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Master Thesis Human Geography · Michiel Dekker · University of Amsterdam UvA ID: 6146414 · [email protected] · Supervisor: Dr. Virginie Mamadouh · June 23, 2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..4

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………….……………………5

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Introduction ...... 6

1.2 Ukraine’s path to its territorial breakup ...... 7

1.3 Research questions ...... 11

1.4 Societal and academic relevance ...... 11

1.5 Structure of the thesis ...... 11

CHAPTER TWO

2.1 Introduction ...... 12

2.2 Geopolitics ...... 12

2.3 Borders and territoriality ...... 12

2.4 Geopolitical imaginations ...... 14

2.5 Nation building ...... 15

2.6 Core concepts ...... 15

CHAPTER THREE

3.1 Introduction ...... 16

3.2 Conceptual model ...... 16

3.3 Operationalization of concepts ...... 17

3.3.1 Operationalization of factors contributing to geographical divisions ...... 17

3.3.2 Operationalization of attitudes towards the European Union and Russia ...... 17

3.3.2 Operationalization of individual, household and contextual characteristics ..... 18

3.4 Data ...... 19

3.5 Dataset variables ...... 22

3.5.1 Dependent variables ...... 22

3.5.2 Independent variables ...... 22

3.6 Descriptive analysis ...... 23 ~ 2 ~

3.7 Logistic regression analyses ...... 24

CHAPTER FOUR

4.1 Introduction ...... 25

4.2 Historical legacy of the west ...... 25

4.3 Historical legacy of the east ...... 27

4.4 Nation building in post-Soviet Ukraine ...... 29

4.5 The ‘myth’ of a divided Ukraine ...... 31

4.6 The importance of the region ...... 34

4.7 Russia and the ‘otherness’ of Ukrainians ...... 37

4.7 Divisions in Ukraine and external forces ...... 40

4.8 Conclusion and hypotheses ...... 45

CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 Introduction ...... 46

5.2 The direction in which Ukraine should develop ...... 47

5.3 Ukrainian attitudes towards the West ...... 50

5.4 Ukrainian attitudes towards the East ...... 52

5.4 Other characteristics of the Ukrainian population ...... 55

5.4.1 Economical preferences ...... 57

5.4.2 Political preferences ...... 59

5.5 Explanation of the used analyses and interpretation ...... 70

5.6 Explanation of the independent variables ...... 71

5.7 Binary logistic regression analyses ...... 73

5.8 Multinomial logistic regression analysis ...... 80

5.9 Conclusion ...... 83

CHAPTER SIX

6.0 Conclusion ...... 83

References……………………………………………………………………………………………………..86

Appendices…………………………………………………………………………………………………….92

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PREFACE

This master thesis is the final product of my master’s programme in Human Geography of the University of Amsterdam, in which I hope to demonstrate the acquired research skills during the years of my study.

The demonstrations in Ukraine in November last year immediately caught my attention, and before I knew it, I converted the events into the subject of my thesis. Writing a thesis while trying to stay up-to-date with the developments in the country has proven to be a challenge. Also, a change in methodology asked even more time than available which resulted in working seven days a week on the thesis. But these are sacrifices that I would make again, for the sake of writing about a topic that genuinely interests me, and a good part of society, according to the attention it gets in the media.

My special thanks go to Virginie Mamadouh, for providing me with huge amounts of feedback, pushing me in the right direction when needed and a shared interest in the subject. I also have to thank Sjoerd de Vos, for helping me out with the statistical analyses.

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ABSTRACT

After the Second World War, the Eastern European region of the Ukraine was under direct influence by the Soviet Union, the cause of a period of deterritorialisation in the area. When the Cold War ended, the European area started to experience a phase of reterritorialisation, meaning that the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics led to the birth of new states, including Ukraine. Ukraine, a country squeezed in between Western Europe and Russia is a divided country, in terms of support for either closer ties with the west or east, and tensions are visible. This was demonstrated by violent events in Ukraine in the beginning of 2014, marking the end of the in office period of the pro-Russian president Yanukovych. This study was done to get a better understanding of the 2014 crisis in Ukraine. In this research, two research questions are formulated: “Which factors have contributed to the shaping of a divided Ukrainian nation?” and “To what extent are different attitudes of Ukrainian citizens towards the European Union and Russia explained by individual, household and contextual characteristics?”. It is argued that the historical legacy has a major role in shaping divisions in Ukraine, and that nation-building policies have not brought the result the Ukrainian authorities were looking for. Different attitudes towards the EU and Russia are to be explained for a good part by reported voting behavior and the residential location, along with other independent variables. In the conclusion, it is argued that there is no single geopolitical vision in Ukraine. Furthermore, that a slow reorientation of the public opinion towards Europe since the independence in 1991, along with an event in which the government had to choose a geopolitical direction could be a primary reason for the crisis. It remains a central challenge for the Ukrainian government to accommodate desires to ‘Europeanize’ along with desires to maintain strong ties with Russia.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISIONS IN UKRAINE

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

On the 21st of November in 2013, the Eastern European country Ukraine suspended preparations for a trade agreement with the European Union. The government said that it was instead looking into setting up a joint commission to promote connections between Ukraine, Russia and the European Union. This marked the start of large-scale demonstrations in the capital Kyiv and other cities. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians expressed their discontent with the decision to delay the association deal with the EU. The protests turned violent in the beginning of 2014, and after deadly clashes in February, the Russian-oriented president Viktor Yanukovych disappeared from his post on the 22nd of that month. The picture in figure 1.1 demonstrates the intensity of the occurrence.

Figure 1.1: Before and after the occupation of Kiev’s Maidan Square.

Source: The Funambilist, 2014.

These series of events were yet another eruption of the tensions in Ukraine, caused by the many contrasts in the country. Historically, Ukraine has been under the sphere of influence of different and contrasting ideologies. ~ 6 ~

1.2 UKRAINE’S PATH TO ITS TERRITORIAL BREAKUP

The nation-state of Ukraine was born in August 1991, when the parliament declared independence from the USSR followed by a nationwide referendum in which 90% voted for independence. Following on the independence, the economic and demographic situation deteriorated with the GPD collapsing with 60% between 1990 and 1998 and the population dropping by millions. The situation worsened during the presidential elections in 2004. Supporters of the more western-oriented candidate Viktor Yushenko claimed that the elections were accompanied by massive corruption, voter intimidation and direct electoral fraud. Their protests were later known as the Orange Revolution. This political crisis was characterized by the possibility of a civil war and breaking-up of the country, with some threatening to incorporate East-Ukraine into the Russian Federation.

About ten years later, the situation escalated again. The violent protests in the beginning of 2014 were only the introduction to a crisis of a much larger scale however. Although the interim government, voted on by the Parliament on the 27th of February in 2014, led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk was recognized by the European Union and the United States, Russia condemned the government for being illegitimate and the result of a coup d’état.

The Crimean peninsula became at stake in what is now referred to as the Crimean crisis. This land mass was once transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union in 1954.Only three days after Yanukovych disappeared, pro-Russian forces started to take control of the Crimean peninsula. After a referendum, condemned by actors such as the EU, the United States and Ukraine, Crimea declared independence from Ukraine and asked to join the Russian Federation on March 17. On the 18th of March, Russian president Vladimir Putin defended his rights to annex Crimea: “In people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia. This firm conviction is based on truth and justice and was passed from generation to generation, over time, under any circumstances, despite all the dramatic changes our country went through during the entire 20th century” (The Washington Post, 2014).

The United Nations General Assembly declared the referendum invalid and incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation illegal. The sovereignty over the peninsula is currently disputed between Ukraine and Russia, but is de facto controlled by the Russian Federation.

Other cities in the east of Ukraine were confronted with pro-Russians as well (figure 1.4). The Ukrainian army came to action following the occupation of government

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buildings in these cities, and the state of affairs gained more and more characteristics of a civil war. On the 11th of May, 2014, referenda on the status of Donets’k Oblast and Luhans’k Oblast took place, two oblasts that are bordered by Russia in the east. The results of the referendums were not officially recognized by any government, but the oblasts already named themselves Donets’k Peoples Republic and Luhans’k Peoples Republic.

Figure 1.4 A man replacing the Ukrainian flag for a Russian flag on an administration building in the eastern Ukraine city of Kharkiv.

Source: Ronkainen, 2014.

What has caused this rapid escalation and territorial breakup of Ukraine? According to Janmaat (2014), Ukrainians and Russians are closely affiliated ethnicities. Apparently, even situations like these can escalate quickly into violence, regionalism and separatism. Janmaat assessed linguistic differences as a primary reason for the territorial crisis. For a more thorough view, one has to consider the contributing factors to a divided Ukraine. Linguistic differences are part of a larger set, called ethnic identity. Ethnic identities are influenced by nation-states: they tell themselves who they are and what they represent in relation to the world, and how this influences their relations with other nation-states. Competing geopolitical

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visions are produced by distinctive national identities, and interaction between them can lead to conflict (Dijkink, 1997).

Are there different geopolitical visions in Ukraine competing with one another? This is a difficult question, as these visions aren’t stable, but fluid. The spatial imaginary of Europe is reordering and that process continues to this day. The future of the Eastern border of the common European space is still a highly contested, and politically important issue. The actual situation is even more complex than this discourse, as Bialasiewicz (2003) demonstrates. Path dependency is a well-known concept, but the actual historical legacy shouldn’t be neglected when studying the diversity in a territory. The historical region of Galicia, once part of the Austro- Hungarian empire is situated in a territory which is divided between Poland and Ukraine today, and in that sense also straddling the border of the European Union. Although historical, the region is still a geographical representation with a regional identity that hasn’t disappeared when the Austro-Hungarian Empire came to its end. This means that ethnicities and identities aren’t naturally divided in separated territories, but instead that borders, recognized or not recognized, are overlapping and therefore creating a complex mosaic of territories. This creates a difficult challenge for political actors who are striving for a consentient nation.

Aware of the foreign influences of the past, one of the priorities of the new Ukrainian government after independence in 1991 became state and nation- building in the country. In this process, a state can try to eliminate cultural diversity in the country, for example by a forced assimilation of the minorities. National history has played a significant role in nation-building in post-colonial Ukraine. The new myths and legends of the country portrayed Ukraine as a European country with a different political culture than Russia. A country with a long history, legitimizing its independent statehood, but a victim of past foreign incursions. Tragedies in the past, such as the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 could have only happened because Ukraine was not an independent nation at the time, so these events were utilized to further promote nationalization (Kuzio, 2002). Teaching and popularizing Ukrainian history is a key part of the state and nation building, attempting to unite the Ukrainians into one polity. The nation-building is based upon a civic nation that has its roots in different aspects of one ethnic group, Ukrainians. To foster this idea, the education system utilizes the same textbooks throughout its territory, with no exception for local variances, values or customs. Ukrainian history is higher on the teaching agenda than world history (Janmaat, 2002). National minorities can react in different ways to nation-building. They can fully assimilate to the dominant group, and lose their language and identity or they can resist and hold on to their own cultural roots and identity at all cost (Janmaat,

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2000). The 2014 crisis in eastern Ukraine creates the suggestion that the latter is more prominent.

Ukraine is heavily influenced by the policies of several foreign actors too. For example, the process of European integration is not over and the European Union is currently “building Europe in Ukraine” by means of cross-border cooperation schemes, better known as Euroregions. Popescu (2008) examines the Euroregions from a geopolitical viewpoint with multi-scalar conceptualizations of political territory. Popescu emphasises on the Euroregions in the Romanian-Ukrainian- Moldovan boundaries. Cross-border regions have been formed across European state borders in order to reduce their role as obstacles, eventually leading to a redefinition of state territoriality. Popescu concentrates on Euroregions as new territorial constructions instead of new institutional spaces. The regions in the East European borderlands were meant to be a territorial framework where applicant nations for the EU could get ready for their membership.

To the east of Ukraine lies Russia, of whom its predecessor, the Soviet Union, used to occupy a much larger territory in the past, including Ukraine. The influence of groups demanding that Russia must begin to reassert itself as a great power became already evident a few years after the independence of Ukraine. The foreign policy had to be reoriented towards the former Soviet republics in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and to create some distance with the West in that tactic. This led to worries of Western observers, fearing the consequences of a more confrontational Russia (Kubicek, 2000).

It is clear that Russia didn’t shy away to take measures in the Crimean Crisis. Ukraine and its population is squeezed in between the political struggles of these two giants, the European Union and Russia. This study looks at the population of Ukraine with respect to the current conflict and their attitudes towards the European Union and Russia. For contextual purposes, the historical legacy and internal and external forces that have contributed to a divided nation will receive attention as well.

To what extent do different geopolitical (di)visions exist in Ukraine, and what are the underlying reasons for this? Which dimensions can be identified that are geographically dividing the population? And to what extent can we explain the attitudes of Ukrainian citizens towards the European Union and Russia by individual, household and contextual characteristics? The formulated research questions are named in the next section.

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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Two research question are formulated in this study:

1. Which factors have contributed to the shaping of a divided Ukrainian nation? 2. To what extent are different attitudes of Ukrainian citizens towards the European Union and Russia explained by individual, household and contextual characteristics?

1.4 SOCIETAL AND ACADEMIC RELEVANCE

The current tensions in Ukraine are receiving lots of attention by the media. The British politician William Hague named the situation Europe’s biggest crisis in the 21st century. The future of Ukraine is a topic leading to much discussion, and many people have an opinion about the situation. The results will contribute to the societal discussion about the future of Ukraine, and it will help people gain a better understanding of the situation. The most important aspect of societal relevance lies in the current affairs. Ukraine is the ‘battleground’ where the differences and difficulties between European and Russian policies are executed.

When talking about academic relevance, there has been much academic debate about geopolitical imaginations, ethnic identities and conflict. The current political unrest in Ukraine lacks academic insight however. This research will be a new chapter to the debate, as the situation in Ukraine is a new chapter in European territorial and ethnic struggles as well.

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

Following on this chapter, chapter two will provide the general theoretical framework that covers the main concepts of this research. In chapter three, the research design will be elaborated. Chapter four will look at different forces that are playing a role in the shaping of a divided Ukraine: the historical legacy, as well as internal and external forces. Chapter five includes both the descriptive and regression analyses, in the search for an answer of the second research question. Finally, in chapter six, the conclusions will be presented and discussed.

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UKRAINE: STATE, TERRITORY AND GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATIONS

CHAPTER TWO

2.1 INTRODUCTION

To explain the ongoing creation of a divided Ukrainian nation, a general theoretical framework is essential. In this chapter, several concepts will be addressed that are needed to enquire a theoretical understanding of territoriality in Ukraine.

2.2 GEOPOLITICS

Before anything else, the kind of geopolitics used in this research should be defined. Geopolitics itself is a widely used notion for the spatiality of world politics. Classic geopolitics is the trend that considers states as homogeneous national units that are interacting with similar units. As this research is looking at diversity within Ukraine, classic geopolitics is not useful for this research. On the contrary, critical geopolitics tries to tell different narratives that don’t use states as building blocks. It recognises the ‘irredeemable plurality of space and the multiplicity of possible political construction of place’ (Ó Tuathail & Dalby, 1998:4). Critical geopolitics originates from the work of scholars who tried to investigate geopolitics as a social, cultural and political practice, instead of an easy understanding of world politics. Critical geopolitics is not about the ‘outside’ of a state but about the formation of boundaries at much more scales and levels. The territorial breakup of Ukraine is especially relevant to critical geopolitics because its narrative constructs an alternative vision of the nation-state, by contesting the vision of a homogeneous Ukraine. Both territoriality and national belonging are combined in this narrative.

