“So many Russians! Where will we bury them all?”

The Winter

War By Richard P. Hallion Photo courtesy of Historical Research Agency, via Richard P. Hallion t the end of the 1930s, the USSR—then set his gaze upon . an excellent Finnish-made submachine ’s Krasnaya Finland, a nation of 3.7 million gun, giving them withering close-combat Armiya (Red Army) em- confronting one more than 40 times firepower. bodied Stalin’s military larger, seemed doomed—particularly Finland’s “Mannerheim Line”— strength. It had five mil- since years of political indifference, named after Field Carl Gustaf Alion troops, more than 300 divisions, a questionable acquisition priorities, Mannerheim—defending the Karelian formidable reserve, and included the and complacency had left its military Isthmus was simply coils of barbed Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily (VVS), the undersized, underfunded, and poorly wire, some obstructions, and occasional Air Force. It seemed invincible, and equipped. machine gun nests connecting lakes Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov and marshes. As its namesake soberly even said so to delegates at the 1939 A Drawn-out Slugfest reflected, “The Mannerheim Line is the Party Congress. The Red Army had more than one Finnish soldier standing in the snow.” In August 1939, Stalin and Hitler million soldiers already deployed on its Yet the fiercely patriotic Finns re- executed a nonaggression pact es- borders; Finland, prior to mobilization, fused to give in. “So many Russians! sentially giving Stalin a free hand in had just 33,000. The VVS and Soviet Where will we bury them all?” one the Baltic States and Bessarabia, the Navy deployed 2,300 aircraft; the Finns soldier quipped. His jest soon proved region around modern-day Moldova had just 114. grimly prophetic. encompassing parts of Ukraine and Finnish troops had several months’ Stalin launched all-out war on Nov. Romania. Stalin wrung concessions worth of ammunition, some czarist- 30, 1939. The Red Army assaulted the from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—a legacy artillery, and few tanks or heavy Mannerheim Line, also invading cen- prelude to absorbing them later into the machine guns. Fortunately, they wielded tral Finland to sever supply lines from 112 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 Soviet paratroopers tumble out of a Tu- polev TB-3. Finland shot down at least one of the transport-bomber aircraft early in the war, along with dozens of other bombers.

Photo courtesy of Air Force Historical Research Agency, via Richard P. Hallion Staff map by Zaur Eylanbekov

Sweden. The Soviet Navy prowled the an airplane marked with his personal bombers and two more Dutch Fokker coast. Aloft, VVS fighters and bombers good luck symbol, a blue . It D.XXI fighters. But it needed more struck at ports, cities, and installations. became the official Finnish air emblem fighters. The Finnish Air Chief was But the offensive quickly degener- (but had no connection to the Nazis’ Jarl F. Lundqvist, an artillery officer ated into a drawn-out slugfest, with the later use of the symbol). turned air commander. His predilection thrust into central Finland ending in a In 1928, the air service became the for bombers and maritime patrol con- grim landscape of abandoned vehicles Ilmavoimat, the Air Force. But it was strained Finnish fighter modernization and frozen, snow-covered corpses. inadequately supported by the Army and at a time when world fighter design was Everywhere white-clad Finnish snipers Navy traditionalists who dominated the evolving rapidly. took a deadly toll, as did ski troops, at- general staff and who selected Army- and Frustrated fighter advocates saw nu- tacking swiftly out of the woods with maritime-centric leaders to run it. On the merous opportunities missed to secure submachine guns, grenades, and tank- positive side, Finnish airmen became better, more advanced, aircraft that, destroying Molotov cocktails. Stalin’s masters of making do, operating under in retrospect, could have dramatically Navy suffered from , its rough conditions, even in the frozen tun- affected the . landing attempts repulsed. dra and wastes of the high Arctic. They Thus, in 1940, the obsolete Fokkers But nowhere did the Finns fight more developed portable shelters and heating constituted the front line of Finnish air tenaciously than in the air. for exposed aircraft; mobile logistical defense, even though they only had Finland established an air service in support to enable austere operations; an armament of four 7.9 mm machine 1918, when a group of adventurers joined and thorough unit-level maintenance. guns and a maximum speed of just its fight against the Bolsheviks. One of In 1936 Finland purchased two 286 mph. Still, they were fast enough them, ’s Eric von Rosen, donated squadrons of British to intercept most bombers and were AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 113 When the war began, Finland had 18 Bristol Blenheim light bombers, such as this one at Immola. Finland marked its with blue , a good luck symbol. There was no connection to Nazi ’s ubiquitous use Photo courtesy of MikkoVeijalainen, Military Aviation Museum of Central Finland, via Hallion Richard P. of the ancient symbol.

