Virtual Democracy in :

Information Technology, Internet Political Message Board,

and the Politics of Representation in Thailand after 1992:

Pitch Pongsawat*

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"The medium, or process, of our time- electronic technology- is reshaping and restructuring patterns of social interdependence and every aspect of our personal life. It is forcing us to reconsider and reevaluate practically every thought, every action, and every institution formerly taken for granted." Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore (1967). The Medium is the Massage. P.8

The paper is an attempt to understand the current landscape of the relationship between media and politics in Thailand after the bloodshed event of 1992. Central to the discussion of this paper is the question of the origin, significance, and impact of new media technologies in relation to the politics of representation in Thailand, with a focus on Internet Political Message Board (IMB). I argue that although the conventional belief of looking at the positive relationship between the media and the rise of civil society-public sphere in Thailand is compelling, closer attention needs to be focused on both access to these technologies, and how the technologies operate. The discussion on the access to new information technologies tells us who is the "netcitizen" in Thailand. The discussion on how the technologies operate tells us to what extent technology is used to set the limit of democratic possibility in Thailand.

My conclusions go beyond the general argument of pointing out the dominance of the middle class' power over the political agenda. I argue that the use of the new IMB technology in

Thailand reveals that this middle class-led public sphere is contentious, unsustainable, and unable to resolve fundamental conflicts in Thailand due to the lack of trust among the participants. The lack

* Lecturer: Department of Government, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, 10330, Thailand [[email protected]]. Ph.D. Student: Department of City and Regional Planning, University of California at Berkeley, CA 94720-1850 [[email protected]].

2 of trust leads to self-censorship among Internet communities as we can see from both the content of the discussion and the creation of the limits of democratic possibility by certain forms of technology. The critical case that reveals the lack of trust among the participant is a dispute over the release of Internet Protocol (IP) address on the message board to reveal or to trace the "true" identity of the participants. This is especially the case when the discussion gets into the area of

"politics" that centers around three major political issues; 1) the politics of personality, 2) the politics of development, and 3) the politics of memory. The lack of trust phenomenon can be traced back to the dominant claim of "mob discourse" or conspiracy theory that is a major political discursive practice since the 1970s political uprising and massacre.

The structure of this paper is divided into three major parts. It starts with a general survey of contemporary Thailand's media and information technologies. The second part of this paper deals with a detailed discussion of IMB, with a focus on Pantip.com [http://www.pantip.com], the most popular IMB in Thailand. The final part raises the questions concerning the future roles of information technologies in Thailand's politics of representation and democratization.

I) Information Technology, Media and Current Thai Politics: A General Survey

In this section I will provide a general survey of how information technology has been used in the media with regards to Thai politics since the 1992 uprising. In sum there is both a continuation and an invention in terms of the types of political media and the types of technology in these media. Central to the new relationship between the media and politics in Thailand are three inter-related movements in the relationship between media and Thai politics. These three movements take place in five types of media. The three movements are 1) the freedom of speech movement, 2) the (freedom of) "speed" movement, and 3) the expansion of public sphere by 3 increasing levels of participation via "interactive" technology. The five major types of political media in contemporary Thailand include 1) newspapers, 2) civic radio stations, 3) television news stations (and news television), 4) polls, and 5) Internet message boards (IMBs).

Three Major Movements in Media and Politics:

1. Freedom of Speech: Post 1992 politics saw a major leap in the guarantee of freedom of speech in Thai politics, with the establishment of Article 39 of the 1997 Constitution. The censorship of press, radio, and television, which had been widely practiced during the authoritarian regime, is now prohibited. There exists a new media committee, set up as an independent political organization, outside the government's influence to look after the media and allocate frequencies.1

The rights of the reporters to freely express their views without intervention are now guaranteed by the new constitution.

2. Speed: Different braches of the media employ various types of technology in order to compete with each other, this is especially true when media becomes one of the large profitable businesses. Speed becomes a major benchmark in competition. Speedy reports are made possible by various new technologies such as facsimile, phone-in reports, satellite communication, as well as updated news on the newspaper web sites.

3. Interactive Technology: New technology not only increases the speed of information transmission, it also creates real-time communication between the information receiver and the information disseminator. This interactive technology can increase a sense of "imagined community"2, that stretches beyond the ability to share information, into the ability to exchange opinions in real time.

