“So many Russians! Where will we bury them all?” The Winter War By Richard P. Hallion Photo courtesy of Air Force Historical Research Agency, via Richard P. Hallion t the end of the 1930s, the USSR—then set his gaze upon Finland. an excellent Finnish-made submachine Soviet Union’s Krasnaya Finland, a nation of 3.7 million gun, giving them withering close-combat Armiya (Red Army) em- confronting one more than 40 times firepower. bodied Stalin’s military larger, seemed doomed—particularly Finland’s “Mannerheim Line”— strength. It had five mil- since years of political indifference, named after Field Marshal Carl Gustaf Alion troops, more than 300 divisions, a questionable acquisition priorities, Mannerheim—defending the Karelian formidable reserve, and included the and complacency had left its military Isthmus was simply coils of barbed Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily (VVS), the undersized, underfunded, and poorly wire, some obstructions, and occasional Air Force. It seemed invincible, and equipped. machine gun nests connecting lakes Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov and marshes. As its namesake soberly even said so to delegates at the 1939 A Drawn-out Slugfest reflected, “The Mannerheim Line is the Party Congress. The Red Army had more than one Finnish soldier standing in the snow.” In August 1939, Stalin and Hitler million soldiers already deployed on its Yet the fiercely patriotic Finns re- executed a nonaggression pact es- borders; Finland, prior to mobilization, fused to give in. “So many Russians! sentially giving Stalin a free hand in had just 33,000. The VVS and Soviet Where will we bury them all?” one the Baltic States and Bessarabia, the Navy deployed 2,300 aircraft; the Finns soldier quipped. His jest soon proved region around modern-day Moldova had just 114. grimly prophetic. encompassing parts of Ukraine and Finnish troops had several months’ Stalin launched all-out war on Nov. Romania. Stalin wrung concessions worth of ammunition, some czarist- 30, 1939. The Red Army assaulted the from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—a legacy artillery, and few tanks or heavy Mannerheim Line, also invading cen- prelude to absorbing them later into the machine guns. Fortunately, they wielded tral Finland to sever supply lines from 112 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 Soviet paratroopers tumble out of a Tu- polev TB-3. Finland shot down at least one of the transport-bomber aircraft early in the war, along with dozens of other bombers. Photo courtesy of Air Force Historical Research Agency, via Richard P. Hallion Staff map by Zaur Eylanbekov Sweden. The Soviet Navy prowled the an airplane marked with his personal bombers and two more Dutch Fokker coast. Aloft, VVS fighters and bombers good luck symbol, a blue swastika. It D.XXI fighters. But it needed more struck at ports, cities, and installations. became the official Finnish air emblem fighters. The Finnish Air Chief was But the offensive quickly degener- (but had no connection to the Nazis’ Jarl F. Lundqvist, an artillery officer ated into a drawn-out slugfest, with the later use of the symbol). turned air commander. His predilection thrust into central Finland ending in a In 1928, the air service became the for bombers and maritime patrol con- grim landscape of abandoned vehicles Ilmavoimat, the Air Force. But it was strained Finnish fighter modernization and frozen, snow-covered corpses. inadequately supported by the Army and at a time when world fighter design was Everywhere white-clad Finnish snipers Navy traditionalists who dominated the evolving rapidly. took a deadly toll, as did ski troops, at- general staff and who selected Army- and Frustrated fighter advocates saw nu- tacking swiftly out of the woods with maritime-centric leaders to run it. On the merous opportunities missed to secure submachine guns, grenades, and tank- positive side, Finnish airmen became better, more advanced, aircraft that, destroying Molotov cocktails. Stalin’s masters of making do, operating under in retrospect, could have dramatically Navy suffered from coastal artillery, its rough conditions, even in the frozen tun- affected the Winter War. landing attempts repulsed. dra and wastes of the high Arctic. They Thus, in 1940, the obsolete Fokkers But nowhere did the Finns fight more developed portable shelters and heating constituted the front line of Finnish air tenaciously than in the air. for exposed aircraft; mobile logistical defense, even though they only had Finland established an air service in support to enable austere operations; an armament of four 7.9 mm machine 1918, when a group of adventurers joined and thorough unit-level maintenance. guns and a maximum speed of just its fight against the Bolsheviks. One of In 1936 Finland purchased two 286 mph. Still, they were fast enough them, Sweden’s Eric von Rosen, donated squadrons of British Bristol Blenheim to intercept most bombers and were AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 