Exploring Local Governance in Urban Planning and Development

The case of Lindholmen, Göteborg

Doctoral dissertation

Åsa von Sydow

Stockholm 2004

TRITA-INFRA 04-026 ISRN KTH/INFRA/--04/026--SE ISSN 1651-0216 ISBN 91-7323-090-1

Royal Institute of Technology Department of Infrastructure Division of Urban Studies Unit of Urban Planning SE-100 44 Stockholm Telephone: +46 8 790 60 00 http://www.infra.kth.se/SP/

ii Exploring Local Governance in Urban Planning and Development The case of Lindholmen, Göteborg

Åsa von Sydow

Royal Institute of Technology Department of Infrastructure Division of Urban Studies

Abstract In the late 1970s the city of Göteborg was faced with massive job loss as well as an empty urban waterfront (Norra Älvstranden) due to the closing down of the shipyards. Since then Göteborg has been struggling to transform itself into a successful post-industrial city. The political leadership has worked diligently at promoting Göteborg as a knowledge and event city with the goal of creating growth in the region. After the shipyard crisis an area on the waterfront called Lindholmen was planned for housing, green areas and the preservation of an historically valuable building. In 1997, however, this all changed when the private company Ericsson started to look for a new office location and showed interest in the area. The company demanded the establishment of an IT-cluster consisting of 10 000 workplaces on the pier. This started a process which resulted in Lindholmen Science Park, a growth environment for knowledge intensive, high-tech companies. The urban planning and development process of Lindholmen is described and analyzed here. Specifically, the focus is on how public and private actors collaborate to create a capacity to govern and thus achieve their agenda. The purpose of the dissertation is to investigate and analyze the governing process of Lindholmen in order to contribute to the knowledge of conditions for and processes of urban planning and development in Sweden. The dissertation utilizes the governance perspective as a general conceptual framework that provides a perspective on the relationships between public, private and voluntary actors in the process of governing in contemporary society. Urban regime theory is applied to understand the processes of governing, as it focuses on how actors seek collaboration with the purpose of achieving a capacity to govern as well as identifies different forms of power in the urban context. Today, as Swedish cities compete in a global arena, urban policy and planning face the challenge of how to balance demands of market efficiency with the need to allow time for democratic processes in order to secure legitimacy, transparency and accountability.

Key words: Governance, urban regime theory, urban planning and development, governing process, agenda, coalition, power, democracy, Lindholmen, Norra Älvstranden, Göteborg.

iii

To mum

vi Contents

Abstract iii List of Figures x List of Tables x List of Pictures x Acknowledgements xi

Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Purpose and Structure of the Dissertation 2 The Post-Industrial City 3 A shift in Urban Policy 4 Expanding Urban Politics 5 Regenerating the Waterfront 7 An Overview of Urban Policy and Planning Research 9

Chapter 2 Local Governance Perspective 13 A Broad Concept 13 Changes in Society Influencing Governance 16 Defining Governance 19 Normative Approaches to Governance 20 Governance and Government 21 New Theoretical Perspective, Old Empirical Phenomenon 24 Governance and Democracy 25 Conclusions Local Governance 27

Chapter 3 Capacity to Govern in an Urban Context 29 Urban Regimes 31 Regime Characteristics 32 Regime Typologies 35 Agenda and Governing Coalition 37 Urban Power 39 Community Power Debate 39 Urban Power Expands 41 Forms of Urban Power 43 An Approach to Analysing Lindholmen 45

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Chapter 4 Method and Material 49 Theoretical Approach 49 Different Contexts 51 Regime Theory Concerns 53 The Case Study of Lindholmen 54 Single Case 56 A Unique as well as Representative Case 57 Qualitative Method 57 Material 58 Abduction – Induction and Deduction Combined 60 Generalization of Case Studies 60 Validity and Reliability 61

Chapter 5 Göteborg: Historical and Political Context 63 The History of a Shipyard and Harbour City 64 Göteborg as a Knowledge City 69 Politics in Göteborg 71 The Chairman of the City Executive Board 73 Göteborgsandan - The Spirit of Göteborg 76 Local Debates on Urban Planning and Democracy 80 Conclusions Göteborg 83

Chapter 6 Lindholmen: From Shipyard and Harbour to Science Park 85 Waterfront Regeneration Takes Off 90 The First Initiatives for Urban Regeneration 90 A Vision for Norra Älvstranden 92 The City Creates Capacity for Regeneration 94 Planning to Enable Economic Development 97 Ericsson is on the Move 99 The Attraction of a Cluster 100 Handling Demands From a Private Company 101 A Learning Process 104 Programme Work and Ericsson Takes Time 105 Any Objections? 107 Dock Shed 178 109 Growth Environment to Fight Global Competition 112 A Science Park Begins to Take Form 113 The Board 117 Agendas and Tensions 118 Focus Areas 118 The Science Park Grows 119

viii Norra Älvstranden and Göteborg Today 123 Conclusions Lindholmen 125 Agenda and Governing Coalition 125 Forms of Power 128

Chapter 7 Urban Planning and Governance Between Efficiency and Democracy 133 Governance and Government 133 Governance and Planning 140 Governance Between Democracy and Efficiency 142

References 151 Appendix A: Interests and Actors Related to the Case Study 167 Appendix B: The Swedish Political and Administrative System 169 Appendix C: The Swedish Planning System 170

List of Figures Figure 3.1: Different Governance Concepts 30 Figure 3.1: Urban Regimes and Governing Coalitions 46 Figure 7.1: Regime in Göteborg and Governing Coalition in Lindholmen 137 Figure 7.2: Governance in Göteborg from the Perspective of Lindholmen Science Park 139

List of Tables Table 2.1: Common Usages of the Concept Governance 14 Table 3.1: Stone’s Regime Typology 35 Table 3.2: Stoker and Mossberger’s Regime Typology 36 Table 3.3: Urban Power According to the Community Power Tradition 40 Table 3.4: Forms of Urban Power 43 Table 6.1: Norra Älvstranden 87 Table 6.2: Course of Events Planning Process of Lindholmen Pier 98 Table 7.1: Lindholmen Science Park – Actors and Considerations 134

List of Pictures Picture 5.1: Göteborg, on the Swedish West Coast 64 Picture 5.2: Eriksberg, Lindholmen and Götaverken Shipyards 66 Picture 5.3: The Shipyards at Norra Älvstranden 67 Picture 6.1: Norra Älvstranden 86 Picture 6.2: Different Areas on Norra Älvstranden 86 Picture 6.3: Shipyard Eriksberg 91 Picture 6.3: Lindholmen and its Pier 100 Picture 6.4: Programme Area Lindholmen Lundbystrand 105 Picture 6.5: Dock Shed 178 and Grain Silo 108 Picture 6.6: Drawing of Ericsson's Building 110 Picture 6.7: Drawing of Ericsson's Building From Within 111 Picture 6.8: Lindholmen Science Park 114 Picture 6.9: More Companies Join Lindholmen Science Park 119 Picture 6.10: Ericsson's Building on the Lindholmen Pier 121 Picture 6.11: Lindholmen Science Park’s Hub: Navet 122

x Acknowledgements

Today it is almost impossible to write a dissertation without funding. Therefore I am deeply grateful to FORMAS (grant BFR 970318-8) for providing this essential prerequisite to embark on this journey.

Writing a dissertation cannot be done without the help and contribution of many people. To begin with I have had the privilege to work with two encouraging and committed supervisors: professor Göran Cars, KTH, Urban Studies, and professor Ingemar Elander, Örebro University, Department of Social and Political Science. I am forever grateful to both of you for sharing your knowledge with me and for guiding me from the first day to the last. Göran – thank you for having more faith in my capability to accomplish different tasks than I have had myself. Ingemar – thank you for insightful readings of draft after draft, never ending support and a friendship that I value dearly.

Thank you to Professor Folke Snickars, KTH, opponent at my mid-seminar, and Professor Arvid Strand, NIBR, opponent at my final seminar for valuable, constructive comments. I would also like to extend my gratitude to my colleagues, Associate Professor Lars Orrskog and PhD Karolina Isaksson, who have read and discussed my research along the way. I am grateful to PhD Bo Öhrström, Chalmers University of Technology, for providing me with comments on chapter six. Thank you also to PhD colleagues Mikael Granberg and Karin Perman, as well as Associate Professor Stig Montin, for comments on early drafts during seminars at Örebro University, Department of Social and Political Science.

Dying of nervousness, since I have based a lot of my work on his, I presented a paper before professor Clarence N. Stone in December 2001. To my astonish- ment the result was an invitation to George Washington Institute of Public Policy, George Washington University. It was an amazing semester for me! My sincere gratitude to Professor Stone for showing such an interest in my research and giving me such brilliant comments. Thank you to Professor Harold Wol- man for making my stay formally possible and providing me with such a warm welcome and inspiring academic environment.

My D.C. girls: Lindsay Clark, Christi Fanelli, Carrie O´Regan and Maria Polis, from day one you treated me as your best friend, amazing - thank you! I am also grateful to the wonderful Clark family who took in a lost Swedish soul and treated her to a real American thanksgiving celebration. Thank you to my flat- mate Marissa who brightened everyday life on 5th str, and to Clarence and Mary Stone who kindly invited me to various social activities.

I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to all my wonderful colleagues and former roommates at Urban planning (formerly Regional planning) who I have had the privilege to work with during my PhD studies. Thank you for providing me with such a fun social environment as well as a stimulating academic one.

I am grateful to everyone in Göteborg who have in different ways helped me in my case study work. I have enjoyed taking breaks from life on KTH campus to go to Göteborg! A special thank you to everyone that I have interviewed. You have all big-heartedly taken time out of your busy schedules, invited me to your offices/homes and generously shared your experiences with me.

Thank you to Professor Stephen F. Fournier of The Heller School for Social Policy and Management, Brandeis University, for, through his thoughtful language editing, killing off my swenglish. I am also grateful to Terese Neivelt Ericsson, Tigran Hasic, Lina Martinson and Peter Persson for last minute panic help with translations, computers etc.

In parallel with my PhD studies I have also had the privilege to work with the journal PLAN first as an editorial secretary and later as editor. Thank you to the editorial committee for stimulating discussions on various topics, Björn Al- fredsson and Mats Lundström for all the fun during work, Birgit and Olle Wastesson for making sure things were properly done, and to Professor Folke Snickars and Adjunct Professor Carl-Johan Engström for giving me the chance.

I am blessed with the best friends in the world – thank you all for enriching my life. I am grateful to my family for encouragement and support. To my three pillars in life - mum, Peter and Gina - goes thanks and love beyond measure.

Two researchers in Göteborg have unknowingly motivated me by generously enlighten me on the fact that someone from Stockholm cannot possibly be capable of doing research on Göteborg.

A warm, sunny September day in Stockholm, 2004

Åsa von Sydow

xii Chapter 1

Introduction

What we do here will be of vital importance for the development of Göteborg during the next hundred years. It is of such magnitude that we probably cannot yet comprehend the full value of it. (Genborg 2001:34)

This is how the chairman of the city executive board commented on the waterfront regeneration of the north riverbank in the city of Göteborg. Slightly more than twenty years ago the city was dependent on manufacturing industries such as the production of ships and cars. As the shipyard crisis hit in the late 1970s the city was faced with a massive job loss and a five kilometre long central city riverbank location was abandoned. In 2001 as the chairman of the city executive board inaugurates a new information centre at the north riverbank billions were being invested in different regeneration projects. A science park had just been established to provide the city with a growth environment for knowledge intensive, high-tech companies to increase the economic growth of the region and strengthen the city’s position as a successful post-industrial city. This process is studied here.

To be more precise Lindholmen pier, on the north riverbank, is the primary focus. Although originally planned for housing, services, green areas and the preservation of a historically valuable building this all changed. In 1997 the private company Ericsson Mobile Data Design started to look for a new office location and showed interest in the area. The company demanded the establishment of an IT-cluster consisting of 10 000 workplaces on the pier. The urban planning and development process that followed is described and analyzed here. Specifically, the focus is on this process, how public and private actors collaborate to create a capacity to govern and thus achieve their agenda.

Purpose and Structure of the Dissertation

The purpose of the dissertation is to investigate and analyze the governing process of Lindholmen in order to contribute to the knowledge of conditions for and processes of urban planning and development in Sweden. This purpose will be achieved in two steps, firstly, by synthesizing elements of the governance perspective and urban regime theory into an analytical framework in order to understand how a capacity to govern is achieved in urban planning and development. Secondly, by probing the analytical potential of this framework, i.e. to describe and understand the process of governing in current Swedish urban planning and development, through a case study of Lindholmen in Göteborg. Arguably, by looking at the agenda, the governing coalition and the forms of power exposed in this particular case of planning and development the dissertation will also contribute to the knowledge of Swedish urban planning and development practice more broadly.

Urban planning, policy and politics involve a complex process of coalition formation, informal influence, negotiation and cooperation between actors from the public, private and voluntary sector. The governance perspective puts its focus on the fact that public and private actors cooperate in governing processes. Urban regime theory highlights how they cooperate to achieve the capacity to govern. In the next two chapters a conceptual framework, to study local governance, based on urban regime theory, is outlined. Instead of limiting the empirical study to looking at the planning process from the perspective of the different steps in the formal process we will look at the identifying agenda, governing coalition and forms of power to understand how the actors achieve a capacity to govern.

Chapter four discusses theoretical and methodological considerations made, and provides an account of material used. Thereafter follow two chapters presenting the case study. In chapter five, a brief introduction to the history of Göteborg as a shipyard and harbour city, as well as the local political context of the city, is given. The sixth chapter describes the planning and development process of Lindholmen, which results in Lindholmen being transformed from a brownfield site to a science park. The concluding chapter provides a discussion on governance, planning and democracy based on the case study of Lindhol- men.

2 The Post-Industrial City

During the latter half of the 20th Century Western cities experienced changes in the economy, transforming cities from industrial to post-industrial (Herbert & Thomas 1997). A set of economic and technological forces operating together profoundly influenced the global system of cities. To begin with, a new international division of labour has evolved (Hall 1995); as manufacturing processes have become automated and computerized they require fewer workers. Previ- ously, during the industrial era, there was a relatively crude division of labour (Short & Kim 1998). Manufacturing was undertaken in the industrial cities of the capitalist core economies while command functions were concentrated to large cities, particularly world cities. However, over the past 30 years there have been major changes in manufacturing production (Short & Kim 1998). As a result of technological developments, which has led to decreasing transport costs and deskilling of labour, manufacturing production can be undertaken anywhere around the world. Location is now driven more by labour costs than by the need to be close to raw material, markets or pools of skilled labour. As a consequence there has been a global shift in location of manufacturing, resulting in the decline of older manufacturing cities in the capitalist core economies and the growth of cities in the newly industrialized countries.

Another fundamental change is the shift of all advanced economies from goods production to the processing of information (Hall 1995). The shift started already at the beginning of the 20th century and in advanced countries today a majority of the population is involved in producing services. Knowledge intensive companies, within the growing service economy, tend to be footloose, these knowledge based industries, especially in the high-tech sectors have a high degree of locational flexibility (Short & Kim 1998). They are not dependent on traditional location factors (such as coal, iron and water). Their prime concern is service and command functions which can, because of technological changes, be located away from production. Hence, the production of services becomes increasingly detached from that of production “…as a combined result of globalisation and informationalisation.” (Hall 1995:4).

As traditional locational factors have eroded and there is a greater locational flexibility in the contemporary economy, cities compete to keep their place in the urban hierarchy (Hall 1995). Jobs and investments move quickly (and often) around the world, from city to city, up and down the urban hierarchy (Short & Kim 1998). As a result, cities need to position and reposition themselves. Hall (1995) identifies two levels of a global hierarchy in the urban system. At the top of the hierarchy are global cities such as London, Paris and Brussels. These cities conduct a substantial part of their business, which is specialised services,

at a global scale. However they also perform lower-order functions for more restricted areas. The next level in the global hierarchy consists of regional cities. This group of medium-sized city regions (population raging from 0,5-2,5 million) serve as administrative and higher-level service centres (Hall 1995). Göte- borg falls into this second category.

In order to keep their place in the urban hierarchy cities try to establish a market niche (Hall 1995). The goal is to establish some unique quality that no other city can match. As a result cities tend to market themselves rather like competing consumer goods (Hall 1995). This marketing of place is often not limited to promoting the existing virtues of the city, but may in addition, seek to redefine and change the city towards an image not associated with the industrial city (Hubbard & Hall 1998). Posters, pamphlets and numerous other cultural products can be used as services to promote the image of a vibrant international spot.

One concrete way to enhance the city’s image has been through large-scale physical redevelopment of urban waterfronts (Bassett, Griffiths & Smith 2002). As a result of the decline in industrial activity, coinciding with shifting industrial activities, cities have been left with brownfield sites at central city locations. These urban waterfronts have been looked upon as an opportunity for post- industrial city space-making (Marshall 2001). Examples of such mega projects are London’s Canary Wharf, Barcelona’s Olympic Marina, Sydney’s Darling Harbour and New York’s Battery Park (Breen & Rigby 1996, Hubbard & Hall 1998).

These urban waterfront regeneration projects have often been carried out as part of a broader growth-oriented strategy agreed upon by local elites to establish a new image of their cities in an increasingly competitive urban system (Bassett et al. 2002). In these waterfront regeneration projects local authorities have collaborated with a wide network of agencies and interest groups ranging from business elites to community groups. “They have thus often been seen as symbols of the successful transition to a new form of governance.” (Bassett et al. 2002:1758).

A shift in Urban Policy The emphasis on policies pursued by local governments is shifting, from those focused on local provision of welfare and service, to policies designed to promote and encourage local growth and economic development (Imrie & Tho- mas 1995, Hubbard & Hall 1998). It has been argued that traditionally, urban policy meant long-term planning in the interest of the public; different interests were coordinated and balanced (Andersen 2001). Urban policy was reactive to social development and paramount to welfare issues. There has, however, been a development towards more short-sighted policy, focusing on economic po-

4 tentials and benefits as the primary objective (Andersen 2001). It is suggested that cities and regions, in an increasingly globalised economy, often compete with each other in so called ‘place wars’ (Healey, Cars, Madanipour & de Ma- galhães Eds. 2002). As a response to this increased competition, local governments are pressured to develop and adopt strategies to improve the attractiveness and competitiveness of their city.

During the past two decades local politics in all advanced Western nations have gained in importance as a focus for proactive economic development strategies (Mayer 1994). It has become increasingly difficult for the nation state to ar- ranged conditions of production and reproduction needed by globally mobile capital.

Hence local political organizations, their skills in negotiating with su- praregional and multinational capital, and the effectiveness with which they tailor the particular set of local conditions of production have become decisive factors in shaping a city’s profile as well as its place in the international urban hierarchy. (Mayer 1994:317).

Whereas urban leaders previously were engaged in diverse local economic development activities, these activities have gradually changed into a more sys- tematic economic development policy strategy oriented towards fostering growth and, subsequently employment (Mayer 1994). The objectives of local development policies are to create new jobs, expand the local tax base, foster small firm growth and attract new forms of investment. The goal is to improve the local embeddedness of existing firms as well as attract new forms of business (Hubbard & Hall 1998). Local development policies aim at promoting the comparative advantage of a city relative to other cities which may be competing for similar forms of investments.

Dryzek (1996), however, argues that as public policy becomes dictated by the need to compete and flourish in the transnational economy, states in capitalist economies are becoming less democratic. Public policy, as a result of capital mobility across national boundaries, is constrained by fear of upsetting actual or potential investors. Consequently, popular sovereignty can only come in second place. “Free trade, market liberal ideology, economic rationalism, and aggressive individualism combine to obstruct any deeper democratization and to erode existing democratic achievements.” (Dryzek 1996:3).

Expanding Urban Politics It is claimed that Western cities are currently governed, organized and managed in new and different ways. This development, labelled by some as ‘new urban politics’, evidences two characteristics (Hubbard & Hall 1998). The first was described above as the shift in emphasis of the policies pursued by local gov-

ernments towards policies designed to promote and encourage local growth and economic development. The second is that these policies are formulated, supported and financed by a diverse array of agencies and institutions within and beyond the public sector.

The strategies developed to mobilize a local potential for economic growth involve actors beyond those of classical local politics (Mayer 1994). The actors participating in the definition and implementation of economic development programmes are for example: business associations, chambers of commerce, local companies, universities, research institutes, banks, unions, welfare associations, community organisations and grassroots initiatives. A more cooperative style of policy-making has emerged, where local authorities instead of giving orders now act to moderate or initiate cooperation (Mayer 1994).

Public-private partnerships are one form of cooperation between actors from the public and private sector that have become common within urban development (Bailey 1995, Elander & Blanc 2001, Pierre Ed. 1998). For local authorities public-private partnerships are appealing since they attract additional resources to urban development and have a potential to increase the effectiveness in achieving goals (Bailey 1995). The idea is that the use of public powers combined with entrepreneurial flexibility, organisational capacity and additional private capital can result in urban development tasks being carried out both more quickly and efficiently. For private investors, public-private partnerships are attractive because they offer a possibility to expand their activities (Mayer 1994). Urban redevelopment provides profitable opportunities for private developers who need access to promising real estates. In exchange for local authority’s subsidy, use of governmental powers, interpretation of government regulations etc, the private partner is expected to meet certain project goals, assume management tasks and share project returns with local authorities (for example through tax payments, hiring local workforce and/or provide public infrastructure).

Thus, the role of the municipality has changed from being the (more or less redistributive) local ‘arm’ of the welfare state to acting as the catalyst of processes of innovation and cooperation, which it seeks to steer in the direction of improving the city’s (or community’s) economic and social situation. … In order to win the resources and competences of various private actors, the local authority has to respect to some degree the peculiar character and particular functional conditions of these non-state organizations. (Mayer 1994:326)

As argued by Le Galès (2000), individuals, firms and loose networks of private stakeholders have become increasingly significant actors in European cities. Interest groups increasingly tend to work through informal networks rather than established, bureaucratic channels. Also, new relationships tend to be built

6 on concrete achievement, consequently they develop between individuals and organisations that have the capacity to act rather than the right to represent. According to Le Galès (2000) urban governance is becoming more institutionally fragmented resulting in a much more complex system of interrelationships between statutory agencies and non-statutory groups.

Regenerating the Waterfront

As cities shift from industrial to service economies, a major aspect of their success will be in the quality of urban environments. It is here that the waterfront plays a crucial role. Waterfronts are often the most degraded places in the city, being the sites of the former industries. Waterfronts are highly visible locations in most cities. The image of the city can be remade here. (Marshall 2001:9)

Since World War II industry, transportation facilities and ports have moved away from central city locations, leaving core city space available for other uses (Breen & Rigby 1996). Communities all over the world began to perceive their urban waterfronts as potentially transformative spaces, rather than as abandoned and physically deteriorated problematic areas. Early regenerations started in the US as well as the UK during the 1950s and 1960s. These began a trend that continues and has spread to Australia, Japan and Europe and today we can find waterfront regeneration projects all over the globe (Breen & Rigby 1996).

Urban waterfronts are regarded as capable of attracting investment and revers- ing patterns of decline, and as a result create new urban zones where pleasure and profit come together (Sandercock & Dovey 2002). These brownfield sites are described as “screens on which cities project and explore emerging trends and prescriptions for urban development and regeneration.” (Sandercock & Dovey 2002:151). Examples of internationally well-known regenerated waterfronts are Baltimore’s Inner Harbor, Barcelona’s Olympic Marina, London’s Canary Wharf, New York’s Battery Park, Sydney’s Darling Harbor and Yoko- hama’s Pacifico Yokohama (Breen & Rigby 1996, Marshall 2001). Within Scan- dinavia, Oslo’s Aker Brygge, Norrköping’s waterfront as well as Göteborg’s Norra Älvstranden have been receiving international attention (Breen & Rigby 1996). Other Swedish examples are Helsingborg’s Norra hamnen (Reiter 1999), Malmö’s Västra Hamnen (Larsson, Elmroth & Sandstedt 2003), Västerås Östra Hamnen (Granberg 2004) and Stockholm’s Hammarby Sjöstad (Bodén Ed. 2002).

The success of early projects, such as Baltimore’s Inner Harbor, encouraged a series of large regeneration projects on urban waterfront sites around the world (Marshall 2001). “Waterfronts became associated with ways to recreate the image of a city, to recapture economic investment and to attract people back to

deserted downtowns.” (Marshall 2001:5). The waterfront was looked upon as an opportunity to create urban environments that reflect contemporary ideas of the city, society and culture. The possibilities and potential represented by waterfronts to post-industrial cities have created an enormous enthusiasm regarding what can be achieved.

There is a tendency, in much of the literature, to view waterfronts as a kind of urban panacea, a cure-all for ailing cities in search of new self-images or ways of dealing with issues of competition for capital developments or tourist dollars. The waterfront redevelopment project has become synonyms with visions of exuberance. (Marshall 2001:6)

The urban waterfront regeneration story is usually told in terms of success although there seems to be more than one side to this story. For example, Balti- more’s Inner Harbor, mentioned above, is often put forward as one of the best examples of waterfront revitalization (Breen & Rigby 1996, Marshall 2001). And although “…the area continues to attract a number of tourists, it has failed to address the city’s more immediate problems such as arresting white flight, suburban sprawl, inner city crime and unemployment.” (Urban Age 1999:20).

Although presenting promising opportunities, it has turned out to be hard to fulfil the potentials and possibilities the waterfronts present. For example, the blue-collar jobs that once existed in the area are not replaced. “The waterfront turnaround then, may be seen as a success story with an underlying consequence that constitutes one of today’s most fundamental problems in developed countries – lack of job prospects for unskilled workers.” (Breen & Rigby 1996:12). Another possible consequence of waterfront regeneration projects is an increase in the process of gentrification (Breen & Rigby 1996). In some cases people less well off have been relocated or ignored as new, more affluent, populations have moved in.

A common criticism regarding urban waterfront developments is that cities, in their enthusiasm to import ideas from abroad, have been prone to adopt ge- neric models without taking into account local characteristics and conditions that contributed to those successes (Marshall 2001, Urban Age 1999). The result is a homogenous group of buildings that turn out to be rather similar such as aquariums, convention centres, museums, shops and restaurants. Nonethe- less, according to Sandercock and Dovey (2002), waterfront transformations, although they are played out in a globalizing world, result in surprisingly different outcomes, thanks to local requirements and experiences as well as local place identity.

8 In some cases large-scale waterfront regeneration projects have proved to be highly successful, resulting in urban re-imaging and wider community mobilization (Bassett et al. 2002). In other cases they have resulted in a collapse of democratic public planning (Sandercock & Dovey 2002). Consequently these projects highlight many aspects of governance, such as local power structures, political agendas and forms of governing arrangements (Bassett et al. 2002).

An Overview of Urban Policy and Planning Research

Although other studies have been conducted to describe and understand the process of governing in Swedish urban planning and development, this dissertation distinguishes itself by an analytical approach based on a combination of urban governance and urban regime theory as two conceptual frameworks that have mostly been applied to empirical objects in a non-Swedish context. In this section I will briefly mention a few studies at least partly related to the approach applied in this study. To begin with, a number of studies on urban waterfront developments have been conducted in the Swedish context.

Öhrström (2004) also studies Lindholmen, or to be correct the whole Norra Älvstranden area of which Lindholmen is part. The focus is on examining how urban regeneration and redevelopment can serve as a tool for the creation of an urban growth node, i.e. Lindholmen as an innovative cluster. According to Öhrström, a revised model for planning was put into practice which served as a tool for both enabling corporate strategies and as an institutional structure for urban regeneration. The focus of this dissertation, however, is not on tools and methods but rather on relationships between the actors and how they collaborate in order to achieve power and govern.

Granberg (2004) has studied the urban waterfront in Västerås, or more specifically the planning process of the housing area in the eastern harbour (Östra hamnen). Both our case studies involve actors from different sectors. However, the interviewees in Granberg’s study describe the planning process as problematic and trust between certain actors has been very low. Granberg’s study results in conclusions showing how a process perceived by the participants as problematic finally ended in a new housing area. The interviewees in the Lind- holmen case on the other hand describe the process as very efficient with a high level of trust between the core actors.

Isaksson (2001) analyzes the power exercise in the conflicts regarding the Den- nis package. These have been described in the media as filled with difficulties, controversies and debates whereas Lindholmen, on the other hand, is described

in the media as a successful planning effort with little conflict. Hence, the goal is to see how power is exercised in a case which does not, at first glance, seem to be characterized by conflict but, at least as described by a number of key actors, rather by consensus.

Theories on governance and urban regimes have for quite some time been applied in American as well as European research on urban politics, planning and policy (see for example Stone 1989, Kooiman (Ed.) 1993, Judge, Stoker & Wolman 1995, Rhodes 1997, DiGaetano & Klemanski 1999, Pierre (Ed.) 2000, LeGalés 2002, Sellers 2002,). In Sweden on the other hand, the use of these theories is a more recent phenomenon (Elander 1997, Elander & Strömberg 2001, Hertting 2003, Sundin 1997), although a number of empirical studies of Swedish urban planning and development point to the relevance of a governance perspective. Thus, during the 1990s a number of research projects on Swedish planning and development, without explicitly using these concepts, indicated an increasing involvement of non-public actors in planning, as well as a growing importance of relationships and activities outside the formal planning process (Cars 1992, Persson 1999).

Persson (1999) analyzes the formal and informal exercise of power in a Swedish municipality to understand who and what influence political decisions. He concludes that influence and power are exerted through different forms of networks and relations, and that various groups can impact decision-making through their possession of land. In this dissertation the multi-dimensional conception of power deduced from urban regime theory is applied as it incor- porates and exceeds the importance of relations and resources that Persson points to.

Using negotiation theory to study the interaction between public and private actors in planning, Cars (1992) found that planning was carried out partly in other ways than those assigned by law. In parallel to formal decision-making channels, informal relations developed and these did, to a large extent, influence the outcome of the planning process. This study applies urban regime theory to look at how actors establish informal arrangements, that sustain longer than during a negotiation phase, in order to set the policy agenda and achieve a capacity to govern.

Several projects have studied interaction between public and private actors in urban planning and development through policy networks. Hertting (2003) applies theories of policy networks and studies governance as self-regulating policy networks in the context of neighbourhood renewal. He concludes that the dilemma of network governance is that informal cooperative institutions, while protecting the autonomy of the participating organisations, fail to provide an institutional framework strong enough to regulate the substantive conflicts involved.

Sundin (1997) applies theories of policy networks when looking at planning from an interorganisational context. He concludes that in practice the municipal plan monopoly has not become the instrument for governing as it was intended. Instead, different interests have been able to influence decision-making and planning. Sundin refers to a shift from hierarchical decision making by the municipality towards negotiations with non-public actors and market solutions. In this dissertation urban regime theory, with its focus on how actors seek collaboration with the purpose of achieving capacity and power to govern will be applied instead of the less precise policy network approach (see also chapter two, section Defining Governance).

Elander and Strömberg (2001) have conducted one of the few regime analyses done in the Swedish context. Studying local politics, especially housing policy, during the 20th century they conclude that Sweden has had coherent and long- lived urban welfare regimes in our municipalities between 1950-1980. They also argue that during the 1990s local welfare regimes have gradually been replaced by fragmented policy-making, often with a tendency towards dominance of local business coalitions. These are rather narrow, informally working coalitions, commonly including a limited number of strategic interests within local politics and business working together in order to increase the competitiveness of a town or a city as compared to other towns and cities. However, following Elander and Strömberg, although business coalitions seem to have been more successful in terms of influence on urban governance than other kinds of coalitions, they have also been contested by coalitions with an orientation towards ecological sustainability or social justice.

Drawing upon the regulation theory framework Billing & Stigendal (1994) analyse post-war developments in Malmö as an expression of the Swedish model of welfare state expansion. Successfully positioning their city in the context of macro-economic tendencies local politicians in Malmö became vehicles of this model which brought with it urban economic growth as well as improved living conditions for the local citizens. Thus, in line with regulationist thinking the local politicians were not just passive links in a chain driven by strong economic forces but strategic actors for implementing a Social Democratic strategy of welfare state expansion based on Keynesianism.

12 Chapter 2

Local Governance Perspective

In the Lindholmen case a number of actors from both the public and the private sectors can be identified as being involved in the governing process. The concept of governance is introduced as a concept with a potential to analyse the institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing without limiting itself to government. Thus, governance as an analytical concept calls for empirical investigations to find out which public, private and voluntary agents that are governing. In this chapter we take a closer look at the local governance perspective to identify research questions for the case study. However, although the governance perspective is useful as a general conceptual framework it has to be complemented by an approach that goes deeper into examining the processes of governing. Thus, in the next chapter, we will turn to urban regime theory to develop a theoretical framework to be applied on the Lind- holmen case and hence be able to answer the research questions formulated in this chapter.

A Broad Concept

There is not one simple over-arching theory that explains what governance is all about. Instead, governance is described and explained from various angles. To begin with, theories of governance operate at different spatial levels of analysis such as the international, the European or the regional, often referred to as multi-level governance, and the nation state etc. Here, the focus is on local governance. These actors can be derived from all levels in society but the majority of them are most likely based in the city, municipality or region.

Further, governance offers different theoretical perspectives drawn from various academic disciplines such as public administration and management, international relations, development studies, systems theory, economics and political

science (Kooiman 1999, Newman 2001). The perspective outlined in this work draws mainly on governance literature within political science as well as public administration and management as they deal with governing processes involving public, private and voluntary actors at the city level.

Table 2.1: Common Usages of the Concept Governance Governance as Good Governance Strategies for helping developing countries achieve the best possible governance based on liberal democratic values Global Governance The interplay of political, economic and social actors in order to tackle global problems and create worldwide obligations Multi-level Governance Dispersion of governance across multiple levels such as local, national and regional Corporate Governance How to establish efficient management of corporations New Public Management Introducing corporate management and marketization to the public sector New practices of co- Negotiated social governance such as networks ordination and partnerships

Governance is also used in a number of different areas, where it is consequently defined in slightly different ways (see table 2.1). Hirst (2000) lists five different ways, Kooiman (2002) lists twelve and Rhodes (1997) lists seven. For example, one area of use is corporate governance, which refers to ways of ensuring that corporate actions, agents and assets are directed at achieving the corporate objectives established by the corporation’s shareholders (Sternberg 2004). Transac- tion cost economics, describes the firm in organisational terms, as a governance structure, and not as a production function (Williamson 1996). Here, corporate governance deals with the institutions that may help to minimize the transac- tion costs of the managerial agency problem. A growing amount of literature within corporate governance discusses questions such as accountability, transparency and professional management within corporations (Hirst 2000, Rhodes 2000).