2.3 BORDERS AND TERRITORIALITY

When studying a political world map, it is easy to make note of the borders dividing the territory. Borders have several important features that will be addressed first. First of all, borders are not a static feature of the landscape that can be taken for granted. Instead, borders are discursively constructed, meaning that the idea of boundaries gets produced and reproduced in an endless cycle. Boundaries are used ~ 12 ~

by people to make legitimate distinctions between territories and they are not perfect reflections of the physical and cultural landscapes of territories (Paasi, 1996). A second feature is that borders are used as an instrument to create a collective territorial identity. This is not generated naturally, but constructed by exploiting us-versus-them feelings (Paasi, 1996). Third, borders are utilized to reify power emerging from social and spatial relations. Contradictions and conflicts are present during processes of boundary making, and borders embody these (Newman & Paasi, 1998). It is important to stress on these features, partly because “the border has become a mark of distinction, a divide from the non-European ‘Other’.” (Paasi 1996:22).

So, borders are constructed, but there is a good reason for that according to Moisio (2007). It seems almost inevitable that borders are needed in Europe to create order. For example, the political space in Europe is currently a mix of old and new forms of territoriality, and it is uncertain whether the EU will develop into a neo-Westphalian super state with, for example, a shared European identity. The fall of the communist regimes left a large area with an undefined territoriality behind and the process of spatial establishment is still far from over, particularly when taken into account that the dynamics of the establishment of the European Union itself are far from over.

Speaking about territoriality, this concept is in essence a behavior that uses bounded space as an instrument to secure particular outcomes. When access to the territory is controlled, one can manipulate its content and design the character of the territory (Taylor, 1994:151). Territoriality can be explained on different scales, one of them being the state level. A state is a political corporation exercising sovereign political authority over a defined geographic territory. A nation is a community of people who identify themselves as sharing a common future. A fundamental territorial link exists between state and nation. This can be a link of unity, but also a link of tension, and implications of this tension are shown in intrastate en interstate violence (Mansbach & Rhodes, 2007:426). This brings us to the time of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which was a sovereign Soviet socialist state from 1922 to 1991. The foreign affairs of that country were tightly controlled by the political elites of the Soviet Union in Moscow however. The lack of Ukrainian control over their territory is a reason why the country experienced intense deterritorialisation in that period, a historical legacy that would play a role in the formation of the independent Ukraine after the Cold War. The new Ukraine was a state of disunited polity, regional disparities with the need to build a coherent political nation within its borders, which were the heritage of the Ukrainian SSR (see also chapter four). The state and nation building were therefore characterized by integration, consolidation of the political space and the search for unity (Kuzio

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2002:43). Seven divisions were pointed at as preventing the unity that the Ukrainian leaders would like to see:

• political: left versus right-wings • regional: the west versus the east • nationalism: patriotism versus cosmopolitanism • territorial structure: separatism versus federalism and centralists • statehood: Derzhavnyky (statists) versus National Democrats • religion: believers versus non-believers • economy: supporters of capitalism versus those in favor of a planned economy

The process after the independence of Ukraine is a reterritorialization process. Reterritorialization can be defined as the processes that are “generally understood as the restructuring of territorial forms of organization of social relations, such as the nation-state. This implies the uncoupling of the exclusive links between state sovereignty and territory, as well as the emergence of territorial configurations beyond the scope and the scale of the nation-state.” (Popescu, 2008:419).

2.4 GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATIONS

The actual geographical location is not enough for states to understand their place in the world system. The geopolitical imagination, or geopolitical vision, of a country is important too. Where does a state fit into the global system, and what is the perception of other states in the same system? As Agnew (1998:5) suggests, ‘the history of modern world politics has been structured by practices based on a set of understandings about “the way the world works” that together constitute the elements of the modern geopolitical imagination’. The geopolitical imagination has its foundations in sixteenth-century Europe. Geopolitical imaginations aren’t stable, but instead they differ over time due to long-term changes in both spatial and historical context. Popular views of the territoriality of a nation are often competing with other interpretations, and the latter may become the dominant view over time (Mansvelt Beck, 2006).

For a more comprehensive view of geopolitical imaginations, the work of Dijkink (1997) is important. Dijkink wrote about the stories that some nation-states tell themselves about who they are and what they represent in relation to the world, and how this influences their relations with other nation-states. Geopolitics, in this sense, is nothing else then competing geopolitical visions that are produced by distinctive national identities that interact with one another, leading to international conflict. The framework Dijkink constructs is said to be relevant for supranational

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integration (such as the EU) and economic globalization too. Geopolitical visions are to be seen as national however. Western or pan-European geopolitical visions do not exist, although important similarities in the views of different European countries exist. National identities are the fuel of distinctive geopolitical visions, by transforming collective feelings of pride and pain into models of the world. Five elements of geopolitical visions are named: the naturalness of national borders, a listing of friends and foes (geopolitical codes), the selection of a foreign model to emulate, a national mission and a set of natural forces that determines the nation’s position in the world (for example, sea power versus land power or degree of isolation).

2.5 NATION BUILDING

No single definition of a nation exists, but a nation is often described as the culmination of a process of evolution from a tribe through to an ethnic group (Kuzio, 2002:6). This requires a definition of ethnic groups as well. They are a group of people that hold a common belief in their descent, as said by Max Weber (2001). Usually, they share a history with a myth that tells the story of their descent. A distinctive and shared culture and a defined territory are other features. Adding to that, an ethnic group must somehow be aware that they are different from their neighboring ethnic groups, so they must recognize a difference between ‘We’ and ‘Others’.

For nation building, the definition of Mylonas is used (2013:xx): “Nation-building, sometimes used interchangeably with national integration, is the process through which governing elites make the boundaries of the state and the nation coincide.”

2.6 CORE CONCEPTS

The core concepts that are especially relevant in this research are nation-building, ethnic identities and geopolitical visions. The geopolitical visions that are particularly important are the visions that compare the position of Ukraine with the European Union and Russia. These visions are dependent on the ethnic identities of people, together with the efforts of the state that contribute to the creation of geopolitical visions. The next chapter will use the theories in this chapter to establish the research design.

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RESEARCH METHODS

CHAPTER THREE

3.1 INTRODUCTION This chapter will elaborate on the research methodology, prior to the analysis in the next chapters. First, the conceptual model will be presented and discussed. Second, the research questions will be operationalized, working towards a description of the statistical analyses in chapter five.

3.2 CONCEPTUAL MODEL

The conceptual model (figure 3.1) consists of all earlier mentioned groups of variables and their assumed connections.

Figure 3.1 Conceptual model

Individual and household characteristics

Attitudes towards the

Ethnic identity European Union and Russia

Contextual characteristics

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3.3 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS

This section involves the operationalization of the research questions. The first research question will be answered through a literature study. The second research question will be answered by means of a quantitative study, using descriptive statistics and regression analyses.

3.3.1 OPERATIONALIZATION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISIONS

Which factors have contributed to the shaping of a divided Ukrainian nation?

This contextual research question is represented in the left side of the conceptual scheme. Three main groups of factors are considered: the historical legacy, internal forces and external forces.

Historical legacy in the context of this thesis is defined as all the relevant events that happened in the past, which are still reflected in present-day Ukraine. An event is historical when they happened before the independence of Ukraine. The answer to this question is based on existing literature on the topic of historical events in the Ukrainian region.

The analysis of internal forces that contributed to a further divide in Ukraine is based on a literature study. Internal forces that are included are nation-building, language and education policies and movements and parties.

External forces that contribute to the shaping of a divided Ukrainian nation are foreign policies of several actors. To operationalize the foreign policies, both academic and policy papers of the involved actors are analysed. Only documents since the independence of Ukraine are included. The included actors are Russia, the EU, France, Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and the United States.

3.3.2 OPERATIONALIZATION OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN UNION AND RUSSIA

To what extent are different attitudes of Ukrainian citizens towards the European Union and Russia explained by individual, household and contextual characteristics?

The attitudes are part of the geopolitical visions of the Ukrainian population. Strictly said, an attitude is a settled way of thinking or feeling about something. The last word of that sentence, ‘something’, represents a person or thing, which is the

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subject of the thoughts and feelings of, in this case, an individual. Methodologically speaking, the ‘something’ is a dependent variable, a variable of which its values are the result of independent variables. Not surprisingly, the independent variables coincide with attitudes. The dependent attitudes that are the subject of this thesis are the attitudes towards the European Union among other Western actors and Russia. But in what kind of attitudes should we be interested? To understand the current political unrest in the country, the attitudes towards the European Union among other Western actors and Russia are equally important. General variables that would be helpful in an analysis are about the direction in which Ukraine should develop, ranging from closer ties with Russia or the West towards a more independent development. Also, an evaluation of the political situation in the West and East are helpful. Is the way the politics in the West and East are functioning appreciated by the Ukrainian population? More specific themes will need to be addressed too. When talking about the European Union among other actors in the west, the attitudes towards an entry of Ukraine into the European Union might be one of the most significant indicators. Also, the opinions about an entry of Ukraine into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are quite important. Changing the scope to Russia, a few themes are of importance as well. Data that could answer how close the ties with Russia should be are helpful here. A possible entry of Ukraine into the Union State of Russia and Belarus should be an important indicator. Another theme is to make Russian an official language in Ukraine.

3.3.2 OPERATIONALIZATION OF INDIVIDUAL, HOUSEHOLD AND CONTEXTUAL CHARACTERISTICS

It is interesting to find out what the attitudes about these themes are, but for a more thorough understanding, one should incorporate independent variables too. This allows us to explain the origin of the different attitudes. Independent variables can be divided between individual and household variables and contextual variables. Individual and household variables that could explain the dependent variables are the following: nationality, language, age, income, religion, education, family status, gender, political and economic preferences and the group of population where an individual feels the most connection with. For the contextual variables, we have to look at the living location. Two types of the living location are important. First, the oblast in which a respondent lives. Second, an urban or rural living location. The next section will explain the data which is going to be used to answer the second research question.

Attitudes to the economic organization of Ukraine that are significant are to be found on the topic of the economic transformation in the country. A sudden change

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of the economic system after the collapse of the Soviet Union can have a strong influence on the lives of individuals, whether it’s a positive or negative influence. Is the Ukrainian population willing to adapt to a new economic system? More specifically, variables that would be needed are concerning the willingness of working for a private company. And, of course, the attitudes about the economic transformation in general. Is the population in favor of it?

Besides variables concerning the economic organization, variables concerning the political organization in Ukraine are important too. A general topic on the political organization is the state system. Furthermore, the public opinion about a state system based on the principles of socialism or capitalism is a variable we need to concentrate on. This is also related to the political transformation in the country since the collapse of the Soviet Union. More topics that can be essential are the attitudes towards a multiparty system, and the preference of a few leaders with more political power over more laws and debates or not. A final indicator of the politics in the country is the willingness of the population to protest against deteriorating living standards in the country.

3.4 DATA To give an insight into the influence of the individual, household and contextual characteristics on the attitude towards the European Union and other Western actors and Russia, a quantitative analysis will be carried out. The dataset which will be used is from GESIS – Leibniz-Institute for the Social Sciences (Vorona et. al, 2004). The title of this project is “Ukrainian Society at the Edge of the 21st Century”. The objective of the data collection was to catch individual attitudes to the political, social and economic transformations in Ukraine. In total, 1810 citizens living in Ukraine completed the written survey with a standardized questionnaire. Respondents were at least 18 years old of age and they were not in hospital, jail or in active military service at the time. The surveys were conducted in either the Ukrainian or Russian language. The data was collected in January of 2000 by the SOCIS center, a Ukrainian sociological company which conducts socio-political and marketing research. Respondents were selected by a quota sample and the average bias from the social statistics at that time does not exceed 2.0 percent. See figures 3.2 and 3.3 for an overview of the living location of respondents. The producers of the survey haven’t provided information about non-response.

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Figure 3.2 Number of respondents by oblast in Ukraine.

Figure 3.3 Distribution of respondents.

To compare the number of respondents per oblast with the population distribution, see figure 3.4. The sampling of the survey is in line with the population distribution. The eastern oblasts are the most populated oblasts of Ukraine, and that is where a relative high number of surveys were collected. On the other hand, the lesser- populated oblasts have a smaller number of respondents. ~ 20 ~

Oblasts are Ukraine’s primary administrative units. Ukraine is a unitary state, meaning that the central government is supreme and oblasts can only exercise power that the government decides to delegate. Along with the 24 oblasts, Ukraine consists of one autonomous republic, Crimea, which became the subject of the territorial dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2014. Also, two cities with a special status exist: the capital Kyiv and Sevastopol, which is located on the Crimean peninsula. Within the survey, Crimea also includes Sevastopol however, so there is no unique data of Sevastopol in the analysis. The oblasts and cities with a special status are further divided into raions (districts), but the focus of the analysis will be on the administrative level of oblasts. The oblasts are often named after their respective administrative centers, the largest city in a region. In general terms, the population of oblasts consists of about one to two million people with the most populated oblasts being situated in the east (as shown in figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4 Population distribution in Ukraine.

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3.5 DATASET VARIABLES

In section 3.3, the dependent and independent variables were named that could be helpful in answering the research questions. This researched is limited to the available data however. In this section, questions from the survey are connected to each of earlier discussed themes, beginning with the dependent variables.

3.5.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The attitudes towards the European Union and other Western actors involves the following variables:

o V147 In what direction would you like to see Ukraine develop? o V150 Evaluation of the political situation in Russia o V151 opinion about Ukraine joining union with Russia and Belarus o V152 opinion about Russian as official language o V153 opinion about entry into EU o V154 opinion about entry into NATO

In the descriptive analysis, the answers to these questions are presented in a geographical way, ordered by category, to provide insight into the divisions in the country.

3.5.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The explanatory variables (questions) that can be used in an analysis are:

• Individual and household characteristics: o V128 voting for parliament election o V148 to what group of the population you carry yourselves first of all? o V334 average income per person in your family o V398 membership in a religious confession o V399 gender o V400 age o V401 family status o V405 education o V406 nationality o V409 native language o V4 attitude about economic transformation in Ukraine (markets vs pre- Perestroika conditions)

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o V10 working for a private company o V11 support for socialism or capitalism o V123 Do you agree with the idea that a few strong leaders could do more good for our country than all the laws and debates? o V393 suffer for the sake of order or protest against deterioration of economic situation? o V124 In your opinion, does Ukraine need a multiparty system?

• Contextual characteristics: o V411 where do you live now? (Kyiv, large city, small city or village) o V412 residence location (oblast)

3.6 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

How will the data be used? Two main types of analyses will be done. First, the data will be analyzed in a descriptive way. Second, the dependent variables will be tested on their relationship with independent variables using regression analyses.

There are several benefits of doing a descriptive analysis prior to regression analyses. A descriptive analysis allows us to do a further exploration of the data. These knowledge has its benefits when formulation hypotheses that will be tested using the regression analyses. A good understanding of the data is vital in that sense.

The descriptive analysis includes the presentation and interpretation of statistics. To make the statistics easier to interpret, maps are provided. As the number of oblasts in Ukraine is quite high, it would be difficult only to use tables. The maps will display the data ordered by oblasts. Maps are faster to interpret than tables, and because of the spatiality of this research, maps are an indispensable instrument. Especially because the regional differences in Ukraine may be far more complex than a simple east-west divide, the maps are a necessary tool. The maps will immediately give us a sense of the relationship of the dependent variables with a contextual individual variable. Both the dependent and independent variables will be used in the descriptive analysis.

In the descriptive analysis, the spatiality of the dependent variables will be presented first. First, the attitudes towards the Ukrainian nation. Second, the attitudes towards the European Union and other Western actors. Third, the attitudes towards Russia. The next thing to do is to present the spatial distribution of the independent variables.

