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The Case of Ecuador Under Rafael Correa 2 Ees ® Can Presidential Popularity Decrease Public Perceptions of Political Corruption? The Case of Ecuador under Rafael Correa Sebastian Larrea and J. Daniel Montalvo 032 [email protected] # [email protected] December 21, 2017 Topical Brief On December 13, 2017, Ecuador’s National Court of Justice (CNJ) found the current Vice President of the Republic, Mr. Jorge Glas, guilty of illicit association as part of several investigations into acts of corruption linked to the Brazilian company Odebrecht. For this crime, the CNJ sentenced Glas to 6 years in prison and the repayment of USD$14.1 million to the Ecuadorian state.1;2 At the same time, the National Anticorruption Commission (CNA) presented data from their investigation into the cost of corruption in Ecuador in the last 10 years. According to the CNA, the cost has reached over USD $35 billion dollars in bribes, overcharging in public contracts, tax evasion, commissions on petroleum exports and related imports, public debt, and current expenditures.3;4 The Odebrecht scandal in Latin America points to a well-organized crim- inal network involving many politicians and high-ranking public employ- ©2017, Latin American Public Opinion Project www.lapopsurveys.com The Case of Ecuador under Rafael Correa 2 ees. In Ecuador, some of these politicians and public employees were incarcerated during the government of former president Rafael Correa (2007-2017), while others remain at large. While these events have sent ripples of shock through the media and the public, data from the Americ- asBarometer in Ecuador suggest that Ecuadorians’ assessments of the transparency of politicians varied considerably depending on levels of approval of Correa’s government.5 This Topical Brief arrives at this conclusion through analysis of the re- sults of data from the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer surveys about the correlation between corruption perceptions and presidential approval.6 To measure corruption perceptions, we use the following question: EXC7NEW: Thinking about politicians in Ecuador, how many of them do you think are involved in corruption?7 Brazil 83.4% Perceived Corruption among Politicians Mexico 77.2% Ecuador 2016/17 Peru 77.0% Colombia 74.9% Venezuela 74.2% Panama 74.0% Chile 72.5% 16.4% Paraguay 68.3% Bolivia 66.7% Argentina 65.9% Guatemala 65.7% 56.4% Dominican Republic 64.6% 27.3% Honduras 58.3% Ecuador 56.4% El Salvador 55.1% Haiti 54.4% Jamaica 53.9% Costa Rica 49.7% None/Less than Half Nicaragua 45.4% Uruguay 40.0% Half of Politicians More than Half/All 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent Reporting More than Half or All Politicians are Involved in Corruption, 2016/17 95 % Confidence Interval (with Design-Effects) Source: AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2016/17; v.07172017 Figure 1: Corruption Perceptions in Ecuador and in Comparative Perspective, 2016/17 Figure 1 shows that 56.4% of Ecuadorians believe that more than half or all politicians (that is, the majority) are involved in corruption. In comparison ©2017, Latin American Public Opinion Project www.lapopsurveys.com The Case of Ecuador under Rafael Correa 3 to the rest of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Ecuador is slightly below the regional average of 60.9%. While perceptions of political corruption are comparatively low in Ecuador, there is a significant difference in corruption perceptions by president Correa’s approval rating, as shown in Figure 2. To measure presidential approval, we use responses to the following question: M1. Speaking in general about the current government, would you say that the job that President Rafael is doing is…?8 Figure 2 displays the most important finding of this study: Correa’s job ap- proval considerably attenuated citizens’ corruption perceptions.9 89.3%, that is, almost 9 in 10 respondents who expressed strong disapproval of former president Correa’s administration, responded that the majority of politicians are corrupt. At the other extreme, only 46.1% of those who strongly approved of Correa’s administration reported that the majority of politicians are corrupt. Dominican Republic 57.7% 100 89.3% Ecuador 57.6% Uruguay 53.9% 76.8% El Salvador 48.4% Nicaragua 48.1% 80 Colombia 47.3% Brazil 45.3% 61.3% Guyana 43.6% 60 Bolivia 41.9% 48.3% 46.1% Paraguay 38.0% Honduras 37.9% Argentina 33.7% 40 Chile 33.6% Mexico 33.6% Perceived Corrutpion Panama 30.8% 20 Venezuela 30.1% Haiti 28.7% Jamaica 28.3% Guatemala 28.2% 0 Costa Rica 28.1% Very Bad Bad Neither Good Very Good Peru 20.0% Good nor Bad 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Executive Job Approval Executive Job Approval (%) Ecuador 2016/17 Latin America and the Caribbean 2008-17 95 % Confidence Interval (with Design-Effects) Source: AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2008-2017; v.07172017 Figure 2: Perceived Corruption and Correa’s Job Ap- proval, 2016/17 Figure 2 shows Correa’s average job approval (that is, the percent eval- uating his performance as “good” or “very good”), as measured