholders have failed to follow this logic in FATA and Afghanistan while pursuing their agendas. The path dependency

357Maqsudul Hassan Nuri, Ahmed Rashid and NoorulHaq, “Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan”, IPRI Paper 10, 2005. For detail study see also Ahmad Rashid, Taliban, The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond (London & Newyork: I. B. Tauris, 2001).

358For detail study see Victoria Schofield, Afghan Frontier: At the Crossroads of Conflict (Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2010).

359 Pierson, “Increasing Returns”.

360Daniel Markey, “Securing Pakistan’s Tribal belt”, Council on Foreign Relations Report, Centre for Preventive Action (CFRC) 2008.

117 approach is not merely citing inevitability with the past simply predicting the future; in fact, as North emphasizes, at every juncture, choices are available and wise decisions can lead to many choices.361

It is difficult to perceive why the authorities did not felt the need to focus on FATA's governance and other challenges, especially after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. The situation in the tribal belt would have been much different today if policies were devised then to integrate it into the mainstream. But its greatest tragedy has always been its blatant neglect. Even when there have been opportune moments and genuine efforts to address FATA’s constitutional status and development issues, they have failed due to political instability, clashing interests, and discontinuation of better policies started by governments dismissed before the end of their terms.

Turmoil in Afghanistan and the impact on FATA

Paul A. David believes that by using the path-dependency approach, we can analyse changing capabilities of institutions while taking into account their historic structures. So, in case of the tribal areas of FATA, it is important to check the process of change from the lens of history. In fact, understanding the process and amount of change over the last few decades is essential if any breakthrough is to come about in future.

As mentioned earlier that despite its isolation and political, administrative, constitutional and social ambiguity, the tribal belt has generally remained a peaceful region. Similarly, even during the war in

Afghanistan in 1980s, while its tribal structures suffered due to the presence of refugees, radical madrassas and culture of weapons and foreigners, but its structure remained stable and essentially intact and no such violence or militant activities were there and the tribesmen never posed a threat to the rest of the country.

361Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 70.

118

Although many people ignore the scenario in the neighbouring Afghanistan and its effects, the entire

Soviet operation did play an important role in transforming the nature of events in FATA. But after the incident of September 9, 2001, it almost destroyed the tribal culture. In fact, since the U.S. intervention,

Pakistan has faced numerous repercussions and the entire region has become extremely unstable. This has had a particularly negative impact on FATA, which is now seen as the sanctuary for militants, terrorists,

Al-Qaeda and other organizations. Initially, the violence was confined to North and South Waziristan, but the growing instability in Afghanistan, especially in 2007, has led to trouble spilling to the relatively stable and peaceful agencies of Orakzai, Kurram, Mohmand and Khyber, and other settled parts of

Pakistan.362

Despite nearly ten years of war in Afghanistan, there is no visible sign of stability. The Taliban and

Al-Qaeda are still at large while a growing insurgency has gained momentum and continues to escalate.

In fact, the ongoing operations have left in its wake a world that is more precarious than existed on that momentous day in 2001, as the scope and threat posed by terrorist groups has grown significantly in regions such as Africa, Asia and Europe.363

The tribal region continues to suffer from violence and insecurity, which is intensified further due to the informal alliance between Pakistan and the United States. Coupled with the extremist activities of al-

Qaeda, the Taliban and other regional groups that resort to the use of force for their religious, ideological and political goals; this has led to persistent instability in the region.

Margaret Levi said that once a country or region began to go down the track, the price of reversal is very high.364 This is because the benefits from a particular path increase over time, and the alternative

362 Rashid, Taliban, The Power of Militant Islam.

363 Ibid.

364 Gary King, Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, The future of political science: 100 perspective (Routledge, 2009), 212.

119 options seem unattractive. However, this applies only to systems that are favorable to all i.e. the people and the State, which is not the case with FATA where the prevailing system of governance has only benefitted a small portion of the society. Lack of political will has led to power being invested in the hands of a few selected tribal elites, elders or Maliks and now clergy in a policy that has been simplistic and convenient.

Daily governance symbols, such as taxes, utilities, and compliance with national laws, are foreign concepts for the people of FATA who do not tolerate interference in their affairs. 365 Reluctant to give up this uninterrupted freedom, despite relentless calls for reform, those people who are getting benefit from the system have opposed any change.366 Therefore, even if the established path is not optimal, vested interests also prevent modification.

Path dependence claims that institutions are vital in understanding how countries or governments operate, and why they are subjected to lasting instability and struggle to build political, social and economic prosperity. However, simply understanding the institutions, especially in the case of FATA, is not enough because of the need to design new paths and implement policies to transform dysfunctional institutions into functional institutions. In this way, you can avoid the sense of deprivation among ordinary tribesmen. It will transform the radical and extremist faces of the FATA region and tribal members into peaceful citizens of Pakistan.

This chapter analyses the causes for the rise of militancy in FATA by using Paul Pierson Theory of

‘Path Dependency’ and Ted Robert Gurr’s Theory of ‘Relative Deprivation’. The most pertinent questions as to how the historical treatment of the tribal region by the successive Pakistani governments lead to the rise of militancy in the region and what the status of FATA in the political set up of Pakistan,

365 Daniel Markey, “Securing Pakistan’s Tribal belt”.

366 Ashley J. Tellis, “Pakistan and the War on Terror Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2008.

120 its consequent impact on the social and economic makeup of the region and its links with the rise of militancy are solved. The alienation of FATA from the mainstream national progress of Pakistan that led to its exploitation by the militants is probed. Why FATA became the central breeding ground for the militants and caused the rise of militancy in the tribal area is highlighted. Why did the government of

Pakistan show no concern with the rise of militancy among the Pashtuns of FATA in the initial stages?

Similarly, endeavours are made here to dig out the hidden causes for the militant and extremist activities in the tribal region.

121

Chapter-5

Impact, Challenges and the Way Forward

Pakistan has been a frontline ally in the counter-terrorism campaign since the US war on terror, 2001. In this partnership with the Western countries, thousands of Pakistanis have lost their lives while fighting terrorists. In the same way, many American soldiers and other from NATO countries have been killed as well. Though many countries suffered greatly on account of the war on terror, yet Pakistan, and particularly the tribal areas, have suffered greatly at the hands of local and foreign terrorists.367

Price of the Present Militancy for Pakistan

After the US war on terror, though Pakistan sided with the US yet faced a lot of problems particularly in the tribal areas. The decision of the government of Pakistan to ally with the US coalition forces and to oust the Taliban was taken by the radical Islamists as betrayal on the part of Pakistan. A considerable number of people particularly the Islamists and the like minded people started demonstrations throughout the country against this decision of the government of Pakistan.368 The hardline religious leaders persuaded the people, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan and the tribesmen, to go to

Afghanistan to wage jihad against the infidels.369 The law enforcing agencies did their best to deal the

367 Ashley J Tellis, Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals Compromised Performance (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008).

368Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “The Challenge of Terrorism after September 11: A Pakistan Perspective”, in Moonis Ahmar ed., The World after September 11: Challenges and Opportunities (Karachi: BCC & T, 2003), 75.

369 M. Ilyas Khan, “The ISI Taliban Nexus”, The Herald, November 2001, 22-26. Also see “Pakistan the Danger of Conventional Wisdom”, International Crisis Group, Pakistan Briefing, March 12, 2002. Also see Hamid H Kizilbash, “Anti-Americanism in Pakistan”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Vol. 497, 1988, 58– 67.

122 hardliners with an iron hand and President Musharaf banned many extremist organizations on 12 January,

2002.

After the US invasion and displacement of Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan most of the members infiltrated into the tribal areas of FATA, bordering Afghanistan.370 The infiltration of Al-Qaeda and Taliban from Afghanistan to Pakistan particularly the tribal region after the US raids on Afghanistan since the incident of 9/11 was a big challenge to Pakistan to tackle with. As a result of these infiltrations, the culture of terrorism prevailed in Pakistan that included ambushing armed forces, target killing of religious, political and civil society figures, scholars and doctors, blowing up schools, offices of NGOs, bridges and pylons, suicide attacks in mosques and other important places which is still going on. So far more than 35000 Pakistanis have lost their lives in different incidents of terrorism including the loss of

5000 armed personnel. During 2010 alone there have been 2113 militant and sectarian attacks took place killing 2913 people and injuring another 5824.371 Similarly, 295 bomb blasts occurred in FATA and

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa during 2014 only which killed 244 people while 686 severely injured.372 In the deadliest terror attack, 131 children and 10 other people were killed when militants stormed an Army

Public School in Peshawar on December 16, 2014.373 It is stated that in the ‘war against terror’ in 2013-

14, 968 people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa while 2190 wounded. The same year, 674 were killed and 990 wounded in the tribal region. Similarly, 276 police posts and 20 bridges, 437 schools and colleges, 60229 houses, 66 offices and 103 telephone exchanges were destroyed. Since 2008-2012, 3236 people have been reported to be killed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 8721 wounded while 3768 were killed and 7315 wounded in FATA. Terror attacks are mostly carried out in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa particularly the tribal

370 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan- Afghanistan Frontier”, International Security, Vol. 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008), 42.

