IRumb. 35305

SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of FRIDAY, the 10th of OCTOBER, 1941 by

Registered as a newspaper

FRIDAY, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 .

March* 1941. -. . The following Despatches have been received by the Secretary of State for // War from General the Viscount GORT, V.C., K.C.B., C.B.E./D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C., * Commander-in-Chief, British Expeditionary Force. (France and Belgium 1939-40.)

FIRST DESPATCH (Covering the period from 3rd September, 1939, to 3ist January, 1940).

General Headquarters,- 3. The plans for the despatch of the Force British Expeditionary Force, differed in two important respects from those of August, 1914. 2$th April, 1940. The possibility of attack by sea and air made it necessary to use the Western ports of France Sir, instead of the Channel ports, while the total 1. I have the honour to submit a report on the replacement of animals by mechanical vehicles, employment of the British Expeditionary Force which had been completed by 1939, presented in France from 3rd September, 1939, the date I a new problem in transportation. assumed command, until 3ist January, 1940. The troops were landed at Cherbourg 'and 2. The move of the Force to France began as their stores and vehicles were despatched to a whole on loth September, although small Nantes, St. Nazaire, and Brest. advanced parties and technical personnel had This plan entailed the early despatch of staff been arriving since 4th September. The success with the proper complement of units of the of the initial operation was due primarily to the Docks and other Transportation Services. The many detailed and complex plans carefully personnel of these Services were in the main prepared under conditions of absolute secrecy recruited from the Port Authorities in Great in peace time. The perfection of these plans, the Britain at the outbreak of war. ready co-operation of the Board of Trade, the These units were operating to full capacity the complete arrangements made by the Admiralty berths allotted to the Force, within forty-eight for the safety of ships while at sea, and the hours of landing, and the programme w?.s willing help of the French Naval, Military, and carried out according to the time table through- Civil authorities all combined to ensure the out the whole period of the disembarkation of successful landing of the British Troops in ist and 2nd Corps. This I regard as a feat France. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

4. On landing the fighting troops were passed The towns of Le Mans and- Laval were rapidly through transit camps and their vehicles fifty miles apart, and the base ports were on an were cleared at once to Vehicle Marshalling average one hundred and fifty miles from the Parks, whence they were despatched in convoys, assembly area. Helpful though the French while troops left by rail on the same day as authorities were, the unfamiliar conditions made they landed. telephone communication difficult, apart from Since the troops and their vehicles were the danger of breach of security which it entailed. landed at different ports they had to be collected Since many despatch riders spoke no French it in an assembly area which had been chosen was often found that control could only be in the vicinity of Le Mans and Laval. The properly maintained by personal visits; Com- assembling of troops by rail and vehicles by manders and their staffs were therefore forced road took about six days. The resource of to spend many hours on the road. individual drivers was tested by changes of The dispersion dictated by the possibility of programme, inevitable in an operation of this aerial bombardment greatly increases demands kind, by the damage which some vehicles had upon signal communications and transport and sustained during the sea passage and by thus lengthens the time which must elapse mechanical failures. Drivers and vehicles were between the issue of orders and their execution. on the road for long periods, but their duty was lightened by the hospitality of the French The Move to the Belgian Frontier. inhabitants, which all ranks will recall with 9. On 22nd September, I left Le Mans for gratitude. Amiens. Arriving at Mantes-sur-Saine, I was 5. On i3th September I moved my head- handed a telegram from General Georges, Com- quarters from the War Office to Camberley, mander of the French Front of the North-East, where General Headquarters was forming. On which read as follows :— the following day, accompanied by Lieutenant- " Pour General Commandant, B.E.F. General (now General) Sir John Dill, Commander " Limite envisaged prevoit front de B.E.F. of ist Corps, and by my personal staff, I droite a MAULDE gauche a MENIN ou embarked in H.M.S. " Skate," and, landing at gauche a AUTRYCHE - SUR - ESCAUT. Cherbourg, left by motor car for the Chateau de Ge"n6ral GEORGES d6sirerait avoir accord la Blanchardiere, Le Mans, which the French 22 Septembre." Government had kindly placed at my disposal. In the meantime, however, General Gamelin 6. On 2ist September the concentration of had proceeded to London to discuss with His the General Headquarters Staff and of the Majesty's Government the frontage which was to essential Lines of Communication units was be held by the British Expeditionary Force. complete. The next day the advanced elements After I had made a reconnaissance on 24th of ist Corps and of General Headquarters Troops and 25th September of the sector which it was arrived, the former moving to an area around proposed to allot to the British Expeditionary Laval and the latter to an area around Le Force I visited General Georges at Grand Mans. Units were given a minimum of one Quartier General on 26th September, in the week in which to assemble and reorganise and company of my Chief of the General Staff, although some of the units of ist Corps were still Lieutenant-General H. R. Pownall. I then incomplete, the limited accommodation available agreed to accept the sector offered by General in the assembly area made it essential to begin Georges to the British Expeditionary Force. the move forward before 26th September when This sector was from Maulde exclusive to the leading units of 2nd Corps were due to arrive. Halluin inclusive, and thence a defensive flank 7. During these early weeks the maintenance along river Lys/Armentieres. General Georges of the Force presented a problem which called placed 5ist French Division (Ge'ne'ral de for the greatest resource and initiative on the Brigade Gillard) under my command, and I part of my Quarter-Master-General, Lieutenant- decided to employ it in my left sector, covering General W. G. Lindsell, his Staff and Services. the towns of Roubaix and Tourcoing. In the units of the Royal Army Service Corps were many officers and men fresh from civil 10. It had been originally intended that life who were constantly called upon to surmount formations, as soon as they had completed their unforeseen difficulties. By their unflagging reorganisation in the assembly area, should energy and the assistance of the French authori- move to a concentration area in the North of ties the Force was maintained without any France, and remain there in readiness to occupy failure of supplies. It should be added that with the line not earlier than 5th October. General the exception of eleven regular officers, the Georges decided, however, that it was inadvisable personnel of the Movement Control organisation to await the arrival of the whole British Expe- was built up from Supplementary Reserve ditionary Force in 'the concentration area and officers and men. expressed a wish that ist Corps should move without delay into the sector north of Maulde. The administrative staff were obliged to deal I accordingly informed General Georges that with the day-to-day work of landing troops, ist Corps would take over its sector on 3rd October their vehicles and current supplies, and to and that 2nd Corps would be able to^o into the undertake the equally important task of building line about I2th October. up reserves of ammunition, supplies, and ordnance stores. Covered accommodation was ist Corps began the two hundred and fifty-mile difficult to obtain and temporary dumps of non- move from the assembly area on 26th September. perishable stores had to be established wherever Tanks, tracked vehicles, and slow moving the necessary space could be found in the vicinity artillery proceeded by train and the remainder of the ports of entry. of the force advanced on three parallel routes. 8. In these early days the Staff met for the Three days were allotted for the move of each first time the problem arising from the wide formation. Two staging areas were arranged on dispersion imposed by the necessity to guard each road, south of the rivers Seine and against air at.ta.gk, Somme respectively, and anti-aircraft defence SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 ^5901 was provided at these river crossings. The certain French technical troops continued to weather was fine throughout the whole period of work in the sector under the command of the the move. French Commander of the Defensive Sector The first stage was one hundred and of Lille, Colonel (now General de Brigade) twenty miles. An average of five hundred Bertschi. vehicles moved daily over each stage of the route, While defences continued to develop on the maintaining a distance of one hundred yards lines of the original plan, based on the close between each vehicle as a precaution against defence of the frontier, it was also necessary to air attack. A halt of one day for maintenance organise the position. purposes was made after the first day's move. The priority of work envisaged the eventual In the initial stages of the move, the Provost construction of three positions in the forward service were responsible for the regulation of area, and a Corps reserve position was sited traffic, but on entering the French Zone des across the base of the Lille salient formed by Armees, columns came under the direction of the frontier. Further in rear, a second position the French road control (Regulatrice Routiere) had been sited, following the line of the Haute organisation, which gave valuable help in Deule, Sense"e and La Basse"e canals. marking detours and in directing traffic through The whole scheme involved the immediate towns. A French-speaking British officer was construction of field defences and the duplica- established in Amiens to ensure liaison between tion of the anti-tank obstacle in the forward my headquarters and the French authorities. zone. Breakdowns and accidents were few, which It was consequently necessary to construct reflects great credit on the drivers, who were at an early stage reinforced concrete " pill- unaccustomed to long hours at the wheel and boxes " to afford protection to those weapons to driving on the right-hand side of the road. which formed the backbone of the fire defence Among the many important lessons which were throughout the whole depth of the position. learnt during the largest road movement ever In order to save time standard designs were undertaken with motor transport by any British prepared to accommodate both British and Army were the need for early reconnaissance of French weapons. staging areas, for control at the dispersal points, 13. Work on these " pill-boxes " was begun by and for allowance for unforeseen delays. the Royal Engineers, assisted by other arms. 11. The move forward continued without Early in November a specially constituted force incident or interruption, and on the agreed date, composed of twelve field companies of the 3rd October, ist Corps took over from the Royal Engineers drawn from Territorial Army. French the sector Maulde-Gruson on the Belgian Divisions at home, and known as " X Force," frontier. This sector lay between that of the arrived in the British Expeditionary Force ist French Army and of the i6th French Corps, area. This force had its own transport and with 2nd Division (Major-General H. C. Loyd) special plant for the construction of reinforced on the right and ist Division (Major-General concrete " pill-boxes" by mass production Hon. H. R. L. G. Alexander) on the left. methods. It was accompanied by companies of General Headquarters opened in and around the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps. Habarcq (8 miles west of Arras) on 2nd A special Excavator Company, equipped with October. mechanical excavators of various types, arrived On I2th October, 3rd Division of 2nd Corps at the same time as X Force. It has been (Major-General B. L. Montgomery) moved employed in digging anti-tank ditches, burying into the line between Bouvines and Lannoy, signal cables, constructing breastworks, and relieving the left brigade of ist Corps and the other tasks. right regiment of the French 5ist Division. A creation of such a defensive system 4th Division of the same Corps (Major-General demanded a quantity and variety of engineer D. G. Johnson, V.C.) was located in General stores far exceeding pre-war anticipations. Headquarters reserve. Bad weather in October and November, and The initial occupation of the line by the British a succession of frosts later, considerably delayed Expeditionary Force was thus completed arid the work, but by the end of the period covered the organisation of the position was undertaken by this despatch the position had been developed at once. in considerable depth. A large number of con- crete " pill-boxes" had been completed and The Organisation of the British Positions. many others were under construction ; new wire 12. In allotting sectors the geographical fea- had been erected and existing wire strengthened, tures of the pronounced salient occupied by the buildings had been reinforced, and many miles British Expeditionary Force had to be con- of anti-tank ditch dug. sidered. East of the Tournai-Orchies road the country is flat, much wooded and inter- The Saar Detachment. sected by small streams. Further to the north 14. In November, 1939, I arranged with lies open and undulating agricultural land which General Georges that a British infantry brigade lends itself to artillery observation and to the should take its place in the line on the Saar movement of armoured fighting vehicles. front, under the command of a French Division. Further north again the sector is for the most The brigade took over the sector from the part on the fringe of a highly industrial and French 42nd Division on the 4th December mining district. without enemy interference and during the When ist Corps arrived in the sector assigned period under review conditions were quiet. to the British Expeditionary Force in the first Since that date infantry brigades of the week in October, an almost continuous anti- British Expeditionary Force have successively tank obstacle already existed in the form of a completed short tours of duty in this sector, and ditch covered by concrete blockhouses built to junior leaders have thus had valuable training mount anti-tank guns and machine guns. In in their day to day duties when in contact with accordance with plans prepared in peace time the enemy. 5902 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

The fortifications of the Maginot Line in the under my command from the dates of the dis- sector concerned continued to be manned by embarkation of their ground units. Later other French fortress troops, the British battalions units were added, and the Air Component now being disposed in depth in advance of the comprises, in addition to Headquarters, one fortified line. The enemy positions were on the Fighter Group Headquarters, eight Wings, a average one thousand five hundred yards distant Communication Squadron, and certain adminis- from our foremost posts. trative and other detachments. The British Army contains to-day very few The ground echelons were moved in advance regimental officers and other ranks who fought of ist and 2nd Corps to the aerodromes in the in the last war; much that was common know- region to be occupied. In the early stages they ledge and accepted practice then, must therefore were largely dependent on the assistance given to be learned again. Nevertheless, events on the them by the French Region Aerienne under the Saar front have proved beyond doubt that command successively of General Jeauneaud the young officer and his men, once they have and General Armengeaud. had experience of active service, will be in every On I4th and 15th September, the anti-aircraft way worthy of their predecessors. units disembarked at the base ports and, in conjunction with fighter units of the Royal The Completion of the First Contingent. Air Force, undertook the task of protecting 15. During October and November, i5th and the disembarkation of the two Corps and their I7th Infantry Brigades were sent from home, forward moves. and placed under command of ist and 2nd Once the concentration was complete, the Corps respectively. i3th Infantry Brigade was available anti-aircraft resources were divided also relieved on the Lines of Communication between forward defences and Lines of Com- by 25th Infantry Brigade. munication. Besides the normal provision for On ist and 2nd December, the French the defence of headquarters and railheads, 5 ist Division was relieved by 4th Division and arrangements were made to protect certain i7th Infantry Brigade, and withdrawn from my important French installations in the British command : I was sorry to part with them and zone and a searchlight zone was also established with their commander, who at all times gave as a protection against enemy night bombing. me loyal support. On all occasions, the Air Officer Commanding The plans for the despatch of the Force had has been greatly helped by General d'Astier, envisaged that two divisions of the Territorial commanding the French Air Forces with the Army would be sent from home as soon as they northern group of French Armies. were sufficiently trained. Since three regular During the period under review, enemy air infantry brigades had by now arrived, however, activity has been almost entirely confined to I decided on 27th October to form the 5th reconnaissance flights at great heights. Division under the command of Major-General H. E. Franklyn. On the night of 2gth-3oth Air Reconnaissance. December the division took over a sector on the 17. The strategical plans for air reconnais- left of the 4th Division. sance were worked out in conjunction with the At this time the five divisions of the British Air Ministry and with General Mouchard, Expeditionary Force were all in the line. commanding the Air Forces with the French During the month of January the 48th Armies of the North East. Division (Major-General A. F. A. N. Thome) In accordance with these plans many recon- arrived in France, and by 23rd January had naissances have been carried out both by day completed its move forward. It was placed and night. Much photography has been under ist Corps, but held in G.H.Q. reserve. undertaken with useful results, both in informa- By the end of January the Force, therefore, tion obtained and in experience gained in consisted of two corps, each of three divisions, photographic and survey methods. with corps and army troops. The first stage The work of the units of the Royal Air Force in the development of the Force was thus engaged in air reconnaissance deserves the concluded. highest praise, since it has been performed, as a The strength of the British Expeditionary rule, in the face of enemy opposition. Pilots Force at the end of January stood at two have often been called on to carry out flights to hundred and twenty-two thousand two hundred, the full limit of the range of their aircraft, all ranks, not including the men of the Air flying over long and circuitous routes to avoid Component and of other units of the Royal Air neutral territory; this rigorous duty has been Force for whose maintenance I am responsible. boldly and cheerfully undertaken. The preparation of Aerodromes. Air Forces and Anti-Aircraft Defence. 18. It had been decided, before mobilisation, 16. Although development of the Air Forces that the maintenance and construction of all and of the Air Defence organisations proceeded aerodromes used by the Royal Air Force in simultaneously with the despatch of the Force France, as well as their signal communications, and with its subsequent moves, I have thought should be the responsibility of the British it convenient to describe this development Expeditionary Force. separately. Many aerodromes and landing grounds had The composition of the Force included a been placed at our disposal by the French Component of the Royal Air Force under the authorities, but it soon became evident that the command of Air Vice-Marshal C. H. B. Blount, problems of construction and maintenance Royal Air Force, consisting of two Army were far greater than had been contemplated Co-operation Wings, one Fighter Wing and one before the war. A new policy had, therefore, Bomber Reconnaissance Wing. to be formulated and comprehensive plans The aircraft were flown to France according prepared. In most parts of France, permanent to plan at the outbreak of hostilities and came pasture does not exist, and this fact, in view of SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 5903 the weight of modern aircraft, has made it neces- requisite selective censorship on the abnormally sary to construct concrete runways, often of large number of letters now despatched daily. considerable extent, on the principal aero- Extremely useful reports on the outlook of the dromes in use. A number of special units of British Expeditionary Force as a whole and on the Royal Engineers had consequently to be its relations with the local French inhabitants raised, and a large amount of plant, grass seed are produced periodically. These are based and materials had to be provided. largely on information supplied by the censorship organisation supplemented by reports from the Frontier Control. Field Security Police. 19. The sector of the frontier occupied by the British Expeditionary Force presented a very Publicity and Propaganda. difficult control problem. There were initially The section of the Intelligence branch dealing over ten thousand Belgians working on the with publicity and propaganda has worked in beet harvest in the British zone and on the close co-operation with the organisations con- average considerably more than twenty thousand cerned both in England and France, and has local inhabitants passed the frontier daily on fulfilled a r61e which has assumed far more their normal business. importance than in previous campaigns. Much The strength of the frontier organisations has been done to counter German propaganda. charged with the control of the frontier traffic Material has been provided for the Miniform had been seriously reduced on mobilisation. It Committee in Paris in this connection, and was therefore essential to supplement the normal information bulletins are issued periodically to all machinery of control. units of the British Expeditionary Force. The system devised in co-operation with the ist French Region and the commander of the Cipher Personnel. fortified sector of Lille included a primary Up to date the whole of the cipher work in the control on the frontier proper and a secondary Force has been carried out most efficiently control on the line of the foremost anti-tank by Army Educational Corps personnel. This obstacle wherever the latter did not coincide personnel is now required to revert to its normal with the frontier. duties in the United Kingdom and is being Co-operation with the French authorities replaced. has been close and harmonious throughout. The Field Security Police have played an Press. important role in this unusual and difficult 21. The significance and requirements of the task and have contributed largely to the success Press and of the press and cinematographic of the organisation. publicity in the field in modern war have proved greater than was appreciated prior to the out- Intelligence. break of hostilities. Shortly after mobilisation 20. Conditions on the operational side of a Public Relations unit was hastily formed and intelligence work in the field have naturally incorporated in the Intelligence branch of been abnormal. Much valuable preliminary General Headquarters. work and re-organisation has been carried out Since its formation in October this unit has and full advantage has been taken of the unusual administered and arranged facilities for a total situation, to complete the training of the of some fifty-five War Correspondents perma- Intelligence staffs. Co-operation with the French nently accredited to the British Expeditionary Intelligence service has been close and cordial. Force, besides representatives of the principal It became apparent at an early date that the news-reel companies. Some sixty visiting staff and organisation provided for dealing with editors, correspondents, broadcasters and cine- wireless intelligence were inadequate for this matographers, in addition to selected repre- increasingly important branch of operational sentatives of the neutral Press, have been given intelligence. The expansion of the wireless facilities for visiting the Force. intelligence units is now, therefore, in progress. There has also been a small unit of the British Closest co-operation has been maintained with Broadcasting Corporation with the Force since the French Wireless Intelligence Service. October, and facilities have been provided for It has been necessary to increase the air intelli- selected official photographers to meet the gence section of the Intelligence branch at requirements of the British Press. General Headquarters, which has performed The Newspaper Proprietors Association gener- valuable work in the collection and distribution ously makes a large supply of papers available of information. free daily for the Force. In the matter of The problem of security has presented many distribution, close touch has been kept with unusual difficulties. This has been largely due them and with the "Continental Daily Mail," to the long period of inactivity, the geographical which supplies the troops with their latest news. position of the Force, the length of the Lines of The Press and photographic censorship is now Communication, and the congestion in the rear working efficiently and co-operation with the areas owing to the presence of evacuees. The French is close and harmonious. French authorities have co-operated most closely in the matter of civil security and have Development of the Rearward Services. throughout given all the assistance in their 22. The work of the administrative staffs power. and services in back areas has in many respects been fully as heavy as it would have been if Censorship. fighting had been in progress. It was their The postal censorship discipline of the British duty, while maintaining a continually growing Expeditionary Force is on the whole good. force, to make and put into execution long term Very considerable increases in personnel have plans in preparation for the arrival of future been found necessary in order to impose the contingents. 5904 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 The initial scheme provided for the formation The Welfare of the Force of temporary maintenance dep&ts near the ports 23. The health of the Force has been good of Brest and Nantes, but it was soon evident and the number of troops in the care of medical that, with so long a line of communication, units has never exceeded 2-8 per cent, of the an advanced base was required. strength of the Force, despite the unusually The use of the port of Havre had at first severe weather conditions in December and been considered undesirable owing to certain January. geographical and technical difficulties in the I wish to express my appreciation of the work air defence of the docks. These were, however, of the Royal Army Medical Corps under my overcome in mid-November, and an Advanced Director of Medical Services, Major General Base area is now being established near this J. W. L. Scott. port with the co-operation of the French The arrangements for leave came into force authorities, while Field Supply Depdts are being on i8th December. The numbers permitted set up further forward. By mid-December, to be absent on leave at any one time are based the staff of the Movement Control were working on the percentage of strength which can be spared some ninety stations, while fourteen ports were from the Force. By the end of January ten in use for landing personnel, animals and stores. days' leave home had been granted to some sixty Through these ports, a quarter of a million men, thousand of all ranks and compassionate leave forty-five thousand mechanical vehicles and a had also been granted in deserving cases. monthly tonnage varying from sixty to one hundred thousand tons of stores of all kinds The question of leave was worked out in were imported and distributed to their various great detail by the Adjutant General, Lieutenant areas and reserve dep6ts. General Sir Douglas Brownrigg, and the members of his staff. Works projects of great magnitude have been in progress from the outset, and the problems The Expeditionary Force Institutes have now of accommodation have been many and complex. established some ninety institutes open on the An extensive programme of building and hutting Lines of Communication and bulk stores have for depdts, hospitals and reinforcement camps been established in forward areas to enable units was put in hand, together with installations for to replenish their own canteens. The same electric light and power, the bulk storage of organisation is providing concert parties and petrol and so on. A vast amount of minor mobile cinemas, and a proportion of the troops work in connection with accommodation has are able to visit each week one of the enter- been carried out by the Royal Engineers. tainments provided by the Entertainments National Services Association. Railway construction at depdts and aero- dromes has been undertaken by the Trans- I am likewise grateful to those organisations portation Services under very adverse weather which have co-operated so whole-heartedly with conditions. the Royal Army Chaplains Department in attending to the welfare of the troops. The complicated nature of modern military equipment has added greatly to the work of the Amongst these are the Catholic Women's Royal Army Ordnance Corps, as regards both Guild, The Army Scripture Readers' Association, storeholding and repair. Great difficulty has The Church Army, The Church of Scotland, been experienced in finding suitable accommo- Toe H, The Salvation Army, The Young Men's dation for depdts and workshops at the bases, Christian Association, and the Young Women's more especially since the whole of the resources Christian Association. of France are engaged at high pressure on her The despatch and delivery of mails takes place own war industries. New installations have with regularity, and more than nine thousand therefore been planned and are now under bags of mail have been handled in one day by construction. the Postal Service. The necessity for censor- The maintenance of mechanical vehicles has ship is fully realized, but there has been no received constant attention and the number of delay in the time taken in the transit of mail road accidents, and consequently of repairs, for an ever increasing force. has been greatly reduced through measures The great distances between forward troops taken by the Provost Service to enforce road and the base made it necessary to depart from discipline. the old established procedure whereby the 2nd The labour problem bids fair to become one Echelon of the Adjutant General's Branch has of great magnitude, and its solution may be always been located in the theatre of war. difficult. As no adequate labour force was This office is now established in Margate, available on mobilisation, the gap was filled and the move has been fully justified by the by the temporary use of cavalry and infantry increased speed with which matters are now reservists. Later, the Auxiliary Military Pioneer handled. Corps absorbed the various labour units already in France. This Corps has carried out cheer- Training and Organisation. fully and efficiently the important, but often 24. The absence of fighting has -afforded unexciting tasks allotted to its units. opportunities to continue the training of the I am grateful to the Government of India Force. Weapon training has been possible for for the high standard of the animal transport almost every unit, and thanks to the co-opera- units sent to France, which have proved their tion of the French Army, artillery practice usefulness on many occasions. camps have been held and other training Major General P. de Fonblanque, General facilities provided. Exercises with troops in- Officer Commanding, Lines of Communication volving road movement on a large scale have Area, has under his command the greatest part been held and much progress has been made of the undertakings described above. They in the technique of co-operation with the Royal now cover almost one third of France, stretching Air Force. from Dunkirk to Brest and from Cherbourg to About eight hundred and fifty officers and Marseilles. non-commissioned officers have been sent home SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 59<>5 as instructors to assist in the training of new I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the formations, while an equal number have been chief of the Mission, General de Division Voruz, attached to the Force, for instruction, from and to all his staff for their ever ready help to units at home. the-British Army on all occasions. Despite the almost complete absence of battle Thanks to their efforts, matters relating to casualties the supply of officers has caused me billeting, hire of land, and local purchase of concern. Over four hundred candidates have material have been handled without friction. been sent home for training as officers, while a To them is due, in large measure, the friendliness further four hundred have been recommended of the relations which exist between the French for immediate commissions. population and the troops, and also as between These have been drawn to a large extent from French and British staffs and regiments. Warrant Officers Class III. A British Military Mission under Brigadier A large number of War Establishments, par- J. G. des R. Swayne was established with the ticularly for the Intelligence Corps and for units Headquarters of General Georges under whose on the Lines of Communication, were found to immediate command the British Expeditionary need adjustment and steps have been taken to Force is serving. this end. The existing War Establishment of an infantry Distinguished Visitors. battalion, which was not designed for Continental 26. On 4th December His Majesty The King warfare, has called for modification and I am visited his troops in France and was received grateful that my recommendations for an in- -everywhere with enthusiasm. During the three crease have been accepted. days tour His Majesty was able to make a The Royal Corps of Signals has been put to detailed inspection of forward and rear areas. great strain in providing communications not On his return to England, His Majesty was only for the Army, but for the whole of the Air graciously pleased to send a message to his Forces in France. The degree of dispersion Army which was warmly appreciated by all required in modern warfare has materially ranks. added to their difficulties. The President of the French Republic has The success with which these demands have spent a day with the British Expeditionary been met is due not only to the spirit in which Force. the personnel of that Corps have faced and The Prime Minister and other members of the overcome difficulties, but to the successful War Cabinet, the Ministers from the Dominions, arrangements for co-operation with the French many members of the Army Council and seven military and civil organisations, and with the Field Marshals are amongst those who have General Post Office. The Wireless Intelligence visited my Headquarters at various times. Staff have done valuable work, and the cipher duties of the Force have been most efficiently Honours and Awards. performed by personnel of the Army Educational 27. I am submitting separately the names Corps. of officers and other ranks whom I wish to The Survey Directorate has been called upon recommend for reward or to bring to your notice to carry out a great deal of work under difficult for gallant or distinguished service. conditions and has fulfilled all the demands made upon it. I have the honour to be, Liaison with the French. Sir, 25. On the arrival of the British Expeditionary Your obedient Servant, Force in France a French Military Mission was established at my headquarters to deal with French military and civil authorities and to act GORT. as a link with Grand Quartier General. In addition, officers and non-commissioned officers General, of the French Army are attached for liaison Commander-in-Chief, duties to the headquarters of each formation British Expeditionary Force. and unit as it arrives. 5906 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

