Republic of the Philippines OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OAKLEY, INC., APPEAL NO. 14-03-25 Petitioner-Appellee, INTER PARTES CASE NO . 4079
Petition for Cancellation : TM Registration No. 57569 - versus - Issued: 05 April 1994 Trademark: "OAKLEY" For: T-shirts, shorts, pants, sandos, WILLIE A. LAO, jeans, jackets, sweatshirts, Respondent-Registrant-Appellant . socks, polos X------X
DECISIO N
This concerns Decision No . 2002-13 rendered by the Director of the
Bureau of Legal Affairs (Director) on 13 June 2002 granting the Petition for 10 Cancellation filed by the Appellee OAKLEY, INC . (Appellee)' for the cancellation
of Certificate of Registration No . 57569 issued on 05 April 1994 for the trademark
OAKLEY of the Appellant WILLIE A . LAO (Appellant) Z used on t-shirts, shorts,
pants, sandos, jeans, jackets, sweatshirts, socks and polos under Class 25 of the
International Classification of Goods3 .
• The controversy involves the determination as to :
1 A corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Washington, U .S.A. with principal office at 10 Holland, Irvine, California 92718, U .S.A. (see Decision No. 2002-13 dated 13 June 2002, page 1). 2 Filipino citizen, with office address at 195-H, 8th Avenue Extension, Grace Park, Caloocan City, Philippines (see Decision No . 2002-13 dated 13 June 2002, page 1) . 3 Also known as the Nice Classification . It is based on a multilateral treaty administered by World Intellectual Property Organization, called the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purpose of the Registration of Marks, which was concluded in 1957 . The Agreement is open to States party to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property . OCT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE IPO Building, 3 51 Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue. Makati City, Philippines Trunk Line: 752-5450 to 65 Far: 890-4862 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://ipophil.govph 1 . Whether or not the Appellant's mark OAKLEY is confusingly similar to that o f
the Appellee's mark OAKLEY.
2 . Whether or not the Appellant is the prior user and adopter of the mar k
OAKLEY.
Records show that on 07 August 1992, Appellant filed with the defunct
Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) under the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) an application for registration of the mark
OAKLEY used on t-shirts, shorts, pants, sandos, jeans, jackets, sweatshirts, socks and polos under Class 25 of the Nice Classification . On 05 April 1994 the mark was registered with the Principal Register and Certificate of Registration No. 57569 was issued in favor of the Appellant . Consequently, on 25 August 1994, a Petition for
Cancellation was filed by the Appellee, alleging that: 4
1 . The registration of the trademark OAKLEY in the name of the Appellant
violates and contravene the provisions of Section 4(d) of Republic Act No .
166, as amended because said mark is confusingly similar to the trademark
OAKLEY owned and unabandoned by the Appellee, as to be likely, when
applied to or used in connection with the goods of the Appellant to cause
confusion or mistake or deceive purchasers thereof ;
2. The registration was obtained fraudulently through misrepresentation befor e
the BPTTT;
4 Petition for Cancellation dated 12 July 1994, pages 1-2 . Page 2 of 17 OAKLEY 3. The trademark OAKLEY is known all over the world to be exclusively
owned by the Appellee. Hence, the registration of the confusingly identical
trademark OAKLEY in the name of the Appellant will be a breach of the
clear provisions of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property which is enforced in the Philippines since 27
September 1965;
4. The mark OAKLEY is a tradename/company name of herein Appellee and
as such is protectable even without registration pursuant to Article 8 of the
Paris Convention and Section 37 of the Philippine Trademark Law ;
5. The registration of the mark OAKLEY in the name of the Appellant will
cause grave and irreparable injury and damage to the Appellee within the
meaning of Section 8 of Republic Act No . 166, as amended.