Moreover, a second usage is, according to Hirst (2000) when development economists talk about Good Governance as a necessary component of effective economic modernisation. Here it is recognised that institutions matter and that development is not just a matter of creating free markets. The good governance strategy, which for example is promoted by the World Bank, thus means creat-

14 ing an effective political framework promoting private economic action (Rho- des 2000). In 1999 UN-HABITAT launched the Global Campaign on Urban Governance with the motivation that “there is a growing international consensus that the quality of urban governance is the single most important factor for the eradication of poverty and for prosperous cities.” (UN-HABITAT 2003a). The Campaign has formulated a number of principles for good governance centred around the following concepts: sustainability, subsidiarity, equity, efficiency, transparency and accountability, civic engagement and citizenship, and security (UN-HABITAT 2003b)

Governance as Global governance refers to the various patterns in which global, regional, national and local actors come together to manage a growing range of political, economic and social affairs (Wilkinson 2002). It is recognised that certain problems go beyond the problem-solving capacity of single states, for example environmental problems, regulation of world trade and international financial markets. Instead these problems need to be tackled by multiple actors at the global level. “Much of the scholarship on global governance focuses on the slightly more concrete international regimes, the norms, rules, and decision- making procedures that states (and sometimes other powerful actors) have created to govern international life within specific realm.” (Murphy 2002).

Yet another usage of governance is multi-level governance, which focuses on dispersion of governance across multiple jurisdictions (Hooghe & Marks 2002). This usage takes its starting point in a dispersion of authority away from central government upwards to the supranational level, downwards to subnational jurisdictions and sideways to public/private networks. The EU is often mentioned as an example of multi-level governance as it posits links between the Commission, national ministries and local and regional authorities (Rhodes 2000).

Governance as the New Public Management (NPM) is related to the growth, since the early 1980s, of commercial practices and corporate management styles within the public sector (Hirst 2000, Kooiman 2002). Through corporate management have private sector management methods such as performance measures and managing by results been introduced. Incentive structures, such as contracting-out, quasi-markets and customer choice have been introduced into public service provision (Rhodes 2000).

Another “…usage of governance relates to the practices of co-ordinating activities through networks, partnerships and deliberative forums that have grown up on the ruins of the more centralized and hierarchical corporatist representation of the period up to the 1970s.” (Hirst 2000:18). It is argued that the state can no longer assume a monopoly of resources or expertise necessary to govern but must instead rely on a plurality of actors drawn from both within and beyond government. In this chapter the approach to governance applied in the disserta-

tion, related to the last usage above, will be outlined. Here governance is regarded as the process of governing, and involves processes of policy formulation and implementation across boundaries within the public sector or between the public, private and voluntary sectors.

Changes in Society Influencing Governance

It is argued that there has been an erosion of traditional bases of political power, challenging the institutional strength of the nation state from different sources (Pierre 2000). As a response to this, states are searching for alternative strategies through which they can pursue their objectives and they have “increasingly come to rely on influencing a multiplicity of institutions and actors. New strategies based on informal influences, enabling and regulation have grown in importance.” (Newman 2001:13). Over the past couple of decades a number of changes, at different levels of society, have taken place, altering the context in which the state and local government governs. In this section we will look at five interrelated changes, which have been identified in the governance literature as affecting the conditions for governance: - Globalisation - Financial decline of the state - Ideological shift from politics to the market - New Public Management - Institutional fragmentation - New policy challenges

To begin with, one of the most common causes referred to, when explaining changes in governance, is globalisation or internationalisation of economies.1 The deregulation of the financial market brought with it an increased volatility of international capital (Pierre 2000). Now, financial capital is much more international and mobile, thereby increasing the importance of multinational companies (Andrew & Goldsmith 1998). These companies do not owe loyalty to any nation state and their concern is to locate where they obtain the best advantage related to tax, labour cost or raw materials. They are also able to compete for labour on an international market, locate research and development facilities where it is most advantageous as well as seek to obtain the most advantage in investment deals with national, regional and local government when it comes to making location decisions.

1 A study made concerning the Swedish welfare state shows that globalisation is not without significance, however, domestic factors, is still very important (Lindbom 2001).

16 Businesses pick and choose locations according to the global calcula- tion of advantage; in response political leaders of whatever party label follow policies to please the market. (John 2001:10)

In other words, the process of economic globalisation affects and has consequences for local governments.2 There has been a considerable growth in the role played by local governments in terms of local economic development (An- drew & Goldsmith 1998). This is evident in Western Europe, North America as well as in some parts of the Third World.3 According to Andrew and Gold- smith (1998) there is recognition amongst cities that they need to be internationally competitive in the world economy. As a response local leaders build alliances with business to find local solutions to policy problems, solutions that make the locality attractive for business to stay in or relocate to. Various writers refer to a ‘new localism’. “By re-emphasizing responses that are particular to place, local leaders can help their economies compete.” (John 2001:10).

One of the things that has encouraged the development of new instruments of governance is the decline in state financial resources during the 1980s and 1990s (Pierre & Peters 2000). Most of the Western European governments had relatively stable economic growth during the 1960s. This generated growing tax revenues to finance increasing commitments of the state. In the 1980s the situation had changed and many developed countries were rapidly accumulating deficits and debts. Economic growth had slowed down, become uncertain and in some cases declined. During the 1990s there was a widespread trend of central government putting a heavier burden on local governments (Elander & Blanc 2000). This resulted in a number of policy initiatives by local governments such as spreading out responsibility on various intergovernmental sectors and sub-levels, complementing local government service production by reactivating the voluntary sector, becoming more business-like etc.

A third change identified in the governance literature is an ideological shift from politics to the market, a shift from a collectivistic to an individualistic political culture (Pierre & Peters 2000). During the early post-Second World War period, governments in Western Europe took a higher profile and the political sphere of society expanded. Government was seen as the legitimate and unchallenged vehicle for social change, equality and economic development. This however changed during the Thatcher and Reagan era (1980s) when government was increasingly seen as the root cause of societal problems - not the solution. Instead the goal was to let the market play a leading role in society. At the same time, as we noted above, Western European governments experi-

2 Pierre & Peters (2000) question a number of, what they refer to as, tacit assumptions that are made regarding how things were ‘before’ globalisation. Such as the assumption that states were sovereign before, that they were able to exercise effective control, and finally, the assumption that states did not compete with each other for private investments before globalisation. 3 However, this is a much more recent concern in Western Europe than in North America.

enced a decline in financial resources. This led to cutbacks in public spending and a search for new, more efficient ways of managing the public sector.

Consequently, this brings us to a fourth change, ‘the move to the post- bureaucratic state’ (John 2001), the ‘managerial revolution in public service production and delivery’ (Pierre & Peters 2000) or to put it simply, New Public Management (NPM). NPM is a philosophy of public management that contains general recommendations about how to best organise the administration of public services (John 2001, Montin 2000). It is based on the assumption that public organisations should be managed in the same way as any private sector organisation (Pierre & Peters 2000). NPM advocates a centralisation of management, including measuring the outputs of government, creating a split between setting objectives and the means to achieving them and techniques to improve performance (John 2001). At the same time, decentralisation of functions and administration to micro agencies or decentralised units are advocated. “The consequence is the breakdown of older notions of hierarchy and the introduction of less visible lines of control.” (John 2001:13). The NPM approach also includes a number of administrative mechanisms designed to improve efficiency, such as the contracting out of services to the private sector, new budgeting systems, performance related pay and new techniques for financing public services.

A fifth change can be found in institutional fragmentation. Fragmentation implies that the actors involved are spread among a variety of agencies as well as across public, private and voluntary sectors (Healey et al. 2002). According to Rhodes (1997), governance is the product of the hollowing out of the state from above (international interdependencies), from below (special purpose bodies) and sideways (agencies). The result is a decline in the capacity to govern at the same time as an increased need for coordinating structures and action. Thus, when government slackens, the need for co-ordination and governance increases.

The tendencies towards fragmentation are noticeable in Swedish municipalities (Montin 2000). New kinds of coalitions, networks, social movements and user- controlled public services are entering the policy arena challenging the old institutions. Bogason (1998) investigates the Scandinavian situation and comes to the conclusion that an organisational fragmentation is taking place, a change from bureaucratic command to interorganisational negotiation. First, powers have been decentralised to local service organisations and thus local government policies have become diversified in organisational terms. Second, users have become influential as new channels of influence, new organisational measures, are being developed. As a result space has been created for both new managerial styles and democratic initiatives that place service users in command of service institutions.

18 The marketization of the public sector, which is a result of the introduction of NPM, intensifies institutional fragmentation because of the creation of special agencies or special purpose bodies, processes of contracting out or privatisation. In other words, the various changes identified here as affecting governance are hard to separate as they occur simultaneously and reinforce each other. The affect they have on governance will, in the end, vary according to place and context.

In the context of these social, economic, and political changes, the environment in which city and local governments operate has been undergoing, and continues to face, rapid change. Such an environment has been and continues to be very unstable, placing a premium on governments (both national and local) to be flexible, innovative, and adaptive, to “reinvent” themselves… (Andrew & Goldsmith 1998:105)

Finally, and of great importance, is new policy challenges that we face which reflect contemporary social change and increasing complexities (Pierre & Peters 2001). Issues such as environmental protection, high levels of migration and an ageing population are neither clearly defined geographically or institutionally. These issues need holistic solutions, which require numerous of actors be involved (John 2001), and many of these issues need to be tackled domestically as well as regionally and internationally.

Defining Governance

Governance has been defined in numerous ways. Kooiman (2000:139) defines it as “…arrangements in which public as well as private actors aim at solving societal problems to create societal opportunities, and aim at the care for the societal institutions within which these governing activities take place.” Follow- ing this definition private actors such as firms participate in governing arrangements to solve societal problems, create societal opportunities and care for societal institutions. However, the primary goal for private business is to maxi- mise their profit. Consequently, if it is a good strategy for them to care for societal institutions, they will, if it is not, they have no obligation to care.

Another definition is provided by Stoker (2000b:93), who writes “... governance which can be broadly defined as a concern with governing, achieving collective action in the realm of public affairs, in conditions where it is not possible to rest on resource to the authority of the state. Governance involves working across boundaries within the public sector or between the public sector and private or voluntary sectors. It focuses attention on a set of actors that are drawn from but also beyond the formal institutions of government.” This defi-

nition is the most useful one to apply to the case study in this dissertation. Governance is about governing and not only across public and private sector boundaries but also within the public sector. This is relevant in a Swedish context. However the definition lacks one important aspect. It can, but does not have to be that public actors choose governance arrangements because it is not possible to rest on resource to the authority of the state; they could choose it for other reasons as well. The state can, for example, choose to co-fund an infrastructure investment to reduce the amount of taxpayers’ money spent on that particular project and as a result be able to finance other investments as well.

In the literature governance is often defined by reference to the network concept. Rhodes (1997:53) for example offers the following definition: “… governance refers to self-governing, interorganizational networks.” Here governance is characterised by a significant degree of autonomy from the state. Net- works are self-organising and not accountable to the state. The state can indi- rectly steer networks but it does not occupy a sovereign position. Using this definition as a starting point in a Swedish case study might in the end turn out to be too narrow. First of all, in Scandinavia, many policy networks are created of the initiative of public authorities, in other words they are not self-organised (Hoff 2003). Besides, traditionally local government in Sweden has had a rather strong role in local politics and planning. Even though the role of local government has undergone radical change a definition, which reduces the role of government before analysing the case, would be too hasty. By claiming that the state is largely incapable of ruling, i.e. governance without government, the network approach may fail to consider that there are cases when government may be effective (Hirst 2000).

These definitions all have useful ingredients. Considering the aim of this dissertation, a definition is needed which leaves to the empirical investigation to decide the role and the purpose of the actors. Thus, the following definition of governance is used in this dissertation: Governance is the process of governing, in conditions where a single actor does not have the capacity to effectively tackle problems unilaterally or in situations where actors can mutually benefit from co-operation. Governance involves working across levels and sectors within the public sector as well as between the public, the private and the voluntary sector.

Normative Approaches to Governance

One should be aware of the fact that governance at times is used to promote normative ideas and strategies, both by politicians and policy makers as well as interests trying to influence decision- and policy-makers. The World Bank, for example, advocates ‘good governance’ (Kooiman 1999, Stoker 2000a). Which

20 in Stokers words “… marries the new public management to the advocacy of liberal democracy.” (Stoker 2000b:57). To achieve efficiency in the public services the World Bank suggests privatising public enterprise, encourages competition and markets, promotes decentralised and minimised administration etc.

In their bestseller, Reinventing Government, Osborne and Gaebler (1993) use governance to promote their version of NPM, advocating entrepreneurial institutions instead of bureaucratic ones. Here, governance is a reinvented form of government that is more efficiently run by acknowledging the full potential of using different managerial tools and sensibly choosing which one to use at the right occasion. Policy decisions (steering) is distinguished from service delivery (rowing) and, according to Osborne and Gaebler’s argumentation, bureaucracy is a bankrupt tool for rowing.

It is noticeable that normative arguments range widely from liberal to radical. An example of the latter is actors who distrust the state as they see it as cap- tured by commercial interests, corrupt politicians and unaccountable bureauc- racies (Hirst 2000). These actors (for example alternative policy bodies in the advanced countries and NGOs in the developing world) see governance as a new potential for organisation through civil society.

The aim of this dissertation is not normative. Governance is used as a theoretical framework to provide a language for and frame of reference through which the case of Lindholmen can be described and analysed. However, one must be conscious of the thin line between describing reality and prescribing how that reality should be; especially since much of the research literature describes governance as a concept that signifies change, describes how organisations and institutions are governed today, makes comparisons to prior outcomes and, slips easily over to describing how it should be. According to Newman (2001):

The concept governance thus links normative hopes for a move beyond the fragmenting and dislocating market reforms of the 1980s with an analysis of the complex interactions and interdependencies of government institutions, communities, citizens and civil society. (Newman 2001:17)

Governance and Government

In its traditional sense, was governance defined as a synonym for government, that is, the formal institutions of the state and their monopoly of legitimate coercive power (Stoker 2000a). Yet, in the current interest on governance there is a redirection in its use and significance. With the internal reorganisation of local governments, the emergence of new agencies and new roles for the pri-

vate and voluntary sectors, the workings of local government can no longer be equated with local governance (Lowndes 2001). A separation of governance from government has developed in academic writing.

Governance separates the process of governing from government, a particular agent (Gamble 2000). In contrast to the narrower term government, governance covers the whole range of institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing (Pierre & Peters 2000). Essentially governance is about process rather than institutional structures. The output of governance is not different from that of government, instead what differs is the process. “… governance refers to the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred.” (Stoker 2000a:17).

No single actor, public or private, has the knowledge and information required to solve complex, dynamic and diversified problems; no actor has an overview sufficient to make the needed instruments effective; no single actor has sufficient action potential to dominate unilaterally. These are basically matters of the relation between governance and governing. (Kooiman 2000:142)

With the argument that no single actor has sufficient resources to govern on their own, the governance perspective identifies power dependence between the actors involved in collective action (Stoker 2000a). This means that in governance relationships the public, private and voluntary actors are dependent on each other. To achieve goals they have to exchange resources and negotiate common purpose. According to Stoker (2000a) power dependence may increase the problem of unintended consequences for government. In a relationship of power dependence, where you negotiate purpose and determine the rules of the game as you go along, your intentions may not always match the outcome. However, unintended does not necessarily mean undesirable. Gov- ernance implies a greater need or willingness to cope with uncertainty.

It is argued that the state no longer can presume a monopoly of expertise or of resources necessary to govern. “Governments, the argument goes, must adapt by developing new strategies to influence and shape the actions of others…” (Newman 2001:12). One result, it is argued, is an increase in the role of government as enabler, facilitator or as co-operating partner (Kooiman 1999, Stoker 2000a). The tasks of local government are seen as defining a situation, identifying key stakeholders and developing effective linkages between the relevant parties. Further tasks are to influence and steer relationships in order to achieve desired outcomes, and to establish mechanisms for effective coordination.

22 Not to forget, governance failure may occur (Stoker 2000a). Tensions and difficulties within institutions, inadequacies in the organisation that bridge the gaps between the public, private and voluntary sector, differences in time scale and horizons and failures of leadership may lead to governance failure. According to Jessop (1998, 2000), the interest in governance is a response to past state failure, i.e. failure to achieve substantive political objectives, and market failure, i.e. the failure of markets to provide economically efficient allocations. Govern- ance, it is suggested, avoids theses problems and supplements market and hierarchy with institutionalised negotiations to mobilise consensus and build mutual understanding. However, Jessop warns that the growing interest in governance as a solution to market failure and state failure should not lead to neglect of governance failure. One way to assess governance failure is to look at whether or not it produces more efficient long-term outcomes than the market and more effective long-term outcomes than top-down co-ordination.

There are different opinions regarding the role of government in governance and at least two different propositions can be identified. One argument holds that the process of globalisation has reduced the capacity of the state to manage their own economies, at the same time as challenges from within the nation have questioned the political legitimacy and integrity of the nation state (New- man 2001). According to Rhodes (1997), the hollowing out of the state, that is, the loss of functions upwards to the EU, downwards to special purpose bodies and outwards to agencies, has reduced the states’ autonomy.

Another interpretation, however, holds that it is more appropriate to speak of shifting roles of government than of shrinking roles of government (Kooiman 2000), the state is not so much decreasing its role as transforming its role from a role based in constitutional powers towards a role based in coordination and fusion of public and private interests (Pierre & Peters 2000). A greater need to co-operate with other societal actors and a reshuffling of government tasks does not mean that government interventions are outdated (Kooiman 2000). It shows an awareness of the limitations of traditional public command-and- control as a governing mechanism and awareness that responses to societal problems require broader sets of approaches and instruments. The role of government in governance can be placed along a continuum reaching from state- centric to society-centric (Pierre & Peters 2000). Different governments and policy areas will be located at different points along this continuum.

New Theoretical Perspective, Old Empirical Phenomenon

Is Governance new? Following the approach to governance outlined in this chapter, the answer is both yes and no. From a theoretical perspective, with its current use in social science, it is a rather recent occurrence. But as an empirical phenomenon, governance cannot be seen as something new. In fact, it is hard to imagine that local authorities alone have exercised all governmental powers in any particular locality. Elander and Strömberg (2001) point to numerous examples of collaborations between public and private actors in Sweden between the 1950s and 1980s. At one end of the scale they found industrial communities where important decisions were taken in agreement between the factory management, the union and the municipalities. At the other end of the scale the municipal political leader seemingly decided everything by himself. In reality he functioned as a powerful coordinator of all interests that needed to come together in order to get things done. Also, traditionally, Sweden has been considered a prime example of corporatism a system where organised interests have a chance to influence government as they are invited to participate in the process of formulating and implementing public policy (Blom-Hansen 2000). Thus, public policies have long been shaped by a wide range of actors, both inside and outside government. One must be cautious concluding what is new, and what is simply made more visible now because of a change in analysts’ conceptual lenses.

The process of local governance is not new, it has just become pro- gressively delinked from the representative and bureaucratic institutions of local government. (Lowndes 2001:1961)

In other words, governance as an empirical phenomenon is not anything new but what constitutes governance empirically, the practices and forms of governance, changes. As a result of changes in society, fora for decision-making as well as the relationships between actors have changed. The context is very different today; the circumstances and scale of local governance are worlds apart from the situation during the last decades according to Wilson (1998). Cole and John (2001) argue that there has been a qualitative change in governance during the past two decades due to the institutional fragmentation and blurred boundaries between public, private and societal actors.

As society changes, the roles of the actors in the governing process change, new governing arrangements appear, and hence what constitutes governance empirically changes continuously. As a result much of the literature on governance use the concept to signify change. Readers who are familiar with governance literature, might have noticed that so far the widely used dichotomy ‘from government to governance’ has not been used here. A reason for this is that a

24 dualism, indicating a shift from one state to another, risks over-simplifying the past and present in an attempt to make such a tidy dualism. It makes nice rhetoric, but hides the underlying changes, which actually complicates the picture.

The question then is why, over the past several years, has the governance perspective become so popular? Until the beginning of the 1980s corporatism was an accepted element of Swedish politics (Naurin 2001). This system, however, gave the impression that government was making the decisions. Today we have an increasing political fragmentation, meaning that decisions and implementation of decisions wholly or partly have been moved either to the private sector, civil society or public bodies at a lower or higher level (Elander & Strömberg 2001). In other words, this has made governance, governing processes and governing arrangements, more visible and more public. Corporatism was based on established relationships that were stable over long periods of time. Now relationships are less stable and ad hoc arrangements more common. Besides, coordination and fusion of public and private resources have become a widely adopted strategy for local authorities throughout Western Europe (Pierre 1999).

Governance and Democracy

In governance arrangements actors, representing various interests, from the public, private and voluntary sectors, carry out formulation and implementation of policy. This can be interpreted as an open form of politics, where a plurality of interests and institutions are involved, possibly resulting in a division of powers between many actors, increasing public participation and giving a voice to excluded groups in society. Governance, in other words, has the potential to strengthen democracy. However, governance may also constrain democracy.

Liberal democracy ideally builds on a state-civil society separation (Bang 2003b, Held 1987). Through governance arrangements, such as public private partnerships, joint ventures and coalitions etc, this divide is no longer so clear resulting in problems of the possibility of democratic control and of accountability (Hirst 2000). Hirst argues that the state is fragmented and merged with non-state or non-public bodies and would be better seen as part of an ‘organisational society’ “with large hierarchically controlled institutions on both sides of the public- private divide that are either unanswerable to or only weakly accountable to citizens.” (Hirst 2000:20). According to Rhodes (1997:21): “The traditional mechanisms of accountability in representative democracy were never designed to cope with multi-organizational, fragmented policy systems.”. Writing about partnerships as an example of governance arrangements, Elander and Blanc (2001) conclude:

While traditional government, at least in theory, contained a chain of accountability ultimately leading to some kind of elected body like a parliament or municipal council, partnership arrangements leave the question of accountability wide open. At best these arrangements may serve as positive complements to representative democracy, giving a voice for excluded groups in society. At worst partnerships may serve as more or less sophisticated forms of sustained elite governance. (Elander & Blanc 2001:108)

Furthermore, when public authorities transfer decisions to, for example public private partnerships, which consist of a board of representatives from the private sector and public bodies, the outcome will not represent the view of the locally elected public body (John 2001). In other words, policy priorities and formulation may not be synchronized with priorities made by politicians elected to represent the interest of the citizens and the community as a whole, but instead be a result of compromises made between much more narrowly defined interests.

In addition, research shows that established corporate interests and strong bu- reaucrats, at times, dominate governance arrangements, while politicians and marginalized groups have a much weaker position or are simply excluded (Elander & Blanc 2001). In that case, political parties, as well as marginalized groups, are left outside the policy process. As a consequence, there is not much left of the pluralism of interests or the dispersal of power.

As a result, if the public does not regard policy-makers to be representative, and view governance arrangements as closed activities out of reach for participation and accountability, then the policy process and its outcome may not be viewed by the public as legitimate. The exercise of power, as well as power holders, must appear to be legitimate to be effective in the long run.

A number of interpretations regarding democracy and governance can be made (Elander 1999). Governance arrangements can be seen as a new channel for different citizen groups to influence policy-making. Another interpretation is that governance arrangements strengthen the power of private capital and hence, provide privileged access to the local political process. This applies also to other strong interest organisations. A further interpretation argues that governance arrangements are a way for public authorities to keep at least some influence in areas that would otherwise get totally controlled by private capital.

A shift from the administrative centralism of the traditional Western European welfare state need not necessarily signal a radical step towards more democratic life. Traditional welfare state roles may be displaced by new cultural elites who become significant players in the

26 more decentralized and diversified realm of political life. Yet the broad mass of people may not find a new voice or increased representation – a point not sufficiently appreciated in much governance thinking. (Bang 2003a:5)

Conclusions Local Governance

In this chapter we have detailed that governance perspective describes current political contexts as complex and fragmented resulting in actors and institutions being dependent on collaboration to achieve a capacity to act. This suggests that studying Lindholmen Science Park through the formal planning process, and the actors that can be identified here, would be too limited. Instead the broader perspective of urban governance needs to be applied in order to describe and understand the conditions for urban planning and development in Sweden today.

The governance perspective has helped to identify a number of questions concerning the process of governing in Sweden today that can be applied on the case study of Lindholmen Science Park. It has been argued that no single actor, public or private, has expertise, information or resources necessary to govern. What actors collaborate to achieve the capacity to govern in Lindholmen?

Further, it has been argued that institutional fragmentation has increased the need for co-coordinative structures and action. How, through what arrangements, do the actors collaborate?

It has also been argued that one of the effects of the process of economic globalisation at the local level has been for local leaders to co-operate with business to find solutions to policy problems that make the locality attractive for business to remain in or relocate to. Around what agenda do the actors in the case of Lind- holmen co-operate?

The importance of participation, both its effect on accountability and legitimacy, hence for democracy, has been highlighted. To what extent are different interests participating and represented in the governance process of Lindholmen?

It has been noted that governance arrangements might, at times, turn into rather exclusive governing processes. This raises the question of how governance arrangements exert power and how they can be influence. What forms of power are present in the case of Lindholmen?

28 Chapter 3

Capacity to Govern in an Urban Context

Governance occurs, not as an act of will or domination, but as a coordination of efforts by those who have complementary aims. (Stone 1989:230)

By focusing on the informal arrangements that surround and complement the formal workings of governmental authority, urban regime theory provides a framework for studies that seek to capture key aspects of urban governance. According to urban regime theory, governance is a problematic activity (Stoker 2000b). Social complexity, political fragmentation and the division of resources between public and private actors make the capacity to act difficult to achieve in urban settings. Urban regime theory emphasises how actors seek forms of cooperation with the purpose of getting things done, i.e. achieving a capacity to act in an attempt to resolve the problem of governing.

Urban regime theory identifies key actors and institutions in the public and private sector through which urban policy and politics are negotiated. It cap- tures “…the dilemma that city governors face more than ever before: whether to maintain their power bases in urban political movements and party structures or attempt to shape the destiny of their cities by allying with the business community.” (John & Cole 1998:382). Urban regime theory highlights the opportunities and costs of forms of government based on a close relationship between public and private decision makers.

In addition, urban regime theory also provides an elaboration of urban power theory. It argues that conceptions of power that previously dominated urban power research, do not capture the character of urban power as it operates in modern societies. Politics is not restricted to acts of domination by the elite and consent or resistance from the ruled; instead, politics is about achieving govern-

ing capacity, and power has to be created by bringing actors together for cooperation (Stone 1993). Since Lindholmen is a case study set in the urban context, I have chosen to look at theories of urban power in particular as opposed to more general theories of power. Theories of urban power focus on how actors in an urban context exercise power in decision-making and governing processes.

Networks (informal arrangements gathering multiple agendas)

Urban Regime (informal arrangement with a city G wide agenda) O V Governing Coalition (informal ar- E rangement with issue or policy specific R agenda) N Public Private Partnership A (formal arrangement with N issue or policy specific C agenda) E

Figure 3.1: Different Governance Concepts

Although the governance literature covers numerous concepts, I for this dissertation am placing focus on urban regimes and governing coalitions. Figure 3.1 serves as a simplified illustration of how these concepts relate to concepts such as governance, networks and public private partnerships. As indicated by the title of the former chapter, governance is regarded as a theoretical perspective and within this perspective there is room for different concepts. One such concept is network, which will here be reserved for channels of communication that may range from something informal and interpersonal to something formal and interorganisational (Stone 2004). Networks, in the communicative sense, thus play an auxiliary role in the process of governing; they provide the basis from

30 which for example public private partnerships develop (Lowndes, Nanton, McCabe & Skelcher 1997). Public Private Partnerships are regarded as instruments of governance chosen by public, private and voluntary institutions to pursue policy goals (Peters 1998). They have a formal basis, for example a company structure, which results in clear boundaries, and the operation of the public private partnership tends to be formalised through boards and agreement over members’ rights and obligations etceteras (Lowndes et al. 1997).

These governance arrangements differ with respect to their agendas. Networks are regarded as gathering multiple actors along with their respective agendas, whereas urban regimes, public private partnerships and governing coalitions refer to arrangements where a limited number of actors collaborate to pursue an agenda jointly. Urban regimes pursue a locality wide agenda at the city level, whereas public private partnerships pursue agendas at the level of a policy or planning issue. Public private partnerships are the only arrangement that is formal in its character. To what extent these concepts are represented in a city is of course a question for empirical investigation.

Urban regimes and governing coalitions are my conceptual tools to describe and understand the governing process in Lindholmen as the two concepts emphasize how actors achieve a capacity to govern as well as how they utilize power in the urban context. The other two concepts do not offer such an explicit emphasis on power.

Urban Regimes

Urban regime theory stems from a political economy perspective (Elkin 1987, Stone 1993). This means that urban regime theory takes as given a liberal political economy which combines two conditions. One condition is a set of government institutions controlled to an important degree by elected officials. However, governmental conduct is constrained by the needs of re-election, referred to as popular control of the formal machinery of government. The other condition is an economy guided mainly (but not exclusively) by privately controlled business interests. This results in governmental conduct being constrained by the need to promote investment activity in an economic arena dominated by private ownership. Following Lindblom (1977) regime theorists note the significance of the divide by those who control the levers of economic investment and activity and those who control the levers of government.

Businessmen generally and corporate executives in particular take on a privileged role in government that is, it seems reasonable to say, unmatched by any other leadership group other than government officials themselves. (Lindblom 1977:172)

Lindblom (1977) claims that economic distress can bring down a government and consequently a major function of government is to see to it that businessmen perform their task well. As government cannot command business to perform they encourage them, through for example infrastructure investments and tax reductions, to assure profits high enough to maintain minimum levels of employment and growth. From the point of view of government officials, businessmen do not simply represent a special interest, as do representatives of interest groups. Instead they are seen as functionaries performing actions that are indispensable and effect society as a whole rather than a special interest group. According to Lindblom (1977) any government official who understands this will give businessmen a privileged position:

He does not have to be bribed, duped, or pressure to do so. Nor does he have to be an uncritical admirer of businessmen to do so. He simply understands, as is plain to see, that public affairs in market-oriented systems are in the hands of two groups of leaders government and business, who must collaborate, to make the system work government leadership must often defer to business leadership. (Lindblom 1977:175)

A regime, then, is a set of arrangements through which the division of labour between those who control the levers of economic investment and activity and those who control the levers of government is bridged (Stone 1993). The political economy approach emerged in the early 1980s and argued that the powerful influence exercised by economic interests so far had been overlooked (Pierre 1995). It focused on the limitations on local autonomy set by market actors, and ended in an economic determinism, rather pessimistic about the possibilities of influencing local politics (Imbroscio 1998). Regime theory emerged in the mid 1980s and argued that, while economic forces may play a strong role in shaping urban outcomes, politics still matters. The relationship between economics and politics are intertwined, where economic forces both shape and are shaped by political arrangements (Stone 1993). Although the nature of business involvement varies from indirect and limited to direct and extensive, the economic role of business and the resources they control are too important for theses actors to be left out of an analysis of local decision-making (Stone 1989).

Regime Characteristics An urban regime is defined as “the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out decisions” (Stone 1989:6, emphasis in original). It is a relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions. The informal arrangements surround and complement the workings of government authority. What makes the group informal is that the actors are brought together by an informal mode of cooperation. There is no structure of

32 command that guides and synchronises participant behaviour. There is a purposive coordination of efforts but it comes about informally. As a result, a regime is purposive, created and maintained as a way of facilitating action. For the participating actors, a regime is empowering. A few regime characteristics are listed below (Stone 2001): - An identifying agenda, around which resources can be mobilised, is needed for a regime to take hold and sustain itself. - Regimes are relatively stable though not static. - Regimes have a cross-sector foundation and this foundation is embodied in a governing coalition. Governing coalition refers to a core group who comes together repeatedly in making important decisions. - Regimes are informal and hence not fully specified by the formal structure of government. The informal character and the cross-sector foundation means that no power of command directs the arrangements, in other words some form of cooperation plays an important role. - Regimes have a productive character, meaning that they provide a capacity to act and bring resources to carry out the identifying agenda to a degree that would not happen without the arrangements that constitute the regime.

Purpose (which makes up the identifying agenda), engagement, resources and capacity are central elements in forming, sustaining and altering regime arrangements (Stone 2001). Purpose motivates engagement; engagement mobi- lises resources; and mobilised resources provide problem-solving capacity. If purpose is underdeveloped, inadequately framed or not adapted to changing conditions the regime capacity weakens as engagement weakens. If the resources brought together are inadequate to pursue the identifying agenda, the regime arrangement becomes purposeless and fades.

Regimes are driven by two needs, institutional scope and cooperation (Stone 1989). Institutional scope refers to the need to encompass as many institutions as needed to mobilise the resources required in making and implementing governing decisions. Cooperation refers to the need to promote enough cooperation and coordination for the different participants to reach decisions and sustain action in support of those decisions. Cooperation is not obtained and sustained through hierarchy and bargaining but through networks. By identifying complementary interests, interdependent relationships based on trust, loyalty and reciprocity develop, which encourages collaborative activity (Lowndes & Skelcher 1998). Organisations learn to cooperate by recognizing their mutual dependency.

However, cooperation does not occur simply because it is useful. Cooperation cannot be taken as a given, it must be achieved and often at significant costs. Some of the costs are visible resources expended in promoting cooperation while others are less visible (Stone 1989). Achieving cooperation requires

commitment to a set of relationships and these relationships limit independ- ence of action. Ongoing relationships cannot be neglected and might even call for sacrifices to prevent alienating allies. To form wider connections is thus not a cost-free step and thus not always a step that community actors are eager to take. As centrifugal tendencies are strong, achieving cooperation is a major accomplishment that requires constant effort. A powerful actor can induce cooperation, but more often cooperation is achieved through some degree of reciprocity. The potential problems of cooperation in the absence of a system of command are myriad as illustrated by games and experiments such as pris- oner’s dilemma and the free-rider problem.