SECOND DESPATCH f (Covering the period from ist February, 1940, to 3ist May, 1940, with an Appendix covering operations of ist Corps from 6 p.m. 3ist May, to midnight 2nd/3rd June).

| i. The narrative portions of this despatch have been compiled from the war diaries and other records of the General Staff at G.H.Q. These have been supplemented by war diaries, including those of the Swayne Mission, and by diaries, notes and records made by various commanders and staff officers at the time, or within a few days of their arrival in England. The records of the General Staff at G.H.Q. are only partially complete for the period loth—i8th May, owing to some papers having been destroyed at Boulogne, and a portion of the records for 3ist May lost at sea. Some records of less importance were burnt at Hazebrouck to avoid possible capture and others were destroyed in a lorry which caught fire near Cassel on or about 24th May. 2. The Appendix contains an account of the operations at Dunkirk from 6 p.m., 3ist May, to midnight 2nd/3rd June, which may conveniently be appended to this despatch, though they were not carried out under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. It has been compiled by the General Staff at G.H.Q., from sources similar to those used for the despatch itself.

London, Arrival of yd Corps in France. 25 July, 1940. 3. 3rd Corps (Lt.-General Sir Ronald F. Sir, Adam, Bt.), consisting of 42nd Division (Major- 1. I have the honour to submit a report on General W. G. Holmes), 44th Division (Major- the employment of the British Expeditionary General E. A. Osborne) and 5ist Division Force, and on the part which it played in (Major-General V. M. Fortune) was due for operations in France and -Belgium from ist despatch to France in February and March, and February, 1940, to 3ist May, 1940, on which 5 ist Division arrived during early February. date I gave up Command of the Force. The 5oth (Motor) Division (Major-General G. le Q. Martel) arrived in France at the same time The period under review may be divided into and was allotted to 2nd Corps. It had been two distinct and sharply contrasting phases, arranged that the front of the B.E.F. should be namely, before and after loth May, on which extended northwards to Croix de Poperinghe on date active operations began. The active the Belgian frontier, two miles north-east of operations themselves can be divided geo- Bailleul, and that 3rd Corps should go into the graphically into two distinct parts ; on the east, line on the left of the B.E.F. taking over 5th the advance to the River Dyle, and the with- Division from 2nd Corps, and relieving 53rd drawal to the frontier; on the west, the defence French Division, between Armentieres and Croix of Arras and the organisation of the Canal line. de Poperinghe, with 5ist Division. The Com- Later, the two parts merged into one whole in mand of the new sector had passed to the the final phase of the withdrawal and embarka- B.E.F. at midnight 3ist Jan./ist February, and tion of the Force. the relief of the French troops was to take No such clear definition can be made in terms place about I2th February. of time; furthermore, the two operations, on At this time, however, owing to the situation the east and on the west, were closely inter- elsewhere in Europe His Majesty's Government dependent, and the same reserves had to serve found it necessary to postpone the despatch of for both. For this reason the accounts of the 3rd Corps (excepting 5 ist Division) and also of operations on the two fronts cannot but be certain anti-aircraft, administrative and labour intermingled at certain points in the narrative. units. I was also instructed to earmark one Broadly speaking, however, three distinct phases division for withdrawal from the B.E.F. if can be distinguished. First, the advance to the required ; for this I selected 5th Division. It Dyle from ioth-i6th May; then from i7th-26th was evident that the programme of shipments of May the withdrawal from the Dyle to the ammunition and other war material to France, Escaut, the defence of the Belgian frontier and on which I had counted to make up the serious of the southern and western flanks ; and finally deficiencies in stocks, would be severely curtailed the withdrawal and embarkation of the Force in February and March. from 27th-3ist May. 2. The narrative in my first despatch dated 4. These changes entailed a delay in the 25th April, 1940, concluded with the completion development of the Force which was naturally of the first contingent of the Force. disappointing; moreover, it became impossible I had been informed that the expansion of the for me to take over the new sector to Bailleul, Force was to be continued by the despatch of and at the same time to retain a proper propor- 3rd Corps during the early months of 1940; tion of divisions in reserve. I was, therefore, the Armoured Division was to follow in May, obliged to obtain the consent of the French to and a fourth Corps, with ist Canadian the indefinite postponement of the relief, and to Division, during the late Summer ; furthermore, accept the resulting congestion in the area of it had been decided that the Force should be the B.E.F. divided into two Annies, as soon as the number 5oth Division was temporarily accommodated of divisions in the field, excluding the Armoured in an area south-west of Amiens in G.H.Q. Division, rose above eleven. reserve. Preparation for this expansion, which had At the end of March, however, the 3rd Corps been proceeding since the previous autumn, was finally despatched to France ; 5ist Division continued steadily until loth May. duly relieved the French in the new sector on SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 5907

28th March; 44th Division, on disembarkation, The sub-machine gun was taken into experi- moved into 3rd Corps reserve in the St. Pol area, mental use by patrols in the Saar front: its and 50th Division into 2nd Corps reserve, south- value had already been recognised and I trust west of Lille ; 42nd Division, on arrival, moved that a weapon of this type will be permanently to the area south-west of Amiens, in G.H.Q. included in the armament of the infantry. reserve. Preparation for Further Expansion. 5. The German invasion of Denmark and 7. In the meantime I had been preparing for Norway on gth April created a new situation; the arrival of further troops, and, in particular, leave was stopped in the British and French for the formation of Army Headquarters which Armies on loth April, and i5th Infantry Brigade were due to arrive in the latter part of June. of 5th Division was despatched to England, On the assumption that the positions held by en route for Norway, on I5th April; certain the B.E.F. were to remain the same, a lay-out units of 42nd Division were also retained at had been prepared involving a move of G.H.Q. home, but with a few exceptions despatched The construction of the new G.H.Q. and of later. The remainder of 5th Division was left the two Army headquarters.was put in hand; in France, but in War Office reserve, and was this involved the laying of about 150 route accordingly relieved in 3rd Corps by 42nd miles of heavy armoured cable. Negotiations Division. Reports of enemy intentions to invade were in progress regarding the extension of the Holland and Belgium were received from front of the B.E.F. on arrival of a fourth Corps, different sources and at different times, and the French being anxious that this should between the nth and 22nd April certain troops be southwards rather than northwards. were placed under short notice to move. Intensi- fied air reconnaissance .was ordered in the zone Development of the Defensive Positions.. allotted to the Air Component which included 8. The development of the successive defen- part of the Ruhr and the area to the west of it, sive positions and switch lines behind the but apart from small bridging activity no Belgian frontier was continued steadily till positive results were observed. loth May. By this date over 400 concrete o " pill-boxes " of varying size had been com- The Soar Front. pleted with over ibo more under construction, 6. During this period the detachment of one while work on the improvement of field defences, infantry brigade on the Saar front was main- wire and other obstacles proceeded continuously tained ; at the outset the severe cold interfered on the original front and in the sector north of considerably with the work of improving the Armentieres recently taken over from the defences in the forward area. Much required to French. be done, as regards increased protection, pro- Chiefly by the use of excavator machinery vision of alternative fire positions, covered over 40 miles of revetted anti-tank ditch had approaches and improved communications ; the been added to that prepared by the French wire required thickening and its tactical lay-out army in time of peace. Machines had also been improving; the thaw, when it set in, was rapid used to assist the troops in constructing earth- and energetic steps had to be taken to maintain work defences, mixing concrete and burying a proper standard of sanitation. signal cables. The tour of duty of each infantry brigade was Training. raised in March to three weeks, and a pioneer battalion was included in the detachment. 9. Training areas were being prepared to accommodate the Armoured Division and other At the end of March it was decided to increase formations; base reinforcement depdts were the Saar force to a total of one division, with rapidly taking shape in their new locations near attached troops, including cavalry, machine Rouen, and their training staffs had assembled. guns, and pioneers. 5ist Division was selected. Corps schools had been established, principally The Division had concentrated in the Metz area for the training of junior leaders, and a sniping by 30th April and by 7th May had relieved school had been set up. Practice camps, both 7th French Division, thus extending the for field and anti-aircraft artillery had been British front on the Saar on either side of the developed with the help of the French and steps front originally held to a total of 12,000 yards taken to continue the weapon training of from Guerstling exclusive to Remeling inclusive. selected units. 5ist Division remained in the Saar area and The practice undertaken with anti-tank took no part in the operations in Northern weapons, to which special attention was given, France. From loth May therefore, it ceased was amply to prove its value when the time came. to be under my effective command; the Saar Force was later moved to the Rouen area, The Equipment Situation. where it took part in subsequent operations. 10. The situation as regards equipment, Patrolling, both by our own troops and by though there was latterly some improvement in the enemy, grew steadily more active during certain directions, caused me serious misgivings, this period; early on the morning of the 5th even before men and material began to be March, the enemy carried out a successful raid, diverted by the needs of operations elsewhere. supported with a box barrage of a type familiar I had on several occasions called the attention in the war of 1914-18, on one of our front line of the War Office to the shortage of almost every positions in a wood known as the Hartebusch, nature of ammunition of which the stocks in then held by a battalion of the 4th Division France were not nearly large enough to permit (2nd D.C.L.I.). In this and subsequent of the rates of expenditure laid down for sus- encounters the enemy regularly suffered casual- tained operations before the War. ties, many of them at the hands of battalions There was a shortage of guns in some of the of the I44th Infantry Brigade of the 48th anti-tank regiments of the Royal Artillery, Division, the first Territorial Army formation while armour-piercing shells for field guns had to meet the enemy in.this campaign. not, by loth May, been provided. 5908 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