potentially deadly opponents if flown prepared caches of supplies and am- by skilled pilots. munition and loaded trucks with spare Finland’s fighter pilots were superbly parts, tools, and other necessities. trained, thanks to Lt. Col. Richard “Our esprit de corps was high despite Julius Lorentz and Capt. Gustaf Erik the fact that we would be up against Magnusson. In the early 1930s, Lorentz heavy odds,” ace commanded Lentolaivue 24 (LeLv 24), recalled later. “We were ready.” Finland’s premier fighter squadron. It ’s Air Force outnumbered Fin- was a time when his pilots took pride land’s by 20 to one. The Soviet Union in flying a tight three-ship Royal Air deployed 2,318 aircraft, including 1,044 Force-inspired V-shaped arrowhead. fighters and 855 bombers. The Soviets But Lorentz realized it limited effec- had 395 others for strategic bombing, tiveness and increased vulnerability. paratroop insertion, reconnaissance, artillery observation, and maritime pa- Setting the Stage for Defense trol. In contrast, Finland’s 114 aircraft Instead, he made an element of two included 42 Fokkers, 15 older Bulldogs, fighters, leader and wingman, the basic formation. He stressed mutual protec- tion, gunnery, use of radio in aircraft and ground observer networks, and exploiting signals intelligence. His initiatives created a crude command Col. Richard Lorentz (above) and Maj. and control system, with radar being Gustaf Magnusson (right) readied and trained a cadre of superb Finnish pilots unavailable to Finland at the time of the who fought tenaciously in the air de- Winter War. As well, he encapsulated spite being greatly outnumbered. his thinking in an air war manual is- sued in 1939. advocated beam and stern attacks, “Eka” Magnusson, one of Lorentz’s deflection shooting, and firing at short flight commanders, was so interested range, targeting gunners first, and then in tactics that he traveled at his own engines and pilots. expense to fly with France’s l’Armée Magnusson pitted his Fokkers against de l’Air. He returned impressed by its each other and against older but more use of gun cameras for analysis and by nimble biplanes. It was the extensive critique following each excellent preparation: The Fokker pilots training mission. learned not to attempt turning fights In 1938, now himself commanding against biplanes such as the Polikarpov LeLv 24, he visited Germany. Magnus- I-15bis and I-153. son returned convinced Europe was at In the fall of 1939, as Soviet recon- best a year away from war. He exercised naissance incursions increased, Lorentz LeLv 24 hard, emphasizing tactics, (newly appointed as commander of marksmanship, and maintenance. He fighters) dispersed his aircraft. Teams 114 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 A Polikarpov I-15bis sports a “For Stalin!” slogan on its flank. The biplanes were deadly foes in turn- ing fights, but the Finns knew how to avoid that sort of battle. Photo courtesy of George Mellinger Collection, via Hallion Richard P.

and 18 Blenheims. one bomber down. tools warm. On Nov. 30, amidst bad weather that The remainder were attacked by 1st Accidents caused by fatigue—for shielded Stalin’s airmen from Finnish Lt. Jorma Sarvanto. In just four minutes, pilots flew up to eight sorties each interception, eight bombers set out to Sarvanto shot down six. The seventh day—constituted as much a danger as raid port and oil storage facilities near Soviet bomber then fell to Sovelius, Soviet fighters and anti-aircraft fire. By . But they missed their targets who caught it as it crossed the coast. the end of January, LeLv 24 had only 28 and instead dropped bombs across the On Jan. 17, the Finns intercepted 25 mission-capable Fokkers left. city, killing almost 100 Finns—and SBs over Karelia, shooting Fortunately, diplomatic efforts to triggering international outrage. down nine and damaging several oth- secure additional airplanes were now The next day, when more returned, ers. Three days later, they shot down a bearing fruit. Arriving aircraft were they ran into a swarm of Fokkers led by further nine, at the cost of one Fokker assembled in Sweden, and a total of Magnusson. The angry Finns swiftly shot and pilot lost to a pair of I-16s. 116 aircraft were readied by the end down 11 Soviet bombers, one falling Altogether, in the month of January of March. before Magnusson’s own guns. 1940, Finland’s Fokkers shot down 34 Britain sent 30 That encounter established a pattern Soviet aircraft, primarily bombers. biplanes, the French supplied 30 Mo- for the subsequent air war. Finnish rane-Saulnier MS 406 monoplanes, and pilots focused on destroying bombers, A Brutal Cold Winter South Africa donated 29 Gauntlets (the engaging fighters only when necessary Throughout the war, Lorentz and Gladiator’s predecessor). or when defending their own bomber Magnusson repeatedly stressed attacking Finland ordered other fighters, includ- and reconnaissance aircraft. bombers, reconnaissance, and artillery ing 35 Italian Fiat G.50 monoplanes (32 On Dec. 19, LeLv 24’s pilots shot spotters. Over time, as the threat of of them delivered before war’s end), 44 down 12 bombers, one pilot recalling, Soviet fighters increased, the Finns American Brewster B-239s (an export “Everything went exactly like training.” refined their tactics further, so that version of the US Navy’s F2A-1, though On Dec. 23, they destroyed six bomb- once a bomber formation was located, only a few had been delivered before ers and two fighters, at the cost of one dispersed radio-directed fighters would hostilities ceased), and a dozen British Fokker lost—its pilot survived. “swarm” and attack in great numbers, Hawker Hurricanes, 10 of which ar- LeLv 24 ended the year having shot destroying as many as possible before rived, though too late to participate in down 54 aircraft for the price of one returning to dispersed bases. the campaign. Fokker. The Finns constantly shifted detach- The Moranes and Fiats, with gener- On Jan. 6, 17 Ilyushin DB-3 bomb- ments among remote sites with tamped- ally similar performance to the Fokkers, ers flew across the down snow runways. They operated proved equally deadly against the Soviet from Estonia, but signals intelligence off frozen lakes using skis instead bombers beginning in February 1940. had alerted the Finns of the impending of wheels. As the winter of 1939-40 Many foreigners volunteered for Finn- raid. Thus, near Utti, the second wave was brutally cold, maintenance was a ish military service, but as the Finns were of eight encountered a Fokker piloted nightmare. Mechanics risked frostbite highly selective, few actually flew. The by 1st Lt. Per-Erik Sovelius, who shot and even used blowtorches to keep only organized foreign air unit was the AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 115 LeLv 24 pilots—four shown here with a Fokker D.XXI—claimed 120 air-to-air victories. Though obsolete, the Fokker racked up a 16-to-one kill ratio. Photo courtesy of MikkoVeijalainen, Military Aviation Museum at Central Finland, via Hallion Richard P.