The Appellee also claimed that:5 • 1 . The Appellee is the true and actual owner of the mark OAKLEY and has
registered the same in the U .S.A. and in more than 25 countries outside
the U.S.A. ;
2 . The mark OAKLEY (stylized) is a copyrighted property of Appellee ;
Id, page 2-3. r Page 3 of 17 OAKLEY
OCT 2 2iN3 3 . The mark OAKLEY for clothing, headwear and footwear, and also on
protective and/or anti-glare eyewear including sunglasses, spectacles,
goggles and their parts and accessories including replacement lenses,
earstems, frames, nose pieces and foam strips ; cases specially adopted
for protective and/or anti-glare eyewear and their parts and accessories
has been used by Appellee since 01 August 1976 (Class 9 : goggles) and
01 June 1977 (Class 25);
• 4. Appellee has built an immense and valuable goodwill for its OAKLEY mark due mainly to the vastly superior quality of its products and large sums of
money that it has spent for advertising and promoting its goods bearing
the OAKLEY trademark;
5. In adopting and using a similar mark on his goods, it is obvious that
Appellant, is intending to ride-on and cash-in on the international
popularity of Appellee's OAKLEY mark and to palm-off his goods as those
• of the Appellee ;
6. The use and registration of the mark OAKLEY by the Appellant will likely
cause confusion, mistake and deception to the buying public on the origin
of the goods and will definitely dilute the value of Appellee's OAKLEY
mark because the mark and goods of the Appellant are confusingly similar
if not identical to that of the Appellee's ;
Page 4 of 17 OAKLEY In his Answer filed on 07 October 1994, the Appellant interposed th e
following:6
1 . The petition is fatally defective in that copies of certificates of registrations
of marks, trade names and copyright in other countries and other
supporting documents mentioned in the petition were not filed therewith .
2. If Appellee is to be believed that the registration of the mark OAKLEY in
the name of Appellant violates and contravenes the provisions of Section
4(d) of Republic Act No . 166, as amended, the then Application Serial No .
81941 of Appellant should have been rejected outright . On the contrary,
after the usual process of research and examination, the application was
given due course and ripened into Certificate of Registration No. 57569.
3. The accusation of Appellee that the registration was obtained fraudulently
through misrepresentation is without any legal or factual basis . The
40 discussion of the registrability of the mark duly signed by the Examiners
will attest to the fact that the registration was issued in accordance with
the Trademark Law and rules .
4. Article 6bis of the Paris Convention applies only when the mark in
question is used on similar goods. The labels attached to the petition upon
e Answer, dated 07 October 1994, pages 3-4. Page 5 of 17 OAKLEY
OCT 22 2W which the Appellee predicated its action shows that its OAKLEY mark is
used on "software" only.
5. The protection afforded to tradename under Article 8 of the Paris
Convention applies only in countries where there is no specific provision
requiring registration of tradenames to be entitled to protection .
In the Philippines, the Trademark Law requires registration of tradenames
in order that the owner will be entitled to protection . • 6. The alleged OAKLEY mark of the Appellee which is neither used nor
registered in the Philippines is not entitled to protection. Thus, the claim of
Appellee that the registration of the trademark OAKLEY in the name of
Appellant will cause grave or irreparable inju ry and damage to the
Appellee or will likely cause confusion, mistake and deception to the
buying public utterly lacks any basis. • 7. Goodwill attaches to a trademark only if the same is used in commerce .
Logically, a non-user mark like Appellee's OAKLEY can never attain a
simple goodwill, much less an immense and valuable goodwill .
Incidentally, on 01 January 1998, Republic Act No. 8293 also known as
the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (IP Code) took effect. It
abolished, among other things, the BPTTT and transferred its functions to the
Page 6 of 17 OAKLEY newly created Intellectual Property Office. Accordingly, on 13 June 2002, the
Director rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads,
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Cancellation is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, Certificate of Registration No. 57569 for the mark "OAKLEY" issued in the name of WILLIE A. LAO on 05 April 1994 is hereby ordered CANCELLED.
"Let the file wrapper of OAKLEY subject matter of this case be forwarded to the Administrative, Financial and Human Resource Development Se rvices Bureau for appropriate action in accordance with this Decision and a copy thereof furnished the Bureau of Trademarks for information and update of its records."
On 28 June 2002, Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration prompting
the Appellee to file an Opposition on 16 July 2002 . The Director denied the
motion per Resolution No. 2003-01 (D) dated 18 February 2003. Not satisfied,
the Appellant filed the instant appeal .