There were also deficiencies in technical units, including anti-aircraft. My Adjutant- apparatus for light anti-aircraft requirements, General's branch, in conjunction with the such as Kenison Predictors, signal lights, Adjutant-General's branch at the War Office, technical and specialised vehicles of many had in hand plans for the more economical use types and a number of smaller items. The same of man-power, the elimination of fit men from difficulties in provision of equipment were no sedentary or base duties and the reduction of doubt the cause of delays in the despatch of new tradesmen in War Establishments. Investiga- units to the B.E.F., particularly armoured and tions made by the War Office, which had my anti-aircraft units, and while it is to some extent full co-operation, were directed towards a more true that the shortness of the campaign pre- economical and more flexible system of replace- vented the full effect of the shortages being felt, ment and repair of vehicles and equipment in it is I think, justifiable to assume that the the Force. presence of the Armoured Division and of a complete Army Tank Brigade would have been The Royal Air Force. an invaluable aid in the difficulties with which 13. On I5th January, 1940, Air Marshal A. S. we were faced in meeting enemy armoured Barratt had assumed command of the British formations. Ah- Force in France, including the Air Com- ponent which, however, was to remain under my The Administrative Situation. operational control. Under this arrangement, 11. The development of the rearward installa- in my opinion, the control of available air forces tions had been proceeding systematically. was better allocated to meet the needs not only The medical base installations had been of the British but also of the French Army for extended and a hospital area was in course of whom considerable aerial reconnaissance was rapid development near Boulogne in addition being carried out. The development of the to the original medical base sub-area at Dieppe. Allied Central Air Bureau and of its communica- tions to the headquarters of higher formations The British Army requirements in the port of in France and to the Royal Air Force at home, Brest, a French naval base, had been sub- was likewise to prove its worth in the 4^ys to stantially reduced by the use of other ports come as an organisation for co-ordinating such as St. Malo and Caen ; by May, seventeen information and requests for air action. ports in all were being operated and 2,500 tons of stores were being despatched to railheads At the same time I felt that the resources of daily. the Air Component would prove insufficient for the requirements of the Force during operations ; At the same time, the construction of semi- so long, therefore, as this state of affairs existed permanent dep6ts of all kinds in the neighbour- it was of prime importance that the machinery hood of Nantes, Rennes and Rouen was in for obtaining the allotment of additional bomber progress; this would later on have led to more and fighter support should be as simple and as efficient and economical working than was swift in operation as it could be made. possible in the temporary accommodation, taken up in September, 1939. By loth May, Throughout the period, construction of new seven ammunition depdts were open, in addition aerodromes, landing grounds and communica- to railhead dumps ; all these were intended, in tions for the British Air Force in France was time, to be rail served; while the construction of proceeding as fast as resources would permit, the regulating station at Abancourt, by French concrete runways being constructed in the railway troops on behalf of the B.E.F., was well early part of the year until the season allowed advanced. It opened on a limited scale in the for the sowing of grass. Upwards of 10,000 men first week of May. A supply dep6t was being were employed on this work, and forty-seven constructed close by so as to relieve the aerodromes and satellites (including 19 new dangerous congestion at the ports of Rouen aerodromes) were under development or con- and Havre. struction. By I5th May eight of the nineteen new aerodromes were capable of use, and at The progress of all these undertakings was least 50,000 tons of concrete had been laid. adversely affected by the shortage of labour, to Constructional work was also undertaken on which I referred in my first despatch, and it behalf of the Air Ministry at other R.A.F. was decided, in March, to send three Divisions installations in central France. to France to undertake labour duties and at the same time continue their training, albeit The Dyle and Escaut Plans. slowly. The Divisions selected were I2th (Major-General R. L. Petre), 23rd (Major- 14. Very shortly after the arrival of the B.E.F. General W. N. Herbert) and 46th (Major- in their positions on the Belgian frontier I had General H. O. Curtis). These arrived in April; been invited by General Georges, commanding 23rd Division was allotted for work on aero- the French Front of the North East, under dromes in the forward area, and the remaining whose Command I was, to study the part to be two to the Lines of Communication area. played by the B.E.F. in the event of an advance into Holland and Belgium, or into Belgium alone. The question of such an advance was Organisation. one of high policy with a political as well as a 12. The absence of actual operations up to military aspect; it was therefore not for me to loth May gave opportunities to make a number comment on it. My responsibilities were con- of changes in organisation. fined to ensuring that the orders issued by the Divisional cavalry regiments were grouped French for the employment of the British into Armoured Reconnaissance Brigades and the Expeditionary Force were capable of being Lines of Communication area was re-organised carried out; and indeed events proved that the into two districts. orders issued for this operation were well within Infantry battalions were filled up to the new the capacity of the Force. and higher establishments, and action was The subject presented difficulties greatly initiated to raise the establishment of artillery complicated by the policy of neutrality to which SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 5909 the Belgian Government were wedded. The Both these plans were worked out in the French authorities were never in a position to greatest detail, and orders and instructions obtain reliable and accurate details of the plans kept up to date as new divisions arrived and of the Belgian General Staff for the defence of the role of divisions changed. their country in the event of an invasion by The Escaut plan was by far the simpler of Germany; staff conversations were out of the the two; it involved sending armoured car question, yet plans had to be framed in such a reconnaissances to the river Dendre to be way that they could be put into instant opera- relieved by divisional cavalry, who were later, tion in the event of Belgium asking for military if necessary, to fight a delaying action back- assistance from France or Great Britain when wards to the Escaut; demolitions were provided invasion had taken place or was imminent. for on both rivers; for the remainder of the Such slender contact as existed between the force, however, the advance appeared likely British and Belgian Military authorities was to be an easy one, well within a day's march maintained through the Military Attach^ at His on foot. The Dyle plan, on the other hand, Majesty's Embassy at Brussels and General involved an advance of some sixty miles, carried Van Overstraeten, Military Adviser to the King out at a time when every moment was of value of the Belgians. over roads not previously reconnoitred, perhaps crowded with refugees moving counter to the 15. Three alternative plans were decided on allied armies. Much, too, depended on the by the French High Command during October resistance which the Belgians, and perhaps the and November 1939, and I had agreed with Dutch, were able to offer to the enemy, who at General Georges on the part to be played in such a time would certainly be making every each of them by the B.E.F. effort to pierce the line of the Meuse and the Albert Canal. The first alternative was to occupy the frontier defences, pushing forward mobile troops to the 16. The plans made in advance for the advance line of the Escaut, while the French 7th Army to the Dyle position actually worked to schedule on my left were to delay the enemy on the line in almost all respects. It may therefore be of the Messines Ridge and the Yser Canal. convenient to summarise them here. This plan was soon discarded in favour of the second alternative, which was to secure and The Allied forces were to advance to the line hold the line of the Escaut itself, from the point Namur—Wavre—Louvain—Antwerp, of which at which it crosses the frontier at Maulde the B.E.F. Sector extended from Wavre to northwards to the neighbourhood of Ghent Louvain, both inclusive. On our right was to where it was intended to effect a junction with be the French ist Army (General d'Armee Belgian forces. Blanchard) under whose command was the French Cavalry Corps, and whose task it was Later, however, as information became avail- to delay the arrival of the enemy on the Dyle able regarding the defences of the Belgian Army, position and to block with its main forces the * and its readiness for war, the French High Gembloux gap, with the Cavalry Corps pushed Command formed the opinion that it would be forward to the line Eghezee (8 miles north of safe to count on the Belgian defence holding Namur)—Tirlemont. On our left the French out for some days oh the Eastern frontier, and 7th Army (General d'Armee Giraud) was to the Albert Canal. It was also ascertained that advance to the general area Antwerp-Ghent, the Belgians were preparing a de Cointet anti- with the object of supporting Belgian resistance tank obstacle running southwards from Wavre north of Louvain. The plans of this Army towards Namur. included a possible advance into Holland as The line of the river Dyle was from the military far as the line Turnhout-Breda, and this was point of view a better one than that of the Escaut. actually carried out. It had been ascertained It was shorter, it afforded greater depth and its that a portion of the Belgian Army, if forced to northern portion was inundated. In addition, withdraw from their frontier defences would it represented smaller enemy occupation of come into line on the left of the B.E.F. on the Belgian territory. general line from Louvain exclusive, thence northward to the fortified area of Antwerp, On the other hand, it involved the B.E.F. known as the National Redoubt. in a forward move of some sixty miles against time, while it also necessitated the holding by The British front was to be occupied initially the French on our right of the Gembloux gap with ist Corps (Lieutenant-General M. G. H. which contains no natural anti-tank obstacle. Barker, who had recently taken over command This plan was twice discussed by General Georges from General Sir John Dill), on a two-division with me on I3th October at my headquarters front, on the right, and 2nd Corps (Lieutenant- at Le Cauroy and again on i6th November at General A. F. Brooke, now Sir Alan Brooke) Folembray the headquarters of the French First on the left, on a front initially of one division. Group of Armies; on this occasion there were The advance was to be made in four periods. also present General Billotte, who commanded In the first, i2th Royal Lancers (Armoured the Army Group, and Generals Blanchard and Cars) were to move to a general line some eight Corap, Commanding the French ist and gth miles beyond the Dyle in observation of the Armies. At this conference it was agreed that approaches from the east; they were to be the frontage of the B.E.F. on the Dyle position relieved by cavalry regiments of ist and 2nd was to be from Wavre to Louvain, both places Corps when they arrived. inclusive, and a formal instruction to this effect Behind them were to come, from right to left, was issued to me by General Georges on the 2nd Division (Major-General H. C. Loyd) and following day. From this time onward, Com- ist Division (Major-General Hon. H. R. L. G. manders and Staffs were studying simultaneously Alexander) of ist Corps, and 3rd Division two alternative plans for advances to the Dyle (Maj01-General B. L. Montgomery) of 2nd or the Escaut; these became known as plans Corps. The whole of the move of these three DandE. divisions was to be made by motor transport, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 and troop carrying companies were allotted to OPERATIONS—FIRST PHASE Corps in such a way as to complete the move (ioth-i6th MAY) in 90 hours. Belgium calls on Allies for assistance: advance At the same time 44th Division was to march to the River Dyle by British and French to an area north-west of Audenarde, with a Armies: the Belgian anti-tank obstacle is view to organising the defence of the Escaut in found to be sited further forward than had this area. been expected. The enemy penetrates the front Movement in the first phase was to be con- of French gth Army and crosses the Meuse. tinuous by day and night. The French had Action by Royal Air Force. General Billotte decided to restrict the movements of their main appointed to co-ordinate action of British, bodies to the hours of darkness, but I judged French and Belgians. The Dutch lay down the time factor to be of paramount importance arms. and accepted the risk that our air support might loth May—The enemy invades Holland and be insufficient to prevent enemy interference Belgium. with the move. Events proved that the risk was justifiable. 18. The tension which had been increasing during April had lessened somewhat during the In the second period, to be completed by the early days of May; during this period I had end of the sixth day, 48th Division (Major- received reports of enemy activity from several General A. F. A. N. Thorne) and 4th Division sources of varying degrees of reliability, culmin- (Major-General D. G. Johnson, V.C.) were to ating in a report from the Hague, but it was not move by march route and motor transport into until the night of 9th-ioth May that information ist and 2nd Corps reserve respectively, while was received of exceptional activity on the ist Army Tank Brigade consisting of two frontiers of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. battalions was to move chiefly by rail into The weather was set fair, and with the exception ist Corps area. of some heavy thunderstorms which had no The third period was to be completed by the effect on operations, remained so to the end of tenth day, and included the movement of soth the month. At about 4.30 a.m. on loth May, Division to 2nd Corps reserve, while 4th Division enemy aircraft appeared over my headquarters moved into the line on the right of 3rd Division. at Arras and bombs were dropped on aero- The fourth period included the forward dromes hi the neighbourhood and on a number movement of 3rd Corps. 5th Division (Major- of towns including Doullens and Abbeville. General H. E. Franklyn) was to move to At 5.30 a.m., a message was received from my positions in G.H.Q. reserve, along the river mission with General Georges ordering " Alertes Dendre, north and south of Grammont; 42nd i, 2 and 3," namely, instant readiness to move and 44th Divisions to the line of the river into Belgium. I at once sought, and obtained, Escaut around Tournai and to the south of the release of the 5th Division from War Office reserve, and henceforward it was employed Audenarde respectively, to organise bridgehead under my orders. At about 6.15 a.m. I received positions pending orders for a further advance. instructions to put Plan D into effect. Detailed instructions had also been issued It was ascertained that I2th Royal Lancers for the preparation of defences on the three could be ready to cross the frontier at i p.m., river lines of the Dyle, Dendre and Escaut, as and accordingly I laid down this time as zero also for the necessary demolitions and inunda- hour. tions. Special arrangements had been made for the control of traffic, including refugees for At i p.m. I opened my command post at whom routes had been allotted; definite bodies Wahagnies, midway between Douai and Lille. of troops were detailed for these tasks. ist and 2nd Corps experienced some delay in moving, due largely to the fact that owing to the short notice received, preliminary moves The Belgian Anti-Tank obstacle of transport had not taken place; apart from 17. Late in April and early in May, I received this, moves on this day proceeded according to reports regarding the siting of the Belgian plan; very little interference was experienced anti-tank obstacle; it appeared that, without either from enemy aircrait or refugees and informing either the French High Command or i2th Lancers reached the Dyle unopposed at myself, they had sited the obstacle much 10.30 p.m. further to the east than had originally been The French armies on our light and left were planned, namely on the line Namur-Perwez- reported as advancing on time. Louvain: furthermore the obstacle was not The Belgian population received the allied as yet by any means completed. The matter armies in the most cordial manner, and in was discussed with General Georges. particular the leading troops were loudly cheered. On the British front, the river Dyle was so far superior as an anti-tank obstacle to any Operations between nth and i$th May. artificial work further east which the Belgians 19. On nth May, enemy air action increased might be preparing that I had no hesitation in somewhat, but did not interfere with the forward urging adherence to the existing plan for the movement of troops, and during the afternoon defence of the Dyle position. and evening, the leading infantry brigades On the front of the French ist Army the reached the Dyle, refugee traffic being situation was different: the absence of a natural handled successfully. The original arrange- obstacle forced them to rely on.that prepared ments, of which the Belgian Government were by the Belgians. To clear the matter up, aware, included the use by the B.E.F. of roads information was demanded as to the true site 'passing through the northern and southern of the artificial obstacle. These negotiations outskirts of Brussels, but not through the were begun through our Military Attache1 on centre of the city. A series of requests was 8th May, but they were not destined to be however received to discontinue the use of these concluded. roads on the ground that Brussels had been SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 declared an open town and that British troop Air Force to impede the enemy advance; but movements would prejudice its safety, but no such opportunities were of a fleeting character, adequate alternative routes to the Dyle were since the enemy established strong anti-aircraft available and I was therefore compelled to defences soon after his arrival, particularly in adhere to the original plan of using the outskirts towns at which roads converged. Tactical of the city. reconnaissance became virtually impossible The 3rd Division, on arrival, reported that a without fighter support, and the demands made Belgian division was holding the bridgehead at on the fighter group of the Air Component were Louvain, although I had assumed that this extremely heavy. They had been met with should be a British responsibility. 2nd Corps unfailing skill and courage, and with marked therefore took up a narrow front on their right success, but by now the group was reduced to with a strong reserve in rear of Louvain. some 50 aircraft, and although I had asked for 5th Division, which was training in the area four fresh squadrons from home, only one had south-west of Amiens, was ordered to proceed arrived. In three days' operations, the British by march route so as to shorten the move by Air Force in France had firm reports of the motor transport in a later phase, and later destruction of 101 enemy aircraft, mostly occupied a position on the Senne. fighters, against a loss of 78 of our own. The news from the Belgian army, of which That afternoon a conference was held at the King Leopold had assumed command on the Chateau Casteau, near Mons which was attended outbreak of war, was not good. Belgian cyclist by the King of the Belgians, General Van troops from east of the Meuse were falling back Overstraeten, M. Daladier, Generals Georges on Huy. At Maastricht, it was reported that and Billotte, and my Chief of the General Staff they had been forestalled by enemy action from (Lieutenant-General H. R. Pownall), as my the rear and had been unable to demolish representative in my absence. The primary important bridges over the Albert Canal and object of the conference was to achieve the Meuse across which : the enemy had some measure of co-ordination in the begun to move. Air bombing was requested Belgian theatre of war. General Billotte's and was extremely effective, but could not command included the French ist and altogether deny the passage of the water 7th Armies, between which lay the Belgian obstacles to the enemy. On my right the Army under the independent command French Cavalry Corps had reached their of their King, and the B.fe.F. which, though position on the line Huy—Hannut—Tirlemont under the command of General Georges, was not and reconnoitred the Belgian anti-tank obstacle. under that of General Billotte. Whatever the They reported that, as I had supposed, there nature of the operations, a common doctrine was no effective obstacle on the Gembloux line was clearly necessary and when General Georges and that the obstacle on the Perwez line was enquired if the King of the Belgians and I not only unfinished but badly sited on a forward would be prepared to accept co-ordination by slope. I thereupon conveyed to General Georges General Billotte as bis representative, General a confirmation of my objections to pushing Pownall said he was sure that I would agree. forward so as to make use of the obstacle in its The King of the Belgians likewise agreed. unfinished state, notwithstanding the Belgians' . 21. On I3th May I moved my Command Post anxiety that I should do so. Later that day I forward to Renaix; no event of major impor- was informed that he had decided that the main tance occurred during the day, but some small line of resistance was to be on the Gembloux infantry attacks developed on the British sector. line as planned, but that the French were to These were easily held. Movements of the main push out advanced troops to the line of the bodies of the French ist and 7th Annies con- obstacle. He expressed the hope that the B.E.F. tinued in accordance with their plans, and units would conform, and ist and 2nd Corps of the latter were by now north of Antwerp on accordingly reconnoitred the anti-tank the Dutch border. It was, however, becoming obstacles reported to exist round the forest of increasingly evident that they would be unable Meerdael with a view to pushing forward to prevent the enemy occupation of Walcheren detachments with anti-tank guns. They found and Zuid Beveland which was developing from them complete only in places. the north-east. 20. The first phase of Plan D was successfully During the day and the following night the completed by i2th May, and the French ist Belgian forces were in process of withdrawing Army on my right then accelerated the pro- their northern forces to the general line Louvain- gramme governing their forward movement by Antwerp, and the Staff of the Belgian G.Q.G. moving by day as well as by night. The enemy expressed concern lest the simultaneous with- progress across the Albert Canal had up to now drawal of their Cavalry Corps and that of the been relatively small, due to a successful French, north-west and south-west from their counter-attack by the French Cavalry Corps at junction point at Tirlemont, would create a gap. St. Trend, but larger concentrations were now There appeared to me to be little danger, but reported north of the Albert Canal. Disquieting nevertheless I ordered I2th Lancers to watch news was received from the Ardennes, where a the situation, assisted if need be by divisional German thrust was reported as developing on cavalry regiments. the front of the French gth Army, with at least 22. On I4th May I went to Brussels, where at two armoured divisions. 12 noon I met the Commanders of ist and 2nd On this date I requested the War Office to Corps at the British Embassy. The Commander expedite the despatch of the ist Armoured of 2nd Corps reported that the Belgian ist Division to the greatest extent possible. I also Corps was now reforming in 4th Division asked that they should be shipped to the nearest' area. I also discussed the organisation of the available port and loaded tactically with a view second position on the Senne canal and of a to operations as soon as possible after landing. Corps reserve line east of Brussels. 5th and 48th The day was one of great activity in the air, Divisions were ordered to reconnoitre the Senne and afforded great opportunities for the Royal position on I5th May. That afternoon at 3 p.m. 5912 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