1 The law is currently being developed in the legislature. 2 See Anderson (1992) for detail. 4

Five types of Political Media in Contemporary Thailand: The three movements are articulating in the various types of media as presented below. In sum, newspapers, civic radio and television news seems to be continuing an increasing role of media in Thai politics as a channel of political participation. However, there are also internal developments within these media that will be discussed in detail. The most recent political media to develop are polls and IMBs.

1) Newspapers: After the 1992 uprising and until the economic crisis in the second half of the 1990s, magazines and newspapers (especially the political and business newspapers) flourished.

Substantial parts of the Thai daily and weekly business newspapers and weekly political magazines survived the economic crisis.3 Their survival was largely made possible by the restructuring of the press industry. Most, if not all, of the survivors are no longer operated by small independent presses, rather they are operated by the multimedia businesses in the stock market. Although the sources of income for the press comes from both advertisement and the retail price, in the last ten years there has been more than a 50% increase in the retail price. Retail price increases of up to

50% have forced the various media to become very competitive; and made media survival more challenging.

There are three major developments in the newspaper sector since the events of 1992 and the economic crisis: a) the diversification of media business, b) the rise and continuation of the "public intellectual" in press, and c) the rise of the "online" newspaper.

a) Media Business: Newspapers became part of products in the mega media business, that includes, for example, news radio, television news, print press, as well as the clipping business.

The expansion of media businesses requires new forms of management that sometimes creates tension between management teams and the reporters. However, the new constitution and the new

3 The major political and business newspapers and magazines are the Manager, Krugthepturakit, Matichon Weekly, Nation Weekly, Siamrath Weekly, and Prachachart Turakit Weekly. 5

Media Act (a result of the 1992 uprising) protect reporters from being laid off without proper reason.4

b) Public Intellectual: One of popular aspects of the Manager newspaper during the 1992 uprising was that they invited many university professors to write their own columns in the newspaper. This phenomenon opened up communication between the intellectual and the public in new ways and it became popular as a pattern for the current business newspapers and political magazines. It provides more in-depth analysis (mostly anti-state) to the news and current situation, and a link to progressive politics, or "people's politics" (that is advocating for the poor and the rural who are under-represented in the media).5 The columns also provide the intellectual more control over their own perspectives, avoiding arbitrary editing that occurs with interview columns. The columns also become a new source of income of the intellectual.6

c) Online Version: Speed and interactive technology are the new trends in the media business. All major newspapers are providing a free online version of the paper, as part of a new channel for advertisement.7 However, some newspaper and magazine do not publish a full version on line. Unlike the print version of the newspapers, online versions include updated headline news every hour, and poll/opinion/discussion sections.

2) Civic radios: There has been an increase in the number of "civic radio" stations. Civic radio stations played an important role in providing a space for discussion of and resistance to the

4 We should not ignore the fact these rights and privileges only came into being as a result of the long struggle between journalists and the authoritarian state. 5 The most popular columnists are Nithi Aewsriwong, Kasian Tejepira, and Giles Ji Ungpakorn, among others. Nithi is a professor in History currently retired from Chieng Mai University. Kasian is a professor in Politic Science at Thammasat University. He was also one of the student leaders in 1976 movement who fled to the jungle after the massacre. Giles is a left wing political science professor at Chulalongkorn University. He is also a son of the late Pauy Ungpakorn, the liberal technocrat who was in exile since the 1976 political turmoil. 6 Columnists are paid approximately from 1000-3000 Baht per article, depending on the popularity of the intellectual. National university salaries for professors with a Ph.D. start at 10,000 Baht/month. A full-professor (C11) receives around 30,000 Baht/month. 6 one-way information dissemination and censorship during the events of 1992. In the early development of civic radio, it reported Bangkok traffic, by allowing people to "phone-in" from their mobile phones. However, station like Jor Sor FM 100 opened non-rush hour airtime for discussions on a variety of topics. During the 1992 event, this military-sponsored, but middle class-based radio could not homogenize different political discussions based on different ideologies (i.e. the right wing and the progressive ideologies). In the end the producer chose to take sides with the military.

However, the newest popular radio "Ruam Doui Choui Kan" (Volunteering) does not focus on traffic reports. Rather, it rather focuses on all issues related to public legal dispute and Bangkok

City government's service delivery. In other words, it turns to the issues of public participation on the local levels, rather than national political issues.