In its Appeal, the Appellant contends that the decision of the Director
granting the petition for cancellation and ordering the cancellation of Ce rtificate of
Registration No. 57569 is contra ry to law, jurisprudence and not suppo rted by
evidence.' The Appellant also claims that the Director erred in finding that the
Appellee is the p rior user of the trademark OAKLEY in the Philippines.8 Fu rther,
the Appellant argues that the Director erred in finding that the goods of the
Appellee and the Appellant are not totally unrelated to each other and tha t
"sunglasses" and "clothing" may both be described as wearing apparel.9
7 'Appellant's Appeal Memorandum dated 10 March 2003, page 4 . e Ibid, page 4. ° Ibid. Page 7 of 17 OAKLEY OCT 2 2 7W For its part, the Appellee argues in its Comment filed on 28 March 2003
that the Director had correctly and validly ordered the cancellation of the
Appellant's trademark ce rtificate of registration, inasmuch as the Appellee had
presented more than substantial evidence to suppo rt the Appellee's claims that it
is the true owner and prior user of the OAKLEY mark.10 The Appellee also claims
that prescinding from the clearly meritorious ruling of the Director, the herein
Appellee is clearly entitled to the protection of its OAKLEY mark both for goods
falling under International Classes 9 and 25.11 Further, the Appellee argues that
contrary to the Appellant's asse rtion, the Director had correctly upheld the
doctrines on related goods and reasonable business expansion, hence, the order
to cancel the Appellant's trademark certificate is but proper, and must be upheld
by the Director General of the IPO .12
After consideration of the foregoing and review of the records of this case,
this Office finds the appeal devoid of merit.
• Let us take the first issue. This Office agrees with the finding of the
Director that the Appellant's mark OAKLEY is confusingly similar to the
Appellee's mark OAKLEY .
t0 Appellee's Comment dated 27 March 2003, page 1 . " Ibid, page 2 . 'Z Ibid . Page 8 of 17 OAKLEY OCT22 M3 Republic Act No. 166, as amended, which is the applicable law in thi s
case, provides that:
"Sec. 4. Registration of trade-marks, trade-names and service-marks on the principal register. - There is hereby established a register of trade-marks, trade-names and service-marks which shall be known as the principal register . The owner of a trade-mark, trade-name or service-mark used to distinguish his goods, business or services from the goods, business, or services of others shall have the right to register the same on the principal register, unless it :
xx x
(d) Consists of or comprises a mark or trade-name which so resembles a mark or trade-name registered in the Philippines or a mark or trade-name previously used in the Philippines by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when applied to or used in connection with the goods, business or services of the applicant, to cause confusion or mistakes or to deceive purchasers ; 40 xx x
In this light, the Supreme Court has spoken that likelihood of confusion is
a relative concept; to be determined only according to the particular, and
sometimes peculiar, circumstances of each case . In trademark cases, even more
than in any other litigation, precedent must be studied in light of the facts of the
particular case . The wisdom of the likelihood of confusion test lies in its
recognition that each trademark infringement case presents its own unique set o f
~ facts. Indeed, the complexities attendant to an accurate assessment of likelihood
of confusion require that the entire panoply of elements constituting the relevant
factual landscape be comprehensively examined .13
13 Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A., et al., vs. CA, et al ., G.R. No. 112012, dated 04 April 2001 . Page 9 of 1 7 OAKLEY The competing marks are reproduced below for comparison :
APPELLANT'S MAR K
APPELLEE'S MAR K • O1((I!Y
As the Director correctly pointed out:
"The trademarks of the Appellee and the Appellant are not only similar but are identical. Both parties use the word OAKLEY in exactly the same style, configuration and pictorial arrangement . The trademarks used by both parties are exactly the same such that it can reasonably be concluded that one party copied the trademark of the other. It is quite impossible for two people to come up with exactly the same trademark, presented in exactly the same method of design, is without one first having seen the trademark of the other. In the face of such identity, the question as to confusing similarity of trademarks becomes academic. Res ipsa loquitor. x x x." 14
The Supreme Court enunciated in one case that a practical approach to
the problem of similarity or dissimilarity is to go into the whole of the two
trademarks pictured in their manner of display. Inspection should be undertaken
from the viewpoint of a prospective buyer . The trademark complained of should
" Decision No. 2002-13, page 5. Page 10 of 17 OAKLEY
WT 222M be compared and contrasted with the purchaser's memory (not in juxtaposition)
