Croatia and - The Political Upheaval and Its Repercussions

The pejorative image of courses. Compared to the and Slovenia might be well the „Balkans“ as a group- other Central European EU ahead of Bulgaria and Ro- ing of states with a com- candidates, the reform mania economically, but mon heritage and a com- progress for Bulgaria and also concerning their po- mon destiny captures less Romania was slow, due not litical standing in the Euro- and less the complex re- least to the ambivalent, Atlantic institutions. ality of heterogeneity and top-down nature of the The invitation for Croatia diversification in this cor- coup d’etats in both coun- is coming in troubling ner of Europe. Self-differ- tries in 1989 – events times. The electoral vic- entiation is the guiding hardly comparable with tory of the Serbian Radi- principle today. We have the bottom-up peaceful cal Party in the parliamen- reached a fragile transi- revolutions in Poland, tary elections of December tion phase, in which the Czechoslovakia and else- last year and the agoniz- decades of nationalism where. However, Bulgaria ing establishment of the and warmongering clearly will probably manage to backward-looking minority belong to the past, yet the enter the European Union government of Vojislav new identity of the region in January 2007 (Romania Kostunica (dependent on is evolving only under still with a serious ques- the good will of the old stress and pain. Given the tion-mark), whereas the Milosevic party SPS), com- past decades of socio- “Western Balkan” coun- pounded by the violent economic malaise, sup- tries lost almost a decade outburst in Kosovo in pression of civil society by war and turmoil. March this year, are not and nationalist fervent, We have also become used only serious, but strategic this is hardly surprising. to the detachment of setbacks. A certain disori- Setbacks had to be antici- Slovenia, which managed entation, not to say help-

South Eastern Europe pated, even more than in in 1991 to escape after lessness in how to deal with the transforming coun- only nine days of war from this Serbia is recogniz- tries of Central Eastern the “Balkans” and asserted able. It is not improbable Europe. And as always, itself as one of the most that Serbia might follow image change only hesi- rapidly reforming coun- the semi-authoritarian tantly follows political tries of Central Europe. path of Putin’s Russia or change. What is more recent is the Kutschma’s Ukraine, thus Today, remarkable pro- breath-taking and appar- gress crystallizes next to ently now rewarded effort fatiguing stagnation and of Croatia to catch up with Content SOE-Monitor

Task Force Force Task depressing drawbacks. Bulgaria, Romania and Unfortunately, the poles in Slovenia and thus to make Marija Pejcinovic the “Western Balkans” good ten years of isolation Buric Croatia on the can be clearly identified, and stagnation. The recent Center for Europan Integration Studies Road to European without wanting to draw invitation by the outgoing Union a black and white picture: Prodi Commission to start Jasna Jurisic

Croatia on the one hand, accession negotiations Croatia´s Turn Towards a New Serbia on the other, with with Croatia is both a trib- Reconciliation the rest of former Yugo- ute to the dedicated re- Policy slavia and Albania caught form efforts of both the Milan Kosanovic in-between. We have be- former Racan and the new Status Serviae come used to the gulf be- Sanader government as Idibus Martiis Volume 4 MMIV a.d. tween the “Western” and well as a signal to the other No. 2 Task Force the “Eastern Balkans”, “Western Balkan” coun- Network for April underlined in 1989/90 tries that there is a realis- European Studies when both sub-regions tic perspective of EU mem- Plans 2004 2004 embarked on fundamen- bership also for them. In a and 2005 tally different political few years time, Croatia 2 SOE-Monitor * April 2004

isolating itself once again, alienat- four years of drawing the region and the South might become a per- ing its neighbours and motivating nearer to the EU. It is at the same manent one. Croatia has, Montenegro and Kosovo to even time the most forceful sign that the unfortunately, in recent years more vigorously drive for indepen- enlargement process will go on displayed an attitude towards its dence. Much will depend on how long after 1 May 2004. The “missing Southern neighbours, which is not Kostunica’s Government manages link” between the Stabilization and helpful to overcome this gap. The to stay in power. Anyway, those who Association Process and the “away from the Balkans” attitude played in recent years with the card enlargement process is finally filled. is still predominant. To keep the of trying to forge a joint Croatian- That Croatia is able to jump from SAP dynamic and avoid a situation Serbian ticket into the Union are the SAP into the accession where Albania, Bosnia and refuted by reality. The gap between negotiations without having to wait Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Belgrade and Zagreb is widening, the entire six-year duration of its Montenegro and Serbia remain in a in all respects, frustrating all ef- Stabilization and Associations nowhere land, will need a lot of forts to embrace Serbia by finan- Agreement is completed is an stamina and statesmanship by the cial assistance and political indul- inspiration for others. new Commission. For the dividing line we are talking about dates back gence. The honeymoon for Serbia Thus, the old North-South divide of to Rome and Byzantium, the Habs- is definitely over. former Yugoslavia is asserting itself burg and the Ottoman Empire. The again, being only temporarily The invitation for Croatia has overcoming of this division still lies blurred in the 1990s. It is the therefore also a motivational ahead. aspect, all the more since the No- former prosperous North of vember parliamentary elections in Yugoslavia, which finally appears to depart from the South and embark Croatia brought back to power the Dr. Rafael Biermann HDZ, which not only carried out the on a vigorous course of Euro- authoritarian nationalism of the Atlantic integration. The Tudjman era, but was in turn sanctioning of this, at least stigmatized especially by Brussels temporary detachment of Croatia Rafael Biermann, PhD, is Head (much less by Washington) from Serbia by the EU is most rele- of the Task Force South Eastern throughout the 1990s as a trouble- vant. Both countries today earn maker not much less war- what they worked for: Croatia reaps Europe at ZEI, worked for six instigating than Milosevic’s SPS. the fruits of four years of persi- years in the German That the Prodi Commission only half stent, even if not unambiguous Chancellory and the MoD and a year after the HDZ rose to power reform efforts; Serbia has is just finishing his habilitation overcame its deep-rooted initial manoeuvred itself into a blind alley, on international conflict suspicion and resolutely decided to which it can only leave by another, trust this however reformed HDZ is complete political U-turn. A prevention in Kosovo before the a proof how much Brussels is significant risk is that the dividing NATO air campaign at Bonn looking for tangible success after line between Slovenia and Croatia University.