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3.7 LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSES

After the initial descriptive analysis, regression analyses will be utilized to find an answer to the last research question:

To what extent are different attitudes of Ukrainian citizens towards the European Union and Russia explained by individual, household and contextual characteristics?

The different attitudes are seen from a dichotomous perspective whenever possible, to ensure that the results are more likely to be significant. The exact interpretation of the analyses will be explained in the section prior to the analyses. After the binary logistic regression analyses, a multinomial regression analysis will be done too, this time including three instead of two categories of the dependent variable.

In the following chapter, the research will focus on the question which factors have contributed to the shaping of a divided Ukrainian nation. Chapter five includes the quantitative analysis.

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THE ONGOING REALISATION OF A DIVIDED NATION

CHAPTER FOUR

4.1 INTRODUCTION Over the course of the European history, borders have changed, states have emerged and dissolved and geopolitical imaginations are moving with them, and not always in a linear process. In this chapter, it will be explained how the historical legacy is echoed in the current geopolitical landscape of Ukraine. That will done by elaborating on the geopolitical imaginations that are and were present in the current Ukrainian territory. Also, the nation-building efforts in post-Soviet colonial space will be described, ultimately leading to a theoretical insight in the internal differences in Ukraine. Finally, the influence of external actors in dividing Ukraine is discussed.

4.2 HISTORICAL LEGACY OF THE WEST

How important are borders in creating differences? Paasi (1996) provides an understanding of the divisions created by boundaries, the rise of nations and nation states and political identifications. Paasi wants to underline his statement that territorial transformations in nation states are the result of decisions and practices which can be done every day of local civil societies. Throughout history, the Finnish territory Paasi describes has been dominated by Russia and Sweden, so there has been little opportunity for independent development. Instead, external political forces played a major role in shaping statehood, political autonomy and a weak national consciousness. The Ukrainian territory has seen a similar process, historically being dominated by forces that were not Ukrainian. This historical dimension is one that should not be forgotten, as path dependency can play a major role in the breeding of future tensions.

Borders are a space of division, but competing geographical imaginaries exist, in which borders are not a line, but a space of multinational coexistence. An example of these competing imaginaries has been researched by Bialasiewicz (2003). The national leaders of the new independent Ukrainian state were confronted with the challenge to deal with the role of historic Polish colonialism in western Galicia. The legacy of the Habsburg Empire is reflected in western Ukraine today, which used to

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be the easternmost province called Habsburg Galicia of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The imperial heritage has been at the center for numerous interventions in the urban landscapes of different post-communist cities, and the touristic potential of this has already been exploited (see for example figure 4.1). The picture shows the railway station of L’viv, which is one of the most notable pieces of Art Nouveau architecture in former Galicia. As Bialasiewicz quotes from an observer, “the Habsburg legacy, especially in the early years of the transition, came to represent all that was true, good, beautiful and, above all, European” (page 23).

Figure 4.1: The rediscovery of the Habsburg legacy in the renovated railway station of L’viv.

Source: Stecker (2014)

To establish a border-regional togetherness, a distinct set of territorial symbols has to be used, of which a name is the most important. Giving a name to a territory places the inhabitants in a geopolitical, civilizational, historical and cultural space. One can add the ingredient myth-making to that. Myths have the capability to reduce the plurality of social, political and cultural factors into a unity. This was needed, as the region was inhabited by Polish, Ukrainian and Yiddish people. The myths made Habsburg Galicia an idealized world, a world where one could be what one wanted to be. Galicia was depicted as ‘the last Europe’ before the outbreak of the world wars.

After the Ausgleich in 1867, Galicia was more privileged than other provinces in the

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Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. The local elites were dominated by the Polish, and they got the rights that allowed them to start getting rid of the former Germanization policies in the province. Two years later, Polish was established as the language of the bureaucracy and the courts. In 1870 and 1871, Polish became the language of instructions in the universities of Kraków and L’viv. Overall, the political status of the Galician Poles continued to rise. In turn, the feelings of nationalism among the Poles grew as well. The identity topic became quite interesting in that sense. The inhabitants were citizens of Europe and ‘locals’ at the same time. Students graduated with both knowledge of European and national history. The education system was essential in that sense. And because anyone could ‘be what one wanted to be’, the national or ethnic belonging was not the most significant part of identification. Only the people who were ‘not from here’ were seen as ‘others’. The Austro-Hungarian Empire came to its end during the First World War, but the Habsburg lands were not ‘purified’ by eliminating ethnicities. Poland had been granted most of the former Austro-Hungarian Ukraine after the war. They tried to discourage any expression of Ukrainian nationhood from the beginning. It turned out that the Polish regime radicalized the Ukrainian national sentiment, instead of assimilating the Galician Ukrainians to the culture and language of Poland (Janmaat, 2000:56).

The multinational dream of the Habsburgs ended during Nazi Germany in the Second World War, in which Jews, Rom, Poles, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and Russians were killed on a large scale by the Nazi’s. After the Second World War, the ‘demographic chaos in the East’ was ‘cleaned up’ by realigning populations to conform to the new frontiers. Galicia was the key area in the mass migration of populations. The new borders were cut straight through the historical regions.

After independence of Ukraine, the myth of Galicia (Galicja felix) would rise again, both as simple marketing tool and in the names of public and private institutions. The myth is shared by the nations of Ukraine and Poland. However, actual reterritorialization is not possible without deterritorialization of another territorial unit. The revival of the Galician imaginary shows that (a part of) western Ukraine is a distinctive region within the whole of Ukraine. As the Austro-Hungarian Empire didn’t stretch to the current eastern borders of Ukraine, the more eastern parts have had a much different historical influence.

4.3 HISTORICAL LEGACY OF THE EAST

Unlike the western areas of Ukraine, the eastern areas are much more influenced by the legacies of Czarist and Soviet times. After the Partitions of Poland between 1771

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and 1795, Ukraine was divided between the Tsardom of Russia and Habsburg Austria. Research has been done to the Czarist and Soviet policies in Ukraine (Janmaat, 2000). The Czarist policy was quite radical, as its purpose was to deny the existence of Ukrainian as a separate language and the Ukrainian people as a distinct nation. These policies started in 1804, when a law permitted the teaching of non- Russian languages in the empire, but Ukrainian was not included in this law. This meant that Ukrainian was banned from schools and universities as a subject and as language of instruction. The Russians felt that Ukrainians are truly part of the Russian nation, and rejected anything that could consolidate Ukrainian culture. In 1876, Ukrainians books, newspapers and public cultural events that were performed in Ukrainian were not allowed anymore too. Overall, the ethnic mobilization of Ukrainians was greatly disturbed by the policies of the Czarist rulers. This was contrasted by the situation of the Baltic peoples, who were granted more linguistic rights in that sense. So, the Austrian authorities in in Galicia allowed the use of minority languages, but the Czarist rulers did not. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian national idea managed to stay alive in small sections of the population in eastern Ukraine.

The Bolsheviks were the victor of the Ukrainian civil war between 1917 and 1921. The Bolsheviks radically broke with the Russification policies of their predecessor by introduction a nationality policy that made the minorities (populations and languages) equal in status to Russian and the Russians. Eagerness to secure loyalty, a desire to spread the Proletarian Revolution and to socially mobilize the minorities were their reasons to do this. In political sense, the minorities were granted their own Union Republics, although the actual political power was still in the hands of the centralized Communist Party. In social sense, the republican party and state organs were no longer staffed by just Russians. Finally, the cultural element stimulated the use of non-Russian languages by providing education and media in the minority languages. The cultural element, called Ukrainizatsiia, was successful in the media and education. On the other side, Ukrainian never held the same status as Russian in the party and state organs. The relative liberal policies were ended from the 1930’s, when Stalin rose to absolute power. In 1926, the percentage of Russians in Ukraine was less than 10 percent, with 2,6 million Russians living in the Ukrainian SSR. This percentage grew to 13,5 percent in 1939, with 4,2 million Russians living in the Ukrainian SSR.

After the Second World War, the western Ukrainian lands were finally united with Soviet Ukraine, and centralization and Russification policies continued. The percentage of Russians living in the Ukrainian territory grew to more than 22 percent, with 11,4 million Russians living in Ukraine (Demoscope, 2014). The status

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of the Ukrainian language continuously degraded. Years later, the political landscape started to change again when the ‘Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR’ in 1989 made Ukrainian the sole state language.

To sum it up, the Ukrainian territory has been divided between different forces during the majority of the history of the last centuries. Whereas the Ukrainian language was suppressed in the east during most of the last centuries, the western half of the country savored relatively more rights related to their language. Therefore, the linguistic differences in the country can clearly be explained from its history. Not only the linguistic perspective is important however. Other attributes of the Ukrainian society can be traced back in the history of the country, whether it be influences of the Austro-Hungarian empire, Poland, the Czarists of the Soviets, it is clear that Ukraine’s history can’t be characterized by unity.

4.4 NATION BUILDING IN POST-SOVIET UKRAINE

Janmaat (2000) delineated the nation-building efforts of the Ukrainian state after independence. To a certain extent, all state are engaged in nation-building, as it is an instrument to enhance the unity, legitimacy and, following on that, the stability of the state. The nation-building policies affect the social-cultural position of minorities in a country. They vary from mild policies, allowing the minorities to develop their cultures and languages within the borders, to policies that seek to homogenize the country by eliminating groups that have a different language, culture or identity from the core group. National minorities can react in different ways, from complete assimilation to convulsively trying to hold on to their own culture and identity. Education is envisioned as the most important instrument of nation-building for a state, and also the most important institution for national minorities to pass their language and culture on to new generations. For Ukraine, this challenge was not particular easy, with a large Russian minority living disproportionally in the eastern and southern parts of the country.

The previous section mentioned that the status of the Russian language in the country already was declining in the years just before independence. Measures restricting the use of Russian in the education system were intensified after independence. One of them stated that the proportion of Russian-instructed pupils in each local population should be in line with the composition of the national population. As the proportion of Ukrainian-instructed pupils lagged far behind in the southern and eastern oblasts, this meant a massive Ukrainization in these parts of the country. Another decree of the Ministry made Russian an optional subject for Ukrainian schools. Russian, on the contrary, was put away in the ‘world literature’ course. A third measure took the possibility away from Russian schools to obtain ~ 29 ~

prestigious titles like lyceum, college or gymnasium. Five years after independence, in 1996, the unequal status of Russian was finalized by the Constitution by granting Russian the status of a national minority language. Ukrainian was from now on to be the sole state language. Thus, the Russians and other minorities were not granted much autonomy in school education, which was highly centralized with a national curriculum developed by the Ministry of Education. The national idea of Ukraine was disseminated through the school subjects of history of Ukraine, Ukrainian literature and geography of Ukraine. In the history of Ukraine, the distinctiveness between the Ukrainians and Russians was maximized. For example, the Bolshevik Revolution was depicted as a foreign phenomenon with no Ukrainian role. The Ukrainian individuality was underlined by presenting the Ukrainian language as the sole native language. The revised Ukrainian literature and geography courses were largely left untouched however, and did not contribute much to the nation-building project.

The Ukrainian state did not set the goal to fully eliminate cultural diversity however. Russians and other minorities who lived on the Ukrainian territory were offered citizenship. Second, non-Ukrainians were not forced to leave positions in state offices, and they did not face serious discrimination in the job market, although western Ukraine was an exemption in the latter to some extent. Third, the Law on National Minorities granted extensive rights to minorities. Fourth, national authorities showed consideration for Ukraine’s linguistic profile by accepting that language regulations were implemented only gradually, and that some targets couldn’t even be met. Thus, the strategy of Ukraine in dealing with ethnic pluralism can be characterized as one that is fairly liberal with a mild but nonetheless persistent drive to culturally homogenize the country.

The success of the nation-building policies of the national authorities are different in the country. Some oblasts were well on its way reaching the national composition in the schools, like Dnipropetrovs’k, Kherson and Mikolaiv. Other oblasts, however, only showed minimal growth figures, with Donets’k, Luhans’k and Crimea as the main examples. These oblasts are also the oblasts in which the Ukrainization was urgently needed from a policy perspective. Oblasts that were moderately behind are Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia and Odesa. A reason for the failure of Ukrainization in the most eastern and southern oblasts is the relatively autonomous behavior of these oblasts. A shortage of Ukrainian teachers and materials is another reason. Also, the choice behavior of parents is an important determinant.

The use of the new revised textbooks looked like to be completed however. In 1997, the books were used in schools in Crimea as well. Language regulations were in that sense much less successful than the introduction of new teaching materials. Figure ~ 30 ~

4.2 shows the maximum extent of the influences in Ukraine from the west. Contrary to the influences from the east, the western forces never occupied the complete current territory of Ukraine. It is clear however that Ukraine has been lying in the middle of two spheres of influence for years throughout history, creating different historical legacies.

Figure 4.2: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at its maximum extent, in 1619.

Source: Wedrowiec, 2014.

4.5 THE ‘MYTH’ OF A DIVIDED UKRAINE

The regional divisions in Ukraine are often framed as the east-west divide, in which a Ukrainian-speaking and nationalistic west is bordered by a Russian-speaking and separatist east. But, is Ukraine really divided along a perfect east-west axis, or is this sharp division just a myth? An effective approach in which these divisions become visible are elections. Ten years before the presidential elections in 2004, the regional diversity gained attention after the voting patterns were said to be heavily influenced by the linguistic diversity, with the Ukrainian-speakers west of the River Dnipro, and the Russian-speakers east of the River Dnipro (Arel & Wilson, 1994). Leonid Kuchma, the candidate who aimed for stronger ties with Russia, got the ~ 31 ~

most votes in every oblast east of the Dnipro. On the contrary, the other candidate Leonid Kravchuk who campaigned for Ukraine’s distancing from Russia won in all the oblasts west of the Dnipro. Due to the demographics, with the much higher populated oblasts in the east, Kuchma was the final winner. The Orange Revolution after the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections underlined the fact that regional diversity is still strongly present and the difficult challenge the Ukrainian state faces to reconcile these divisions, and to create a modern Ukrainian identity.

Furthermore, the east-west divide was underpinned by research that often concentrated on L’viv in the west and Donets’k in the east, two cities that were seen as symbols of the two opposing political poles in Ukraine. These studies led to conclusions that the residents of L’viv and Donets’k have the opposite opinions on economic, political and geopolitical ideals; ultimately stating that Ukraine is divided along an east-west axis (see table 4.1). In this table, the opposing poles of L’viv and Donets’k are used to generalize differences to the whole country.

Table 4.1: Ideal-type profiles of ‘east’ and ‘west’ in Ukraine.

Characteristics ‘West’ ‘East’ Density of population Low High Urbanization Low High Ethnic composition Ukrainian Ukrainian and Russian Language spoken Ukrainian Russian Religion Catholicism Orthodoxy Economic profile Agriculture Industrial Political orientation Moderate or radical Communist or liberal nationalism and liberal Geopolitical preferences Pro-European Pro-Russian/CIS Historical memories Soviet Union as ‘invader,’ Soviet Union as Russians as ‘enemy’ legitimate state, Russians as ‘Slavic brothers’

Source: Wolzcuk, 2001.

The responses to Ukraine being depicted as a divided state were not light-headed. A civil war was said to be inevitable due to the polarization in the country (Seely, 1994). These responses were criticized, but the 2014 crisis opened up the way for the discussion again, with Putin naming the crisis a ‘large-scale civil war’ (Elsevier, 2014) and Western media naming it a situation characterized by ‘strong signs of a civil war’ (Trouw, 2014).

Up to the current crisis however, the ‘allegedly insurmountable’ differences have not led to a large scale crisis and the reason for that remained largely unexamined.