Swedish volunteer squadron, Flygflottilj grimly went in at extremely low level ning, as Finnish journalist and diplomat 19 (F19), commanded by Maj. Hugo and emptied our guns,” Chief War- Max Jakobson recalled, a “day of quiet, Beckhammar. Made up of aviators and rant Officer Eino Ilmari Juutilainen bitter mourning.” support personnel from the Flygvapnet recalled, “then it was save yourself The Winter War cost Finland 68,480 (the ), it consisted of a against the enemy fighters who would casualties, including 24,923 dead or dozen Gloster Gladiator biplane fighters roar down from overhead. ... Those missing, and 43,557 wounded. Its casu- and four two-seat Hawker Hart biplane ground attacks were the most mis- alties constituted nearly two percent of dive bombers. erable missions we flew during the the nation’s population. Finland lost 10 F19 entered combat in early January, Winter War.” percent of its territory and the Karelian completing 464 sorties over 62 days, Timoshenko’s strategy and resources Isthmus, whose remaining inhabitants losing five aircraft in combat and one in eventually succeeded. Massed artillery took refuge in Finland rather than remain an accident. In turn, its pilots destroyed fire, followed by armor and infantry as- in place as Soviet subjects. eight (and possibly 12) Soviet aircraft, saults breached the Mannerheim Line on Still, Finland’s ferocious defense including a four-engine Tupolev TB-3 Feb. 12. Still, Finnish discipline held, saved it from having to form a puppet shot down outside Kemijärvi on March and its soldiers withdrew in good order state and sharing the fate of Lithuania, 10. The F19’s presence freed the Finnish to a secondary defense line. Though Latvia, and Estonia. The Soviet empire Air Force to concentrate its efforts over France and Britain offered assurances eventually absorbed each of those once- the . of imminent aid, the Finns realized both independent nations. More than a million In January, Stalin replaced Voroshilov countries were more concerned about Baltic citizens vanished into the labor with Semyon K. Timoshenko, a cavalry their own war with Germany. camps of the gulag, where most were commander and systematic planner. He The Finns also knew other European shot or worked to death. instituted an all-forces training program states were reluctant to risk widening the For Stalin, any satisfaction derived while building up his artillery and armor. war, one that might even see Germany from conquering Finland was tempered Then, in February, he unleashed an assault. entering on the side of its erstwhile ally, by the Red Army’s amateurish perfor- Mannerheim’s doughty troops re- the Soviet Union. mance and extreme casualties. Soviet pelled this latest Soviet assault as well, fatalities numbered 273,000—10 times though at great cost. An Uneasy Peace more than Finland’s—with thousands fighters now turned In early March, Sweden announced more wounded. The combined casualty to ground attack, strafing troops and ve- it would not permit any foreign forces total was likely a quarter of the 1.2 hicles trying to cross Lake Ladoga and, to cross its territory to fight in Finland. million Soviet soldiers deployed. later, Viipuri Bay and other iced-over Messages from Mannerheim and other Asked what had been gained, one waterways. From the air, each column front commanders grew increasingly Soviet general replied, “We have won looked like “a long black snake,” Capt. pessimistic. enough ground to bury our dead.” Eino Luukkanen recalled. “We could On March 6, after much debate, a Stalin characteristically reacted in not have been offered a better target.” Finnish delegation left for Stockholm, Draconian fashion, wasting little time One strike repulsed a battalion-sized then flew on to , arriving the in assigning blame and punishments. column, leaving half its vehicles and next day. There, on March 12, Finnish He considered the 5,648 Soviet sol- personnel dead on the ice. and Russian conferees signed a treaty of diers and airmen taken prisoner by the Patrolling Soviet fighters increased peace. The next day, at 11 a.m. Helsinki Finns to be traitors. When they returned, the risk to Finnish airmen as well. “We time, an uneasy peace returned, begin- they immediately passed from the hu- 116 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 France supplied Finland with 30 Morane-Saulnier MS 406 aircraft, such as this one, to help the war effort against the Soviets, but France was clearly more concerned with its own war, against Nazi Germany. Photo courtesy of MikkoVeijalainen, Military Aviation Musuem of Central Finland, via Hallion Richard P.