of the trademark said to be infringed . Some such factors as sound ; appearance;
form, style, shape, size or format ; color; ideas connoted by marks ; the meaning,
spelling and pronounciation of words used ; and the setting in which the words
appear may be considered . For, indeed, trademark infringement is a form of
unfair competition.15
Thus, where a comparison between two trademarks show such
resemblance in the general appearance or general features of both as would
likely deceive the ordinary purchaser exercising ordinary care, and to induce him
to believe that the goods bearing the marks are products of one and the same
enterprise, the junior mark is confusingly similar to the other .1 6
Appellant now advances that it is erroneous to describe or classify
sunglasses and clothing as wea ring apparel because sunglasses is an optical
apparatus or instrument under Class 9 while clothing falls under Class 25. Thus,
according to him, it cannot be denied that the sunglasses, eyewear, goggles, ~ replacement pa rts such as lenses, ear stems, nose-pieces, etc . are unrelated to
t-shirts, shorts, pants, sandos, jeans, jackets, sweatshirts, socks and polos, the . 17 products of Appellant On this score, the High Court ruled, that: 'd .
15 Etepha vs. Director of Patents, G.R. No. L-20635, dated 31 March 1966. 1e The Law on Trademark, Infringement and Unfair Competition, 2000 Edition, by Ruben E . Agpalo, pages 54-55, citing Recoro vs . Embisan, 2 SCRA 598 (1961); and Mead Johnson & Co. vs. N.V.J . Van Dorp., Ltd., 7 SCRA 768 (1963). "Appellant's Appeal Memorandum, page 11 . Page 11 of 17 OAKLEY "In determining whether a trademark registration should be a bar to the registration of the identical or similar trademark, the courts have formulated the doctrine of related or similar goods . Under this doctrine, whether trademark infringement exists depends for the most part upon whether or not the goods are so related that the public may be, or is actually, deceived and misled that they came from the same maker or manufacturer. For non-competing goods may be those which, though they are not in actual competition, are so related to each other that it might reasonably be assumed that they originate from one manufacturer. Non-competing goods may also be those which, being entirely unrelated, could not reasonably be assumed to have a common source . In the former case of related goods, confusion of business could arise out of the use of similar marks; in the latter case of non-related goods, it could not . The vast majority of courts today follow the modem theory or concept of related goods which the Court has likewise adopted and uniformly recognized and applied .
Goods are related when they belong to the same class or have the same descriptive properties; when they possess the same physical attributes or essential characteristics with reference to their form, composition, texture o r ~ quality. They may also be related because they serve the same purpose or are sold in grocery stores. Thus, biscuits were held related to milk because they are both food products. Soap and perfume, lipstick and nail polish are similarly related because they are common household items nowadays . The trademark 'Ang Tibay' for shoes and slippers was disallowed to be used for shirts and pants because they belong to the same general class of goods . Soap and pomade, although non- competitive, were held to be similar or to belong to the same class, since both are toilet articles. But no confusion or deception can possibly result or a rise when the name 'Wellington' which is the trademark for shirts, pants, drawers and other articles of wear for men, women and children is used as a name of a department store."18
Also, court and administrative decisions that have adopted the liberal view
~ of trademark protection against subsequent appropriation have relied upon th e
Supreme Court doctrines in Ang vs . Teodoro and Sta. Ana vs . Maliwat. In Ang
vs. Teodoro, the Supreme Court said:
"In the present state of development of the law on Trade-Marks, Unfair Competition, and Unfair Trading, the test employed by the courts to determine whether non-competing goods are or are not of the same class is confusion as t o the origin of the goods of the second user. Although two non-competing articles may be classified under two different classes by the Patent Office because the y
18 Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. vs. CA, 116 SCRA 336, 31 August 1982, pages 342-343 . Page 12 of 17 OAKLEY
OCT Z2M are deemed not to possess the same descriptive properties, they would, nevertheless, be held by the courts to belong to the same class if the simultaneous use on them of identical or closely similar trade-marks would be likely to cause confusion as to the origin, or personal source, of the second user's goods . They would be considered as not falling under the same class only if they are so dissimilar or so foreign to each other as to make it unlikely that the purchaser would think the first user made the second user's goods .