I visited H.M. the King of the Belgians and By the night of i5th May the movements General Van Overstraeten and reached agree- envisaged in Plan D were all running ahead of ment that the Belgian ist Corps should be schedule. 4th Division was moving into Corps withdrawn from the area of 2nd Corps and that reserve behind 3rd Division; 5th Division was the left boundary of the B.E.F. should be moving on to the Senne in place of 5oth Division adjusted so as to allow the Belgians the use of as originally planned, and the latter was now the road Vilvorde-Alost for this purpose. I moving to G.H.Q. reserve along the River also stressed the importance of having fresh Dendre. Belgian troops established early in position north of Louvain to continue the British line covering Brussels. Further serious news came from the south OPERATIONS—SECOND PHASE where the enemy had crossed the Meuse between (i7th-26th MAY) Sedan and Me"zieres, and further north he was reported to be surrounding the fortress of St. Withdrawal to the Escaut decided on; the threat Heribert (4 miles S.S.W. of Namur). to Arras and to the right flank; formation of Macforce and deployment of 2yd Division on The French Cavalry Corps on my right had the Canal du Nord. The enemy reaches the on the previous day received orders to retire Somme and cuts communications with the Base ; to the Perwez position whence they subsequently Calais and Boulogne invested: the admini- withdrew, according to plan, to the main position strative position. The organisation of the Canal running through Gembloux. line. Alternative lines discussed with French At the request of Air Marshal Barratt I and Belgians, resulting in further withdrawal placed at his disposal for use on the French from the Escaut to the Frontier defences and front three squadrons of fighters which I had fresh plans for attacks southwards in conjunction only recently received in response to an urgent with French main forces. $th and $oth Divisions appeal to the Secretary of State for War. counter-attack on 21st May. A further attack 23. On 15th May the Dutch Army laid down in conjunction with French planned for its arms; the immediate effect of this on the 26th May: this plan is abandoned owing to operations of the B.E.F. was small, for the penetration of Belgian line on the Lys. British forces operating in Holland had at no time been under my command. I anticipated, The beginning of the withdrawal (ifith-T.'jth May) however, that this would come as a shock to 24. By i6th May, it became clear that a the Belgian Army. prolonged defence of the Dyle position was The French 7th Army withdrew' its advanced impracticable. The French ist Army on my formations to the neighbourhood of Antwerp right were unlikely to make good the ground and on this day ordered divisions to move across lost' on the previous day, notwithstanding the my rear to fill the gap created further south. support I had given them in the air and on the This move, however, did not take place till ground, and a further withdrawal seemed likely some three days later when it was accomplished, to be forced on them by events in the south. thanks to efficient traffic control, with little On the other hand there had been no serious delay to our own movements. attack on the Belgian positions on my left; On this day (i5th May) I established a nevertheless, any withdrawal from our present command post at Lennick St. Quentin, 6 miles positions would of necessity involve a withdrawal west of Brussels. On the British front, the day by the Belgian Army in the course of which passed quietly on the whole, ist Corps was not Brussels, and probably Antwerp also, would be attacked in strength ; 3rd Division of 2nd Corps abandoned to the enemy. was attacked north-west of Louvain and its Very early on i6th May therefore, I sent a forward positions were penetrated, but a counter- representative to General Billotte who was attack successfully restored the original line. co-ordinating the movements of the British, There was considerable enemy bombing of French and Belgian Forces; I asked that, if rearward areas during the day, and the movement he intended to withdraw, he should let me know of refugees became increasingly difficult to the policy and the timings at once, especially control. This was, in part, due to the bombing as the first bound back to the Senne canals of Tournai and other towns on the routes and involved a march of some fifteen to twenty to the French decision to close the frontier to miles. pedestrian and horsed traffic. Despite my At about 10 a.m. I received from him orders requests, made as early as loth May, the Belgian for a withdrawal to the Escaut, and for the authorities had done nothing to restrict the use occupation of the positions along that fiver of private motor cars or the sale of petrol. originally planned. The operation was to begin During the day I received a request that I that night (16/17 May), one day being spent on should take over part of the front held by the the Senne and one day on the Dendre positions ; French division on my right. To meet this thus the Escaut would be reached on the night request I placed under the orders of this division of 18/19 May, though the French orders did a brigade of 48th Division ; this step proved not rule out the possibility of staying for longer necessary since at about 6 p.m. the enemy had than one day on each bound. penetrated the French front, thus threatening That evening, I held a co-ordinating con- the right of 2nd Division. By this tune, how- ference at ist Corps Headquarters as a result ever, 48th Division, less one brigade, was in of which I ordered 5th Division, which was on position in ist Corps reserve behind 2nd the way to join 2nd Corps, to the line of the Senne Division, and I agreed with the commander of in ist Corps reserve. Two brigades of 46th ist Corps that the withdrawal of his right Division* which had been moved up from the should take place to the River Lasne to join Lines of Communication for the protection of up with the French left. This movement was carried out on the night of the 15/16 May, * One of the three divisions sent to France for closely followed by the enemy. pioneer duties. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 59*3 vulnerable points, were ordered to relieve units 23rd Division moved to their positions during of ist and 2nd Corps on protection and traffic I7th May; they were provided with about forty control of main routes in Belgium. Railheads, field, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft guns from which had been advanced on i3th May to the ordnance reserves. general line Enghien—Ninove, were now moved The enemy break-through was now offering back across the frontier. an imminent threat to rear G.H.Q., to the During the night i6/i7th May the withdrawal communications over the Somme at Amiens to the Senne positions began, and was success- and Abbeville, and to the base areas. To meet fully completed by the afternoon of the lyth. this, every available man and weapon was Some enemy tanks and motor cycle units had collected and orders were issued to the been reported on the right flank of ist Corps, commander, Lines of Communication Area, for west of the forest of Soignies, and as a precaution, the remainder of I2th and 46th Divisions to be part of the ist Army Tank Brigade, which had despatched to the forward zone. One brigade started to withdraw for entrainment, was (36th Infantry Brigade of I2th Division) turned about to meet the thrust. arrived during the day, and the leading By the time the tanks reached their entraining battalion was despatched with four field guns stations railway difficulties prevented the trucks to cover the north-western exits from PeYonne, being moved, and the remainder of the move while engineer parties, organised by the was carried out by road; this gave rise to Commander, G.H.Q. Troops, were sent to inevitable mechanical trouble later on. * prepare for demolition the crossings over the Canal du Nord between the river Somme and By.the early morning of iyth May the situation the right of 23rd Division at Ruyalcourt. in the south had become grave, and enemy The remainder of 36th Infantry Brigade were armoured and mobile forces were reported to moved forward to Albert, and the other two have crossed the Oise. At St. Quentin the brigades of I2th Division ordered to the Abbe- situation was obscure, and though by this time ville area. These latter, however, arrived too General Giraud, lately commanding the French late to come under my effective command, and 7th Army, had been ordered to take command their operations on the Somme were carried of the forces in that region, it was clear from out under the Commander Lines of Communi- reports and from visits of liaison officers that cation Area. he had not yet succeeded in establishing effective Elsewhere in the area between Corps rear control. A gap of at least twenty miles existed boundaries and the Somme, local defence south of the Forest of Mormal in which there schemes were put into operation under the appeared to be no organised resistance. Later orders of the Commanders of G.H.Q. Troops in the day information was received from the and of " X " Lines of Communication Sub-Area*. French that ten enemy armoured divisions were Few if any of these units or their commanders engaged in the battle. had any experience in fighting, but their During the whole of this period, communi- determination was beyond all praise. cation with my liaison officer at General Georges' A mobile bath unit, for example, took part Headquarters was maintained so as to keep in in the defence of St. Pol, while, both now and touch with events as they developed. However, later, the General Construction Companies of I received no infoimation thiough this channel the Royal Engineers, and many units of the of any steps it was proposed to take to close the Royal Army Service Corps, set to work to gap, which might have affected my own place their localities in a state of defence and command. manned them until they were overwhelmed, It was not till later, on the night of iqth/zoth relieved or ordered to withdraw. Wherever May, that General Billotte informed me of the possible, transport was collected or requisitioned action which was being taken to this end by to enable parachute detachments to be dealt the French Armies in the south. with. These many small delaying actions all contri- The defence of rearward areas. buted to gain the time required for the.with- 25. Rear G.H.Q. at Arras had intensified the drawal of the main forces. precautions already being taken against sabotage The defence of the town of Arras itself was and air landing units, but on the early morning entrusted to the O.C. ist Bn. Welsh Guards of I7th May a telegram was received from who had under his command some units of the General Georges ordering 23rd Division to move Royal Engineers, an Overseas Defence battalion at once to occupy the line of the Canal du Nord, (gth West Yorks), and various details including on a frontage of fifteen miles from Ruyalcourt an improvised tank squadron. (10 miles north of Pdronne) to Arleux (6 miles south of Douai). Orders were issued for all administrative troops not required for defence to move forthwith north The division, which, like the I2th and 46th of a line Orchies-Lens-Fre'vent. Divisions had joined the B.E.F. for work in rearward areas, consisted of eight battalions only At the same time to guard against a more with divisional engineers, but no artillery, and immediate threat to my right flank a force was signals and administrative units in no more than organised consisting of I27th Infantry Brigade skeleton form. Its armament and transport was of 42nd Division, ist Army Tank Brigade, on a much reduced scale and training was far a Field Artillery Regiment and the Hopkinson from complete. Missionf, all under the command of Major- General F. N. Mason-MacFarlane, my Director Nevertheless, troops of these three divisions fought and marched continuously for a fortnight, * This Sub-Area had been formed to deal with units and proved, were proof needed, that they were which, remained in the old G.H.Q. and Corps areas composed of soldiers who, despite their when the B.E.F. moved into Belgium. inexperience and lack of equipment, could hold f The Hopkinson Mission, under the Command oi Lieut.-Colonel G. F. Hopkinson, had been formed to their own with a better found and more numerous secure certain information for the R.A.F. and for enemy. G.H.Q. immediately on entry into Belgium. 59^4 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 of Military Intelligence. The force was known occupied by the French. It was not however as Macforce and its task was to cover the practicable to move the 23rd Division again crossings over the Scarpe between Raches (3 and G.Q.G. were informed to this effect. Yet, miles N.E. of Douai) and St. Amand. It began by next morning no French troops had appeared to assemble at Orchies on the afternoon of i7th either on the right of 23rd Division or to relieve May. them. Later in the day, however, an order was received by which the commander of the French Withdrawal to the Escaut begun. 2nd Region was ordered to fill the gap. En- 26. It had now to be decided whether or not quiries by a liaison officer at Amiens, where the the withdrawal from the Senne to the Dendre staff of the French 7th Army was in process of was to begin on the night of 17/18 May, and the taking over from the 2nd Region, established situation in the South was such that I felt that that no troops would be likely to arrive for to spend a day on the Senne would be to risk twenty-four hours at least. being outflanked on the right and so imperil By the afternoon, however, some enemy had the force under my command to no good purpose. reached Pe"ronne, and were in contact with General Billotte had issued orders for withdrawal 36th Infantry Brigade. to the Dendre that night, but I had also seen On this day Major-General R. L. Petre, an order from General Georges which envisaged commanding the I2th Division, was given remaining on the Senne for a further twenty- command of the troops engaged on this flank, four hours. I therefore sent a liaison officer to namely 23rd Division, 36th Infantry Brigade General Billotte to represent my views. In and the garrison of Arras.* the result, General Billotte's orders stood In the meantime an order issued by the French confirmed. First Group of Armies had laid down the By 4 p.m. on i7th May therefore ist and 2nd boundary between the French ist Army and Corps were on the Senne with 5th, ist and 4th the B.E.F. through Maulde, Orchies, Raches Divisions in line right to left. 48th Division and He*nin Li6tard. Arras was thus excluded was covering the right flank from Enghien to from the zone of the B.E.F., but its defence Lembecq. 5oth Division was on the Dendre, to was necessarily continued by British troops. which line 2nd and 3rd Divisions were now All troops not required for defence left on the withdrawing,, whilst 3 Corps was in position on igth, including rear G.H.Q. which moved in two the Escaut with 42nd Division (less one infantry echelons to Hazebrouck and Boulogne in accord- brigade) and 44th Division. ance with plans prepared on i7th May when the threat to Arras became serious. 27. On i8th May I held a conference at the headquarters of ist Corps at which were settled On the evening of i8th May I moved back the details of the withdrawal to the Escaut. my command post from Renaix to its previous This line was to be held with six divisions, right location at Wahagnies. to left ist Corps (48th and 42nd Divisions, less Moves of the Royal Air Force. one infantry brigade, with 2nd Division in 29. On this day also, the bulk of the Advanced reserve), 2nd Corps (ist and 3rd Divisions with Air Striking Force moved from the neighbour- 50th Division in reserve), 3rd Corps (4th and 44th hood of Rheims to Central France and the Air Divisions), on a front from the bridge over the Component moved one of their main operational Escaut at Binaries to Audenarde, both inclu- aerodromes from Poix to Abbeville. On the sive. 5th Division was in G.H.Q. reserve. evening of I9th May enemy action obliged them There was little pressure during the day on to evacuate this aerodrome also. The Ah* the British front or on that of the Belgians to Officer Commanding the Air Component then the North. Owing to the late arrival of orders moved his headquarters to England, but an the Belgian Army had started their withdrawal advanced landing ground was maintained at after the B.E.F.; they had therefore asked for Merville until 22nd May. and received protection to their right flank at From the 2 ist May onwards all arrangements Brusseghem up to 7 a.m. and Assche up to for air co-operation with the B.E.F. were made 8 a.m. on i8th May. On withdrawal they by the War Office in conjunction with the Air effected a junction with the B.E.F. on the Ministry at home. The air liaison work was Dendre at Alost. carried out in England at Hawkinge and the Southward from their junction with the targets selected in accordance with telephone B.E.F. the French line ran through Mons and or telegraphic requests from the B.E.F. so long Maubeuge, and enemy tanks were attacking as communications remained open, supple- the front of the French Corps on my immediate mented by information received from the Royal right. Enemy air action had by now intensified Air Force, and other sources. on the front of the B.E.F. and continuous fighter support was necessary during the hours of day- Alternative plans considered. light, both to enable our reconnaissances to take 30. On the night of 18/19 May, the ist, 2nd place and to hold off enemy bombers. The and 3rd Corps completed then: withdrawal to enemy did not confine bis attention to troops the line of the Escaut without interference, and but attacked the long columns of refugees prepared to defend the line of the river. Soon which continued to move westwards. after arrival, however, the level of the water became dangerously low, at places less than The position on the Canal du Nord. three feet deep. It looked, therefore, as if, apart 28. The position on the Canal du Nord had from the unusually dry weather, some of the caused some anxiety, partly on account of con- sluices in the neighbourhood of Valenciennes had tradictory orders received. Shortly after orders been closed in order to produce inundations had been issued on I7th May for the occupation in the low lying ground in that area, even if of the position by 23rd Division, an order was at the expense of the water on the front of the received from G.Q.G. allotting to the B.E.F. B.E.F. the sector Pe'ronne-Ruyalcourt instead of the * Major-General Petre's command was known as sector Ruyalcourt-Arleux which was now to be Petreforce. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17. OCTOBER/1941 "59*5 The enemy had, during the previous day, the abandonment of large quantities of equip- penetrated as far as Amiens, and rail communica- ment. It would obviously be unwelcome to tion with the bases was severed' at that'point. the Belgians who would be faced with the 'Communications by road and rail over the alternatives of withdrawing with us and aban- Sorrime at Abbeville were still holding on igth doning Belgian soil, fighting on a perimeter of May and the town was being placed in a state their own, or seeking an armistice. of defence with such resources as were available, So far as I am aware, the French High mainly, units of I2th Division. However, there Command had never suggested such a move- was little doubt that enemy armoured forces ment up to that date and it is doubtful whether in'that area, which at the time I estimated at even had they, decided on immediate withdrawal five armoured divisions, would shortly break as soon as the French gth Army front on the through to the coast. Meuse had been penetrated, there would ever The force could then no longer be supplied have been sufficient time for the troops in the through the ports south of the Somme, and the north to conform. great bulk of the reserves, which were in the Thirdly there was the possibility of with- rearward areas, would • shortly cease to be drawal north-westwards or northwards towards available to the force for the purposes of main- the Channel ports, making use of the successive tenance or replacement. Several days' reserve river and canal lines, and of holding a defensive had, however, for some time past been maintained perimeter there, at any rate sufficiently long to north of the Somme. enable the force to be withdrawn, preferably in The prospect of securing the reinforcement of concert with the French and Belgians. I the Armoured Division had likewise become realised that this course was in theory a last remote/ I had been advised that two Armoured alternative, as it would involve the departure Brigades, of this division would disembark at of the B.E.F. from the theatre of war at a time Havre on i6th May, and were to concentrate at when the French might need all the support Bolbec, and I had therefore sent instructions by which Britain could give them. It involved the hand of a staff officer to the Commander the virtual certainty that even if the excellent (Major-General R. Evans). He was to move the port facilities at Dunkirk continued to be leading brigade on disembarkation with all available, it would be necessary to abandon speed to secure, the crossings of the Somme west all the heavier guns and much of the vehicles of Amiens, from Picquigny to Pont Remy, both and equipment. Nevertheless, I felt that in inclusive, with a view to .the concentration of the the circumstances there might be no other remaining -brigade behind the Somme and the course open to me. It was therefore only move of his division to join the main body of prudent to consider what the adoption of such the B.E.F. However, in the meantime, orders a plan might entail. On this day therefore at had been issued locally to concentrate the about 1.30 p.m. the Chief of the General Staff Division south of the Seine, and the plan to telephoned to the Director of Military Opera- cross the Somme and join the B.E.F. proved tions and Plans at the War Office and discussed impossible to execute. The division therefore this situation with him. remained in the Lines of Communication Area and never came under my effective command. The Position of the French ist Army and the About midnight on the iSth/igth May, British right flank reinforced. General Billotte came to see me, and gave me 31. The French ist Army had by igth May an account of the situation as he saw it. He completed its withdrawal and was in touch also told me of the measures which were being with the right of ist Corps. On the night of taken to restore the situation on the front of i9/20th May they took up positions on the line the French Qth Army, though clearly he had of the Escaut as far south as Bouchain ; but at little hope that they would be effective. Reports that point, instead of continuing to hold that from the liaison officers with French formations river towards Cambrai (which according to my .were likewise not encouraging ; in particular information was not held in strength by the I was unable to verify that the French had enemy) they had drawn back westwards along enough reserves at their disposal south of the the river Sensee. Thus in the quadrilateral gap to enable them to stage counter-attacks Maulde—Va-lenciennes—Arleux—Douai, some sufficiently strong to warrant the expectation nineteen miles by ten, there was assembled the that the gap would be closed. bulk of the French ist Army, amounting to Thus, in my opinion, there was an imminent three Corps of two divisions and two divisions danger of the forces in the north-eastern area, in reserve—a total of eight divisions. The that is to say the French forces next to the sea, Commander of the French 3rd Corps, General the Belgian Army, the B.E.F. and the bulk of de la Laurencie, remained that night in close the French ist Army on our right, being touch with General Mason-MacFarlane, at the irretrievably cut off from the main French headquarters of Macforce. forces in the south. Further west the French Cavalry Corps was There were three alternative courses of action assembling at Oppy, north-east of Arras. open to the northern forces under General None of these forces were being seriously Billotte : first, in the event of the gap being pressed at this stage, but since the enemy had closed by successful counter-attacks made already penetrated, so deeply further south, I simultaneously from north and south it would felt it necessary, without more delay, to in theory be possible to maintain the line of the strengthen the dispositions for the defence of Escaut, or at any rate the frontier defences, what had become the bastion of Arras. It was and thence southwards on one or other of the also necessary to secure crossings westwards canal lines. from the right of Macforce, along the line Secondly, there was the possibility of a with- Carvin—La Basse"e. drawal to the-line of the Somme as far as its I therefore ordered soth Division, then in mouth. This plan had the attraction that we G.H.Q. reserve, to send one Infantry Brigade should be falling back on our lines of communi- (25th) to take up positions on the Canal on the cation and if it was successful would not entail line La Bassee—Carvin under the command of •5916 -SUPPLEMENT TO THE. LONDON GAZETTE, -17 -OCTOBER:

Macforce. The remainder of the division was - I .discussed,--these- instructions- with,'.the moved that night (i9/20th) to the same area, .C.I.G.S. at- my Command Post at Wahagnies and was thus suitably placed for the counter at 8.15 a.m.; I put to him my view that attack in which they took part on 2ist May. withdrawal to "the south-westwards, however I also ordered I2th Lancers with a field desirable in principle, was not. in the circum- battery to move to Arras and carry'out necessary stances practicable. ; reconnaissances south and south-westwards, . In the first place, it would involve the dis- and to gain touch with the outlying portions of engagement of seven divisions which were at Petreforce. the time in close contact with the enemy on the Arras was heavily bombed for the first time' Escaut, and would be immediately followed up. on igth May, but 23rd Division, though in an In addition to this-rearguard action the B.E.F. exposed position, was not seriously attacked. in its retirement to the Somme would have to However, at 5 a.m., 6th Royal West Kent, of attack into 'an area already strongly occupied 36th Infantry Brigade, on the Canal du Nord by the enemy armoured and mobile formations. north-west of Peronne, had been attacked by Some of these indeed now appeared to be holding enemy tanks and had been withdrawn to Sailly •the line of the Somme whilst others were already on the road to Albert. -within a short distance of the coast, and might turn northwards at any time. Thus the B.E.F. General Petre that night issued orders for would be obliged to disengage its seven divisions 23rd Division to withdraw from the Canal du in contact with the enemy, fighting a rearguard Nord to the line of the Grinchon river south of 'action, at the same tune to attack south-west- Arras to join up at La Herliere with 36th wards, and finally to break through enemy Infantry Brigade which was to hold a line forces on the Somme. During this manoeuvre thence to Doullens. 23rd Division was, how- both flanks would have to be guarded. ever, caught by enemy aircraft when embussed and finally occupied posts on the line of the Secondly, the administrative situation made Scarpe for some six miles East of Arras. it unlikely that sustained offensive operations could be undertaken. Communication with the Thus, by the evening of igth May, the situa- bases was on the point of being interrupted. tion was somewhat relieved in that the defensive The mobile echelons of gun and small arms flank had begun to take shape. On the other ammunition were full, but once they were hand, the character of the operation had now exhausted I could not safely reckon on being radically altered with the arrival of German able to replenish them. troops in Amiens. The picture was now no Lastly, though I was not in a position to longer that of a line bent or temporarily broken, judge, I had the impression that even if I had but of a besieged fortress. To raise such a decided to attempt this manoeuvre, neither the siege, a relieving force must be sent from the French ist Army nor the Belgians would have south and to meet this force a sortie on the been in a position to conform. part of the defenders was indicated. Nevertheless, I told the C.I.G.S. that I fully realised the importance of an attack in a The attack of $th and 50$ Divisions. southerly direction and that I already had plans 32. On 2oth May, the breach South of Arras in hand to counter-attack with the 5th and deepened and widened. From indications 5oth Divisions to the south of Arras and that received during the day the enemy armoured these divisions would be ready to attack on forces appeared to be directed on two main the following morning (2ist May). These were objectives; one down the valley of the Somme the only reserves which I then had available, on Abbeville, the other by Hesdin and Montreuil, apart from one armoured reconnaissance brigade, doubtless making for the Channel Ports. and one infantry brigade of 2nd Division. To I2th Lancers, early in the day, reported tanks create a further reserve I had already begun "from the direction of Cambrai approaching negotiations with Belgian G.Q.G. for the relief Arras, where they were held off by the Welsh of 44th Division on the Escaut, but these were Guards; a strong request for bomber support not yet completed. was therefore made through the War Office to The C.I.G.S. agreed with this action and accom- the Air Ministry. Later in the day enemy panied by the C.G.S. he left for Lens to meet tanks were reported to be ten miles west of Generals Billotte and Blanchard. At that Arras, and all endeavours by I2th Lancers to interview the C.I.G.S. explained the action to reach Doullens had failed. By 6 p.m. they be taken by 5th and 5oth Divisions. General were back on the line Arras—St. Pol. Billotte fully agreed to this plan, and said that Early in the morning General Sir Edmund the French would co-operate with two divisions. Ironside, the Chief of the Imperial General On return to my headquarters, the C.I.G.S. Staff arrived at G.H.Q.; he brought with him sent a telegram to General Georges which made instructions from the Cabinet that the B.E.F. it clear that, in his opinion, General Billotte's was to move southwards upon Amiens, attacking Army Group would be finally cut off unless the all enemy forces encountered and to take station French ist Army made an immediate move on on the left of the French Army. He was also Gambrai or unless General Georges launched a to inform General Billotte and the Belgian counter-attack northwards from Peronne. My command, making it clear to the latter that liaison officers with Generals Billotte and Blan- their best chance was to. move that night chard conveyed a similar message from me to between the B.E.F. and the coast. those commanders, making it clear that if our Similar information was to be given by the counter-attack was not successful the French War Office to General Georges. During the and British Armies north of the gap would day however, it appeared that operations were have their flank turned and could no longer actually being directed by General Weygand remain in their present positions. who later, on 23rd May, announced in a General On 2ist May I sent a formal acknowledgement Order that he was now Commander-in-Chief of the instructions brought by the C.I.G.S. in all theatres of war. adding that, in my opinion, withdrawal to the -SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON~GAZETTE; 17 OCTOBER, 1941 south-west was' entirely impossible until the •covered" had -already far e'xceeded the estimated situation had been retrieved on the front of the life of the tracks which were now beginning to French ist Army. break through wear. It v/as clear therefore that the attack of 33. 5th Division was therefore "ordered .to Frankforce would not maintain its momentum join 5oth Division in the Vimy area, and its .unless it was reinforced and supported by the commander, Major-General Franklyn, was placed French on its left. • During 22nd May, therefore, in command of all the British troops operating .General Franklyn held his ground, and pro- in and around Arras. Frankforce, as it was to longed his right flank westwards, while the be known, consisted of 5th and 5oth .Divisions -French Cavalry Corps took up a position at (each of two brigades only), ist Army Tank •Mont St. Eloi. All day long pressure increased Brigade* (previously with Macforce) together round his right flank, and an observation post with Petref orce. and the force under O.C. i2th of i2th Lancers on Mont St. Eloi could see at Lancers. Petreforce was by this time very tired one moment as many as 48 enemy tanks. and widely dispersed. • Next day (23rd May) the enemy advanced My immediate instructions to General Franklyri steadily north-eastwards from the high ground were to. occupy the bridgeheads on the Scarpe, of the Lorette ridge, and by evening they were east of Arras and thus to relieve the remains of reconnoitring the' southern outskirts of Bethune 23rd Division. He would then be suitably and the road from Lens to Carvin. It was clear disposed to advance south and south-east of that Frankforce was becoming dangerously Arras on the following day in conjunction with hemmed in. Two roads were still available for the French. ' their extrication and at about 7 p.m. I decided It will be convenient to conclude the story that .there was no alternative but to withdraw of Frankforce here. Frankforce. This withdrawal had necessarily to be in an easterly direction. 5th and 5oth During the evening of 20th May, General Divisions had been engaged with the enemy all Franklyn completed his reconnaissances for an day and had inflicted very severe losses ; they attack on the following day to secure the line were now ordered to withdraw to the area of the rivers Scarpe and Cojeul: his intention around Seclin, where they would be well placed was to exploit success by moving on 22nd May to take part in any further counter-attack to to the Sensee and thence towards Bapaume the southward which might be staged. Petre- and Cambrai. In these plans he had the full force was withdrawn to an area north of Seclin. co-operation of General Prioux, Commander of the French Cavalry Corps, but the light Thus concluded the defence of Arras, which mechanised divisions were much" reduced in had been carried out by a small garrison, hastily strength and probably had no more than one assembled but well commanded, and determined quarter of their tanks fit for action. to fight. It had imposed a valuable delay on a greatly superior enemy force against which it However, one of these divisions was ordered had blocked a vital road centre. to advance on each side of Frankfbrce, while 12th Lancers watched the right flank on the 2ist May — The Organisation of the Canal line. Arras—St. Pol road. The hope was not realised, however, that the French 5th Corps would also 34. The time had now come to organise, as attack southwards from Douai with two divisions soon as possible, the further defence of the in co-operation with Frankforce on the 2ist. south-western flank of the force. A conference had been arranged at 6 p.m. on " The enemy advance beyond Arras had hitherto the 20th at General Franklyn's headquarters but been carried out almost entirely by armoured no representative from that Corps attended. forces, supported by motorised infantry which Finally, at 12.30 p.m. on the 2ist I received a was doubtless increasing in numbers every day. letter from General Blanchard to say that the The situation regarding the enemy's normal Corps Commander, General Altmeyer, thought'he infantry divisions was still uncertain. It was could move on the 22nd or the following night. therefore of first importance to reinforce the Tim;, however, was vital. General Franklyn organisation of the line of the canals from the adhered to his plans, and at 2 p.m. attacked with Escaut to La Bassee, and to continue it to ist Army Tank Brigade, I5ist Infantr,y Brigade St. Omer and the sea. These canals offered the of 5oth Division and I3th Infantry Brigade of only anti-tank obstacle on this flank. They were, however, crossed by numerous bridges, many of 5th Division all under General Martel. The which had already been prepared for demolition French ist Light Mechanised Division co- by our own engineers under my Engineer-in- operated, though its movements did not develop Chief (Major-General R. P. Pakenham- Walsh), so widely to the flanks as General Franklyn the Commander of Macforce, and the French had hoped. Commanders' of the fortified sectors of Lille and The opposition was stronger than had been Flanders (Qene'raux de Brigade Bertschi and expected. Objectives for the day were reached, Barthdiemy). and in the evening there were heavy dive- It had been proved that even weak garrisons bombing attacks by the enemy. Enemy tanks holding important road centres, such as Arras had been put to flight: over 400 prisoners had and Doullens, were of much value in imposing been captured: a number of enemy had been delay, for the initial advances of the enemy killed and many transport vehicles destroyed. always followed the main roads. It was therefore The tank brigade had, however, begun to decided to continue the policy of organising suffer severely from mechanical trouble ; the such " stops," not only along the canals but at tanks had been on the road continuously since all possible centres whether north or south of they detrained -at Brussels, and the mileage the canal line. Macforce, which had been formed on * At this time their strength was reduced to approxi- mately 65 Mark I and 18 Mark II tanks. By the end of May, had been augmented on i8th and igth by the withdrawal from Arras there remained 26 Mark I I38th Infantry Brigade (46th Division) which and 2 luark II tanks. went into line on the canal between Raches and ' SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