Croatia on the Road to European Union

Full membership in the European European Union within the frame- The legacy of the Zagreb summit is Union is a strategic foreign policy work of the Stabilisation and Asso- twofold. Its Final Declaration can be goal of Croatia, and the values un- ciation Process. described as an important landmark derlying the European democracies in further political and economic re- After the preparatory steps towards are principal guidelines in the in- lations between the SAP countries the institutionalisation of relations ternal development of Croatia. and the European Union. The Dec- between Croatia and the EU - the Hence the tasks to be carried out laration gives assurances to the SAP meetings of the Joint Consultative towards these ultimate objectives States of a European perspective, Working Group of Croatia and the occupy a central place in the new subject to their individual achieve- EU, and the adoption of the Feasi- Croatian Government’s pro- ments and engagement in reviving bility Study (regarding the negotia- gramme. The Government views the regional co-operation. Follow- tions on the Stabilization and As- that the sustainability of the proc- ing the success of the summit, the sociation Agreement, SAA) in June ess of adjustment of systemic re- Zagreb Process was launched as a 2000 - the European Commission forms, as well as the overall proc- forum to bring together the heads recommended to the Council of Min- ess of European integration, may of States and Governments of the isters of the EU to commence the be guaranteed only by the prospect European Union and the countries SAA negotiations. The negotiations of future membership in the EU. involved in the Stabilisation and were opened in the context of the Association Process. Over the past few years, we have Zagreb Summit in November 2000. witnessed the improvement of re- During the negotiations, the three lations between Croatia and the official rounds were held plus the SOE-Monitor * April 2004 3 two technical rounds along with a in the institutionalisation of the assumed under the Agreement series of expert meetings. All chap- relations with the EU, which should have been carried out according to ters of the Agreement were dis- enable Croatia to gradually prepare the Implementation Plan of the SAA, cussed, and the mutual agreement for full membership in the EU. The which was adopted immediately was reached during the final round conclusion of the Agreement con- before the signing of the SAA, and in Zagreb, on 11 May 2001. The firmed the status of Croatia as a has been in force ever since. The Stabilisation and Association Agree- potential candidate for EU member- purpose of the Plan was to ensure ment (SAA) was initialled on 14 May ship. both the systematic implementation 2001 in Brussels, and signed on 29 of a number of policies which October of the same year. Apart encourage the reforms contained in from Italy and the United Kingdom, the SAA and the Interim Agreement it has thus far been ratified by the as well as, to a greater extent, the parliaments of the current EU mem- implementation of such measures, ber states. as were self-imposed by Croatia. Although not expressly specified in Although it has not yet taken ef- the SAA, these measures facilitate fect, the trade and transport pro- the adoption of European standards visions of the SAA have been ap- and procedures leading towards an plied since 1 January 2002, by im- accelerated fulfilment of the plementing the Interim Agreement conditions necessary for full on trade and related issues (signed membership. Subsequently, the on the same day as the SAA), which National Programme for the Inte- became effective on 1 March 2002. MEI State Secretary Marija Pejcinovic Buric gration of the Republic of Croatia Regular meetings of the Interim into the European Union upgraded Committee and its five sub-com- It is intended that all relevant the Implementation Plan, based on mittees are conducted among the activities may be conducted in a the experience of the National Pro- joint Croatian and European Com- more dynamic manner, so that grammes for the Adoption of the mission bodies responsible for the Croatia will be ready for full Acquis Commaunitaire. Since its supervision of the implementation membership in the EU by the end introduction in 2003, the National of the Interim Agreement. This co- of 2006. It is essential to note that, Programme serves the purpose of ordination ensures a constant com- in doing so, no commitment has a roadmap by which the Croatian munication with the EU bodies on been set as to a point in time when Government realistically assesses technical issues, as well as an ex- Croatia will attain the full EU its capacities, and the capacities change of information on Croatia’s membership. The realisation of of Croatian society as a whole, to progress in the implementation of such an objective does not depend implement all that is included in the standards and legal regulations of on Croatia’s activities and adjustment to the EU criteria. the EU in specific areas. This helps capacities alone, but primarily on determine the steps that will need the Union’s own decisions regarding By the consensus of all Croatian to be taken in the further process the dynamics and scope of the EU parliamentary parties (111 votes to of implementation. The Joint State- enlargement process. However, one abstention), at its session on ment between the Republic of Croatia’s intent is to take all the 18 December 2002, the Croatian Croatia and the European Commu- steps realistically possible in order Parliament adopted the Resolution nities and its Member States on to ensure that the process of on Croatia’s Integration into the Political Dialogue, which established rapprochement and final European Union. This underlined a the framework for consultations on integration into the EU be carried strong commitment of all the political issues, was also signed on out by the end of 2006; thus Croatia Croatian parliamentary parties to 29 October 2001. may be ready for EU membership, reaching the strategic goal of EU i.e. to become a “virtual member”, membership, and carrying out the A contractual relation between as of January 2007. Therefore, far-reaching reforms required for Croatia and the EU was established already in 2001, it was decided to the harmonization with EU stand- for the first time through the con- simultaneously implement the ards. The Resolution urged the Gov- clusion of the SAA. The SAA is a obligations undertaken by the Sta- ernment to submit Croatia’s appli- preferential agreement, with the bilisation and Association Agree- cation for EU membership by the purpose of contributing towards the ment, and to begin fulfilling the end of February 2003. economic and political stabilisation Copenhagen membership criteria. of Croatia, as well as towards the The decision to submit the Croatian To our great satisfaction, above 80 establishment of close, long-term application for membership in Ath- % of all measures, envisaged for the relations between the contractual ens on 21 February 2003, was based implementation under the Stabili- parties. In other words, the SAA is two main factors: on the one hand, sation and Association Agreement, also the legal basis for, and the the assessment that Croatia had have already been realised. framework of, the content of the made a substantial progress in ful- relations between Croatia and the Since the signing of the SAA in filling the necessary political, eco- EU; it is, therefore, the first step October 2001, the commitments nomic, legal and institutional com- 4 SOE-Monitor * April 2004