One of the major obstacles to the development of civic radio is the form of radio administration in Thailand; all radio stations belong to various government agencies (both civilian and military).8 As a major source of income, the concession of frequencies is renewed every year with fierce competition. This situation also applies to the case of television stations.

The state's monopoly of radio and television is under a major challenge resulting from the new constitution's requirement that all stations be owned by "the public" and frequencies be allocated by a non-partisan organization. The by-laws of this non-partisan organization is currently being worked out on the legislature.

3) Television News and News Television Stations: The major outcomes of the 1992 uprising are the creation of the new public Independent Television Station (ITV) and the relatively larger time allocation for political news, political analysis, and political discussion programs. ITV

7 In fact an editor of a major political magazine told me that the sale of his magazine actually increased dramatically since he posted a free version online. 8 For example, there are currently 491 FM radio stations. 256 stations belong to the military-police, and 235 to the non- military government agencies. 7 was crated with a politically independent organizational structure with the goal of making sure that there will not be censorship in news broadcasts.9

The development of political analysis and political discussion programs in fact originated before the 1992 uprising. However, these political discussion programs had been periodically banned during the military regime prior to the uprising. Larger time allocation and freedom to criticize government's policies and practices in political news, political analysis, and political discussion programs took place after the uprising in terms of no censorship and (less) pressure from the government. Such broadcasts also made possible public discussions on political conflict and conflicts over development and resource allocation. In other words, government policies are publicly criticized. Public discussion on television (albeit with minimal time allocation compare to the total time allocation) thus becomes part of the conflict resolution process in current Thai politics.

The current situation is that there is now a News Television station on the cable network.

This cable news station is run by the Nation Group that once was behind ITV's popular assertive political news. However, the accessibility of the information by the public is still a big question.

Also, there is an allegation of conflict between the new board of ITV with the news staff. The news staff was forced to resign when they revealed that the board was trying to influence news production in favor of Taksin Chinnawatra (the media tycoon and the current Prime Minister who recently acquired the majority share of ITV) during the 2001 nation wide election campaign.

Last, the role of media, especially television media in Thai politics is reaching the new phase when the media capitalists are getting elected in the national elections and running the country.

9 Thailand has 6 Bangkok-based TV channels: 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 and ITV. Channel 3 and 9 belong to Mass Communication Organization of Thailand (MCOT). and 7 belong to the Army. Channel 11belongs to Public Relations, Department, Ministry of Telecommunication and Transportation (MOT). All regional based stations are the extension of channel 11. 8

These media capitalists once totally relied on the concessions from the state to operate their business without competition. The current head of Thai Rak Thai party, the first majority ruling party of Thailand and the prime minister, Thaksin Chinnawatra is the owner of Thailand's satellite, the only cable television network, and the nation's largest mobile phone company. Pracha

Malinond, a member of his party and the deputy minister of telecommunication and transportation, is also running Channel 3. Thaksin's administration is also publicly supported by Thanin

Jearwaranond, an agro-business tycoon who also has a concession with the ministry of telecommunication to provide all telephone lines in Bangkok and all provincial areas in Thailand.

All of them received concessions from MOT mostly during Chartchai Government in the late

1980s.

4) Polls: While freedom of speech has been guaranteed by the new constitution and the speed of information transmission is improved by various forms of media, the issue of validity claims of information becomes the key issue in the relationship between media and politics. The significance of the new "politics of opinion" or "politics of representation" can be traced back to a report by the Manager newspaper during the 1992 demonstrations, prior to the uprising. The

Manager claimed that the majority of the demonstrators came from the middle class, identified by college education and level of income. This claim creates two major possibilities of recent Thai politics: on the one hand, the claim of middle class opinion over the political movement rejects the typical "mobilized mob" or conspiracy theory argument put forth by the state in the political conflict. On the other hand, it unintentionally disassociates the political movements from the mass, both the worker and the peasant. It sets a new standard for Thai politics; i.e. political movements in

Thailand must have consent from the urban middle class. This consent is represented through opinion polls that are mainly conducted in the city. In other words, the colonization of the public 9 sphere by the middle class in Thailand does not occur only from the consumption of the media, it occurs also from the production of the media by the creation of opinion polls. It is in fact a circular reasoning when their opinion derives from the news they consume which is mostly based on the issues they are interested in, mostly about themselves.

