Historical Security Council The Libyan Civil War Chair Introductions
Dear delegates,
Welcome to the Historical Security Council of CUIMUN HS 2021!
I am Zi Han, one of your HSC chairs. Currently, I am a second-year student reading Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at University College London.
CUIMUN HS will be my 17th conference to date, before I step into a Secretariat role at LIMUN HS (feel free to check us out at https://limun.org.uk/limun_hs). Outside of MUN, I am actively involved in youth advocacy, volunteering with a range of organisations such as Major Group for Children and Youth, UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network - Youth, YOUNGO, United Nations Association Youth Platform (UK), and Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (London).
We hope the Libyan Civil War will prove to be a challenging and rewarding experience, and give you much food for thought. Even as you navigate the fast-paced dynamics of the crisis, remember to take a step back and reflect on the broader implications of your actions.
With that, feel free to contact me via email ([email protected]) with any questions, and hope to e-meet everyone soon!
Yours Sincerely, Xuan Zi Han Dear delegates,
My name is Panagiota Dimitrakopoulou and I will have the utmost honor of serving as one of the chairs in this year’s CUIMUN-HS Historical Security Council. Starting September I will be a student of the 12th grade in the German School of Athens (Deutsche Schule Athen).
I have served in over 20 conferences in various positions. I started off as an anxiety ridden delegate and now I have reached the point of serving as a member in two Secretariats. This October I will also have the honorary position of the Secretary General in DSAMUN (https://www.dsamun.gr/24th-conference-2021). I have served as a chair in many international conferences such as THIMUN and of course in CUIMUN-HS last year.
Outside of MUN I enjoy further cultivating my interest in areas such as politics, history and philosophy while also trying to balance my studies. This entails being knowledgeable on current affairs and reading literature relating to these topics. I participate in the organization of several events at my school, while of course preparing an entire conference. My interests in history have allowed me to join an archaeological excavation in Greece next summer. Lastly, when I graduate, I hope to be studying Political Science in either Germany or the Netherlands.
I have never served in the Historical Security Council which makes this upcoming experience even more exciting. Having that I wish to make this experience enjoyable for you too. Should you have any questions do not hesitate to contact me via this email address: [email protected].
Kind Regards, Panagiota Dimitrakopoulou Dear delegates,
Greetings, I’m Justin and I’ll be one of your chairs for CUIMUN HSC! As a junior at Diocesan Boys’ School, I’ve been involved in ~20 conferences now, ranging from Deputy Secretary-General at ISMUNHK, Hong Kong’s largest student-run conference with ties with UNESCO HK, to helping my school launch our very own conference as Director of Council Affairs.
Outside of MUN, I’m also quite intrigued by business development, as a VP of Business Development for the Luminate Network, an entrepreneurial platform for students to network and a Gen Z consultancy platform for businesses such as K11, a large mall in the city. Moreover, I was recently a trainer for Flashpoint Debating, the city’s premier debating programme for novice debaters.
Seeing that HSC’s one of my personal favourite councils, we really hope the issue at hand would allow you to gain insights on the region and to push you to consider possible solutions. As always, please feel free to contact me through email ([email protected]) if you have any questions!
Best regards, Justin Cheng Rules of Procedure
The Historical Security Council will feature both traditional UN Security Council debate and a crisis element.
1. The aim of the traditional UNSC session is to address an issue in the realm of international peace and security. This will be done through conventional MUN mechanisms, including the use of working papers and draft resolutions. The Permanent 5 members (People’s Republic of China, Republic of France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States) will have veto rights in the voting process for draft resolutions, and hence they can only be passed if none of the P5 members casts a vote in objection.
2. The aim of the crisis committee is to respond to a dynamic issue of concern, where delegates will retain their specific country profiles and respond to updates and developments throughout the crisis session (which will be provided by the chairs). This will be done through country and/or joint directives. Notably, crisis operates in faux real time and time will progress depending on committee progress. As such, delegates will have to bear in mind the time-sensitive nature of the committee and act promptly. Veto rights cannot be used during the session. The Libyan Civil War Introduction to Topic After a decade since it first started, the Libyan Civil War continues to rage on, with seemingly no end in sight. As rival governments strive to secure control over oil resources and restore national sovereignty, the country has been torn apart by political fragmentation and humanitarian crises, risking an imminent collapse into total chaos. Furthermore, in what has become one of the Middle East’s most intractable proxy wars1, the conflict has seen a dramatic escalation of foreign involvement, with flagrant violations of ceasefires and arms embargoes fuelling an increasingly devastating war of attrition. To further complicate the issue, sporadic activity by terrorist groups, including but not limited to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), continues to undermine regional stability.
Through the HSC, set in March 2020, delegates will be challenged to revisit this complex crisis, uphold their key national interests, while establishing a feasible and sustainable solution for peace and security in the region.