Carvin, and on the following day isgth Infantry near Maulde on the front of ist Division a Brigade of the same division joined the force. number of enemy had crossed the river dis- On 2ist May I27th Infantry-Brigade rejoined the guised as refugees, but had been detected and 42nd Division and the sector from Millonfosse driven out with the bayonet. The Corps Com- to St. Amand was handed over to the French. manders all felt that they could hot how hold Already on 2oth May, I had ordered Major- on for more than .twenty-four hours. We General Curtis, Commanding 46th Division, to discussed a withdrawal to our old frontier take command of the sector of the canals between defences, where advantage could be taken of the Aire and Carvin. General Curtis' force was existing blockhouses and trenches, and of tha known as Polforce, and was to.consist of four anti-tank ditch. This move would have little battalions - of 46th Division, 25th Infantry effect on the French on our right since it would Brigade of 5.oth Division (in line between La pivot on the junction point, where the Escaut Bassee and Carvin) and one field battery, crossed the frontier, but "would seriously affect together with a number of engineer and other the Belgians, who now held the line of the units o'f G.H.Q. troops which had been moving Escaut from Audenarde to Ghent and of the northwards and .were collected on the Canal. canal from Ghent to the sea at Terneuzen. It had originally been intended that part of this I had also to consider the pressing need to force should hold St. Pol, Prevent and Divion, stiffen the defence of the canal line westwards to but the railway trains in which were the remain- Gravelines and to form a new reserve to replace ing three battalions of 46th Division failed to the divisions now committed to counter-attacks reach that town in time and remained south of southward from Arras. the Somme. The defence of these localities south A provisional decision was therefore reached of the Canal had therefore to be abandoned. to withdraw to the frontier defences on the night Further to the north-west the defence of the of 22nd/23rd May, details being left until I had canal line was being organised by Brigadier reached agreement with the French and the C. M. Usher, Commander of X Lines of Communi- Belgians. cation Sub-area. On 22nd May he reported that General Weygand had visited General Billotte the enemy had already reached the left bank of during the day and the latter indicated that an the river Aa between Gravelines and St. Omer. attack was being planned for the following day 23rd Division had been ordered to move to this (22nd May), northwards from the direction of area and its leading battalion (6th Green Howards) Roye, with the object of closing the gap. At arrived at Gravelines. Brigadier Usher therefore 8 p.m. on 2ist May I went to Ypres where in held the right bank of the river from St. Omer to the Burgomaster's office I met H.M. the King Gravelines with this battalion and five batteries of the Belgians and General Billotte. There of heavy artillery used as infantry, in conjunction were also present General Van Overstraeten, with certain French troops of the Secteur General Champon, the head of the French Fortifie des Flandres. Mission with Belgian G.Q.G., General Pownall The front of Macforce was covered by the and others. French, 3rd, 4th and 5th Corps, who were still I explained the situation which was developing in their quadrilateral on the line of the Escaut on the Escaut about Audenarde, and the diffi- and the Sensee. Here, however, information culty of maintaining positions there since the was frequently lacking and could only be obtained water in the river was so low as no longer to by reconnaissance. form an obstacle. It was then agreed that on Thus, by 22nd May, the canal line was occupied the night of 22nd/23rd May the Escaut should be in the sense that the whole of the length of 85 abandoned and that the Allied armies should miles from the sea at Gravelines to Millonfosse occupy a line from Maulde northwards to (West of St. Amand) was divided into sectors Halluin, thence along the Lys to Courtrai and for each of which a British commander was Ghent. responsible. The total strength of the troops I discussed the possibility of reserves. It on the Canal line did not on this day exceed appeared that the available divisions of the 10,000 men, and the number of anti-tank French ist Army were all too tired to take part weapons was barely adequate to cover all the in offensive operations in the immediate future. crossing places: certainly there could be no It was therefore agreed that the French should question of being able to keep an effective take over a further sector of the defensive watch against small parties of infantry crossing positions northwards from Maulde, so that the the canal between the bridges. The barges, 2nd and 48th Divisions could be withdrawn into however, had almost all been moved away or reserve on leaving the line of the Escaut. The ,, at any rate to the bank furthest from the enemy, French took up these positions on 22nd May. .and bridges were fast being prepared for On the north, 44th Division on withdrawal demolition. from the Escaut were to hold the sector Halluin- - Courtrai, but it was hoped that a Belgian 2ist May—The Situation on the Belgian Front. formation would relieve them on the night of 35. On 2ist May at 4.45 p.m. I met the three 23rd/24th May. Corps Commanders. I told them what had When these moves were complete the Allied happened on the southern flank and how, in line would run slightly west of north to Halluin, -order to take the initiative and encourage the and then almost at right angles, north-eastwards French ist Army to do likewise, I had gone to along the Lys. It was evident that sooner or the length of committing practically the whole later the Belgian army would have to swing of my reserve. back to a line in rear, pivoting on their right From the Corps Commanders I learned that of Halluin. Accordingly at the end of the the line was thinly held and that attacks had conference General Billotte asked the King of taken place at several points. At Petegem on the Belgians whether if he were forced to with- the front of 44th Division the enemy had secured draw he would fall back on to the line of the a bridgehead 1,000 yards deep on a front of Yser. His Majesty agreed, though evidently 3,000 yards, and at the junction with the French with some regret, that no alternative line existed. SUPPLEMENT to THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 5919 On return from the meeting, orders were issued evacuation was carrie.d out under the orders of to implement these decisions, and that evening the War Office, being completed on the night I moved my command post to the Chateau de of 23/24th May. Premesques, midway between Armenti&res and Lille. The Administrative Situation. 37. During the whole of this period I had The final severance of the L. of C. and the invest- been kept in the closest touch with the adminis- ment of Boulogne. trative situation by the Quarter-Master-General 36. During the gist May the enemy penetra- (Lieutenant-General W. G. Lindsell). Up to tion into the rearward areas increased and com- i6th May the administrative arrangements munication across the Somme was finally which formed part of Plan D had worked well, severed. Since the I7th May the Commander and although enemy air action steadily intensified of the Lines of Communication Area (Major- during the period, there was no serious inter- General P. de Fonblanque) had been taking ference with the maintenance of the force. energetic steps for its defence, in so far as it was On i7th May, however, the Quarter-Master- possible with the few and scattered troops General decided, in view of the situation south available. of Arras, to discontinue the use of the railway These consisted, apart from Armoured from the regulating station at Abancourt via Division and 5ist Division now returning Amiens and Arras, and to switch all traffic via from the Saar, of those portions of I2th and Eu and Abbeville to Bethune. He also ordered 46th Divisions (some nine battalions in all) forward every available trainload of ammunition which could not be despatched forward, three to the Hazebrouck area. unbrigaded infantry battalions and the contents On igth May, directly after the C.G.S. had of the reinforcement depdts, together with spoken to the War Office as to the possibility troops of the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps of enforced withdrawal, the Q.M.G. telephoned and of the administrative services. to the War Office to discuss the opening of new On '23rd May, however, the War Office bases. On the same day, one of his staff officers appointed Lieutenant-General- Sir Henry .left for London to arrange an emergency ship- Karslake to command the defences on the Lines ment programme for supplies and stores to of Communication and I was not concerned in the ports of Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk. It the operations which ensued. Nevertheless, was to prove none too soon, for the railway I did not immediately abandon hope of the at Abbeville was cut on 2ist May. A new plan Armoured Division breaking through, and I had to be put into operation at once for the urged the War Office to use their best endeavours. maintenance of the fcfrce north of the Somme, to this end and to prevent its being used piece- estimated at 250,000 men and requiring a daily meal in local operations at the request of the lift of ammunition, supplies and petrol, of some French Command. 2,000 tons. At about 3.30 p.m. on the 2ist May, I received The petrol situation, fortunately, gave no cause information that an enemy column of all arms for concern since, although the dumps forward was approaching Boulogne. The rear element of the Somme had been destroyed on evacuation, of G.H.Q., consisting largely of the Adjutant- together with a large civil storage plant near General's Branch and of headquarters of Douai, there still remained a large army bulk Services, which had been sent to that town on filling station near Lille. I7th and i8th May, had been moved to Wimereux The supply situation was however, bad, and on 20th May as a result of enemy bombing. on 2ist May, Corps had only three days * All possible steps had been taken to put R.A.S.C. supplies in the forward area. Matters Boulogne in a state of defence with the troops might, at any time, have become serious had it available, consisting of labour units and the not been for the success of the measures taken personnel of rest camps. On igth May, an between 23rd and 26th May, to organise the endeavour was made to bring up troops from supplies in Lille belonging to the Expeditionary beyond the Somme, to hold the line of the Canche; Force Institutes and to civilian firms. but the time for this was past and the troops The decision to maintain the force through could not get beyond Abbeville. The hospitals the northern ports was finally taken on 2ist in the Etaples area were now evacuated, and on May and the headquarters of a Base Sub-Area 2ist May a party of Engineers, supervised by established at Dunkirk, together with a section my Director of Works, Brigadier W. Cave- of Q.M.G's staff, in close touch with the British Browne, demolished most of the bridges over and French Naval authorities. the Canche. Rail communication in the area was by now As soon as the news of this new threat was precarious, and plans were worked out on the received, the War Office was asked for bomber basis of establishing dumps, one in each Corps . support, which was at once forthcoming. Enemy area, which could be wholly maintained by tanks were located and bombed at Hesdin and road. The position was, by this time, greatly Fruges, but no good targets were obtained on complicated by the numbers of improvised the coast road. The War Office was also asked forces which the quickly changing situation to send a detachment of Royal Marines for the had made necessary: most of these, like the defence of Boulogne but had already done three divisions for pioneer duties, had no proper so. Early on the 22nd May, 2oth Guards administrative echelons. Some were within Brigade (Brigadier W. A. F.' L. Fox-Pitt) of reach of Corps, but others were not and these two battalions with an anti-tank battery had to be dependent on fortuitous sources of .landed, thus establishing the defence of the supply, or else live for a time on the country. town and enabling those troops who were not The situation had" grown even worse by required for the defence to be evacuated in 22nd May, when the ports at both Boulogne good order. and Calais were out of action, and the greater By the evening of 22nd May, the enemy part of the Railhead Mechanical Transport armoured forces were within nine miles of Calais. Companies had been captured. Furthermore if-g final a^ reconnaissance of Ostend had shewn that the 5920 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 port could not be worked for military require- execution has hope of restoring the situation. ments at short notice. A certain amount of Weygand reports French VII Army is advanc- rations and small arms ammunition was sent ing successfully and has captured Peronne, by air up to 23rd May, but from then onwards Albert and Amiens. While realising fully it became impossible for aircraft to land. On dangers and difficulties of your position which 23rd May therefore, on the advice of the Q.M.G., has been explained to Weygand it is essential I decided to place the B.E.F. on half rations. that you should make every endeavour to Dunkirk, though its water supply was co-operate in his plan. Should however destroyed, remained available for unloading situation on your communications make this supplies till 26th May, but constant air raids at any time impossible you should inform us imposed a well nigh unbearable strain on the so that we can inform French and make stevedore battalions. However, they remained Naval and Air arrangements to assist you at duty until, in the end, all the quays and cranes should you have to withdraw on the northern were put out of action. Thereafter supplies coast." could only be landed on the beaches. Lighters It will be noted that, according to the telegram arrived to embark troops loaded with a portion General Weygand informed the Prime Minister of supplies, ammunition and water, and these that Peronne, Albert and Amiens had- been were unloaded and distributed by Corps. The recaptured. It later transpired that this in- delivery of supplies to Corps was maintained, formation was inaccurate. albeit irregularly, up till 30th May when the The Weygand plan, as it came to be known, last convoy went forward from the supply depdt was for a counter offensive on a large scale. on the beach at La Panne. From the north the French ist Army and the By 20th May all the General Hospitals had B.E.F. were to attack south-west at the earliest been cut off from the forward area and possible moment with about eight divisions improvised arrangements had to be made for and with the Belgian Cavalry Corps supporting the evacuation of casualties. Some of the the British right. Casualty Clearing Stations had to be diverted The newly formed Third French Army Group from their normal function and used as Hospitals. was reported to be organising a line on the Hospital ships continued to berth at Dunkirk Somme from Amiens to Peronne with a view to till the night 3ist May/ist June and casualties attacking northwards. were evacuated to them by road and by rail. Ambulance trains were running as late as 26th A new cavalry Corps was assembling south of May. the Somme near Neufchatel and was to operate * on the line of the Somme west of Amiens, in Further proposals for an attack Southwards. 'touch with the British Armoured Division on 38. On 23rd May the French ist Army their left. pushed forward some elements southwards I fully appreciated the importance of attacking from Douai. On the same day, 5th and 5oth early before the enemy could bring up his Divisions, which had attacked two days before, infantry in strength, but facts had to be faced. were themselves being attacked on the Scarpe The 5th and 5oth Divisions were on this day and had already lost most of their tanks through (23rd May) still closely engaged with the enemy, mechanical wear. and 2nd, 44th and 48th Divisions, would not be- come available for a further 48 hours, since the The threat to their rear was increasing hourly French and the Belgians> though they had and they were thus unable to make any further arranged their relief, could not complete it advance or to assist the French, except in so far earlier. The ammunition immediately available, as they were able to engage troops who might - to the B.E.F. .was of the order of 300 rounds otherwise have threatened the right flank of per gun and with communications cut with the the French advance. The French approached main base, the prospect of receiving any further the outskirts of Cambrai meeting with little supply was remote. opposition but withdrew later on being attacked by dive-bombers. The French light mechanised divisions and our own armoured units had already suffered On the same day I received a copy of a serious losses in tanks which could not be telegram from the Prime Minister to M. Reynaud, replaced. Such information as I. had received which read as follows:— of the Belgian cavalry did not lead me to take " Strong enemy armoured forces have an optimistic view of the prospect of their cut communications of Northern Armies. being able to engage, at short notice, in a battle Salvation of these Armies can only be obtained forty miles away and on French soil. by immediate execution of Weygand's plan. Experience had already shown the vital I demand that French Commanders in North importance of close co-ordination of the allied and South and Belgian G.Q.G. be given most armies in any operation. General Billotte had stringent orders to carry this out and turn been appointed the co-ordinator at the con- defeat into victory. Time vital as supplies ference at Mons on I2th May, but in practice, are short." the measure of co-ordination fell far short of I was not sure whether the situation which what was required if the movements of the was developing for the allied armies in the three allied armies were to be properly controlled. north could be accurately appreciated except Except for the issue of orders to retire from on the spot. I therefore telegraphed to Sir the Dyle (obtained only after I had sent Major- John Dill asking him to fly over that day. General Eastwood to General Billotte's head- The next day, however (24th May), the Prime quarters to represent my views), I received no Minister again conferred with M. Reynaud and written orders from the French First Group of General Weygand in Paris, and I received the Armies, though at the meetings between following telegram from the Secretary of State General Billotte and myself which took place describing that conference :— from time to time, we always found ourselves " Both are convinced that Weygand's plan in complete agreement. Unfortunately, how- is still capable of execution and only in its ever, General Billotte had been seriously.-and. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 5921 as it turned out, fatally injured in a motor These moves left only four divisions on the accident returning from the conference which he frontier defences and made'it possible to with- and I had attended at Ypres on the night of draw the headquarters and Corps troops of 2ist May. General Blanchard succeeded him in 3rd Corps for employment on the Canal line command of the French First Group of Armies, where they were badly needed. This was done and presumably succeeded to the function of at 4 p.m. on 23rd May, leaving ist Corps with co-ordination although this was never officially 42nd and ist Divisions and 2nd Corps with confirmed. 3rd and 4th Divisions. 2nd, 44th and 48th Divisions tcame under out 3rd Corps and that night made a' march west- of three different nations, and that I personally wards. I had decided to employ 2nd and 44th could not undertake any measure of co-ordina- Divisions on the Canal line facing west, but their tion in the forthcoming operations as I was move required a farther twenty-four hours to already actively engaged on my Eastern and complete. Southern fronts and also threatened on my Meanwhile the canal defences required stiffen- Lines of Communication. ing as much as possible. And accordingly, Nevertheless, I saw General Blanchard and Polforce temporarily assumed control of the proposed to him that to implement our part of whole front between St. Omer and Raches, the Weygand plan, we should stage an attack and two regiments of 2nd Armoured Recon- southwards with two British divisions, one naissance Brigade were placed under its com- French division and the French Cavalry Corps. mand. Polforce also undertook the responsi- So far as we were concerned the attack could bility for demolitions as far north as Watten not take place till the 26th at the earliest owing including no less than 43 bridges. to the.reliefs which were in progress, and the The sector eastward from Raches was now need to assemble 5th and 5oth Divisions. I handed over to the French, the British also asked General Blanchard to enquire from demolition parties being left on the bridges at G.Q.G. how such an operation could be syn- the disposal of French 3rd Corps. chronised with the attack from the line of the Macforce, now comprising four field batteries, Somme which was said to be in process of half an anti-tank battery and one battalion, preparation. These negotiations, as will be seen, withdrew from the line Carvin-Raches on were later continued by Sir Ronald Adam on 23rd May and was moved to a rendezvous in my behalf. I emphasised, both to the Secretary the. eastern end of the Forest of Nieppe where of State and'to General Blanchard, that the it was joined by Headquarters and one. regiment principal effort must come from the south, and of ist Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade. that the operation of the northern forces could i39th Infantry Brigade (46th Division) continued be nothing more than a sortie. to hold the sector from Carvin to Raches until I never received any information from any 26th May. source as to the exact location of our own or .The situation on the canal line deteriorated enemy forces on the far side of the gap; nor during 23rd May and the enemy established did I receive any details or timings of any bridgeheads at Aire, at St. Omer (which seems proposed attack from that direction. to have changed hands twice during the day) and near Watten.1 His tanks were reported as zyrd May—Further development of the Canal line. harbouring in the forest of Clairmarais, and 39. On 23rd May the organisation- was con- during the day his armoured fighting vehicles tinued of " stops " behind the Canal line. came within three miles of Hazebrouck. ,By At Hazebrouck, where the organisation of the evening, however, these movements nad defences had been begun on 2 ist May by the been checked and steps taken to keep. the staff of the Major-General R.A. at G.H.Q. enemy out of the Forest of Nieppe. the garrison was now about 300 strong and . The enemy had also been active that day on included eighteen French light tanks and some the canal line at Be'thune, where they had been Belgian machine gunners. driven off and had then moved towards Carvin. Cassel was occupied by i3/i8th Hussars, less Here the defenders had been reinforced by one squadron, and on the same afternoon (23rd) further artillery under C. R. A. 2nd Division Brigadier Usher's force took over the defence of (Brigadier. C. B. Findlay), and the crossings Bergues. were firmly held. On the night of 22/23rd May the withdrawal- On 23rd May Calais was finally isolated. Its to the frontier defences had been carried out. garrison; had been reinforced under the orders The French had taken over the sector northwards of the War Office, by 3oth Infantry Brigade from Maulde and the right boundary of the (Brigadier C. Nicholson) and 3rd battalion .B.E.F. was now Bourghelles-Seclin both inclu- Royal Tank Regiment—a cruiser tank regiment. sive to the French.. This change of boundary did I had intended to move the latter within the not however affect the dispositions which the canal line, but it was already too late-. After B.E.F. had taken on the Canal line by which two attempts they were driven back into Calais, the rear of the French positions was protected. with the. exception of three tanks which On the left of the B.E.F. the Belgians, who eventually reached Dunkirk by way of Grave- had previously agreed to relieve the 44th lines. The remainder of the gallant defence Division after withdrawal to the Lys on the of Calais was conducted under the orders of the night of 23rd/24th May, ordered one of their War Office. It-was finally concluded on the divisions to occupy the sector Halluin-Courtrai night of 26/27th May. on the night of 22nd/23rd May. 44th Division Information received at this time indicated was concentrated in G.H:Q. reserve on the that two enemy armoured divisions were morning of 23rd May. converging on Calais and two more,- supported On the right, 2nd and 48th Divisions passed by a motorised. S. S. (Schutz-Staffel) division, through the French on the night of 22nd/23rd on St. Omer. A fifth armoured division appeared Mav and also concentrated in G H.O reserve. to he mnvincr rm 5922 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