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Additionally, since the research concentrated on extreme cases, the question how the rest of the spectrum looks like remains under lighted. One cannot extrapolate the results of a case study of two cities to the complete nation, leading to a statement that Ukraine will inevitably split into two halves. It is more likely that the ‘two Ukraines’ are overlapping with areas characterized by signs of both east and west. Identity trajectories are intertwined, giving many Ukrainians a fluid and ambivalent identity. Zhurzenko (2002) argued that the ‘myth of two Ukraines’ is popularized by media, with the purpose to promote a particular viewpoint of what Ukraine is and what the direction of the country should be. Zhurzenko adds that the ‘two Ukraines’ discourse has led to eastern Ukraine being put away as the hinge factor in the arduousness of the nation building processes in Ukraine after the independence. Later on, the author points to Kuzio (2002), in which the assumption is made that without the eastern half of Ukraine, the country would be way further towards European integration. Responding to the results of the 2002 parliamentary reaction, Kuzio writes:

“Nevertheless, the elections showed that west-central Ukraine voted for “Estonian-style” radical reform and a pro-Western orientation, while southern and eastern Ukraine voted along ”Belarusian” lines for either a return to the communist past or for oligarchs who favour an authoritarian-corporatist state.” (Kuzio, 2002).

According to Zhurzhenko, this is an effort to make an artificial division between the ‘European’ Ukraine, characterized by a strong civil society and democratization, and Eastern Ukraine, with a primitive political culture as the legacy of tsarist and Soviet eras. National identities are mainly absent in southern and eastern Ukraine, so the civil society is also at its weakest in this regions, as Kuzio (2002:162) states. Thus, the identities of eastern Ukrainians are seen by Kuzio as essentially pre-modern. A transformation into a national identity is necessary because “national identities (…) are indispensable for political reform because only in nation-states have democracies been traditionally created” (Kuzio, 2002:144). This point of view is criticized by Rodgers (2006), who argues that the deterministic approach of Kuzio is exaggerating the importance of national identity as the sole instrument to become part of the democratic European way of life.

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4.6 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REGION

Paasi (1996) describes regions as historically contingent social constructions that give meaning to territories through a gradual process of institutionalization in the public consciousness. Regions do not have precise borders, but instead they are often ill-defined, overlapping and temporal constructions.

The view of Kuzio on regional identities is also quite drastic, as an “indicator of an incomplete identity in transition”. Rodgers (2006) criticizes this view, in which regional differences are turned into a transitionary phenomenon. Nation-building shouldn’t be viewed as a homogenizing and assimilatory process, as that will underestimate the potential existence of multiple identities in modern societies. Furthermore, one should not assume that nation building is a one-dimensional process at nature with a pre-determined end. Rodgers calls for a response to take the complex, dynamic and multidimensional characteristics of national identity into account, instead of reducing national identity to a single element. The regional element has been researched in a study by Jackson (1998), who argued that the population of the Zaporizhzhia region in the southeast of Ukraine is deeply involved in the politics of identity, even though they are not actively involved in the formal debate of national identity. There has been little academic attention to how the debates on national identity at the state level were reflected at the local level, the level where the tensions and difficulties in the nation-building process become visible. Rodgers (2006) outlines the results of qualitative research in regions where multiple identities prevail. These are Sumy, Kharkiv and Luhans’k, all located in the eastern borderlands. The complexity of these identities emerged after erosion of the Russian and Ukrainian linguistic and cultural differences under Tsarist rule, and, more significant, Russification policies. These identities have a weak sense of historical consciousness and often feel closely related to a Russian identity, making the nation-building process quite difficult for Ukraine. The study was done to find out how the population thinks about their own identity, to provide an answer to the question how important the region is in their perception. This ‘who they are’- question is contrasted by the ‘who they are not’-question, by reflecting on Russia’s role in the identity politics of Ukraine. The opinions of schoolchildren of about 16-17 years old were compared with those of their teachers, of which the majority of the latter category was educated in the Soviet Union.

Two important themes were central in the outcomes. First, the regional differences in Ukraine do play a role in the domestic politics and the east-west division is real, according to the teachers. Ukrainians in the west were said to not to fully understand the historical relationship with Russia as a state and Russians as a

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nation. They possess a different historical perspective of what it means to be a Ukrainian than people in other parts of the country. An assistant lecturer in Luhans’k said the following about this:

“For only 60 years we have been a whole Ukraine and previously we were part of different territories. Because of this, we are totally different people. People from western Ukraine come here and do not understand our mentality. Why we don’t get rid of the monuments to Dzherzhinsky and Lenin. Why? It is because the monuments do not get in our way, they are part of our history and why should we get rid of it?.” (Rodgers, 2006:162)

The second theme that emerged also had to do with regional differences. To a certain extent, the divisions are, in the eyes of the teachers, artificially constructed by the media and political actors to legitimize their actions. There has been much discussion on language politics in Ukraine and eastern Ukrainians got the impression that when they would travel to western Ukraine and spoke in the Russian language, tensions would be created with the local people. The respondents who travelled to western Ukraine in recent years however haven’t encountered situations like these however. A history teacher in Luhans’k said:

“Yes, we were told that in L’viv, if you ask directions in Russian, then they will give you the wrong directions. This wasn’t the case. If you speak with local people in Russian, they will also speak back in Russian so you can understand them. Maybe in some deep villages, where the level of civilization is very low, then maybe this is the case, but I personally haven’t encountered this.” (Rodgers, 2006:162).

Thus, the regional differences are for a good part existing because of misperceptions. Rodgers does not deny that regional differences exist, but misperceptions have the potential to reinforce the differences in the eyes of the ordinary population, making the challenge of the state for unity even harder.

Turning to children, the theme of language was brought up as the most important theme of regional differences too. Children felt a reluctance to use their own language, Russian. A schoolgirl from Luhans’k said:

“I was in the Carpathians not long ago and it is interesting to think about the relations between western and eastern Ukraine. We thought that they would call us moskali (Russians), but a man we met in L’viv, said that they only call moskali, those people who live in L’viv and speak Russian and that we shouldn’t worry.” (Rodgers, 2006:163).

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Although opinions like these were expressed more than once, many children expressed negative representations of western Ukraine, mainly caused by its relation to the Russian language. According to other respondents, western Ukraine has a negative attitude towards the Russian language and Russia in general. Many respondents voiced their dislike to an open dislike of Russia. “Ukraine is made up of two parts, western and eastern Ukraine. Western Ukraine has a more sharp politics, she is against Russia. There should be a sensible nationalism, and not fanaticism.” Western Ukraine is also criticized for being ‘polluted’ by foreign neighboring countries, of which Poland has the main role in the ‘pollution’. Two schoolchildren from Kharkiv say:

“We have differences between the western and eastern parts. In the western part they don’t speak the Ukrainian language, they speak Polish combined with Ukrainian.” (Rodgers, 2006:163).

“Lots of people in western Ukraine think that they are more Ukrainian than we are as they speak Ukrainian. Yet their culture is a mix of Polish and Ukrainian cultures. They have Catholic churches, it is not pure Ukrainian culture, it is very mixed. All they have is their language. To hear real Ukrainian, you must go to Poltava Oblast.” (Rodgers, 2006:164).

The perspective of these children is significant in the light of identity politics in Ukraine. The discourse in which the ‘other’ in Ukraine are eastern Ukrainians is completely opposed by them. In their eyes, the real ‘other’ in identity politics are western Ukrainians, being influenced by Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. Furthermore, the western Ukrainians are portrayed as people who perceive themselves as more Ukrainian on the base of language, thinking they are ‘real’ Ukrainians and eastern Ukrainians are Russians. A respondent said “I disagree. I am Ukrainian, I was born in this country and I live in this country. It doesn’t matter what language you speak.”

The attitudes towards the Russian language are thus for a large part responsible for the shaping of the identity of the respondents. The Russian language is particularly significant in shaping awareness of regional diversity across Ukraine. Many respondents in eastern Ukraine shared the perception that the western half of the country has a hostile opinion towards the Russian language. Rodgers adds that people in west Ukraine hold the opposite perception: that Ukrainian-speakers are also prone to a hostile reaction when speaking Ukrainian in in eastern Ukraine, demonstrated by the following quote from a schoolgirl in Luhans’k:.

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“I think that western Ukrainians are real Ukrainians, they are proud of their country, not all but the majority and as for our region (Luhans’k), I think we have failed. I’m sure that there are people who love their country who live here, but it is difficult for them to speak in their native language here because very often people argue and say, ah, you are Banderites. I have heard such things. I mainly speak Russian but when I meet with some of my friends, we speak Ukrainian. When we speak Ukrainian in the cafes and transport, people behave in a strange way. They blame us for all crimes.” (Rodgers, 2006: 164).

But understanding identity solely using language differences is not the way it should be, some schoolchildren say. A schoolboy from Luhans’k said:

“I think that this is stupid. We are one people, but history has turned out that western Ukraine and eastern Ukraine are against each other. This is not clever. We are one country. Simply for us, Russian is as much ‘our’ language as Ukrainian is for people in western Ukraine. In western Ukraine, they have even tried to ban the Russian language and because of this there were many protests. We since birth have spoken Russian. And it turns out that just because of this, that we speak Russian and not because of other reasons, such a love for Russia or personal convictions, they in western Ukraine consider that we are chuzhyi ‘foreign’ people, although we live in one country.” (Rodgers, 2006:164).

Many schoolchildren in the borderlands in the east of Ukraine felt misrepresented by commentators, who are said to make claims that just because they speak the Russian language they are ‘Russian-loving’ and skeptical of Ukraine as an independent state at the same time. The individuals had a desire to be understood that they are the same Ukrainians as those who live in other parts of the country. Speaking the Russian language is not making them less Ukrainian. The schoolchildren define their identity using other things than just language.

4.7 RUSSIA AND THE ‘OTHERNESS’ OF UKRAINIANS

Self-identification does not only exist with the ‘who you are’ question, but it needs ‘who you are not’ too. Therefore, it is important to discuss the feelings of eastern Ukrainians towards the Russian state too. Rodgers discusses the outcomes of two themes: the border between the Ukrainian and Russian state and the relations between Ukraine and Russia. Patterns of regional and national identities are not often coinciding with state borders. Transnational regionalism (Hurrell, 1995) is what makes ideals in striving for united states with one identity difficult to

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accomplish. As already discussed by Bialasiewicz earlier in this chapter, it is not unthinkable that people can identify themselves with a territorial structure that belongs to the past when looking at the current (state) borders. In the case of eastern Ukraine, people may still identify themselves with people who live on the other side of the Ukrainian-Russian border.

The older generation, the teachers, broadly shared the opinion that there is no need for a ‘symbolic demarcation’ between Ukraine and Russia, because in reality no divisions exist. Most of the teachers had relatives living on the other side, so for them the border is an unnecessary hassle.

Despite the unity in the opinions of the older generation, the younger generation expressed far more diverse opinions. Some agreed with their older generation, and argued that Ukraine, Belarus and Russia are one Slavic nation, and borders between them serve no function. Others had a complete other opinion, stating that Ukraine would lose its own nationality when the border between Ukraine and Russia would disappear. They feel a threat that Russia would take over control of Ukraine. For them, the border is a necessary instrument to defend their independence. When talking about the importance of the border, it can be said that the older generation lived for most of their lives without one between Russia and Ukraine and don’t see the relevance of a border now. This topic leads to much more discussion for the younger generation. Here, the concrete effects of the nation-building efforts in the country can be measured. The schoolchildren have spent their entire lives in an independent Ukraine. They have a greater sense of their own territory, where it begins and where it ends. The fact that the opinions between the generations are so different proves that there has been at least some effect in the nation-building efforts of the state. Slowly, the political entity Ukraine is emerging.

The results after discussing the topic of the general relations with Russia were in line with those of the opinions of the border. The older generation dislikes the efforts to ‘artificially’ divide Russia and Ukraine. A teacher from Sumy points at politicians creating the problems between the nations:

“I was born in Kharkiv. But my father was a servicemen, thus we lived in Russia a lot. We never encountered a bad relationship to Ukrainians. In Ukraine, up to 1991, also there was never hostility towards Russians. I think that the problem of relations between Russians and Ukrainians is made up by politicians, only so as to gain more personal power. To show that only now they can do things for the people, for previously they were under the control of Russia. This does not correspond to reality. Definite political forces are interested in breaking ties between Russia and Ukraine. They try to erect

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some sort of barrier. But for many centuries, both our peoples have had single roots, everything was inter-connected and artificially to break these connections is not possible. All the more, in the world at present is taking place processes of integration. And what will we, Slavic nations, break apart? History will not allow this.” (Rodgers, 2006:167).

An interesting finding is that, when the respondents had to point at an ‘other’ of eastern Ukrainians, it would be western Ukrainians, instead of Russians. It is said that the problems with the relations with western Ukraine are bigger than with Russia, because in the west, the mentality of the individual is more developed. Thus, internal regional differences in Ukraine are more significant than differences with Russia, who do not exist in the eyes of the older generation of eastern Ukrainians.

The issue was an inducement for more discussion for the younger generation. One statement was in line with the opinions of the older generation, saying that there is no need for a border because Ukraine and Russia occupy one single cultural and political space. When something negative is heard about Russia, they worry too, as they don’t see the Russians as foreigners. A schoolgirl from Kharkiv says:

“About the question whether to go to Europe or Russia, I think that we should turn to Russia. I think that Russia could be even better than Europe, it has a great potential, no European country can compete with Russia. In culture and religion, we are almost the same as Russia. The big problem is now here are some nationalists in our politics and these angry people will make big problems in our relations with Russia. They want to be separate from Russia, but we should be together.” (Rodgers, 2006:168).

The other discourse of the schoolchildren expressed that a territorial Ukrainian identity is emerging, and that a unification with Russia is not desirable. The national pride, traditions and language of the Ukrainians would be lost if that happens. Although it is important to maintain relations with Russia, the country is not someone special for Ukraine. To conclude this part, among the younger generation is awareness that they are growing up in a rapidly changing world in which Ukraine can stand on its own feet. There is a clear understanding of the differences between the west and the east, but the opinions in the more central located Sumy Oblast (although still a border oblast) were more temperate about this. The regional factor is far more complex than a simple east-west divide. Rather than ethnicity and language, the region of residence is far more important in explaining the desire for an independent Ukraine. A complementary study (Barrington, 2002) found that where someone lives and the economic status of that person is more important than ethnicity and language.

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4.7 DIVISIONS IN UKRAINE AND EXTERNAL FORCES

The current escalation of the tensions in Ukraine cannot be understood without also taking external forces into measure. This section looks at the external forces with regard to Ukraine. First, a theoretical background is given on the topic of the enlargement of the European and its role with Ukraine. Second, the policies of several actors towards Ukraine are discussed, and third, other influences that may have influenced the unrest in Ukraine.

Among the current disintegration in Ukraine, processes of integration are happening at the same time. Kovacs & Leipnik (2008) wrote about the EU too, in this case addressing the theme of “Europeanization” in Ukraine. The meaning of Europeanization is a bit unclear, as it means to represent “a process of institutional transformation underway in countries that are members of, or applicants to, the EU”. An important discovery is that Ukrainians don’t have a strong understanding of what Europe essentially is, and in that logic it is a bit odd to start “building Europe in Ukraine”. The writers propose that “Europeanization” should be observed as an implication of colonialism and “westernization”. In Ukraine, Europe is mostly a mythology: the emphasis lies upon improvement of the living standard while disregarding the economic dangers. To continue of the process of European integration, another form of “building Europe in Ukraine” are cross-border cooperation schemes, better known as Euroregions. Euroregions are territorial units spanning two or more state borders, where spatial patterns of social life can be organized without having to worry about state borders to the benefit of the civil society (Murphy, 1993). They are meant to redefine fixed, Westphalian territoriality. Cross-border regions are, in that sense, one of the most visible examples of contemporary territorial rearrangement in the Westphalian state system, and it questions the logic of absolute state territorial sovereignty. The regions are different in size, with most of them having their own formal governing institutions like councils, secretariats and working groups, and some of them are even accommodated with own symbols such as logos and flags. The Euroregions are supported by the EU. They view them as a model and an engine of European integration that contribute to reducing tensions between states and to reduce mutual economic disparities. Popescu (2008) examines the Euroregions from a geopolitical viewpoint with multi-scalar conceptualizations of political territory. Popescu emphases on the Euroregions in the Romanian-Ukrainian-Moldovan boundaries. He begins by describing how cross-border regions have been formed

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across European state borders in order to reduce their role as obstacles, eventually leading a redefinition of state territoriality. Popescu concentrates on Euroregions as new territorial constructions instead of new institutional spaces. The regions in the East European borderlands were meant to be a territorial framework where applicant nations for the EU could get ready for their membership.