Political polls in contemporary Thailand are mainly conducted by the media and/or with collaboration from a research unit of private-business university (Assumption Business

Administration College) and teacher colleges (eg: Rajapat Suan Dusit).10 The polls are conducted mainly to survey an opinion towards government policies and speculate upon the popularity of key political figures, using simple marketing research standards with major population sampling in

Bangkok. This is different from the pre-1992 polls that were conducted mainly by a social science research unit of national universities for the purpose of election estimation.

Contemporary political polls have been highly criticized as being "under-representative" and

"biased". Such criticisms come from right wing and rural-based veteran politicians.

5) Internet Message Boards (IMBs): IMBs became popular since the information technology boom. Provided by private Internet service providers, political message boards are actually part of many "discussion groups" on web boards/ message boards. Central to the popularity of IMB are accessibility and interactive technology that allow the viewers to express their own opinions right away. Also the establishment of any Internet postal site does not require any official permission or legal contract with the state.

There are three major ways of using Internet message boards in contemporary Thai media.

First, IMBs become part of newspaper web sites to get some opinions from the readers. Second,

10 This is with the exception of polls conducted by Therayuth Boonmee on behalf Thammasat University's research center. Therayuth is an outspoken anthropology professor at Thammasat who was a key student leader during the October 1973 uprising. However, Therayuth recently is turning himself to be a public intellectual by presenting his opinions in a press conference rather than conducting the poll. 10

IMBs become part of the web sites of political parties, key political figures, and organizations.

Third, IMBs become a major part of privately owned web sites. Private web sites are home to the most popular and comprehensive IMBs in contemporary Thailand.

The most popular IMB in Thailand is Pantip.com's Rajadamnern Cafe, named after

Rajadamnern Avenue where the 1992 uprising took place. A detailed discussion of this IMB is presented in the next section.

II) Internet Political Discussion Message Boards and the Politics of Representation in

Thailand: A Case of Pantip.com

"I want to see a one-stop online magazine that serves the interests of all communities, simulating the Thai community structure which has established temples, schools, and houses". -Wanchat Padongrat, founder of Pantip.com [Bangkok Post 12 October 1999]

A brief history of the Internet in Thailand can be traced back to the first commercial operation of an Internet Service Provider in 1995. At the middle of the year 2000 a media survey showed that the Internet is ranked fourth in popularity by young Thai adults, after television, radio, and print, respectively.11 According to the survey, the first priority for the use of the Internet is to communicate with others, followed by searching for information. The significance of the Internet as a new media is expected to increase, despite the fact that the total Internet population in Thailand today is less than one million.

Pantip.com, one of the most popular Internet portal sites in Thailand, and the first "Thai community web site", was set up in 1997 by a former programmer of Thai Airways International,

Wanchat Padungrat. The name of the web site was borrowed from Pantip Plaza, the largest computer retail complex in Bangkok, Thailand (also the largest pirated software market). It was 11 originally set up as a magazine-like web site, with an emphasis on the classified section as a major source of income. The content of the "magazine" was originally divided into two major departments: Information Technology (IT) and the non-IT departments. Later on the site started to introduce new community portals, or "cafes/tables/communities" covering such topics as automobiles, fine arts, politics and libraries.12 Recently the "cafes" section is listed above the

"technical exchange" section. Rajadamnern (political cafe13) and Chalermthai (entertainment cafe) are among the most popular cafes in Pantip.com.

In an interview with the Bangkok Post in 1999, Wanchat stated his ultimate goal that, "I never really think of myself as being the owner of Pantip.com. I just let the Web run by itself. The basic concept of Pantip is a community web and we try to make it a one stop service for visitors."

With 30,000 hits a day14, 30% of its visitors college students and 25% of its visitors college graduates, Pantip.com started to yield a financial return in 1999. In addition its reputation as the first Thai-language based community web site and one of the largest community and frequently visited web sites in Thailand grew. At the end of 1999, Pantip.com signed a five-year alliance contract with Nation Multimedia group (the owner of the Nation and Krungthep Turakij newspapers) for joint content development and marketing co-operation. Pantip.com will give exclusive rights to the Nation group to handle the marketing of Web advertising on its site, and

Krungthep Turakij's web site is obliged to contribute local news content to Pantip.com. This deal took place at the same period when the other two web portals, Sanook.com and Hunsa.com were taken over by large multimedia groups. Pantip.com currently earns more than 300,000 Baht a

11 A survey by Starcom of 200 young Thais, aged between 18-30 years old, splitting the sexes equally in downtown and outskirts of Bangkok. (Source: Nation 07/13/2000) 12 The names of the cafe/tables resemble well-known places/ items in Thailand. Pantip.com currently has 15 cafes covering 15 major non-ITs topics ranking from love, leisure, books, sports, finance, study abroad, science, spiritual, and politics. 13 The discussion includes issues on politics, economy, and society. 12 month, and expects a revenue surge this year; in addition they have a minimum advertisement guarantee from the Nation group.