371Muhammad Amir Rana, “Pakistan Security Report 2010”, Pakistan Institute of Peace study (PIPS), 2011, 2.

372 Daily Aaj, July 7, 2014.

373 Daily DAWN, December 17, 2014.

123 region hard hit.374 The militants started targeting the foreigners in Pakistan as well like the murder of

Daniel Pearl, a correspondent of the Wall Street Journal. Such type of activities led to the impression that the terrorists and militants are re-organizing once again in Pakistan. The alliance of Pakistan with the coalition forces in Afghanistan against the war on terror followed by the subsequent terrorist and militant activities in Pakistan shattered its economy to a considerable level. Due to the militant activities, the international airlines suspended their flights to Pakistan that resulted in serious cargo and travel implications. The international sports teams stopped their visits to Pakistan especially after the militants attacked on the Srilankan cricket team in Lahore.375 The terrorist attack on the Karachi International airport is another sad episode in which many innocent Pakistanis alongside the security personnel lost their lives.376 Apart from the fact that Pakistan is the most affected country, Obama in his speech declared:

“Our efforts must also address terrorist safe-havens in Pakistan. No country is more endangered by the presence of violent extremists, which is why we will continue to press Pakistan to expand its participation in securing a more peaceful future for this war-torn region. We will work with the Pakistani government to root out the cancer of violent extremism, and we will insist that it keeps its commitments”.377

The American global war on terror especially in Afghanistan led to a bad impression on their image in Pakistani society particularly in the tribal areas of FATA. As a result of the anti-American sentiments the Mutahida Majlas-e-Amal, an alliance of six religious parties, came into being which as a result came into power in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2002 elections. All the religious parties in MMA were

374 Daily Aaj, December 26, 2014.

375Kiran Firdous, “Militancy in Pakistan”, Strategic Studies 30(2) summer & autumn 2009, 50-59.

376 Daily The Mashriq, June 9, 2014.

377 “Text of President Obama’s Speech on Afghanistan”, The New York Times, June 22, 2011, Online available (accessed August 6, 2014).

124 critical of the American presence in Afghanistan and it became their election slogan. They have had affiliations with the various militant factions in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan.378

The government of Pakistan is facing strong criticism for joining the war on terror from internal quarters. The government of Pakistan is actively pursuing the Al-Qaeda’s and other militant factions’ operatives in the country which is taken by many Pakistani as external pressure.379 Similarly the Pakistani authorities have been facing the strong criticism for the presence of foreign troops and FBI (Federal

Bureau of Investigation) on the soil of Pakistan. The FBI in collaboration with Pakistan security agencies have pursued the Al-Qaeda operatives in Lahore, Faisalabad, Islamabad and arrested many Pakistani and foreign militants and activists. The interrogation of Pakistani citizens by FBI has led to a strong criticism from the political circles.380

Then the government of Pakistan decided to send army to the tribal areas in order to pursue and undo the regrouping of Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants. It led to increase the bitterness of the tribesmen on one hand and the militants on the other. To stop further infiltration of activists the authorities in

Pakistan sealed the Pak-Afghan border. The sending of army and sealing of Pak-Afghan border was a major departure in Pakistan’s policy towards the tribal areas which was severely criticized by the civil society in Pakistan. However, this move satisfied the US government to some extent. The mistreatment of

Pakistanis in US under the Patriot Act 2001 and the new generation rules for the aliens was another

378Fazl-ur-Rehman, “Pakistan and the War on Terrorism”, Strategic Studies, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, Autumn 2003, 80. Also see Imtiaz Gul, “Military Operations in FATA Since 2004: Achievements and Backlash,” in Political Violence and Terrorism in South Asia, ed. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema et al. (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2006), 35.

379 Ayesha Sidiqa Agha, “Is the US-Pakistan Honey Moon Over?”, Janes Defence Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 2, January 15, 2003, 21.

380 Hassan Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan: The United States and South Asia”, Paper presented at International Seminar on “Major Powers in South Asia”, organized by Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 11-13 August 2003, 7.

125 reason for the anti-US sentiments in Pakistan. Similarly, some Pakistanis were detained in Guantanamo

Bay in Cuba on the bases of suspicion.381

So, being a partner of US in war against terrorism Pakistan suffered a lot. The incident of 9/11 was only one terrorist incident on the US territory but inside Pakistan a number of such incidents have taken place, which deteriorated the law and order situation in the country. No part of the country is safe due to bombing and suicide attacks by terrorists. Pakistan’s troubled economic conditions, fluid political setting, and perilous security circumstances present serious challenges to Pakistan’s security.

When the British came to power in the Indian sub-continent, the tribesmen learnt for the first time to adopt political authority which imposed hierarchy and demanded allegiance therein. Besides, the system of Maliks and Khassadars, etc. were alien practices to the tribesmen of FATA. The customs, traditions and cultural values of the tribesmen were politicized such as Jirga, etc. and later on it became an integral part of the FCR. The laws of FCR had long reaching impacts on the political, economic, cultural and social life of the tribesmen of FATA. After Pakistan came into being, the old system of laws and authority was retained in the tribal areas till date.382 Since the Soviet invasion and the US presence in

Afghanistan and its engagement in the tribal areas equally impacted the social, economic, political and cultural values of the tribesmen and that very impact has now become a challenge not only for Pakistan but also for the regional countries, US and the whole world.

The ways state interacts with a society leads to different social outcomes and realities. Those societies which receive state patronage flourish and vice versa get vanished. Unfortunately, the Pashtun

381Ibid., 8.

382Lateef Afridi, “FATA: the Impact of FCR”, Presented in a Seminar on Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, Organized by Area Study Centre And Hanns-Seidel Foundation Germany, University of Peshawar, December 7-8, 2004, 150.

126 society living on both sides of the Durand Line experienced different social realities.383 On the basis of geographical placement, Akbar S. Ahmad has divided Pashtun society into two different models: those who live in settled areas and those living in hilly areas.384The first is Qalang society, which pays rent or taxes to a state or Khan. This Pashtun society is less egalitarian and is marked by hierarchies. Their customary laws of Pashtunwali have died down and have been replaced by state laws. The second type of society is Nang society which is governed by honor. It is the one that has not been subjugated by outside power. They live according to their own code of life better known as Pashtunwali.

The measurement of difference between the two ideal societies is made basically on the basis of preservation of traditional values embodied in Pashtunwali.385 The Nang society is very much conscious of their cultural values and has remained successful in preserving their traditional cultural values from state infringement whereas the Qalang society has yielded to state pressure. Akbar S. Ahmad declares

FATA’s society as the Nang ideal type of society.

Later on, with the advent of the British and their stay in the tribal areas resulted in distortion of cultural values and the code of Pashtunwali of the tribesmen. Introduction of the Maliki system among the tribesmen created hierarchy which disturbed the egalitarian spirit of the society.386 Correspondingly,

Pashtunwali was subjected to FCR, and thus Pashtunwali no longer remained their sole governing customary law.

383 Akbar S. Ahmed, Religion and Politics in Muslim Society: Order and Conflict in Pakistan (Cambridge University Press October 28, 1983), 146.

384Ibid., 7-8.

385 R. O. Christensen, “Tradition and Change on the North-West Frontier”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1982), 162.

386Kimberly Marten, Thomas H. Johnson And M. Chris Mason, “Misunderstanding Pakistan’s Tribal Areas”, International Security, Volume 33, Number 3, Winter 2008/09, 184.

127

This type of social pattern had its roots since British time and it prevailed till 1970s. The Maliks and Mullahs rose to prominence and became the two important figures in the tribal areas.387 When

Pakistan came into being, initially the influence of Maliks was increased and they got state-sponsorship and mostly government projects were given to them. However, this type of pattern could not stand long and the state patronization was soon shifted from Maliksto Mullahs. This shift of state policy created bad blood between the Maliks and Mullahs. Nevertheless, the Maliks were sidelined by the quick rise of

Islamists subsequently.388 The rationale behind this shift of policy was mainly to counter the Pashtunistan

Movement and the Islamists were used equally to pursue strategic depth policy. In this show-down of

Maliks and Mullahs, common tribesmen remained neglected. They seemed neither free nor full modern state essentials were extended to them nor were they left to their own values of Pashtunwali. The state equipped them with no other right except the guns without any license or permit.389The Afghan war further strengthened their sole right to hold guns and FATA markets were flushed with sophisticated, more lethal and modern weapons. These developments are taking place with consent of state.390 Such type of developments helped in the rise of militancy in the tribal areas and it has become one of the challenges for the state of Pakistan and even the international community to cope with.