The literature on cross-border regions used to conceptualize the regions in two main perspectives. The first one of them is related to the field of political economy, and looks at the potential of capital accumulation within the regions. This literature is skeptical of their potential as meaningful spaces of reterritorialization (see for example Jessop, 2002). The second discourse in the literature is less skeptical, and sees the cross-border regions as territorial unites with innovative possibilities as spaces of reterriorialization (Murphy, 1993). It must be noted however that cross- border institutions are currently too weak to defy state territorial sovereignty (Jessop, 2002).

But, European integration is not the only territorial process in the geopolitical landscape. An interesting difference can be found in the territorialities of Europe and Russia. Klinke (2012) argues that territoriality in Europe is intended as postmodern, with softening sovereign territories and the establishment of multi- layered identities. This is in contrast with Russia, which is said to be caught up in a framework of fixed borders and national identity. Klinke reflects on this popular concept of Europe. In his study, Klinke reveals how the original idea that Russia must become like the European Union is inverted. A return from the postmodern to modern is needed to counter the dangers that originate from the modern. To make their political power grow in the world, the EU should express themselves with a single opinion and secondly take a more thoughtful geopolitical attitude to new world order. But this is hard, when one takes the complex spectrum of political processes in Europe in mind. Two phenomena are dominating the geopolitical scene of Europe. One of them is integration, by means of the enlarging borders of the EU, and of them is disintegration, as expressed by tensions, conflicts and social crisis beyond the eastern border of the EU (Marcu, 2009). Marcu discusses the border relations between Ukraine, Moldova and Romania since their independence. These borders are multidimensional and ethno-territorial, prone to tensions and conflict. Two possible measures are discussed, opening the border by means of cooperation or closing the border by means of control and security.

The EU enlargements of the 2000’s were accompanied by developments in the geopolitical imaginations of the EU too. First, the EU got new neighbors in the east which will not be eligible for a quick entrance into the EU too. Second, the new members in the east have interests with their eastern neighbor and would like to see ~ 41 ~

them become an EU member too. Third, the size of the EU made EU leaders think beyond their immediate regional context to the place of the EU in world politics.

For several purposes, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was launched in 2003. The policy was meant to create a framework for a partnership between the EU and their neighbors in the south and the east of Europe, to strive for security and prosperity for the entire region. Structural aid and enhanced political cooperation were the means to reduce economic and political disparities between the EU and its neighbors (Emerson, 2004). The cross-border cooperation is a major strategy of the ENP (Batt, 2003).

The ENP is the new geopolitical vision of the EU in which the EU can emit ‘soft power’ beyond its boundaries, raising the question if we are witnessing post- Westphalian geopolitics now as the ENP is promoting multi-scalar EU spatial imagination beyond its boundaries. The neighbours of the EU are worried however that the ENP might deny them full EU membership in the future, as the EU might not want to go further than stable political and economic relations that are derived from the ENP.

Currently, Ukraine’s borders with EU nations (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania) stretch for an approximate length of 1000 km. The Romanian-Ukrainian- Moldovan Euroregions have a central role in the implementation of the ENP policies, acting as territorial mediators between the EU and the territory of the former Soviet Union. Formally speaking, the EU stops at the eastern borders of Romania, but informally, the territory of the Euroregions is overlapping between Ukraine, Moldova and the EU space.

Changing the perspective to the current situation in Ukraine, the statements of several countries on the topic of Ukraine are discussed.

The Foreign Minister of France, Laurent Fabius, stated on April 14, 2014, that there is evidence of actions of great violence that are being organized in south-eastern Ukraine. Fabius condemns all the violence and says that it seems clear that Russia bears some responsibility for the violence. The aim of France is both to show firmness and to keep dialogue open; stepping up the pressure without making dialogue impossible (France Diplomatie, 2014). The Foreign Minister of Germany, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, called upon all sides to exercise restraint in the Ukraine conflict on April 25, 2014. Specifically, Steinmeier stated that Kyiv and Moscow have a responsibility to live up to the commitments they undertook in Geneva. The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs took a somewhat different position, in supporting the entire Ukrainian people to successfully continue the European

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course it has freely opted for, as stated on May 26, 2014 (Romania Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). Second, the Ministry declared concerns over the impact of Ukrainian developments on Romanian ethnics, and reiterated the importance of a stable Ukraine in which the society is united as a whole, instead of a divided society. Then Bulgarian Foreign Minister Vigenin called on May 28, 2014, for a stabilization of the politics, economics and finance of Ukraine and to keep working on a united Ukraine through a dialogue in which all the regions participate and in which the rights of minorities are respected in accordance with the standards of the Council of Europe (The Republic of Bulgaria Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs ‘strongly condemned Russian aggression in Ukraine’. Sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine is most vital, as said on March 13 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland, 2014).

The United States Department of State ‘condemned the Russia Federation’s invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory, and its violation of Ukrainian sovereignty’. The country argues that the action is a threat to the peace and security of Ukraine, and the wider region, as said on March 1, 2014 (U.S. Department of State, 2014).

On May 29, 2014, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a statement regarding the escalation of the situation in the East of Ukraine, in which Russia expressed deep concerns. The military operation, organized by the current Ukrainian authorities brings pain and suffering to peaceful civilians. The Ukrainian authorities are requested to stop the war and to start a real national dialogue. Russia appeals to their western partners to use their influence to stop the rolling of Ukraine into a national disaster (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2014).

Comparing all the different statements, it is clear that there is a significant difference between the statements of western countries and Russia. In the eyes of the western countries, it is the Russian Federation who is the main aggressor in the crisis. Russia, on the contrary, names the Ukrainian authorities as the main aggressor. Thus, the international community is divided on the situation in Ukraine. The effect of a divided international community won’t help to unite the Ukrainian population in that sense.

External forces are not just formal actors. Looking through informal eyes, the recent revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests, riots and civil wars in the Arab world could have been a source of inspiration for the Ukrainian population as well. Some media even named the crisis in Ukraine the ‘Ukrainian Spring’ (For example

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Verger, 2013), a cross-reference to the events in the Arab world that are known as the Arab Spring.

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4.8 CONCLUSION AND HYPOTHESES

In this chapter, the factors that contributed to the shaping of a divided Ukrainian nation were discussed. The divided nation originates from history, in which different cultures influenced the Ukrainian population. The historical legacy is reflected in geopolitical imaginations of Ukrainians today. Although the theory shows that, in general, everyone feels like a Ukrainian, the definition of a Ukrainian is unclear. For some, the eastern influences are inextricably connected with their identity. And for others, the influences from the west are the core in which their identity is derived from. The Ukrainian authorities acknowledged the differences in their population, and started to build towards a more united nation following on their independence in 1991. The most important nation-building tool was education. The policies were not undeniably successful in every part of the nation however. The Ukrainian authorities tried to create a distinction between the Ukrainian and Russian identities. This caused parts of the population in the east to feel misunderstood. The Russian legacy is part of their identity, which does not make them less Ukrainian in their eyes. The actual division in Ukraine is not perfectly divided in a dichotomous way between the west and east, but instead, the regional differences are much more complex. The international community is divided over the divided situation in Ukraine, which obviously will not have a positive effect in an attempt to make the nation more united.

Based on the theory in this chapter, several hypotheses can be made that are to be tested in the analysis in the next chapter. First of all, the location in which one lives is important to determine the attitudes towards the EU and Russia, especially on historical grounds. People living in an eastern oblast are more likely to have a positive attitude towards Russia, and people who live in a western oblast are more likely to have a positive attitude of the EU. The second hypothesis is that people who are older are more likely to have a postive attitude of Russia, as they were educated in the Soviet Union. Third, people who have had more education are more likely to have a positive attitude towards the EU and NATO, as they are more confronted with the nation-building policies of the Ukrainian state in which distinction with Russia is created. Fourth, people whose native language is Russian have a negative attitude towards the EU, as the west are ‘Others’ to them instead of Russians and Russia.

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DIFFERENT ATTITUDES OF THE UKRAINIAN POPULATION

CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the results of the analysis will be presented and discussed. In general, the chapter can be divided in two main components. First, the variables will be presented visually with a descriptive analysis. Second, regression analyses will be presented in order to explain the different attitudes of Ukrainian citizens towards the European Union and Russia by individual, household an contextual characteristics.

Figure 5.1: Political map of Ukraine.

Source: Teschke, 2014.

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Prior to the analysis, it is important to understand the political map of Ukraine (see figure 5.1). Six oblasts of Ukraine are bordered by Russia in the east. They are, from north to south: Chernihiv (partly), Sumy, Kharkiv, Luhans’k, Donets’k and Crimea. Also, seven oblasts are bordered by EU countries (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania) in the west. They are, from north to south: Volyn, L’viv, Transcarphatia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and Odesa (partly). Also, some oblasts are bordered by Belarus in the north or Moldova in the west.

In this chapter, special attention goes to the hypotheses:

- People living in an eastern oblast are more likely to have a positive attitude towards Russia, and people who live in a western oblast are more likely to have a positive attitude of the EU. - People who are older are more likely to have a postive attitude of Russia compared to younger people. - People who have had more education are more likely to have a positive attitude towards the EU and NATO than people who have had less education. - People whose native language is Russian are more likely to have a negative attitude towards the EU, compared to people whose native language is Ukrainian.

5.2 THE DIRECTION IN WHICH UKRAINE SHOULD DEVELOP

One of the most fundamental geopolitical questions that can be asked is in which direction a country should develop. The original question in the survey was “In what direction would you like to see Ukraine develop?” To give an insight into the opinions of the Ukrainian population, the possible answers were recoded in more clear categories. The first three options, ‘Mainly to broaden ties within the CIS’ ‘Mainly to develop relations with Russia’ and ‘First of all to strengthen the east- Slavic bloc (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus) are recoded into one option ‘Broaden ties with Russia or former Soviet Union’. In other words, a direction towards the East. In total 42,2 percent favors a direction towards countries in the East. The option ‘Mainly to establish ties with Western countries was chosen by 16,5 percent. Finally, the option ‘Mainly to rely on our own resources to strengthen independence’ was chosen by 29,6 percent (see also figure 5.2).

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Figure 5.2: Public opinion of the direction in which Ukraine should develop to.

The direction in which Ukraine should develop to

Mainly to rely on Ukraine's own resources to 11,7 strengthen independence 29,6 Broaden ties with Russia 16,5 or former Soviet Union

Broaden ties with Western countries

42,2 Other

In the map, Yellow stands for the option to rely on Ukraine’s own resources to strengthen independence, blue stands for the option to broaden ties with Western countries and red stands for the option to broaden ties with Russia or the former Soviet Union. The results are shown in figure 5.3. The results seem to have a connection with the spatial location of the residential oblast of the respondents. A direction towards Russia or the former Soviet Union is preferred in most of the Southern and Eastern oblasts. These results are the strongest in Crimea and Luhans’k, two oblasts that declared independence in the current crisis. The Central oblasts have a more or less divided population in the sense of this question. The population of Western oblasts mainly have the opinion to either broaden ties with Western countries or to rely on Ukraine’s own resources to strengthen independence.

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Figure 5.3 Public opinion of the direction in which Ukraine should develop to

In the original question, only one option was to broaden ties with Western countries, and several options were on possible Eastern directions. This means that the Russian or former Soviet Union-oriented opinions can differ from closer ties with Russia to closer ties with countries of the CIS.

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5.3 UKRAINIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE WEST

Two important actors can be named in the light of a possible aim to tighten the Ukrainian relations with Western countries. The European Union is one of them, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the other one. The attitudes towards an entry into the EU are presented in figure 5.4. The original question was “What is your attitude toward the entry of Ukraine into the European Union?” In total, 22,4 percent has a negative attitude towards the entry of Ukraine into the European Union. The percentage with a positive attitude is about five times higher: 74,3 percent. The remaining percentages aren’t sure or think that it is difficult to say.

Figure 5.4 Should Ukraine join the European Union?

In every oblast, a larger proportion of the population is in favor of an EU-entry than the proportion of the population that is not in favor. The strongest support is to be found in oblasts in the Central and Western areas of the country. In six of these oblasts, almost every respondent is in favor of an entry into the EU. The support is lower in especially Odesa and Luhans’k, but there’s still no majority with a negative attitude in these oblasts.

The other important actor on the topic of possible closer ties with the West is NATO. The attitudes towards an entry of Ukraine into NATO are quite different from a possible entry into the EU, as shown in figure 5.5. As we have seen in the previous topic, a majority of the population is in favor of an entry into the EU, but

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when they have to consider an entry into NATO, the national majority disappears. The original question was “What is your attitude towards the entry of Ukraine into NATO?” About half of the population, 48,5 percent has a negative attitude. That number is higher than the percentage with a positive attitude: 39,9 percent. The remaining percentages don’t know or think that it is difficult to say. Most of the Western oblasts have a strong majority in favor of a NATO-entry, but the support is much lower in the Southern and Eastern oblasts. A division between the West and East is clearly visible in the map.

Figure 5.5 Should Ukraine join NATO?

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5.4 UKRAINIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EAST

In this section, three topics concerning attitudes towards Eastern actors and topics are discussed. The first one is the question whether Russian should be an official language in Ukraine. The usage and status of Russian is currently an object of political disputes within Ukraine. Currently, Ukrainian is the only state language of Ukraine. The original question was “Do you think the Russian language should be an official language of Ukraine?”. The national average with a positive attitude is 62 percent, opposed to 30,6 percent with a negative attitude. 7,4 percent doesn’t know or thinks it is difficult to answer.. Figure 5.6 is a visualization of the attitudes about the question whether Russian should be an official language in Ukraine. The division between the East and the West can clearly be noticed in the map. A large amount of Eastern oblasts populate a majority of people in favor of Russian as an official language. The opinions are the strongest in the border oblasts, especially in Odesa, Crimea, Donets’k and Luhans’k, with scores above eighty percent. The support in the most Western oblasts like L’viv, Volyn and Transcarpathia is much lower.

Figure 5.6 Should Russian be an official language of Ukraine?

In the next map (figure 5.7), an evaluation is shown of the political situation in Russia by the Ukrainian population. The data is from a time when Vladimir Putin was starting his first Presidential term of Russia. The Russian economy was crawling up from a collapse in 1998. The original question was “How would you evaluate in

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general the political situation in Russia?”. In total, less than a percent would evaluate the political situation in Russia as ‘quite good’. Three percent would say ‘quiet’. Just above half of the population, 52 percent, would evaluate the situation as ‘tensive’ and 30,7 percent would say ‘critical, highly explosive’. The percentage that evaluates the political situation in Russia as ‘critical, highly explosive’ is shown in the map. An division between the Western and Eastern oblasts can be found once again. In a few oblasts, a majority evaluates the political situation in Russia as highly explosive. Especially the oblasts Volyn and Ivano-Frankivsk are standing out. On the other side, the lowest percentages evaluating the political situation in Russia as highly explosive can be found in the south: Mykolayiv and Crimea, toppling no more than about a quarter of the population.