mitments undertaken in the SAA; of the application, the Council of Mi- proceeding smoothly and swiftly and, on the other hand, the firm nisters mandated the European towards conclusion by the end of determination to be ready to as- Commission to start preparing an 2006. It does help that, after all, sume the obligations ensuing from avis on Croatia’s membership we have been well placed to EU membership by the end of 2006. application. On the occasion of his analyse all good, as well as less than This assessment is most notably visit to Croatia on 10 July 2003, the positive, aspects of the confirmed by Croatia’s constitu- President of the European negotiations carried out by both tional and political stability, which Commission, Mr. Romano Prodi, former and current candidate is deemed to have reached the handed over the avis questionnaire countries, and to assess, accor- highest level in the region. The to the Croatian Prime Minister. On dingly, our own potentials and functioning of its political, state, the basis of the information capacities. Hence, it does not seem and democratic system together provided last October, as well as the unrealistic to assert that we are with related institutions, have performance of the new capable of accomplishing our helped to foster steady growth of Government, especially in fulfilling accession negotiations in a two- democracy, the strengthening of the the political criteria – the issue of year period. The Accession Treaty rule of law, the improved protec- cooperation with the ICTY being the may then be signed in 2007, and tion of human rights, and not only most prominent one - the European enter into force in 2008 or 2009. a satisfactory but also constantly Commission finalised and adopted To this end, the present Croatian improving economic performance. its avis on Croatia’s application on government has undertaken an By applying for EU membership, 20 April 2004. This is just a calendar exhaustive diplomatic offensive, Croatia contributed towards the of events that brought us to the starting in Brussels and stability in the wider region of point where we expect the European encompassing the capitals of both South-Eastern Europe, and demon- Council in June to reflect on it and the EU-15 and the new member strated to the SAP countries the take adequate decisions on states. profitability of carrying out the re- Croatia’s candidate status and the In realising this objective we shall quired reforms, making their pros- opening of membership nego- not be competing with either Bul- pects of EU membership more real. tiations. The European Parliament, garia and Romania on the one hand at its session on 1 April 2004, Already on 14 April 2003, less than – both already well advanced on this already passed its favourable two months after the submission itinerary – or with any other SAP recommendation to the Council country on the other hand. On the concerning Croatia’s candidate Republic of Croatia: Fact-sheet contrary, Croatia welcomes Mac- status. edonia’s application for member- Independence: 25 June 1991 In the avis the European ship (presented in Dublin on 22 Commission concluded that Croatia March 2004). We shall be compet- Area: 56,542 sq km is a functioning democracy with ing with ourselves alone, in meet- ing the challenges of reaching the Capital: Zagreb stable institutions, which function properly and that there are no major EU standards and criteria to the Government Type: problems over assuring the rule of best of our abilities. We know ex- parliament democracy law and respect for fundamental actly how much daring the reform Governmental Parties: rights. As far as the economic efforts take, and how difficult the HDZ, CD criteria is concerned, Croatia can comprehensive and coordinated Population: 4,422,248 (July 2003) be regarded as a functioning market tasks will be. economy that should be able to Population Growth: 0.31% (2003) Furthermore, we are also aware cope with competitive pressures that it is necessary to continue our Ethnic Groups: and market forces within the EU in Serb 4.5%, Bosniak 0.5%, Slovene reforms by proving our readiness the medium term. On the third 0.3%, Roma 0.2%, Czech 0.2%, Alba- to address the three remaining po- criterion, the European Commission nian 0.1%, Montenegrin 0.1%, others litical preconditions. These include assessed that Croatia will be in a 4.1%, Croat 89.6%, (2001) a full cooperation with the Interna- position to take on the other Religions: tional Court for War Crimes in obligations of membership in the Orthodox 4.4%, Muslim 1.3%,Prote- Former Yugoslavia, the return of medium term as well. Therefore, we stant 0.3%, other and unknown 6.2% refugees, and the judiciary reform. Roman Catholic 87.8%, (2001) expect that Croatia could become As a result Croatia would reconfirm the next candidate for membership GDP per Capita: $ 9,800 (2002) its determination to respect for the of the European Union by the values and principles upon which GDP- r.G. rate: 5.2% (2002) summer of this year. the EU is based. Apart from these Inflation rate: 2.2% (2002) In view of further steps for Croatia political preconditions, we also Export: $ 4.9 Billion f.o.b.(2002) to catch the 2007 enlargement have to continue reforming our leg- wave, the preferable date of the islation by bringing it in line with Import: $ 10.7 Billion c.i.f. (2002) commencement of membership the European acquis. Last but not Unempl. rate: 21.7% (2002) negotiations would fall at the end least, there is the issue of economic of 2004 or early in 2005, with their performance, where Croatia can SOE-Monitor * April 2004 5 already show a very good track strategic objective – to become an Marija Pejcinovic-Buric, formerly record. associated, and subsequently a full active in the Croatian Europe member of the EU. By becoming a Movement, has been Assistant Mi- In short, the SAA, and especially the member of the EU, Croatia wishes nister in the Croatian Ministry of activities undertaken to implement to ensure its own stability and wel- European Integration during the the Agreement, clearly indicate not fare, and foster further stability and Racan government and has now only the increasingly improving re- welfare across Europe. been elevated to serve as State lations between Croatia and the EU but also Croatia’s commitment and Secretary in the same Ministry. determination to accomplish its Marija Pejcinovic Buric, MA