"Such construction of the law is induced by cogent reasons of equity and fair dealing. The courts have come to realize that there can be unfair competition or unfair trading even if the goods are non-competing, and that such unfair trading can cause injury or damage to the first user of a given trade-mark, first, by prevention of the natural expansion of his business and, second, by having his business reputation confused with and put at the mercy of the second user . When non-competitive products are sold under the same mark, the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark created by its first user, inevitably results . The original owner is entitled to the preservation of the valuable link between him and the public that has been created by his ingenuity and the merit of his wares or services . Experience has demonstrated that when a well-known trade-mark is adopted by another even for a totally different class of goods, it is done to get the benefit of the reputation and advertisements of the originator of said mark, to convey to the public a false impression of some supposed connection between the manufacturer of the article sold under the original mark and the new articles being tendered to the public under the same or similar mark . As trade has developed and commercial changes have come about, the law of unfair competition has expanded to keep pace with the times and the element of strict competition in itself has ceased to be the determining factor. The owner of a trade-mark or trade-name has a property right in which he is entitled to protection, since there is damage to him from confusion of reputation or goodwill in the mind of the public as well as from confusion of goods . The modem trend is to give emphasis to the unfairness of the acts and to classify and treat the issue as a fraud .- 1 9
• On the other hand, in Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat, the Supreme Court held :
'Modem law recognizes that the p rotection to which the owner of a trade-mark is entitled is not limited to guarding his goods or business f rom actual market competition with identical or similar products of the parties, but extends to all cases in which the use by a junior app ropriator of a trade-mark or trade-name is likely to lead to a confusion of source, as where p rospective purchasers would be misled into thinking that the complaining party has extended his business into the field (see 148 ALR 56 et seq; 52 Am. Jur. 576) or is in any way connected with the activities of the infringer; or when it forestalls the normal potential expansion of hi s
19 Mg vs. Teodoro, 74 Phil . 50, 14 December 1942, pages 54-55 . Page 13 of 17 OAKLEY business (v. 148 ALR, 77, 84 ; 52 Am. Jur. 576, 577) . It is on this basis that the respondent Director of Patents adverted to the practice "among local tailors and haberdashers to branch out into articles of manufacture which have some direct relationship" x x x x, "to garments or attire to complete one's wardrobe". Mere dissimilarity of goods should not preclude relief where the junior user's goods are not too different or remote from any that the owner would be likely to make or sell ; and in the present case, wearing apparel is not so far removed from shoes as to preclude relief, any more than the pancake flour is from syrup or sugar cream (Aunt Jemima Mills Co. vs. Rigney & Co., LRA 1918 C 1039), or baking powder from baking soda (Layton Pure Food Co. vs. Church & Co ., 182 Fed . 35), or cosmetics and toilet goods from ladies' wearing apparel and costume jewelry (Lady Esther Ltd. vs. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, 148 ALR 6) . More specifically, manufacturers of men's clothing were declared entitled to protection against the use of their trademark in the sale of hats and caps [Rosenberg Bros . vs. Elliott, 7 Fed. (2d) 962] and of ladies shoes (Forsythe & Co . vs. Forsythe Shoe Corp ., 254 NYS 584). In all these cases, the courts declared the owner of a trade-mark from the first named goods entitled to exclude use of its trade-mark on the related class • of goods above-referred to ."20 In the instant case, the Appellee has sufficiently proved that it is dealing in
the distribution and sale of goods under Class 25 in the United States and
several other countries worldwide, such that the sale of clothing in the Philippines
is a normal potential expansion of its business . The registration of the trademark
OAKLEY in the name of Appellant not only forestalls such expansion but is likely
to cause confusion and deception of the buying public as to the source of • goods?' As to the second issue, this Office is not persuaded that the Appellant i s