In the same way, a weak civilian leadership, ongoing power struggles between the executive and judiciary, and discord in federal-provincial relations all serve to hamper effective governance. This directly causes unemployment, inflations, and reluctance of the investors to do investments. This also led to political bargaining in order to run the government in center and in provinces. Such political bargaining

387 Dr. Ahsanur Rahman Khan, Moorings and Geopolitics of the Turbulence in Pashtun Tribal Areas Spreading to other Parts of Pakistan (Lahore: M. Ashraf Publishers, 2011), 29.

388Ibid., 30.

389Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Path to Catastrophe and the Killing of Benazir Bhutto (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2010), 147.

390 “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants”, Asia Report, 11 December 2006, 3. Available online at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2006/asia/pakistans-tribal-areas-stop-appeasing- the-militants.aspx. (accessed July 24, 2014).

128 led to power sharing and are a burden on the economy of a developing country like Pakistan.391 Like at the state level, the recent rise of militancy in FATA has also impacted the political system in the tribal areas as well and it has become a challenge for the Pakistani authorities to handle. The peculiar political system was promulgated in the tribal areas under the compulsion of trans-border maneuverings. Under such type of system the tribesmen were deliberately deprived of their political rights. After the inception of Pakistan, unfortunately, the same old and obsolete political system of the Raj was applied in the tribal areas. Not enough portions of budgets were allocated to the tribal areas and those allocated were basically spent on the Khassadars, Scouts and Frontier Constabulary, etc.392 By the strengthening of the institutions of political authorities, Khassadars, Scouts and Frontier Constabulary, etc, resulted in acceleration of coercion and suppression of the common tribesmen. Formation of political organizations and participation in political activities was banned in FATA. De-politicization was the result of the policies set in motion in

FATA.

Elections to the Members of National Assembly (MNAs) were held on non-party basis till 2012.

Party basis elections were held for the first time in 2012 general elections. The tribesmen cannot contest election for becoming members of Provincial Assembly (MPAs). Political parties were not allowed to organize socializing programmes in the tribal areas till 2012 and for the first time they were allowed to go there but still the situation is not conducive for the parties to operate except religious parties.393 Similarly, the common tribesmen have no right to vote till late 1996 except Maliks and Lungi holders. Only, Maliks and Lungi holders had the right to vote and they acted as a sort of Electoral College for MNAs in

FATA.394 This all shows how the tribesmen were treated as second rate citizens in Pakistan. They had no

391Eamon Murphey and Ahmed Rashid Malik, “Pakistan Jihad: The Making of Religious Terrorism” Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) 11(2) summer, 2009, 7.

392Spain, “Pakistan’s North West Frontier”, 34.

393 Richard L. Park, “Politics of Change”, Polity, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Winter, 1969), p. 225.

394Ijaz Khan, “Challenges Facing Development in Pakistan’s FATA”, 4.http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=145 (accessed July 23, 2014). 129 political rights and no say in the affairs of the state nor have any control over their own affairs. Though they form an integral part of Pakistan, yet much different than normal Pakistanis in term of rights.

The present militant and terrorist activities have deeply impacted the socio-psychological fabric of the tribal society. Mostly, the environment in the tribal areas remains tense. No doubt, the common Pakistanis are not out of the direct psychological impact due to violence there but the people living in the conflict zones of the tribal areas of FATA particularly are the most affected ones. Their constant exposure to violence has engendered many psychological problems, in some cases in the form of serious mental illness. The horrific sounds of cannon shelling on militant hideouts by the army remains stuck in the minds of people, especially women and children, who are suffering from continuous psychological problems and trauma.

Anxiety, nightmares, depression and suicidal tendencies have been cited as some of the common symptoms, often following the loss of a home or a family member.395 In such like a situation, the impact has been all the more on the mental health of children and females. He told that majority of the children displaced in the wake of the military operations in FATA were aged between three months to eleven years and they were suffering from mental problems including phobias, acute stress disorder, post-traumatic stress syndrome depression and insomnia.396 Dr.

Khalid Mufti, former President Pakistan Psychiatrist Society, in his report said that more than 54 per cent of people living in the conflict zone had shown symptoms of acute stress, post-

395 “Swat: Paradise Regained”, 22-23, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, July 2010. www.hrcp- web.org/pdf/Swat-Paradise-Regained.pdf. (accessed July 27, 2014).

396Dr. Shujat Ali Khan, Interview by the author, Bannu, Dated; 8-02-2015. Dr. Shujat Ali Khan did FCPS in Psychiatry. He has remained incharge of mental hospital Peshawar. He served in different capacities in psychiatry departments in KP. Recently, he is Associate Prof. and head of the Psychiatry Department in Government Institute of Medical Sciences Kohat (KIMS).

130 traumatic stress disorders, depression, fear, anxiety, loss of appetite and sleep disturbance.

Almost 60% of the affectees are women and they are suffering from fear, panic and post- traumatic stress. The men, however, mostly suffer from depression. The total number of such psychological patients may actually be much more than 54 per cent, as many people in far-flung areas do not have access to medical centres.397 To cure the psychological pressure on the minds of tribesmen particularly is one of the impacts of the militant phenomenon and has become a challenge for the government of Pakistan to deal with.

On economic front, Islamabad faces crises that erode its options. According to the financial division of Pakistan its economy has undergone a cost of 2.1 trillion dollar because of its active role in the war on terror.398 Due to bad security condition, it not only reduced Foreign Direct investment (FDI) but also had a negative impact on industrial production and the export. The State Bank of Pakistan in 2010 estimated that FDI was reduced by 54.6% and caused a loss of 1.18 billion dollars due to the unstable political situation, threats of terrorism and internal security problems.399 In the current scenario our government is unable to sign a new deal with foreign stakeholders. The stock market has plunged due to the deteriorating security situation in the country, because suicide attacks and unstable government security policies have formed fear and chaos within the society. Investors are reluctant to invest in

Pakistan due to instability. Even Pakistan’s own traders, industrialists and investors are reluctant to invest here and prefer to invest in foreign countries where they can receive handful return. Pakistan’s economic performance does not appear to be bright in the wake of the prevailing turmoil, political uncertainties,

397Interview of Dr. Khalid Mufti, the Ex-President of Pakistan Psychiatric Society, http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/295028,suicide-bombings-causetorment-for-pakistani-children-- feature.html. (accessed July 28, 2014).

398Pakistan Today, 2011. Available online at http://www.pakistan today.com.pk/2011/08/united-FRONT/ (accessed December 2013).

399Attiq-Ur-Rehman, “Pak-US Strategic Relations under War on Terror A Decade of Security Challenges for Pakistan”, Monthly Current Affair Digest October, 2011, 39.

131 rising terrorist violence and growing Talibanization in the society. Similarly, the recent rise of militant and extremist phenomenon in the tribal areas of Pakistan, economic condition of the tribesmen has deteriorated as well. Since long ago until the advent of Europeans and fixation of states, the tribesmen remained actively engaged in trade with recent fertile valley of Pakistan and with people of Hindu Kush of Afghanistan.400 Besides, the tribesmen also generated their revenue by providing protection to the trading caravans of Silk route. With the advent of British in the area disturbed the ongoing pattern of economy of the tribesmen. The tribesmen had no option than to resort to raids on settled districts. To avoid such type of lawlessness and uncertainty, the British applied the policy of recruiting the tribesmen in Frontier Constabulary, military and Khassadari system.401 Similarly, the system of Maliks was introduced as well to assist the political administration. As, the objective of the British in the tribal area was more for strategic reason than economic; therefore they discouraged economic activities and did nothing for the economic well being of the tribesmen. Similarly, an application of the Laws of FCR particularly the notion of nikat led to unique imbroglios on mercantilist activities in the tribal areas of

FATA. The system of nikat allowed outsiders to buy or own tribesmen land. In the same way, under the notion of collective responsibility the investors were propelled and discouraged by the British government as they frequently confiscated tribesmen property for any wrong done by the tribe. To avoid such type of uncertainty, even the wealthy tribesmen opted for settling their businesses outside the tribal areas and eventually they themselves left the tribal areas because they had no other option. All these developments resulted in flight of capital from tribal areas. The recent Reconstruction and Opportunity Zones (ROZS), vowed by the US to be established in tribal areas to counter the militancy could not take place due to precarious law and order situation and evident indifference of the establishment to the idea as the programme have resulted in a change of mindset of the tribesmen.

400 R. L. Sammon, Mullahs and Maliks: Understanding the Roots of Conflict in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Master of Arts Thesis) (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania, April 2008), 43.

401Ibid., 44.