Croatia´s Turn Towards a New Reconciliation Policy

Only three years after its disastrous ried out a nationalistic policy of dis- Zagreb and Belgrade. election debacle in 2000, when the crimination and violation of human But given the results of the parlia- then-ruling Croatian Democratic and minority rights, thus isolating mentary in De- Union (HDZ) after 11 years in power Croatia in the international commu- cember 2003, when the centre- lost its first parliamentary and soon nity. Given this past, doubts about right Serbian Democratic Party of afterwards presidential elections, the HDZ´s credibility as well as Vojislav Kostunica acceded to power the conservative party is impres- democratic trustworthiness only by the support of the socialist sively back on Croatia’s political arose.But shortly after coming into Milosevic-party and is now leading scene. In the recent parliamentary power, Prime Minister Sanader of- a minority government, the coop- elections held on 23 November 2003 ficially embarked upon a new rec- eration in political terms could be the HDZ won 66 out of 152 seats onciliation policy. He explicitly and less successful and less rapid than and became the ruling party in the publicly invited all Serb refugees to Sanader desires. The new Serbian Croatian parliament (Sabor). There- return to Croatia and emphasised government started with a nation- fore the composition of government the promotion of refugee return and alistic restoration policy, far from changed significantly. Since minority integration as a top prior- the Croatian pro-European ap- Croatia’s independence in 1991, ity of his government. Conse- proach. Things might change since the second regime change in the quently, Sanader initiated important Vuk Draskovic was elected Minister country has taken place and the cooperation agreements, signed for Foreign Affairs of Serbia and former Tudjman party is in power with minority representatives. The Montenegro and immediately after for the second time. The new rul- most wide-ranging agreement has coming to power expressed his will- ing coalition, led by Prime Minister been reached with the representa- ingness to cooperate with Croatia. and HDZ-chairman Ivo Sanader, is tives of the Serb minority regard- Kostunica and Sanader are aware based on a formal agreement with ing the return of Serb refugees, the of the fact that regional coopera- the Democratic Centre (DC) and the reconstruction of destroyed or dam- tion is not only a condition for EU Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS). aged pre-war houses and proper- membership, but rather crucial for Though not part of the coalition, ties, the judicial reform and the stability and peace in the region. but supporting the government, are cooperation with neighbouring three members of the Croatian Pen- states. A new HDZ? sioners Party (HSU) and eight rep- Besides these formal commit- Sanaders ambitious commitments resentatives of national minorities ments, underlining his willingness and initiatives during the first (strikingly, three of these being for reconciliation, Sanader in vis- months in power clearly signal a from the Serb Democratic Independ- ited the Serbian Orthodox Christ- constructive and forward-looking ent Party/SDSS). Eight years after mas reception January 2004, where approach. In addition, the initia- the end of the war between Serbs he greeted the Serbs in traditional tives seem to be aimed at and Croats, a former hard-line na- orthodox manner. Beyond this, Sanader’s and HDZ’s critics, who tionalistic party thus came into Sanader consistently demonstrates raised doubts about the credibility power with the votes of the Serb his high dedication to strengthen- of the former Tudjman party. For minority. ing regional cooperation, not only this reason party leader Sanader is In view of the HDZ´s election vic- in economic but also in political eager to present a new, reformed tory, many observers and critics terms, especially with Serbia- and modernised HDZ, far from the within Croatia and especially in of- Montenegro. As regional integration nationalistic policy of the Tudjman ficial international circles have been is a crucial part of Sanaders new era, prepared for an unqualified mi- highly sceptical. During the crucial reconciliation approach, he con- nority policy, thus disarming the post-war period in the 1990s the stantly expresses his desire for in- critics. With Sanaders election as authoritarian Tudjman regime car- tensifying the relations between chairman of the HDZ in 2000, the 6 SOE-Monitor * April 2004