113 When the war began, Finland had 18 Bristol Blenheim light bombers, such as this one at Immola. Finland marked its military aircraft with blue swastikas, a good luck symbol. There was no connection to Nazi Germany’s ubiquitous use Photo courtesy of MikkoVeijalainen, Military Aviation Museum of Central Finland, via Hallion Richard P. of the ancient symbol. potentially deadly opponents if flown prepared caches of supplies and am- by skilled pilots. munition and loaded trucks with spare Finland’s fighter pilots were superbly parts, tools, and other necessities. trained, thanks to Lt. Col. Richard “Our esprit de corps was high despite Julius Lorentz and Capt. Gustaf Erik the fact that we would be up against Magnusson. In the early 1930s, Lorentz heavy odds,” ace Ilmari Juutilainen commanded Lentolaivue 24 (LeLv 24), recalled later. “We were ready.” Finland’s premier fighter squadron. It Russia’s Air Force outnumbered Fin- was a time when his pilots took pride land’s by 20 to one. The Soviet Union in flying a tight three-ship Royal Air deployed 2,318 aircraft, including 1,044 Force-inspired V-shaped arrowhead. fighters and 855 bombers. The Soviets But Lorentz realized it limited effec- had 395 others for strategic bombing, tiveness and increased vulnerability. paratroop insertion, reconnaissance, artillery observation, and maritime pa- Setting the Stage for Defense trol. In contrast, Finland’s 114 aircraft Instead, he made an element of two included 42 Fokkers, 15 older Bulldogs, fighters, leader and wingman, the basic formation. He stressed mutual protec- tion, gunnery, use of radio in aircraft and ground observer networks, and exploiting signals intelligence. His initiatives created a crude command Col. Richard Lorentz (above) and Maj. and control system, with radar being Gustaf Magnusson (right) readied and trained a cadre of superb Finnish pilots unavailable to Finland at the time of the who fought tenaciously in the air de- Winter War. As well, he encapsulated spite being greatly outnumbered. his thinking in an air war manual is- sued in 1939. advocated beam and stern attacks, “Eka” Magnusson, one of Lorentz’s deflection shooting, and firing at short flight commanders, was so interested range, targeting gunners first, and then in tactics that he traveled at his own engines and pilots. expense to fly with France’s l’Armée Magnusson pitted his Fokkers against de l’Air. He returned impressed by its each other and against older but more use of gun cameras for analysis and by nimble Bristol Bulldog biplanes. It was the extensive critique following each excellent preparation: The Fokker pilots training mission. learned not to attempt turning fights In 1938, now himself commanding against biplanes such as the Polikarpov LeLv 24, he visited Germany. Magnus- I-15bis and I-153. son returned convinced Europe was at In the fall of 1939, as Soviet recon- best a year away from war. He exercised naissance incursions increased, Lorentz LeLv 24 hard, emphasizing tactics, (newly appointed as commander of marksmanship, and maintenance. He fighters) dispersed his aircraft. Teams 114 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 A Polikarpov I-15bis sports a “For Stalin!” slogan on its flank. The biplanes were deadly foes in turn- ing fights, but the Finns knew how to avoid that sort of battle. Photo courtesy of George Mellinger Collection, via Hallion Richard P. and 18 Blenheims. one bomber down. tools warm. On Nov. 30, amidst bad weather that The remainder were attacked by 1st Accidents caused by fatigue—for shielded Stalin’s airmen from Finnish Lt. Jorma Sarvanto. In just four minutes, pilots flew up to eight sorties each interception, eight bombers set out to Sarvanto shot down six. The seventh day—constituted as much a danger as raid port and oil storage facilities near Soviet bomber then fell to Sovelius, Soviet fighters and anti-aircraft fire. By Helsinki. But they missed their targets who caught it as it crossed the coast. the end of January, LeLv 24 had only 28 and instead dropped bombs across the On Jan. 17, the Finns intercepted 25 mission-capable Fokkers left. city, killing almost 100 Finns—and Tupolev SBs over Karelia, shooting Fortunately, diplomatic efforts to triggering international outrage. down nine and damaging several oth- secure additional airplanes were now The next day, when more returned, ers. Three days later, they shot down a bearing fruit. Arriving aircraft were they ran into a swarm of Fokkers led by further nine, at the cost of one Fokker assembled in Sweden, and a total of Magnusson. The angry Finns swiftly shot and pilot lost to a pair of I-16s. 116 aircraft were readied by the end down 11 Soviet bombers, one falling Altogether, in the month of January of March. before Magnusson’s own guns. 1940, Finland’s Fokkers shot down 34 Britain sent 30 Gloster Gladiator That encounter established a pattern Soviet aircraft, primarily bombers. biplanes, the French supplied 30 Mo- for the subsequent air war.