The major characteristics of Pantip.com, when compared with the other two major web communities, are its seriousness and the relatively higher age of visitors. Sanook.com and

Hunsa.com seem to capture the younger generations. Apart from the IT forum and various links,

Pantip.com develops its reputation as an online community via its political discussion message board, Rajadamnern. The visitor can participate freely in discussions and in posting any topic.

Opinions expressed in Pantip.com are often quoted by the press in front page news stories, replacing the conventional interview style. Many newspapers have established a daily column summarizing political, social and economic Internet debates from various online communities (eg: "Judprakai

Dot Com" in Krungthep Turakij).

The rising popularity of Internet message boards raises questions concerning this new form of politics. Natee Vichitsorasatra, an IT columnist of the Nation, praises the popularity of

Pantip.com's Rajadamnern cafe as the rise of Habermasian's public sphere in Thailand.15 Natee argues that the public sphere is an arena dedicated to rational debate, independent from the government or partisan economic forces and accessible by all citizens.16

For Natee, Rajadamnern’s message board "forms a silent revolution in the Thai political world." He points to the success of this message board as a result of the quality of the discussion, stating that, "the audience debates ideas in an intelligent manner. (...) They offer constructive criticism instead of meaningless punch-lines so common in traditional Thai debate, better known as to-watee."17 Natee praises the way the board "self-regulated" itself by filtering out the lobbyists and

14 Figure from 1999 15 Nation 05/23/2000 16 Ibid. 17 Nation 09/02/2000 13 those with impure intentions from the web board with technology, tracking down the IP address and the telephone numbers, or "Internet finger print" of contributors. As a result of this tracking and filtering, Natee argues that this small message board is now "home to the opinions of academics, journalists, politicians and most importantly, people of all background. Also "it now has a loyal and large following of thoughtful minds, capable of formulating educated debates and opinions. All participants, regardless of fame, education or wealth, are equal in their ability to argue a cause.”18

With the development, he argues, “Thais now have a free-flowing arena in which to express their opinions on sensitive issues, censors only by one's morals, ethics and conscience."19 At the end of his article, his Smithian sentiment argument points to the major obstacle for the new economy; i.e. the lack of the interest of the government to support small and medium enterprises.

The liberal view of the public sphere's inclusiveness of the new media (in contrast with "the vocal mass media" the enterprising businessman, and the influential) is challenged by the ex-student leader during the 1976 massacre, Thongchai Winichakul, who is actively campaigning to reveal the facts of the 1976 event. Thongchai is skeptical about the sense of "public" in this new political community. Instead, he argues that the views of this board represent the educated, urban middle classes, and younger educated classes that support the new constitution. Thongchai also raises the question of how sympathetic this group is with the rural people who are still perceived as "ignorant, selling their votes and electing those corrupt politicians to the parliament."20

While agreeing with Thongchai that the claim of inclusiveness of Rachadamnern cafe is far fetched and mythical, I would like to go into more detail about how the form of technology itself can shape certain stages of democratization in Thailand. It is no doubt that the rise and popularity of the political message board takes place at the conjuncture of the three major movements in the

18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 14 relationship between media and politics in Thailand. These three movements are, as stated earlier: freedom of speech, speed, and interactive technology to enhance inclusiveness. It is, for the first time, that the new technology allows the visitors to exchange ideas freely in "cyber space" and in real time. Also, and of principal importance, the visitors do not have to reveal their own identity.

Anonymity or fictional identities may make them feel more comfortable in discussion. Technically speaking, however, tracing the IP address and telephone numbers is possible, and have been conducted many times (primarily they are conducted at the request of the portal owner when cases involve serious violation of "invisible" rules such as child abuse attempts or fraud).21 At the same times the web master can delete any inappropriate message and/or block the IP address to prevent the access of those who use that address to log in. This is the reason why the supporters of the online democracy have faith that there will be an end to any conspiracy, which constituted "mob politics" since the 1970s.