132

The current situation in the tribal areas, no doubt, has become a challenge for the government of

Pakistan. But it is above apprehension that the FCR deters legal investment in FATA but on the contrary, encourages the expansion of illegal economy there. Mostly, Pak-Afghan trade is carried out through the routes lying in the tribal areas. The trade in FATA is not governed by custom laws and officials of

Pakistan. That is why, the tribal areas have become hub of illegal weapons circulation and drug smuggling. All the tribal areas particularly Khyber agencies and North Waziristan are the hub of smuggled goods.402 It is interesting to cite here that the black money has become one of the sources of

Jihadist and extremist groups that operate in the tribal region. The political administration is silent about the illegal trade in the tribal areas. More interesting, the black money in the tribal areas has become a luring tool for administrators and they battle hard for appointment in FATA. The drug trade flourished tremendously during the reign Gen. Zia-Ul-Haq which flourished drug and arms culture in the tribal areas. Opium cultivation reached to the zenith in the tribal areas with a silent approval of state. The money generated through the cultivation of opium was then supplied to the Mujahedeen and hard liner for fighting the Afghan Jihad.

To continue with the same, the recent militant and extremist phenomenon has affected FATA both culturally as well as religiously. The strong desire of the people of FATA for attainment the primordial inspiring values of scripture has been instrumentalized by the state for catering its vested interests. This yearn attitude of the tribesmen for culture and religion was initially used against Soviet forces in Afghanistan and later the same tactic was used against US and ISAF forces.403 If observed from the lens of history, all Pashtuns particularly the tribesmen were primarily followers of the traditional Sufi

Islam. Mostly they followed the Naqshbandi Sufi order. It was only after the inception of Pakistan that the

402 Salah-u-Din Ahmad, “Karkhano Marketon ko Tax Net Mein Laney ka Faisala”, Daily Aaj (Peshawar), June 12, 2011.

403 Muhammad Waseem, “Origin and Growth Pattern of Islamic Organizations in Pakistan”, 18. http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalismandSec urityinSouthAsiach2.pdf (accessed July 29, 3014).

133 institutionalization of political Islam and Jihadi culture got roots in the tribal areas of FATA. Earlier than this the tribesmen used to fight under the tutelage of their traditional tribal chiefs and leaders.404 But after that, the traditional leadership was gradually replaced by the Mullahs, religious mentors, with a well planned state patronage. Similarly, the Code of Pashtunwali-Pashtun way of life was gradually sidelined as well. The Hadiths (sayings of Prophet Muhammad) and Ayahs (Quranic verses) became ultimate sources of legitimacy. Fantasy for promulgation of Sharia as propagated by Mullahs became a dream of tribesmen. In the process the code of Pashtunwali was perverted and alien practices such as strict purdah

(using veil) and gender segregation were incorporated into Pashtunwali.

The radical Islamists tendencies and ideologies further entrenched in the tribal region during the anti-Soviet Jihad. The Saudi impetus in the form of petro-money further disseminated Wahabbism in the tribal region and so anti-soviet supporters and sympathizers in the tribal areas were financed and helped.

During the same days of Afghan Jihad, the heinous and disgusting radical literature was translated mostly into Pashto which further boasted the extremist tendencies in the tribal region.405 Though once the same radical tendencies were boasted by the state of Pakistan with the support of different actors but yet it has become now a challenge for the government of Pakistan itself to cope with.

In the same line, during the Soviet-Afghan war, all kind of support was forwarded to the religious madrassas in Pakistan particularly in the Pashtuns areas. It resulted in the rapid proliferation of madrassas in Pashtun areas particularly the tribal region which not only molded the centuries old religious beliefs of the people but also affected the cultural values of the tribesmen. The same rapid increase of the religious madrassas in the tribal areas has now become the mushrooms of extremists and fundamentalists. This is now one reason of the rise of militancy in the tribal areas after 9/11. This type of situation has now become a challenge for Pakistan to tackle it. As earlier said the proliferation of

404 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan- Afghanistan Frontier”, International Security, Vol.32, No.4 (Spring, 2008), 67.

405 Syed Minhajul Hassan, “The Impact of Afghan Crisis on Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan”, 133.

134 madrassas was facilitated by the vested interests in order to ensure recruitment among the tribesmen for the anti-Soviet Jihad. But the vested interests made no future arrangements for the elimination of such type of phenomenon. So, as soon as the Afghan Jihad ended the same stuff were used for supplying recruits to the Taliban. Mostly, the entire transformation was basically financed and sponsored by Saudi government.406 The move facilitated and served the vested interests of both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: for Pakistan the strategic depth mantra was promoted and for Saudi Arabia Wahabibism was exported to the Pashtun area particularly the tribal region of FATA. No doubt, through those policies and discourse they were successful to pursue their objectives and bringing the desired results for the parties involved but those results were basically achieved at the cost of Pashtun’s culture which faced distortion and deformation. That deformation and distortion of Pashtun’s culture has now become a headache not only for Pakistan but also for regional countries, US and the ISAF forces in Afghanistan. The rapid increase in the religious madrassas from one account states that before 1975, there were only ten thousands

Madrassas’ students whereas by 1997 the number mounted to between 540,000 and 570,000.407 Increase in the number of students means increase in the number of Madrassasas well. Before the Soviet-Afghan war 1979, some nine hundred religious Madrassas operated in Pakistan and in the preceding years the number stood between thirty to thirty five thousands.408 The ultimate outcome and consequences of the

Madrassas proliferation for tribal areas were that it had developed an aversion to the cultural values of the areas and turned the tribesmen into militants and radicals-jihad culture.409

Challenges Faced by Pakistan

406Hamza Alavi, “Pakistan between Afghanistan and India”, MER issue 222, 25.

407 Olivier Roy, “Islamic Radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, UNHCR Emergency and Security Service January 2002, 11. Available online at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3c6a3f7d2.pdf (accessed July 29, 3014).

408 Ahmad Rashid, Taliban: the Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2010), 87.

409Major General Shaukat Sultan, “Pakistan’s Struggle Against Terrorism” Pakistan Defiance Review 20 summer, 2006, 6.

135

But when the Afghan Jihad ended, the same patronage of the Madrassas was continued in the official circles of Pakistan. The then Prime Ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the late 1990s tried to reform the curricula of the religious Madrassah but with no success.410 The result of this patronization was that the influence of local leaders was substituted by the Mullahs. The huge financial involvement in the expeditions of Jihad and Madrassas raised the status of the radical elements in the tribal areas and consequently it changed the internal socio-economic dynamics in FATA.411 The centuries old code of Pashtunwali was replaced by Shari’a and large social engineering were carried out which changed the fiber of tribal society. Resultantly, in the whole game the Mullahs became the fountain of both spiritual as well as temporal power and leadership in the tribal society.412 Last but not the least, the saga of Afghan Jihad rendered horrific demographic changes in the society. All these effects on the tribal society since 1979 has now became a challenge not only for Pakistan but the regional and international community as well.

During the post-Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Pak-Afghan relations are facing a number of obstacles and challenges. Pakistan wanted to have good relations with the Afghan Transitional Authority

(ATA) but due to the presence of elements of Northern Alliance on key positions, it could not be improved. The high officials in ATA were friendlier to India as compared to Pakistan. That was why when the Pak army moved to the tribal areas of Pakistan, incidents of skirmishes took place with the

Afghan tribal chiefs and later on the regular Afghan Army.

410 Muhammad Waseem, “Origin and Growth Pattern of Islamic Organizations in Pakistan”, Op. Cit., 23.

411Safdar Sial,“Patterns of Talibanization in FATA”, in Muhammad Amir Rana, Safdar Sial and Abdul Basit ed., Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA (Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2010), 147.

412 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan- Afghanistan Frontier”, Op. Cit., 70. See also Discussion of Dr Ashraf Ali, President of FATA Rsearch Centre, Islamabad, cited in Razia Sultana and Saira Aquil, “The Pakistani Pashtuns and the End Game in Afghanistan”, International Journal on World Peace, Vol. XXIX, no. 4 (December 2012), 19.