the prior user and adopter of the mark OAKLEY.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the function of a trademark is to point out
distinctly the origin or ownership of the goods to which it is affixed ; to secure to
20 Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat, 24 SCRA 1018, 31 August 1968, pages 1025-1026. 21 Decision No . 2002-13, dated 13 June 2002, page 7 . Page 14 of 17 OAKLEY
OCT 2 2 2W3 him, who has been instrumental in bringing into the market a superior article of
merchandise, the fruit of his industry and skill ; to assure the public that they are
procuring the genuine article; to prevent fraud and imposition; and to protect the
manufacturer against substitution and sale of an inferior and different article as
his product.22 Aptly, the right to register trademark is based on ownership . When
the applicant is not the owner of the trademark being applied for, he has no right
to apply for the registration of the same . Under the Trademark Law only the
owner of the trademark, trade name or service mark used to distinguish his
goods, business or service from the goods, business or service of others is
entitled to register the same .23 of
As per the evidence presented, the trademark OAKLEY was first used by
the Appellee for its products sold in the United States in the year 1977, and was
first placed on stickers in 1978. In the Philippines, Appellee sta rted selling its
products bearing the trademark OAKLEY in the year 1987 through its distributors
Offroad Cycle Shop (until 1990) and Twin Pines Industries (until 1994) . From
1995, Appellee has been selling its products through its exclusive distributor ~ Meera Trading. To prove such sales, Appellee presented various documentary
evidences, already mentioned above. Appellant, on the other hand, claims to
have first used the trademark OAKLEY in the year 1989 . However, the earliest
documentary evidence presented to support this claim, i.e., sales invoices, dates
22 Mirpuri vs. CA, 318 SCRA 516, 19 November 1999, page 532 . 23 Unno Commercial Enterprises, Inc . vs. General Milling Corporation, 120 SCRA 804, 28 February 1983, page 808 . Page 15 of 17 OAKLEY I
only as far back as the year 1991 .24 As held in one case, the use of a trademark
by a mere importer, indentor or exporter inures to the benefit of the foreign
manufacturer whose goods are identified by the trademark .25
Moreover, this Office agrees with the Decision26 of the Director that a
cursory review of the documentary exhibits indicates that OAKLEY, INC . was
incorporated on 28 November 1977.27 It cannot be disputed that the word
OAKLEY is the tradename/company name of the Appellee. It is likewise shown
that Appellee had registered the said tradename as a trademark in its country of
origin, the United States Patent and Trademark Office under Registration No.
1,169,945 registered on 22 September 1981 under classes 9 and 12 which were
first used on 29 August 1978 and 01 August 1976 respectively ;28 Registration No .
1,521,599 registered on 24 January 1989 under class 9 which was first used on
1984 March;29 Registration No . 1,519,596 registered on 10 January 1989 which
was first used in 1984 March for class 9 ;30 Registration No . 1,522,692 registered
on 31 January 1989 for class 25 which was first used on July 198031 and
Registration No. 1,356,297 registered on 27 August 1985 for classes 9, 12, and
~ 25 which was first used on June 1978, 1977 and 1977, respectively32 .
24 Decision No . 2002-13, dated 13 June 2002, pages 5-6 . 25 Unno Commercial Enterprises, Inc. vs. General Milling Corporation, 120 SCRA 804, 28 February 1983, page 811 . ~ Decision No. 2002-13 dated 13 June 2002, page 8. ~ Exhibit "B" . 28 Exhibit "C". Exhibit "D". 30 Exhibit "E". 31 Exhibit "F" . ~ Exhibit "G" . Page 16 of 17 OAKLEY . '.
Lastly, this Office also noted that the Appellant conceded by testifying that
the word OAKLEY was already in existence when he registered the same as
trademark.33
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is no cogent reason to disturb
the appealed decision of the Director of the Bureau of Legal Affairs . Accordingly,
the same is AFFIRMED .
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau o f
Legal Affairs for appropriate action, and the trademark application as well as th e 0 records be returned to her for proper disposition . Further, let the Directors of the
Bureau of Trademarks and the Administrative, Financial and Human Resource
Development Service Bureau be furnished copies hereof for information and/or
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
City, Philippines. 46 OCT 22M , Makati
1~. FIRANCISCO !rector General
3' Transcript of Stenographic Notes, dated 27 February 1997, pages 14-15 . Page 17 of 17 OAKLEY