Although the argument of the inclusiveness of "people of all classes" is hardly sustained due to small numbers of the net population (netizens)22, such skepticism should not overlook the increase in Internet access for group such as college students. All colleges do provide free access to the Internet on and off campus, and small informal and inexpensive "Internet cafes" do flourish around campus.23 In other words, while Internet discussion groups may not be accessible to the total population, discussion groups are accessible to other classes as a whole. If this is the case, a question to ask is how does one make sense of the current stage of democratization in Thailand? In

20 Nation 09/05/2000 21 However, IP address from a commercial Internet cafe service or in libraries are difficult to track down when the user does not have to login. 22 The Thai Internet population constitutes less than a million users, as compared with the total Thai population of 60 million and the eligible voter population of 30 million. 23 Fees range from 15-30 baht per hour. 15 reading into the practice of Internet political discussion groups, what picture of urban-middle class democracy emerges?

My observation is that the major challenging task for the current stage of democratization in

Thailand is not about the acceptance of freedom of speech. Freedom of speech to a great extent is fully guaranteed by the new constitution. The challenging task is the micro level politics of how certain types of political freedom is practiced. For the case of the Internet political message board, it is too simple to celebrate the existence of this cyber public space or to be entirely skeptical about the class composition. What actually takes place is certainly the existence of a variety of opinions.

However, the debate in the IMB does not resolve in the agreement or mutual understanding among the visitors. Furthermore, freedom to post any new topic and opinion into the board by the participants sometimes makes it difficult to maintain the momentum of discussion and to capture the attention of the participants especially when the topic moves to the next page.24

When taking a close look into the discussion in IMB, there are three major issues that have been recurring without any agreement, mutual understanding, or solution. These three major issues are "the politics of personality", "the politics of development" and "the politics of memory".

1) The politics of personality: A cynical agreement to blame the current political system as being corrupt and not responsive always comes up in the discussion. Also, when it comes to the discussion regarding opinion towards some leaders, visitors tend to split into two extremely different camps and sometimes reject different opinions. These discussions usually end with the sentence; "This is my 'personal' opinion, and I don't care what others think!".

At the moment, it is clear there is extreme disagreement between the supporter of Thanksin

Chinnawatra, the present Prime Minister, and Chaun Leekpai, the former Prime Minister and the current opposition leader. Both of them put the blame on each other and attack the other for 16 sabotaging and agitating each other's topics. Personality and personal life of political leaders are the major content of discussion. It is interesting to view the growing popularity of Internet discussion as an extension of "gossip politics" which is always the local practice (at least) in Thailand.25

2) The politics of development: Central to the discussion is the debate between the belief in the "readiness" level of democracy in Thailand, in relation to the level of economic and social development. Sometime the discussion starts from satirical expression towards the quality of a member of the parliament or the cabinet member who is a representative from a rural area. Then the discussion continues to answer that these low quality representatives came from money politics and vote buying in the rural area and is a result of the low level of economic and social

(educational) development. In other words "the low quality representative mirrors the low quality voter."

Furthermore, the discussion sometimes reveals an opinion that the protests from many poor/rural organizations are not based on rationality or "rules", but irrationality and arbitrariness.

Moreover, these "mobs" also does not "represent" the majority of the poor and they are mobilized by a third person.

3) The politics of memory: The discussion on the "correctness" of some majors political struggles in Thailand, especially the two major massacres in October 1976 and May 1992 have emerged in the cafe on occasion. Massive discussions on the massacres occur during the anniversaries of the events. These discussions also emerge when some key political figures during

24 Pantip solves this problem by introducing "the famous/popular topics" section before the general topic. 25 I am really indebted to Craig Reynolds for his comment on the issue of gossip politics. 17 that time is running for any major political campaign, as in the case of Samak Suntharavet’s

Bangkok governor campaign last year.26

In general, the dispute is mainly about (communist) conspiracy accusation from the right wing, and the authoritarian accusation from those who consider themselves progressive. However, the most interesting point is that many opinions either said that they are "too young" to remember or to have participated in those two events, or "we should forget the past and go to the future together."