136

In the same way, the rising tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the issue of cross border terrorism is another big challenge. In the last few years, US-led NATO powers have continuously been insisting upon Pakistan to ‘do more’ against the militancy in the tribal regions in order to stop cross- border terrorism in Afghanistan. While ignoring the responsibilities of the US, ISAF and Karzai-led troops in Afghanistan, especially US civil and military high officials have unilaterally been blaming

Islamabad that the level of militancy increased in Afghanistan owing to the militants who entered

Afghanistan from Pakistan, and increased pressure on the NATO troops. In his visit, the former US

Defence Secretary Robert Gates and some high officials, while repeating the false allegations had indicated that Pakistan’s failure to stop insurgents from Pakistani side of the border has resulted into 40 per cent rise in the militants’ attacks in east Afghanistan, infiltration of insurgents in Afghanistan takes place from the safe-havens of FATA. They were also critical of Pakistan Army and its intelligence agency, ISI, for their alleged close contact with the Afghan Taliban. The Afghan media was also critical of blaming Pakistan for cross-border terrorism in Afghanistan and involvement of ISI as well.413 The government of Pakistan always refutes such allegations. Pakistani authorities claim that while Taliban problem is basically Afghan own problem and inspite of all efforts, it cannot stop the cross-border movement effectively. However, whatever the case is, it led to bad blood between the two Islamic neighbours. The UN Secretary General’s report to the UN Security Council on Afghanistan sums up the security situation there as under:

The insurgency is being conducted mostly by Afghans operating inside Afghanistan’s border. However, its leadership appears to rely on support and sanctuary from outside the country, the insurgency’s current centre of gravity falls in and around the provinces Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan and increasingly Farah…. The insurgency now covers a board arc of mostly Pashtun dominated territory, extending from Kunar province in the east to Farah province in the west…414

413Sajjad Shaukat, “Pakistan Facing Cross-Border Terrorism”, The daily Nation, June 13, 2011.

414“The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for peace and Security”, Report of the Secretary General UNO, September 11, 2006.

137

From the above report, it is clear that the insurgency is actually Afghan-based, but the insurgents get their support from the Pakistani insurgents in the tribal areas for obvious reasons and it is a big task and challenge for Pakistan. The Afghan perception of Pakistan involvement in their internal affairs is the first challenge for Pakistan. Here, once again, one will have to see the matter from historical perspective.

Since the inception of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan alleged and counter alleged each other for interfering in their internal affairs. But since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan is actively engaged in Afghanistan and so, the Afghan people always see Pakistan with suspicious eyes for involvement in their internal affairs. Since the Soviet invasion, two generations have grown up by seeing

Pakistan’s engagement in Afghanistan and thus they consider its involvement in their internal affairs. The perception of Pakistan’s involvement has become so strong that if Pakistan is not involved they considered it being involvement. No doubt, the Taliban and insurgents are moving across the border but

Pakistan is equally sharing the sufferings at their hands.415

There are many reasons for the cross border movement of the insurgents. Local customs and traditions, easy mingling of the Taliban among the locals, porous border and treacherous terrain are some of the factors for the easy cross border movement of the insurgents.416 Besides, International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF), and the Afghan security are equally responsible for their incapability to closely watch the cross border movement of insurgents. Pakistan, even, proposed to fence the border but it was categorically rejected by the Afghan government.

The dissatisfaction of Hamid Karzai with Pakistan is also due to some other factors. The Afghan

President blames Pakistan to hide their failure to counter insurgency properly, civilian casualties due to

ISAF air strikes, corruption in developmental projects, etc. and host of other social ills and frustration.417

415 The News International, Islamabad, December 7, 2006.

416 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London, New York & Toronto: Simon & Schuster Inc., 2006), 273.

417MassoumehTorfeh, “Afghanistan’s Tipping Point?”,BBC South Asia, April 16, 2007.

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So, blaming Pakistan for involvement in the Taliban issue has become one way of catharsis for Afghan government. The long running tension between the two neighbouring countries exploited by many external and internal factors led to further mistrust and reflects negatively on the struggle against the war on terror. The most suspicious elements in the eye of Pakistani authorities is the warlords of Northern

Alliance who are mostly pro-Iran, pro-India and always anti-Pakistan.418 These warlords have a significant influence on the policies of the Afghan President as they are his support bases.

As we know that the tribal belt is also lying across the border. The Pashtuns/tribesmen living on both side of the border have same background and matrimonial alliances with each other. Afghan government accused that Pakistan is not doing enough to stop the cross border infiltration of the Taliban which are destabilizing the Afghan government. Such type of allegations and counter allegations led to a bad blood between Pak-Afghan relationships. That is why the Pakistan embassy in Kabul was attacked on

July 8, 2003 and the same occurred from time to time. This incident occurred when there was already border tension between the two neighbouring countries.

Unfortunately, the poorly planned military operation in the tribal areas of FATA led to displacement and alienation of the tribesmen. The government’s obsolete and old policies of the British raj provided a space to the extremist elements there. To cope with the issue of extremism, instead of providing economic, civil and political rights to the tribesmen, unfortunately, the government of Pakistan opted for using force and through an application of the centuries old system of raj which further alienated the tribesmen of FATA.

To sum up, Pakistan suffered a lot as a result of war against terrorism both internally and externally. Since Pakistan became an ally of the western powers against the war on terror, the ratio of

418Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 203.

139 terrorist acts have increased in Pakistan considerably. The foreigners are equally targeted by the terrorists.

So, it created a bad image of Pakistan internationally.

Policy Recommendations and the Way Forward

As discussed in chapter two that FATA is not regulated by the common law of Pakistan. It is directly administered by the federal government under the headship of the President. Governor of

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa act as an agent of the federal government, President and political agent as representative of the governor in a particular tribal area. The tribal areas are governed by FCR and the ordinances are issued from time to time when the need arise. There is no concept of regular laws in the tribal areas as they are in vogue in other parts of the country.

It is the need of the hour to bring the tribal region into the mainstream of Pakistan through legislative amendment in the constitution. It will lead the tribesmen to participate in the provincial affairs so that they need not feel deprivation. When the tribal region become a part of the province or itself a province, it will remove the grievances of the tribesmen and they will be integrated into the mainstream. Malik Gohar Ayub expressed the same view.419

As discussed in chapter-4, the historical treatment of the tribesmen and the adoption of old and obsolete policies of the British Raj are some of the basic factors which played its due role in the rise of militancy in the tribal region of FATA. Politically the tribal areas have been neglected to a larger extent. So, it is urgently needed that the government should adopt the policies in the tribal region like political enfranchisement through the extension of the Political Parties Act (PPA), assertion of the rule of law through the reform of the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) and the full inclusion of the FATA in

Pakistan’s legal frameworks and to the mainstream of Pakistan and a development strategy based on

419 Malik Gohar Ayub, Interview by the Author, FR Bannu, Dated 30-01-2015. Malik Gohar is the son of (Late) Malik Mamoor Khan and the incumbent chief of clan Tori Khel Wazir, North Waziristan Agency.

140 providing economic opportunity, investment in infrastructure and, above all, investment in education.

There is a need to pursue such policies through which the hearts and minds of the people of FATA can be won so that the tribesmen may not feel deprivation. Malik Khan Marjan expressed the same view.420

Malik Khan Marjan suggested that there must be a separate constituent assembly for FATA composed of 50-60 members. The members of this council will be either directly elected by the tribesmen or indirectly elected by the local councils. This constituent assembly will make reforms in FATA. The constituent assembly can propose a new constitution for the tribal areas. It will propose budget for FATA as well. He further suggested that each constituent unit of FATA must have local councils comprised of

25-30 members who must be elected. The local administration will be responsible to those councils. The local councils would be responsible to the main constituent assemble. Its headquarters should be at

Hayatabad Peshawar.421

It is highly recommended that the least-worst option at present is through a containment strategy policy for the FATA. By applying the policy of containment, it would be better to insulate the FATA from the dynamics in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It will also be better to de-escalate the violence within the FATA, and refocus the objectives of the US and Pakistan militaries. If such a strategy is to be effective it must be co-ordinated, it must operate at multiple levels, and it must be sustained because it will not be immediately effective. Recognizing that not all the players in this strategy will be willing partners, it is necessary that gradual and recalibrated pressure to form part of the strategy.

The violent, critical, militant and terrorist phenomenon in the tribal areas of FATA demands the most serious and wise decisions not ever taken before. Only force is not the solution

420 Malik Khan Marjan, Interview by the Author, Peshawar, Dated 06-02-2015. Malik Khan Marjan is the incumbent chief of clan Wozi Khel Wazir, sub-clan Babar Sari Wazir, North Waziristan Agency. He is under-graduate in the 70s. All of his four sons are graduated. One of his sons resides in Ireland who is Medical specialist.

421 Malik Khan Marjan, Interview by the Author, Op. Cit.

141 to any problem. By force the critical scenario cannot be solved in the tribal belt, as it leads to phenomenon of revenge and anger on the part of the tribesmen and the local people. Force is not the only solution and the war against terrorism can never be won by force alone. Pakistan needs a viable and realistic policy to deal with militancy existing in the state particularly the tribal region. Pakistan can improve its non-traditional security if it adopts to make internal policies based on tolerance and moderation for countering extremism. Similarly, drastic reforms need to be initiated in the tribal areas. So, the problem of the tribesmen is mainly economic. Force and bribery have failed to bring us any nearer to solution. What is needed is an entirely new approach to the subject. The tribesmen are the people who wish only to be allowed to live in their own way. They have been misunderstood. Not only that, but for a very long time their case has been deliberately misrepresented by interested parties. They have no desire to dominate others. It is equally clear that they will never submit to dictation or discrimination of any kind from any quarter.