Although the key participants in regime arrangements are considered to be elected officials and business, the regime literature also recognises that a variety of other community interests can be present in regimes; for example minorities, neighbourhoods and organized labour etc. In addition, Stoker (1995) points to the leading role of technical/professional officials in European coalitions. To be an effective regime partner one needs to have strategic knowledge, a capacity to act on the basis of that knowledge and control of resources that makes for an attractive coalition partner (Stoker 1995). Knowledge and economic position are the key resources that provide some interests privileged access to decision making.

In order to prevail, urban regimes need to develop strategies to cope with the wider political environment (Stoker & Mossberger 1994). One strategy is to practise a politics of exclusion and purposely exclude certain interests, with the intention of ensuring that they are not given access to decision making. How- ever, at times, a strong enough opposition can be mobilized to disrupt a regime, therefore, another strategy can be to incorporate certain marginal groups as part of the project, hence preventing them from acting against the agenda of the regime.

Urban regime theory does not imply that every community has a strong and effective regime (Stone 2001). To begin with, it is a matter of empirical evidence whether or not a regime is present. Further, regime arrangements vary along several dimensions such as the scope of their identifying agendas, their strength in addressing their agendas and the capabilities of their capacities to emerging issues. Governing arrangements can be placed along a spectrum of greater to lesser effectiveness. The concept of urban regime is intended to focus on when and how effective arrangements come into existence and how they are sustained over time. For various sectors of the community, non- cooperation is, in many ways, the norm, cooperation (rather than its absence) is to be explained. The focus on efficiency does not mean that regime theory is indifferent to aspects of democracy. However, efficiency comes first (Elander forthcoming).

34 Regime Typologies Several typologies have been developed, categorising different kinds of regimes. Stone (1993) identified four types of regimes: maintenance regimes, development regimes, middle-class progressive regimes and lower class opportunity expansion regimes (see table 3.1). This typology is based on the need for the regimes to match their resources with the requirements of their proposed agenda. For example, a development regime needs more resources to pursue a growth policy than a maintenance regime needs to pursue the task of preserving routine service delivery. Hence, the purpose of the typology is to show how, if policy change is to be brought about, the resources have to match the requirements of the proposed agenda.

Promoting development, pursuing progressive mandates, and seeking opportunity expansion for the lower class are not choices available through a simple process of enactment. To pursue these policy alternatives means to marshal the resources required for their achievement. Policy choice, then, is a matter of regime building, of bringing together the essential partners on a basis that enables them to meld together the resources commensurate with the governing responsibility undertaken. (Stone 1993:22)

Table 3.1: Stone’s Regime Typology Purpose Maintenance Regime Sustaining status quo, provision of routine service Development Regime Changing land use in order to promote growth or counter decline Middle-class progressive Promoting environmental protection, historic regime preservation and affordable housing Regime devoted to lower Enriched education, job training, improved trans- class opportunity expan- portation access, enlarged opportunities for busi- sion ness and homeowner ship

A maintenance regime involves no effort to change established social and economic practice and therefore neither any extensive mobilisation of private resources nor any substantial change in behaviour is called for. “They provide us with a benchmark against which to compare other types of regimes.” (Stone 1993:18). Development regimes on the other hand are concerned with changing land use in order to promote growth or counter decline and hence seek to modify established social and economic patterns which involve linking private investment to public action. Middle-class progressive regimes focus on such measures as environmental protection, historic preservation, affordable housing and quality of design. The government-business relationship here is not a largely volun-

tary one but instead coercion plays a larger part than in development regimes. Finally, regimes devoted to lower class opportunity expansion involve enriched education and job training, improved transportation access and enlarged opportunities for business and homeownership. Such regimes are regarded as largely hypothetical in the US as they require substantial mass mobilisation as well as resource and coordination prerequisites that are often absent in American cities (Stoker 1995, Stone 1993).

Table 3.2: Stoker and Mossberger’s Regime Typology Purpose Organic Regime Maintenance of status quo Instrumental Regime Project realization Symbolic Regime Redirection of ideology or image

Stoker and Mossberg (1994) later developed a typology of urban regimes for cross-national urban research (see table 3.2). “The typology adapts the maintenance, development, and progressive regimes by including them in the broader categories of organic, instrumental and symbolic regimes.” (Mossberger & Stoker 2001:825-826).

Organic regimes seek to sustain status quo and thus preserve the present character of their communities (Stoker & Mossberger 1994). There are two subgroups identified within this category. The goal of caretaker regimes, in small or medium- sized towns with few aspirations to grow or change, is the maintenance of traditional small-town life-style. Exclusive regimes on the other hand are based on strategies of exclusion and maintenance involves social cohesion through ho- mogeneity. “Through implicit or explicit racial or class-based exclusion, high- income communities maintain their prestige, their high property values, and superior services for relatively low tax rates.” (Stoker & Mossberger 1994:200).

The driving force behind the instrumental regime is to gather the power required for accomplishing specific projects. In other words the purposes are short term and project oriented. “Goals are shaped in part by what is feasible rather than by a strong local consensus (organic regimes) or by a broad vision or set of beliefs (symbolic regimes).” (Stoker & Mossberger 1994:201).

The driving force behind the symbolic regime is to fundamentally change a city’s ideology or image, thus the purpose is transition (Stoker & Mossberger 1994). Symbolic regimes may occur when cities have experienced the rapid change of deindustrialization. There are two subtypes of symbolic regimes: progressive regime and urban revitalisation regime. In progressive regimes: “Economic growth

36 exists not as a goal in itself, but as an activity that must conform to the regime’s broader values about what the city is or should be.” (Stoker & Mossberger 1994:201). These progressive regimes stress values such as environmentalism, historical preservation or opportunities for the poor. The goal of the urban revitalization regime is to change the city’s image in order to attract investment and/or middle-income or high-income residents.

Agenda and Governing Coalition

The typologies above have identified both purpose and resources as crucial for regime formation and maintenance. In order for a regime to take hold and sustain itself it needs an identifying agenda, i.e. some set of recognised purposes that are linked to concrete courses of action. Through the identifying agenda, diverse bases of support and resources can be gained and maintained. The core group of actors, who jointly dispose of resources necessary to formulate and achieve the agenda, is referred to as a governing coalition. The identifying agenda is formulated by a governing coalition. A governing coalition is the set of informal political networks of city leaders that form around a particular identifying agendas. The function of coalition building is to establish common ground among differing interests as a means to work out collective solutions. The concept coalition is used to emphasise the bringing together of various elements of the community and the different institutional capacities they control.

A governing coalition is a form of issue-focused decision-making between public and private actors and as such they are inter-organisational, coordinating and empowering (Stone 2001). The crucial role of governing coalitions is to blend capacities between governmental and non-governmental actors in order to achieve a governing task (Stoker 2000b). Governing coalitions need to be formed among those actors who have access to and the power to deliver resources – financial, physical, human, and political – of key public and private institutions (Harding 1994).

The capacity to act on the identifying agenda rests on the coalition members and the nature of the relationships among them (Stone 2001). The agenda is only meaningful if the coalition collectively has resources to act on it. If a coalition cannot deliver on the agenda, the members will disengage. Resources are important not only to act on the agenda but also to formulate one. Conse- quently, public policies are shaped by three factors: the composition of a community’s governing coalition, the nature of the relationship among members of the governing coalition and, last, the resources that members bring to the governing coalition. In turn, the socio-economic environment frames the options

open to the governing coalition at the same time as state-level policies sometimes are necessary to make certain options feasible (Stoker 1995).

The advantage of minimum majorities, in which fewer players mean more benefits per player, does not necessarily hold true for governing coalitions (Di- Gaetano & Klemanski 1999). Instead, as the purpose of coalition building is to coordinate activities around particular agendas, coalition building and maintenance is a matter of pooling resources. As a result, more members of a governing coalition might mean a larger institutional base from which to generate resource and hence increase the chances of achieving the agenda.

Potential coalition partners make calculations about the costs and benefits of participating in governing coalitions. According to DiGaetano and Klemanski (1999) politicians are governed by a ‘political logic’, which is based on addressing the concerns of the voters. Business leaders act out of an ‘economic logic’, where they consider the effects of participation on business. Finally, community activists are ruled by a ‘community logic’ that weighs costs and benefits of participation in relation to their organisation or neighbourhood. As participation in a governing coalition calls for partners to compromise their desired goals, the actors must determine whether it is worthwhile contributing resources to a governing task that does not fully meet their interests.

“Thus a governing coalition is the group of actors who come together, in many instances unofficially and tacitly, for the purpose of setting a locality wide agenda and giving it priority standing (That is, they provide “guiding and steering”).” (Stone 2002:2). For Stone the term ‘governing coalition’ puts the focus on the fact that a core group holds informal arrangements together; moreover, a core group whose purpose it is to set a locality wide agenda.

In this dissertation, however, governing coalitions will be a way to see who constitutes the core group which comes together for the purpose of setting the agenda for Lindholmen and giving it priority standing. The presumption is that a governing coalition exists within each planning and policy process and that the coalition governs the process. Regime, on the other hand, signifies a core group of actors who come together for the purpose of setting a locality wide agenda and giving it priority standing. However, it cannot in beforehand be taken for granted that a regime exists, that has to be empirically investigated. A regime thus is a long-term coalition, governing the city by setting a locality wide agenda.

38 Urban Power

So far we have concluded that the identifying agenda attracts the governing coalition which blends the capacities from governmental and non- governmental actors in order to create a capacity to act and achieve a governing task. Next we turn to theories of urban power to understand how actors in the urban context achieve the power to govern.

Community Power Debate Since the 1950s studies of urban politics and urban power have been influenced by research originating in North America. The ‘community power debate’ during the 1950s and 1960s was between elite theorists, who argued that urban power was concentrated and highly stratified (Hunter 1953), and pluralists, who conceived of power as dispersed among interest groups (Dahl 1961).

Elite theory argues that local governments are ruled by a relatively small number of people with like-minded (usually business) interests (Judge, Stoker & Wolman 1995). The theory is based on a hierarchical conception of society and concerns itself with relations between the rulers, who are powerful, and the ruled, who are powerless (Harding 1995). One famous elite study is Floyd Hunter’s study of Atlanta where he, through reputational analysis4, concluded that formulation of policy mostly took place in groups where economic interests where dominant (Hunter 1953). The study offered evidence that local representative democracy in the US was just a smokescreen for dominant economic interests (Harding 1995).

The pluralists reject the elite theorists’ view of urban political power as highly stratified, dominated by a single, coherent elite and instead they see political power as dispersed among interest groups (Judge, Stoker & Wolman 1995). In his famous study of New Haven, Robert A Dahl, searched for an answer to the question who governs? (Dahl 1961) The conclusion was that while the political system might be stratified it was also differentiated, as different groups/elites exerted degrees of influence in different policy areas at different times. Plural- ists do not dispute that community decision-making is restricted to a small number of people, but they see the political system as being open to groups who are active, organised and wanting to be heard (Judge 1995). They see a pluralism of interests with different groups competing to exercise power.

4 Reputational analyses trace the distribution of power in the city by discovering those who are reputed to be in some way influential. They are based on reputational methods such as compiling a list of names of people regarded as having power based on the answers of a number of interviewees or ask a panel to assess and rank names in order of influence in the city (Saunders 1980).

Instead of using a reputational analysis as Hunter did in his Atlanta study, Dahl in his New Haven used a decisional approach “…which involved looking at what they [the pluralists] said was the actual exercising of power in real decision-making situations…” (Harding 1995:40). Dahl defined power as “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” (Dahl 1957:203). Neo-elite theorists, however, attacked pluralists by arguing that decisional analysis was blind to the way policy agendas are set and that the power used to make concrete decisions only represented one dimension of power (Harding 1995). Instead Bachrach and Baratz (1962) argued for a second dimension of power, operating through a process of non- decision making to suppress conflicts and to prevent them from entering the political process.

Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. (Bachrach & Baratz 1962:948)

Contrary to the first dimension of power, which claims that actors participate in politics on the basis of a conscious discontent, the second dimension of power argues that it is not evident that those with the greatest needs participate most in politics. Hence, in the first dimension of power, the exercise of power occurs in observable overt conflicts between actors over key issues. In the second dimension of power, Bachrach and Baratz’s approach, the exercise of power occurs in covert conflicts between actors over issues (or potential issues). In other words, by making sure that the agenda is not reflecting the needs of the non-participants they are precluded from the decision-making process (Johans- son, M 2002). Bachrach and Baratz refer to the process which confines decision-making to safe issues such as ‘the mobilization of bias’ (Lukes 1974).

Table 3.3: Urban Power According to the Community Power Tradition Advocates Question Object Elite theory Hunter, Mills Who rules? Reputation of power, positions and resources Pluralism Dahl, Polsby Who governs? Decision-making process Non-decision Bachrach & Baratz Who sets the Non-decisions, making agenda and how? mobilisation of bias

40 Urban Power Expands After neo-elitism, the debate about power became even more abstract, to the point that “…any concern with the sort of urban empirical data that had helped fuel it disappeared.” (Harding 1995:40).5 However, during the 1980s, work on urban regimes marks a partial reversion to the concerns of the community power debate with a focus on power in the urban context. As we concluded above, for elite theorists and pluralists, power meant the ability to get people to do something they would not otherwise do. Thus exercising power is to control or gain domination over others. As a reaction to this, urban regime theory emerged in the mid 1980s claiming that governance is not simply a matter of social control in which rival factions or coalitions dominate government decision-making. “…social control is not a helpful lens through which to view power and that its unchallenged acceptance has caused both the pluralist an elitist schools of thoughts to misunderstand the character of power as it operates in modern societies.“ (Stone 1989:220, emphasis in original).

In contrast to elite theory and pluralist theory that focus on social control, that is domination and subordination over other actors, regime theory puts the focus on social production. In a fragmented urban world an understanding of power as an issue of social control is insufficient (Stoker 1998). What is at issue, according to regime theory, is a capacity to act and accomplish goals. The power struggle concerns power to (which is gaining and fusing capacity) not power over (which is control and resistance). Hence, politics is about achieving governing capacity, which has to be created and maintained in cooperation with actors who hold complementary resources essential to achieve policy goals.

In a social control model the central issue is the cost of compliance, the diffi- culty of maintaining a comprehensive scheme of control (Stone 1989). Chal- lenge can drive up the cost of control for the ruling group and thereby reducing their dominance. In other words the cost burden is on the governing body. But in the social production model, the cost burden is on the challenging group. Challenging a regime is not simply a question of mobilizing resistance. Opposi- tion is inconsequential unless it can be organised on a mass basis and trans-

5 The ‘general’ power debate, as opposed to the more specific community power debate, continued with adding both a third and, what has by some been labelled as, a fourth dimension of power. In the third dimension of power, developed by Lukes (1974), power also involves the exercise of shaping people’s preferences to prevent conflicts from arising. Consequently, when this form of power operates, there is a latent conflict (Ham & Hill 1993). “…A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants.” (Lukes 1974:23). Another alternative perspective of power, has been developed based on Foucault with power expressed and exerted in the interplay between dominating and opposing discourses (Brikell 2000, Hajer 1995, Isaksson 2001, Johansson, M 2002). Discursive power is exerted through the rules and procedures that in every discourse and at every moment are active to decide which definitions, classifications, statements, perceptions and actions that are regarded as allowed, valid, reasonable and true (Foucault 1971).

formed into an alternative capacity to govern. In a fragmented world governance is not a task of comprehensive control it is the process of bringing about enough cooperation among disparate community elements to get things done.

Participants thus do not behave as if the underlying structure of the situation is one of polarity between the few who dominate and the many who are dominated within an integrated system of control. In- stead, they act as if the capacity to govern is in question. Where are the needed resources? How can cooperation be induced? Who can provide a reliable foundation of support? With a view of the situation defined by questions such as these, the most attractive allies are those who are organized, who control essential resources, and who have a capacity to engage in a dependable system of cooperation. (Stone 1989:229)

Shifting from a model of social control to social production illustrates why challenging a regime is not simply a question of mobilising opposition (Stone 1989). It is a question of restructuring the way in which people and groups are related to one another and providing new avenues of cooperation between them. That is unlikely to happen in a simple mobilisation of dissent. Opposi- tions can gain concessions but only if it can threaten the foundation of the support for the governing coalition. “The power struggle concerns, not control and resistance, but gaining and fusing a capacity to act – power to not power over.” (Stone 1989:229, emphasis in original).

Regime theorists do not believe, as elite theorists do, that one group is able to exercise control in a complex world (Stoker 1995, Stoker 1998). They do not believe, as pluralists do that government responds to groups on the basis of their electoral power or the intensity of their preferences. Instead they believe that governments are prone to cooperate with those that hold the appropriate resources to achieve a governing task.

The community power debate has centred on the question of control, its possibilities and limitations, or to what extent domination by a command centre is possible and how the cost of social control is worked out. Regime theory places focus on cooperation, its possibilities and limitations, i.e. cooperation of the kind that bring together people based in different sectors of a community’s institutional life and hence enables coalitions of actors to make and support a set of governing decisions. The social-production model “…is based on the question of how, in a world of limited and dispersed authority, actors work together across institutional lines to produce a capacity to govern and bring about publicly significant results.” (Stone 1989:9). However, power to does not make power over obsolete; instead the two concepts are regarded as inseparable

42 partners in the political process. “Social control and social production are not mutually exclusive models of the political process, but instead elucidate different dimensions of the use of political power.” (DiGaetano & Klemanski 1999:22).

Forms of Urban Power The contribution of urban regime theory to theories on urban power is to expand the understanding of urban power not only to include power as social control, i.e. power over, but also to understand power as social production, i.e. power to. Urban regime theory is premised on the view that power in urban politics can be observed in a variety of forms. There are at least four forms of power (see table 3.4) identifiable in operation: systemic power, command power, coalition power and pre-emptive power (DiGaetano & Klemanski 1999, Stoker 1995).

Table 3.4: Forms of Urban Power Form of Power Systemic power Available to certain interests because of their position in the socioeconomic structure Command power Active mobilization of resources to achieve domination over other interests Coalition power Actors bargaining on the basis of their respective autonomous basis of strength Pre-emptive power Bringing together a coalition of interests capable of providing leadership

Systemic power enables certain interests to influence decision-making simply through their position in society (DiGaetano & Klemanski 1999, Stoker 1995). For example business may not need to act in order for its interests to be taken into account in public decision-making because they control crucial resources necessary for political success. “… governing decisions are made in ways that seek accommodation with privileged power holders.” (DiGaetano & Klemanski 1999:21).

This means therefore that, if the situation is such that B feels a need to be accommodating to A, then A has power over B, whether A sought that position or is even aware of it or not. (Stone 1980:979)

A participant need not make a conscious effort to obtain an advantage position or even be aware of the consequences of her power position (Stoker 1995).

Systemic power is often exerted unintentionally or unrecognised. Although systemic power is constraining, scope for influence of political forces and activity remains, and thus urban decision makers still have relative autonomy.

The two following forms of power, command power and coalition power, both stem from the first dimension of power’s conception of power as A getting B to do what B would not otherwise do, or to put it in other words, A being able to overcome B’s resistance and achieve compliance (Stone 1988). Command power refers to power as a relationship between actors engaged in pursuing or resisting compliance. It is less positional and more active (Stoker 1995). Com- mand power involves active mobilization of resources, such as information, finance and knowledge, to achieve domination over other interests. It can be expressed both through formal authority and informal influence (DiGaetano & Klemanski 1999). Command power can most likely only extend over a limited domain and a restricted set of activities since the resources, skills and the time needed to achieve command power are only likely to be available to certain interests in limited areas (Stoker 1995). Therefore, to influence a larger sphere of activity, actors need to find allies with compatible goals as well as complementary domains and resources. “That process of working out arrangements between complementary domains is coalitional power.” (Stone 1988:88).

Because of this limited capacity for domination and control in urban politics this third form of power, coalition power, is employed in coalition building. (Stoker 1995). It refers to a relationship between mutual actors who have complementary resources and bargain on the basis of their respective strengths, instead of merely trying to dominate (DiGaetano & Klemanski 1999). This form of power might be employed when dominating power is too costly. Whereas the limit of command power is the cost of obtaining compliance, the problem with coalition power is that the coalitional arrangements tend to be issue specific and therefore short-lived (as well as somewhat unstable) as they rest on compatible goals and complementary resources.

Stone (1988) argues that much of the community power debate has been focused on a view of power as a compliance problem, i.e. A getting B to do what B would not otherwise have done. Stone’s study of Atlanta led him to conclude that there is another form of urban power present, namely pre-emptive power or power as a capacity to occupy, hold and make use of a strategic position. “Power here rests on the need for leadership in a complex society and the capacity of certain interests in coalition to provide that leadership.” (Stoker 1995:65). Rather than being achieved through ideological indoctrination (compare to Lukes (1974) third dimension of power), this leadership is a result of a group of interests being able to form a structure capable of solving collective action problems. “The act of power is to build a regime and achieve the capacity to govern. This form of power is intentional and active.” (Stoker 1995:65).

44 The ability to hold and occupy a strategic position in the governing process enables a coalition to control the policy setting. As a result those who acquire pre-emptive power can direct policy setting and discourage potential opposition to their policy agenda by making challenges far too costly to attempt (Stone 1988). Thus, pre-emptive power shifts our understanding of the cost of compliance. The challenging group cannot simply resist and drive up the cost of compliance. Instead the challenging group must be able to withstand the costs of being in opposition as well as be able to constitute an alternative set of governing arrangements.

Pre-emptive power does not reject command power (with its compliance and resistance) nor coalition power (with its emphasis on the bargaining relationship), they are part of the total picture. The focus of pre-emptive power is on the ability to aggregate enough of the proper resources and bring together a coalition capable of exercising a policy-setting role.

An Approach to Analysing Lindholmen

In this section the approach to analyse the governing process of Lindholmen is outlined. The following questions have been identified: - Around what agenda do the actors in the case of Lindholmen co-operate? - What actors collaborate to achieve the capacity to govern in Lindholmen? - How, through what arrangements, do the actors collaborate? - To what extent are different interests participating and represented in the governance process of Lindholmen? - What forms of power are present in the case of Lindholmen?

The governance perspective highlights the need to take into account both public and private actors when analysing governing processes. Since no single actor has the knowledge, resources or action potential to govern on her/his own but is dependent on other actors, the context and the relationships which influence planning and development are likely to exceed the formal planning process as well as the public sector. Therefore, the conceptual framework for analysing Lindholmen and responding to the questions above, are developed from urban regime theory with its focus on urban power and how public and private sector actors and institutions cooperate to achieve their capacity to govern. Urban regime theory provides the following concepts for analysis: - Identifying agenda - Governing coalition - Urban Power: systemic power, command power, coalition power and pre- emptive power

The identifying agenda will be used to examine what policy goal attracts the actors as well as to identify which actors are attracted to the agenda. The governing coalition is used to determine which actors are collaborating and how they do it, but also to look at which interests, if any, that are excluded. Different forms of power are analysed to find out how the actors govern and to discuss the possibilities for excluded interests to influence the process.

Figure 3.1: Urban Regimes and Governing Coalitions

City wide agenda: urban politics

Regime

Gover- Gover- Gover- ning ning ning coali- coali- coalition tion tion A B C

Specialized agenda: urban planning and policy

Figure 3.1 illustrates the differences, as well as the relationships between urban regimes and governing coalitions used in this dissertation. A regime is a long- term coalition that governs on the city-level. It controls the policy setting on a locality wide arena for quite some time. A regime may not always be present in the city; this is a question of empirical evidence. Governing coalitions, on the other hand, operate on the level of a specific planning or policy issue, such as the development of a new education policy or the planning of a new housing area.

46 The governing coalition includes the actors who blend their capacities in order to achieve a capacity to govern and, for example, to establish a science park in Lindholmen.

In other words, urban regimes are regarded as operating at the city-level whereas governing coalitions operate at the level of a policy or planning issue. This approach differs from urban regime theory as applied in earlier studies. Urban regime theory is concerned with governance arrangements at the city- level and consequently uses regimes as well as governing coalitions to refer to governance arrangements with a locality-wide agenda. Following urban regime theory one can, in other words, conduct a regime analysis of Göteborg. Follow- ing the approach outlined here, it is possible to study the governing process of Lindholmen and at the same time take into account the locality wide context of urban politics in Göteborg which may influence the outcomes of the process.

To conclude, the purpose of the approach outlined in this chapter is to be able to describe and understand the governing process of Lindholmen. This approach highlights the complexity of governing in the urban context. To understand the Lindholmen process it is not enough to look at the formal planning process one needs to take into account how actors seek collaboration to achieve a capacity to govern and one also needs to look at the urban political context which may influence the process. The analysis of the Lindholmen case may give clues to a more general understanding of the conditions for and forms of urban planning and development in contemporary Sweden.

48 Chapter 4

Method and Material

The objective of this chapter is to provide the reader with a clear and open account of the theories, methods and materials that have been used in order to increase the inter-subjectivity of this study, i.e. to make it more or less recon- structable for the reader (Lundquist 1993). First the potentials and limitations of governance and urban regime theory are examined, methods and material are then discussed.

Theoretical Approach

In 1999 Mikael Granberg and I published a report on Swedish planning and the Swedish planning debate during three decades entitled: Whatever happened to rational planning? Swedish planning reflections during three decades (Granberg & von Sydow 1999). In this debate, we identified a shift towards a multi-actor perspective. Despite its formal monopoly, the municipality, through its politicians and planners, is only one actor in a complex structure of various actors and interests. Hence, I was left with a lingering curiosity regarding how things are actually accomplished in a fragmented, urban environment where an increasing number of actors articulate interests and demand their right to influence urban development and planning. When I began my PhD studies, this pre-understanding led me into the literature on governance. The concept of governance offers a potential to analyze the institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing without getting limited to government. Thus, governance as an analytical concept calls for empirical investigations to uncover which public, private and voluntary agents that are actually governing.

One may argue that governance is too broad a concept to be useful as guidance to an empirical study of a particular case. Considering the many more or less overlapping definitions and applications one may even ask ‘if governance is

everything maybe it is nothing’? However, I would argue that the governance perspective is useful as a general conceptual framework that provides a perspective on the relationships between public, private and voluntary agents in the process of governing in contemporary society. As such it has provided the case study of Lindholmen with a number of research questions. However, as the study of Lindholmen has progressed the need arose for an approach that goes deeper into the processes of governing and explain how actors achieve power to govern in a complex and fragmented urban context. Therefore urban regime theory was chosen because it places focus on how actors seek collaboration with the purpose of achieving a capacity to govern as well as identifies different forms of power in the urban context. Urban regime theory integrates elements of various conceptions of power and extends those by formulating a new approach (Elander forthcoming). Thus, on the one hand urban regime theory can be seen as part of the more general governance perspective, but, on the other, regarded as a more specific and concrete theory developed to understand urban politics.

Regime analysis has mainly been developed through case studies of particular coalitions in the institutional and historical settings of individual cities (Stoker 2000b). Regime theory is not a theory in the strict, deductive sense that it contains precise assumptions about casual relations between concepts central to the theory, nor is it a model in the sense of a simplified picture of reality (Elander & Strömberg 2001). It is more correct to speak about regime theory as a form of inductive empirical theory in an early phase of its development. As a comprehensive frame of reference it can provide context to and connections between political processes, within different issue areas of urban politics.

…regime analysis is not intended to be a comprehensive theory on the order of, say, Marxism or rational choice. It is a second-level theory, concerned with a particular set of problems, not with a total way of viewing the world. (Stone 1998:250)

Urban regime theory, as with other theories related to urban governance, can be seen as one of several approaches belonging to the broad family of institutional theory (Rothstein1996; Bogason 2000). Other, urban policy related approaches of this family are indicated by concepts such as “capacity building” (Cars, Healey, Madanipour & de Magalhães Eds. 2002) and “growth machines” (Molotch 1976). However, for the particular purpose of this dissertation there is no need to dig deeper into this discourse. Arguably, the chosen combination of urban regime and urban governance analysis provides a conceptual tool suit- able for an analysis of the Lindholmen case in a wider urban context.

50 Different Contexts The various literatures and theories of governance are influenced by the political contexts in which they have been developed. Most of the governance literature applied here has been developed mainly in the UK and the US. Although Sweden, the UK and the US share certain experiences in societal changes affecting governance, as discussed, there are differences in their respective political contexts.

For example in Sweden and the UK, political decisions and actions are seen as the only legitimate exercise of control and authority, whereas the political culture in the US is based in market ideologies (Pierre 1998). Locally owned business in the US is important in a way that is not comparable to European states (John & Cole 1998). In the United States, according to John and Cole (1998), the porous public bureaucracy, the weak state tradition and diffuse political parties make for greater business influence on local policy than in Europe. Im- plied in most American case studies is the near hegemonic acceptance of the role of capital in shaping the local policy agenda and determining the built environment in the central city (Strom 1996).

Pierre (1999) argues that even though the legal and economic frameworks for local economic development policies vary across national contexts, the basic problem remains largely the same; urban political dependency on private capital for its tax base and revenues. In Scandinavian countries, local government funding comes primarily from the state, and corporate taxation is national rather than local. But, private businesses provide jobs, which generate local income taxes. “To be sure, the competition for private investment in these countries is almost as fierce as in the United States.” (Pierre 1999:385).

Moreover, central government tends to be stronger in European states (Strom 1996). They have a greater capacity and willingness to intervene in the market and they play a more significant role in setting policy guidelines. Fiscal equaliza- tion schemes, in which central government redistributes resources from wealth- ier to poorer regions, leave local units less dependent on the local market, although at the expense of local autonomy (Strom 1996). As a result a city’s dependence on, or autonomy from, central government and the market shape local politics, and hence the way that governing arrangements are constructed.

Clearly the British and Swedish contexts also differ. For example, compared to the UK, Swedish municipalities have a strong constitutional status, relatively high degree of policy-making autonomy and, as their activities mainly are financed by local income tax, financial independency (Montin 2000). The role of local government in the UK differs from the Swedish counterpart. “… the English state remains highly centralized and unrestrained, with power resting in the executive based in London.” (Cole & John 2001).

As a result of contextual differences, based on dissimilarities in the countries’ economic and political environments, governance differs in some aspects. Ar- guably, the governance perspective is broad enough to capture and highlight these differences. Consequently, the main focus of the British governance literature is on the fragmenting effects of NPM and networks, with partnerships as one mode of coordination. The American literature, on the other hand, focuses on the influence of business on urban policy, with growth machines and urban regimes as modes of coordination and instruments for economic development.

Urban regime theory has been criticised for being too provincial to be applied outside the North American context. As indicated above, there is no doubt that the governing context of European cities is different from that of the United States where urban regime theory originates. The role of local government and private business differs widely. Still, European research has identified a situation where local government increasingly shares powers, responsibilities and resources with non-governmental actors, resulting in an increasing role for the private sector in local politics in Europe (Harding, Wilks-Heeg & Hutchins 2000, Harding 1995). Hence, urban regime theory, with its focus on cooperation and barging between public and private interests in urban policymaking, has the potential of contributing to an analysis of governance in a European context as well. Elander (forthcoming) argues that, when it comes to describing, systematizing and explaining different urban development policies, urban regime theory can in fact provide a tool for comparison between cities and municipalities within and between different countries. According to Stoker (1995), if some of its ethnocentric assumptions are taken into account, regime theory has the capacity to travel and offer an effective framework for analyses in different countries as well as cross-national comparison.6

Strom (1996) applied urban regime theory on a case study of Berlin and concludes that it can illuminate aspects of German urban politics that are sometimes overlooked in German literature. However, the kinds of governing coalitions that emerge are shaped by a different set of political and cultural dynamics than those common to American cities. In other words, although many researchers have concluded that a governance perspective as well as urban regime theory is appropriate for cross-national analysis (DiGaetano & Klemanski 1999, Harding 1994, Sellers 2002), it is clear that one needs to be aware of contextual differences since they result in differences in the process of governing. Argua- bly, urban regime theory could be very useful as a tool to identify and describe these very differences.

6 For cross-national comparison see for example Seller study of urban regimes in French, Ger- man and American cities (2002) as well as DiGaetano & Klemanski study of British and Ameri- can cities (1999).

In conclusion, there is a considerable literature on how cities are governed which stems from different national contexts. Although this literature is based on findings from these various contexts, they point to similar conclusions regarding the conditions for cities today and how they are governed. Thus it can be argued that urban regime theory has general applicability. But obviously, in the study of Lindholmen, there must be an awareness of Swedish contextual differences, for example our municipalities’ relatively strong role. However, one should not forget that the conditions for cities within the same national context also vary. Hence, Göteborg and the Lindholmen case may share more contextual similarities with a non-Swedish city than with a small town in a sparsely populated area in Sweden.

Regime Theory Concerns A challenge to urban political analysis is to connect local and non-local sources of policy change and place the analysis within the context of wider processes of change. Regime theory has been criticised for its ‘localist’ orientation, i.e. its preoccupation with theorising the city’s internal political dynamics, while ne- glecting the external environment, especially changes in the global economy (Lauria 1997, Stoker 1995). However, following Stone (1998) regime analysis is not at all purely localistic; rather, it is a way of relating local and extra-local forces to one other. A regime approach holds that the impact of the global economy on the local community is mediated through local governing arrangements. Stimuli from the larger world are part of the overall process; urban regimes are the mediating factor, not the total explanation. Thus, the rationale of the approach applied in this dissertation is that urban regime theory provides a tool for studying how different actors collaborate and act when faced with global changes.

With its focus on coalition formation, regime theory has been criticised for assuming that governance moves inevitably toward cooperation and hence may be overlooking mechanisms of political exclusion (DiGaetano & Klemanski 1999, Larsson 2004). However, the fact that coalition formation may limit participation to a few elite actors does not disqualify urban regime theory as an approach that could identify inclusion as well as exclusion of actors. It is up to the researcher where to lay the focus in empirical analysis of a particular case.

Stoker (1995) argues that many studies of cities refer to regimes without actually performing a regime analysis. A regime analysis has to offer an explanation of why certain political leaders and business elites are strong. Furthermore, an analysis of the nature of the partnership created between governmental and non-governmental leaders must be provided. In addition, a distinction has to be made between power exercised as social control and power as social production. Besides, regime is not a descriptive label for any political system, but a

concept characterizing a particular type of long-term stable relationship between governmental and non-governmental partners.