image and structure of HDZ indeed organizations are still fond of na- the total number of returned Serbs, changed fundamentally. It has been tionalistic ideas and unwilling to registered by the Croatian govern- since Sanaders crucial interest to reconcile. It is more than question- ment in July 2003, was 102,504. transform the HDZ into a demo- able whether those for the HDZ Thus, an enormous number of cratic, pro-European, conservative important groups will support Croatian Serbs is still displaced. party. Shortly after acceding to Sanader’s reconciliation and minor- This failure has its roots: In the power he eliminated nationalistic ity policy in future. This could be- decade of the Tudjman regime, the tendencies within the HDZ, man- come a fundamental and divisive return of Serb refugees was system- aged to build a reform consensus issue within the HDZ and has to be atically blocked by the government. among the party officials and rose observed carefully. Serbs were not welcome in post-war to become the political key figure Croatia and were persistently dis- in the HDZ. As party leader he suc- criminated. The return process in ceeded in forming a circle of young, fact has been initiated only after democratic, pro-European politi- the political changes in 2000, but cians within the HDZ, who now sup- the results have been less success- port his reconciliation and minor- ful than expected. The readiness to ity policy in cabinet. As the HDZ reconcile and to integrate the re- belongs to the European People’s turning refugees fully in social and Party, Sanader also maintains close political life has been, especially on relations to leaders of all important the local level, insufficient. Conse- European conservative, peoples, quently, minorities still face vari- and Christian democratic ous obstacles when returning to parties.Sanaders pro-European ap- their pre-war homes in Croatia, HDZ Chairman Sanader: crucial interest in EU proach is probably most evident in Integration above all in the judiciary, public in- the case of Ante Gotovina. stitutions and employment. Prob- Gotovina, a Croatian Army general Croatia’s long path to a consist- ably one of the most significant ob- indicted for war crimes against ent minority policy stacles for refugee return concerns Croatian Serbs in 1995, has been a During the Tudjman era in the the repossession of property, both long-time and highly sensitive po- 1990s, Croatia had strong demo- privately owned houses as well as litical issue in Croatian political af- cratic deficits. With the democratic socially owned apartments. Most of fairs. Until recently the Croatian changes in 2000 a coalition came the Serb refugees to date have not government was accused of not to power, which was strongly com- been able to regain their occupied fully supporting the International mitted to democracy and human homes, but at the same time have Criminal Tribunal for the Former rights. Led by the social-democratic not received alternative properties Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague in Prime Minister Ivica Racan the gov- or monetary reimbursement. Nine handing over Gotovina and other ernment initiated reforms, bring- years after the end of the war, the Croatian war crime indictees. Im- ing about substantial progress not obviously limited efforts of the pre- mediately after coming to power only in the area of institution build- vious governments to start a fair Prime Minister Sanader assured un- ing, but also in the field of human repossession policy discourage restricted cooperation with the rights. Despite these achievements most of the pre-war owners to re- ICTY and guaranteed support in Croatia’s political system still has turn. In order to encourage refu- trapping Gotovina, who is still on shortcomings and democratic gees to return the new government the run, presumably hiding abroad. shortcomings, particularly as con- committed itself to solve all cases Since then six accused Croatian cerns the functioning and efficiency concerning repossession of property generals went to The Hague and as of institutions and state bureauc- by the end of 2004. a result, the ICTY Chief Prosecutor, racy, the rule of law, the fight Carla Del Ponte, lately confirmed the Another major obstacle is the lack against organised crime and cor- of assistance in the reconstruction full and effective Croatian coopera- ruption, the reform of the judici- tion with the Tribunal. of damaged or destroyed pre-war ary as well as the development of homes. Until the end of 2002, seven Although Sanader solved quite a lot independent media. years after the war, Croatia had of major problems within the HDZ, Currently one of the most sensitive failed to reconstruct refugee prop- challenges remain. During the time and difficult tasks concerns the re- erties, especially of the Serb mi- the HDZ was in , several turn policy. During the wars of the nority. It was only then that the HDZ MPs advocated nationalistic 1990s more than 300,000 Serbs left government started to assist the policies, in contradiction to Croatia, mostly for the Federal Re- reconstruction of pre-war refugee Sanader’s reconciliation policy. Fur- public of Yugoslavia and Bosnia- homes through state funding. How- thermore, party members and lo- Herzegovina. Precise data on how ever, those efforts have been in- cal officials, large parts of the HDZ many Serb refugees have returned sufficient and frequently discrimi- electorate (above all citizens from to Croatia since the end of the war natory. The new government rural areas and older people) as well do not exist. According to the Hu- pledged now to reconstruct all de- as the traditionally close veteran man Rights Watch world report 2004 stroyed or damaged houses by the SOE-Monitor * April 2004 7 year 2006.In summary, discrimina- But even though the past few Jasna Jurisic, recently at ZEI, is tion on ethnic affiliation and return months saw first signs of a new rec- studying Political Science at the obstacles persist most intensively onciliation policy and the numerous University of Potsdam, Germany; at the local level. Local authorities governmental initiatives are to be she studied at the University of as well as the local population of- welcomed, one should not be eu- Zagreb in 2002/2003 and is writ- ten obstruct re-integration efforts. phoric. ing her master thesis on Croatia’s By now HDZ rules many communi- transition path from 1989 to 1999. Sanader launched very ambitious ties, especially in former Serb com- initiatives on extremely sensitive munities. As the HDZ is in govern- political issues. Words must now be ment now, it will be Sanader’s per- followed by deeds. The Croatian sonal task to promote conditions for prime minister will have to ensure return by calling on his local party the return of Serb refugees by fi- colleagues to respect, and where nancing and pushing through the necessary, to enforce minority reconstruction of damaged or de- rights. This could be one of the stroyed homes and properties, by most difficult, but crucial tasks for repossessing occupied homes to the HDZ chairman. He has to bridge pre-war owners, by assisting in the abyss between his reform- employing returned refugees and by minded and pro-European elite at preventing discrimination in public Literature: cabinet level and the often nation- administration and the judiciary. alist local HDZ officials, party mem- Opinion on the Application of But Sanader has not only genuinely bers, and the electorate at large. Croatia for Membership of the to encourage Serb refugees to re- The Serb minority, supporting European Union, turn to Croatia. He has primarily Sanader’s government in parlia- http://europa.eu.int/comm/ to create a political climate, in ment, threatens to withdraw sup- external_relations/see/croatia which Croatian citizens truly wel- index.htm, 20.04. 2004. port, if Sanader does not deliver on come Serbian refugees and inte- his promises regarding refugee grate minorities into social and pub- Bogdan Ivanisevic, return.Although Sanader’s policy lic life. The new government, and Legacy of War: Minority agenda therefore seems to be built Returns in the Balkans, in: personally Prime Minister Sanader, on highly fragile ground, serious Human Rights Watch Report, has indeed taken important first problems are not expected. On the 2004. steps towards a long overdue rec- official political level a cross-party onciliation process. But the most Dušan Reljic, consensus guarantees the support difficult part, the implementation Nur eine Kurzstrecke?, of all decision-makers and leading of the initiatives as well as the crea- SWP-Aktuell 8, March 2004. groups in solving the refuge return tion of a political atmosphere con- and minority problem, which is in Christian Schmitz, ducive to minority integration is yet Croatia’s crucial interest. Kroatiens neue Regierung, imminent. Croatia still has a long in: Länderbericht Towards reconciliation way to go. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 15 January 2004. The new HDZ government has been in office for a couple of months now The New HDZ-led and even critics admit that Jasna Jurisic Government, in: OSCE Background Report, Sanader’s return and minority policy 20 January 2004. is more explicit and transparent than the policy of any Croatian gov- ernment before.