mane captivity of the Finns into gulags. air attaché reported, “The accomplish- Finnish aircraft, while losing four of Few, if any, survived. ments thus far of the Finnish pilots have their own. In March, Voroshilov was forced, in been truly remarkable.” But this marginal victory constituted Stalin’s words, to “acknowledge the The Finns claimed 521 Soviet aircraft the apex of Soviet success. Stalin may bankruptcy of his leadership.” Yakov in the course of 5,963 sorties: 207 shot have lost 900 aircraft, almost eight Shmushkevich, chief of the VVS was down air-to-air and another 314 falling times the number Finland possessed at arrested and shot, together with other to ground fire. Of these, Lorentz’ fighters the war’s outset. airmen and ground commanders. claimed 170, more than 80 percent of In June 1941, Hitler abrogated the But Stalin himself bore the great- Soviet aircraft allegedly lost in air-to-air pact with the USSR, sending his Wehr­ est responsibility for the Red Army’s action. Of the 170, Magnusson’s LeLv macht into Soviet-occupied Poland and miserable performance. His purges had 24 claimed 120, a hundred of them (83 across the Soviet frontier. Finland joined claimed the cream of its officer corps and percent) bombers. Finnish fighter pilots Germany as a co-belligerent, hoping to almost all its senior leadership, resulting frustrated the VVS’ efforts to undertake regain its lost territory. The “Continu- in the elevation of inexperienced and systematic bombing operations, un- ation War” lasted through the summer ill-trained subordinates. Coupled with doubtedly saving hundreds, and perhaps of 1944, during which Finnish airmen organizational and training weaknesses, thousands, of lives—particularly civil- again dominated the VVS. this meant the Red Army was a hollow ians in various towns and cities who Despite the vast power of the Red force, vulnerable to a better trained and otherwise would have perished. Army, which forced a settlement, the focused opponent. Finns again succeeded in retaining their This particularly held true for the Standards of Performance independence, avoiding the postwar fate VVS. While its airmen had fought Though obsolescent, the Fokker of Eastern Europe, though again they over , China, and Manchuria, D.XXI achieved a 16-to-one kill ratio, lost much territory. The Paris Peace they had little experience in combined due to the courage, training, tactics, and Treaty of 1947 constrained the size of arms warfare or following established marksmanship of its pilots. Ten Finnish Finland’s Air Force in the postwar era, doctrine and tactics. Many of the most pilots earned ace status, accounting for though not its excellence. experienced had been purged as well, 68 bombers and fighters. Finland lost Today the Finnish Air Force operates robbing the VVS of the benefits of their 62 aircraft, mostly bombers, reconnais- F-18 Hornets and BAE Hawks with ad- knowledge. sance, and artillery spotters. vanced precision munitions. Its airmen Though the Winter War gave the Red The single worst engagment, from exercise with the Nordic air forces, and Army and the VVS an inkling of vital Finland’s perspective, occurred Feb. those of other nations, including the changes each had to make, both still 29. Due to intelligence failures, 40 Po- . possessed serious deficiencies when, likarpov fighters surprised and trapped If Finland’s equipment has vastly slightly over a year later, Germany a mix of Fokkers and Gladiators over changed, its standard of performance invaded the USSR. Immola. In the multibogie furball that has not. Today as then, the Finnish Air Finland’s Air Force ended the Win- followed, VVS pilots shot down seven Force punches well above its weight.n ter War stronger than it had been at its outbreak. It was now combat-proven, Richard P. Hallion is an historian who served 11 years as the Air Force seasoned, and confident. Finnish airmen historian and has written widely on aerospace technology and airpower topics. His had acquitted themselves with obvious previous article for Air Force Magazine, “Richard Whitcomb’s Triple Play,” appeared in distinction, and that March, an American the February 2010 issue. AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 117