2qkh May. Preparations for counter attack and the Admiral du Nord, Admiral Abrial, whose strengthening of canal defences. command included Boulogne, Calais and 40. During 24th May, I had simultaneously Dunkirk. Under his authority the command to prepare for a counter-attack southwards on of military forces in these areas was assumed on the 26th and also to press forward with the 24th May by General de Corps d'Arme'e Fagalde, strengthening of the canal line. commanding the French i6th Corps which up To make the detailed arrangements for the to now had been fighting on the left of the counter-attack I appointed the Commander of Belgian Army. the 3rd Corps, Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald The French defences of Dunkirk were based Adam, who, on my behalf, continued negotia- on the peace time organisation of the Secteur tions with General Blanchard, and with the Fortifie des Flandres, and extended only as Commander of the French 5th Corps, General far as the Belgian frontier. They comprised Altmeyer. an inner and an, outer sector, the inner on the The final plan was for a counter attack with line of the old Mardyck Canal to Spyker, thence three French and two British divisions under by Bergues to the frontier and so to the sea; the command of General Altmeyer. As a the outer on the line of the river Aa to St. Omer first stage, on the evening of 26th May, bridge- thence by Cassel and Steenvoorde to the heads were to be established south, of the frontier. General Fagalde had at his disposal Scarpe, and the main attack was to start the certain regional troops in numbers equivalent following morning, with the objective Plouvain— to a weak division, who were located in the Marquion—Cambrai. Sir Ronald Adam with outer sector from Grayelines to the Forest of three divisions (two British and one French) Clairmarais and whose dispositions had been was to advance east of the Canal du Nord, and roughly co-ordinated with those of Brigadier General Altmeyer with two French divisions Usher. About this time the 68th French to the west of the Canal du Nord, his right being Division arrived at Dunkirk from Belgium and covered by the French Cavalry Corps. This took over the inner sector. attack was never carried out for reasons which On the 24th and 25th May the British posts will presently appear.* on the river Aa were taken over by the French, On the same day, I issued orders to dissolve who also began to operate the inundations, the various improvised forces on the Canal which formed part of the defence scheme of line, and their units were absorbed by the Dunkirk and extended each side of Bergues and formations in the areas of which they now were.. as far as the Belgian frontier north of the I appointed Major-General Eastwoodj to take Bergues—Furnes canal. command of the defences on the Canal line, 2$th May—Attacks on the Canal Line and on and he assumed command early on 25th May. the Belgian Army. The position on the Canal line was consider- 42. On 25th May, enemy activity intensified. ably strengthened -during 24th May. 44th Two enemy Corps were reported to be attacking Division began to move into the line between the French in the area Denain—Bouchain ; the the forest of Clairmarais and Aire, with 2nd enemy was also across the canal at St. Venant, Division on its left between Aire and La Bassee, and was developing the bridgeheads between and 4&th Division (lately Polforce) from La that place and Aire and also at St. Omer, whilst Bassee to Raches. It was not till the evening further north the situation on the river Aa was however that 2nd and 44th Divisions gained still obscure. contact with the enemy and for most of the day At about 7 a.m. on 25th May, news was the defence of the sector still remained under received that in the late evening of 24th May the Commanders of Macforce and Perforce. the enemy had attacked the Belgian 4th Corps Fighting of a somewhat confused character on the Lys with a force reported to be of four went on for most of the day in and south of divisions, supported by tanks. The attack the Forest of Nieppe, and the enemy also began penetrated to a 'depth of i| miles on a front of heavy bombing and shelling of Cassel. The 13 miles between Menin and Desselghem. remainder of Macforce, which included field It was fast becoming a matter of vital and anti-tank artillery, was therefore sent importance to keep open our line of communica- to reinforce the i3/i8th Hussars. tion to the coast through a corridor which was 48th Division (with under its command part hourly narrowing. It was no longer possible of 23rd Division in the area Gravelines—St. to count on using the main road Estaires— Omer) was ordered to send one "infantry brigade • Cassel—Dunkirk, while the news which had to Dunkirk and one to Cassel and Hazebrouck. just been received made it certain that before I45th Infantry Brigade completed its relief long, the whole area east of the Yser canal of the improvised garrisons of the two latter would be in the hands of the enemy, since there <• places on 25th May, but General Thome found was, in fact, no satisfactory defensive position that the French had already made complete between the Lys and the Yser canal. There dispositions for Dunkirk, and had informed seemed, therefore, to be a serious risk of the the British Base Commandant. He therefore Belgian right becoming separated from the decided to send I44th Infantry Brigade to British left at Menin, and of the Belgian Army Bergues and Wormhoudt. He established his being forced to fall back in a northerly, rather H.Q. at Bergues, which he- rightly regarded as than in a westerly direction. I considered it the vital point of defence. vitally urgent to prolong the British front The French reinforce Dunkirk. without delay northwards to Ypres, along the old Ypres—Comines canal, now practically 41. The local defences of Dunkirk, in dry, and round Ypres itself to the line of the accordance with French practice, were under Yser canal. * See pars.. 43. As an immediate step, I2th Lancers were f Major-General T. R. Eastwood had recently sent off early on 25th to .watch the left flank of arrived in France to take command of a division, and, 2nd Corps on the Lys, and gain touch with the pending a vacancy, was attached to the Staff of G.H.Q. right flank of the Belgians. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 5923 The remaining infantry brigade of 48th Cavalry Corps for this attack. Therefore, even Division (i43rd) was later placed under 2nd if no British divisions could be made available, Corps, and a pioneer battalion sent to begin the possibility of carrying out the operation preparations for the defence of Ypres in case would not be entirely precluded. I did realise Belgian measures for the purpose should prove however that the French Were unlikely to take inadequate. the offensive unless British support was forth- The Belgians had at this time one division coming. in reserve between Menin and Ypres, and this Even so, however, the situation on my northern was ordered to counter-attack at 2 p.m. "How- flank was deteriorating so rapidly that I was ever it is doubtful whether it was found possible convinced that there was no alternative but to ever to launch this counter-attack. Orders were occupy, as quickly as troops could be made also issued for the Belgian ist Corps to come available, the line of the Ypres-Comines canal into line on the right of their 4th Corps between and the positions covering Ypres. I therefore Ghelewe and Ledeghem; this move was carried issued orders to 5oth Division to join 2nd out on the 26th May. Corps at once, and shortly afterwards I ordered Sir John Dill (who had now become C.I.G.S.) 5th Division to follow. 2nd Corps placed and whom I had asked to visit me, 'arrived on 5th Division on its left flank northwards the morning of 25th May, and I explained the from Halluin along the Ypres-Comines canal position to him. He then telegraphed to the with 5oth Division on its left around Ypres. At Prime Minister and to the Secretary of State, this time also, the greater part of the medium that there could be no disguising the seriousness and lieavy artillery of ist and 2nd Corps was of the situation. He added that in his opinion grouped under 2nd Corps, and the successful the proposed counter-attack to the south could defence of the positions on the Ypres-Comines not be an important affair in view of the enemy canal and around Ypres, which was maintained attacks which had penetrated the Belgian during the next three days; was greatly assisted defences. by these artillery units, which remained in General Blanchard arrived during Sir John action till they had fired all their ammunition. Dill's visit and took part in our discussions. The Commander of 3rd Corps, who was no During the day the Belgians continued to longer required to take part in the attack withdraw in a north-westerly direction under southwards, was now ordered to take over the enemy pressure. Reports also indicated that a command of the front from St. Omer to Raches fresh enemy attack would take place next day from Major-General Eastwood, whom he relieved on the northern end of the Lys position. on 26th May. . I immediately communicated my decision to the headquarters of the French First Group of OPERATIONS—THIRD PHASE Armies, but I was unable to get-into personal touch with General Blanchard that evening as 26th-3ist MAY he was visiting the Belgian G.Q.G. at Bruges. The decision taken, in agreement with the French, However, I went to see General Blanchard at to withdraw behind the Lys. H.M. Covernment his headquarters at Attiches early next morning authorises withdrawal to the coast. The Dunkirk (26th May), at a moment when the enemy was perimeter organised by Sir Ronald Adam. attacking at Carvin and had penetrated the The Belgians ask for an armistice. General front of a North African Division near Bois Blanchard at first determines to remain in d'Epinoy. I found that General Blanchard also position but later French yd and Cavalry Corps feared the collapse of the Belgian Army and felt withdraw to Dunkirk. Occupation of perimeter that the time for a counter attack southwards completed. Problems of embarkation of British was past. Indeed he had already decided that and French troops. Withdrawal of 2nd and the situation on both flanks made it necessary yd Corps. G.H.Q. closes and C.-in-C. embarks to withdraw. for England. After an hour's discussion, we arrived at a joint plan for the withdrawal of the main bodies The decision to Withdraw. behind the line of the Lys. These arrangements 43. By 6 p.m. that night (25th May) I was were subject to there being no further deteriora- convinced that the steps I had taken to secure tion in the Belgian situation. my left flank would prove insufficient to meet With this decision, there vanished the last the growing danger in the north. opportunity for a sortie. The layout of the The pattern of the enemy pincer attack was B.E.F. was now beginning to take its final becoming clearer. One movement from the shape. Starting from what could be described south-west on Dunkirk had already developed as a normal situation with Allied troops on and was being held; the counterpart was now the right and left, there had developed an developing on the Belgian front. ever lengthening defensive right flank. This The gap between the British left and the had then become a semi-circular line, with Belgian right, which had been threatening the both flanks resting on the sea, manned by whole day, might at any time become impossible British, French ' and Belgians. Later the to close : were this to happen, my last hope of position became, a corridor in shape. The reaching the coast would be gone. At this southern end of this corridor was blocked by tune, it will be recalled, I had no reserves beyond the French ist Army; and each side was a single cavalry regiment, and the two divisions manned, for the greater part of its length, by (5th and 5oth) already earmarked for the attack British troops. Next to the sea were French southwards. troops on the west, and French and Belgian The French ist Army, which was not troops on the eastern flank. affected in the same way as the B.E.F.^ The immediate problem was to shorten this by the situation which was developing on perimeter. British and French forces were the Belgian front, had, it will be remembered, together holding a front of 128 miles of which agreed to provide three divisions and the 97 miles were held by British troops, though 5924 SUPPLEMENT TO .THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

some sectors were held jointly with the French. I replied that a plan for withdrawal north- The virtual closing of Dunkirk as a port of westward had been agreed with the French entry was making the supply situation ever tha't morning; I added that the news from the more difficult, and the ammunition situation Belgian front was disquieting,' and concluded permitted only of very restricted expenditure. by saying:— ..." I must not conceal from you that The Plan for Withdrawal. a great part of the B.E.F. and its equipment will'inevitably be lost even in best circum- . 44. Later, on 26th May, I discussed the plan stances." for withdrawal with the Corps Commanders, and issued orders for the operation in accordance Later in the day, I had a further teiegram with the agreement reached with General from the War Office which read as follows :— Blanchard that morning. The plan, as agreed "... Prime Minister had conversation with the French First Group of Armies, envisaged M. Reynaud this afternoon. Latter fully the reservation of certain roads for the exclusive explained to him the situation and resources use of the B.E.F. In fact, however, French French Army. It is clear that it will not be troops and transport continued to use them, and possible for French to deliver attack on the this added very considerably to the difficulties south in sufficient strength to enable them to of the withdrawal of British troops. The roads effect junction with Northern Armies. In were few and for the most part narrow, and for these circumstances no course open to you the next three days they were badly congested but to fall back upon coast. . . . M. Reynaud with marching troops and horsed transport of communicating General Weygand and latter French formations, and with refugees. will no doubt issue orders in this sense On the night 26th/27th May, ist and 2nd forthwith. You are now authorised to Corps, leaving rearguards in the frontier defences, operate towards coast forthwith in con- were to swing back to the old divisional reserve junction with French and Belgian Armies." position with their right at Fort Samghin (5 miles south-east of Lille), while the French The Situation, of the Belgian Army. prolonged this line from Thumeries to the canal at Pont-a-Vendin, linking up there with 2nd 45. The situation on the Belgian front was Division. The following night (27th/a8th May), causing me ever increasing anxiety. At the main bodies were to withdraw behind the Lys, conference at Ypres on the evening of 2ist May, leaving rearguards on the Deule canal up to its His Majesty the King of the Belgians had agreed junction with the Lys at Deulemont: these that, if forced to abandon the positions on the rearguards were to stay there until the next night Lys, he would withdraw to the Yser, maintaining (28th/29th May). The immediate effect of touch with the left of the B.E.F. Now, however, these dispositions would be to shorten the total signs were not wanting that the Belgian Army perimeter by some 58 miles, but on the other were being forced to withdraw northwards and hand I had to face the possibility of having to away from the Yser canal. If so, the task of occupy the front from Ypres to the sea, some defending the whole line as far as the sea 25 miles long, which was still the responsibility appeared likely to fall on ourselves and the of the Belgian Army. French, as actually did happen. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, who There remained the question of the future. had been carrying out liaison duties with I had not so far discussed with General H.M. the King of the Belgians since the opera- Blanchard a further withdrawal to the sea. tions began, came to G.H.Q. on the morning of However, the possibility could not have been 26th May, and I e'xpressed to him my earnest absent from his mind; nor was it absent from hope that the Belgian Army would fall back mine, for, although up to now no instructions towards the Yser. Sir Roger Keyes took this had been given authorising me to undertake message back to the Belgian G.Q.G. at Bruges, such an operation, I had, as I have said, foreseen where he saw His Maj esty. Later he telegraphed the possibility of such a move being forced to me sajdng that the Belgians would do their upon us. best, but that His Majesty considered that the I returned from the conference at General only method of avoiding immediate and com- Blanchard's headquarters at about 10.30 a.m. plete disaster was a strong and immediate on 26th May to find a telegram from the counter offensive between the Lys and the Secretary of State which read:— Escaut. Such an operation was, however, quite ..." I have had information all of out of the question since, now that 5th and which goes to show that French offensive 5oth Divisions had been committed, my reserves from Somme cannot be made in sufficient were again reduced to one weak cavalry strength to hold any prospect of functioning regiment. with your Allies in the North. Should this The indication that the Belgian Army would prove to be the case you will be faced with a withdraw northwards and not to the Yser, was situation in which the safety of the B.E.F. confirmed in a note, a copy of which I received, will predominate. In such conditions only sent on 26th May by General Michiels, the course open to you may be to fight your way Chief of the Staff of the Belgian Army, to back to West where all beaches and ports General Neissens, head of the Belgian Mission east of Gravelines will be used for embarka- with G.K.Q. tion. Navy will provide fleet of ships and This note contained the following passage :— small boats and R.A.F. would give full support. . . . ft To-day, 26th May the Belgian Army As withdrawal may have to begin very early is being attacked with extreme violence on preliminary plans should be urgently prepared. the front Menin-Nevele,* and since the . . . Prime Minister is seeing M. Reynaud 0 battle is now spreading to the whole of the to-morrow afternoon when whole situation area of Eecloo, the lack of Belgian reserves will be clarified including attitude of French to the possible move. ..." • * Eight miles west pf Ghent. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 5925

makes it impossible to extend our boundaries, was likely to prove an exacting one: work which were notified yesterday, further to the had to begin at once, and my own headquarters right. were fully occupied with the withdrawal of the We must therefore, with regret, say that forward troops. we have no longer any forces available to I therefore appointed Lieut-General Sir Ronald fill the gap in the direction of Ypres. Adam to undertake this duty, and sent with As regards the withdrawal to the Yser the. him my Quarter-Master-General and other idea must be ruled out since it would destroy staff officers from G.H.Q. He was to take our fighting units more quickly than the command of the troops already in the area, battle now in progress, and this without loss make arrangements for the troops of ist, 2nd to the enemy." and 3rd Corps who would be withdrawing into On receipt of this information, on the morning the bridgehead and arrange for the embarkation. of 26th May, I asked the Secretary oi State to He was to act in conformity with the orders of bring strong pressure on the Belgian Govern- General Fagalde, provided that these did not ment to withdraw their Army westwards and imperil the safety and welfare of British troops- to maintain touch with the B.E.F. I also Sir Ronald Adam accordingly handed over communicated in the same sense to Sir Roger command of the 3rd Corps to Major-General Keyes, but his reply never reached my S. R. Wason (till then Major-General R.A. at Headquarters. G.H.Q.), and took up his duties on the morning of 27th May. 26th May—The Southern and Western fronts. At 7 a.m. that morning he attended a con- 46. On the remainder of the front 26th May ference at Cassel as my representative. At was marked by heavy air action everywhere. this conference there were present Admiral The enemy attack on the French North African Abrial and General Fagalde from Dunkirk, division at Carvin which was in progress when General Blanchard, General Prioux, now in I visited General Blanchard at Attiches, was command of the French ist Army, and General driven back by the • prompt action of two Koeltz who was representing General Weygand battalions of 5oth Division which were deployed behind the French troops. 2nd and 44th Sir Ronald Adam and General Fagalde Divisions reacted against the enemy and both arrived early, and before the conference began succeeded in advancing some distance west- they had the opportunity to -reach general wards from Merville and Hazebrouck respec- 'agreement on the organisation of the bridgehead tively towards the Canal. position. Further north, the French had completed the The perimeter was to extend from Gravelines relief of all our troops on the river Aa from south-eastwards to the Canal de la Colme, St. Momelin northwards But had themselves along the canal to Bergues and thence by Furnes begun in places to withdraw towards the. and Nieuport to the Belgian coast. In fact, Mardyck Canal. It therefore became the more the French were by now evacuating Gravelines necessary to strengthen further the defences and the western part of the perimeter, and in of Bergues, and this was carried out under the process of going back to the line of the Mardyck orders of 48th Division. Canal from the sea to Spyker, on the Canal de la Colme. The French were to be responsible Plans for final withdrawal. for the defence of the western half of the peri- 47. On this evening (26th May), I put in hand meter as far as Bergues inclusive, and the my plans for a final withdrawal. I was uncertain British for the eastern half. By this time, the how far I should be successful in withdrawing position of the Belgian Army was so obscure the whole of the B.E.F. within the bridgehead that the possibility of its being included in at Dunkirk, nor could I judge how much fighting the bridgehead was not taken into account, my troops would have to undertake during the though the perimeter could of course have been withdrawal. extended eastwards to include them if necessary. I had, therefore, asked the War Office whether Sir Ronald Adam then explained to General it would be possible to send out an infantry Fagalde his plan for Corps boundaries, assembly brigade of the ist Canadian Division so as to areas and the layout of beaches. He specially provide a nucleus of fresh and well trained stressed the importance of avoiding traffic troops on the bridgehead position. ~ This request .congestion in the perimeter and said that he was at once agreed to, and orders were given had decided to allow no British transport to despatch the Brigade to Dunkirk on the north of the canals except such as was strictly night 26th/27th May. These orders were, necessary for tactical, supply or medical pur- however, cancelled on 28th May. poses. He urged General Fagalde to issue similar orders to the French troops under his The contraction of the B.E.F. area and the command. He also suggested that the French shortening of its Lines of Communication was troops entering the bridgehead position should now making it possible to dispense with a all be located in the'western part of the peri- number of the rearward units. I had already meter. However, it appeared that these orders issued orders for the embarkation of a number of did not reach all the French troops, who brought key personnel who could be spared so as to ease a quantity of transport into the sector. the supply situation which was becoming acute; I now ordered the withdrawal of all units which These matters were later reviewed at the full 'were not required to continuejihe battle. This conference, but the principal business was the policy involved leaving most of the fighting issue by General Koeltz of an order of the day troops until the last, but if full use was to be by General Weygand. made of the shipping available, and congestion This enjoined a resolute attitude on the part avoided on the beaches, no other course was of every leader, and the counter-offensive possible. wherever possible. General Koeltz then pro- The task of organising a bridgehead at Dun- ceeded to urge Generals Blanchard and Fagalde kirk, and of arranging the details of embarkation to attempt the recapture of Calais and, though 5926 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