Figure 5.7 Evaluation of Russian politics.

In the final map of this section (figure 5.8), the attitudes are shown towards the idea that Ukraine should join the Union of Russia and Belarus. The Union State is a supranational entity of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus. The state was formed in 1996, with the intention to provide greater political, economic and social integration. The original survey question was “What is your attitude toward the idea if Ukraine joins the Union of Russia and Belarus?” In total, 42,8 percent has a negative attitude towards this idea, and 51,4 percent has a positive

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attitude. Another 5,8 percent doesn’t know or thinks it is difficult to say. Again, a sharp division can be found between the East and West. Also, the oblasts bordering Russia show a stronger tendency of being in favor of Ukraine joining the Union State. In Luhans’k, Donets’k and Crimea, the idea is supported by over eighty percent of the population. The support is much lower in the Western oblasts, with no more than twenty percent in favor. Also, the capital Kyiv has a population that largely disagrees with the idea that Ukraine should join the Union State.

Figure 5.8 Should Ukraine join the Union of Russia and Belarus?

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5.4 OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UKRAINIAN POPULATION

In the last part of the descriptive analysis, several independent variables are spatially analyzed. The function of this analysis is to get an insight into the characteristics of these variables before they will be used in the regression analyses. The first independent variable in this section is the group of population were Ukrainians feel the most attached to, as shown in figure 5.9 and 5.10. It is clear that, in every oblast, a majority of the population feels most attached to the Ukrainian population above others. The percentage of the population who feels the most connection with the European population is limited, and is only scarcely visible in Western and Northern oblasts. People who feel the strongest connection with the former Soviet Union are more visible. Especially the oblasts who share a border with Russia are evident in this case: Kharkiv, Luhans’k and Crimea to name a few. On the national level, 76,1 percent feels most connected to Ukraine (state, oblast or city). 14,2 percent feels most connected to the former Soviet Union and 6 percent feels the most connection with the European population.

Figure 5.9 Ethnic identities of the Ukrainian population. Group of population that Ukrainians feel most attached to

2,80% 5,60%

District or city Region 12,20% 31,40% Ukraine Former Soviet Union 41,10% Europe 6,90% World

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Figure 5.10 Ethnic identities of the Ukrainian population, recoded.

Next, the different preferences of the Ukrainian population towards the Ukrainian nation are discussed. Both economic and political preferences are brought forward.

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5.4.1 ECONOMICAL PREFERENCES

Figure 5.11 A return to pre-Perestroika conditions?

Perestroika was a program instituted in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev to reform the political and economic system. The goal was to make socialism work more efficiently by introducing market-like reforms. It is said to be a major cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the map (figure 5.11), the opinions are shown on the topic of a return of the economy to pre-Perestroika conditions. The original question was “What is your attitude towards the economic transformation in Ukraine?”. The first attention-grabbing fact is the relative low support in the Western oblasts. This may be a direct cause of the historical influence of Western Europe. Apart from the capital Kyiv, wider support for pre-Perestroika conditions can be found throughout the central and Eastern oblasts. It even seems that four oblasts (Chernihiv, Vinnytsya, Kirovohrad and Luhans’k) have a majority for a return. Thus, the topic of a return of the economy to pre-Perestroika conditions shows a wide geographical dispersion throughout the country. The national average that is in favor of a return is 30,4 percent. 28,3 percent has the opinion that ‘certain changes are necessary’ and 22,5 percent agrees that a complete market transition is required. The remaining percentages consist of the respondent who couldn’t give an answer.

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In the next map, statements about another economic topic are presented. Along with the economic reforms, it became possible to work for a private company, something which was not possible in most of the cases for the workforce during the Soviet Union. Figure 5.12 is a map with the willingness of the Ukrainian population to work for a private company. The original question was “Would you agree to work for a private company?” In total, 39 percent said ‘yes’ and 16,6 percent said ‘probably, yes’. In the map, these two categories are combined. 21,7 percent would not agree to work for a private company, and 9,6 percent would probably not agree. A sharp contrast with the previous topic is the first eye-catcher. Not surprising, as working for a private company is more or less the opposite of working in a pre- Perestroika system. A brighter colored oblast means a higher percentage of the population willing to work for a private company.

Figure 5.12 Is the Ukrainian population willing to work for a private company?

The only two oblasts with a minority of the population willing to work for a private company are the centrally located Cherkasy and Luhans’k on the Eastern border. Possible explanations have to be found in the economic organization of the oblasts. A relative low percentage of the workforce working for a private company might be an explanation.

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5.4.2 POLITICAL PREFERENCES

Socialism is a way of organizing society in which production, distribution and exchange is owned or regulated by the community as a whole. Socialism in this way doesn’t exist anymore in Ukraine, but that doesn’t mean that there is no support for socialism in the country. The original question in the survey was “Political forces today are presently divided into those which want to return to socialism and those which want to develop capitalism. What is your personal attitude towards such forces?”. The national average supporting the proponents of socialism is 22,5 percent. A more interesting fact may be that 18 percent is supporting both socialism and capitalism, to ‘avoid conflict’, as stated in this answer option of the survey question. 20,4 percent supports neither socialism nor capitalism. Figure 5.13 shows the support for socialism in Ukraine by oblast. This is only done for people who do not support capitalism as well. In the map after this one, the support for capitalism is shown.

Compared to the economic attitudes, this first political attitude results in a bigger contrast in the country. Whereas the Western oblasts have relatively few supporters of socialism, the Eastern oblasts bordering Russia have a population of whom roughly half is supporting the values of socialism. Also, the centrally located Cherkasy has a relative high amount of supporters of socialism.

Figure 5.13 Does the Ukrainian population support socialism?

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On the contrary of socialism, there is capitalism. Instead of an organization in which production, distribution and exchange is owned or regulated by the community as a whole, capitalism is a system in which these facets are controlled by private owners for profit. Figure 5.14 shows the support for capitalism in Ukraine. The national average that supports the proponents of capitalism is 17,1 percent. It comes as no surprise that this map is almost the opposite of the map of socialism, but a few remarks can be made though. The Northern oblast Chernihiv has about the same percentage of population in favor of socialism as capitalism which are both about a third of the population. Also, some oblasts are low in support for both capitalism as socialism: Odesa, Kyiv and Chernivtsi to name a few. The oblasts with low support for either socialism or capitalism are generally located in the Western half of Ukraine.

Figure 5.14 Does the Ukrainian population support capitalism?

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In the topic of politics, we also have to consider how the population thinks about leadership in the country. A question was asked to find out the preference of the following: Do you agree with the idea that a few strong leaders could do more good for our country than all the laws and debates? The national average that agrees with this statement is 76,7 percent. 21,3 percent does not agree. The results are presented in figure 5.15. At first sight, there are no sharp distinctions between the Western and Eastern oblasts to be found. In all oblasts, a majority of the population is in favor of “a few strong leaders” over “all the laws and debates”. Two centrally located oblasts stand out with almost full support for a few strong leaders: Chernihiv in the north and Mykolayiv in the south. Surprisingly, Mykolayiv is bordered by two oblasts with relative few people in favor of a few strong leaders over all the laws and debates: Kirovohrad and Odesa.

Figure 5.15 A few strong leaders or more laws and debates?

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“A few strong leaders” is more or less the opposite of a multiparty system. The results of the question whether the population is in favor of a multiparty system are presented in figure 5.16. The original question was “In your opinion, does Ukraine need a multiparty system?”. The national average answering ‘yes’ is 41,3 percent. A much higher percentage says ‘no’: 57,8 percent. Another 10,9 percent doesn’t know the answer.

Figure 5.16 Is the Ukrainian population in favor of a multiparty system?

A same tendency as the previous topic can be identified, with no sharp distinctions between the Western and Eastern oblasts. The support for a multiparty system does not exceed fifty percent in many oblasts. Three oblasts stand out with a strong support for a multiparty system: Sumy, Chernivtsi and Odesa. These three oblasts are all border-oblasts, bordering different countries.

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In less prosperous times, with deteriorating living conditions, people can make a decision to protest. The alternative is to do nothing, for the sake of order. The original question was “In your opinion, do you think it is better to suffer economic hardships for the sake of order, peace and accord in the country or to come out on the streets and protest when living conditions seriously deteriorate?”. This choice was proposed to the respondents and the results are presented in figure 5.17. About a third, 45,7 percent, says ‘yes, it is better to actively protest against deteriorating living conditions. The percentage saying ‘no, it is necessary to preserve order, peace and accord in the country is a bit higher: 51 percent. Another 3,3 percent doesn’t know or thinks it is too difficult to answer.

Figure 5.17 Protest or order?

Unlike the last themes, more spatial similarities can be found in figure 5.17. The population living in Eastern oblasts are, in general, more likely to protest against deteriorating living conditions. A majority of people willing to protest can be found in most of the Eastern oblasts, with Poltava, Donets’k and Luhans’k representing the largest percentage willing to protest. An odd thing to make note of, with regard of the protests in the end of 2013, is the relative low score of the capital city Kyiv. The protests that eventually led to the territorial breakup of Ukraine started in Kyiv. What could be a reason for this? People don’t have to protest in their own place of residence or oblast. Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) is one of the most obvious locations to express your feelings as a citizen. In other words, it is not

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unthinkable that a large proportion of the protesters travelled from elsewhere in the country (or even from abroad). Another odd fact is that the protests in the Eastern oblasts were much less fierce than in the Western oblasts. A simple reason for this could be that the president during the protests, Yanukovic, had relatively more supporters living in these Eastern oblasts. Shifting away from political attitudes, other independent variables are discussed.

Figure 5.18 Urbanization in Ukraine.

Next, the degree of urbanization is considered. A respondent lives in an urban location, when the population of the dwelling place exceeds 10,000 inhabitants. Figure 5.18 shows the differences in urbanization in Ukraine. The Western half of the country has a small majority of people who live in a rural location. The Central oblasts have a small majority of people who live in an urban location. This domination is stronger in the Southern oblasts, and the Eastern oblasts are highly urbanized. These Eastern oblasts are characterized by an industrial economy, which explains the high degree of urbanization when compared to the West. On the national level, 67,5 percent lives in an urban location and 32,5 lives in a rural location.

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Figure 5.19 Incomes in Ukraine.

The distribution of incomes shows a quite unbalanced situation in the country (figure 5.19). The percentage of low incomes is higher in most Western oblasts, when compared to Eastern oblasts. The highest percentages of high incomes can be found in the capital area. Also, Odesa in the South, and Donets’k and Luhans’k are oblasts with one of the highest percentages of high incomes in the country. On the national scale, 38 percent is in a low income group, 37 in a middle income group and 25 percent is in a high income group.

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Figure 5.20 Largest nationalities in Ukraine.

Figure 5.20 displays the nationalities in the country. For a majority, a nationality doesn’t need to form more than 50% of the population, but it has to be the largest group. In all oblasts except one, the biggest group of nationalities is Ukrainian. The only oblast in which people where Russian nationality forms the largest proportion of nationalities is Crimea. The proportion of Russians in this oblast is 63 percent. In the oblasts of Luhans’k and Donets’k, the percentage of Ukrainians is below fifty percent, but they still form the largest ethnic group in these oblasts. The Western and Northern oblasts are all represented by a strong majority of people with the Ukrainian nationality. On a national scale, the percentage of respondents with the Russian nationality was 21,4 percent, and the percentage with the Ukrainian nationality 75,1 percent. The remaining 2,4 percent had a different nationality.

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Figure 5.21 Native languages in Ukraine.

So, the percentage of Ukrainians in the Eastern half of Ukraine is low when compared to the Western half. As shown in figure 5.21, the native language majorities are comparable with the nationality majorities. The percentage of people who have a Russian mother tongue is much higher in the Eastern oblasts than people who have the Russian nationality. Five oblasts have a majority of people with a Russian mother tongue: Odesa, Kharkiv, Donets’k, Luhans’k and Crimea, of which the last three have a strong majority (above 75%). In The Central and Western oblasts, Ukrainian is the native language of a strong majority of the population (above 75%). The only exception is the Kyiv city, in which the percentage of people with a Ukrainian mother tongue is 67%. On the national level, 35,1 percent of the respondents had a Russian mother tongue and 63,8 percent a Ukrainian mother tongue.

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Figure 5.22 Religious groups in Ukraine.

Religion is the next independent variable, again showing a sharp contrast in the country in figure 5.22. Roughly said, the Western half of the country is populated by a majority of people who are religious, and the Eastern half is dominated by a population who is not religious. The largest religious group in the Western oblasts is, in most cases, Ukrainian Orthodox (Kyiv Patriarchate). In L’viv, Ternopil, Ivano- Frankivsk and Mykolayiv, the biggest religious group is Greek-Catholic (see figure 5.19). On the national scale, 30,7 percent is religious and 50,1 percent is not. The remaining percentage is missing data.

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Figure 5.23 Ukrainians and their reported voting behavior.

The last independent variable in this descriptive analysis is the reported electoral behavior of Ukrainians (5.23). The used reported voting results are those of the second election round in Ukraine’s presidential elections in 1999, between the pro- Russian candidate Symonenko and the pro-Western candidate Kuchma. Instead of only showing the winner in each oblast, the oblasts where one of the candidates won with a strong majority are also highlighted. Once again, the East-West division is clearly visible. The border-oblasts in the West and East generally had a strong preference for one of the candidates. On the national scale, 49,3 percent voted for Kuchma and 24,2 percent for Symonenko. When a party won with more than 20 percent dominance over the other, the oblast is brighter colored.

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5.5 EXPLANATION OF THE USED ANALYSES AND INTERPRETATION

The effect of each independent variable is determined using the odds ratio between the chance of a positive and the chance of a negative attitude. The odds ratio is displayed in the tables as Exp(B). The odds ratio is calculated by dividing the chance of a positive attitude by the chance of a negative attitude, and its values can be anything from zero up to infinite. When the score of the odds ratio is bigger than one, then the effect of the independent variable on the odds ratio of the dependent variable is positive. The effect is negative when the Exp(B) score is below zero.

The dependent variable in a binary logistic regression analysis consists of two categories. One of them is used as reference, and the chance of the second category is determined with respect to the first category. The first category can be either a positive or negative attitude, this is described at each individual analysis. The independent variables that were originally nominal are now treated as dichotomous as well, with the exception of the variable expressing to which group of the population someone feels most attached to. In this nominal variable, three categories exist, in which one of them is used as reference. This means that each time, the categories Former Soviet Union and European are compared with the reference category Ukrainian. (De Vocht, 2010).

A binary logistic regression analysis does not result in a proportion explained variance (R2), since variance isn’t the most right term to fit in a regression analysis with a dichotomous dependent variable. However, different pseudo-R2’s exist, and they are comparable with a R2 from a linear regression analysis. The output in SPSS provides two different pseudo R2-measurements. The Cox & Snell R2 isn’t used often, because it can never reach the value one. The R2 of Nagelkerke is able to reach this value. For the rest of the analysis, only the Nagelkerke R2 will be considered for the explained variance.

After the binary logistic regression analyses, a multinomial regression analysis will be done. The difference with a binary logistic regression analysis is that the dependent variable now consists of three categories, in which one of them is used as reference category.

Before the interpretation, the significance level will be made note of. Statistical significance is the probability that an observed effect occurred due to chance. The maximum probability level before an effect will be rejected in the following analyses

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is 0.05 (5%). The relationships that do not show a significant relationship are still visible in each analysis, but they won’t be discussed.