In the case of Lindholmen an approach has been developed where the concept ‘governing coalition’ is used to study a governing process at the level of a particular process of policy or planning, whereas the regime concept is reserved for governing at the level of a city, by achieving the capacity to pursue a locality wide agenda. Through the case study, conclusions regarding governing coalitions in Lindholmen can be drawn. The study also provides indications of whether or not a regime exists in Göteborg. However, it has not been possible within the given time frame to gather material broad enough to conduct a regime analysis equivalent to Stone’s (1989) well-known Atlanta study which spanned over four decades and numerous policy issues and could draw upon 97 interviews.

The Case Study of Lindholmen

What is ‘a case’? According to Stake (1995:2): ”The case is a specific, a complex, functioning thing.” He exemplifies with a teacher, all the schools in Swe- den and an innovative program. But teaching, a relationship between schools or the policies of school reform is given as examples that lack the specificity and the boundness to be a case. Stake concludes that the case is an integrated system such as people and programs adding that “Events and processes fit the definition less well.” (Stake 1995:2). There are two problems with this definition. First, my case study is a process and according to Stake a process fits his definition “less well”. Second, his definition is too broad (Johansson, R 2002, Yin 1994). According to Yin (1994:17) using Stakes definition will result in every study of entities qualifying as objects (e.g., people, organisations, and countries) being a case study. Yin (1994) argues that it is the methodology which characterises the case study. In his book Case Study Research he describes a methodology that is instrumentally oriented and based on logical positivism. Yin (1994:13) defines a case study as an empirical inquiry that: - “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when - the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”

54 This definition is similar to a later definition formulated by Gillham (2000:1). A case is: - “A unit of human activity embedded in the real world; - Which can only be studied or understood in context; - Which exists in the here and now; - That merges in with its context so that precise boundaries are difficult to draw.”

These two definitions are attractive as they recognise the interaction between the study object and its context. When studying a governing process it is hard to draw the line between what constitutes the context and the object. The boundary alters during the study.

Yin (1994) and Gillham (2000) differ in their opinions of theory. Gillham (2000) holds that you do not start out with a priori theoretical notions simply because you can not know before you get hold of your data and understand the context, which theories that can provide the best help. Yin (1994:13), on the other hand, asserts that the case study inquiry “… benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis”. In the case study of Lindholmen, theory and case have been studied in parallel, although initially I started with studying theory.

The problem with Yin’s (1994) and Gillham’s (2000) definitions is their use of ‘contemporary’ and ‘in the here and now’. Most parts of Lindholmen are now planned and developed. But the decision making part of the planning process occurred prior to the building, prior to the “here and now”. But this does not make it any less interesting or less important as a study object. In fact it is not at all clear what would result if you were to make participant observation only in contemporary time. Such a limited time frame would preclude being able to examine the process of power at work. Moreover, the goal is also to uncover events and relationships outside the formal planning process which affect the outcome of the formal decision. One way to capture this is through interviews. If these are conducted contemporaneously, it is possible you might uncover a more detailed picture. On the other hand some things might only become ap- parent retrospectively.

Johansson, R (2002) has developed an approach to case study methodology that does not limit itself to only contemporary phenomena. According to Jo- hansson, R (2002) there are experimental, reductive and explicative research strategies. A reductive strategy aims at isolating a few variables within a large number of units of analysis (statistical analyses). An experimental strategy aims at isolating one unit of analysis and a few variables (experiments). The third research strategy, the explicative (latin explicare, meaning to develop) strategy, is an approach which aims at explaining and understanding one case in its context and to include as many relevant variables as possible. In other words Johansson

argues that neither a psychological experiment nor a questionnaire is a case study since they focus on only a few variables isolated from their context. The aim of the explicative strategy is to tackle the research problem without limiting the number of variables used to be able to find out what it is that is important.

According to Yin’s (1994), Stake’s (1995) and Gilliam’s (2000) definitions, the empirical study of Lindholmen presented in this thesis is not a case study. However, following the explicative strategy developed by Johansson, R (2002) the study well fits the criteria of such a study. It is focused on one case, Lind- holmen. It offers a holistic approach aimed at providing an understanding of the whole in terms of its internal complexity. The case, a governing process, has an outcome which exists here and now, although the actual focus of the case study, i.e. where the clues to explanation are to be found, is prior to the here and now.

Single Case Case study research can include both single- and multiple-case studies, and make use of qualitative and/or quantitative evidence. The single case study is appropriate under several circumstances. Yin (1994) lists three rationales; the first, when a single case represents the critical case in testing a well-formulated theory, the second when the case represents an extreme or unique case and, the third when a single case study is the revelatory case (a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation). I see Lindholmen as a single case of the first type, as it provides a contemporary Swedish example trough which theories on governance and urban regimes can be tested and developed. The conditions for planning and development pointed at by the governance perspective are highlighted in waterfront regeneration projects throughout the western world. These projects take place in a fragmented urban context where public and private actors come together to create a capacity to act and thus be able to realize projects that will, hopefully, improve certain qualities of the locality. These projects highlight many aspects of governing and governance, such as local power structures, political agendas and forms of governing arrangements. As a result they provide empirical material on which theories on governance and urban regimes can be tested and developed.

This study builds on previous research which concludes that in parallel to formal decision-making channels, informal relations and informal exercise of power influence the outcome of planning process. To be able to capture both the informal and the formal aspects of decision-making, which entail an understanding of how the actors have valued the process, I chose to conduct an in- depth study of one case. Lindholmen was picked over other areas as it is ‘not only’ a matter of an urban planning process of one distinct object (for example a housing area). It is rather an area where the goal is not only to provide offices premises and education facilities but also, and maybe primarily, to create a

56 growth environment to boost economic development in the region. I have assumed that such an urban planning and development process is likely to attract actors from more than the one sector (governance), and probably also rather high profile actors, thus indicating the existence of a potential regime.

The starting point of the case study was the planning and development of the Lindholmen pier. But as the process evolved, the geographical area of concern grew to involve a larger part of Lindholmen (see picture 6.8). As to the timeframe, the main focus of this ongoing process is from 1996 but we must also take into account the period from the shipyard crisis in the late 1970s.

A Unique as well as Representative Case It has been argued that the conceptual framework identifies general aspects of how cities are governed. The case can be regarded both as unique and representative. Lindholmen is a unique case as compared to the other developments at Norra Älvstranden. It has attracted multiple actors from various sectors and the goal has not only been to create an area with office premises but also to develop an area for economic growth in the city region. The case is unique for Göteborg; the city has other science parks but none that has been promoted as extensively by high-profile actors from the City, academia and industry. Aside from the large size, what distinguishes Göteborg from many other Swedish towns is the strong positive links between the City, academia and industry, as symbolised by the slogan Göteborgsandan (the Göteborg spirit).

Although numerous urban waterfront regeneration projects have taken place all over the world, what distinguishes Lindholmen from many of these is the relatively strong role taken by the City. However, as an urban governing process, Lindholmen also has many traits that are common for urban governance more generally, e.g. when it comes to the interaction and collaboration between actors from different sectors, the tensions between efficiency and democracy and the experienced need to create and promote growth in order to fight off global competition.

Qualitative Method The events that this study attempts to describe and understand are those related to the governance process of Lindholmen which do not lend themselves to more quantitative approaches. Qualitative methods, on the other hand, capture meaning, process and context and thus are appropriate for this case study (De- vine 1995). Through different ways of collecting information, the essential thing is to provide a comprehensive description of the case and its context, in order to gain a deeper understanding of the complex of problems one is studying (Holme & Solvang 1986). The method is characterised by the closeness to

the source from which one collects information. By observing or talking to people, or studying background material such as letters and newspaper ac- counts, qualitative techniques allow the researcher to share in the understandings and perceptions of others. Qualitative research includes methods such as interviewing, document and text analyses, as well as participant observation, historical analyses and ethnographic research (Berg 1989). The first two of these has been used in the Lindholmen study.

Material Written documentation and interviews have been the main sources of material. The written documentation is based on planning documents such as comprehensive plan, detailed development plan, programme and reports from public consultations as well as reports written jointly by the city planning authority and Norra Älvstranden Development Corporation on the process of Norra Älvstranden. This material comprises the public documentation from those who are responsible for the planning. To get another perspectives on the process, articles from journals and newspapers have also been included. The dominant newspaper in Göteborg is Göteborgs-Posten, a liberal newspaper which reaches 75 per cent of the inhabitants, and consequently this is the main source for news articles as well as debate articles and letters to the editor. A number of other newspapers and journals such as business magazines have also been used.

For the interviews, the initial respondents were identified in public records or newspaper articles as relevant for the case study. Thereafter I have been able to identify other respondents through the interviews. I have not interviewed citizens in Göteborg in general instead the respondents have been chosen because they have been part of the process. I am aware of the fact that this may give the study the character of an elite study. Besides being aware of this fact, I have also read numerous debate articles as well as letters to the editors. These do of course not represent the views of the citizens of Göteborg, not everyone writes to a newspaper. But hopefully this has at least provided a broader insight into the interests of the ‘elite’. Moreover, my goal is to look at the governing process of Lindholmen, therefore these participants seem the most relevant.

Six respondents were interviewed in 2001. The names of the respondents are kept confidential, although through the coding system it is indicated which institution, organisation or company the respondent represents: CM for City Museum, CPA for City Planning Authority, CU for Chalmers University of Technology, E for Ericsson, GP for Göteborgs-Posten, GU for Göteborg University, NDC for Northern Riverbank Development Corporation, LSP for Lindholmen Science Park Corporation, M for the Moderate Party, S for the Social Democratic Party, TPTA for Traffic and Public Transport Authority and VCC for Volvo Car Corporation. At the end of section References a full list of

58 the respondents are given as well as an explanation to the coding system. In appendix A interests and actors related to the case study are described.

After having studied official documents, newspaper articles and conducting a first round of interviews, there was an evident need to develop the theoretical framework. Urban regime theory was studied and an approach to study governance and urban planning was developed based on these studies. As a result of the new knowledge gained from urban regime theory I felt that the case study was, so far, too shallow. For that reason, the six respondents that had been interviewed in 2001 were once again interviewed in 2003, as well as three new ones. The second round of interviews resulted in the identification of five more interviewees relevant to the case, thus a third and final round of interviews was conducted.

In total twenty semi-structured interviews with fifteen respondents were conducted to unveil the actors’ different interpretations, experiences and understandings in the case of Lindholmen. Most of the interviews were held at the respondent’s office or home; and were recorded and lasted between one and two hours. For each interview, a number of questions have been developed in advance. In reality the interviews have been very flexible, with the possibility for both the respondent and myself to raise new questions and issues during our talk.

In retrospect, the first round of interviews was affected by the need to uncover the course of events regarding the process of Lindholmen, and as a result were more focused on the respondents recalling the events. Therefore a second round (and later a third round) of interviews was conducted to focus on the interviewees’ insights into the flow of events. Throughout both series of interviews respondents were offered strong encouragement to reflect openly on their interpretation of the situation. Thus, to reiterate, the first set of interviews were focused on the events of the case study, whereas the second and third sets were focused on the respondents’ reflections on the situation.

Three separate requests to interview the chairman of the city executive board were unsuccessful. The chairman of the city executive board is constantly present in the media, and I have been able to extract a number of his published interviews Moreover, many of the interviewees talked about him, even at their own initiative, which offered a lot of insight into how he is perceived and his position in the city. The study on the governing process of Lindholmen has shown that what the chairman of the city executive board says is of great importance to how other actors in Göteborg act in the governing process. Argua- bly one more interview with this man would not have added much to the overall picture of this process.

Abduction – Induction and Deduction Combined The research process has been characterised by reciprocity; studies of theory have inspired the empirical work at the same time as the empirical work has influenced the theoretical work. New experiences and thoughts, derived both from theory and empirical studies, have been used continuously. Consequently, the theoretical work, as well as descriptions and interpretations of the empirical material, have repeatedly been adjusted and reviewed. This approach has similarities with the concept of abduction, which Alvesson and Sköldberg (1994) describe as emanating from empirical facts just as induction, but not rejecting theoretical pre-conceptions, consequently abduction is closer to deduction. The empirical analyses can be combined with existing theory in an attempt to find a pattern that can provide a greater understanding. “During the research there is consequently an alternation between (earlier) theory and empiric, which means that both will gradually be re-defined in the light of each other.” (Alvesson & Sköldberg 1994:42, my translation).

Generalization of Case Studies Case studies are often called into question regarding the possibility of generalizing from a single case or the extent to which the results from one case study can be applied in situations other than that investigated. One argument posits that it is up to the reader to decide whether or not the results are applicable to other situations (Merriam 1994). Thereafter, the research report must specify everything the reader needs to know to be able to understand the results and make an informed judgment on how far the findings mat go.

According to Yin (1994), case studies are generalizable to theoretical propositions although not to populations or the universe, just as experiments. The case study does not represent a sample and the goal of the researcher is not to enu- merate frequencies, i.e. statistical generalization, but to expand and generalize theories, i.e. analytic generalization. Following Flyvbjerg (2001), it is a misun- derstanding that one cannot generalize on the basis of a single case: instead one can argue the opposite, i.e. that generalizing on the basis of a single case may be crucial to the growth of scientific knowledge. Formal generalization is overval- ued as a source of scientific development at the same time as the power of the good example is underestimated (Flyvbjerg 2001).

Of course the results of the Lindholmen case study must be seen in light of the specific context and we cannot take for granted that the results are valid for other planning processes. On the other hand some possibilities of empirical generalisation are possible, either as a result of comparison to other case studies

60 (Granberg 2004, Öhrström 2004), or through relating the case to theory (analytical generalisation). Thus, although the main focus is on Lindholmen, knowledge is also generated on a more general level, i.e. with regard to today’s urban planning and development.

Validity and Reliability One aim of research is to produce valid and reliable results. Validity infers that we are measuring what we think we are measuring, whereas reliability infers that applying the same procedure in the same way would always produce the same result (King, Keohane & Verba 1994). As a result data and analyses should, as far as possible, be replicable. Replicability applies also to data, so that reliability can also be judged, as well as the entire reasoning process used in producing conclusions. “On the basis of our research report, a new researcher should be able to duplicate our data and trace the logic by which we reached our conclusions.” (King, Keohane & Verba 1994:26).

Whereas qualitative case studies are generally perceived to have high validity, reliability is a problematic concept within social science, because the behaviour of humans is changeable and not static (Merriam 1994). The reliability of a method is based on the assumption that there is one single reality that will give rise to the same results if it was studied again. Qualitative research often seeks to describe and explain the world from the perspective of how people who live in it, comprehend it. Because there are a number of interpretations of what is occurring, there are no firm points of references to start out from to repeatedly measure a phenomenon and hence perform a reliable measurement.

Many of the study objects within qualitative research are ‘moving targets’, i.e. they continually change, they are multi-dimensional and contextual, hence reliability becomes an imagination and impossibility (Merriam 1994); this is especially true as the information derived is a function of the person that contrib- utes with it along with the skills of the researcher. The course of action during a qualitative case study is developed as the study progress and hence cannot be established beforehand. In other words, if repeated, a qualitative investigation might not lead to the same results. Therefore, it is impossible to apply the concept of reliability in any meaningful way, according to Merriam (1994). By presenting material in a form which makes several interpretations possible, the case study, to some extent, puts the responsibility for the reliability on the reader.

A number of strategies have been applied in an attempt to secure validity and reliability in the study of Lindholmen. Triangulation, or crosschecking data using multiple sources of evidence, has been applied (interviews, newspaper articles, official documents and plans) (Yin 1994). Furthermore, my case study description has been compared to another study of Lindholmen to ensure I have covered all the necessary events (Öhrström 2004). Throughout the study the results have been presented at different seminars for comments, and there has been an underlying attempt to provide the reader with clear information on the sources as well as the theories on which the study is based.

62 Chapter 5

Göteborg: Historical and Political Context

Göteborg7 is Sweden’s second largest city and has around half a million inhabi- tants8. The city is situated on the Swedish west coast (see picture 5.1) and has a tradition of trade and industry. Swedish industries such as Volvo, SKF and Hasselblad have their origins and headquarters here. A considerable amount of the Swedish export and import go through Göteborg’s harbour, which is the largest harbour in Scandinavia. Nowadays the city is also known for its universities as well as its efforts at events, tourism and culture such as the Swedish Ex- hibition & Congress Centre, the sports arena Ullevi, the amusement park Lise- berg, the Göteborg Opera, the City Theatre, the Museum of World Cultures, the House of Science and much more.

First an introduction to Göteborg’s history as a shipyard and harbour city along with information on the local political context of Göteborg is provided.9 The chapter is not meant to provide a complete picture, rather it serves as a short description of the historical and political context within which to place the Lindholmen case study.

7 The local level of the Swedish political system are the municipalities. In the case of Sweden’s three largest cities – Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö – the municipalities are called: ‘City’. To distinguish Göteborg as a town/urban area from Göteborg as a municipality/local government a capital C is used for Göteborg as a municipality/local government (the City). City council is used for kommunfullmäktige, and city executive board for kommunstyrelse. 8 At the end of the third quarter of 2003 the population of Göteborg was 477 798. During the first nine months of 2003 the population increased by 2 877, 400 less than the previous year. The reduction is partly explained by people moving out to adjacent municipalities in the suburban area (Göteborgs stad 2004). 9 All the quotations in this chapter are my translation. The interviews are coded. For example NDC is used to refer to an interview conducted with someone at Norra Älvstranden Develop- ment Corporation. A complete list of all the interviews can be found last in the references.

Picture 5.1: Göteborg, on the Swedish West Coast

Finland

Sweden

Norway

Denmark

Source: Kartena AB

The History of a Shipyard and Harbour City

In the 13th Century, after having formed the boundary between Norway and Denmark, the river Göta Älv became Sweden’s gateway to Western Europe (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 1999a). In 1603 king Karl IX began to build Göteborg on the island Hisingen, the north riverbank of river Göta Älv. The city was supposed to be a colony for foreign tradesmen, particularly of Dutch origin

64 (Andersson, Fritz & Olsson 1991). This small piece of land on the west coast was regarded as Sweden’s chance to start a westward trade. Holland was, at this time a quickly developing trade nation with widespread connections all over the world. Through contacts with Holland, Sweden was able to break out of the isolation in the Baltic Sea area.

However, Göteborg was again seized by the Danes who in 1611 burnt down the settlement (Andersson 1996). Peace was achieved in 1619, and in 1621 king Gustav II Adolf founded modern Göteborg and gave it city privileges. The contacts with Holland continued and the city was built after a Dutch city plan (Fog & Westerlind 1979). The city administration had an international character, as the members of the body of borough administrators were four Swedes, three Dutchmen, three Germans and two Scots (Andersson, Fritz & Olsson 1991).

The purpose of the city was twofold; on the one hand, to act as a strong Swed- ish fortress against enemies approaching from the west, and on the other hand, to be a hub for Swedish trade westwards with Western Europe and the international market (Andersson 1996). At this time the river Göta Älv was a narrow corridor to the sea in the west, situated between Denmark in the south (today the Swedish province Halland) and Norway in the north (today the Swedish province Bohuslän). However, this vulnerable location, which characterised Göteborg, changed during the mid-17th Century as the west coast became fully Swedish (Bohlin 2000). At the onset the city had an explicit international orientation and during the 18th Century the network expanded from nearby Euro- pean trading to the Mediterranean Sea, the East Indies and to North America (Andersson 1996). Göteborg lacks power and other natural resources. Instead it is the ice-free river harbour as well as the city’s location by the river, close to the western sea, and the world economy, which has been the city’s strength (Olsson 1996).

In the mid 19th century new demands faced the shipyards because of technical development such as steam ships. New harbours were first built on the south side of the river Göta Älv, but the land area was not sufficient (Stads- byggnadskontoret 2001a). On the other side of the river, the north riverbank, the south shore of Hisingen, there was plenty of land. Hence, three shipyards were established on Norra Älvstranden: the first, nearest the city Götaverken in 1867, the second, Lindholmen in 1845 and finally, furthest away from the city centre Eriksberg, which opened in the 1853s (Wallén 1954) (see picture 5.2 and 5.3). In the early 20th century Göteborg was Scandinavia’s most important export harbour (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a) and between 1850 and 1980 thou- sands of new built ships left Norra Älvstranden (Wahlberg 2001a).

Picture 5.2: Eriksberg, Lindholmen and Götaverken Shipyards

Lindholmen Götaverken Eriksberg

Source: Adapted from Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a:2-3

Between 1820 and 1920 Göteborg grew from a small commercial city with 20 000 inhabitants, to an important industry and shipping city with 200 000 inhabitants (Fritz 1996). Trade dominated the city’s economic life during most of the 19th Century. However, in the latter part of the century that role was taken over by industry. The first large-scale industry was textile. But at the turn of the century, and during the first decade, at the same time as the company SKF (SKF Ball Bearing Co.) quickly grew to a world leading industry and the automobile company Volvo was established, the breakthrough came for the shipbuilding industry on Hisingen. With this followed a concentration on shipbuilding in contrast to the earlier, more diversified mechanical engineering production (Stråth 1982).

The shipping companies in Göteborg became well known on the oceans of the world. “The harbour activities can be seen as the economic artery of Göte- borg.” (Fritz 1996:350). Göteborg as a harbour city evidenced a number of activities including trade (slightly more export than import), harbours, docks, shipping companies and shipbuilding yards (Olsson 1996). The Swedish industrial breakthrough between 1890-1920 brought with it the production and the need for transportation of large quantities of goods. The state subsidised the building of the country’s harbours, and in 1921 harbour Frihamnen was the last harbour to be opened by Göta Älven River (Wallén 1954). Hence the large expansion in Göteborg was finished.

66 Picture 5.3: The Shipyards at Norra Älvstranden

Source: City planning authority, Göteborg

Between 1945 and 1974, world trade increased quickly (Olsson 1996) bringing with it larger ships which resulted in a specialised trade, that is, containers with bulk goods. These offered tremendously increasing volumes but also demanded large investments, which resulted in a strong concentration process. The industry also started to produce more refined and expensive goods and thus the need for a fast and safe system of transport increased. Consequently, the competition between transport at seas, over land and in the air increased as well.

Ports all over the world were greatly affected by these developments. Container ships were very expensive and could only visit one port in each country (Ridell 1999). With Gothenburg’s strategic location on the Swedish west coast and the access to an extensive network of railway, road and canals the city remained Sweden’s leading harbour. Even though Göteborg was not able to develop into one of the big West European harbours like Rotterdam or Antwerp, neverthe-

less, it remained and still is Sweden’s leading harbour (Olsson 1996).10 How- ever, as shipping logistics developed from general cargo to containers, the smaller product-specific inner harbours were abandoned in favour of container harbours at the river mouth that could receive deeper ships. The result was a restructuring of port activities as well as a relocation of these activities from Norra Älvstranden to the river mouth (Öhrström 2004).

The breakthrough for Swedish shipyard industry came during the first year of the First World War (Fritz 1996). During these years the foundation was laid for a large-scale industry that would be of utmost importance for Göteborg until the 1970s. “Thus, trade, shipping and a growing industry can arguably be seen as foundations of the development of the city.” (Fritz 1996:350). The period 1945 to 1973 were the golden years for the Swedish shipbuilding industry (Olsson 1996). During the 1960s, the Swedish shipbuilding industry was, with its ten per cent market share, the second largest in the world (Stråth 1987). Most of the ships were produced at the shipyards in Göteborg: Götaverken, Eriksberg and Lindholmen. Even still, at the end of the 1960s, a shipyard crisis was approaching.

By the 1950s, the increasing use of road transport by cars and lorries had elimi- nated coastal shipping for all but bulk cargoes (Ridell 1999), thus reducing the demand for ships. During the 1960s containerisation arrived (Ridell 1999). This meant handling cargo in containers using bigger ships, being able to sail faster and handling cargo faster, safer and easier. In other words, containerisation resulted in the need for fewer ships. Also, as the size of ships and tankers grew, old shipyards had difficulties keeping up with these developments, as they did not have the capacity to build larger ships or tankers in their shipyards. As part of a solution, and as a complement to the extent shipyards, the Arendal shipyard was built between 1958 and 1964 (Olsson 1996). It was located far out in the sea approach to Göteborg so as to be able to produce large ships. However, to make matters worse, the less sophisticated ships needed to transport containers could be built at lower costs in developing countries (Ridell 1999). The Swedish shipyard industry was also vulnerable because of its concentration on building oil tankers and, consequently, was dependent of the oil economy (Ols- son 1996). After the Second World War the demand for oil tankers had increased year after year and as a result these shipyards expanded. (Wahlberg 2001b). However, this demand decreased with the oil crisis in 1974.

In 1977 the Swedish state intervened in an attempt to save the shipbuilding industry (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a). They took over the shipyards in Göteborg forming the company Swedeyard Corp. (Svenska Varv AB). How-

10 Göteborg dominates as transit harbour, while Oxelösund is a raw material harbour, and Stock- holm a consumption harbour, with an extensive import primarily for the city’s own needs (Ols- son 1996).

68 ever, by the end of the 1970s, two of the three shipyards on Norra Älvstranden had closed down, Eriksberg and Lindholmen, while the third one, Götaverken, became a repair yard.11 “From once having been a world-leading shipyard nation, most of Swedish shipbuilding industry was closed down.” (Stads- byggnadskontoret 2001a:30). In 1957 the Swedish shipbuilding industry employed 30 800 people in 1982 the number was down to 8 000 (Stråth 1987). In Göteborg as many as 15 to 20 000 jobs were lost (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a).

Expansive economic development brought with it a major transformation of Göteborg’s economy and business life (Olsson 1996). Optimism related to this growth resulted in society accepting a refinement of the economy towards heavy manufacturing industry. The shipyards and the car industry, dominated by Volvo12, became more and more dominant while other industry was cur- tailed. The variety of Göteborg as an industrial city, which was characteristic during the interwar period, began to vanish. After the shipping crisis decimated the shipbuilding industry and the shipping companies, industry in Göteborg became more and more dominated by the growing car industry (Olsson 1996). The number of people employed within the manufacturing industry peaked in 1965 and starting with 1980 the fast growing car industry compensated the job loss within the shipyard industry (Olsson 1996).

Göteborg as a Knowledge City The period after 1974 has been characterised by a combined shipyard crisis and a concurrent large expansion for the car industry (Olsson 1996). “We have, above all, expanded industry. That was a lesson we learnt from the shipyard crisis” (Ericson 2003:51) the chairman of the city executive board commented on the efforts made to stimulate knowledge intensive industry such as IT and medicine. Others argue that there is still a large dependency on Volvo. “After 1974 the city should actually be labelled a car city rather than a shipping city. The problem [of one-sidedness] has rather increased over the years.” (Olsson 1996:348). The character of many of the jobs within companies such as Volvo has changed to jobs related to research, design and development demanding a well-educated workforce. Today two of the biggest employers in Göteborg,

11 Swedeyard Corp. took over other shipyards in the country as well. The company’s purpose was to adapt the shipyards capacity to the market, through specialisation and dividing up the market. Three shipyards have survived, in Göteborg, Götaverken Cityvarvet, in Landskrona, The Öre- sund shipyard and last Swedish shipping group Kockums. These shipyards today have other owners (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a). 12 Volvo has since developed into two companies Volvo Car Corporation and Volvo Group (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a). Volvo Car Corporation produces passenger cars and was sold to the Ford group in 1999. Volvo Group produces trucks and heavy-duty vehicles and also includes Renault and MackTrucks.

Volvo Car Corporation and Saab Automobile (Powertrain), are owned by American companies Ford and General Motors (Bohlin 2000).

The trade and transport sector employs most people in Göteborg, tightly followed by the manufacturing industry (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 1999c). In other words, although more people today work in the service sector, and this is where current job increases occur, the old industrial base is still very important. There is a slow long-term development towards a larger share of employment in the service sector (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 1999c).

Göteborg’s large size in Swedish terms made possible the development of the city as a competitor to the capital Stockholm regarding education, financial institutions and industry (Olsson 1996). For example, banking and business services/administration is a rather large sector, well above the Swedish average. The combination of universities and industrial development, as a strategy for promoting economic growth, has become popular in Göteborg. The City works hard at encouraging the development of science parks and clusters (Öhrström 2004, Stadsbyggnadskontoret 1999c). Four business sectors are identified as development zones in the current comprehensive plan, namely IT, biotechnol- ogies, logistics and service (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 1999c). In a recent interview the chairman of the city executive board listed five clusters which in the future should make Göteborg well-known: IT, medicine, environmental knowledge, logistics and safety, both for cars and other transportation (Ericson 2003).

The City has also worked hard at establishing Göteborg as both a knowledge city and as an ‘event’ city (Ericson 2003). As an event city Göteborg includes arenas such as the Swedish Exhibition & Congress Centre, a sports arena Ullevi, an amusement park Liseberg and has hosted events such as the world championships for athletics, the Gothia Cup and science as well as film festi- vals. The City has also established of the Göteborg Opera, the Museum of World Cultures and the House of Science to provide citizens and visitors with a vibrant cultural environment. Tourism has increased in Göteborg during the 1990s and had, in 1998, a turnover of ten billion SEK and employed more than 10 000 people (Bohlin 2000).

The approach of the City is that a cultural and creative environment needs to be stimulated to attract not only visitors and tourists but also a highly skilled workforce to Göteborg (Olsson 1996). In other words, in the knowledge city, it is not enough to provide high-class education in an attempt to provide companies with a highly educated workforce; the city also needs to create an environment which attracts a workforce (the event city) as well as an environment which attracts companies (clusters). The purpose of these efforts, the knowledge city and the event city, is to create increased growth in Göteborg (M 2004:19, S 2004:18).

70 Politics in Göteborg

Stråth (1982) describes Göteborg prior to the 1910s as characterised by a bour- geois hegemony. However, as industrialization took off and the number of industrial workers increased, the Social Democratic Party grew. According to Stråth, the traditionally strong Liberal position in the city made the attack un- usually hard by those who were not absorbed by the system and consequently the labour movement in Göteborg became more radical than in other comparable places in Sweden. In 1910 the Social Democratic Party had one seat in the city council, in 1922 they had 31 out of 60 (Stråth 1982). A majority of Social Democrats and Communists in the city council lasted until 1959 (Olsson 1996). After that date there have been shifting majorities in the city council.

On the contrary to many municipalities in Sweden the post war period was characterised by the Liberal Party gaining ground, and it was not until 1979 that the Moderate Party became the largest right-wing party (Olsson 1996). One explanation offered, besides Göteborg’s history with a liberal tradition, is the fact that liberal local newspaper Göteborg-Posten (The Göteborg Post) during the 1930s became the working class’ paper, and for a long period was the only morning paper (Olsson 1996). Today the Göteborg-Posten is still the dominant local newspaper reaching 70 percent of the inhabitants of Göteborg.13 Cur- rently the biggest local party is the Social Democratic Party. They have held office since 1994 and are governing through a coalition with the Left Party and the Green Party (S 2004, M 2004).

Three things distinguish Göteborg from the Swedish political and administrative system in general.14 First, the City of Göteborg, like Stockholm, is divided into districts with neighbourhood councils (stadsdelsnämnder). Secondly, since 1999, Göteborg is also, one out of three new regions in Sweden. By merging three former county councils, the West Swedish region (Region Västra Göta- land) was formed, consisting of 49 municipalities and a population of nearly 1.5 million (Region Västra Götaland 2004). The region is responsible for the overall management of health care in the region as well as regional development such as business development, public transport and communications, international issues, culture, tourism, environmental issues, higher education and research. Third, the City of Göteborg runs public companies to a wider extent than other Swedish municipalities.

The City of Göteborg owns more than 60 companies, which can be compared to the City of Stockholm that owns slightly more than 15 companies. The annual turnover of Göteborg’s public companies are 15 billions SEK with assets

13 In the age group age 15-79 Göteborg-Posten reaches 70 per cent of the inhabitants in Göte- borg (Göteborgs-Posten 2004). 14 See appendix B for an overview of the Swedish political and administrative system.

closer to 50 billions SEK (Kraft 2003). There is a continuing debate in the city about the large number of public companies. Working through public companies to some politicians is regarded as an efficient mode of working which offers a certain degree of decision power (S 2004:18, M 2004:19). Many politicians in Göteborg have experience in industry and private companies and hence are accustomed to that mode of working. In addition, many private companies regard it as easier to reach an agreement with a public company rather than a public authority since a company is more of a familiar environment for them (S 2004:18). “When it comes to business relations, the undemocratic element of everything not automatically being public has of course also served as an en- ticement.” (S 2004:18).

Critics argue that public control is weaker in public companies as compared to traditional public activity, some of the companies are not making a profit, there is a risk that the public companies are competing with private companies on the local market and further, selling the companies could provide money better needed elsewhere (“Kommunala bolag” 2004, Svensson 2004b,c).

It is possible that a critique has started to grow in Göteborg that it has gone too far. And it is not totally unjustified. The main reason cannot be that you avoid the public part of it. It cannot be a way for making strange contracts for directors or bonuses. ... There is a risk with companies since you recruit directors, employees and maybe board members because they come from industry. That can create a breeding ground for a culture that is not acceptable in the public administration. (S 2004:18)

In the fall of 2003, a consultant company published a report on corporate governance in which 20 West Swedish public companies had been studied (Berg- sand 2003). The conclusion was that companies on the stock market actually are better then the public companies when it comes to openness. Companies on the stock market are better at accounting for the board’s tasks and method of working, presenting board members and the management, describing how the ownership is exercised, how the owner directives are formulated and followed up (Kraft 2003). Hence, it is hard for citizens as well as media to scrutinize public companies. The local newspaper Göteborgs-Posten investigated 27 of the public companies in 2004 and found that several of the companies are experiencing large losses, which have to be covered by other profitable public companies (Svensson 2004a). They also discovered that 72 per cent of the ap- pointments in public companies were held by men (Svensson 2004a).