at the time they had nothing available save their homes in northern France before the French the 68th Division and the regional troops, Government put into operation the plans they they did not demur. had made. The French organisations were not However, so far as I am aware, no action was available and no British troops could be spared ever taken in this respect. to control the traffic. The refugee problem had therefore become increasingly acute, and the Description of the Dunkirk Perimeter. tide which at first set westwards from Belgium 48. The British sector of the Dunkirk peri- had now met the enemy again in the meter had its right at Bergues, and thence Somme area and had begun to turn back on followed the canals to Fumes and Nieuport. itself. Scenes of misery were everywhere, and These places were old-fashioned fortified towns, the distress of women, children and aged people easy to defend but affording good bombing was pitiable. Fortunately the fine weather targets. The destruction of the bridges pre- and warm nights mitigated their plight to some sented no difficulty, and all were in fact blown degree and though the outbreak of famine was in time by British or French troops except that expected at any moment it did not actually at Nieuport which was wide and solid, and could occur in the area of the B.E.F. Little, un- not be demolished before the arrival of the enemy. fortunately, could be done to help the refugees, Two natural switch lines were available : the since supplies for the troops were still seriously canal from Bergues to Dunkirk and the Canal short. Moreover their presence on the roads des Moeres from Dunkirk south-east towards was often a grave menace to our movement. Hondschoote. It had been necessary to give Corps a free hand Immediately north of this line came the in handling them*: on occasions it had been inundations, extending from Bergiies over the necessary to turn vehicles into the fields in district of the Moeres to a width varying from order to keep the roads clear. one to three miles. Except in a few places, During the 27th May, troops and their trans- they did not cover the roads but were designed port began to withdraw into the perimeter on to leave them clear, while preventing deploy- the fronts of all three Corps; and where the ment. They did, however, sometimes prevent troops had received the necessary orders, troops from digging themselves in. On the ' vehicles were disabled and abandoned in the Belgian side of the frontier the order to begin assembly areas. The few troops who could be the inundations was not given by Belgian G.Q.G. spared for traffic control did not, however, till the morning of 26th May and they never prove sufficient for the purpose, and conse- became effective. quently a great number of British and French To the north of the inundations was more vehicles entered the perimeter and the town, low-lying land ; then came the Bergues-Furnes of Dunkirk when they should have remained Canal, and the main lateral road from Fumes outside. There was inevitably a large number to Dunkirk. Finally there was the narrow of vehicles which had become detached from strip of dunes giving way to a wide, open beach their units, and a number of cases also occurred running the whole length of the position and that day in which units became separated from shelving very slowly to the sea. There were no their formations and arrived within the peri- quays or piers whatever except those at Dunkirk meter without sufficiently clear orders. These itself. At intervals of about a mile along the were sent to reinforce the defence of the peri- shore lay the seaside resorts of Coxyde, La meter, or embarked, as seemed best to those in Panne, Bray Dunes and Malo-les-Bains. control. Next day (28th May) when Corps started to Layout of the Sector and Problem of Traffic Control. take charge in their areas, the difficulties with 49. Sir Ronald Adam, on leaving Cassel, the British traffic were cleared up, only to be went at once to the headquarters of the 48th replaced by difficulties with the French traffic. Division at Bergues to find out the latest situa- The French 6oth Division .began to arrive tion and in particular what troops were imme- from Belgium, and at the same time rearward^ diately available either to hold the perimeter elements of their light mechanised divisions" or to control the traffic. He learnt that the appeared from the south-east and south. These enemy were advancing north eastwards from were soon followed by the transport of the the.Forest of Clairmarais : there could therefore French 3rd Corps, mainly horsed. None of be no question of using any of the reserves of these appeared to have received orders to leave 48th Division, and the only troops immediately their transport outside the perimeter: seldom available were certain engineer units. General did they do so unless compelled by British Thome, however, lent his C.R.A. (Brigadier traffic control posts. Hon. E. F. Lawson) who was instructed to lay By the 28th, Brigadier Lawson, using the out the defence of the perimeter, and to use for greatest energy, had succeeded in the urgent the purpose such troops as were on the spot, task of manning the perimeter from Bergues to or were entering the perimeter. Nieuport with troops from a number of units, The position was then divided into three chiefly artillery. Corps areas, each including a collecting area outside the perimeter, a sector of the canal line 50. The Admiralty had placed - the naval and a sector of the beach. arrangements for embarkation in the hands of Already it was seen that the traffic problem the Dover Command. A Senior Naval Officer was going to assume formidable proportions. had been sent to Dunkirk to work out detailed Ever since the loth May it had been a potential plans, and steps had been taken to collect a source of trouble, but it had been kept in hand large number of small ships, and of boats for in the early stages by strict adherence to pre- talcing troops from the beach out to the ships. arranged plans and by the use of infantry for On 27th May, however, these arrangements traffic control. Once the withdrawal from the had not had time to take effect, nor had it yet Dyle began, the problem became acute in France been possible to provide sufficient naval ratings as well as in Belgium. Refugees began to leave to man the beaches. Yet a start was made; SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 5927 beaches were organised at La Panne, Bray Dunes While at the Bastion, General Koeltz asked and Malo-les-Bains, one being allotted to each me, shortly after n p.m. whether I had yet Corps ; and military beach parties were impro- heard that H.M. the King of the Belgians had vised on each Corps beach. They carried on asked for an armistice from midnight that without naval assistance for two days, but were night. This was. the first intimation I had hampered by a.shortage of small boats and by a received of this intention, although I had lack of experience in their use. The troops were already formed the opinion that the Belgian unable to handle boats on a falling tide, and Army was now iqcapable of offering serious during daylight on the 27th, when only one or prolonged resistance to the enemy. I now destroyer and two whalers were available for found myself suddenly faced with an open gap work on the beaches, not more than two hundred of 20 mile's between Ypres and the sea through men were embarked. which enemy armoured forces might reach the Dunkirk, which for some days had been •beaches. heavily bombed, received a particularly severe Owing to the congestion on the roads, I did attack on 27th May; lorry columns had been not get back to my headquarters at Houtkerque set on fire in the town and a pall of black smoke until about 4.30 a.m. on 28th May. There I from the burning oil tanks .hung continuously found that a telegram had been received from over the town and docks, impeding the air the War Office at 1.30 a.m. saying that H.M. defence. the King of the Belgians was capitulating at Though the outer mole could still be used midnight. the inner harbour was now blocked except to small ships. Withdrawal- to' the Sea. Dunkirk was therefore cleared of all troops 52. .Next morning (28th May), General and they were sent to the dunes east of the Blanchard arrived at my headquarters at town to await embarkation. The port itself Houtkerque at about n a.m., and I read him was kept under the control of G.H.Q. and .the telegram which I had received the previous manned by naval ratings. At one time it day from the Secretary of State. It was then seemed likely to go out of use at any moment, clear to me that whereas we had both received but troops were in fact embarked there till the similar instructions from our own Government end, in numbers which far exceeded expecta- for the establishment of a bridgehead he had, tions. as yet, received no instructions to correspond Supplies, water and ammunition were des- with those I had received to evacuate my troops. patched from England to the beaches, and General Blanchard therefore could not see his on 28th May the first convoy arrived. Unfortu- way to contemplate evacuation. nately a high proportion of these stores were I then expressed the opinion that now the destroyed on the way over or sunk when. Belgian Army had ceased to exist, the only anchored off the shore. Nevertheless consider- alternatives could be evacuation or surrender. able quantities were landed at Coxyde and La The enemy threat to the North-Eastern flank Panne and served to create a badly needed appeared certain to develop during the next reserve. forty-eight hours. The long South-Western flank • During 27th May, the move of 5th and 5oth was being subjected to constant and increasing Divisions was completed and the left flank thus pressure, especially at Cassel and Wormhoudt, extended as far as Ypres. On the front from and the arrival of the enemy heavy columns Bergues to Hazebrouck enemy pressure steadily could not be long delayed. These considerations increased. could not be lightly dismissed. While this dis- On the same afternoon, G.H.Q. moved from cussion was taking place, a liaison officer arrived Premesques to Houtkerque (six miles W.N.W. from General Prioux, now in command of the of Poperinghe). Communications were difficult French ist Army, to say that the latter did not throughout. the day since Corps headquarters consider his troops were fit to make any further were all on the move, and it had not yet been move and that he therefore intended to remain possible to re-establish line communications in the area between Bethune and Lille, protected which hitherto had run through Lille. by the quadrangle of canals. I then begged General Blanchard, for the sake of France, the French Army and the Allied The Belgian Armistice. Cause to order General Prioux back. Surely, 51. During 27th May, I received a further I said, his troops were not all so tired as to be telegram from the Secretary of State which incapable of moving. The French Government read "... want to make it quite clear that would be able to provide ships at least for some sole task now-is to evacuate to England maxi- of his troops, and the chance of saving a part of mum of your force possible ". It was therefore his trained soldiers was preferable to the cer- very necessary to discuss further plans with tainty of losing them all. I could not move General Blanchard, for no policy had yet been him. Finally he asked me formally whether it laid down by G.Q.G. or any other French higher was my intention to withdraw that night to the authority for a withdrawal northward of the Lys. line Cassel-Poperinghe-Ypres. I had no idea what plans either he or Admiral I replied in the affirmative and informed him Abrial had in mind. that I now had formal orders from His Majesty's In the evening, I left my headquarters at Government to withdraw the B.E.F. and that Houtkerque with the C.G.S. and the French if I was to have any hope of carrying them out liaison officer from .General Blanchard's head- I must .continue niy move that night. General quarters to try and 'get into touch with General Blanchard's parting was not unfriendly, and Blanchard. I failed to find him at La Panne, when he left I issued my orders for withdrawal so I went on to Bastion No. 32 at Dunkirk to to provide for that change of mind on the part visit Admiral Abrial, only to find- that both he of the French High Command for which I so and General Fagalde were equally unaware of sincerely hoped and which in fact took place his whereabouts. later. 5928 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

ist and 2nd Corps were to withdraw on the . on the historic ground of the Ypres-Comines night of 28th/29th May to a horse-shoe position Canal, Zillebeke and the eastern outskirts of on the line Proven-Poperinghe-Ypres-Bix- Ypres, and on these positions, the infantry, well schoote, with outposts on the line Ypres- supported by the artillery, had stubbornly held Godevaersvelde. The position of 3rd Corps was their ground in the face of strong and deter- more difficult and obscure. 2nd Division, now mined attacks by the enemy. reduced to less than the strength of an infantry ist Corps also ordered ist Division to move brigade, had fought hard and had sustained a into their sector of the perimeter; on the same strong enemy tank attack. It was already in day ist Corps was ordered to reinforce the process of withdrawing from the line and orders garrison of Bergues with one battalion. This were issued for it to fall back in the direction of order could not be carried out that day, but Beveren and Proven, prolonging the right flank next day (29th May) a battalion of 46th Divi- of ist Corps. 48th and 44th Divisions were in' sion (9th Foresters) was sent there. contact with the enemy on a front of over twenty miles from Bergues through Cassel to Vieux During this time it had been, a constant Berquin, in touch with the French ist Light anxiety to G.H.Q. lest those enemy forces Mechanised Division, west of the latter place. released by the Belgian armistice should fore- The French ist Army had 3rd and 4th Corps in stall our occupation of the perimeter. There line between Merville and Sailly-sur-la-Lys, had been no time to lose. Early on the 28th but were out of touch with their 5th Corps. the leading enemy mobile troops and tanks had The orders to 48th Division were to stand reached Nieuport, and they would have arrived for a few hours longer. They withdrew that there unopposed had it not been for the work night under pressure from the enemy, with the of a troop of i2th Lancers. The state of the assistance of the armoured vehicles of the roads, congested as they were with refugees and Hopkinson Mission. The garrison of Worm- Belgian troops, must also have played their houdt was extricated together with such portions part in delaying the enemy. Throughout the of the garrison of Cassel as could disengage from day, however, the defensive positions were the enemy. 44th Division was also ordered improved and a number of additional troops to disengage that night, and to move north- ' from various units, chiefly Royal Artillery, were eastwards towards the old frontier defences. collected and organised to occupy them. 46th Division, which had moved on the night On 29th May, troops of I2th Infantry Brigade 26th/27th May from the Seclin area to Steen- and Corps Artillery began to arrive; that vorde, was to move into the Dunkirk perimeter. night 4th Division relieved the mixed detach- Before he received this order, the Commander ments which up to now had been holding the of 44th Division (Major-General Osborne) had sector. Throughout the 29th May the enemy visited headquarters of the French 4th Corps, had been attempting to cross the canal between where he learned of the Belgian armistice ; and the French-Belgian frontier and Nieuport. heard that General Prioux had orders to stand At the latter place, where the bridge had not his ground. He, too, had endeavoured to been blown, they established a bridgehead in the town. Everywhere else they were driven convince General Prioux that the only hope back. Some attempted to cross in rubber boats; for his army lay in withdrawal. others were disguised as civilians, even as nuns, Later, on 28th May fresh orders were issued and attempted to cross with the refugees, horses by the French ist Army. They were to the and cattle. On this day enemy forces advancing effect that General Prioux himself would near the coast were shelled by H.M. ships. remain with the 4th Corps in its present position, and that General de la Laurencie, with his own Thus, once again the enemy had been fore- 3rd Corps and the Cavalry Corps, would with- stalled just in the nick of time, and the prompt draw so as to arrive within the Dunkirk peri- and gallant action of the troops on the spot had meter on 3oth May. No copy of this order gained the few vital hours which were to make reached General Osborne, who learned of the it possible, against all expectation, to embark change*of plans when, at 10.30 p.m. that night, practically the whole force. he visited the headquarters of the French ist 54. On the afternoon of 28th May, I moved Army. As General de la Laurencie had decided my headquarters from Houtkerque to La to begin his move at 11.30 p.m., General Osborne. Panne, which was in direct telephonic com- had some difficulty in conforming, but succeeded munication with London. On arrival I heard in doing so. I was genuinely very glad to learn reports from Sir Ronald Adam and the Quarter- that part, at any rate, of the French ist Army Master-General. would now be sharing in the withdrawal, how- These reports were not optimistic. No ships ever great the difficulties might be. could be unloaded at the dock§ at'Dunkirk, and . few wounded could be evacuated. There was Occupation of the Perimeter Completed. no water in Dunkirk and very little on the 53. ist and 2nd Corps were now free to pro- beaches. The naval plans were not yet in full ceed with the occupation of their sectors of the operation, and some 20,000 men were waiting Dunkirk perimeter, and both Commanders met to be taken off the beaches, 10,000 having been Sir Ronald Adam on 28th May. 2nd Corps taken off in the last two days, chiefly from had, that morning, ordered Headquarters, 2nd Dunkirk. The area was congested with French Armoured Reconnaissance. Brigade, to take over and Belgian troops and their transport, as well the sector from Fumes exclusive to the sea at as with refugees. Nieuport, and now ordered 4th Division to move They gave it as their opinion that, given a from the line of the Ypres-Comines Canal to reasonable measure of immunity from air attack, relieve them. 3rd Division was to follow as troops could gradually be evacuated and soon as possible and take over the sector supplies landed. If, however, intensive enemy between the French-Belgian frontier and Furnes. air attack continued, the beaches might easily These two divisions had been in the line at become a shambles within the next forty-eight Ypres since 25th May. They had held positions hours. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 5929 I communicated the gist of this report to the The arrival of these troops, though welcome C.I.G.S. and I asked that H.M. Government from-so many points of view, raised the question should consider the policy to be followed in the of embarkation in an acute form. Admiral Abrial event of a crisis arising, as well it might. had apparently received no orders from his In reply, I received two telegrams which Government that the whole of the British troops .read:— were to be embarked, and he professed great ". . . . H.M. Government fully approve surprise when he heard of my intentions. He ypur withdrawal to extricate your force in had, it seems, imagined that only rearward order embark maximum number possible of elements were to be withdrawn, and that British British Expeditionary Force. ... If you troops would stay and defend the perimeter to are cut from all communication from us and the last, side by side with the French. I there- all evacuation from Dunkirk and beaches had, fore sent Sir Ronald Adam to see the Admiral. in your judgment, been finally prevented He explained the orders to extricate my Force after every attempt to re-open it had failed which I had received from His Majesty's Govern- you would become sole -judge of when it was ment and which had been confirmed the day impossible to inflict further damage to enemy." before. I also received a gracious telegram of en- Meanwhile, the French troops were expecting, couragement and good wishes from His Majesty, to embark along .with their British comrades, the King, which I communicated to all ranks. notwithstanding that no French ships had so far General Weygand telegraphed on this day been provided: the beaches were becoming appealing personally to me to ensure that the crtiwded with French soldiers, aiid difficulties British Army took a vigorous part in any counter- might have occurred at any time. I urged the attacks necessary; the situation, he added, War Office to obtain a decision as to the French made it essential to hit hard. When he sent policy for embarkation and asked that the French this message, he could have had no accurate should take their full share in providing naval information of the real position or of the powers faculties. However, to permit embarkation of of counter-attack remaining to either the French the French troops to begin at once, I decided to or the British. General Koeltz had not, as yet, allot two British ships to the French that night, had time to return to G.Q.G. with a first-hand and also to give up the beach at Malo-les-Bains report on the situation, and in any case the for their sole use. time for such action in the northern theatre was long past. Medical arrangements. French troops arrive : Problems of embarkation. 56. Hospital ships worked continuously till 3ist May though "continuous bombing made 55. By 2gth May, the naval arrangements their berthing difficult and they frequently had .were beginning to bear -fruit: however, during 'to put to sea before they were fully loaded. the day, the enemy began to shell Dunkirk from Walking wounded were taken on board personnel the' south-west, and the port and the beaches ships from Dunkirk or the beaches, but to prevent were constantly bombed. delay in embarking fit men, orders were issued Owing to a misunderstanding, the personnel that the most serious cases should only be of certain anti-aircraft units had been embarked embarked on hospital ships. Casualty Clearing instead of being retained for the defence of Stations had been established at Dunkirk and at the port-of Dunkirk. Therefore, I -was the the beach at La Panne. Some of the wounded more dependent on the action of fighter aircraft, were, however, too ill to move. They had been and I made this clear to the War Office. I collected into two Casualty Clearing Stations, realised how heavy was the demand to be made one at Crombeke and one at Rosendael, where on the Royal Air Force for the remainder of the they were to be cared for till the enemy should operation, and how impossible it would be to arrive. expect that they could succeed completely in preventing air action on the beaches. Yet they did succeed in intercepting a large part of the The Evacuation of yd and 2nd Corps. enemy attacks, and those which'arrived, though 57. The 3rd Corps Sector included the canal at times serious, were never able to impede from Dunkirk to Bergues, with the town of our embarkation for long. Bergues, and a little more than two miles of French troops were now arriving in the peri- front west of the town. By the evening of .29th, meter in large numbers, and, unfortunately, 3rd Corps had withdrawn 44th and 2nd Divisions brought with them much transport. The conges- from their positions and Corps headquarters tion created within the perimeter was well-nigh were now embarked. 44th and 48th Divisions unbearable and for two days the main road' were ordered to be transferred to ist Corps, and ' between La Panne and Dunkirk became totally 2nd, 23rd .and 46th Divisions to proceed to blocked with vehicles three deep. The French Dunkirk for embarkation, ist Corps was also were in process of withdrawing all their troops ordered to embark what remained of 42nd behind the defences on the Belgian frontier, and Division, except for I26th Infantry Brigade. for the next two days' their dispositions were Subsequently a change was made, 44th Division superimposed on those of the British troops in being embarked and 46th Division remaining that part of the perimeter between the frontier with ist Corps. and Bergues. The French military forces, within the perimeter or now approaching it, During the 2Qth and 30th May, 5th and 5oth consisted of two weak divisions of the i6th Divisions came into the 2nd Corps, area: the Corps (6oth and 68th), General Barthele'my's former, sadly reduced in numbers, was with- regional troops, General de la Laurencie's drawn from the line, while the latter occupied a 3rd Corps of two divisions (i2th and 32nd), and sector between the Belgian frontier and the right the Cavalry Corps, together with some artillery. of the 3rd Division. 5930 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