It also should be noted that while some might argue that the politics of memory isn't so much about the "correctness" of major political struggles but a struggle about control over the narratives telling stories of these bloodshed events, I would like to argue that from the point of view of the participants in the cafe, there is the only one truth about the event.27

My observation does not mean to ignore the huge amount of the visitors who are just

"watching" many hot debates or who may post the objective question that starts with "what do you think about .... (the issues/public figures)?" Perhaps it is still hard to know how the "silent majority" think and act, despite advances in interactive and speedy information technology.

Leaving the silent majority argument aside, I would like to interpret this Internet phenomenon as a new possibility to open up a new realm of politics in Thailand. At least it reveals to a certain extent the tension and frustration of a certain class, with more narratives than the simple opinion polls and the way news is reported conventionally (i.e. one-way) by the press, radio, and television. However, the major challenge in the new politics is not only about how to incorporate various ideas to reach a shared understanding, but also how to build trust among the discussants.

Often times computer literate participants do not express their opinions in the message boards,

26 The dispute between Samak and Giles Ji Ungpakorn, a decendent of Dr. Pauy Ungpakorn who was unfairly attacked during the 1976 massacare, regarding Giles’ request for Samak to clear himself of all right wing activity allegations during that time is one of largest and hottest debates in Pantip.com last year. 27 With special thanks to Craig Reynold's comment on my earlier draft. 18 rather they accuse their opponents by showing that they can trace an IP address to show that their opponents do not sincerely engage in the conversation because various opinions seem to come from the same IP address.28 The bottom line is that IP address can show the institution (if it is not the commercial Internet provider) that the discussant is affiliated with and where the discussant logs in.

Rajadamnern is the only community in Pantip.com that displays IP addresses.29 30

Issue of deliberative democracy in Thailand via Pantip.com is also challenged by the most famous/largest "underground" web site: Lhudlok.com31 where the tone of discussion is more sexually explicit. Participants in Pantip.com sometimes refer to Lhudlok.com as the degraded site, and suggest that some discussants should go visit this site instead of Pantip.com if the discussants cannot have a discussion in a proper well-articulate manner. On the other hand, a participant in

Lhudlok.com message board referred to Pantip.com's cafes as, "the cafes of the angel (- read the snob)."

III) The "King's Way"32 and the "Counterfeit Market": The Future of Information

Technology, Media, and the Politics of Representation in Thailand

"In the 90s, there is no medium, and there certainly is no message. We're living in the eclipse of the mass media. And why? Because a medium of communication implies reciprocity, exchange and a minimal degree of interaction. Mass media have never been about reciprocity, exchange, interaction, or even communication. They replace reciprocity with false simulation, exchange with the tyranny of information overload producing a numbed culture that shuts down for self-protection, interaction with a dense operational network substituting

28 Although tracking down the IP address is possible, tracking down the phone number is not possible and unconstitutional unless it is done by the police. Also technically a person can share the same IP address as a result of being automatically assigned from the Internet service provider when login. 29 There are certain attempts of this web site to create a sense of community beyond the online discussion, such as the membership and the open meeting among the membership. 30 There was another hot debate over Rajadamnern cafe last year that led to the first attempt by a discussant to file suit against another discussant. One of the participants was accused as intriguing and “selling the nation” by “accepting money from the foreign organization” because he is working as an NGO. 31 http://come.to/lhudlok 32 A direct translation of "Rajadamnern" Avenue is "King's way". Craig Raynold argues that King's way is literally "Royal Progress"; i.e. the king's royal procession in the old days that marked out the extent of his territory. It is different than the modern sense of progress (Kaona) (personal communication). 19

polls and focus groups and high-intensity marketing warfare for genuine human solidarity, data for communication, and speed for meaning." Arthur Kroker and Mariolouise Kroker. (1997). Digital Delirium. P.xiii.

"In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks: more of less numerous from one State to the next, it goes without saying - but this precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance of each individual country." Antonio Gramsci. (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks. p.238

Despite the fact that participants in the underground web sites like Lhudlok.com can freely discuss in improper words, the rule of this message board do not allow the discussants to discuss about "three pillars" of Thailand's civic religion: the Nation, the Religion, and the King.33 The same rule apply, implicitly and explicitly, to all Internet message boards in Thailand, including

Pantip.com's Rajadamnern cafe. This fact raises the questions of how much freedom of speech can be tested in contemporary Thai politics when the state seems to step out of the censorship role and leaves the power of regulating in the hand of civil society. Moreover, to what extent can the online deliberative democracy influence the "off-line" politics of Thailand, especially the politics of personality, development, and memory?