At present, USA is actively engaged in drone strikes in the tribal areas of FATA. So, it is highly recommended for the government of Pakistan and the US as well to think about the outcome of those strikes. There is need of strategies to contain the public impact of US airstrikes in the tribal region of FATA. These strikes cannot do away with the issue of militancy and terrorism but its outcome happens in the shape of worse anti-Pakistan and anti-US sentiments in the tribesmen. So, there exists considerable scope for better articulating the purpose of these strikes with the Pakistani public particularly the tribesmen. Similarly, it must be ensured that the US, NATO, the Pakistan Army and the Pakistan civilian government are speaking with one voice about these actions. Steps must be taken to avoid civilian casualties and material loss.

142

Malik Niamat Ullah says that poverty is a general phenomenon in Pakistan but the common tribesmen live below national poverty line. He said that Poverty leads to evil thinking as well. An empty stomach can become a source of many evils. Then the poor can be easily exploited by the vested interests for different activities particularly terrorist, militant and extremist activities. So, economic reforms can bring about positive changes in the tribal areas.

The hearts and minds of tribesmen should be won through development projects, employment opportunity to the educated youth, providing loans and to bring reforms in the tribal region so that poverty could be alleviated.422

Malik Gohar says that illiteracy is the root of all evils. Illiterate people can be exploited easily. The literacy rate in the tribal areas is very poor. The Government of Pakistan is spending currently about 2% of GNP on education, which is insufficient in light of the country’s educational needs. The Government must commit to allocate no less than 4% of GNP to the education sector. In the tribal region, there is a need of such schools where children could get religious and technical education and that education should be free. In this way these children will be able to earn their livelihood with honor and dignity. Similarly, they will not be exploited by the vested interests easily. So, education and literacy is the need of the hour in the tribal areas. He said that those persons who are matriculated can hardly write their names because they pass exams by unfair means.423 The religious madrassas is one source of education for the

422 Malik Niamat Ullah, Interview by the author, South Waziristan Agency (SWA), Dated: 31-01-2015. Malik Niamat Ullah is the brother of (Late) Senator Malik Faridullah (Hilal-i-Imtiaz) and Chief of AspirkaWazir, Shakai South Waziristan Agency. It’s the most renowned family in SWA and their lineage can be traced back to Malik Sowhan Khan, the then Malik in Mughal and Sikh rule. To see the lineage of their family Maliks see Sir Olaf Caroe, The Pathan, Trans. Syed Mahboob Ali (Urdu) (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, July, 1967), 367. Also see Major Herbert B. Edward, CB, A Year on the Punjab Frontier Vol. I (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1851), 40.

423 Malik Gohar Ayub, Interview by the Author, Op. Cit.

143 tribesmen. They can also play a positive role if they are brought under strict government scrutiny so that the radical preaching can be taken away from tribal region. The government should try to revise the curricula of Madrassas according to the need of the modern times.

It is highly needed on the part of government of Pakistan to mainstream terrorism and extremism issues into policies and development programs as a key planning strategy to promote harmony in the tribal society. It will lead to improvement and will contribute to the national, social, and economic development of Pakistan.

The tribesmen are mostly exploited by the religious figures. The religious leaders play an exploitative role in the tribal areas that support extremism and terrorism. The authority figures must come forward and have some measures to stop these religious leaders from exploiting young tribesmen who become the victims of such religious mentors. There must be some laws in order to curb religious extremism, militancy and terrorism from Pakistani society in general and the tribal society in particular.

Children and young people are the most exploited ones at the hands of terrorists, militants and other vested interests. They can be easily lured by different ways either in the name of religion, heaven and more. That’s why, they need special attention as more than two third of the anti government persons were insurgents from the age group of 15 to 35 years.

It is highly recommended that Pakistan should revise its strategies and foreign policy to combat insurgency within tribal region and the country as well. Pakistan should revise its policy with regard to Afghanistan as its instability provide safe haven to the vested interests. The territory of Afghanistan is then used by those insurgents to destabilize Pakistan. This is another

144 worse phenomenon of security threats faced by Pakistan. Bold steps are required in this respect to guard the border by showing serious response against any allegation.

As a front line ally, Pakistan has suffered a lot. Pakistan needs economical help from the international community particularly the US. Pakistan should start, with the help of international community and US, developmental projects especially in the tribal region of FATA. Instead of exerting pressure on Pakistan to oust extremism, the United States, the international community and Pakistan in mutual collaboration can eventually purge terrorism. Political reforms, social development and economic prosperity in the tribal areas can help to maintain peace in long run not only in Pakistan, the tribal areas but also the regional countries and even the world. Malik

Gohar Ayub told that USA and other western countries can help the tribesmen to give them free educational visas so that the tribal region could be modernized. It will help in minimizing the militant tendencies there as well.424Malik Niamat Ullah expressed if the funds given to Pakistan by the foreign countries are utilized well can lead to development of the tribal area.425

As discussed before that the presence of insurgents in the tribal areas is due to its location near Afghan border and the porous borders between Afghanistan and the tribal region of FATA as well. So, it is the responsibility of both Pakistan and Afghan governments to pay special attention in this regard to stop the insurgents’ infiltration. The jirga system and the tribal lashkar should also be used for the said purpose.

In a nutshell, it is a difficult task to brining change and peace in the tribal region of FATA. It will take time, effort and will demand the parties to make concessions to each other. Perhaps one of the

424 Malik Gohar Ayub, Interview by the Author, Op. Cit.

425 Malik Niamat Ullah, Interview by the Author, Op. Cit.

145 reasons that make this conflict so problematic is the numerous actors involved in it, all with unlike aims and attitudes. To suppress the issue of militancy, extremism and terrorism in the tribal region and the settled areas of Pakistan as well, besides the above suggestions, there is need for a stable

Afghanistan. To get peace efforts to succeed and have a stable Afghanistan, it is need of the hour to remove the widening misunderstanding and mistrust among Pakistan, the United States and

Afghanistan. Their role is imperative for the efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. We cannot keep aside

Iran from the turmoil in Afghanistan. Reservations of Iran about peace talks with the Pakistan- supported Taliban and the widening gap between US and Iran are other complicated fault lines.

Without the support of Iran peace talks cannot be succeeded. So, to bring Iran on the table is a major challenge for the Western alliance. Iran will not tolerate to support any initiative which gives a predominant role to the Taliban. In the same way, Russia and China are also important actors in the region. Russia considers the continued presence of US troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014 with glances that hinder regional cooperation on Afghan end game.

It is also highly necessary to prevent Afghanistan becoming the center of a new proxy war between India and Pakistan. So, without their support, no peace can be imagined in Afghanistan. The major powers should also play their due role for improvement in Indo-Pak relations because it would have the most positive influence on the peace efforts in Afghanistan. The legitimate security concerns of Pakistan have to be taken into consideration for an orderly transition in Afghanistan.

It is also highly needed that Islamabad should come out of the circle to install a ‘Pakistan-friendly’ government in Kabul. Such an ambition could be disastrous for the regional stability and it is neither in favour of

Pakistan nor Afghanistan. Islamabad certainly have concerns about Pashtun revolt spreading to its borders. This concern of Pakistan may be valid but it may not give her the right to act as a spokesperson for the Pashtuns in

Afghanistan or for that matter Afghan Taliban as well. Although Pakistan has the capacity to play an important role in the peace process in Afghanistan but it cannot and should not be required to speak on behalf of the entire group of

146 insurgents. Pakistan can play the role of facilitator for holding of talks between the Taliban and Afghan government, but it would be a grave mistake on its part to become a party to the ethnic divide in Afghanistan.

On the other hand, Kabul must not play the politics of the question of the Durand Line and must respect it as an international boundary. This border must be better controlled and guarded in order not to allow any side to use as sanctuaries for each other’s insurgents. The settlement of the question of border could eliminate a major source of conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan and help build the trust that is essential for Afghan peace process and regional stability. Afghanistan must not get involved in the internal affairs of Pakistan as it will lead to distrust between Islamabad and Kabul. No doubt, stable Afghanistan is critical for peace in the entire region, but it is much more important for Pakistan which is a direct affectee by the long war spilling over to its territory.

Pakistan must stop its land to be used by Afghan insurgents for cross border terrorism. It is mistake on the part of Islamabad to use Taliban to turn the situation in Afghanistan in its favour. Such mistake would not only keep the region in turmoil but would also hurt Pakistan the most, as its military is fighting a bloody war against home grown insurgents and militants. Similarly, the rise of insurgency and extremism in Pakistan is a serious threat not only to the country’s own internal security but also to regional stability. The policy of ambivalence and appeasement in suppressing some extremist groups has turned the country into a training center for Islamic radicals from across the world. Economically, the rise of insurgency says worse on the country’s economic stability. If Pakistani civil and military leadership is serious in the country’s economic and social progress, it is need of the hour to formulate an overarching strategy to combat rising militancy. Such type of strategy is not only critical for the country’s social and economic progress but the international security as well.