Status Serviae Idibus Martiis MMIV a.d.

The Serbian Elections politics was the assassination of seemed to have been lost. Djin- When on November 13, 2003 Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic on djic’s successor Zivkovic was not Natasa Micic, the President of the March 12, 2003. The murder and able to follow in his predecessor’s Serbian Parliament and the acting the following operation “sabre” of footsteps - despite the internation- President of Serbia dissolved the the Serbian Ministry of Interior re- ally recognized police operation Parliament and scheduled new par- vealed the deep infiltration of the “sabre”, the Zivkovic government liamentary elections for December criminal structures from the gave the impression rather to re- 28, the first chapter of the post- Milosevic era in almost all levels of act than to act. Probably the roots Milosevic era should have come to the Serbian state. The confidence of the problem already emerged in an end. However, the actual turn- in the international business sec- Djindjic’s term of office, but ing point in Serbian post-Milosevic tor and the trust of the voters Djindjic displayed an air of being 8 SOE-Monitor * April 2004

in control of the situation, espe- Democratic Party (DS). Although in power continually until October cially in international encounters. January 2004 the leader of the DSS, 2000. As an old cadre party the re- Quite soon after Zivkovic’s takeo- Vojislav Kostunica, partly back- sources at its disposal should not ver the split in the ruling party alli- tracked, there were only few indi- to be underestimated - resources, ance “Democratic Opposition of cations of a possible integration of which some of the centrist parties Serbia” (DOS) became obvious. the DS in an eventual coalition. lacked. Nevertheless the SPS poten- Because of the opaque deposition Kostunica advocated a minority tial is today weakening because of of Mladjan Dinkic, head of the Cen- government under the leadership of an unfavourable age structure. The tral Bank, the domestic political the DSS but with the support of the SPS is now hardly able to compete crisis aggravated. On November 16, DS. All parties of the centre took with the SRS on the right wing. A the presidential election failed for part in the coalition talks: DSS, DS, partial reorientation on social top- the third time because of insuffi- as well as the electoral al- ics or a new positioning on the left cient voter turnout (38,8 per cent). liance - wing of the party system is not im- Shortly before that, the acting New Serbia (SPO-NS). The differ- probable. The future of the minor- President dissolved the Parliament. ences between the DSS and the DS ity government depends more than DOS had by then lost its majority seemed to be insuperable.The coa- marginally on the reform ability of in the Skupstina.Serbia entered lition talks dragged on and took the SPS. over two months. In the end the DS into a quite dangerous power Cooperation with The Hague vacuum. The results of the presi- refusedsource: http://www to support.seesac.org/press/media.htm a minority gov- dential elections made the prefer- ernment under the leadership of the Everyone involved in the SRS-SPS ence of the voters for the national- DSS; thus the Socialist Party of Ser- talks were silent about possible con- istic “” (SRS) bia (SPS) came into play. The SPS cessions, which were made to the obvious. However, because of the was willing to support the minority SPS. However, in an interview on 2 low voter turnout the election re- government. The negotiations al- March the future minister for capi- turns were not taken serious ready started at the end of January tal investments, Velimir Ilic, enough. The non-voters were at- and consensus was reached by the dropped first hints that the new tributed to the political centre. In end of February. government could follow a new course regarding the International the evening of December 28, 2003, This brought the SPS back on the Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugo- after the parliamentary elections, political stage. Although both slavia (ICTY). Over time, the price the last optimists were refuted - the Kostunica and Tadic (DS) chose for the support of the SPS became winner was the Serbian Radical prefatory tones in public state- clear. Finally on March 30, the Ser- Party (see table 1). ments, finally on the issue of a bian Parliament passed a law on the common presidential candidate of Consequences rights and its support for Serbian all centrist parties for the Presiden- defendants at the Tribunal. The law Heterogeneous minority govern- tial elections this fall it became ob- provides that the relatives of the ment and its chances for survival vious that the trench between the