5.6 EXPLANATION OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

To be able to interpret the tables in the correct way, one needs to take in mind the scores each independent variable can get. Children: Zero means no children, one means one or more children. This means that when the Exp(B) score is above one, there is a positive effect between having one or more children and the dependent variable. Ethnic identity: The categories “Russian” and “European” are each time compared to “Ukrainian” with respect to the dependent variable. A score above one of these categories means that there is a positive effect between the population group someone feels most attached to and the dependent variable compared to feeling Ukrainian. Age: The scores of this variable are between 18 and 75. A score above one implies that there is a positive effect between being older and the dependent variable. Nationality: One means Russian, two means Ukrainian. This means that when the Exp(B) score is above one, a positive effect exists between people with the Ukrainian nationality and the dependent variable. Voting behavior: One means a voting behavior towards a pro-Western party, two means a voting behavior towards a pro-Russian party. This means that a score above one implicates a positive effect between a pro-Russian party and the dependent variable. Native language: One is Russian, two is Ukrainian. This means that an Exp(B) score above one implies a positive relationship between being Ukrainian and the dependent variable. Gender: Males have the score 1, females have the score 2. This means that when the Exp(B) score is above one, there is a positive effect between females and the dependent variable and a negative effect between males and the dependent variable. Religion: A score of one means that the respondent is not religious, and a score of two means that the respondent is religious. This means that when the Exp(B) score is above one, a positive effect exists between being religious and the dependent variable. Income: The average income per member of a family can take many values. A higher income means a higher score, implying that a Exp(B) value above one means a positive effect between having a higher income and the dependent variable.

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Residence location (oblast): This variable used to be a nominal variable, now it is recoded to West and East, in order to be better able to provide significant scores. The ‘border’ between West and East is used as shown in figure 5.23. This is also the traditional way in which Ukraine is regarded as divided. A score of one means a residence location in a Western oblast, and a score of two means a residence location in an Eastern oblast. An Exp(B) value above one implies a positive relationship between living in an Eastern oblast and the dependent variable. Residence location (urbanity): A score of one means a residential location in an urban setting, and a score of two means a residential location in a rural location. A Exp(B) score above one is because of that implying a positive effect between living in a rural location and the dependent variable. Education: A score of one means primary of general secondary education, and a score of two means specialized secondary education or higher education. Thus, a Exp(B) score above one implies a positive effect between being higher educated and the dependent variable.

.

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5.7 BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSES

BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE ATTITUDES TOWARDS A UKRAINIAN ENTRY INTO NATO

Independent variable Sig. Exp(B)

Children ,801 ,940 Ethnic identity (Ukrainian) ,034 Ethnic identity (European) ,050 9,635 Ethnic identity (Former Soviet Union) ,101 ,514 Age ,000 ,971 Nationality ,418 ,726 Reported voting behavior ,000 ,186 Native language ,009 2,720 Gender ,025 ,609 Religion ,000 2,699 Income ,163 1,002 Residence location (oblast) ,000 ,294 Residence location (urbanity) ,002 ,450 Education ,007 1,941 Constant ,008 23,564

Cases included in analysis N Percent

585 32,3

Nagelkerke R Square ,474

The results of the binary logistic regression analysis towards a Ukrainian entry into NATO show much more significant values. With a maximum alpha-score of 5%, nine independent variables show significant results. First of all, the population who considers themselves as a European citizen is much more likely to be in favor of a Ukrainian entry into NATO then their Ukrainian-feeling counterparts. This is not completely surprising, but the effect is also much stronger than the other effects of independent variables in this analysis. Next, an effect can be found between age and the attitude towards an entry into NATO. As the value is below zero, older people are less likely to be in favor of a NATO-entry. This effect doesn’t seem to be

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really strong, but we have to keep in mind that the chances of a positive attitude are declining with every extra year of age that a citizen is. The effects between reported voting behavior and the NATO-attitudes are remarkably strong. Someone who voted pro-Russian has a very small chance of being in favor of a NATO-entry. Russia is not a NATO-member either, something that may explain this strong effect. On the other hand, this is an example of the sharp political divisions in the country. Looking native language, a quite strong effect can be found between Ukrainians with the Ukrainian language as their mother tongue and a positive attitude towards an entry into NATO. This means that Russian-speaking citizens are less likely to have a positive attitude towards a NATO-entry. The next variable with interesting results is gender. The Exp(B)-value is fairly below zero. This indicates a negative effect between women and a positive attitude towards a NATO-entry. Thus, men are more likely to be in favor of a NATO-entry than women. The Exp(B)-value of religion is about the same as native language. This time, it implies that people who are religious are more likely to be in favor of a NATO-entry. Looking at the original data, it is fairer to say that people who are not religious are more likely to have a negative attitude towards a NATO-entry. Next, we look at the effects between education and the attitude towards a NATO-entry. A positive effect exists between being higher educated and a positive attitude towards a Ukrainian entry into NATO. Finally, we look at contextual characteristics: the residential location. The effects of the oblasts in which one lives are stronger that the effects of living in an urban location. A negative effect can be identified between living in an eastern oblast and a positive attitude towards a NATO-entry. This negative effect can also be found between living in a rural location and a positive attitude towards a NATO-entry. In other words, someone who lives in a urban location is less likely to be in favor of a NATO-entry. The Nagelkerke’s R squared is ,474, meaning that more than 47% of the total difference in the attitudes towards a Ukrainian entry into NATO is explained by the discussed independent variables.

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BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE ATTITUDES TOWARDS A UKRAINIAN ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION

Independent variable Sig. Exp(B)

Children ,417 ,767 Ethnic identity (Ukrainian) ,019 Ethnic identity (European) ,998 67478782,942 Ethnic identity (Former Soviet Union) ,005 ,395 Age ,004 ,972 Nationality ,201 ,603 Reported voting behavior ,000 ,125 Native language ,921 1,041 Gender ,192 ,711 Religion ,290 1,334 Income ,430 1,001 Residence location (oblast) ,017 ,485 Residence location (urbanity) ,003 ,404 Education ,103 1,702 Constant ,000 6302,267

Cases included in analysis N Percent

652 36,0

Nagelkerke R Square ,366

The descriptive analysis already showed a much wider support in the country for an entry into the European Union, when compared to an entry into NATO. This time, five independent variables show significant scores with a maximum alpha-score of 2,5%. This smaller number may be caused by a relative smaller dispersion of attitudes. First of all, the population who considers themselves as Russian is less likely to be in support of an EU-entry than the Ukrainian-feeling population. This effect is even bigger than the same variable in the NATO-analysis, but that one showed no significant score. The independent variable age proves that older people are less likely to have a positive attitude towards an entry into the EU. This effect is almost the same as the effect when a NATO-entry is the dependent variable. The effect between voting behavior and an EU-entry is reasonably stronger however,

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when compared to a NATO-entry. People who voted pro-Russian are less likely to be in favor of a EU-entry as shown in the table. The last two independent variables with significant scores are the contextual variables. Surprisingly, the effect of urbanity is now bigger than the effect of the oblast with regard to the NATO- analysis. Someone who lives in an Eastern oblast is less likely to be in favor of an EU- entry. But, as said, someone who lives in an urban location is even less likely to be in favor of a EU-entry. The Nagelkerke’s R squared is ,366, meaning that more than 36% of the total difference in the attitudes towards a Ukrainian entry into the EU is explained by the discussed independent variables. The numbers in this analysis have to be interpreted with the knowledge that Ukrainian people don’t have a strong understanding of what it means to be part of the European Union. When there would be more knowledge of the EU, the percentage of positive attitudes could possibly be lower.

BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE ATTITUDES TOWARDS AN ENTRY OF UKRAINE INTO THE UNION OF RUSSIA AND BELARUS

Independent variable Sig. Exp(B)

Children ,703 1,095 Ethnic identity (Ukrainian) ,005 Ethnic identity (European) ,085 ,213 Ethnic identity (Former Soviet Union) ,007 3,519 Age ,020 1,018 Nationality ,236 ,637 Reported voting behavior ,000 11,793 Native language ,083 ,536 Gender ,720 1,078 Religion ,046 ,631 Income ,100 ,998 Residence location (oblast) ,000 6,549 Residence location (urbanity) ,002 2,169 Education ,064 ,638 Constant ,000 ,010

Cases included in analysis N Percent

786 43,4

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Nagelkerke R Square ,584

Six independent variables are significant in this analysis with a maximum alpha- score of 5%. One would guess that someone who feels Russian, is in favor of a entry into the Union of Russia and Belarus. This effect can be found in the table, but some variables are showing even stronger effects than the ethnic identity variable. Still, the effect between feeling Russian and a positive attitude towards a Ukrainian entry into the Union of Russia and Belarus can be considered as quite strong. When we are looking at age, a positive effect can be found between being older and a positive attitude towards an entry of Ukraine into the Union of Russia and Belarus. The attitudes towards the European Union and NATO already showed evidence that younger people are more likely to be in favor of an entry into one of these actors, so on the other side, it is logical to state that older people tend to be more Russian- oriented in the sense of this variable. The strongest positive effect can be found between reported voting behavior and a positive attitude towards an entry into the Union of Russia and Belarus. People who voted pro-Russian have a high probability of being in favor of a Ukrainian entry into the Union of Russia and Belarus. A negative effect exists between being religious and a positive attitude towards the dependent variable. In other words, people who are not religious are more likely to have a positive attitude towards an entry into the Union. The final variables with significant scores are the contextual variables. The effect between residence location (oblast) and the dependent variable is much stronger than the effect between the urbanity and the dependent variable. The effects are both positive, meaning that people who live in an Eastern oblast and/or in an urban location are more likely to be in favor of a Ukrainian entry into the Union of Russia and Belarus. The Nagelkerke’s R squared is ,584, meaning that more than 58% of the total difference in the attitudes towards a Ukrainian entry into the Union of Russia and Belarus is explained by the discussed independent variables. The results of this analysis are in line with the earlier discussed theory, in which is shown that older people are less likely to see the necessity of a border between Russia and Ukraine. An entry into the Union would be a first step in removing the border.

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BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE ATTITUDES TOWARDS RUSSIAN AS AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF UKRAINE

Independent variable Sig. Exp(B)

Children ,574 1,132 Ethnic identity (Ukrainian) ,026 Ethnic identity (European) ,451 1,502 Ethnic identity (Former Soviet Union) ,009 2,807 Reported voting behavior ,000 3,699 Education ,443 ,844 Income ,908 1,000 Residence location (urbanity) ,532 1,143 Residence location (oblast) ,000 4,985 Religion ,439 ,846 Gender ,061 1,441 Native language ,000 ,277 Nationality ,097 ,534 Age ,231 1,008 Constant ,184 ,236

Cases included in Analysis N Percent

802 44,3

Nagelkerke R Square ,514

Four independent variables have significant scores in this analysis with a maximum alpha-score of 5%. The first of them is an ethnic identity of the former Soviet Union. These people are more likely to have a positive attitude about the Russian language being an official language of Ukraine, as the positive relationship in the table shows. A stronger effect can be found when looking at reported voting behavior. This effect indicates that someone with a pro-Russian voting behavior is more likely to have a positive attitude about Russian as an official language of Ukraine. The effect is even stronger for the variable residence location (oblast). Someone who lives in an eastern oblast is more likely to have a positive attitude about the Russian language being an official language of Ukraine than someone who lives in a western oblast. This effect is stronger than the two previously discussed variables. Finally, a strong

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negative effect can be identified between native language and the dependent variable. People with Ukrainian as native language are much less likely to be in favor of Russian as an official language of Ukraine than people with Russian as native language. The Nagelkerke’s R squared is ,514, meaning that more than 51% of the total difference in the attitudes towards the Russian language as an official language of Ukraine is explained by the discussed independent variables. Is language really a primary reason for the territorial crisis in 2014, as said in the first chapter? The analysis gives no big Exp(B) scores as big as the analysis before. In that sense, the opinions can be less sharply divided between the independent variables, which implies that it is unlikely to think that language is a main cause of dividing Ukraine.

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5.8 MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS

MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE ATTITUDES OF THE DIRECTION IN WHICH UKRAINE SHOULD DEVELOP

In this final analysis, a dependent nominal variable will be explained by independent variables in a multinomial regression analysis. The dependent variable in this analysis is the direction in which Ukraine should develop. The reference category is Ukraine, so all outcomes will be compared with the recoded statement that Ukraine should develop independently without strengthening ties with the West or the former Soviet Union. First, the different attitudes towards the idea that Ukraine should develop in the direction of Russia or the former Soviet Union in comparison to a more independent development are explained. Second, the different attitudes towards the idea that Ukraine should develop in the direction of Western countries in comparison to a more independent development are explained. In the first category, five independent variables show significant values with a maximum alpha- score of 5%.

95% Confidence Interval for Independent variables Sig. Exp(B) Exp(B) Lower Bound Upper Bound Intercept ,006 Age ,094 1,012 ,998 1,025 Religion ,557 ,887 ,596 1,322 Reported voting ,000 4,943 3,336 7,326 behavior Education ,007 ,567 ,374 ,859 Income ,256 1,001 ,999 1,003 Gender ,985 1,004 ,697 1,444 Residence location Russia ,431 1,174 ,788 1,749 (urbanity) or former Children ,665 ,912 ,601 1,385 Soviet Native language ,001 ,329 ,168 ,642 Union Nationality ,122 1,746 ,861 3,543 Residence location ,000 3,424 2,292 5,117 (oblast) Ethnic identity ,041 ,183 ,036 ,930 (Europe) Ethnic identity (Former Soviet ,065 1,817 ,964 3,423 Union) ~ 80 ~ Ethnic identity . . . . (Ukraine)

Intercept ,001 Age ,000 ,970 ,956 ,984 Religion ,400 1,235 ,755 2,020 Reported voting ,059 ,514 ,258 1,025 behavior Education ,222 ,756 ,483 1,184 Income ,164 1,001 ,999 1,004 Gender ,044 ,662 ,442 ,990 Residence location ,774 ,936 ,596 1,470 (urbanity) Western Children ,064 ,664 ,431 1,024 countries Native language ,004 ,293 ,126 ,678 Nationality ,306 1,621 ,643 4,086 Residence location ,005 ,431 ,240 ,774 (oblast) Ethnic identity ,920 1,050 ,403 2,734 (Europe) Ethnic identity (Former Soviet ,446 ,631 ,193 2,060 Union) Ethnic identity . . . . (Ukraine)

Cases included in analysis N Percent

902 49,8

Nagelkerke R Square ,416

The first of these is reported voting behavior, also showing the largest positive effect. People who voted pro-Russian are much more likely to have the opinion that Ukraine should develop in the direction of Russia or the former Soviet Union, compared to a more independent development. The opposite effect can be found between education and a development towards Russia or the former Soviet Union. People who are higher educated have a bigger chance of preferring a more independent development of Ukraine, instead of broadening ties with Eastern countries. A comparable, but bigger negative effect happens between having a

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Ukrainian mother tongue and an opinion that Ukraine should broaden ties with Russia or the former Soviet Union, compared to a more independent development of Ukraine. In other words, people with a Russian mother tongue are much more likely to have the opinion that Ukraine should develop towards the Eastern countries. Another significant negative effect can be found between people who consider themselves as European and an attitude that Ukraine should develop ties with Eastern countries. This negative effect is bigger than the effects of education and native language. People who consider themselves as part of the population of Europe have a very small chance to have an opinion that Ukraine should broaden ties with Russia or the former Soviet Union. Finally, a positive effect can be found between the residential location in terms of the oblast, and the chance to have an opinion that Ukraine should develop in the direction of Russia or the former Soviet Union. This effect is slightly smaller than the effect of the reported voting behavior. The Exp(B)-value proves that people who live in an Eastern oblast are much more likely to have the opinion that Ukraine should broaden ties with Russia or the former Soviet Union, instead of a more independent development of Ukraine.