Stable and peaceful Afghanistan would open extensive trade and economic opportunities for the entire region and beyond. A stable and peaceful Afghanistan could play its due role by connecting Middle East, Far East,

Central Asia and South Asia. By connecting these countries can bring vast trade and economic benefits to the region. Afghanistan can become economically prosperous by rehabilitation and reconstruction of the ancient Silk

Road which would help the fast transit of goods. Similarly, India and Pakistan could also get transmission of electricity and supply of natural gas from Central Asia via stable Afghanistan. In the same way, the region could be

147 developed through construction of motorways and railroads linking China, Central Asia, South Asia and Iran. In this way, the Afghanistan's enormous mineral resources would be exploited.

Furthermore, by closer regional cooperation, common objectives such as combating narcotics, terrorism and organized crime could be controlled. The entire region is facing the ailment of rising violent extremism and militancy and hence there is a need for an effective regional strategy to combat it.

It is time that Pakistan should think seriously about the tribal region of FATA and undertake security and political reforms there so as to make it safe for the tribesmen living there and get their good wishes as well. Moreover, all religious laws discriminatory on the basis of sex, sect and religion should be repealed, anyone who promotes or glorifies the violence must be prosecuted; the resources of federal and provincial agencies enforcing the civil laws should be improved. Article 8 of the Constitution of 1973, which stipulates that "any act or any custom or usage having the force of law, to the extent that it is incompatible with the rights conferred by (this article) should be strictly enforced in such a way as to prevent the dissolution and annihilation of FATA. The government of Pakistan should use force so that the tribesmen should know that sovereignty is the monopoly of states only. Therefore, all the world,

States, the agencies should be deterred from providing weapons and technical support to any type of group of rebels or insurgents in the tribal areas. Finally it would also include stripping black markets particularly illegal trade of arms and drugs in FATA.

The US recent decision to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by December 2014 is also surprising as the issue of militancy and terrorism has not been tackled yet. To bring change in the region is challenging, so a carefully thought out plan and a clear strategy can always overcome difficulties. The

US government should mend its hegemonic image in the region if she wants to see stable Afghanistan,

Pakistan and its tribal region. There is no need of mounting pressure on Islamabad. Instead, the US government should use the policy of incentives and cooperation to get the desired results. The unilateral

148

US strikes against militants in the tribal region of FATA represent a question mark on Pakistan’s territorial integrity and its sovereignty.

Sher Jan Ahmadzai, Research Associate at the Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of

Nebraska at Omaha and former Aide to President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, expressed the same views as to how the issue of terrorism and militancy in FATA can be redressed. He said that the problem of terrorism and militancy in FATA should be tackled through application of many ways. He stated that sending army or surgical operation in the tribal areas is not the viable way and does not provide any long term solution of the issue under probe. He expressed the same views as mentioned earlier in chapters 4 &

5, to redress the basic problems and the key factors of terrorism and militancy was because of the way

FATA has been maltreated since long. He pointed out that unless the economic, political, civic, etc. issues/problems of the tribesmen are redressed, the issue of militancy and terrorism cannot be redressed.

Terrorism and militancy in FATA is not limited to FATA only. It cannot be addressed by narrow approaches. It requires a holistic and regional approach that should also involve its support networks inside Pakistan’s settled areas.426 Similarly, Pir Zubair Shah highlighted that unless and until the ill attitude towards FATA is stopped in the policy of Pakistan, nothing can be improved. He also pointed out that Pakistan must have to mend its attitude towards Afghanistan and vice versa.427

426Sher Jan Ahmadzai, Interview by the author, USA: University of Nebraska Omaha, July 30, 2014. Sher Jan Ahmadzai is a Research Associate at Center for Afghanistan Studies University of Nebraska Omaha USA, and former aide to President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan.

427Pir Zubair Shah, Interview by the author, New York, USA, August 5, 2014. Pir Zubair Shah is a journalist held from South Waziristan Agency, FATA. He writes to the New York Times and many other organizations. He is now the Edward R. Murrow press fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He joins CFR from the New York Times. He was a reporter in Pakistan, working in the Waziristan tribal area along the border with Afghanistan. His recent book, “telling the story of Pakistan through his own journey from a tribal boy to a New York Times reporter” is about to publish. He shared the 2009 Pulitzer Prize for international reporting for his work at the New York Times and was the 2012 Nieman Fellow.

149

Finally, it is important that the relationship between Islamabad and Afghanistan must be closely observed by US. Strategic culture of Pakistan is traditionally inclined to master Afghanistan. Similarly,

Afghanistan oppose to Pakistan each and every time. Pakistani interests in the region dates back to the times before the Soviet occupation and recently it has been a decisive player by either supporting the jihadists against USSR or Taliban during the Afghan civil war. It is need of the hour that Afghanistan should mend its attitude regarding Pakistan. It is important as well that the international community should assist Pakistan to crush militancy.

Finally, this chapter investigates the impacts of the militant activities particularly on Pakistan and especially on the Pashtun belt. The policy measures adopted by the government to counter militancy in

FATA have been probed. The problems faced by the government of Pakistan in dealing with militancy in

FATA and the possible ways have been suggested.

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Conclusion

Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan are the focus of world attention once again after the incident of 9/11. These areas have always played an important role in the history of the region, presenting a valid, wide and valuable treasure of landscape, planes, towering peaks, archeology and cultural legacy. The tribesmen are well known for their bravery, cultural heritage, traditions and hospitality.

FATA has remained in international focus since the turbulent Cold War era due to its geostrategic position and the mode of the tribal society as the rival forces (Soviet-British & Soviet-US) competed to extend their spheres of influence in the region. Though FATA has remained at the cross-roads of civilizations yet it has assumed much more importance after 9/11 due to the rise of militancy which is a menace not only for Pakistan but for the entire region even the whole world.

With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, FATA lost its importance only for a short span of time to re-emerge on the global scene after the incident of 9/11. The people of tribal region were however quick to realize the extreme sensitivity of the situation arising out of the 9/11 when the government of

Pakistan decided to ally itself with the NATO forces and to deploy troops along the western border. In the initial days, the tribal areas remained calm and there was no big challenge to the world from militant activities. But with the passing of each day the situation worsened.

The situation in FATA is extremely volatile nowadays. It has dangerous repercussions not only for the tribal region but also for the country even for the region and the world at large. However, one should not surprise for such type of situation in FATA because since ancient times it has been of critical importance to South Asian and Central Asian states and empires due to its geographical and strategic alignment on the northwest and the character of its inhabitants as well. Yet the understanding of the tribal

151 region, unfortunately, is driven by a lack of awareness of the broader history and deeper cultural knowledge that have shaped this region.

In the present context of militant and extremist activities in the tribal region of FATA, though local, regional and global factors play an important role yet it is the direct outcome of depriving the tribesmen from their fundamental rights and the historically ill-treatment of the region by the successive Pakistani governments and the Afghan wars since 1979 and the presence of United States and NATO forces in

Afghanistan after 9/11 though major part of it has pull out by December 2014. Besides, the unilateral actions in FATA from across the border led to resentment and lack of trust among the local populations.

Such type of unilateral actions paved way for religious fundamentalism to foster and grow unchecked across the tribal belt.

It worsened the situation as the tribal way of life has historically been miss-perceived, misunderstood and miss-portrayed both regionally and internationally as well. On the other hand, this treatment leads local tribes to stick firmly to their way of life regardless of the repercussions. It led to isolate tribesmen from the rest of the country. The tribal areas have been neglected in developmental programmes and no serious effort has been made to solve their problems amicably. The Pakistani authorities and the international community only resorted to the use of force which increased mistrust and aggravated the situation.

After the incident of 9/11, Pakistan became an ally of the US and NATO forces in the ongoing ‘war on terror’, which further embittered the religious section of the Pashtun/tribal society against the government’s policies. It resulted in the formation of various militant organizations who started an armed struggle against the NATO and US forces in Afghanistan and to end US influence on the government of

Pakistan. To pressurize the government of Pakistan, the extremists and militants started targeting the civil servants, common masses and the security forces as well. They resorted to all kinds of militant and violent activities throughout the country. Though most of the countries have been allied with the US for

152 fighting war on terror yet militancy in the tribal region is increasing day by day after 9/11, especially it reached to its peak after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the fall of the Taliban government in

Afghanistan. It resulted in a heavy loss of Afghan civilians’ lives which directly affected the tribal belt of

Pakistan, by fueling militancy.