The public companies are a large and important part of the City’s operation. Those strategic decisions concerning big investments effect the economy of the whole city. … In the end, it is the taxpayers

72 who are impacted by the priorities that are made in those companies. And it is the values of men which govern, especially men of the So- cial Democratic Party. (Svensson 2004a:6)

These investigations rekindled a continuing debate in Göteborg regarding the City’s public companies. According to the Moderate Party, the City has too many companies and resembles a corporate empire (Svensson 2004c). The Moderate Party “…doubt the inhabitants of Göteborg want to use their money as risk capital in business activity…” (Svensson 2004c:7). The Liberal Party believes it is dangerous that more and more of the City’s activities are placed within companies instead of the local government committees as a more open and democratic, political arena (Svensson 2004b). Both the Moderate Party and the Liberal Party want to sell several of the public companies and use the money for social needs (Svensson 2004b, 2004c). The Centre Party, as well as The Swedish Christian Democrats, are willing to consider selling some of the public companies whereas the Left Party are satisfied with the current number of public companies, although they do not wish to increase them (Svensson 2004c). According to the chairman of the city executive board, a Social Democ- rat, the public companies are a guarantee for a persistent ownership without short-sighted profit interests, and the companies should be developed rather than liquidated (Johansson, G 2004:4). He claims that well-managed companies together with private trade and industry are important instruments for the city’s development.

The Chairman of the City Executive Board

We have only seen the beginning of globalisation. Competition is increasing. One must always stay alert. (The chairman of the city executive board quoted in Johansson, L 2004:3)

The chairman of the city executive board in Göteborg, Social Democrat Göran Johansson, is commonly referred to as ‘the city’s strong man’ (stadens starke man) (Ericson 2003, Johansson, L 2004, Pineus 2003). He is on the board of many of the City’s companies, particularly those concerned with the region’s industrial and business life such as BRG - Business Region Göteborg (strengthening and developing industry in the region), Göteborg & Co (marketing and developing Göteborg), Liseberg AB (amusement park), The Swedish Exhibi- tion Centre (foundation with purpose to promote industry and trade), Norra Älvstranden Development Corporation (company responsible for developing the north riverbank) and Lindholmen Science Park.

I am criticised for devoting myself too little to the soft questions. But everything I do is about creating resources for education, health care and culture. (Göran Johansson quoted in Johansson, L 2004:3)

Everyone seems to have an opinion about Göran Johansson’s leadership. He has been described both as Sweden’s most popular politician as well as a dicta- torial boss (Elam 1995). Göran Johansson is portrayed both as a strong leader, who dominates those under him when he feels the need to following the adage 'what is good for Göteborg' ('det som är bra för Göteborg'), or as a skilful, sensitive leader (Kristiansson 2001). He has been described as efficient, prag- matic and full of great ideas as well as autocratic and arrogant. However there seems to be agreement on one point: ”…everybody says that he decides everything in this town.” (Elam 1995:49). “He seems to have his hands in every cookie jar in this town.” (Hanson 1995:71).

In my interviews regarding Lindholmen, Göran Johansson is described as extremely talented and result-orientated with a great ability to take action. He is focused on growth. Göran Johansson works through strategic alliances and has support amongst the major power holders within the public and private sectors. Whether or not Göran Johansson is personally involved in an issue is of decisive importance according to the participants of the process in Lindholmen. The interviewees trust him and describe him as having a devotion to social issues.

In 2001, the local newspaper Göteborgs-Posten listed the most powerful people in Göteborg (Kristianssson 2001). They concluded that Göran Johansson is power personified in Göteborg. Only a handful of other people are important in Göteborg although far less powerful than Göran Johansson. When business magazine Veckans Affärer the same year listed the thirty most powerful people in the region, Göran Johansson was selected as the most powerful person (Björnelid 2003).

Paper Vision (covering the TIME-sector) listed, in 2001, the 69 most important agenda-setters in the country. Göran Johansson is listed as number 23 (the only local politician on the list) with the argument that he is the strong man of the Social Democratic Party on the west coast and belongs to the Prime ministers inner circle (El-Sherif 2001). In 2003 business magazine Affärs Världen listed the 100 most powerful business people in Sweden. Göran Johansson was listed as number 72 with the reason: ‘only a phone call away from everyone that counts’ (Edling 2003). He is one of the only politicians on the list besides the Prime Minister (2), the Minister of Finance (18) and the Minister for Industry and Trade (30).

74 In 1995 when the SOM-institute15 investigated popularity among politicians. Göran Johansson received the highest number any politician has ever received in a SOM-investigation (Nilsson & Weibull 2001). And even if his numbers have decreased since they, are still above all national party leaders, including the Prime Minister’s. The most unique aspect of Göran Johansson’s high numbers is that he is reasonably popular even among the right-wing voters, which is not commonly the case among social democratic politicians. Within the social democratic voters, Johansson’s numbers are not as sensational but are still im- pressive. Previous Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson was almost as popular as Johansson in 1994, current Prime Minister Göran Persson was in 2001 just slightly more popular than Göran Johansson amongst social democratic voters.

In November 2003 business magazine Veckans Affärer published an interview with Göran Johansson under the heading “King of Göteborg” where he was questioned about his leadership:

It is quite obvious how you have placed yourself in the centre of things. You are not only the chairman of the city executive board, you are also chairman in most public companies of the city focusing on strengthening trade and industry in Göte- borg. Can you understand those who think that too much power is concentrated in you? Maybe one could accuse me of trying to achieve many things, but I guess that just goes with my background. With eight years of elemen- tary school, I never learned how to work in an organized way, that is through others. I want to be personally and strongly involved in our different ventures. There are so many politicians that talk a lot about growth but don’t do much themselves. That’s not my style. Many describe you, in your role as chairman of the city executive board, as very efficient but domineering. “One must want the same thing as Göran Johansson, or you’re out.” Comments? I confess I’m stubborn and don’t give up easily. I could sit behind my desk and turn sheets, but then nothing would happen. If you want to achieve something, you will create enemies. (Ericson 2003:52)

In interviews, Göran Johansson repeatedly returns to worries concerning unemployment, segregation and the economy (Ericson 2003, Johansson, L 2004). He is very popular amongst industry people, with whom he has a well-

15 “The SOM Institute is a research and conference center studying Society, Opinion and Media (S.O.M.) at Göteborg University. The SOM Institute is jointly managed by the Institute for Jour- nalism and Mass Communication, The Department of Political Science, and The School of Pub- lic Administration. Every year since 1986, the SOM Institute carries out a nationwide survey, Riks-SOM (National SOM), in which people are asked questions about politics, society, their use of media, public service, the environment, risks, new media technology and their leisure-time activities. Since 1992 a corresponding survey is carried out in Göteborg and its surrounding communities: Väst-SOM (Western SOM).” (SOM-Institutet 2004).

established close dialogue. They see him as a man who sees opportunities, grasps them and get things done (E 2001:8, NDC 2003:13, GP 2003:10).

For the industry, someone in power, who acts with the strength that Göran Johansson does, is good. We get answers. And if he says, I think we should do like this, we can trust that it will be done. We don’t get a difficult process. There have been issues when there have been obstacles, then he has said, the hell with that. Let’s build, and then we change the rules and regulations afterwards. That is, sometimes, his way of acting. The cause is more important than the process. I don’t think anyone has anything against that. When you see that things are happening you are rather pleased. (VCC 2004:20)

Others describe him as an old school local government boss who controls many issues down to a detailed level. He is without exception described as a strong leader, and as he writes himself: “If you want a politician who lacks will- power – don’t choose me.” (Johansson, G 2000:4).

Göteborgsandan - The Spirit of Göteborg In Göteborg people commonly refer to something called Göteborgsandan (the Spirit of Göteborg).16 “There are many myths regarding Göteborgsandan; but there is a reality, a climate, which has made it pretty accommodating, easier than in Stockholm to collaborate between politics-industry-academia.” (S 2004:18). Göteborg is a rather small city and those who govern politically, economically, culturally and in media are few compared to Stockholm (Pineus 2003). Everyone at the top level knows each other and agreements over bor- ders are the rule rather than the exception. “- Everyone with influence has each others numbers programmed in their mobile phone, says the chairman of the West Swedish Chamber of industry and commerce jokingly, but illustrative.” (Pineus 2003:1).

16 Some trace the roots of Göteborgsandan back to the fact that Göteborg was one of the places where the Liberal party has had its strongest hold, and it is said that Harry Hjörne (1893-1969), member of the Liberal Party and editor of Göteborgs-Posten, and Torsten Henriksson (1906- 1983), the strong man of the Social Democratic Party, were a strong duo who contributed to create a climate of collaboration (Kennedy 1995). A second piece of the puzzle is the fact that Göteborg, traditionally, has had clear class distinctions with a working class (shipyards, harbour) and a number of trade and industry capitalist families, and in an attempt to escape unproductive class battles Göteborgsandan arose (Kennedy 1995). Another explanation might be traced back to the fact that both Göteborg University and Chalmers University of Technology were established through private initiatives and donations, and not by the state. “It is possible that this plays a role when it comes to the feeling of solidarity between industry and academia.” (S 2004:18). Yet another explanation can be found in the fact that “Göteborg has a long tradition of large strong economic centres with a few families that controlled the trading houses and that tradition have probably stayed with us.” (VCC 2004).

76 Göteborg is considered too small for political fights and instead in need of political agreement over party lines to be able to function well. Hence, important decisions regarding the city are supposed to be made based on the local conditions instead of political ideologies (Öberg 1992). The Moderate Party and the Social Democratic Party have had a close collaboration on concrete issues of local economic development (M 2004:19, S 2004:18). It has been clearly stated between the leaders of the two parties, that when it comes to what is best for Göteborg, there should be long-term consensus that survives elections and majority changes, given that urban development processes can take decades. On the other hand when it comes to ideological issues where the two disagree, such as private medical service and private schools, the two parties do quarrel (M 2004:19). It has also been of importance for political agreements over party lines that national media has its focus on Stockholm:17

Very easily media takes over the agenda. They make what has been said and done more incisive. We have been spared from much of that, which has made it easier to collaborate, because our motives have not been questioned from the very beginning. (S 2004:18)

Göran Johansson describes how the City works when they want Göteborg to host events: ”We call a meeting with politicians and officials from the City management as well as representatives from the trade and industry group, consisting of some twenty large companies. ‘This is the case, this is what we will do, and this is how we should help each other. I guess this is quite unique in comparison to other municipalities.” (Ericson 2003:52). And he defines Göte- borgsandan as follows:

What is Göteborgsandan? Nothing but a network of people from industry and politics. Aren’t there any risks with that? The trade and industry of Göteborg support us when it comes to that. This city isn’t bigger than you know everyone. You don’t deal with each other through in- termediaries as in bigger cities. This is what creates the atmosphere known as Göteborgsandan.” (Ek, Bergquist & Lökken 2002:213 referring to interview in Metro 2001)

To pursue policy efficiently in Göteborg it is not enough with political decisions that are turned over to officials for implementation, instead you need a network that creates prerequisites and propelling power (S 2004). Altogether decisive is the network you possess and whether or not you are accepted by it. It is not enough with a network based on shallow acquaintances, it must consist of trustful relationships. In Göteborg there is a well-established network consisting of people on a managerial level both within academia, industry and poli-

17 The dominant local news paper Göteborgs-Posten in several of the interviews has been described either as part of the political system or as only being a descriptive, not an investigative, paper.

tics continuously meet in different formal and informal fora (GP 2003:10, M 2004:19, VCC 2004:20). If there is no appropriate forum, one is created. If there is a need to come together, make a decision and pursue an issue there is a capacity to do that (M 2004:19).

We don’t experience a lack of fora for having a dialogue with the politicians. If we lack a forum, we create one. But it is very easy to find places to meet. We have a number of fora where we meet on a regular basis. We meet at a high level, industrial management, municipal commissioners, rectors. You never hesitate, from the City’s side, to contact industry, or vice versa when you have issues to rise. We have a preventive, continuous dialogue. The City wants to know about developments in companies so that they are ready when things happen and hence maybe they can fend off and help so that things go in the right direction. (VCC 2004:20)

The Moderate Party governed between 1991 and 1994 and was accused of de- stroying Göteborgsandan with its confrontational politics (Johansson 1994, Kristiansson 1994). “That special spirit is just nonsense. It works pretty much in the same way as in Stockholm. However, some claim that Göteborgsandan is about politicians going outside the system and making deals with friends. And in that case I am happy to take the criticism, because that is not how politics should be done.” (Johansson 1994:9). When the Social Democrats came to power in 1994 they explicitly aim at the widest possible majority in questions that are important for the people of Göteborg, “Göteborgsandan continues to live.” (Editorial Göteborgs-Posten 1994:2).

While some argue that Göteborgsandan is very positive, creating consensus regarding large and important projects, others argue that Göteborgsandan brings with it certain risks. One risk is that decisions that are taken are not criti- cally questioned, that the politicians elected by the citizens do not represent them clearly enough and therefore citizens might experience a lack of opposition (GP 2003:10, NDC 2003:14, Nygren 2002). The Moderate Party disagrees. “We had enough to quarrel about when we were in opposition and I think the people of Göteborg noticed that.” (M 2004:19). A lack of public debate is also raised as an issue.

The debate is carried out between industry and politicians. We don’t have any good fora for public debate. Consequently the debate is not very open. The debate is held in small circles. But there is no frustration regarding this amongst the people of Göteborg. They have a lot of confidence in their politicians. (VCC 2004:20)

Although some do not regard the lack of public debate and the fact that debates are held behind closed doors as problematic, others do (GP 2003:10, S 2003:2). In fact, some are harsh in their critique of Göteborgsandan:

78 There is something wrong with the system in the City of Göteborg. We even have a name for it, internally – Göteborgsandan. Göteborg- sandan is about not solving conflicts in public but reaching consensus. That means that the politicians and responsible officials discuss the problems behind closed doors. The only thing that emerges is the result of the discussions. This might be efficient, but democrati- cally doubtful. It strangles the political debate. (Sandberg 1996:2)

The book The City’s Janus-face. Opinions on Göteborg by inhabitants of Göteborg (Ek et al. 2002) is the result of a large investigation, in which over two hundred inhabitants of Göteborg were asked to describe how they perceive Göteborg . One of the interviewees said the following regarding Göteborgsandan:

Since it’s so small one tend to know people on a certain level so decisions come easily. But then there is a very negative side to Göte- borg which I experienced when I came back from Stockholm [to Göteborg] and that is that friendships corrupt. It’s not competence that determines if you get a job but who you know. … The fact is that out-of-towners have difficulties becoming part of this pattern before they become accepted. So the Göteborgsandan does not have to be a positive thing, it can also be something negative. (Ek et al. 2002:166)

Ek et al. (2002) also found another, second, understanding of Göteborgsandan. It is rather a mentality of Göteborg based on compassion and humour.

I believe there is something in Göteborg that could be called Göte- borgsandan. It’s in the humour, one isn’t particularly boastful, not really, I think. It’s about caring about each other and not being mean to each other. You can joke and play tricks on each other, but there is also tenderness and things like that. (Ek et al. 2002:167)

A conclusion in the book is that Stockholm is the background against which Göteborg is outlined and very rarely, only as exception, is anything described as being better in Stockholm (Ek et al. 2002). One takes pride in Göteborg doing things the Göteborg’ way and not as things are done in Stockholm. The inhabitants of Göteborg are described by the interviewees as more open and calmer than people from Stockholm. The most positive thing about Göteborg is that it is a small city or a big town. The interviewees love Göteborg for being com- prehensible and small-scale. The small city gives a tempo that allows people to have time to care for each other. Göteborg is sometimes accused of having an inferiority complex towards the capital, the editor of Göteborgs-Posten writes on the subject:

Surely we are many in Göteborg who might exaggerate local patriot- ism, but it is also very tedious with constant accusations of inferiority complex. It is not unusual with tensions between the capital and the

rest of the country. Just like most countries. It has nothing to do with complexity. It is about the notion that the decision makers of the nation favour the capital at the expense of the rest of the country’s expense. This must be said and opposed. (Hjörne 1996:2)

Lindholmen is located on the island Hisingen. Between inhabitants on the mainland and the islanders of Hisingen there is an us/them relationship. After incorporating Hisingen in the City of Göteborg in 1967 there is one Göteborg on each sides of the river (Ek et al. 2002). There is a prevailing notion of Hisin- gen amongst people on the mainland that there is one Hisingen. Ek et al. (2002) calls it a fiction, a false construction and remarkable that so often the mainlanders even admits they do not know Hisingen that well and hardly ever have been there.

Well, there is just something about Hisingen. I can’t explain it. But it’s enough to ride the tram to get an anxiety attack. (Ek et al. 2002:155)

In several newspaper articles moving across the river is referred to as treason – to both the inhabitants of Hisingen and mainlanders (Balac 2001, Johansson, K2000). “Those who are born in Göteborg stay on the right side of the river and the right side is my side! To move across the river would be treason.” (Balac 2001:23).

Local Debates on Urban Planning and Democracy Roughly at the same time as the planning and development of Lindholmen, a number of other planning processes resulted in a debate in the local newspaper Göteborgs-Posten regarding planning, democracy and culturally valuable buildings.

As the situation is now, the debate - if it exists at all – is about big city renewal in the area surrounding Korsvägen and is held within a limited circle. Those citizens who do not actively seek information about the planning of Göteborg will soon be facing a fait accompli. (Reinholdsson 1998:4)

During 1998 and 1999 there was a debate in the local newspaper Göteborgs- Posten regarding the location of the World Culture museum. The suggested location, Korsvägen, would result in the destruction of old wooden houses that are described as characteristic for the entrance to Göteborg. “To give way for a Museum of World Cultures one is planning to, ironically enough, to tear down four of Göteborg’s unique culture houses. The villas represent unique wooden buildings in Göteborg and they are the city’s first planned residential district from the beginning of the 1870s.” (Kinberg 1999:4). In a number of debate articles, people expressed their frustration regarding the lack of public debate,

80 the feeling that the decision had already been taken before the formal planning process and the fact that old buildings “once again” are going to be demolished (Ekstrand 1998, Karlberg & Izikowitz 1998, Kinberg 1999, Reinholdsson 1998).

It is not only ‘ordinary citizens’ who have had information withheld and whose points of views are being ignored. Even city district committees, the committee of culture and the City Museum are regu- larly ignored. Göteborg is a city cut in two, where friends of preservation often come out short. One part of the City is concerned with writing preservation programmes whilst another part of the City is doing its best to tear the same houses down. (Ekstrand 1998:4)

In 1997 was originally Lindholmen pier actually one of five alternative locations for the new World Culture Museum. In a debate article in the spring of 1999, a municipal commissioner from the Liberal Party questioned the fact that the initial discussions started in 1997 while the democratic process started in 1999 when the location was already decided. She argues that citizens’ insight and participation in the decision making process has been non-existent. No one is taking responsibility for the decision but blaming it on everybody else. “The Planning and Building Act provides conditions for democratic handling but it is set aside through agreements which are drawn up in such detail that it is even clear where a building shall be located.” (Björklund 1999:4). According to the Moderate Party they have often agreed on these issues with the Social Democ- ratic Party and subsequently the smaller parties have decided to use the local opinion that is against the current issue to gain voters (M 2004:19).

There are many buildings that strong interests have wanted to preserve. Where the city commissioners from the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party have pursued a policy of concrete [betongpolitik] and where other parties have tried to take advantage of the situation. We have had major quarrels regarding preservation issues in several areas, where there have been several obstacles in the way. If you want to be mean you could say: “These two are real concrete politicians [the city commissioners from the Moderate Party and the Social Democratic Party]. If they have put their minds on building a museum they don’t care what the preservation program says.”. Of course it is important to preserve old environments, but it is also important to renew. It is always a balance. You should preserve, but without exaggeration. Everything can’t be a museum, we need a living city. (M 2004:19)

In 2000, the debate in the local newspaper Göteborgs-Posten on planning and democracy in Göteborg continued concerning two new projects (The Peda- gogue and Sahlgrenska hospital). ”No sooner had those in power in Göteborg run over the opposition and taken a decision which will be devastating for a cultural environment of national interest – The Pedagogue in the Social House

– then they turn to the next expansion at the expense of cultural environments.” (Sjöström 2003:2). The debate starts with a letter to the editor regarding new plans to extend Sahlgrenska hospital towards the botanic garden and Änggårdens garden city, both classified as cultural environments of national interest.

As usual there are spoken and unspoken development plans, as usual the city planning authority’s programme suffers from inconsistencies, as usual the public consultation period is too short for an exhaustive debate and as usual the information/public consultation meeting is announced at short notice (a week!). (Sjöström 2003:2)

Göran Johansson replies:

Politicians are elected to govern the municipality in a representative democracy. Maybe it is Sjöström who does not understand how democracy works and the difference between political statements and formal scrutiny in accordance to the Planning and Building Act. We have written about The Pedagogue in the Social Democratic budget. Does Sjöström imply that we should not do that until it has been approved by the public authorities? (Johansson, G 2000:4)

A politician from the Swedish Christian Democrats joins the debate:

When influential institutions like Chalmers, the university and the big corporations want to make changes that are of great importance to the city’s future development, there is usually a so-called decision in principal which means that a few leading politicians sign an agreement which more or less restricts the work of the committees and boards. These agreements are, due to their weak support, a scourge to the municipal democracy. (Nilsson 2000:4)

Following Göran Johansson are these agreements only expressions of one's intentions and “… shall be scrutinised by committees and authorities according to the law, and then the decision will be taken. That is the way to do it.” (Jo- hansson, G 2000:4). The politician from the Swedish Christian Democrats comments on this:

Formally, maybe the rules of the Planning and Building Act will be fulfilled by handling the matter in a customary way. In reality, the intentions of the law and the preparatory work will not be fulfilled, because the critical points of view of the citizens and other bodies of consideration will not be regarded if Göran Johansson’s deal shall be kept. The objective of the public consultation, public participation, is in reality meaningless. (Nilsson 2000)

82 According to Ek et al.’s (2002) study there is an evident tendency to regard politicians with scepticism or even discontent among the inhabitants of Göte- borg. There is major disappointment regarding politicians’ lack of responsibility towards preserving historical environments which have resulted in Göteborg not being such a beautiful city as it might have been, but at the same time, the interviewees have a very positive picture of constant activity and accomplishment in Göteborg (Ek et al. 2002).

Conclusions Göteborg

Göteborg has a history of trade and manufacturing industry. In the late 1970s the city was faced with a massive job loss due to the shipyards closing down, as well as a dependence of a few large manufacturing companies. In other words, just like other western cities Göteborg is struggling to transform into a successful post-industrial city. The City of Göteborg has worked hard at promoting Göteborg as a knowledge and event city, still with a large industrial base, with the aim of creating growth in the region.

Urban politics in Göteborg are characterised by a large proportion of public companies, a strong political leader in the chairman of the city executive board as well as Göteborgsandan – a climate in which actors from politics-industry- academia collaborate to get things done, a well-established network based in trustful relationships, consisting of executives from academia, industry and the City play an important role in decision-making in Göteborg.

A number of debates on urban planning and democracy in the local newspaper reveal that some local actors are frustrated by decisions being taken behind closed doors and market values being chosen over preservation. Others argue that these are legitimate democratic processes and that it is more a question of minority parties taking advantage of local opinion. This debate also illustrates how planning and the Planning and Building Act can be interpreted differently. In other words, planning legislation provides room for different planning practices to be developed and different perspectives on democracy to influence that practice.

84 Chapter 6

Lindholmen: From Shipyard and Harbour to Science Park

The river Göta Älven runs through Göteborg leaving, on one side, the south riverbank with the city centre, and on the other side: Norra Älvstranden (North Riverbank). Norra Älvstranden is a five km long stretch of the north riverbank on the island Hisingen (see picture 6.1). Throughout the 20th century, Norra Älvstranden was the centre of Göteborg’s harbour and shipyard activities. Within a few years from the oil crisis in 1974, most of the Swedish shipbuilding industry was closed down leaving a vast area of Norra Älvstranden empty. To- day the area is all but abandoned. A number of improvements in urban development and regeneration projects have taken place on the waterfront resulting in housing, education, service and places of work (see table 6.1 and picture 6.2). The case studied in this dissertation is Lindholmen; precisely the urban planning and development process that took place in an effort to establish a science park in the area.

What we do here will be of vital importance for the development of Gothenburg during the next hundred years. It is of such magnitude that we probably cannot yet comprehend its full value.” The chairman of the city executive board comments the developments at Norra Älvstranden. (Genborg 2001:34)

This chapter is based on interviews as well as newspaper articles and public documents (such as plans, programmes, public consultation reports and process descriptions, and another dissertation, Öhrström (2004), which also investigates Lindholmen. Involved actors and interests are presented in appendix A and the interviews (that are coded) are listed (and explained) last in the references. This chapter begins with a brief introduction to the regeneration of

Norra Älvstranden, of which Lindholmen is part. However, the main focus is on the process that resulted in Ericsson moving to Lindholmen pier and a science park, starting to form at Lindholmen.18

Picture 6.1: Norra Älvstranden

Source: Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a:2-3

Picture 6.2: Different Areas on Norra Älvstranden

Source: City planning authority, Göteborg

18 All quotations in this chapter are my translation except Stadsbyggnadskontoret (2001a) and Öhrström (2004).

86 Table 6.1: Norra Älvstranden19

Färjenäs Eriksberg Sannegårds- Lindholmen Lundbystrand20 Frihamnen hamnen Activities Färjenäs Eriksberg shipyard. Sannegården Lindholmen shipyard as Götaverken shipyard as Frihamnen harbour. roughly harbour. harbour. well as Lindholmen well as Lundby harbour. between harbour. 1850-1975 1975-1980 Eriksberg and Lindholmen shipyards were closed down. Götaverken had moved its production to Arendal further out in the river mouth. Most harbour activity moved further out in the river mouth to Skandia harbour. 15 to 20 000 jobs disappeared in a few years and most of the north riverbank stood silent and deserted. Activities Swedyard corp. Project Lindholmen, a A number of compa- Frihamnen harbour 1975-1989 started regeneration joint venture between nies that had hived off continues its activities. as the shipyard closed the state and the mu- from shipbuilding in- down. Clean-up nicipality. A few upper dustry continued their operations, conver- secondary schools operations in the area. tion into offices. established, a two-year A few buildings were After housing surplus engineering course at renovated; others were was reduced, plans to college level. Area transformed for small start building flats, Slottsberget, tenants and growing compa- converting more offered to buy their nies. Part of buildings, new build- houses from Swedyard Götaverken, Cityvarvet, ing projects. corp. survived as a regional repair yard.

19 This table is based on Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a+b as well as named detailed development plans and programmes. 20 Originally called Götaverken, after the shipyard was once located here. As most of Götaverken operations re-located the area needed a new name not associated with the company. It was namned Lundbyvass. This name was a few years later again changed, this time to Lundbystrand. 87

Compre- Park, Housing and busi- Housing and Housing (4), park, busi- Business, business and Harbour area (2), park, hensive camping, ness, business and business, business (2), business and housing, park (2). business and housing. plan 198921 outdoor housing, business, ness and hous- hosing. Slottsberget, stage, gen- park (2 areas). ing (2), sports, hosts 3 of the 4 housing eral pur- park, business areas. pose, (3), centre. sports, traffic area, housing and business. Land owner The City of Swedeyard Corp. The City of Lindholmen shipyard: Götaverken: Swedeyard The City of Göteborg. 1989 Göteborg. (owned by the Swed- Göteborg. Swedeyard Corp. Lind- Corp. Lundby harbour: ish state). holmen harbour: the the City of Göteborg. City of Göteborg. Land owner During 1998 Norra Älvstranden Development Corporation, company owned by the City of Göteborg, through several acquisitions 1998 and land exchanges become the dominant landowner in the Norra Älvstranden area.

21 Approved by Göteborg City Council in 1990. 88

Färjenäs Eriksberg Sannegårds- Slottsberget Lindholmen - Lundbystrand22 Friham- hamnen nen Activities 1989- Discussed In 2001 ap- In 2001 a thou- In 2001 ap- In Lundbystrand most old build- Conver- 2004 as a new proximately 700 sand new flats proximately 500 ings have been preserved and sion to park and flats have been are planned and flats have been converted for new purposes, offices and recreational built and 500 building of the built in Slotts- mostly offices. A knowledge construc- area. more are under- Eriksberg berget.. centre is established in Lindhol- tion of way. A number Shopping Cen- men. Six upper secondary schools terminal of old buildings tre begins. The and since 1994 Chalmers. As a building have been con- intentions with result 100 000 m2 of educational for Scan- verted. Eriksberg Sannegården is facilities is converted or con- dinavian now consist of a to create a structed. In 1999 Lindholmen Seaways (is mixture of hous- garden city, flats Science Park is established. Re- underway ing, offices, res- as well as ter- sulting in more than 120 000 m2 in 2001). taurants, hotel race houses of building projects such as of- and lighter indus- have been built fices and hotels. In 2004 most of try. here. the offices have been built and moved into.

22 In the comprehensive plan dated in 1989 Lindholmen and Lundbystrand were divided into two areas (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 1989). In 1999 they were merged into one planning area in the Programme for Lindholmshamnen (=Lindholmen harbour) Lundbystrand (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 1999a). An area called Slottsberget, desig- nated for housing and a park area, which was included in the Lindholmen area in the Comprehensive plan 1989 is not included in Lindholmen Lundbyvass in the Pro- gramme for Lindholmshamnen Lundbystrand 1999. 89

Waterfront Regeneration Takes Off

The restructuring process as well as the closing down of harbours and shipyards left large brownfield areas along the five kilometres long north riverbank. For a decade, almost 250 hectares of land at an attractive southern waterfront location on Norra Älvstranden, close to the city centre of Göteborg, lay fallow (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a, Wahlberg 2001a).

The First Initiatives for Urban Regeneration There were two dominant landowners on Norra Älvstranden, the state – which owned the shipyards, and the City – which owned the harbours. In a few years time, Göteborg had lost 15 000 to 20 000 jobs and thus, in the late 1970s, the City approached the Swedish government with various proposals in an effort to garner support in an attempt to find replacements for the lost industries and create new jobs (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a). In 1978 an agreement was reached.23 Company Project Lindholmen Corporation (Projekt Lindholmen AB) was formed and the state granted 60 million SEK for conversion of a part of Lindholmen’s former shipyard to a training and research facility.

It was on state owned land in Eriksberg (see picture 6.3) that efforts to find new opportunities for developments started in the beginning of the 1980s (Stads- byggnadskontoret 2001a). At this time the political interest in Norra Älvstran- den was rather weak (CPA 2003:6, LSP 2003:11). Instead it was the state owned Swedeyard Corp. through its managing director who showed interest in the area and was prepared to finance projects there. Common wisdom is that Norra Älvstranden would not be what it is today if it hade not been for the ambitions, efforts and resources that the managing director put into Norra Älvstranden (CU 2004:16, LSP 2003:11, M 2004:19, S 2004:18). Swedeyard Corp. presented a proposal for a new city structure incorporating both housing and offices. At this time, however, Göteborg had a surplus of several thousand flats on the outskirts and hence the City rejected the plans to build housing in Eriksberg. Swedeyard Corp. continued to work on new projects in the area, investing money and trying to create political awareness about the need to start regenerating Norra Älvstranden (LSP 2003:11).

23 The agreement was reached between the Swedish state, The City of Göteborg, Götaverken Arendal AB and Eriksbergs Mekaniska AB.

90 Picture 6.3: Shipyard Eriksberg

Source: Norra Älvstranden Development Corporation

In 1981 the City became the sole owner of Project Lindholmen Corporation: “… where education, production and research would co-operate under the same conditions.” (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a:36). The project evolved into an industrial development centre concentrating on work-environment research. Companies connected with the new research facilities established themselves in the area. In 1988 planning for a Knowledge Centre began. In 1989 parliament decided to introduce a two-year engineering course at the college level that was established at Lindholmen (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a). “This proved to have significant consequences for the focus on education that Lindholmen had presented.” (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a:19).

In 1985 Swedeyard Corp.24 formed a company called Eriksberg Management Corporation (Eriksbergs Förvaltnings AB) (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a). The task of Eriksberg Management Corporation is “…administration of the land, buildings and facilities at the former Eriksberg shipyards as well as being responsible for the area’s development” (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a:18). The managing director of Swedeyard Corp. continued as managing director of Eriksberg Management Corporation. The company was continually active in developing the area within the existing plan, since the City rejected the previous plans for housing. One example is that the company let the old shipyard Eriks- berg host a number of large-scale outdoor events such as concerts with U2, the Rolling Stones and Madonna (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a). The citizen of Göteborg were not very familiar with Norra Älvstranden simply because most of the area had, as shipyard and harbour areas, been closed to the public. The concerts were an attempt to get the public to discover the area.

Over time political interest for the area awakened and The City of Göteborg formed a steering committee, the Delegation of Älvstranden (Älvstrandsdelega- tionen), to handle the work concerning Norra Älvstranden from the perspective of the City (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a). The delegation consisted of leading members from all of Göteborg’s political parties as well as civil servants in leading positions (S 2004:18). The idea was to create an assembly able to take action and not make the process unnecessarily bureaucratic. A development agreement was signed which stated that the major landowners would pay for necessary infrastructure. However, there was no coordinated effort to regenerate the area but rather competing projects between different landowners (LSP 2003:11).

The Delegation of Älvstranden visited a number of urban waterfronts, such as Baltimore, Boston, New York and London to see how other cities have transformed waterfront areas (CPA 2003:6, S 2004:18). The conclusions drawn were that you need to take control over the entirety of the project and not allow private developers and business interests to steer the process. If you do, you run the risk of creating something characterized by current market conditions. Instead Norra Älvstranden should be allowed to take its time and grow as part of a city (S 2004:18).

A Vision for Norra Älvstranden The question was now what kind of city should be developed at Norra Älvstranden. Current plans dated from 1937 to 1957 and permitted only industrial use (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a). Thus, there was a need to update plans for the area. In 1985 the building committee was commissioned by the city council to plan Norra Älvstranden (CPA 2001:4).

24 At this time Swedeyard Corp. had changed name to Celsius Industries (Celsius Industrier AB).

92 In 1985 the Göteborg city council restated their claim that the inner quay areas on both sides of the river constituted opportunities for future growth. They therefore considered that it was of the greatest importance to investigate the criteria for cementing closer ties between the area and the city from a long-term perspective. The comprehensive-planning work implemented during the forthcoming period was thereby initiated. (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a:15)

When the city planning authority (Stadsbyggnadskontoret) started to work with the comprehensive plan, the City regarded it as important that citizen had an opportunity to state their point of view now that the area was going to be regenerated and turned into a new, public part of the city. A vision called the Friendly City (Den goda staden) was devised and presented as an exhibition incorporating the consultation conduct stated in the Planning and Building Act.25 This was an effort to invite the city’s resident to take part in a broad public debate.