Discussions on the freedom of speech and the "King" are very sensitive topics, but also very compelling. Although, so far, there is a hegemonic consent concerning the respect for the present king across mediums in Thailand, this hegemonic consent does not extend to other member of the royal family. Forms of technology were used to release certain information about a member of the family that is not usually released to the public.34 For example, there were anonymous faxes distributed about the divorce of a royal family member, and forwarded photos on electronic mail of a royal family member's informal party. In this way, the idea of "(high-tech) gossip politics" might be applicable as a "weapon of the weak."

33 See Reynolds (1977) for detail. 34 With special thanks to Charles Keyes' comment on my earlier draft. 20

The rise of the new online deliberative democracy via Internet message board may not represent the opinion of the people of all classes, but it does represent a frustration of a certain class to address and make sense with addressing various current issues in Thailand's politics, economy and society. This class is the urban middle class that has access to the Internet.

However, so far this deliberative democracy has not resolved any conflict regarding the politics of personality, politics of development and the politics of memory, aside from creating a relatively safe space for discussion. Censorship does happen arbitrarily through the web master. A key fact is that in the end this new form of democracy cannot resolve the recurring dispute concerning authenticity of political identity (i.e. whether on-line and off-line political identities are one and the same). Attempts to capture reciprocity via interactive technology, as in the case of polls and IMB finally shows that politics of representation cannot be resolved simply by new interactive/speedy technology and censorship power in the hands of civil society. The belief that this beginning of the online democracy is a free and truly democratic realm ignores “closure” in the form of "membership" and a “disclosure” of "institutional" identity. In this way, the “specter” of conspiracy theory as a result of mob politics during the 1976 event is widespread. It is interesting to see how the middle class based on-line politics, in the end, deploys the conspiracy theory that was actually invented by the right wing during the 1970s struggle to guard against any improper violation of their own community.

The future of politics of representation in IMB may take two different trajectories. On the one hand, the level of participation may increase when the Internet infrastructure reaches the entire country, as part of the new government policy agenda, led by Thaksin Chinnawattra, the media tycoon who is now elected the prime mister. This will make IP tracing as an act of identity 21 disclosure meaningless. On the other hand, high technology can also prevent a level of participation by the creation of a "gated community" or the fragmentation of both issues and groups.

Acknowledgement:

Special Thanks to Peter Zinoman, Athikom Khunawut, Thongchai Winichakul, Jitat Fakchareonphol, Totsachai Asvinvichit, Malo Hutson, Chukiet Sivavethikul, Rungrawee Chalermsripinyorat, Charlie Carroll, Tira Foran, Songsanmanwah, Craig Reynolds, Charles Keyes, and Marc Askew. The article is a revised version of the paper presented at the 2nd National Thai Studies Conference, 12-13 July 2001, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Australia. The presentation at the conference was financially made possible by the Grant In Aid from the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of California at Berkeley. The Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University kindly gives permission for travelling. The earlier draft was presented at the 18th Berkeley annual conference on Southeast Asia, University of California at Berkeley in February 2001.

Selected Bibliography:

-Anderson, Benedict. 1977. "Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 Coup." Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 9 (3):13-30. -Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised edition. London and New York Verso. -Benhabib, Seyla. Ed. 1996. Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c1996. -Bohman, James and William Rehg. Eds. 1997. Deliberative Democracy : Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press. -Calhoun, Craig. Ed. 1992. Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press. -Callahan, William A. 1998. Imagining Democracy: Reading 'The Events of May' in Thailand. Singapore and London: ISEAS. -Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Ed. and Trans. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers. -Hewison, Kevin. Ed. 1997. Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation. London: Routledge. -Kroker, A. and M. Kroker. Eds. 1997. Digital Delirium. New York: St. Martin's Press. -McLuhan, M. and Q. Fiore. 1967. The Medium is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects. New York: Bantam Books. 22

-Morell, David, and Chai-anan Samudavanija. 1981. Political conflict in Thailand: Reform, Reaction, Revolution. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain. -Reynolds, Frank E. 1977. "Civic Religion and National Community in Thailand." Journal of Asian Studies 36 (2):267-282.