by the AmericasBarometer between 2008 and 2017. The data reveal that his ©2017, Latin American Public Opinion Project www.lapopsurveys.com The Case of Ecuador under Rafael Correa 4 approval rating has been among the highest of all countries in the region. During his ten years in government, 57.6% of Ecuadorians indicated, on average, that his performance was good or very good. Given the evidence that high popularity mitigates public perceptions of political corruption, Correa’s high approval ratings provide at least a partial explanation for why perceptions of political corruption have been comparatively low in Ecuador (per Figure 1). Because the most recent survey round was conducted while Mr. Correa was still in office, we do not know whether similar dynamics persist under Lenin Moreno’s administration. How- ever, we suspect that, due to broad media coverage, new efforts by the Comptroller and Attorney General, and above all, Moreno’s commitment to the fight against corruption, public opinion may have changed sig- nificantly. It is possible that those who currently approve of Moreno’s performance in office perceive high levels of corruption among Ecuado- rian politicians. Corruption linked to the Odebrecht scandal in Ecuador and the rest of Latin America is widespread, and it is thus probable that investigations will follow new leads that will, in turn, uncover new involvements and lead to trials and sanctions for politicians, public em- ployees, and business people. The results presented here may shed some light on how presidential popularity could be an attenuating factor in the perceptions people have about corruption in other Latin American countries. Notes 1. Story from El Comercio: http://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/tribunal-condena- jorgeglas-ricardorivera-odebrecht.html 2. The verdict and sentence follow from Mr. Glas’ participation in illicit activity, through one of his uncles, with employees of the Brazilian construction firm, Odebrecht. Additionally, the CNJ requested the General Prosecutor investigate the Vice President for other related crimes, such as bribery, collusion, influence trafficking, embezzlement, organized crime, performing illegal transactions through third parties, and money laundering. ©2017, Latin American Public Opinion Project www.lapopsurveys.com The Case of Ecuador under Rafael Correa 5 3. Story from El Universo: https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2017/12/14/nota/6525505/mas- 35-mil-millones-se-estima-perjuicio-pais 4. The damages (that is, the funds lost to corruption) total about 7 thousand public schools, 244 large hospitals, or more than 3 million two- and three-bedroom houses built by the “Mission Homes for All” program proposed by current President Lenin Moreno during the campaign. We use USD $10,000 as the reference for each “Mission Homes for All” house. This estimate was used by President Moreno during the campaign. http://www.eltele- grafo.com.ec/noticias/politiko-2017/49/moreno-promete-entregar-250-000-viviendas- dignas 5. It is important to note that Mr. Glas also served as Vice President under Correa. 6. The study in Ecuador was carried out from December 2016 to January 2017, with a nationally representative sample of 1,545 individuals. 7. The original question includes the response options, “None,” “Less than half,” “Half of all politicians,” “More than half,” and “All.” In this report, we compare the political attitudes of those who chose the options “More than half” and “All” politicians against those who chose the other options. 8. The original response scale contains the categories: “Very good,” Good,” “Neither good nor bad,” “Bad,” and “Very bad (terrible)”. 9. This correlation is significant and robust to the inclusion of several covariates in a logistic regression model. The covariates fit in the model are corruption victimization, system support, recipient of government assistance, number of children, age, skin tone, material wealth, education, gender, place of residence, and occupation. The results of this model are available from the authors on request. LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer surveys are supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University; the 2016/17 survey also had support from the Inter-American Development Bank (IBD), the UNDP, the Open Society Foundation and several aca- demics and researchers along the Americas. This topical brief was produced exclusively by LAPOP and the opinions expressed belong to the authors and do not necessary reflect the opinion of US- AID or any other supporting organization. Sebastian Larrea is a Research Assistant at LAPOP. Dr. J. Daniel Montalvo is Program Manager at LAPOP. This topical was edited by Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, Dr. Mollie J. Cohen and Emma Tatem. For more information follow us on Twitter at @lapop_barometro. The data and regional report from the 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer are available for free to download at www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop..
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