defendants have the right to re- DSS and the DS was even deeper However, the electoral success of funding of defence contributions, than recognized in public. At the the Radicals did not suffice for rent or salary but also for the trav- first ballot the two parties are go- forming a SRS government. Only elling expenses to The Hague. On ing to take up against each other. the parties aligned toward the cen- top of that, a monthly phone and tre were able to reach a very thin The SPS has gained a pivotal posi- package postage costs flat rate will majority all together. However, dur- tion in Serbian politics. The ques- be paid to the relatives. The law ing the election campaign the tion of reform ability of the was passed with the opposition Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), Miloševic-party looms large. At the votes of the SPS and the SRS but which became the strongest party end of the 1980s the SPS emerged also with the help of the DSS from of the centre, already foreclosed to out of the bond of the Serbian Com- the coalition government. The MPs form any coalition with the former munists (SKS). Being in this tradi- of G17 plus abstained, the SPO/NS strongest party in Parliament, the tion, the SPS managed to stay in together with the DS rejected the law. All in all, 141 representatives voted for the law, 35 against it. The Party / Election list Results Seats proponents justified the law by claiming to help the Serbo- 1. Serbian Radical Party (SRS) / Vojislav Seselj 27, 7 % 82 Montenegrins condemned or on trial 2. Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) / Vojislav Kostunica 18,0 % 53 in The Hague. The chairman of the 3. Democratic Party (DS) / Boris Tadic 12,6 % 37 SRS, Tomislav Nikolic, explained, 4. G 17 Plus / Miroljub Labus 11,7 % 34 the citizens of Serbia would not see 5. Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the indictees in The Hague as crimi- New Serbia (NS) / Vuk Draskovic, Velimir Ilic 7,8 % 23 nals. Especially on this point the 6. Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) / Slobodan Milosevic 7,4 % 21 opponents seemedto be united. They saw a clear concession to the Table 1: Official results of the parliamentary elections in Serbia on December 28 2003 SPS, although the DSS declared that SOE-Monitor * April 2004 9 the law does not mean any rap- not seriously start reforms in many of the Kosovo question gained new prochement with the SPS. areas (health, law, education sys- momentum. For the Serbian policy tem and administration). The cur- it will be essential whether through The danger of new international rent Kostunica government is now these happenings the independence isolation faced with these tasks. The future of Kosovo is going to come closer Internationally the accrued move to domestic policy will have a strong or whether the international com- the right in Serbia was viewed with impact on the success of the gov- munity continues to follow its de anxiety. Many hoped, the DS might ernment. One of the main problems facto status quo strategy, which join the coalition government. As awaiting the Kostunica government hides behind the slogan “standards this hope dissipated, the hope is the Kosovo status question, with before status”. Currently, Serbian turned to a minority government both a domestic and a foreign policy foreign policy tries hard to prevent tolerated by the DS. Of the two dimension. The government is con- a change of the international strat- worst scenarios, the toleration by centrating on the slogan egy in favour of the Albanians. the SPS was the less dramatic one. “Cantonization of Kosovo.” The The integration of the SPS in the model Bosnia and Herzegovina is government would probably have assumed to be a success. A decen- Milan Kosanovic led to serious international conse- tralisation of Kosovo on the basis quences. In the new cabinet the G17 of semiautonomous cantons might, plus, which is internationally highly though, prove too difficult to be regarded as a reformist party, holds carried through. In this field Bel- decisive positions on economic grade seems to be quite aware of a Milan Kosanovic is managing direc- matters (Deputy Prime Minister danger of international isolation and tor of the Michael Zikic Foundation Labus, Finance Ninister Dinkic and appears to be looking for a dialogue at Bonn University, which promotes apart from the cabinet the Head of with international actors. The re- the integration of South Eastern the Central Bank Jelasic). In this cent unrest in Kosovo (March 16 to Europe into the European organi- respect, reforms might continue. 22) led to serious instability in the sations, specifically focusing on The predecessor government did province. The search for a solution German-Serbian relations.