The ‘friendly city’ is a city where people can both live and work (Stads- byggnadskontoret 2001a). There is access to culture, shops, care, schools and reliable public transport. It is a city that is rich in living for all people and it has certain similarities to “the old town”. The friendly city preserves and develops valuable, existing buildings and structures. Different functions are mixed in the friendly city, for example work, housing, education, trade, culture and leisure. Here different work environments and different kinds of housing are also mixed. Meeting places for people are also created, and the friendly city makes use of the water as an event, and creates parks and areas for recreation as well as sports.

The idea behind the vision was a city with the river in focus and open to all residents. It contained economic, physical and social- cultural dimensions. The guiding principles were diversity, variation and quality of life. Here, Göteborg residents should be able to live and work, have access to recreational pursuits and a wide range of cultural activities. The riverside city would be planned so that it complemented Göteborg and Hisingen. (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a:20)

The intentions with the exhibition of the vision, from the city planning authority’s perspective, was to invite the city’s residents to participate in a broad public debate and to decide whether or not the vision was moving in the right direction. The vision was seen as a mean to achieve consensus in the community on the regeneration of Norra Älvstranden. One result was written comments from 389 people during the exhibition (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 1989).

25 The vision can be found on the following webpage: http://www.alvstranden.com/html/fsfore.html (Norra Älvstranden Development Corporation 2004).

In the regional perspective, this area is unique with its city location and size. The possibilities to develop housing and offices at other city location will soon be non-existent. Therefore, Norra Älvstran- den will be a very good alternative in the region for location of housing and business. The area is so large that it might even effect the development of the region by attracting new businesses that would not have established themselves here without access to new land. From a business perspective Norra Älvstranden has been seen to be of national importance for the last decades. Maybe a renewal of the business life will, in the future, give the area national importance as long as competence and potentials are realized. (Stadsbyggnadskon- toret 1989:11)

In 1990 the comprehensive plan of Norra Älvstranden was adopted by the city council. The plan divided Norra Älvstranden into six areas. The aim of the planning and development of the different areas varied from housing, workplaces, restaurants to education and a harbour.

The City Creates Capacity for Regeneration Project Lindholmen was finalised and in 1990 the public company changed name to Lindholmen Development Corporation (Lindholmen Utveckling AB) to indicate the ongoing work in the area. Lindholmen Development had new plans for the area, a business park totalling 40 000 m2 was planned to strengthen the link between industry and education/research which the company had been striving to achieve. However, the plans of a business park did not materialise.26 In 1992 the Lindholmen Knowledge Centre was instead established.27

The motives behind the formation of the Lindholmen Knowledge Centre were to strengthen the development and competitive potential of trade and industry in West Sweden, increase competence amongst the region’s workforce, lend force to Göteborg’s profile as a knowledge-intensive city and optimise the educational administrators’ utilisation of resources. (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a:36)

26 When the initial discussions started, Lindholmen Development did not own all the land in Lindholmen, for example the pier, hence only a limited amount of land was available. Chalmers University of Technology was at the time also concerned with an internal reorganisation, from public authority to foundation, and therefore had other things on their agenda. The access to land and the commitment by Chalmers has been regarded as crucial in later developments towards a science park (C 2004:16, LSP 2003:11). 27 On the boards was representative from AMU (Vocational Training Centre), Chalmers, The Chamber of Commerce, Lindholmen Utveckling AB, the Regional Employment Board and the Board of Education (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a).

94 The new strategy of Lindholmen Development was to create a centre for education or a physical structure where different kinds of educations could take place (LSP 2003:11, M 2004:19). The goal was to gather a number of educational organizers in one area and create an exchange between them and companies, but also to enrich the area with research (M 2004:19). A number of new buildings were built and several organisations and companies within education established in Lindholmen. “A kind of infrastructure for education.” (LSP 2003:11). No fewer than six comprehensive upper secondary schools were located in Lindholmen (LSP 2003:11). In 1994 Chalmers, and more specifically Chalmers Engineering and Ship’s Officer’s Training College, moved to newly built premises in Lindholmen. Later this Chalmers establishment was named Chalmers Lindholmen (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a).

In the beginning of the 1990s Sweden was hit by the economic recession and, in a few years time, real estate and rents had dropped by a third in central Göteborg (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a). Göteborg’s sensitivity to economic fluctuations because of its dependency on the manufacturing industry was de- bated. The slump was felt on Norra Älvstranden, it was hard to attract developers, however the city continued to invest and as the state of the market turned around other developers started to invest in the area.

No one other than public companies would build on Norra Älvstranden because of the real estate crisis. We [the City] more or less forced our companies to build on Norra Älvstranden, as we didn’t want the developments to stop. There was some fuss about that, but it was an active political decision. We use money from companies that have money to keep the developments going. (M 2004:19)

The real estate crisis eventually resulted in a poor financial situation for Eriks- berg Management Corporation (LSP 2003:11). Therefore, in January 1996, the City of Göteborg could buy the state owned company Eriksberg Management Corporation at the price of one SEK (Kristiansson 1996, LSP 2003:11, M 2004:19). Eriksberg Management Corporation owns the three former shipyard areas at Norra Älvstranden. As a result the City became the main landowner at Norra Älvstranden. The City had for years seen the area as a strategic resource and thus there was no problem getting a political majority to vote yes to the acquisition in the city council (Kristiansson 1996). The intention with this redis- tribution of land was to make possible more complete solutions for Norra Älvstranden.

In May 1997 a new managing director of Eriksberg Management Corporation took over and his first mission was to sell the company to business interests. This however was fruitless as the financial situation in the company was simply

not strong enough to attract any buyers (NDC 2001:12).28 The company was given permission to continue on the condition that it runs without cost to the City; Eriksberg Management Corporation shall act like any other company on the real estate market and finance its business without subsidies (Genborg 2000b). On the other hand, the company does not have any short-term demands for profit, which means that the company can use rent deductions to attract companies to Norra Älvstranden.

Through a limited corporation…in position to govern a large and long-term development, the City can form advanced, politically set strategies, and at the same time isolate financial risk. The financing of the entire scheme is solved through ennoblements of latent over values and privatisation of individual projects in a pace that satisfies with the market’s risk-judgement. … The dynamic place initiative solves the dilemmas of financing a large urban re-development scheme, it provides for an extended political influence and a high degree of user-involvement, finally resulting in a privatisation. (Öhr- ström 2004:229)

Once buildings and facilities are developed Eriksberg Management Corporation disposes of them, in other words continued expansions are financed by privatisation of those parts that has already been completed. In short the waterfront regeneration project on Norra Älvstranden is a privatisation project. To put it in another way, regeneration of the waterfront is financed through the surplus values that are created as a result of the urban planning and development process (LSP 2003:11). “It is a way for the City to sell out its interests but only through a process where they can have control over the strategic level.” (LSP 2003:11).

Because the aim of this company is to spearhead the development of Norra Älvstranden, the name was changed to Norra Älvstranden Development (Norra Älvstranden Utveckling AB), here referred to as NDC.29 The change of name was designed to reflect the change in perspective from management to development (NDC 2003:11). The company’s role is to serve as a catalyst in the planning process (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 1999a). Thus the company is performing all its planning and expansion in the area in collaboration with existing and new companies and with the city planning authority.

28 Since then, however, the economic situation has changed. Between 1997 and 1999, according to Dagens Industri (Braconier 2000), the company has reported a profit of 106 million SEK before tax. During the year 2000 Norra Älvstranden Development Corporation and Lindholmen development Corporation made a profit of 190 million SEK (Johansson 2001). 29 Lindholmen Development Corporation was run by NDC through a management agreement between 1997 and 2000 (NDC 2003:13). In 2000 Lindholmen Development Corporation was merged with NDC.

96 The board of NDC consists of leading politicians from both the ruling parties and the opposition. “There are major politicians on the board, that is the trick.” (LSP 2003:11). But the chairman of the board and the managing director are non-partisan (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a). “It was decided very early that this should be a consensual process. The politicians realised that if you are to develop such a large development project, then credibility over time is of the greatest importance.” (LSP 2003:11). In other words, through NDC the City created a financial capacity to control the development of Norra Älvstranden and a political consensus to back it up.

NDC is an instrument for achieving what the City wants. If there is a strong will, you will create the tool needed to achieve it. Not a unique one, but a strong one. The process differs from traditional planning by concentrating all your capacities. NDC handles certain issues such as acquisitions, selling and construction. It is more operational than traditional work. This might speed up the planning process. (CPA 2001:5)

The first task for NDC was to improve the company’s finances to enable them to focus on the development task (LSP 2003:11). As a result, Arendalsverket as well as other real estate and house properties were sold. From the outset the company’s strategy was to work with Norra Älvstranden as a whole. Now, the company had the financial ability to accomplish this. During 1998 the company, through several acquisitions and land exchanges, become the dominant landowner in the Norra Älvstranden area (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a).

Planning to Enable Economic Development

During 1996 and 1997, Ericsson Mobile Data Design AB30 started to look for a place to build a new office as they had outgrown their current location in Göteborg. Mobile phones and wireless data communication is a line of business which is a large part of the Swedish IT industries and it attracts foreign investors (Sjögren 2000). At this time, Kista in Stockholm, and Ideon in Lund were regarded as very successful science parks, and part of the Swedish IT success,

30 Ericsson Mobile Data Design AB develops mobile data systems. The systems idea is wireless transfer of large amounts of data in a joint net. Among the systems users today one can for example mention taxi cars, ambulances and portable PCs. The company specializes in transfer- ring data and has an important role in developing General Packet Radio Services (GPRS), a method to transfer data faster than in the GSM-net (Sjögren 1999). The 3rd generation mobile telephony, which is taking over after GPRS, builds on data packet technique and future mobile systems are also expected to use the technique. Ericsson Mobile Data Design is Ericsson’s centre of competence for data packet technology, Ericsson is currently the world-leading supplier of GPRS technique.

Table 6.2: Course of Events Planning Process of Lindholmen Pier Jan 1996 The City of Göteborg buy Eriksbergs Förvaltnings AB, which owns three shipyards at Norra Älvstranden, the company’s name is changed to Norra Älvstranden Devel- opment Corporation (NDC) 1998 NDC becomes the dominant landowner at Norra Älvstran- den 1997 - Feb Ericsson Mobile Data Design searches for new office, they 1998 are approached by Mölndal and Mölnlycke April 1998 Meetings between Ericsson and NDC 3 June 1998 Ericsson decides to locate on Lindholmen pier and they want an establishment of an IT-cluster in the area 9 June 1998 Detailed development plan Lindholmen pier: building committee gives go-ahead to start work on the detailed development plan of the area 10 Nov 1998 Programme Lindholmen – Lundbystrand: building committee gives go-ahead to start programme work of the area 1 Aug 1999 Lindholmen Science Park Corporation established June - Sep Programme Lindholmen – Lundbystrand: consultation and 1999 public display Late 1999 Chalmers and Göteborg University starts a joint project, to build a multidisciplinary IT-University at Lindholmen 12 Nov 1999 Declaration of intent signed between NDC and Ericsson. IT-cluster is defined as 10 000 jobs 14 Dec 1999 Programme Lindholmen – Lundbystrand: building committee approves the programme 23 March Programme Lindholmen – Lundbystrand: city council 2000 adopts the programme 26 Jan - 7 Detailed development plan Lindholmen pier: consultation March 2000 2000 In April Company Sigma is the first to join Ericsson in the science park, soon Semcon and a number of other companies follows 26 April - 23 Detailed development plan Lindholmen pier: public display May 20000 13 June 2000 Detailed development plan Lindholmen pier: building committee adopts the programme 16 Nov 2000 The Ericsson project is sold by NDC to Nordic Renting 2001 Volvo Car Corporation locates their branch responsible for the development of telematics in the area Autumn 2001 Lindholmen: the IT-University of Göteborg starts Dec 2002 Ericsson moves in 2003 Lindholmen Science Park inaugurates the Hub (Navet)

98 whereas Göteborg lacked such an environment. Ericsson is regarded as one of the most important companies within the IT-sector in Sweden, thus its presence in the region was considered to be of greatest importance. Due to reor- ganisations within Ericsson group in 2002, Ericsson Mobile Data Design, and most of Ericsson’s independent companies were merged with Ericsson group and therefore, hereafter, the name Ericsson is used and it refers to Ericsson Mobile Data Design AB in its current form.

Table 6.2 presents a timeframe of some of the events during the planning and development process of Lindholmen, which received a jump-start as Ericsson started to search for new office premises.

Ericsson is on the Move In 1996 and 1997, when Ericsson announced that they were looking for new office premises, they were handed 19 different alternatives (E 2001:8, NDC 2001:12). In February 1998 it was reported in Göteborgs-Posten that Ericsson, “…one of the worlds leading companies within the field of data communication..” (Isemo 1998:11), plans to move from Göteborg. The company had initially chosen two locations, Mölndal and Mölnlycke. Ericsson was, however, not pleased with these locations:

None of these was satisfactory as they lay close to small-scale industries, such as car sales and foundries. We only have foreign custom- ers. We cannot show them ‘dirt-Sweden’. We want the site to be nice, clean, safe and tidy, just like High Tech areas in the United States. (E 2001:8)

Ericsson contacted BRG - Business Region Göteborg, a public company responsible for developing and promoting trade and industry in the Göteborg region. ”We couldn’t believe it when Göteborg offered us nothing of interest. Did they really not have anything for us? Were they aware of what they turned down?” (E 2003:9). The City reacted.

It made the city management very upset when Göteborg was not chosen as one of the alternatives. They [BRG - Business Region Göteborg] called us up and said that Ericsson is about to leave Göteborg; there is no time to lose, and they wondered if we really could not find something for them [on Norra Älvstranden]. (NDC 2001:12)

On 17 April 1998, NDC, BRG and Ericsson had a meeting in Lindholmen to discuss a future location for Ericsson at Norra Älvstranden (E 2001:8, NDC 2001:12). NDC offered a location adjacent to Chalmers Lindholmen (E 2003:9). However Ericsson considered these premises as too limited and tight and did not approve this suggestion, which put the City in a truly problematic

situation. The meeting was held in a room in Lindholmen that faced the pier; in an attempt to salvage the talks, the managing director of NDC pointed out the window towards the pier (NDC 2003:13). Ericsson instantly liked what they saw. “Lindholmen pier was entirely the right location! A Central one with proximity to Chalmers and the ocean. The pier was full of possibilities! If only the existing buildings were demolished.” (E 2003:9). The same evening Ericsson called back saying the idea was not so bad and a new meeting was scheduled the following morning. “It all happened so fast!” (NDC 2001:12).

Picture 6.3: Lindholmen and its Pier

Source: Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a:5-6

The Attraction of a Cluster Although Ericsson decided on Lindholmen pier (see picture 6.3) for reasons such as a central location, closeness to the water, the possibility of expansion and the proximity to Chalmers, all of this can be summed up in Ericsson’s demand for locating themselves on the pier – the establishment of a cluster. “We [NDC] had some early thoughts on developing a science park, to offer more than just walls. But it was an undeveloped concept at the time. It was Ericsson that immediately came up with the idea of an IT-cluster.” (NDC 2001:12).

When Ericsson moved into their current office in 1991 and 1992 the staff consisted of 110 people (E 2001:8, E 2003:9). Now the staff numbered a 1000 and depending on the times, the future number of employees would change again.

100 Ericsson concluded that it is impossible to foresee the future and hence one needs great flexibility. This would be possible in a cluster; in a cluster the housing-market would be large enough to always provide an opportunity to expand or cut down on office space.

According to Ericsson, high tech areas in the world are located in well-kept areas with high social status (E 2001:8). Ericsson was concerned about being located in a dirty area surrounded by untidy small-scale industries. In the waterfront location on the pier they saw the possibility of creating an urban environment, in a certain style for a certain activity, with the potential for being good-looking and upscale (E 2003:9). Moreover, they thought that by ensuring the distances between buildings were short enough to walk, this could be a further attraction.

To attract the most qualified employees, Ericsson argued, a certain density was needed. If I am the best I want to be surrounded by the best. “The employees do not want to be stuck in the wilderness with only one option.” (E 2001:8). For today’s modern family where both parents work, changing jobs and moving is a major decision. You need to change your whole pattern of life; school, day care etc. But if you can change job within the cluster you can keep your living situation. To attract the best employees you have to have alternative employment nearby.

Ericsson’s ideas of cluster can be summarised by the concepts of dynamism (companies can grow and cut down), proximity (proximity and cooperation with other companies) and attractiveness (nice, tidy urban environment) (E 2003:9). The advantage with clusters also according to Ericsson, is that you are not dependent on one single company’s development. When one company within the cluster is doing poorly another one is doing just fine. That creates a vital work and housing market. Ericsson defined the cluster themselves: “10 000 work places. That gives the real estate owners a big enough market.” (E 2001:8). An ideas forum, with representatives from among others Ericsson, Volvo, Chalmers Lindholmen, NDC and Göteborg’s Planning and Building committee, was initiated to discuss what makes a good cluster (Braconier 2000, Öhrstöm 2004).

Handling Demands From a Private Company Discussions were held between Ericsson and NDC regarding Ericsson’s different intentions and demands (NDC 2003:13). NDC acted on behalf of the City. For the City and the chairman of the city executive board, attracting Ericsson to Lindholmen and establishing a cluster was a major priority.

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This was an affair of the heart for Göran Johansson [chairman of the city executive board]. We [NDC] asked, what can we promise? Any- thing, then you come back here to check with us [city executive board]. You will act as the City, we don’t have time for a lot of public administration. (NDC 2003:13)

As a result of the discussions between Ericsson and NDC, NDC presented a strategy to tidy up the area (to begin with) and on the last of April the City re- sponded that the cluster concept was to be a long-term policy and that planning work would start immediately. Ericsson answered with a letter of intent on 20 May that they would start a project together with NDC and the new detailed development plan had to be ready by June 1999 (Öhrström 2004). The price of land in the area should be kept reasonable so that other companies could afford to move in. Further, NDC should actively recruit other high tech companies to establish themselves in the area. Parking should be readily available, access to roads should be re-structured and the ferry should stop at the pier. Ericsson wanted to arrange for a limited number of real estate operators to work out proposals for the area and then have NDC sell the land to the selected partner. The City was given 12 days to confirm these arrangements.

Ericsson wanted to move within a year or two (E 2001:8, NDC 2001:12). This was a major challenge for NDC and the City in a number of ways. To begin with NDC, did not own the land. It was currently owned by the Harbour Au- thorities (Göteborgs Hamn AB). Moreover, the pier was currently a brownfield site; no building permission existed yet and in the current plan the area was intended mainly for housing. In other words, this task would not ordinarily be accomplished within this one to two years planning horizon. Expectations of a lead-time of between 10 to 15 years had been expressed to solve the planning matter in an ordinary organisation (NDC 2003:13). This was further compli- cated by the existence of a dock shed listed in the Conservation Programme for Social and Historically Valuable Buildings; dock shed 178 was to be preserved according to a municipal decision. It was evident that Ericsson’s opinion was that it would never be possible to adapt this building to their office standard (Öhrström 2004). NDC, however, convinced Ericsson to use a more open- minded approach about the matter. Ericsson agreed to study the matter of using shed 178 as part of the project.

On 2 June a deal was agreed upon between the Harbour Authorities and NDC which now owned the necessary land for the intended developments on Lind- holmen pier. The following day Ericsson’s decision to move to the pier was reported in the media (“Ericsson ska” 1998, “Ericsson bygger” 1998). The City of Göteborg described the new developments as “the Silicon Valley of the

102 Swedish west coast” and the chairman of the city executive board stated that this was an important step towards removing the stigma of heavy industry from Göteborg (“Ericsson ska” 1998).

In June 1998 the building committee agreed to start the work for a detailed development plan for Lindholmen pier. The planners announced to NDC that they would not participate in a process aimed at the destruction of dock shed 178 (NDC 2003:13, Öhrström 2004). As a result the chairman of the City executive board, called the city planning authority’s management to a meeting to chastise them regarding this kind of behaviour. Instead, he declared that NDC would coordinate the entire process with the planners on one side and Ericsson on the other side and report directly to the chairman of the City executive board. “This was when our [NDC] role as leader of the process became evident. The public management understood that there is no use fighting, they had the City’s leaderships behind them.” (NDC 2003:13). According to Öhrström (2004) this moment in the process was formative for the development of a planning practice for Norra Älvstranden. NDC’s role was extended to a more proactive body with a vital impact over the planning agenda.

Suddenly we controlled the process. The City Planning authority was used to handling the situation, so that was very disturbing of course. We put the customer at the centre of attention and asked them what they wanted but the normal procedure is that you make plans without asking the actors what they really want. We have overseen public management and taken direction from industry. We have controlled and steered the process, we have become the hub. (NDC 2003:13)

Through NDC the process is politically anchored. ”Since the City owns the whole area the city executive board came into the picture. NDC governs and they are almost identical with the city executive board.” (CPA 2001:5). Ericsson has direct contacts with politicians: ”We have informal meetings with politicians, sometimes without NDC. Our experience is that the politicians, both those in majority as well as those in opposition, stand behind the development.” (Ericsson 2001:8). NDC has well-developed networks with the public administration ”The city executive board and the city planning authority have a well established cooperative relationships with NDC. Huge networks have been established.” (CPA 2001:4). There is a management group where NDC and the public administration meet. This group discusses current happenings and what needs to be done. “The public administration is strong together, NDC is strong, and Ericsson is strong. It gives a strong dynamic effect.” (CPA 2001:3).

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A Learning Process The planning and development process has been a learning process for the actors involved as they come from different backgrounds. For example, all the staff at NDC has a background in industry, not public administration. ”When we said that we wanted a detailed development plan in a year, the relationship with the city planning authority collapsed completely, although something good came out if it in the end.” (NDC 2001:12). The city planning authority expected this to be a five to ten year long process, to go from housing to office premises. But through NDC’s coordination of the different municipal competences, they were able to shorten the process to a little over a year. “Now we cooperate extremely well. We have a lot of respect for each other. After the initial fuss this has developed into a very positive process.” (NDC 2003:13). Ericsson surprised the city planning authority by being so interested in creating such an urban environment (CPA 2003:6), while Ericsson was impressed by how fast the City could proceed with the process (E 2001:8).

Each of us has learned something from the other. We all had stereotypical images of each other. The city planning authority had an obsolete, old-fashioned picture of industry and has learned now that even they think about the soft values. The public administration learned that they could keep up with the fast pace. Now everything functions very smoothly. Ericsson wanted the detailed development plans within 14 days. They had to get accustomed to the fact that the Planning and Building Act exists, a legality that must be followed. Furthermore they misjudged their own process, where the internal decision-making power was overestimated in the early stages. (NDC 2001:8)

A positive effect for the city planning authority has been economic. ”Thanks to Norra Älvstranden [Development Corporation] there has always been sufficient financing in the process.” (CPA 2001:3). The fact that the collaboration with NDC has continued over a longer period of time has resulted in a store of knowledge which has made the process more efficient.

One develops means and routines that are more efficient than in situations where one deals with a new party all the time. You do not have to start from the beginning. The expectations are clear. The roles are stable. The key people know the area and the background. They can make quick judgements and provide fast answers. The knowledge is there. (NDC 2003:7)

104 Programme Work and Ericsson Takes Time The current comprehensive plan including the pier was approved on 1 March 1990 (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 1989).31 In the comprehensive plan, Lindholmen pier was intended for housing and dock shed 178 as well as the grain silo situated on the pier would be preserved. The area to be affected by the development of the IT-cluster is larger than just the pier itself. Hence, in November 1998, the building committee decided that programme work on the Lindhol- men-Lundbystrand area needed to be undertaken (see picture 6.4). This work should deal with the crucial issues, i.e. the differences between the comprehensive plan and the current plans (hence preparing for the detailed development plan). The detailed development plan is put in mothballs.

Picture 6.4: Programme Area Lindholmen Lundbystrand

Source: Stadsbyggnadskontoret 1999a:1

31 See appendix C for an overview of the Swedish planning system.

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Interview information offers evidence that one reason for halting the process was the fact that Ericsson was not ready to start the process as fast as the city planning authority. ”First we would do the detailed development plan and then the programme, but Ericsson didn’t manage. So we did the programme during that time. Then there was preparedness at the city planning authority when Ericsson said yes.” (CPA 2001:4). Ericsson Mobile Data Design had difficulties getting Ericsson group to take the decision to move to the pier (LSP 2003:11). “Autumn 99, the project was dormant, but we continued persistently.” (NDC 2001:12). The City was very active in convincing the Ericsson group executive board to make a decision to locate in Lindholmen (M 2004:19). Ericsson took a preliminary decision to locate on Lindholmen pier in September 1998 but the final decision was not made until January 2000. Work on the detailed development plan resumed again in January 2000.

In the City of Göteborg, the building committee and the real estate committee are jointly responsible for the detailed development plan. The building committee has responsibility for the plan description and the real estate committee for describing the realisation. The building committee having the formal responsibility. If a plan is within the scope of the comprehensive plan and the two committees agree, the building committee can take the decision to adopt the plan. If the two committees disagree, the building committee presents the plan to the city council which then makes the decision. If the plan is not within the scope of the comprehensive plan, the city council has to make the decision.

The programme differed on some points from the comprehensive plan from 1990 (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 1999a). Firstly, Lindholmen pier was no longer intended for housing but for business, containing only business and service facilities. The planned residences were moved north of the avenue. Secondly, it entails the tearing down of the dock shed 178 and grain silo. Thirdly, the intended park area and the traffic reserve for the bridge connection were re- moved. The park was to be replaced by Lindholmsallén avenue, green market squares and park areas. Because of these deviations from the comprehensive plan, the programme had to be adopted by the city council. This was done on the 23 March 1999. This programme was to constitute the basis for the coming detailed development plans.

On 12 November 1999, NDC and Ericsson signed a declaration of intention. The basis for this was the definition of an IT-cluster formulated by Ericsson. No fewer then 10 000 information technology jobs were to be located on Lindholmen pier. Work on the detailed development plan continued in January 2000 as Ericsson had taken its final decision to locate on Lindholmen pier. The aim of the plan was to make possible the establishment of technology intensive business, an IT-cluster, on Lindholmen pier. In the first stage, 60 000 m2 of office space (for among others Ericsson) was planned, to be followed by a second stage comprising other establishments of around 25 000 m2 of offices on

106 the pier. The detailed development plan for Lindholmen pier was totally in accordance with the programme and hence the building committee could adopt the detailed development plan, which was done in June 2000 (Stadsbyggnadsk- ontoret 2000).

On 16 November 2000, NDC sold the Ericsson project to Nordisk Renting (Nordic Renting), which will be Ericsson’s landlord (Braconier 2000). They, in their turn, appointed Skanska Hus and their affiliate company Selmer Bygg Göteborg AB as commissioner of the building project. The building work started in late 2000.

Any Objections? During the public consultation (1 June to 1 September 1999) a model of the proposed developments was open for the public to visit at the docks of Lund- bystrand, adjacent to Lindholmen pier (Werner 2000). A large number of visitors viewed the model, mainly people living or working nearby. The questions asked were rather basic such as when will the housing be ready, what will the rent be, how can I get back and forth to the city centre. “The public consultation process was very supportive, not questioning and criticising.” (NDC 2003:14). NDC and the city planning authority also invited researchers and teachers from the Chalmers School of Architecture to participate in a critical discussion (Öhrström 2004).

In the official report from the public consultation different issues were raised. For the program area as a whole, issues such as sufficient public transport, fears of segregation due to rent levels, degree of exploitation, environmental consequences and public access to the quays where raised (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 1999b). Regarding the pier itself the issues raised related directly to the changes suggested the comprehensive plan (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 1999a): - Shift from a residential area to a business area - Demolition of the dock shed 178 and grain silo - Intended removal of park area

The cultural committee and the City Museum could not accept the demolition of the dock shed 178 and wanted the volume and character of the grain silo building to be a guiding source for the new construction in the area (see picture 6.5). They argued that the demolition and new construction that had been done in the harbour to this point had left very few examples of buildings from the harbour era. Consequently, dock shed 178 is one of the two remaining quay sheds. In the Conservation Programme for Social Historically Valuable Build- ings from 1975, dock shed 178 and the grain silo were marked as inalienable components in the harbour environment (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2000). It was both the committee’s and the City Museum’s understanding that the pier should keep its harbour character. They wanted the environment as a whole (or

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at least in part) to be preserved and the presence of new designs given an exte- rior treatment that is adapted to the areas’ and the buildings’ form, language and character.

Picture 6.5: Dock Shed 178 and Grain Silo

Source: Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001b:29

The city planning authority’s comment was that the pier is reserved for Erics- son and that this will bring with it the demolition of the dock shed 178 and grain silo. The county board point out that it should at least be part of the programme to analyse the conditions for a formation of the area where these

108 buildings are left. Ericsson did this during the work on the detailed development plan (see section Dock Shed 178).

The park and nature committee, the neighbourhood council and the county board all point out that the total amount of park area was rather small (Stads- byggnadskontoret 1999b). The city planning authority argue that a minimum of 10 000 employees was needed in order for creative processes and knowledge exchange to arise spontaneously. In other words there must be enough space for places to work. Instead of bigger green areas the planned squares, meeting places and parks need to be designed with high quality. The neighbourhood council believed that there were too few dwellings in the area to fulfil the goal of ‘the Friendly City’ (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 1999b). The Council also believes that the area would be vacant and unsafe during the night if there were only business in the area. The county board believe that the share of dwellings seem too small for integration of housing, business and institutions to succeed; this integration was of vital importance for Norra Älvstranden. The city planning authority’s comment as that the reason for prioritising businesses before housing was the desire to create an IT-cluster. For these positive effects to occur, it demands that a sufficient number of companies with a certain number of employees be a part of the cluster. To avoid the vacancy and unsafe conditions at during night, 400 apartments were planed along Lindholmen Ave- nue. Housing was also desired on Ericsson’s part as they did not want the area to be empty after closing time (NDC 2001:14). However, housing could not be located within the cluster since that would decrease the density of the cluster and hence increase the distance between the companies.

The consultation on the detailed development plan occurred about six months after the consultation on the programme (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2000). The comments decreased from 24 pages on the programme to six pages on the detailed development plan. The city planning authority tried to satisfy most viewpoints in one way or another, except one – dock shed 178.

Dock Shed 178 Opinions regarding the dock shed as a historically valuable building differ:

Lindholmen pier was one of the nicest parts of the harbour land- scape. It had a big potential for preservation. A place worth to making a lot of fuss about and a lot of fuss it became. (CM 2001:1)

Preserve dock shed? To believe that building is important you have to be a real househugger. It is terrible. (M 2004:19)

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According to the City Museum: “To get 178 [dock shed 178] ready is not a big project. It takes creativity and energy but obviously they do not have that. But it can be done, we have done it on other occasions.” (CM 2001:1) Ericsson does not agree: ”If it could have been done we would have thought that was really good. But there was no way to pull it off financially.” (E 2001:8). An architect at NDC conceived 200 student apartments in the quay shed, but was doubtful whether or not it was feasible (NDC 2004:14) Several of the interviewees viewed the dock shed as a pawn in the game; the City was willing to make some sacrifices to secure Ericsson’s relocation to Lindholmen.

The city council had previously decided to preserve the quay shed. In other words it was the City’s will to preserve it. But this was tried again through the detailed development plan. The dock shed became part of the game. The City wanted to attract Ericsson. They were prepared to make that trade-off. (CPA 2001:3)

The City of Göteborg is in trouble. They weren’t on the high road to success. Industries are disappearing. These areas [Norra Älvstranden] are new pawns in the game. The matter is highly political. If you are able to create job opportunities, then the rewards are tremendous. A profitable trade-off. They happily ignored us and our opinions. I don’t think they mattered when the decision was taken. (CM 2001:1)

The city planning authority, after extensive studies done on the possibilities of integrating dock shed 178 into the planned building site, recommended demolition of both dock shed 178 and the grain silo. “The content of the detailed development plan is locked by future tenants needs of functions and premises. This has not allowed preservation of dock shed 178.” (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2000).

Picture 6.6: Drawing of Ericsson's Building

Source: Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001b:29

110 The study referred to above was a parallel architectural commission undertaken by Ericsson’s own estate company, ERV (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2000). Five architect’s offices were invited to offer suggestions on the architectural design: Erséus Frenning & Sjögren Ark. AB, KHRAS Architects, Liljewall Architects (which in August was announced as winners), Semrén & Månsson Architects and Gerth Wingårdh Architects (Öhrström 2004). They were to make two alternative plans, one with and one without integrating dock shed 178. A group of people consisting of representatives from Ericsson’s estate company, a stand-alone architect and an expert on building economy judged the proposals. The result was that none of the suggestions could demonstrate how the dock shed could be transformed into effective, high-class office. It would be extremely hard to meet Ericsson’s demands for cell offices and estimates showed that it would cost more to rebuild the dock shed than to demolish it and build a new building.

Picture 6.7: Drawing of Ericsson's Building From Within

Source: Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001b:29

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The city planning authority never questioned the results of Ericsson’s investigation. ”No, we did not. It was made clear that if Ericsson is in, [quay shed] 178 must go.” (CPA 2001:6). Ericsson’s sketches of their house (see pictures 6.6 and 6.7) were met by surprise and scepticism by officials at the city planning authority as well as the City Museum. “It was not an open process. Secretive- ness.” (CPA 2001:3), an official at the city planning authority pointed out and continued, ”The director of the city planning authority participated in meetings with NDC. They [Ericsson] chose certain people. A distinct cultural difference.” (CPA 2001:3). Another official at the city planning authority noted, ”Due to Ericsson’s organisational culture the process was less open. Differ- ent… They held the architectural competition to themselves. At their mercy the city planning authority was allowed to have a peek. Usually we co-host and participate in the judgment.” (CPA 2001:5) Ericsson themselves appointed the jury group. ”Unbelievable. Only one stakeholder could have opinions. We have never been so disregarded before. It is not supposed to be like that! (CM 2001:1).

Ericsson and NDC saw things differently: ”Since the building was designed for us it was natural that we hold the architectural competition. And we did just that!” (E 2001:8). “We let Ericsson handle it, since they were going to reside there.” (NDC 2001:12). According to Ericsson cooperation with NDC was perfect.