Next, Western countries are utilized to compare an independent Ukrainian development with. The second part of the multinomial logistic regression analysis provides the results. Four independent variables show significant values with a maximum alpha-score of 5%. The first one of these is age. The negative effect demonstrates that people who are older are less likely to have an opinion that Ukraine should broaden ties with Western countries, compared to a more independent development of Ukraine. Another negative effect can be found between women and having an opinion that Ukraine should develop in the direction of Western countries. Thus, men are, compared to women, more likely to argue that Ukraine should develop in the direction of Western countries, compared to a more independent development of Ukraine. A strong negative effect can be found when looking at native language. People who have a Ukrainian mother tongue are, compared to people with a Russian mother tongue, much more likely to have the attitude that Ukraine should broaden ties with Western countries, compared to a more independent development. The final significant variable is the residential location in terms of oblast. Not surprisingly, the Exp(B)-value is about the opposite of what it was in the first part of the multinomial analysis. People who live in an Eastern oblast are, compared to people who live in a Western oblast, less likely to have the opinion that Ukraine should develop in the direction of Western countries, compared to a more independent development of Ukraine. In the complete model, the Nagelkerke’s R squared is ,416, meaning that more than 41% of the total

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difference in the attitudes of the direction in which Ukraine should develop is explained by the discussed independent variables.

5.9 CONCLUSION

The analysis in this chapter sought to answer the research question “To what extent are different attitudes of Ukrainian citizens towards the European Union and Russia explained by individual, household and contextual characteristics?” To answer this question, five regression analyses have been done after a descriptive analysis. The support for a Ukrainian entry into the EU is, compared to an entry into NATO, quite high. People with a reported voting behavior that is pro-European, people who live in a western oblast, people who are younger and people with a European ethnic identity are all indicators of a positive attitude towards a Ukrainian entry into both the EU and NATO. This is in line with the first hypothesis. Additional indicators that explain support for a NATO-entry are education, native language and gender. Higher educated people, people who speak Ukrainian (compared to Russian) and men are more likely to be in support of a NATO-entry of Ukraine. This proves the third hypothesis.

Shifting towards the ‘Russian’ themes, two main indicators are important to predict a positive attitude towards a Ukrainian entry into the Union of Russia and Belarus and Russian as official language of Ukraine: a reported pro-Russian voting behavior and a residence location in an eastern oblast. People who are older of age are more likely to be in favor of an entry into the Union of Russia and Belarus. This is in line with the second hypothesis. People whose native language is Russian are more likely to have a positive opinion about their native language as an official language of Ukraine. The fourth hypothesis is confirmed with this. Also, the ethnic identity of people has proven to be a useful indicator to predict a Russian or Western orientation.

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CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION

CHAPTER SIX

In this research, the following questions were asked: “Which factors have contributed to the shaping of a divided Ukrainian nation?” and “To what extent are different attitudes of Ukrainian citizens towards the European Union and Russia explained by individual, household and contextual characteristics?”. The shaping of the (divided) Ukrainian nation has been a long and complex process. The creation of a divided Ukrainian nation started centuries ago, in which the western half of Ukraine was mainly controlled by western forces such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The most eastern parts of the Ukrainian territory have never been controlled by a force from Western Europe. The control over the Ukrainian territory shifted over time, leading to a legacy in which the Ukraine of today is characterized by regional differences, which can, to a certain extent, be divided along an east-west axis in the country. However, it is important to note that the regional differences are far more complex than the popular depiction of a perfect dichotomous division in Ukraine.

The statistical analysis showed that (reported) voting behavior and the oblast in which one lives are the main indicators to predict an orientation towards Western Europe or Russia. It remains a question to give a precise indication of the impact of the contrasts in the country however. To find a reason for the different attitudes in the country, the ethnic identity and geopolitical imaginations should be considered.

Does every Ukrainian in Ukraine share the same common belief, which makes them one ethnic group? Although the Ukrainians consider themselves as Ukrainian, different ideas of their descent exist. Along with that, no single geopolitical imagination exists within the Ukrainian nation. In the eyes of the authorities after the independence in 1991, the Russians have no central role in the origins of the Ukrainian ethnicity, and tried to create distinction between the two. In the hearts and minds of many people in the east of Ukraine however, Russia and the Russians are inextricably connected with their own descent. Russia and the Russians are no ‘Others’ for many of them. It is therefore legitimate to question the nation-building policies of Ukraine after the independence. The aim to unite Ukraine by trying to create a distinction from Russia and the Russians has proven to be a failure, when taking the 2014 crisis into consideration. The Russian-oriented population reacted

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to an event (a possible closer cooperation between Ukraine and the EU) that would force them to further assimilate.

Are the differences within the Ukrainian ethnic identities large enough to drive them apart? At a first sight, it is unlikely. In general, Ukrainians have no doubts about their own identity, and consider themselves as Ukrainian. People do admit that differences between western and eastern Ukrainians exist, but in general, the Ukrainians feel mututally misunderstood without widespread feelings of ‘Otherness’. Still, some commentators warned for a civil war years ago. It didn’t happen for years, but the situation suddenly escalated in 2014.

The research showed evidence that older people are more likely to have a positive attitude towards Russia. Although longitudinal research has to prove this, it is unlikely to think that someone will change its orientation from Russia to Western countries during the course of his life. What does this mean? The relative balance of the orientation of Ukraine between Russia and Western Europe after independence possibly shifted gradually towards Western Europe since independence in 1991. With a declining Russian proportion of the population since the independence, and a younger generation that experienced the nation-building strategies in their education, the balance between the EU and Russia became challenged. The only missing ingredient was an event in which the government had to choose a geopolitical direction.

The clumsy placement of the Ukrainian territory between Europe and Russia is the background of tremendous challenges for the Ukrainian state. The extent to which the authorities can create ‘unity out of diversity’ accomodating desires to ‘Europeanize’ Ukraine, along with desires to maintain close ties with Russia, remains a central task of the government.

This research is limited to the used data. Longitudinal data would be needed to make more accurate statements about the divisions in Ukraine. This study did show however that a national identity doesn’t always have to be a common identity. In the case of Ukraine, it is fairer to say that two main subidentities exist. It is an argument to step away in the academic debate from an idea that national identities are always a unity. Instead, differences within a national identity are of vital importance in understanding territorial tensions. On the field of international politics, this study showed that the crisis in Ukraine is a national problem at its origin. The role of foreign actors should therefore be restrained. Suggesting further research, it would be interesting to compare the data of this study with data that is gathered during the crisis in 2014, to see how the crisis has influenced the public opinion. That would also make it possible to have more certainty about the public

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opinion moving in the direction of Western Europe since the independence of Ukraine.

LITERATURE

Arel, D & Wilson, A. (1994) “The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 26.

Batt, J. (2003). The EU’s new borderlands. (pp. 1-59). London: Centre for European Reform Working Papers. http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/wp483_borderlands_batt.pdf

Barrington, L.W. (2002) “Region, Language, and Nationality: Rethinking Support in Ukraine for Maintaining Distance from Russia,” in T. Kuzio and P. Anieri, eds, Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine (Westport, CT: Praeger), pp. 131– 146.

Bialasiewicz, L. (2003) Another Europe: Remembering Habsburg Galicja. Cultural geographies 10: 21-44.

Bialasiewicz, L. (2008) The uncertain state(s) of Europe? European Urban and Regional Studies 15(1): 71-82.

Demoscope (2014) Ethnic composition of the population in the republics of the USSR. [online] (retrieved 22 June 2014).

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APPENDICES

#1: Support for capitalism and socialism, by oblast 237. IN WHICH OBLAST (REGION) OF UKRAINE DO YOU RESIDE? * m10. POLITICAL FORCES TODAY ARE PRESENTLY DIVIDED INTO THOSE Crosstabulation

m10. POLITICAL FORCES TODAY ARE PRESENTLY DIVIDED INTO THOSE Total

I support the I support the I support both of I support neither Other proponents of proponents of them to avoid socialism capitalism conflict

Vinnytsya 37,9% 17,2% 22,4% 19,0% 3,4% 100,0%

Volyn 9,5% 23,8% 19,0% 42,9% 4,8% 100,0%

Dnipropetrovsk 24,8% 19,8% 26,4% 24,8% 4,1% 100,0%

Donets’k 34,4% 16,2% 18,1% 23,8% 7,5% 100,0%

Zhytomyr 18,4% 23,7% 34,2% 23,7% 0,0% 100,0%

Transcarpathia 9,7% 22,6% 32,3% 29,0% 6,5% 100,0%

Zaporizhzhya 35,0% 20,0% 23,3% 13,3% 8,3% 100,0%

Ivano-Frankivsk 4,7% 55,8% 23,3% 16,3% 0,0% 100,0%

Kyiv (excl. Kyiv City) 19,6% 13,0% 21,7% 45,7% 0,0% 100,0%

Kyiv 16,3% 26,7% 31,4% 20,9% 4,7% 100,0%

Kirovohrad 37,8% 13,5% 18,9% 24,3% 5,4% 100,0%

Crimea 43,2% 6,2% 22,2% 21,0% 7,4% 100,0%

Luhans’k 53,9% 7,9% 15,7% 18,0% 4,5% 100,0%

L’viv 7,4% 41,2% 14,7% 33,8% 2,9% 100,0%

Mykolayiv 22,2% 30,6% 25,0% 19,4% 2,8% 100,0%

Odesa 11,5% 19,2% 23,1% 37,2% 9,0% 100,0%

Poltava 25,5% 29,4% 17,6% 27,5% 0,0% 100,0%

Rivne 18,4% 31,6% 18,4% 31,6% 0,0% 100,0%

Sumy 25,0% 22,2% 25,0% 19,4% 8,3% 100,0%

Ternopil 0,0% 35,7% 10,7% 50,0% 3,6% 100,0%

Kharkiv 42,2% 11,8% 17,6% 24,5% 3,9% 100,0%

Kherson 34,4% 12,5% 31,2% 18,8% 3,1% 100,0%

Khmelnytsky 15,8% 26,3% 13,2% 44,7% 0,0% 100,0%

Cherkasy 41,9% 20,9% 20,9% 11,6% 4,7% 100,0%

Chernihiv 36,1% 16,7% 33,3% 13,9% 0,0% 100,0%

Chernivtsi 15,8% 31,6% 31,6% 21,1% 0,0% 100,0% 407 309 326 370 64 1476 Total 27,6% 20,9% 22,1% 25,1% 4,3% 100,0%

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#2 Attitudes towards a Ukrainian entry into the EU and NATO, by oblast (without missing data)

237. IN WHICH OBLAST (REGION) OF UKRAINE DO YOU RESIDE? * m42. What is your attitute toward the entry of Ukraine into Crosstabulation

m42. What is your attitute toward What is your attitude toward the the entry of Ukraine into NATO entry of Ukraine into EU

negative positive negative positive

Vinnytsya 60,9% 39,1% 6,5% 93,5%

Volyn 12,5% 87,5% 9,1% 90,9%

Dnipropetrovsk 61,8% 38,2% 18,0% 82,0%

Donets’k 79,7% 20,3% 18,3% 81,7%

Zhytomyr 66,7% 33,3% 23,1% 76,9%

Transcarpathia 30,0% 70,0% 0,0% 100,0%

Zaporizhzhya 62,2% 37,8% 8,2% 91,8%

Ivano-Frankivsk 22,2% 77,8% 9,1% 90,9%

Kyiv (excl. Kyiv City) 45,8% 54,2% 10,2% 89,8%

Kyiv 27,6% 72,4% 3,9% 96,1%

Kirovohrad 69,6% 30,4% 17,9% 82,1%

Crimea 78,2% 21,8% 18,9% 81,1%

Luhans’k 84,8% 15,2% 41,8% 58,2%

L’viv 25,0% 75,0% 8,3% 91,7%

Mykolayiv 57,9% 42,1% 0,0% 100,0%

Odesa 82,0% 18,0% 27,6% 72,4%

Poltava 50,0% 50,0% 8,9% 91,1%

Rivne 52,2% 47,8% 17,2% 82,8%

Sumy 52,4% 47,6% 16,1% 83,9%

Ternopil 11,1% 88,9% 0,0% 100,0%

Kharkiv 70,7% 29,3% 20,3% 79,7%

Kherson 64,0% 36,0% 13,8% 86,2%

Khmelnytsky 33,3% 66,7% 3,4% 96,6%

Cherkasy 31,8% 68,2% 0,0% 100,0%

Chernihiv 69,0% 31,0% 23,3% 76,7%

Chernivtsi 19,0% 81,0% 12,0% 88,0% Count 607 450 173 1013 Total 57,4% 42,6% 14,6% 85,4%

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#3 Ethnic identities of Ukraine, by oblast

237. IN WHICH OBLAST (REGION) OF UKRAINE DO YOU RESIDE? * m36. TO WHAT GROUP OF THE POPULATION YOU CARRY YOURSELVES FI Crosstabulation

m36. TO WHAT GROUP OF THE POPULATION YOU CARRY YOURSELVES FI

population of population of the population of the population of the population of population of the district or city region (oblast or whole of Ukraine former Soviet Europe whole of the where you are several oblasts) Union world living where

Vinnytsya 35,8% 4,5% 50,7% 6,0% 0,0% 3,0%

Volyn 38,9% 11,1% 41,7% 5,6% 0,0% 2,8%

Dnipropetrovsk 38,4% 3,6% 34,8% 13,0% 3,6% 6,5%

Donets’k 30,3% 10,1% 35,1% 18,1% 2,1% 4,3%

Zhytomyr 50,0% 1,9% 35,2% 5,6% 1,9% 5,6%

Transcarpathia 36,8% 2,6% 39,5% 2,6% 5,3% 13,2%

Zaporizhzhya 35,1% 5,4% 37,8% 13,5% 4,1% 4,1%

Ivano-Frankivsk 25,0% 20,8% 43,8% 0,0% 6,2% 4,2%

Kyiv (excl. Kyiv City) 51,5% 2,9% 39,7% 1,5% 1,5% 2,9%

Kyiv 18,2% 1,0% 63,6% 11,1% 0,0% 6,1%

Kirovohrad 25,6% 4,7% 44,2% 20,9% 0,0% 4,7%

Crimea 17,8% 11,1% 25,6% 30,0% 4,4% 11,1%

Luhans’k 33,7% 8,9% 25,7% 22,8% 3,0% 5,9%

L’viv 23,3% 16,7% 47,8% 1,1% 6,7% 4,4%

Mykolayiv 40,4% 2,1% 46,8% 2,1% 4,3% 4,3%

Odesa 28,3% 6,5% 23,9% 25,0% 5,4% 10,9%

Poltava 32,8% 9,8% 39,3% 9,8% 4,9% 3,3%

Rivne 34,1% 4,9% 46,3% 2,4% 4,9% 7,3%

Sumy 36,0% 2,0% 46,0% 6,0% 8,0% 2,0%

Ternopil 48,8% 9,8% 34,1% 2,4% 2,4% 2,4%

Kharkiv 18,8% 8,0% 41,1% 21,4% 0,0% 10,7%

Kherson 24,4% 4,9% 51,2% 17,1% 0,0% 2,4%

Khmelnytsky 38,9% 1,9% 51,9% 5,6% 0,0% 1,9%

Cherkasy 18,9% 5,7% 60,4% 7,5% 3,8% 3,8%

Chernihiv 28,6% 4,1% 59,2% 6,1% 0,0% 2,0%

Chernivtsi 37,5% 6,2% 50,0% 0,0% 0,0% 6,2% Total 31,4% 6,9% 41,1% 12,2% 2,8% 5,6%

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