Task Force South Eastern Europe

Network for European Studies in Southeastern Europe Plans for 2004 and 2005 The Network for European Studies purpose of such networking is 5.This will necessitate the in Southeastern Europe coordinated served through the network’s yearly promotion of the future academic by ZEI has concluded its fifth, conferences as well as working- generation of European Studies successful year. As for the future, group meetings. along the lines of “help for self- the following goals have been set help”, which will lead ultimately to 3.To expand cooperation between for the next two years: independent and competent Western European, especially the European Studies programs in the 1.To focus the network’s activities German European Studies programs region. The ‘summer school’ on the western Balkan countries, and potential regional partners in contributes to the realization of this particularly Albania, Bosnia and Southeastern Europe, in order to goal. Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia provide impulses for a compre- and Montenegro. The involvement hensive transfer of ‘know-how’, 6. Academic as well as logistical of our partners from the remaining particularly since this area of study support particularly of European region of Southeastern Europe will exhibits considerable deficits in the Studies programs of cross-border persist in order to maintain the region. nature. continuity and integrity of the 4.To continue efforts for a 7.To promote knowledge of network. significant quality enhancement Europe in Southeastern European 2.To network further regional of current European Studies schools. This requires the education European Studies programs in order programs in the region, for of future teachers and school to intensify the contacts, under- instance in research and teaching, administrators and the conceptu- standing, academic and experi- in order to harmonize the western alization of study material. and southeastern European pro- ential exchanges among one Specific Working Goals and grams. For this purpose, the another in accordance with the Projects Stability Pact and its promotion of Network’s “Reader” series compiles regional cooperation. These con- lists of fundamental literature for - Continuation of the “flying tacts are building gradually. The European Studies. faculty”, whereby the previous two SOE-Monitor * April 2004 10 flying faculties will be fused into one in Bosnia and Herzegovina. - The „Europe at Schools“ Project with a focus on the western Bal- is going to be also on the agenda - The other focal point of the Net- kans. It seems reasonable to send for the next two years. After the work activity in 2004 and 2005 is ten instructors annually, each one successful first phase in which going to be the cooperation with for a week to the universities of “country profiles” for a number of the Bulgarian-Romanian Inter- the region. The instructors will be South East European countries ( Bul- university Europe Center (BRIE) encouraged to visit several garia, Romania, Serbia and established at the Danube bridge programs during one trip in order Montenegro, Macedonia and Alba- between Bulgaria and Romania in to reduce excess costs and increase nia) and a detailed Core Curricu- Rousse and Giurgiu in October 2002 the academic value of the program. lum for a Master in European Edu- and aiming to become one of the cation were elaborated and pub- Centers of Excellence in the region. - More Summer Schools 2004 and lished, an application for financial The Network will continue to support 2005 in Kotor, Montenegro. The support for the second phase was the European Studies Programme Montenegrin partners have already made. announced their agreement to hold offered at BRIE Rousse. The second phase will include two the first Summer School this year At the last annual Network more meetings of the working group in June or July. Around 50 students Conference held in January 2004 in “Europe at Schools” in 2004 and will be invited from European Rousse the Network participants 2005 most probably in Sofia and in Studies Programmes in Belgrade, decided to create the institution of the Western Balkans (Skopje or Novi Sad, Podgorica, Rousse, BRIE Corresponding Members thus Sarajevo) and one “Train the Train- Skopje, and Tirana. offering the opportunity for well ers “ seminar organized by our main known professors from all over There will be two parallel classes at partner in this project, the Insti- South Eastern Europe to come as the Summer School, in which the tute for Globalisation and visiting professors to BRIE and to instructors teach one after the Intercultural Learning (IGI) in teach there.The same applies to the other. Focal points will be Zagreb. In addition, joint efforts in faculty of the Summer School to be interactive learning and the preparing up to date teaching ma- offered regularly for the BRIE conveyance of essentials. The Sum- terial are envisaged. mer School including weekend students. This year the Summer excursion will last ten days. School will be held during the se- cond half of July. - A further Annual Conference 2005 Dr. Emil Mintchev with a focus on the western Bal- -The Hertie Foundation Coordi- kans, which is planned to take place nation Office at ZEI will continue in Skopje. At the end of June 2004, to deal directly with BRIE tasks by Prof. Dr. Ludger Kühnhardt, Director recruiting German faculty for the at ZEI and Dr. Emil Mintchev will BRIE European Studies Programme travel to Podgorica and Skopje, in within the framework of the “flying order to probe the logistics for the faculty” and renowned speakers as Annual Conference. Hertie Lecturers. Furthermore will Dr. Mintchev is Senior Fellow at ZEI. take care of the Hertie Foundation He coordinates the Network of Eu- - A „Train the Trainers“ Seminar Fellows at BRIE and promote the ropean Studies in South Eastern Eu- in 2005 exclusively for instructors campaign all over the region for rope and leads the Hertie Founda- from the western Balkans, possibly recruiting new students. tion Coordination Office at ZEI.

Next Edition: Turkey on the Doorstep of the EU ?

Chief Editors: Dr. Rafael Biermann Assistant Editor: Dr. Emil Mintchev Editorial Assistants: Simon Backovsky Jared Sonnicksen Published by the Task Force South Eastern Europe at ZEI ZEI Walter-Flex-Str. 3 D- 53113 Bonn Zentrum für Europaische Integrationsforschung Fax: 0228/ 731894 Center for European Integration Studies e- mail: [email protected] Rheinische Friederich-Wilhelms- Universität Bonn