It is not possible to find a better collaborating partner than NDC. Their managing director and chairman are not municipal officials but business people. The right men in the right place! We must receive advance notification for our decision-making process. If we, within Ericsson, would have had the same determination as within the City….we have been the ones delaying the process. Not once have we waited for the City. Their actions provided us enormous security. We never doubted the City. (E 2001:8)

Growth Environment to Fight Global Competition

At the same time as the discussion with Ericsson was initiated, NDC was also in talks with Chalmers University of Technology. On their original campus, Chalmers established Chalmers Science Park. The problem, however, was that this science park had no room to expand (CU 2004:16); and thus could never grow into an environment such as Kista in Stockholm or Ideon in Lund (LSP 2003:11). During the late 1980s, and the beginning of the 1990s there were some initial ideas about a science park at Lindholmen. Chalmers did not pursue the issue, however, as the prerequisites had changed (CU 2004:16).

112 Chalmers has had an interest in a science park for a long time. The fact that the City bought all land changed our plans. When someone could offer something. Land for the establishment of a science park with 15-20 000 people working there, like Kista and Ideon. That changed things completely. It created a platform to do it from. (CU 2004 2004:16)

Current trends indicate that future research will increasingly have to be financed through investments from industry. Chalmers wanted to create an environment that could stimulate collaborations between academia and industry. At the same time NDC needed to create a growth environment to be able to realize the regeneration of Norra Älvstranden (LSP 2003:11). As mentioned previously, to be able to finance the different projects they needed to generate income. “To be able to do that one needs an environment which stimulates economic growth. One needs to create a system for economic growth.” (LSP 2003:11). Together NDC and Chalmers came up with the idea to develop a science park in the area (see picture 6.8). “Göteborg is a small city. We knew that there were thoughts in this direction at Chalmers. You know, you meet on many occasions. Everyone knows everyone.” (LSP 2003:11).

The financial situation of NDC at this time was rather solid and hence they had the potentials to build necessary buildings. There was also political consensus with the City’s leading politicians behind the idea of a science park. What was missing was a strategic instrument that could coordinate the actors’ different activities. “An engine that creates a growth environment.” (LSP 2003:11). Without further investigation, the City and Chalmers formed Lindholmen Sci- ence Park Corporation (LSP32) in August 1999 (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a).

We had to put it on the map immediately, so that it exists as a concept somehow. Then you can talk about it. Then you can think about the direction. It took two months and then we had formed a company. (CU 2004:16)

A Science Park Begins to Take Form Initially, the name of the science park was called Chalmers Lindholmen Science Park (CU 2004:16). This was, however, a sensitive issue for some actors and it was decided that the area of Lindholmen should be promoted, thus Lindhol- men Science Park was decided to be a good name. The first step for LSP, for the City and Chalmers, was to attract more actors. To both the City and Chalmers it was obvious that Göteborg University had to join LSP to broaden the academic competence in the science park. In Sweden universities are run in the form of public authorities (according to the The Administrative Procedure

32 LSP is used when referring to the company. Lindholmen Science Park is used to refer to the actual science park in Lindholmen and the companies that are a part of this cluster.

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Act/Förvaltningslagen and the Higher Education Ordinance/Högskolelagen), Chalmers however is an exception and is run as a foundation. This provides them different possibilities for action. For example, in this case, Chalmers could establish a joint-stock company together with the City of Göteborg (CU 2004:16). Göteborg University, on the other hand cannot form a joint-stock company (GU 2004:17).

If Chalmers had not been a foundation, we would not have Lind- holmen Science Park today. The fact that Chalmers already had an establishment here was decisive. However, of even greater importance was the fact that they are a foundation. (LSP 2003:11)

Picture 6.8: Lindholmen Science Park

Source: Norra Älvstranden Development Corporation

Göteborg University could not formally join the company but still became a part of Lindholmen Science Park, not as an owner, but as a member of the company board (GU 2004:17). According to Göteborg University, they have felt like an equal partner in all discussions except with discussions involving new members of the board, as only the owners are allowed to do that. Some new members from industry have questioned why Göteborg University should

114 be included when they do not pay anything. “It is thanks to Göran Johansson’s [chairman of the city executive board] power that we are there.” (GU 2004:17). Besides the development of Lindholmen Science Park, Chalmers and Göteborg University have collaborated in developing an IT-university at Lindholmen.

LSP argued that IT-companies seldom have resources of their own and hence was not much to lean on, instead LSP wanted to get stability. They held a number of seminars, one that concluded that successful science parks include the major actors. Because of these two reasons LSP turned to Ericsson then Volvo Group and Volvo Car Corporation (CU 2004:16).33 Ericsson was already in talks with the City to move to Lindholmen and their decision to move here gave LSP a strong start (CU 2004:16). “Then the phone started ringing. Sigma called. We want to be in the adjoining house. Then Semcon called etc.” (CU 2004:16). Ericsson’s decision was made just before the IT-crisis hit Sweden. “Ericsson took the decision to move here just before they shut down up there in Stockholm [Ericsson’s head office].” (CU 2004:16). “The IT-crash came just as we had signed contracts for 100 000 m2.” (LSP 2003:11). As a result of Ericsson’s situation, their commitment to Lindholmen decreased. “Ericsson was very strong in the beginning. Then they got into trouble. So we left them in peace to deal with their problems.” (VCC 2004:20). The importance of the different actors has varied during the process.

Chalmers as an actor was much more important than Ericsson. If Ericsson had not come we would have done this anyway but we would have had much slower development. Ericsson accelerated the process. Then when Volvo joined… Today Volvo means more than Ericsson. Volvo is a much more powerful actor. There has been a change. It can change again. It has to do with the state of the market. Our goal has been to be durable. (LSP 2003:11)

Volvo Group and Volvo Car Corporation also joined the board. This was very important for LSP. “There are empty premises everywhere. Empty premises are not an argument. The fact that Volvo moved here meant a lot. It means a lot for people around.” (CU 2004:16). The triple-helix concept, collaboration between academia, industry and society in one place, has a spill over effect for Volvo (VCC 2004:20). To begin with, Volvo does not have to make all the investments themselves. Another benefit is the opportunity to collaborate with other actors within the industry that they might otherwise not have met. In addition, the proximity to Chalmers and Göteborg University is regarded as very important for Volvo, the universities provide a creative environment filled with young people, education and research. The kind of an environment that a science park provides makes it possible for Volvo to attract a workforce that

33 Hereafter Volvo is used to refer to both Volvo Group and Volvo Car Corporation.

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regard this environment as stimulating to work in and Göteborg as an attractive to place in which to live.

Volvo has moved selected parts of their activities to Lindholmen Science Park that they believe can benefit from being in an environment with other competences (VCC 2004:20). For example, electronics and safety which can benefit from being close to Chalmers and as telematics which can benefit from being close to Ericsson. “One should not forget that we already have premises and we don’t have to move. It was selective, we wanted to be precisely there to create surplus value.” (VCC 2004:20).

When Volvo joined, the thought was to create a high-class growth environment, but the direction of activities in the cluster was not fully decided. Erics- son was initially very important since they had a vision to create a cluster. When Volvo joined they became important for providing the cluster with content. Volvo is pleased with their ability to influence the direction in which Lindhol- men Science Park has developed.

We have of course influenced the direction of the science park for our own needs. The City listened very wisely to what we said. I dare to say they listened to us a lot. One should not forget that someone who works at Volvo lives in every staircase in Göteborg. Conse- quently we are a considerably powerful force. (VCC 2004:20)

According to Volvo, to compete in the global arena and to prevent local disso- lution they need to be in a growth environment like Lindholmen Science Park (VCC 2004:20). Volvo Car Corporation has to consider internal competition within Ford. If the Ford group sees that there is a growth environment in Göteborg, where competence is growing, which attracts a skilled workforce, then more jobs will be placed here and the products Volvo produce here will become better and better. “Ford is located in other areas like this. If we don’t create an environment like this we won’t be able to survive here.” (VCC 2004:20). Thanks to Lindholmen Science Park, Volvo believes that they will be stronger within the Ford group.

116 The Board Both academia as well as industry were represented in LSP, and through the City also society. LSP, however, felt a need to be more deeply rooted within society and thus BRG - Business Region Göteborg joined the company.34 The Chairman of NDC became managing director for Lindholmen Science Park. The board members all come from their respective group executive board or industrial management. LSP argued that this is where the power and resources necessary to pursue ideas are located (CU 2004:16). All companies in Lindhol- men Science Park are part owners. The large companies have a member on the board, the smaller companies have a representative (rotating, decided amongst themselves).

LSP has two assets, the trademark ‘Lindholmen Science Park’ and its board (LSP 2003:11). The board gathers some of the actors regarded as most powerful in Göteborg. “Without this board this would have been very hard to accomplish.” (LSP 2003:11). Most of the board members knew each other as well as the networks involved which has made it easier to commit to the process. In Volvo’s opinion, the board has made it very easy to reach consensus (VCC 2004:20), because when making decision, all the actors present could do that without first having to go back to their respective organisation to ask for permission. Because of the composition of the board, LSP is part of regional discussions in Göteborg in different form than other science parks.

This board has become very interesting also from other perspectives, because here executives from the City, academia and industry meet. You can take up the queues on E6 or whatever because that also concerns the growth of the area. Therefore, I have understood from others that this is a very attractive board to be on. One of the most attractive in the city. (CU 2004:16)

The interviewees keep referring back to the importance of the chairman of the city executive board’s personal commitment to Lindholmen Science Park (CU 2004:16, GU 2004:17, LSP 2003:11, S 2004:18). Volvo, for example, never doubted the City’s commitment or was afraid that they would quit because of the chairman of the city executive board’s personal commitment (VCC 2004:20). He has been the areas biggest advocate.

34 The board (2004/2005) consist of: former senior vice president, Volvo Car Corporation; chairman of city executive board, City of Göteborg; local government commissioner, City of Göteborg; regional manager, Ericsson group; senior vice president, Volvo Group; senior vice president, Volvo Car Corporation; deputy principal, Chalmers University of Technology; president, Chalmers University of Technology; head principal Göteborg University; managing director, BRG - Business Region Göteborg; managing director, Teleca AB. Additional members (adjungerade): managing director, Norra Älvstranden Development Corporation; regional manager, Swedish Road Administration.

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It is very important what the chairman of the city executive board thinks in this city. And Lindholmen is his baby. He has been a very strong marketing manager of Lindholmen Science Park. He talks about it all the time, on different occasions. The fact that Göteborg’s strong man says that Lindholmen Science park is important has meant very much. (CU 2004:16)

Agendas and Tensions Pursuing a process like the establishment of a science park has proven not to be an easy task. It has taken time to find a common agenda because tensions between different actors and various agendas are always present. There have been tensions between different political constellations as well as both between and within different constellations at the universities (CU 2004:16, GU 2004:17). Several of the interviewees referred back to tensions between Västra Götaland Region’s agenda and Lindholmen’s (CU 2004:16, GU 2004:17), while both want to create growth in the region, they differ on how this should be achieved. From the perspective of Västra Götaland Region, growth in the whole region should be achieved by efforts made in all of the municipalities. LSP argue that growth has to start in Göteborg and thereafter spread throughout the region.

If Göteborg is not visible on the international map, nothing else will be seen either. It has taken us two years to get Västra Götaland Re- gion to invest here. Those who work here have to realise this complex of problems. They can’t go around saying we don’t care about [province] Dalsland. You have to paint a picture of everyone being in and then in the long run take advantage of that. (CU 2004:16)

Another problem is that the individual agendas of the various actors are always present (CU 2004:16). For some it is, for example, very important to see immediate business impacts. This may be hard for Lindholmen Science Park to fulfil since their goal is to create a cluster with a more long-term perspective. The process has required a number of dedicated people who believe in the realization of Lindholmen Science Park and can keep the process alive as well as sur- mount the obstacles that appear.

Focus Areas There seems to be a common understanding between the actors in LSP on the need to create a growth environment in order to be seen. If the cluster is interesting and large enough, other companies will feel they need to be part of it in order to be aware of what is happening. Then hopefully, Lindholmen Science Park can stop the outmigration of companies from the region and Sweden.

118 LSP started with a rather crude idea of their goal (LSP 2003:11). Through seminars the board developed a direction for Lindholmen Science Park. To create an environment where industry, academia and society can exist and cross-fertilize each other (Genborg 2002a). The starting point was that IT alone would be too limited a focus (LSP 2003:11).

There is no coincidence that you don’t find companies such as Framfab here. There was something else behind the companies that invested here. We did thorough analyses. I mean, it was huge investments for our little company. But of course we wanted to hop on the IT train. (NDC 2004:13)

Instead of only focusing on IT, three different focus areas were agreed upon, providing Lindholmen its own Göteborg profile: intelligent vehicle and transport systems, mobile data communications and modern media (Genborg 2002a, LSP 2003:11). Lindholmen Science Park’s intention is that IT brings together these three by themselves very different industries (media, telecom, vehicle and transport industry) and that new activities and business will be created in the interface (Genborg 2003a).

The Science Park Grows In April 2000, the consultant concern Sigma, with 600 employees, was the first company after Ericsson to sign a contract for moving to Lindholmen Science Park (Genborg 2000a). Technical consultant Semcon soon followed as well as Caran, Epsilon, Hasselblad, Teleca and Volvo Car Corporation and more (see picture 6.9). Lindholmen pier has been named Mobile Valley by Microsoft manager Steve Ballmer (Genborg 2000a).

Picture 6.9: More Companies Join Lindholmen Science Park

Source: Norra Älvstranden Development Corporation

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During the autumn of 2000, Chalmers Innovation was also established in Lind- holmen providing an incubator in the Science Park (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 2001a). The IT-university started in autumn of 2001 with multidisciplinary education, combining technology with economics and social science (Wahlberg 2001:a). The goal was to create a university with six new educational programmes, 4 000 students, a strong research profile and open boundaries towards the humanities, trade and industry (Grahn 1999). “This is really important for strengthening west Sweden’s competitiveness…” according to the chairman of the city executive board (Social Democratic Party) (Grahn 1999:8). Ericsson finances two professorships at the IT University (CU 2004:16, GU 2004:17), and the IT University forms the hub of the growing campus (Stads- byggnadskontoret 2001a) with the goal that companies that establish themselves on Lindholmen shall live in symbiosis with the university world and have direct connections/relations with higher educations within the IT sector (Bytt- ner 2001).

The closeness to the west Swedish car industry and the fact that Sweden is in the forefront of the telecom industry has resulted in the quickly developing telematics industry in the region during the last couple of years (Myrén 2002). Besides Volvo, Ford has chosen to place its development of telematics services in Göteborg. Göteborg is trying to profile themselves as number one in Europe and number three, together with Detroit and Tokyo, among telematics cities in the world (Myrén 2002). Their biggest competitor in Europe is the Stuttgart area. Besides Volvo and Ford, a number of other telematics companies are active in Göteborg such as Mercell, HiQ, Volcano and Vehco. Moreover, an interest organisation called Telematics Valley was established in August 2001 and in 2003 it has 60 companies as members (Telematics Valley 2002). Accord- ing to Telematics Valley, 1 000 people in the Göteborg region work with Telematics in one way or another.

In 2002 Lindholmen Science Park began to plan for a new project called IVTS, Intelligent Vehicle Transport Systems, “a west Swedish demonstration of strength regarding intelligent vehicle and transport systems” (Genborg 2002b:29). The goal is an internationally established centre with research, development and test environments where different technologies are combined to create smart systems. Financing will come from the companies involved, EU’s structural funds, Vinnova (Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems) and Nutek (Swedish Business Development Agency).

By the end of 2002 Ericsson move into the new office with a little more than 1000 employees (see picture 6.10). The building has 52 000 m2 and accommodate 1200 places of work and contains research and laboratory spaces as well as

120 restaurants and conference establishments. In 2003 there were 18 000 people working and living in Lindholmen Science Park (Norra Älvstranden Develop- ment Corporation 2003). When the area is fully developed the goal is 38 000.

Picture 6.10: Ericsson's Building on the Lindholmen Pier

Source: Norra Älvstranden Development Corporation

In the spring of 2003 Lindholmen Science Park applied for 35 million SEK from Vinnova, Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems (Genborg 2003a). An initial planning grant was approved and LSP formulated a concept termed Open Arena which were ideas about providing neutral platforms where various ideas from different actors could cross-fertilize and turn into new ventures. Vinnova did not fund the project, but LSP has pulled together internal resources and the work continues, although not at the same pace (CU 2004:16).

Building construction has proceeded as planned. However, to fill Lindholmen Science Park with content has been going much slower than what was hoped for. The state of the market has worked against us. (VCC 2004:20)

In 2003 Lindholmen Science Park inaugurate the Hub, the only building in the Science Park owned by LSP (see picture 6.11). In this building LSP has its office. Here you can also find for example several companies, conference and

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education facilities, different kinds of services such as restaurants, a travel agent and a bank. This is also where new ventures between academia, industry and society can find premises to start up in.

The Hub will be an operational instrument and shall absolutely be owned by Lindholmen [Science Park Corporation]. Göran Johans- son’s opinion that it should be like that meant that it became like that. It would not become like that otherwise. Then other actors would have come in and it would have become totally commercial. (CU 2004:16)

Picture 6.11: Lindholmen Science Park’s Hub: Navet

Source: Norra Älvstranden Development Corporation

In April 2003, Swedish Television and Swedish Radio turned down an offer to relocate to Lindholmen claiming that it would be too expensive (Boström 2003). This was a setback since they were viewed as a major part of the future media effort at Lindholmen. Both Volvo and Ericsson have been eager to include modern media (NDC 2003:13). Swedish Television and Swedish Radio were supposed to provide a creative environment and attract other actors within media like Ericsson and Volvo have done within their fields (CU 2004:16). Unfortunately they did not have the resources to move. Instead during 2003, design was added to the “third leg” of Lindholmen Science Park, modern media, now called modern media and design (LSP 2003:11). In De-

122 cember 2003, local government arts and cultural amenities presents an official report commissioned by the city council which results in a proposal to establish Göteborg as the leading design city in Scandinavia (Göteborgs kulturförvaltning 2003).

In August 2004, according to LSP, 110 companies are established in Lindhol- men Science Park. Although it has taken a bit longer to get the science park up and running than was initially planned, and although not all desired actors have been able to move in, LSP is nevertheless content with the way Lindholmen Science Park has developed so far (CU 2004:16, LSP 2003:11). Others argue that LSP yet has to prove themselves and their ability to create an environment that stimulates growth and new ventures (S 2004:18, GP 2003:10). They have been criticised for being too broad and not focusing enough on a more limited field.

Some argue that we [LSP] are dissipating our energies and tell us to focus. But all business is so complex, the needs for competence are so complex. Therefore, it is actually not a question of dissipating but instead to gather all the competencies that are needed to conduct business within an area. (CU 2004:16)

Norra Älvstranden and Göteborg Today

Many of the plans in the comprehensive plan over Norra Älvstranden, adopted in 1990, (Stadsbyggnadskontoret 1989) have been implemented. Due to economic fluctuations some developments have taken longer than expected. On the other hand, the goal was never to regenerate the whole are at one time but to develop different parts at different times. In 2001, the city planning authority reported the following results regarding the different areas (Stadsbyggnadskon- toret 2001a:42-44): - Eriksberg: 700 flats built, 500 more underway. Big building projects such as quality hotel 11, Eriksbergshallen, Maskinkajen, Sörhallen, Snickeriet and Kranen have been implemented. Approximately 1.8 billion SEK have been invested so far, planned projects amount to another 1.1 billion SEK. - Sannegården: New flats are being built, almost another 1000 are planned. Building of a shopping centre (Köpcenter Eriksberg) has begun. Overall costs of these projects are estimated at just over 1.7 billion SEK. - Slottsberget: 500 flats have been built. Total investment below 0.5 billion SEK. - Lindholmen: Lindholmen Knowledge Centre has invested in conversion, expansion and construction of new educational facilities, just over 100 000 m2 of floor space. Chalmers University of Technology has built new establishments. 0.7 billion SEK has been invested.

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- LundbyStrand: In this area most of the old buildings have been preserved and converted for new purposes. There are 150 000 m2 of floor space, divided into offices and warehousing. A number of smaller building projects but also some major ones like Idrottshallen (Sports Hall), Citadellet, Tornen, Gothia huset and motorverkstaden M1 have been implemented. Approximatley 0.5 billion SEK of investments.

During the latter part of the 1990s, growth in the Stockholm region was clearly the best in the country (Nordea 2002). The telecom industry, as well as finance, which had its main centres in Stockholm, were doing very well. This has changed now as the telecom sector has evidenced structural problems, the financial sector is not doing as well as before and traditional industry is doing better. Due to traditional industry such as cars, ball bearing and pharmaceutical products and the harbour in Göteborg, West Sweden has not been hit by the last recession as hard as the Stockholm region (Johansson, L 2004, Roos 2003). As a result, in contrast to Stockholm, Göteborg has been able to both maintain its growth and is also expected to increase it during coming years (Nordea 2003). In 2003 and 2004 several articles in different business magazines and newspapers were published describing how Göteborg has managed to go from difficult times during the 1990s to a successful development, surpassing even Stockholm in terms of growth (Johansson, L 2004, Pineus 2003, Roos 2003, Genborg 2003b).

Forget shipyard crisis and heavy industry. Göteborg is heading for a new future, where knowledge intensive small and medium-sized companies will replace the traditional corporations. (Roos 2003:27)

In 2004 Göteborg was bestowed the award for Growth Municipality (“Göte- borg – årets” 2004).35 One of the reasons given was its ability to transform a municipality in structural crisis to a regional and national growth engine. The strategic and innovative efforts on Norra Älvstranden are put forward as an example for new ways to combine industry, higher education, research and attractive housing areas. Göteborg is also acknowledged for its ability to promote collaboration between industry and the public sector as well as between municipalities.

Göteborg is climbing the league of growth. Gone is the picture of an old shipyard and transport city. When the new Göteborg grows it is just like before the much talked about Göteborgsandan that drives the city forward. (Pineus 2003)

35 Growth municipality is a yearly award handed out by Arena for growth, a collaboration between FöreningsSparbanken, the Federation of Swedish County Councils, the Swedish Associa- tion of Local Authorities, ICA and Eurofutures. The award is based on a strong growth regarding the following criteria: positive net migration, a larger decrease of unemployment figures than the national average, and a larger increase of income than the national average.

124 The City has now started to plan the south riverbank. NDC has been given the assignment of developing the area (“Bolag utvecklar” 2004). In an article in the local newspaper several politicians criticise the lack of debate. “It seems like they [other politicians] are waiting for a finished proposal to say yes to.” (Ny- ström 2004:7). The developments of Norra Älvstranden are criticised for resulting in loo little mixed use and integration, mistakes that should not be repeated at the south riverbank. In August 2004 the leaders of the Social Democratic Party (the chairman of the city executive board) and the Moderate Party (municipal commissioner) present a joint vision to make Göteborg the country’s second city with one million inhabitants (Sandberg 2004). According to an article in Sweden‘s largest news paper the two show an astounding consensus regarding construction of housing, education and infrastructure. “For the municipality of Göteborg they do not see any real obstacles for growth.” (Sand- berg 2004:A6).

Conclusions Lindholmen

Lindholmen shows the characteristics of ‘new urban politics’ as described in the first chapter. First of all, Lindholmen Science Park is designed to encourage and promote local growth and economic development. Secondly, the policy is formulated and supported by a diverse array of agencies and institutions within and beyond the public sector. This section will look at what agenda the actors in the case of Lindholmen co-operate around, which actors that collaborate to achieve the capacity to govern and the different forms of power that are present.

Agenda and Governing Coalition The identifying agenda, the policy pursued by the governing coalition, was to create a growth environment that makes Göteborg competitive in a global arena. The actors are joined in the conviction that Göteborg is competing globally whether it comes to attracting citizens, students, researchers, workforce, investments or industries. In order to be attractive you need to be large and interesting enough to be noticed. If this cannot be achieved unilaterally, you need to collaborate with other actors. However, it is not enough to locate a number of actors adjacent to each other; academia, industry and society need to collaborate in providing an environment that has the potential to create growth thus making Göteborg attractive enough for global competition. The creation of a dynamic growth environment, by some actors labelled a cluster and by others referred to as a science park, joined a number of actors with their different individual agendas.

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For the City of Göteborg, Lindholmen Science Park is a tool for accomplishing the City’s agenda of creating growth and establishing Göteborg as a knowledge city. Lindholmen Science Park has the potential to help the city drop its reputation as an industrial city in structural crisis and instead establish Göteborg as a knowledge city with modern and future-oriented industry and, as a result, boost the competitiveness of Göteborg as a business region both nationally and internationally. When it comes to IT as well as science parks, other regions in the country have been considered in the forefront such as Kista in Stockholm and Ideon in Lund. The City regards Lindholmen as Göteborg’s chance to improve its position.

Ericsson and Volvo want to be part of an environment that can strengthen their competitiveness globally. They want to be part of Lindholmen Science Park in order to create a dynamic environment where employees and business activity can be stimulated by proximity to other high tech companies and universities, creating projects and joint ventures. Ericsson wants a nice, clean urban environment that will not only be appreciated by their employees but also impress foreign clients. For Volvo Car Corporation Lindholmen Science Park is important to strengthen their position within the Ford group to which Volvo Car Corporation belong. For Chalmers University of Technology, as well as Göteborg University, a Science Park is an important strategy for strengthening their position in global research and education. To be located in a Science Park and collaborating with industry raises the quality of both education and research which thus increasing the potential for future research funding as well as attracting more students.

Ericsson initially worked with two alternative locations, Mölndal and Mölnly- cke, ”Neither of these two alternatives made the establishment of a cluster possible.” (E 2001:8). In other words the actors were not able to gather round an agenda to give them a shared purpose, which in its turn would motivate engagement and mobilise resources to establish an IT-cluster. Ericsson had also approached Göteborg, which was, initially, not able to offer them any alternative that attracted them. However, when approaching Göteborg the second time, it all came together very quickly. According to the interviewees this was because this time around the right people in the right positions were contacted.

The idea of a science park and Ericsson’s need to relocate coincided. Even though the science park eventually might have happened even if Ericsson never decided to locate in Lindholmen, Ericsson served as a catalyst. Thanks to their cluster demands, thoughts regarding a science park materialised faster. The public administration was offered something concrete and the formal planning process started. Concurrently, the idea of a science park under discussion between Chalmers, NDC and the City was intensified. As the word spread concerning Ericsson’s planned move, companies became interested in Lindholmen.

126 Gothenburg University, Ericsson, Volvo Car Corporation, Volvo Group and BRG joined the discussions regarding a science park and LSP was formed together with the City, Chalmers and NDC.

The identifying agenda was only briefly developed, but still able to attract top politicians and businessmen in the region. The general framing of the issue, the need for economic development and growth for the area, occurred early in the process. Discussing how Lindholmen fit that agenda came later in the process; the process went through several stages, moving from a general goal for the whole region to an increasingly specific proposal for Lindholmen. The process includes a stage where a coalition of actors became strong enough to displace the existing plans of an area with small-scale developments, mixed functions and preservation with an area designed to promote growth and economic development.

Although creating a growth environment at Lindholmen has been an agenda that managed to attract resourceful, powerful actors it has still been a difficult task to manoeuvre the agenda over obstacles and tensions between actors. It has been of crucial importance that the actors in the governing coalition all knew each other well previously and trusted one another regarding honouring commitment.

To govern, a governing coalition must be formed among those actors who have access to and the power to deliver resources - financial, physical, human, and political - of key public and private institutions (Harding 1994). In other words, the agenda is only meaningful if the coalition has resources to act on it. NDC had material resources; the pier and funds, and nonmaterial resources; knowledge on how to manage a planning and development process on Norra Älvstranden as well as access to a comprehensive and well-established network both within the public and private sectors in the region. Through NDC the City’s leading politicians were part of the process. This provided a channel where the process could be politically anchored. Thus, when it was time for the city council to debate and decide on the plan there was already a political majority supporting it.

Chalmers had both experience of and well-developed thoughts on science parks and could provide essential input to the discussions. The fact that Chalmers is run in the form of a foundation instead of a public authority gave them the ability to commit to and invest in the Science Park rapidly (in contrast to Göte- borg University). Having Chalmers and Göteborg University committed to the science park was a resource in itself because it attracted industry. On top of this their collaboration on an IT-University also attracted industry. Ericsson and Volvo are strong names. Merely by announcing they were moving to Lindhol- men other companies decided to relocate to Lindholmen Science Park. Erics

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son had well-developed ideas on a cluster and hence provided input on clusters into the process. Volvo is regarded as one of the most powerful actors in the city and has an extensive network and hence was a resourceful partner to have on board.

In this case, a number of actors have come together to be part of Lindholmen Science Park, such as the City, Chalmers, Göteborg University, Ericsson, Volvo and later BRG, Semcon, Sigma and others. However, the governing coalition refers to the core group who initially came together to accomplish the agenda; in other words, those actors who have been crucial for the creation of Lind- holmen Science Park. Hence, not all of the above mentioned actors are part of the governing coalition. The interviewees were all asked which actors that have been crucial for the creation and establishment of Lindholmen Science Park. The results were consistent: the City (including NDC), Chalmers, Ericsson and Volvo are regarded as the most important actors.

Together these four actors blend resources from academia, industry and the City. Amongst them they have the City’s most powerful politician, an extensive network, two of Sweden’s most important companies, one of Sweden’s top technical universities, different competences and knowledge to put into the creation of a science park, the ownership of the land, a political majority and an agenda attractive enough to not only get themselves to commit to the science park but also get others attracted. Thus, in the case of Lindholmen Science Park the identifying agenda has been able to engage and commit actors, attract resources to be able to act on the agenda and given rise to action. Besides, the specific actors attracted to the agenda have guaranteed broad support both within politics and industry. In short, the stage is set for regime formation.

Forms of Power What is characteristic for the governing coalition is that it consists of actors that are perceived as the most powerful within their respective fields as well as within the city and thus they can all be said to have systemic power. Conse- quently, when they collaborate in LSP, they are looked upon by actors outside the governing coalition (or interests outside Lindholmen Science Park) as a very powerful force. Hence, the governing coalition through its positions in Göte- borg alone can be said to have a certain amount of power.

Systemic power is also present within the governing coalition. For example, although it has been of greatest importance to attract Ericsson and its business to Göteborg, which in turn attract a number of other companies to join Lind- holmen Science Park, it is evident that within the governing coalition Ericsson comes up short of having the same amount of influence as Volvo. Volvo has its roots and its head office in Göteborg whereas Ericsson has its head office and roots in Stockholm. Volvo has a larger number of employees in Göteborg

128 compared to Ericsson. Although Ericsson’s financial troubles at the time put them in weaker position, still, Volvo’s position in the socioeconomic system of Göteborg is stronger than Ericsson’s and consequently Lindholmen Science Park has developed in a direction which accommodates Volvo’s needs.

During the formal planning process it is obvious that systemic power enables Ericsson to influence the process simply through its position in society. Erics- son demanded an IT-cluster and got it. ”Ericsson’s conditioned the development of a cluster.” (CPA 2001:3). The company wanted the City to improve infrastructure and clean up the area, and so the City did. Ericsson wanted to handle the architectural contest themselves and so they did. ”They were allowed to drive the race exactly as they wanted” (CM 2001:1). Ericsson decided the pace of the planning process. ”Ericsson’s board stepped on brakes. They didn’t catch up with our planning.”(CPA 2001:4).

As far as power between the actors is concerned it is relevant to look closer at coalition power. This form of power refers to a relationship between actors who have complementary resources and bargain on the basis of their respective strengths. Trying to dominate would be too costly, therefore the actors move to a more cooperative relationship of negotiation in order to compromise, i.e. coalition building (DiGaetano & Klemanski 1999). However, in order to turn Lindholmen into a successful growth environment, it was recognised from the start that a mixture of actors with different competences, resources and institutional capacities would be needed. LSP was initially created as a tool through which diverse actors such as Chalmers, the City, Ericsson, Volvo and Göteborg University could collaborate to create a growth environment which they could not achieve based only on their own resources. In other words, LSP was built on the notion that you need to blend actors with different resources, stemming from different domains, not because you cannot dominate other actors, but because collaboration is a prerequisite for accomplishing your agenda.

The best way to anticipate success in achieving a governing task in Göteborg was, according to the interviewees, is to have the chairman of the city executive board as your coalition partner. In the case of Lindholmen Science Park, he was not only interested in, but also personally involved with the project and consid- ers it to be crucial as a future growth engine for Göteborg and West Sweden. Through the chairman of the city executive board the governing coalition has on board, the man considered to have most power in the city as well as the ability to get things done. Having him on board gives the idea of a science park weight – within the public administration as well as industry and academia. At one time in the process, when planners at the city planning authority declared their refusal to be part of a process where a building listed in the preservation programmed would be demolished, dominating power was used to achieve

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compliance. The chairman of the city executive board ‘put his foot down’ (ta- lade om var skåpet ska stå). Then they realized there was no sense in making difficulties.” (NDC 2003:13). Consequently, in this case, hierarchy still plays an important role.

The case of Lindholmen Science Park is characterized by the governing coalition having pre-emptive power. This form of power is intentional and active; a group of interests form a coalition capable of achieving a capacity to govern. Pre-emptive power is the capacity to occupy, hold and make use of a strategic position through fusing command and systemic power. This enables a coalition to control policy setting as they hold a strategic position in the governing process. As a result those who acquire pre-emptive power can direct policy setting and discourage potential opposition to their policy agenda by making challenges far too costly to attempt. The combination of actors within the governing coalition results in pre-emptive power. The coalition members include the chairman of the city executive board, who is considered to be the city’s strong man, representatives at the level of Senior Vice President from three of the most important employers in the city as well as representatives at the level of President and Head Principal from the two universities. The combination of these actors is perceived, by actors outside the coalition, as a sheer manifestation of power.

In this particular process the governing coalition seems so strong and their network so widespread through out the community that any attempt to challenge the governing coalition would be hard. From regime theory we learn that to be able to influence, you have to form a governing coalition strong enough to shake the current coalition or become a member of the governing coalition and influence it from within. Several of the interviewees mention the impossibility of trying to influence the outcome of the process because of what they perceive as a powerful combination of actors. It discourages them even to try to find allies with whom to ‘join forces. The City museum has not found other interests to join forces with ”Not when it comes to Lindholmen pier. There we have been alone.” (CM 2001:1) and to join forces ”I have nobody to turn to”. To conduct their own alternative investigation on the prospects of keeping the quay shed 178 was out of the question they did not have those kinds of resources.