This sort of situation has many reasons. Militancy in FATA, though actually started with Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, yet, most importantly, it is the direct outcome of the historical treatment of the tribal region by the successive Pakistani governments. FATA was isolated from the mainstream of the country which deprived the tribesmen from the developmental programmes leading to the rise of rebellion among them. The tribesmen were used for strategic purposes by successive Pakistani governments in the past. Even now government of Pakistan has been locked-in in the past decisions and policies.

Despite constitutional, political and administrative isolation and social ambiguity, the tribal region has remained a peaceful and calm at large. The scenario in the neighbouring Afghanistan and its effects, the entire Soviet operation did play an instrumental role in transforming the nature of events in FATA.

The Afghan war in 1980s affected the structure of tribal society due to the presence of foreigners, refugees, radical madrassas and culture of weapons yet its structure remained stable and largely intact.

There were no such frequent violent and militant activities and the tribesmen never posed a threat to the state of Pakistan. But the episode of post 9/11, 2001 developments destroyed the tribal culture altogether.

Indeed, since the U.S. intervention, Pakistan faced numerous repercussions and the entire region has become extremely volatile. This has had a particularly negative impact on FATA, which is now seen as the sanctuary of militant, terrorist, Al-Qaeda and other militant organizations. Initially, the violence was restricted to North and South Waziristan, but growing instability in Afghanistan particularly in 2007, has led to trouble spilling to the relatively stable and peaceful agencies of Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai and

Khurram. Slowly and gradually, the violence spread to settled parts of Pakistan as well.

153

Despite nearly fourteen years of war in Afghanistan, there is no visible sign of stability in FATA. Al-

Qaeda and Taliban are still at large while a growing insurgency has gained momentum and continues to escalate. In fact, the ongoing operations have left in its wake a far more unstable FATA than existed on that momentous day in 2001, as the scope and threat posed by terrorist groups has grown significantly in regions such as Africa, Asia and Europe. Likewise, the Tribal region continues to suffer from violence and insecurity, which is exacerbated due to Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. Militant factions like Al-

Qaeda, Taliban and other regional and local groups resorted to the use of force for their political, ideological and religious objectives which further exacerbated instability in the region.

Besides the Afghan factor, negligence of successive governments vis-a-vis tribal belt played an important role in the rise of militant and extremist activities there. In fact the tribal region of FATA has been neglected in all fields of life since the inception of Pakistan. The same old and obsolete policies and laws of the British Raj are in vogue in FATA. After inception, the government of Pakistan introduced some territorial and geographical changes by creating three more agencies that are Orakzai, Bajaur and

Mohmand agencies. Though some administrative changes were initiated in the tribal areas but those were only of kind not of quality and it could not improve the plight of the tribesmen as the same draconian laws and repressive system of the British era was retained unchanged. Before independence, the administration of the tribal region was run directly by the central government of British India, so as to handle the related strategic issues quickly. So, the tribal area remained a discrete and separate part of

India and an experimental laboratory and a training centre for colonial officers. The British adopted only short term policy of governance to pacify the gateway to India. They never adopted developmental program to improve quality of life of the common tribesmen. The tribal region was bypassed and the blessings of better life and civilization were never fully extended to it.

Pakistan retained the same colonial laws and regulations in the tribal region after independence. It was only the change of masters. The same type of colonial legacy of political arrangements with the tribesmen was retained by the state of Pakistan. Governor of the province of NWFP (now Khyber 154

Pakhtunkhwa) was the administrative head of the tribal area, who was responsible to the Governor-

General of Pakistan. Nothing changed regarding FATA even after the promulgation of the first constitution of Pakistan in 1956. The laws of FCR were repugnant to fundamental rights as mentioned in the constitution. The constitutions of 1956 and 1962 looked like they were not meant for tribesmen of

FATA. The colonial status of the tribal areas and political administration under FCR was left unchanged and retained in both of the constitutions of 1956 and 1962.

FCR is still the anachronistic legal system in FATA and Political Agent, the head of an administrative unit, is solely responsible to the central government. History of events and careful study of systems in the tribal areas show that the odd policies that were implemented in FATA benefited only the selected people and the ruling elites of the state. In fact, the tribal region has been used as a tool since the inception of Pakistan for the promotion of state’s security policy. For the said purpose the government of

Pakistan retained an entrenched policy of subjugation and repression of arrest, torture, surveillance, harassment, blockade, banning political organizations and assembly, seizure of their property and collective responsibility of any wrong done by the tribe. The tribal region has been alienated historically from the mainstream and still the same situation is prevailing. The tribesmen have been and are treated as aliens. It has created the sense of relative deprivation among the tribesmen which ultimately resulted in rebellion in the form of extremist and militant activities.

The tribal region is an integral part of Pakistan as mentioned in Article 1 of the constitution of

1973 but the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Court of Pakistan is not extended to the tribal area in Article 247 (7) of the same constitution. No petition can be registered against fundamental rights

155 violation in these courts. Both the judicial as well as executive powers are exercised by the political agent which is a clear violation of the spirit of Article 175 of the constitution which separates the two branches of government, executive and judiciary. No act or law passed in the parliament of the state can be extended to the ill-fated tribal areas. However, it is still geographically an integral part of Pakistan.

These MNAs are expected to speak for the issues meant for nation but they are indifferent to the matters related to their communities and constituencies. So, the region of FATA has been maltreated both in federal laws and the constitutions of Pakistan. The area has been treated step motherly even in the laws of the country. It is due to this factor the tribesmen feel deprivation which led to current rebellious stance.

The incident of 9/11 proved to be an immediate factor and an impetus in the rise of militancy because the sense of deprivation was already prevailing over there.

FCR and Federal laws provide legal base for the dictatorial political system in the tribal region. As mentioned earlier, FCR confers both the judicial as well as executive authority on the political administration in the tribal area. Both civil and criminal cases are decided through Jirga which is constituted for the said purpose. The Jirga is constituted by the Political Agent but he is above it and its decisions are not binding upon him. An appeal can be made against the decision of the Political Agent to the Commissioner; however the commissioner has no authority to declare null and vide the decision of

PA. In addition, the decision of commissioner could be revised in a Tribune, comprised of Secretary Law and Secretary Home departments of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

156

Under Section 40 of FCR, collective responsibility is enforced running parallel to the Article 8 of

1973 Constitution which is considered an anomaly in the modern world. Under the purview of collective responsibility, a person can be arrested and imprison by the respective political administration for any crime committed by his family member, villager or even his tribesman. In spite of the fact that FCR is a total negation of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, yet it remains in practice as it was in the British period. The government of Pakistan is silent to bring an end or bring about significant changes in the

FCR.

The then President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari brought about some changes in August 2011 in the infamous laws of FCR. For the first time Political Parties Order 2002 was extended to the tribal areas. In the same amendment, a Tribune was constituted to hear appeal against the decision of political administration. In addition, some inconsequent changes have been brought in some sections of FCR dealing with collective responsibility. In the amendment clause, women, men above sixty-five years of age and children below sixteen years of age are exempted to be arrested. The powers of political administration to confiscate the property were curtailed. In final analysis, the FCR is still a black and notorious law. The government is not willing to scrape it out completely and extend the common law that is applicable in the rest of the country. So, history matters. No one can say that such type of treatment with the tribesmen since past may not lead to frustration. The choices with the tribesmen are limited.

They will be either exploited by terrorist and militant groups and organizations or they will resort to unlawful activities.

The ongoing militant and extremist insurgency in FATA is not only a local phenomenon; rather things have spilled over into Pakistan from across its Western borders since the Russian invasion 1979.

After the withdrawal of the Soviets, a civil war broke out between different militant factions which jeopardized the whole Afghan society. These were the days when about one-fourth of total five million

Afghan refugees were living together with the local inhabitants in Pakistan particularly the tribal pashtun areas. 157

Even in the initial years after the US attack on Afghanistan in 2001, the tribal belt remained calm.

However, with increased resistance in Afghanistan, the tribal areas have been gradually transformed into a war zone. American and Allied Forces have drastically failed in achieving any of their stated targets.

NATO and American forces have been launching military operations without intimating Pakistani authorities and this has resulted in foreign militants being pushed into Pakistani settled areas. Agreements with militants that could ensure peace in the area were sabotaged by airstrikes and propaganda - resulting in expansion of the militancy. Youth of the area are fast joining the militants and one of the reasons is that

FATA is underdeveloped, with scarce social services and virtually no job opportunities despite the territory having vast potential for development, particularly in the mineral sector.

In the same way, the tribal areas have been neglected in all fields of life by the successive Pakistani governments since its inception. The tribesmen have been used for different purposes by its own state.

Historically, they have been exploited. They have been neglected by no provision of modern facilities of life. It led to deprivation among the tribesmen. Its ultimate outcome is in the shape of extremist and militant activities. To counter this phenomenon of insurgency as well as to remove the sanctuaries and safe havens of militants in the tribal region, a comprehensive politico-economic strategy must be adopted to rescue FATA from decent into chaos.

158

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