Background and History of Topic
2011: Start of First In March, before an allegedly impending crackdown by Libyan dictator Libyan Civil War Muammar al-Qaddafi on the pro-democracy protesters of the then burgeoning Arab Spring, the UNSC passed Resolution 1973, a NATO-led military operation to impose a no-fly zone and bomb Qaddafi’s forces, before rebel forces killed him in October.
However, as Alan Kuperman, an assistant professor of international relations, highlighted, the so-called humanitarian intervention might have increased the violent death toll more than tenfold, as Libya has not
1 Kirkpatrick, D. D., & Walsh, D. (2020, January 18). As Libya Descends Into Chaos, Foreign Powers Look for a Way Out. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/world/middleeast/libya-war-hifter-russia.html only failed to evolve into a democracy but devolved into a failed state2. The resulting push for regime change seemed to have contributed to further political fragmentation, with inadequate institutional processes to restore peace between warring factions.
March 2011 The United Security Council officially authorised a no-fly zone over Libya due to the situation deteriorating. Libyan forces began capturing territory but were pushed back by GNA militia.
September 2012 A United States Ambassador as well as three more Americans were killed during the storming of the American consulate in Benghazi by Ansar al-Sharia and further militia.
May 2014 The Libyan National Army launched a military offensive which includes airstrikes targeted towards Benghazi. The LNA attempted to seize the parliament whilst accusing Ahmed Maiteg, the Prime Minister of cooperation with Islamist groups.
June 2014: Libyan The disputed election, which propelled to the National Assembly a Parliamentary coalition of liberals and federalists, was ruled as unconstitutional by Election Libya’s Supreme Court, which has stronger ties to the previous Islamist-led parliament3. The Second (and ongoing) Libyan Civil War was hence ignited by the brutal struggle for power and national sovereignty (and in turn, oil revenue) between the Tobruk-based House of Representatives with renegade military commander Khalifa Haftar in charge of the Libyan National Army (LNA) and the UN-backed Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). As a result, Libya had struggled to emerge from chaos, with the power vacuum and
2 Kuperman, A. J. (2019, August 14). Obama's Libya Debacle. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2019-02-18/obamas-libya-debacle 3 Libya faces chaos as top court rejects elected assembly. (2014, November 6). Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-parliament/libya-faces-chaos-as-top-court-rejec ts-elected-assembly-idUSKBN0IQ0YF20141106 maelstrom making it a target for ambitious foreign powers tempted by its vast oil reserves and long Mediterranean coastline.
July 2015 Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, and several former military officials are sentenced to death by a Tripoli court for any crimes committed during the uprising of 2011 against his father. However, he was later freed by an unknown armed group.
January 2016 A Tunisia-based interim government was announced by the United Nations but its authority was not recognised by neither the Tobruk nor Tripoli parliament.
July 2017: End of The remaianing Islamist forces in the area of Benghazi are defeated by the Battle of the Libyan National Army, thus putting an end to the battle of Benghazi, Benghazi which had lasted for almost three years.
July 2018 Khalifa Haftar strongly stands by his claims that his military forces had, at that time, full control over Derma.
Early 2019: LNA’s After a brief interlude of ISIL uprisings, the LNA continued to capture continued advance major Libyan cities such as Benghazi and Derna, in an alleged endeavour to eliminate militias from Libya4. In April 2019, pro-Haftar forces moved to attack Tripoli’s Mitiga airport, as part of the current Tripoli offensive, an attack which Ghassan Salame, the former UN envoy to Libya, has characterised as “a serious violation of international humanitarian law”, which “prohibits attacks against civilian infrastructure”5.
4 Libya's conflict. (2019, July). Retrieved from https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2019/libya-conflict 5 Timeline: Haftar's months-long offensive to seize Tripoli. (2020, January 19). Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/timeline-haftar-months-long-offensive-seize-tripoli-20 0119061244724.html July 2019: In what has been described as one of the most shocking episodes of Escalation of recent fighting in Libya6, a detention centre in the town of Tajoura, near fighting Tripoli, was repeatedly bombed, leading to the death of at least 53 migrants and refugees7 and heralding a new upsurge in fighting8.
However, the resulting UN report was roundly criticised for failing to identify the perpetrator, owing to an inability to stand up to powerful interests of foreign powers at stake, despite technical and circumstantial evidence attributing the attack to the United Arab Emirates and its French-built Mirage warplanes9.