On the evening of 2gth May, therefore, the -I judged that it would be imprudent to con- organisation of the perimeter was complete, and tinue to maintain our position on the perimeter Sir Ronald Adam's task was successfully outside the permanent defences of Dunkirk accomplished. He himself embarked that night. for more than twenty-four hours longer, and I By 3oth May, there remained in the area, at therefore decided to continue the evacuation an estimate, 80,000 British troops for evacuation by withdrawing 2nd Corps on the night of and I had now to complete the plans for the 3ist May/ist June. final withdrawal of the Force. I had received a Orders were accordingly issued for 2nd Corps telegram from the Secretary of State, which to withdraw 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions to the read as follows :— beaches and Dunkirk. 5oth Division was to fall " Continue to defend present perimeter to back to the French defences on the Belgian the utmost in order to cover maximum frontier, and come under command of ist Corps, evacuation now proceeding well. ... If we together with the British Base staff at can still communicate with you we shall send Dunkirk. These moves began to take place on you an order to return to England with such the morning of 3 ist May; by this time there officers as you may choose at the moment had been a general thinning out of the whole when we deem your command so reduceduthat force, and I felt that, however the situation it can be handed to a Corps Commander. might develop, valuable cadres had been with- You should now nominate this commander. drawn which would enable the fighting units of If communications are broken you are to hand the B.E.F. to be quickly reformed at home. over and return as specified when your effective fighting force does not exceed equivalent of three divisions. This is in accordance with 58. The remains of the B.E.F., on being with- correct military procedure and no personal drawn inside the area of the French defences, now discretion is left to you in the matter. . . . came under the orders of Admiral Abrial, and The Corps Commander chosen by you should the time had therefore arrived for me to hand be ordered to carry on defence and evacuation over my command, in accordance with the with French whether from Dunkirk or instructions I had received, and to embark for beaches. . . ." England. I invited Generals Blanchard and The problem was to thin out the troops, while de la Laurencie to j oin me on the j ourney. To my maintaining a proper defence of the perimeter, regret they were both unable to do so, though yet at the same time not to retain a larger 1 was able to arrange for some of the staff of number of men than could be embarked in General de la Laurencie's 3rd Corps to sail with one lift. that of G.H.Q. I had received orders from home that French I had selected Major-General Hon. H. R. L. G. and British troops were to embark in equal Alexander to remain in France in command of proportions. Thus it looked at one time as if ist Corps, now numbering less than 20,000 men the British would have to continue holding a in all. On the afternoon of 3ist May I gave him perimeter, either the existing one or something his instructions, which were based on those I had smaller, at least another four or five days, to myself received from H.M. Government. He enable all the troops to embark. Yet the enemy was to operate under the orders of Admiral pressure was increasing and there was no depth Abrial, and to assist the French in the defence in our position. A line on the dunes could only of Dunkirk. At the same time he was to occupy be held during the hours of darkness to cover himself with arrangements for the evacuation of the final phase of the withdrawal. his command, and I stressed the importance of I discussed the situation with the Commanders the French sharing equally in the facilities which of ist and 2nd Corps on 3oth May. Embarkation were provided for evacuation. had gone well that day, especially from Dunkirk, but enemy pressure had increased at Furnes and I agreed with Major-General Alexander on Bergues and it was plain that the eastern end the night 2nd/3rd June as a provisional date for of the perimeter could not be held much longer. evacuating his force. The enemy had begun to shell the beach at That evening, therefore, at 6 p.m., my head- La Panne. I was still concerned lest the arrange- quarters closed, and after handing over command ments for embarking the French should for any to Major-General Alexander,* I embarked in reason prove inadequate. I therefore motored H.M.S. Hebe, and sailed for England about to Dunkirk to inform Admiral Abrial of my 2 a.m. on ist June. At this time the withdrawal views and to assure myself that the arrangements of 2nd Corps was proceeding according to plan, for embarking British and French troops in but under increasing enemy pressure by land equal proportions were working smoothly. and air; the troops were moving to their places The Admiral assured me of his agreement "on the beaches steadily and in good order. The about the evacuation of the sector, and we then plans made by the Admiralty to provide small discussed the problem of embarkation. craft were by now in full operation; embarka- I had already agreed with General de la tion was proceeding far more smoothly than it Laurencie to evacuate 5,000 picked men from his had yet done, and was favoured by a calm sea 3rd Corps, which had fought alongside us and that night. of the fighting value-of which I had a high In all, 211,532 fit men and 13,053 casualties opinion. However, the Admiral told me that were embarked at Dunkirk and the beaches, in he had had orders from General Weygand that addition to 112,546 allied troops, f the personnel of the Cavalry Corps were to be embarked in priority to others. The matter was settled in a most friendly atmosphere and * An account of events after Major-General Alexander I satisfied myself, so far as it was possible, that assumed command is given in Appendix I. no trouble was likely to arise in practice over f These figures have been obtained from the-War the sharing of the berths at the Dunkirk mole. Office. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 5931 SOME LESSONS OF THE CAMPAIGN Our anti-tank armament was more ample than that of the French, but did not extend further The importance oj equipment; the time factor; back than the division. No guns were available liaison; dejence in depth; the employment for the defence of Corps or rearward areas or for of air forces; river crossing and demolitions ; the three " Pioneer " divisions, except by with- signal communications; traffic control; drawing weapons from the formations to which security; supply and transport; the behaviour they had been allotted in War Establishments. of the troops. These instances amongst many others which 59. So ended a campaign of 22 days which might be quoted serve-to indicate the vital has proved that the offensive has once more necessity for an expeditionary force, if it is to gained ascendency in modern war when under- be used in a first-class war, being equipped on a taken with ah army equipped with greatty scale commensurate with the task it is to be superior material power in the shape of air called upon to fulfil. forces and armoured fighting vehicles. The days are past when armies can be hurriedly The British Expeditionary Force had advanced raised, equipped and placed in the field, for sixty-five miles from the frontier to the Dyle : modern war demands the ever increasing use of then the same distance back from the Dyle to complicated material. Indeed the scientific side the frontier : finally a further fifty miles to the of warfare has been evolving at a very rapid rate sea at Dunkirk. A frontal advance had become even since the end of the war of 1914-18 and is a flank defence ; a flank defence the defence of continuing to do so. Modern equipment requires a perimeter which at times exceeded one hundred time to design and produce, and once it is pro- miles, with my force of nine* divisions and parts duced, further time is required- to train troops of three semi-trained and partially equipped in its technical and tactical uses. Improvised divisions sent to France for labour duties. arrangements, made at short notice, can only Finally had come the witRdrawal to the sea lead to the shortage of essential equipment, the and the shrinkage of this wide front to the production of inferior articles, and the unskilful twenty-four miles of the Dunkirk bridgehead. handling of weapons and vehicles on the battle- The series of situations which the B.E.F. had field. to face was not brought about by failure on their part to withstand enemy attacks when holding The Time Factor. a position of their own choosing : it was caused. 61. The speed with which the enemy exploited by the enemy breaking through completely on his penetration of the French front, his willing- a front many miles away from that held by the ness to accept risks to further his aim, and his B.E.F. Nevertheless this break through, once exploitation of every success to the uttermost it began, was destined to involve in its ill-fated limits emphasised, even more fully than in the consequences both the French ist Army and campaigns of the past, the advantage which the B.E.F. In the withdrawal which ensued accrues to the commander who knows how best both these armies lost the whole of their artillery to use time to make time his servant and not and transport. his master. It would not be appropriate in -this Despatch Again, the pace of operations has been so to discuss questions affecting the higher com- accelerated by the partnership between offensive mand of the Allied forces : on these matters I aircraft and modern mechanised forces that the received orders from H.M. Government and reserves available for the defence are of little through the French commanders under whom use unless they are fully mobile or already in I was placed. occupation of some reserve position. For Nor is .this Despatch the place to deal at instance, had it not been that eight Troop length with the military lessons of the Cam- Carrying Companies, R.A.S.C., weue available, paign ; I have already conveyed my detailed the attack south of Arras could never have been views to the proper quarter. mounted, nor indeed could the flank defences on There are, however, certain matters which it the canal have been organised in time to forestall may be convenient to mention, in broad outline, the enemy. in this Despatch since they may serve in some We had already foreseen, and taught at the respects to amplify and to explain the narrative Staff College, that the methods of staff duties of events. They are dealt with in the paragraphs in the past war would prove too slow for modern which follow. requirements. Headquarters of formations were so frequently on the move that confer- The paramount importance of equipment. ences, supplemented by Operation Instructions or messages, usually replaced the formal orders •60. It was clear from the outset that the ascen- which had been the accepted procedure in past dency in equipment which the enemy possessed campaigns. played" a great part in the operations. He was able to place in the field and to concentrate no Full use was also made of liaison officers of all less than ten armoured divisions in the area grades, who had been provided by the War which he selected and later, to employ at least Office on a generous scale. In the period before five of these against the British rearward de- active operations began, they were of real value fences. On the other hand, the British armoured in settling matters of detail and in reconciling forces in the theatre of war amounted to seven points of view which did not always at first divisional cavalry regiments equipped with coincide; during the fighting they were more light tanks, one regiment of armoured cars of often than not the actual bearers of Operation an obsolete* pattern, and two battalions of Instructions, and performed most valuable infantry tanks, the latter, except for twenty- service to their commanders in ascertaining the three Mark II tanks, being armed each with one exact state of affairs in forward or flank units. machine-gun only. The junior .liaison officers, known as Motor Contact Officers, likewise showed determination * Excluding 51st Division on the Saar Front. and resource in carrying out their duties. 5932 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

The liaison with flanking French formations breaking up formations of enemy aircraft. But was carried out by the exchange of bilingual being purely defensive, it can never prove the liaison officers. I was particularly fortunate in complete antidote to 'enemy bombers and recon- the French officers who were attached for these naissance aircraft, even when available in duties from neighbouring formations. sufficient strength. A commander must have at his call sufficient fighters to intercept and attack I would also like to take this opportunity of the enemy. recording my thanks to General de Division Voruz and the staif of his Mission with G.H.Q. The commander must, likewise, dispose of a for their unfailing helpfulness at all times. sufficient bomber force to be able to engage opportunity targets of. vital tactical importance. Such targets were the enemy mechanised Defence in Depth. columns at Maastricht, Sedan and Boulogne. 62. Closely allied to the question of the time The machinery for their control must be efficient factor is that of defence in depth. The speed at enough to ensure that aircraft can be despatched which armoured units can advance, once they in time. have, broken into a position, calls for a more elastic conception of defence than would be River Crossing and .Demolitions. necessary were it designed solely to hold up a 64. The skill and speed of the enemy in marching enemy. Consequently, frontages may, crossing water' obstacles was very apparent as in-the future, be considerably shorter than those was also the excellence of his equipment for the which the French High Command required the purpose. On the other hand, the paramount B.E.F. to hold in France. importance of demolitions on such obstacles In more rearward areas, schemes must be as a means of imposing even a short delay, was prepared for the manning, at short notice, of established: during the operations the B.E.F. centres of communication and other important destroyed over 500 bridges, and there were few denies. Therefore, all units, even those designed failures. From the number of demolitions for purely administrative purposes, must be which it was found necessary to carry out, it is prepared to take their part in the battle, and clear that every engineer unit, no matter what they must receive the necessary preliminary its normal role, must receive the necessary training. training to execute such work. Anti-tank defence is a science as well as a Signal Communications. craft. It is a science in that it is necessary to 65. During the operations a very heavy strain perfect armour-piercing weapons and anti-tank was thrown upon the Royal Corps of Signals: tactics. It is a craft in that troops must be not least upon those responsible for the com- trained to stalk tanks by day, to keep track of munications of G.H.Q. The problem was two- their movements, and to attack them in their fold : first to provide the normal communica- harbours at night. tions within the force, secondly to provide the long-distance communications required to enable The Employment of Air Forces. G.H.Q. to remain in constant touch with French 63. It was clear from the reports of the G.Q.G., the War Office and the Royal Air Force. Spanish war, confirmed by those of the Polish The latter considerations made it necessary to campaign, that the enemy would employ his follow the buried cable, and thus dominated air forces to further the offensive operations of the moves of G.H.Q. Communications within the army by the use of dive bombers and para- the B.E.F. demanded mobility and rapidity of chute troops. The latter, though effectively construction combined with the need to deal employed in Holland, were less used against the with a heavy volume of traffic. The frequent B.E.F.; however, the nuisance value of those moves, and .the time lag which occurred when which were employed, by their interference with cipher had to be used, resulted in a heavy railway, telephone and telegraph communica- demand on despatch riders. tions in rearward zones, Was altogether out of proportion to their numbers. There were seldom Traffic Control. troops available to isolate and search the areas 66. The vital importance of controlling move- where they landed, usually at dusk, and no ment by road was emphasised over and over French civil organization existed for the purpose. again during the operations. The enemy bombers, both high level and low The movements of mechanised columns flying, were a more serious menace. Their depend for their success on the proper recon- control by the German command was most naissance and allotment of roads, the avoidance efficient, capable of bringing the aircraft to their of traffic blocks and the power to divert the flow objective by wireless call at short notice. of traffic quickly and without interruption whenever an obstacle occurs. The danger of Attack by dive bombers was a new experience interference by enemy bombing is always for British troops. Even those who had grown present, but it can be minunised by the employ- accustomed to heavy shell fire in France during ment of fighter aircraft, by an adequate layout 1914-18 found that this form of attack, when of anti-aircraft guns, by the provision of facilities first encountered, placed a strain on morale. for clearing breakdowns and the repair of roads, As had been anticipated, it was soon realised and by the training of troops in a proper drill that those who were properly entrenched and .when attacked from the air. had perfected the drill of taking cover when on the move, suffered relatively little danger. The movement of refugees, as has been described above, laid a further burden on the Ground anti-aircraft defence, both gun and Provost service. Though the greatest efforts light automatic, improved in accuracy as time were made by all ranks to cope with the task, it went on and it accounted for the destruction of was evident that our organisation required con- over 500 aircraft in addition to its effect in siderable expansion. Recommendations for the SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 5933 creation of a road control organisation under APPRECIATIONS the Quarter-Master-General, on the linos of that The Royal Navy; the Royal Air Force; in use in the French Army, had already been Commanders and Staffs submitted, but unfortunately too late for more than preliminary results to be achieved. The Royal Navy. 70. I have already referred to the embarkation Security. of the Force from Dunkirk and its transport to 67. Akin to the foregoing problem is that of England which evoked the wholehearted admira- security/ Until loth May the work of the tion of the Army. The operation was carried out Intelligence Service in this respect had been in accordance with the finest traditions of the heavy and constant, but when operations began, Royal Navy. The plan involved the use of it 'assumed almost unmanageable proportions. hundreds of privately-owned small craft, and This was due to the opening of the Belgian was put into execution at short notice and at a frontier, the mass movement of refugees, and time when Naval resources were severely the arrival of enemy saboteurs and agents by strained by demands elsewhere. It was carried parachute/ through regardless of danger and loss by enemy bombing. My deep gratitude is due -to all The troops, however, soon became aware of concerned, particularly to Vice-Admiral Sir B. H. the danger and realised the importance, of Ramsay, Vice-Admiral at Dover, Rear-Admiral security measures and the paramount need for W. F. Wake Walker, who superintended the discretion. • actual embarkation and Captain -W. G. Tennant, R.N., the senior naval officer ashore. Nor can Supply and Transport. the Army forget the sterling work of all those 68. As has been already indicated in this members of the Merchant Navy and the civilian Despatch, the operations showed clearly how owners of small craft, in many instances complete reliance cannot be placed on any one volunteers, who unhesitatingly and regardless of channel of movement or maintenance. Enemy dangers gave their services to the British action by mobile forces or by air may put Expeditionary Force. important road or railway routes out of action for hours or days at a time, or even completely sever communications with the bases. The Royal Air Force. 71. Successful operations on land depend more The proportion of reserves held forward, and than ever before on the closest co-operation under load, on rail or on lorry, must therefore be between aircraft and troops on the ground, and high, despite the resultant extravagance in trans- the B.E.F. owes a deep debt of gratitude to the port. The War Office had provided Lines of Royal Air Force for their work throughout the Communication Railhead Companies, R.A.S.C., operations. Pilots returned to the air again and to operate in the event of a railhead being out of again to carry out essential tasks for both French action for a time, and these units fully justified and British Armies, when they were long overdue their existence. for rest and sleep. During the final phases of the operations, the The embarkation of the Force would have civilian employees pf the French and Belgian been well-nigh impossible but for the fighter railways were often not to be found, and the protection afforded. The toll taken* of the Railway Operating Companies, R.E., had to take enemy aircraft on this and earlier occasions has over the working of the trains at short notice. once again established the individual superiority The change of bases made necessary after of the British airman in the air. 20th May was a fine example of quick decision, I wish specially to record my thanks to Air- flexible administration, and the power of the Marshal A. S. Barratt (now Sir Arthur Barratt), administrative staffs at home and in France to Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, British Air improvise at short notice. Forces in France, and to the Air Officer- Com- manding my Air Component, Air-Vice-Marshal The Behaviour of the Troops. C. H. B. Blount. 69. Most important of all, the Campaign has proved beyond doubt that the British Soldier Commanders and Staffs. has once again deserved well of his country. 72. The course of operations in May afforded The troops under my command, whatever their ' very unequal opportunities for the several category, displayed those virtues of steadiness, branches of the Staff, Services and departments patience, courage and endurance for which their to show thek efficiency, and it would, therefore, corps and regiments have.long been famous. perhaps, be invidious to deal with their work in detail to a .greater extent than I have already In addition to the fighting troops, the rear- done in this Despatch. Some, however, were ward units, as well -as the three divisions sent to required with their Staffs to bear a specially France for pioneer duties, all found themselves, heavy and prolonged strain of responsibility at one time or another, engaged with the enemy and I wish to refer particularly to the valuable although often incompletely trained and short services of my Chief of the General Staff (Lieut.- of the proper complement of weapons. General H. R. Pownall), my Quarter-Master Time and again, the operations proved the. ^General (Lieut.-General W. G. Lindsell), and my vital importance of the good junior leader, who Engineer-in-Chief (Major-General R. P. Paken- has learned to encourage, by his example, the ham Walsh), my Signal Officer-in-Chief (Major- men whom he leads, and whose first care is the. General R. Chenevix-Trench), and my Military well-being of the troops placed under his com- Secretary (Brigadier Sir Colin Jardine, Bart.). mand. Firm discipline, physical fitness, efficiency From the narrative of events, it will be evident in marching and digging, and'skill at arms, old- how great is the debt I owe to the Commanders fashioned virtues though they may be, are as important in modern warfare as ever they were *On one day, 77 enemy machines were shot down at' in -J-hp nact the loss of only 16 of our own. 5934 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 of my three Corps. Lieut.-Generals Sir Alan Honours and Awards. Brooke, M. G. H. Barker and Sir Ronald Adam, 73. I am submitting separately the names of Bart. The sudden turn of events on iyth May officers and other ranks whom I wish to recom- threw a violent and unexpected strain on the mend for reward or to bring to your notice for Commander, Lines of Communication Area (the gallant or distinguished service. late Major-General P. de Fonblanque), and I wish to record my sincere appreciation of his I have the honour to be good and devoted work during the time that he was serving under my command. Sir, Finally, I desire to express my thanks and Your Obedient Servant, good wishes to all those officers in' the' French GORT, Army whose duties brought them into contact with the British Expeditionary Force, and whose General, goodwill, understanding and personal friendship did so much to foster the good relations which Commander-in-Chief, existed between the two armies. British Expeditionary Force.

APPENDIX TO SECOND DESPATCH OF C.-IN-C., B.E.F.

OPERATIONS OF IST CORPS FROM 6 P.M. artillery fire. It was therefore evident that the ON 3isT MAY TO MIDNIGHT SND/SED JUNE, force could not be evacuated completely on the 1940 night ist/2nd June. Major-General Alexander therefore agreed on a modified plan with Admiral Major-General Hon. H. R. L. G. Alexander, Abrial and General Fagalde at 8 a.m. on ist June. on taking over command of ist Corps, handed He arranged to hold his present line till over command of the ist Division to Brigadier midnight ist/2nd June; thus he would cover M. B. Beckwith-Smith. He then proceeded to Dunkirk and so enable the French to evacuate Dunkirk to see Admiral Abrial, who informed as many of their troops as possible. He would him that he intended to hold the perimeter till then withdraw to a bridgehead round Dunkirk all the troops were embarked. A French Corps with all available anti-aircraft and anti-tank on the right was to hold the sector from Grave- guns and such troops as had not yet embarked. lines to Bergues (Gravelines however had not During the ist June, heavy enemy attacks apparently been in French hands for some days) developed on the British sector, supported by and a mixed French and British Corps under bombing and artillery fire. The garrison of command of Major-General Alexander was to Bergues (ist Loyals) were forced to withdraw hold a line from Bergues to Les Moeres, and to the line of the canal north of the town, and thence to the sea. to the west, 46th Division, i26tH Infantry Major-General Alexander at once • told the Brigade of 42nd Division and ist Division Admiral and General Fagalde that in his view were forced back north of the canal for about this plan did not take account of the true naval 1,000 yards. 5oth Division had also to meet and military situation which was serious and enemy penetration from the east, but by deteriorating rapidly. The fighting condition of nightfall on ist June the enemy advance had the tro'ops was now such that prolonged resist- been checked on a line Bergues-Uxem-Ghyvelde, ance was out of the question and the present thence due east to the frontier and along the front could riot in his opinion be maintained frontier defences to the sea. after.the night ist/2nd June : furthermore the line to be held was so close to the beach and to Embarkation was temporarily stopped at Dunkirk that the enemy might soon stop all 3 a.m. on 2nd June to prevent casualties in further evacuation by short range artillery fire. daylight; by that time there remained in the He gave the same opinion to the Secretary of Dunkirk area about 3,000 men of various State and received a reply that the British force artillery and infantry units, with seven anti- should be withdrawn as rapidly as possible on a aircraft guns and twelve anti-tank guns. They basis of equal numbers of British and French held the outskirts of Dunkirk throughout continuing to be embarked from that time - 2nd June with little interference save heavy onward. This he showed to Admiral Abrial shelling and bombing of the beaches. and General Fagalde informing'them that he By midnight on 2nd/3rd June, all the remain- would hold the sector allotted to him till mid- ing British troops had been embarked. Major- night ist/2nd June and then withdraw under General Alexander, with the Senior Naval Officer cover of darkness. They agreed that in the. (Captain W. G. Tennant, R.N.) made a tour of circumstances no other plan was feasible. the beaches and harbour in a motor boat and The naval situation had by now grown worse, on being satisfied that no British troops were and the Channel from Dunkirk was under direct left on shore, they themselves left for England.

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