The fact that the governing coalition has employed systemic power has decreased the need for command power. That is, the actors in the governing coalition are perceived by others to be so resourceful and important in the socioeconomic system in Göteborg that other actors feel a need to be accommodating to the agenda of the governing coalition. In addition, the fact that the governing coalition employs pre-emptive power makes it very hard and costly for interests who have not already been discouraged by systemic power to chal

130 lenge the governing coalition. To create an alternative governing coalition or change the current one from within is regarded as too difficult even to be a feasible alternative. In the end the employment of pre-emptive power or power to decreased the need for power over.

Göteborg is currently enjoying praise as a growth engine for west Sweden. Lindholmen is promoted as a successful science park in the knowledge city of Göteborg. As compared to other Swedish cities, Göteborg is also enjoying praise for its efforts as an event city, as manifested for example in strong growth of commercial guest nights per year (Bergroth 2003). At the same time critical voices are raised regarding financial priorities made by the City (events and growth before welfare), values prioritised by the City (market values before preservation) and the way in which politics is carried out (in tight networks, behind closed doors rather than in public debates). Arguably, the process of Lindholmen is characterized by a wish to create growth, a priority of market values over preservation and a governing coalition consisting of powerful actors within the local political elite, local industry and academia.

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132 Chapter 7

Urban Planning and Governance Between Efficiency and Democracy

This concluding chapter analyses and draws conclusions on governance, planning and democracy. To begin with it is concluded that both governance and government are present and needed in the Lindholmen case. Pre-emptive power and well-established networks are examined as mechanisms of inclusion as well as exclusion. After this follows a discussion on the implications that governance and government had in the Lindholmen case and how the formal planning process could be changed to face these challenges without sacrificing the role of government as a true representative of the citizens. Last is a discussion on what this case really comes down to, namely, the fact that planning and policy processes continuously have to balance values of democracy and efficiency. The potential of creating growth may lead to a process which prioritizes meeting market demands rather than safeguarding democratic values. Whether or not one sees this as a problem depends on ones preferences regarding democracy.

Governance and Government

A number of actors and considerations have been involved in the development of Lindholmen (see table 7.1). Previous plans for an area with housing, preservation of a quay shed and park area were disregarded as a coalition of actors from academia, industry and the City put forward plans for a cluster, or a science park, with a major potential for growth creation. Stakeholders promoting preservation and environmental concerns were unable to make themselves heard or influence the process.

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Table 7.1: Lindholmen Science Park – Actors and Considerations

Lindholmen Science Park

Governing coalition ('power to' Actors fully or partly disregarded: partners): • City Museum • Chalmers • Cultural committee • Ericsson • Park and nature committee • The City of Göteborg • County board • Volvo Car Corporation, • Neighbourhood council Volvo Group • Individual citizens Coalition partners joining in: • Gothenburg University • BRG – Business Region Göteborg

Considerations regarded: Considerations fully or partly disre- • Cluster with 10 000 work- garded: places • Desirability of mixed use • Infrastructure improve- • Historical preservation ments • Housing • Tidy up the area • Parks

An interesting point made by regime theorists is that if the governing coalition is regarded as strong and powerful by actors with conflicting interests and agendas, they might not even attempt to influence the process. Through hold- ing strategic positions in the policy process as well as being able to aggregate enough resources to achieve these positions the governing coalition has a policy-setting role and a capacity to govern. The challenging group thus faces the tasks of both bearing the cost of opposition but also having to form an alternative set of governing arrangements (Stone 1988). Hence, mounting opposition is not enough; instead the challenging group must either reconstitute the policy- setting coalition or become part of the existing one.

This line of argument leads to several observations in the case of Lindholmen. One might think that regenerating an area such as Lindholmen, transforming a brownfield area into a new city district, would interest a large number of stakeholders. Consequently a number of actors would have become involved in the process in an attempt to influence the outcome. However, I have only been able to identify a limited number of actors and considerations that were disregarded (see table 7.1). These include actors identified through public documen-

134 tations, interviews and debate articles such as the City Museum, the cultural committee, the park and nature committee, the county board, the city district council and four individual citizens who have written debate articles or offered written considerations during the public consultation phase.

One possible reason for not being able to identify other disregarded actors is that there simply are none. The citizens of Göteborg may simply have been pleased to have something happening to this area. In addition, the pier, as well as most immediate surroundings, was a brownfield site. Hence the number of stakeholders at the actual location was limited, which usually decreases the number of opinions regarding future developments.

However, regime theory’s pre-emptive power puts the focus on another possibility; actors might have been discouraged from even trying to challenge the governing coalition as they perceive it as too resourceful and powerful. An oppositional group might also perceive the possibility of joining the governing coalition and change it from within as impossible at the same time, as there was a lack of potential coalition partners with whom to form a challenging coalition. The city may simply be too small and existing networks too well established to find potential coalition partners with sufficient complementary resources to be able to bring together a challenging coalition capable of exercising the policy- setting role. A lack of public debate might also make it difficult to identify potential partners.

New actors may also have been excluded from even being considered for the governing coalition because of the vital importance of prior networking, knowledge of each other and trust existing in the current governing coalition; these networks, their previous knowledge of and trust for each other among the members in the governing coalition served both as mechanisms of inclusion as well as exclusion.

In recent years two rankings have been published of the most powerful people in Göteborg. These rankings are based on how powerful certain actors in Göteborg are perceived to be, in other words they are based on the actor’s reputation as being powerful. The value and accuracy of this kind of listings can be questioned. However, the fact that a person has a reputation of being powerful can in itself be a political resource.

As a means of determining where power lies, the reputational approach is useless. As one means of generating an initial sampling frame, however, it may have its applications, for ... reputed influence can itself be a significant political resource. In other words, people may defer to those whom they believe to be powerful (hence the concept of anticipated reactions), and this provides good grounds for retaining a reputational approach in any study. (Saunders 1980:330)

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The local newspaper Göteborgs-Posten listed the twenty most powerful people in Göteborg in 2001 (Kristiansson 2001). Weekly business magazine Veckans Affärer listed the thirty most powerful people in the region in 2003 (Björnelid 2003). Although Göteborgs-Posten’s are more oriented towards politics and Veckans Affärer’s more towards industry, six of the twenty most powerful from each list are identical: chairman of the city executive board, CEO Volvo Group, editor Göteborgs-Posten (GP) and main owner the GP group, president Chalmers, CEO West Swedish Chamber of Commerce, CEO the Framtiden Group. When comparing the two lists with the actors involved in Lindholmen Science Park the following actors concur: the City, Chalmers, Göteborg Uni- versity, Volvo Car Corporation, Volvo Group and BRG. Ericsson is included on the list of the chairman of the city executive board’s industry network along with Volvo Car Corporation and Volvo Group (Ericson 2003).

Based on my Lindholmen study it is not possible to make a regime analysis in the same sense as did Clarence Stone in the case of Atlanta. That study spanned several policy areas over four decades with nearly a hundred interviewees. The focus is narrower in this dissertation. However, some regime indications are evident. Through interviews and newspaper articles a concordant picture un- folds. In Göteborg there are close relations in the city between leading politicians, industry and academia. The same names reoccur in interviews as well as articles and networks seem to be well established. The focus is on creating growth in the region and hence policies aiming at growth are given priority. “We built networks earlier than others. Some call it the Göteborg spirit.” (Jo- hansson, L 2004:3) says the chairman of the city executive board in an interview when asked to explain the growth in the region. What he refers to as specific in Göteborg is flexibility, short decision channels and close cooperation between the city, the university, Chalmers and the industry.

In short, politics in Göteborg is about well-established networks, official mutual understandings and quick decisions. According to the informants the networks in post-industrial Göteborg have become more dispersed than the networks during the industrial era which, are described as very rigid. Today growth policies are given priority. Göteborg is now a post-industrial city having the characteristics of an entrepreneurial city; the pursuit of local economic development policies and a multiplicity of actors and interests influencing urban policies and politics. However, the multiplicity of actors influencing urban policies seems to be a rather well established group of actors from the City, industry and academia. Thus, although several actors govern the city, these form a rather consistent group, a regime (see figure 7.1). Local growth policies are pursued in such an efficient way that opposition is discouraged from being organized.

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Creating Growth in the region

Regime Leading local politicians, industry and academia

Governing Coalition Chalmers University of Technology, the City of Göteborg, Ericson Mobile Data Design, Volvo Car Corporation and Volvo Group

Creating Lindholmen Science Park A growth environment where academia, industry and society crossfertilize one another

Figure 7.1: Regime in Göteborg and Governing Coalition in Lindholmen

The voluntary sector, usually included in the governance concept along with the public and private sectors, has not been involved in the Lindholmen process. Neither have women, as a group, to any larger extent. The fact that Göteborg is at times accused of being governed by ‘greybeards’ (gubbvälde) does not seem so far fetched when you look at the two above mentioned listings. Göteborgs- Posten’s ranking of the twenty most powerful people in Göteborg includes only two women (Kristiansson 2001). Looking at the weekly business magazine Veckans Affärer’s ranking of the thirty most powerful people in the region, also here only two are women (Björnelid 2003). Interestingly enough these are not the same two women; a benevolent interpretation can thus be that Göteborg has four ‘powerful’ women.

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Among my interviewees there are no women. During my studies of public documents, newspaper and journal articles as well as interviews, only males have been identified as crucial actors in the Lindholmen process. Even though women have participated, at a lower level in the hierarchy, it is remarkable that the creation of Lindholmen Science Park, considered to be a crucial environment for the future growth of Göteborg, has failed to include women in this venture. This is true especially since it is based on the understanding that different kinds of competences and resources need to collaborate in order for Lind- holmen Science Park to become the kind of growth environment envisioned.

The agenda of Lindholmen fits well with the locality wide agenda of creating growth in the region. The actors in the governing coalition of Lindholmen coincide with actors identified as part of a well-established and powerful network in the city. In figure 7.1 we can see that the policy pursued at Lindholmen is in line with the agenda pursued at the locality wide arena. In addition, the constellation of actors pursuing the agenda at Lindholmen is also part of the regime. This offers an indication of how powerful other interests and stakeholders in the locality have perceived the process to be and shows the limits of their potential influence.

Based on this case study of Lindholmen I would argue that governance, or governing across levels and sectors within the private and public sector, is not something new in Göteborg, rather it is an old tradition deeply rooted in the history of the city. Well-established networks which work to achieve a governing task date further back than the current fad of governance. The Swedish tradition of a strong local government as well as cooperation between various constellations of actors at the local level – leading politicians, union representatives, factory owners and so on – have provided fertile ground for governance arrangements.

Contrary to what some governance scholars proclaim, local government has not lost its capacity to achieve a governing task. However, at times, new ways of working are needed to keep the capacity to govern. When the political decision to develop Norra Älvstranden was taken, the City did not have the financial means to develop the area; at the same time, they did not want to leave it up to shortsighted market interests to control the process. Therefore a public company, NDC, was created which financed the development through surplus value created by previous developments. The public company also met demands from private companies of fast, efficient planning processes by coordinating public administration. In addition, the City established a company together with academia and industry, Lindholmen Science Park Corporation, in order to create a growth environment. Instead of providing us with a theoretical framework that puts focus on something new governance provides a framework to study changes in the ways government seeks to govern.

138 The governance literature has its focus more on networks and other alternatives to hierarchy. One danger is that important situations in which hierarchy continues to play a part are left out. At one point in the Lindholmen process, the chairman of the city executive board intervened with the city planning authority when they wanted to go against the wishes of a private company. It was made clear to the city planning authority that they had no alternative other than to accommodate these wishes even though they disregarded the Conservation Programme for Socially Historically Valuable Buildings.

Networks People within academia, culture, industry, media, politics, sports, tourism, unions etc

Urban Regime VIPs from the City, industry and academia

Governing Coalition Chalmers University of Technology, the City, Ericson Mobile Data Design, Volvo Car Corporation and Volvo Group

Public Private Partnership Lindholmen Science Park Corporation

Figure 7.2: Governance in Göteborg from the Perspective of Lindholmen Science Park

Governance concepts such as network, urban regimes, governing coalition and public private partnerships were described in general terms in chapter three. Figure 7.2 summarizes what the concepts correspond to in the context of Lindholmen and Göteborg. Göteborg today cannot be described as a traditional industrial community where the local government boss governs together with the local foundry proprietor. The city is more like a modern governance

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version of a traditional industrial community. The chairman of the city executive board, the facilitator, governs together with actors from industry and academia, hence more actors are involved in politics and power is being dispersed. However, although several actors are governing the city, these form a rather cohesive group. Other actors in the local community perceive this regime as very powerful. There are reasons to consider if the multiplicities of interests that are supposed to get access to the political arena, in the best of governance- worlds, are not instead discouraged by the pre-emptive power that the regime holds. The governance process of Lindholmen cannot be seen as a new channel for different citizen groups to influence policy-making. It has rather strength- ened the power of the already established elite.

Governance and Planning

The developments on Norra Älvstranden have enjoyed a lot of attention and appraisal in the media. Although some critical voices have been raised regarding the lack of mixed use and integration. According to NDC the developments on Norra Älvstranden has been the first time Göteborg has been able to integrate physical and economic planning (Caldenby 2003). Öhrström (2004) concludes that a revised model for planning and development, which served both as a tool for enabling corporate strategies and as an institutional structure for urban regeneration was put into practice in Lindholmen. A number of observations regarding planning can also be made based on this study of Lindholmen.

The quality of place is of crucial importance for a private investor. In this case, Ericsson made it very clear the kind of environment in which they wanted to be located – they wanted an attractive, tidy, urban environment close to the city centre and university where a cluster could be created. Göteborg was close to losing Ericsson to another municipality because they could not offer a location that met the requirements Ericsson was looking for. In other words, if a municipality wants to attract a private company it is important to find out their preferences regarding the quality of place as well as their agenda.

Planning is often blamed for ‘taking too long’. The Lindholmen case however has showed that the planning process can work according to schedule. In this case the process had to await the much slower than predicted internal decision- making process of the private company.

Both public administration and private companies describe the planning and development of Lindholmen as a learning process. For example both Ericsson as well as the city planning authority confess to having had stereotypical images of each other coming into this process, which during the process, were proven wrong. Ericsson was impressed with how efficient public administration was in

140 accommodating their needs and the city planning authority was impressed with the interest Ericsson showed in the urban environment.

In the Lindholmen case the role of the formal planning process was to make an agreement between the City and a private company legal and legitimate. The role of the city and planning authority was reduced to providing input to public company NDC that was given the leading role in the process. Through the public company, financial stability was provided to the regeneration process of Norra Älvstranden which made it possible to survive two recessions. The public company also coordinated public administration which resulted in a capacity to conduct a formal planning process faster than before.

Lindholmen Science Park was planned and created in collaboration with academia and industry. Through compatible agendas, a window of opportunity emerged, which through a rather fast process resulted in a science park. The opportunity to create growth in the region was in line with the will of the political leadership and regarded to be of such importance that the current comprehensive plan adopted in 1990 carried little weight. When Norra Älvstranden was planned it was based on a vision which the citizens of Göteborg had participated in formulating. Consequently expectations on the comprehensive plans can be assumed to be high, and, if not followed, this might create feelings of disappointment and result in problems of legitimacy.

In the late 1980s when work on the comprehensive plan was carried out, little could be known about the events in the late 1990s that would result in Lind- holmen Science Park. Changes in society are hard to predict. At the same time municipalities feel a need to act when opportunities arise. This need to ‘seize the opportunity’ becomes even more relevant in situations when structural changes in society impact on the general conditions for planning, and in situations when private actors are engaged in the planning process. Consequently, the goal of comprehensive planning may need to be rethought. If comprehensive planning was focused on overall development and welfare objectives in the form of guidelines or principles, they may prove to be more flexible towards changing conditions. If comprehensive plans stayed clear from stating specific uses of limited areas (such as a pier) and instead stated how we would like the whole area to develop in the future (with alternative scenarios), they may prove to be more sustainable.

Another suggestion is to rethink the role of the comprehensive plan. Rather than seeing it as a ‘plan’, it could be viewed as an ongoing activity in which updates and revisions are incorporated to reflect changes in society and an ongoing dialogue with citizens and other stakeholders. This will build up an up- dated knowledge regarding needs and wishes of the local community.

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In the Lindholmen case it is clear that once the City and Ericsson started to talk the possibilities of influencing the outcome of the process decreased quickly. Hence, realistically, participation during the detailed development plan process cannot be expected to be more ambitious than providing stakeholders a legal opportunity to object to the developments. Therefore it is important that the public participation efforts are most ambitious during the comprehensive planning and very clear that the public understands what they can expect from their participation.

The planners at the city planning authority have experienced the process as more closed with a private actor participating. For example, Ericsson hosted the architectural competition and picked the jury. But the planners were not allowed to see the different contributions only the director of the city planning authority. At one point in the process, the chairman of the city executive board brought the city planning authority to reason when they wanted to go against Ericsson’s wishes and as a consequence NDC was made the hub of the formal planning process. Thus, the role as a public planner as well as for the city planning authority is likely to change when strong private companies are involved. In this particular case the process was coordinated by NDC and sketches were provided done in collaboration with NDC. However during a comprehensive planning process as described above, which involves working on guidelines for future developments, the city planning authority could have a central, active role as a facilitator in the continuous dialogue in the local community as well as experts on translating this into plans. It would be the responsibility of the city planning authority to continuously revise comprehensive planning, give the process continuity and safeguard the general interest.

Governance Between Democracy and Efficiency

In the case study of Lindholmen quite a few interviewees brought up the public debate climate in Göteborg; they felt that discussions within and between the political parties were held behind closed doors, before official meetings such as city council, in order to be able to show a united front. An official at the city planning authority comments on the demolition of the quay shed 178. ”It went pretty smooth and clean in the city council. One could have expected more discussion.” (CPA 2001:5). Another official at the city planning authority comments: ”178 was the key question. I can imagine that someone has spoken to the culture commission not to make waves.” (CPA 2001:3). An official at the City Museum says: “It doesn’t make much difference what we think and like. It has been like this always. The democratic process in Göteborg is illusory. Too much has been done through individual contacts with politicians.” (CM 2001:1).

142 The Lindholmen case to some extent resembles other cases of planning de- bated in local media (referred to in the section ‘Local Debates on Urban Plan- ning’, chapter five). In these cases citizens feel that culturally and historically valuable buildings have not been properly valued. Also there is a perception that the decisions are already taken before the formal planning process takes place. Instead the formal planning process becomes a process of making prior agreements legitimate and legal. Hence, all opinions raised during the formal process are counter argued with arguments that are derived from these agreements. The prior agreements can, of course, be invalidated if the municipal decision would conflict with the prior agreement. However, the leading men of the Social Democratic and Moderate parties (during the period of this study) often agreed on growth projects for the city and their respective party groups voted accordingly and achieved a majority. This adds to the feeling that agreements made prior to the debate in the city council between leading politicians and industry will hold. In reality the actors behind the prior agreement are perceived as too powerful for anyone to be able to influence the outcome. This creates a feeling of frustration and of ‘pretend democracy’ amongst citizens. These feelings, lack of transparency, public control and a fair democratic process, can result in problems of legitimacy and discontent.

Without a strong debate climate, it might be hard to find other actors with similar interests or find new networks to be part of in an attempt to become a challenging coalition. It might also mean that there are well-established networks or a regime in the city where the debates are held behind closed doors. There are, of course, always debates in the community outside of the public arena (to a greater or less extent), but it becomes a democratic problem if citizens feel that politics is carried out behind closed doors. It can be difficult for citizens and the media to keep themselves informed of and be able to scrutinize local politics. This may lead to problems of legitimacy, accountability and also a lack of interest about local politics among citizens. Another problem with political discussions and debates held behind closed doors is that political opposition might have difficulties showing the voters that they are an alternative.

From the case study it is clear that the demands of a private company, put forward before the formal planning process started, locks the outcome of the formal planning process beforehand. The demands of the private actor become the arguments the city planning authority use against any opposition put foreword during the public consultation. Besides the public consultation required by law, another citizen participation effort was made. For several months, a model of the proposal was put on public display, with planners present so citizens could present their opinions. However, in reality the possibility of taking these opinions into account was very limited since Ericsson’s demand of ten thousand workplaces was deciding the outcome of the process. Hence, the formal planning process was proceeded buy an informal process that was cru-

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cial for the outcome of the formal process. Prior agreements between the City and a private actor, in practice, locked in the outcome of the process.

Public company NDC has served as an efficient instrument for regenerating and privatising Norra Älvstranden. None of their staff comes from public administration; instead they are all from the private sector. The company is praised by private companies for being very businesslike, professional and sensitive to the demands of the private companies. The company was given the leading role by the chairman of the city executive board in the Lindholmen process because it was viewed as sensitive to private interests. The company was, in other words, created to strengthen the institutional capacity of the City and to accommodate market needs more efficiently.

It is currently argued that we are going though a reinterpretation of democracy where being included in process and participation (delaktighet och deltagande) are toned down while focus is shifted towards the ability to take action (han- dlingskraft) and issues of efficacy (effektivitet) (Jacobsson 1998). The focus of democracy has shifted towards possibilities to pursue policy aimed at results at the expense of citizen’s influence and control of political power. Following Lundquist (1999, 2001) in his critical examination of current debates and practices in Swedish politics, there is a strong tendency to enlarge the liberal concept of democracy not only to include constitutionalism and citizen power, but also to include the ability to take action or efficacy. Lundquist sees a risk with this, namely that constitutionalism and citizen power are forced to stand back in the name of efficacy. He strongly opposes the trend to include the ability to take action, i.e. efficacy, into the concept of democracy. The power to act, to be efficient, often runs against participatory democratic activities (Giljam 2003), making it even more important not to include efficacy as a value defining democracy.

An important objective for Göteborg is to create growth - in order to attract investments, a highly qualified workforce and prevent capital flight - as well as creating visible results. If growth is created, the City will attract both people and companies and hence increase the City’s income and citizen’s welfare. Further there is a need to create visible results, a feeling that a lot is happening in Göte- borg, in order to demonstrate that your politics are effective and thus hopefully, lead to re-election. There is a need to legitimize the methods by which you are governing, and the values that you are prioritizing. These values are more in- clined to satisfy the needs of private companies rather than being a result of ensuring the process is a democratic one which reflects citizen’s values. A substance democracy, which emphasis the substance of the decision, is prioritized before a process democracy, which emphasizes the democratic procedure by which the decision is taken. This is very much in line with the observations made in Ek et al.’s (2002) investigation (chapter five), which concluded that the

144 inhabitants of Göteborg were discontent with the city’s politicians. But, at the same time, liked the fact that so many things were accomplished in the city.

The City of Göteborg, at a time when municipalities are described as less capable of action, has been able to achieve a capacity to govern and get things done. The political leadership has had a strong hold of the developments on Norra Älvstranden and Lindholmen and their efforts to create growth in the region has paid off. The citizens of Göteborg are pleased by the fact that ‘things are happening’ in their city. Whether or not you regard the Lindholmen process as problematic from a perspective of democracy depends on which democratic ideal you adhere to.

Democracy has always been a contested concept in politics as well as in the social sciences (Held 1987). It is often conceptualized in terms of different models. Held (1987), for example, identifies as many as nine different models of democracy. Although the literature displays a rich variety of definitions and models of democracy, three are more common than others, i.e. representative, participatory, and deliberative democracy.

Representative democracy36 gathers ideals of democracy which emphasize the importance of reoccurring elections between alternative representatives. Citizens influence politics by voting on political parties and politicians. Between elections, decision-making is made by the representatives. Although the representatives listen to public opinion and motivate their decisions between elections, this model, in principal, excludes influence from citizens between elections. Key concepts for representative democracy are representation through accountability and representation through mandate (Gilljam & Hermansson 2003).

Participatory democracy37 on the other hand is distinguished by the fact that citizens are active in politics not only to elect their representatives but also to participate in decision-making when possible. Participatory democracy involves two kinds of activities (Gilljam & Hermansson 2003). The first is participation as an attempt to influence, i.e. citizens bring forward their opinions to the political decision makers through activities such as lists of signatures, demonstra- tions and other actions. The second is direct democratic participation, i.e. citizens making their own decisions through local user boards, neighbourhood

36 For literature on representative democracy see for example Held (1987) and Schumpeter (1992). 37 For literature on participatory democracy see for example Rousseau (1994), Mill (1972) and Pateman (1970).

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associations and referendums. The participatory democracy ideal demands politically active and committed citizens who also take political responsibility between elections. The idea is that democratic participation will also increase peo- ples’ political self-esteem, their faith in the system and their sense of the public interest.

Deliberative democracy38 refers to an all-inclusive decision-making by means of rational arguments, i.e. ‘talk as a democratic tool’ (Larsson 2000). In an ideal deliberative process the arguments of all concerned parties should be considered for discussion. The actors involved have to separate themselves from self- interest and not exert power over others (Granberg 2004). Open discussion are held amongst equal actors who are open to rational arguments and are prepared to change their preferences and conceptions, thereby increasing the chance for broadly accepted solutions and consensus. By considering all stakeholders arguments during the discussion, political processes become legitimate. Compar- ing different approaches to deliberative democracy Jon Elster (1998) concludes:

There is a robust core of phenomena that counts as deliberative democracy in all of them. All agree, I think, that the notion includes collective decision making with the participation of all who will be affected by the decision or their representatives: this is the democratic part. Also, all agree that it includes decision making by means of arguments offered by and to participants who are committed to the values of rationality and impartiality: this is the deliberative part. (El- ster 1998:8)

Consequently, depending on which of the three models of democracy one takes as a point of evaluation, outcomes will differ. In terms of representative democracy the Lindholmen process meets the ideals of a democratic process since the political representatives were given a mandate to act through the local elections and will be held responsible at the next election. In terms of participatory democracy, citizens were given a chance to state their opinion during the public consultation, although few citizens used this possibility and their actual ability to influence was limited. Also, there was no direct democratic participation. Fi- nally, in terms of deliberative democracy the possibilities for an all-inclusive decision-making by means of rational argument were, in the Lindholmen case, limited to the governing coalition.

Arguably, the deliberative ideal of democracy should be strived for in all democratic processes. However, when it comes to the level of detailed development planning, often including profit maximising stakeholders seeking a fast and efficient process, it is unrealistic to expect a process based in deliberative democracy. Therefore it becomes even more important to increase efforts at

38 For literature on deliberative democracy see for example Bohman & Rehg Eds. (1997) and Elster (1998).

146 the level of comprehensive planning to create a deliberative process. Educating planners and other process leaders in what is needed to create an open discussion amongst equal actors, and informing citizens and various stakeholders about the benefits of such a process is a necessary starting point. The rules of the game, that is, how the process will be carried out and what the participants can expect from it, must be made very clear in order to stimulate participation and create realistic expectations. A process based on the ideals of deliberative democracy could serve as a process of learning, where public, private and voluntary sector stakeholders increase their knowledge about the locality and where they can learn to trust one another. This may create an atmosphere that spills over to other political processes in the community, thus approaching an urban political process characterised by legitimacy, efficiency and real opportunities for influence.

The three models all include important values of democracy, although they emphasise them differently. However, in real life democracy rarely manifests itself in terms of one particular “model”. Therefore, when talking about democracy constructively, instead of focusing upon one model of democracy I would like to advocate an approach focusing upon certain values that are more or less visible in most models. More specifically, I would recommend constructing a checklist consisting of values that are conducive to retaining democratic legitimacy when building institutional capacity for decision-making and planning: i.e. values like participation, deliberation, transparency and accountability.

Participation – what kind of participation opportunities are available for citizens? Are these equally available to all groups? Deliberation – does the process provide opportunities for open discussion? Are arguments of all concerned parties considered before decisions are taken? Transparency – is the process open regarding access to information? Is the information accessible and understandable to all citizens? Accountability – is it clear who is to be held accountable for the outcome of the process?

This checklist should be included in formal planning processes, i.e. democratic values should be considered in the beginning of the process and later accounted for in the documentation. Of course such a checklist is a long way from dealing with power structures and fighting forces originating in the transnational economy. However, if one has to argue for the priority given to each of these values in the planning process the checklist could at least serve as a tool for making planning more democratic. It could also be a guideline for politicians and government officials when navigating in the fragmented world of governance. As argued by Lundquist (1998), when politics and public management are increasingly focused upon economic values, civil servants should not only be “servants” of democracy but also guardians of democracy.

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How do planners act in situations where values of efficiency and democracy are at stake? What kind of decisions do they make on what grounds? How could planning develop in order to provide plans which are flexible enough to fit current as well as coming needs and demands in society? What should a deliberative planning process look like more in detail? Arguably, these and related questions should be high on the agenda of future planning research.

Unfortunately, the discourse on planning and democracy often ends up in a deadlock between representative and participatory democratic ideals. Listening to the arguments coming from the proponents of deliberative democracy may open new opportunities for planning as well as for policymaking in general. Planning in Sweden today faces the challenge of how to balance demands of market efficiency with the need to allow time for democratic processes in order to secure legitimacy, transparency and accountability. This is a choice that should be reflected upon in all planning processes.

148 149

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Interviews To safe guard the anonymity of the different people that have been interviewed no names are given explicitly. At the same time it is essential to account for the different interviews as correct and clearly as possible. To be able to do that the coding system indicated below is applied in the text. For example CPA 2003:6 refers to an interview made December 10 2003 with someone working at the city planning authority. By using this coding system the anonymity of the interviewees are protected but in the collection and analysis of the material the iden- tities have been clear. City Museum (CM): 2001-11-07 (1) CM 2001:1 2003-12-10 (2) CM 2003:2 City planning authority (CPA): 2001-05-31 (3) CPA 2001:3 2001-06-13 (4) CPA 2001:4 2001-11-08 (5) CPA 2001:5 2003-12-10 (6) CPA 2003:6 2003-12-15 (7) CPA 2003:7 Ericsson Mobile Data Design/Ericsson (E): 2001-11-08 (8) E 2001:8 2003-12-02 (9) E 2003:9 Göteborgs-Posten (GP): 2003-12-10 (10) GP 2003:10 Lindholmen Science Park (LSP): 2003-12-11 (11) LSP 2003:11 Norra Älvstranden Development Corporation (NDC): 2001-11-13 (12) NDC 2001:12 2003-12-11 (13) NDC 2003:13 2003-12-11 (14) NDC 2003:14 Traffic & Public Transport Authority (TPTA): 2003-12-10 (15) TPTA 2003:15 Chalmers University of Technology (CU): 2004-04-27 CU 2004:16 Göteborg University (GU): 2004-04-27 GU 2004:17 Social Democratic Party (S): 2004-05-06 S 2004:18 Moderate Party (M): 2004-05-24 M 2004:19 Volvo Car Corporation (VCC): 2004-05-24 VCC 2004:20

166 Appendix A: Interests and Actors Related to the Case Study BRG - Business Region Göteborg: www.businessregion.se Public company responsible for developing and promoting trade and industry in the Göteborg region. Chalmers Lindholmen: www.chl.chalmers.se A university college within Chalmers focusing on industrial research and training with responsibility for BScEng, BSc and nautical programmes as well as the engineering foundation programmes. The school is situated on Norra Älvstranden in Göteborg. Here you find almost 2 200 students. Chalmers University of Technology: www.chalmers.se Chalmers University of Technology was founded in 1829 following a private donation. Chalmers became an independent foundation on July 1, 1994. Around 13,100 people work and study at Chalmers, including more than 10,500 undergraduates. Ericsson Mobile Data Design AB: www.ericsson.com The company, which develops mobile data systems, is today merged with the Ericson group. Eriksberg Management Corporation (Eriksbergs Förvaltnings AB) State owned company formed by Swedyard Corp. responsible for administration and development of the land, buildings and facilities at the former Eriksberg shipyards on Norra Älvstranden. Göteborg University: www.gu.se Göteborg University was established in 1891 with the help of private donations. There are approximately 70 departments at the university which has over 40 000 students and a staff of over four thousand. Lindholmen Development Corporation (Lindholmen Utvecklings AB) Public company responsible for developing Lindholmen. In 2000 Lindhol- men Development Corporation was merged with Lindholmen Science Park. Lindholmen Science Park Corporation (LSP): www.lindholmen.se Company established in 1999, owned by the City of Göteborg, Chalmers University of Technology, Göteborg University, Ericsson group, Volvo Group, Volvo Car Corporation, Caran, Semcon, Sigma, Epsilon and Teleca. Lindholmen Science Park Corporation owns the trademark and is responsible for developing the cluster at Lindholmen. The three main areas of expertise in the cluster are: mobile data communications, intelligent vehicles, and transport systems and media and design. Norra Älvstranden Development Corporation (NDC): www.alvstranden.com Public company owned by the City. The company’s role is to serve as a catalyst in the planning and development of Norra Älvstranden (The North

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Riverbank). The board of the company consists of the City’s leading politicians, both from the ruling parties as well as the opposition. Project Lindholmen Corporation (Projekt Lindholmen AB) Originally (1978) a joint company between the municipality and state aimed at converting Lindholmen’s former shipyard to training and research facilities. In 1981 the City of Göteborg became the sole owner of the company which amongst other things provided education facilities. Changed name to Lindholmen Development Corporation (see above) in the beginning of the 1990s. Swedyard Corp. During the shipyard crisis state owned company Swedyard Corp. intervened to restructure the Swedish shipyards. For example those on Norra Älvstranden. Telematics Valley: www.telematicsvalley.org Interest organisation for companies within the field of telematics with the purpose to serve as a tool for collaboration and disseminate information amongst members. The City of Göteborg: www.goteborg.se Göteborg is Sweden’s second largest city, with half a million inhabitants, situated on the West coast. The IT University of Göteborg: www.ituniv.se The IT University in Göteborg is a joint venture between Chalmers and Göteborg University with focus on education and research in the field of information technology. It started in the autumn of 2001 and offers programmes on both Bachelor- and Master's level. The IT University in Göteborg has 650 students. Volvo Car Corporation: www.volvocars.se Company that produces cars. Today owned by the Ford Group, previously Swedish. Volvo Group: www.volvo.com Volvo Group produce transport solutions such as trucks, construction equipment, buses, engines for leisure boats and workboats, diesel-powered generator.

168 Appendix B: The Swedish Political and Administrative System

Source: Adapted from Reade 1989:30

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Appendix C: The Swedish Planning System

Source: Alfredsson & Wiman 2001:118

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