Late 2019: In a turn of events all too familiar, foreign interference in what has Involvement of become a global civil war10 has once again escalated: in November, foreign powers while Turkey signed agreements with GNA on security and military cooperation11, the anti-Islamist Arab states (consisting of UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia), combined with Russian mercenaries and clandestine military aid from France, have provided the LNA with significant ammunition and backup to sustain the devastating military
6 The airstrikes on the Daman building complex, including the Tajoura Detention Centre, 2 July 2019. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unsmil-ohchr_report_airstrikes_at_tajoura-27012 020.pdf 7 Libya: UN report urges accountability for deadly attack against migrant centre | UN News. (2020, January 27). Retrieved from https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1056052 8 Varvelli, A., & Lovotti, C. (2019, July 5). Starting From Resources: A Model for Conflict Resolution in Libya. Retrieved from https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/starting-resources-model-conflict-resolution-libya-23451 9 Walsh, D. (2020, February 2). In Libya, Toothless U.N. Embargo Lets Foreign States Meddle With Impunity. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/02/world/middleeast/libya-un-arms-embargo.html 10 Megerisi, T. (2019, June 26). Libya’s global civil war. Retrieved from https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/libyas_global_civil_war1# 11 Libya, Turkey sign deals on security and maritime jurisdictions. (2019, November 28). Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/libya-turkey-sign-deals-security-maritime-jurisdictions -191128070513292.html campaign12. In December, a UN report published highlighted the complicity of both sides in violating a Libyan arms embargo, identifying Jordan, Turkey, and the UAE as the main culprits13.
January 2020: Oil In mid-January, Haftar-backed forces further intensified the conflict by blockade imposing a blockade of oil exports, potentially resulting in the shutdown of Libyan oil production within five days14 and drive the country to the brink of financial crisis15. Given the almost total dependence of Libya’s economy on oil and gas exports, such a development risked undermining the already fragile process of Libya’s democratic transition and economic recovery16.
Late January 2020: On 19 January, the Berlin Conference on Libya was held to stabilise the Berlin Conference rapidly deteriorating situation, and concluded with the establishment of on Libya the “Berlin Process”17, which combined a ceasefire and arms embargo with the initial steps towards the return to the political process that had
12 Wehrey, F. (2020, February 2). Libya's bloodshed will continue unless foreign powers stop backing Khalifa Haftar | Frederic Wehrey. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/02/libya-foreign-powers-khalifa-haftar-e mirates-russia-us 13 Wintour, P. (2019, December 9). Libya arms embargo being systematically violated by UN states. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/09/un-says-member-states-violating-libya-arms-e mbargo 14 Wintour, P. (2020, January 18). Libya: blockade of oil ports threatens Berlin ceasefire plan. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/18/erdogan-tells-europe-to-support-tripoli-govern ment-or-face-new-threats 15 UPDATE 1-Libya faces financial crisis due to oil blockade - PM. (2020, February 15). Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/libya-oil/update-1-libya-faces-financial-crisis-due-to-oil-blockad e-pm-idUSL8N2AF0KM 16 Issawi, A. A. (2019, June 6). Libya's fragile economic gains thwarted by the unnecessary war ǀ View. Retrieved from https://www.euronews.com/2019/06/06/libya-s-fragile-economic-gains-thwarted-by-the-unneces sary-war-view 17 The Berlin Conference on Libya. (2020, January 19). Retrieved from https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/the-berlin-conference-on-libya-1713882 long eluded the fraught political scene in Libya. However, barely a week later, the fragile ceasefire had collapsed and foreign shipments to combatants had resumed, according to the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), with both sides claiming retaliation against the rivals’ attacks, especially around the outskirts of Tripoli18. Meanwhile, the humanitarian fallout from the bloodbath seemed set to heighten, with an estimated 2000 dead and 146,000 displaced, and the end of the crisis looking nowhere in sight.
February 2020: Under UNSMIL’s ambit, the 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission, Geneva Talks comprising five senior officials each from GNA and LNA, was established. As such, Libya’s warring sides continued talks to broker a possible ceasefire and even outline proposals for UN-backed elections in the future, after GNA initially pulled out negotiations after rockets hit Tripoli19. However, the difficulty of navigating the fragile basis upon which cooperation is based had been highlighted by the resignation of Ghassan Salame in March 2020 due to stress and inability for peacemaking to achieve a breakthrough in the conflict20.
March 2020 - Despite pleas by UN Secretary General Antoino Guterres for a complete ongoing: Further ceasefire around the world as governments struggle with the coronavirus Escalation in pandemic, both the GNA and LNA continued to launch attacks and
18 Kirkpatrick, D. D. (2020, January 27). Cease-Fire in Libya Collapses Despite International Efforts. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/27/world/africa/libya-cease-fire-collapses.html 19 Libya's warring rivals resume talks in Geneva: UN. (2020, February 20). Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/libya-warring-rivals-resume-talks-geneva-2002201847 36677.html 20 Nichols, M. (2020, March 12). U.N. chief considers naming Algerian diplomat as new Libya envoy: diplomats. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-un/u-n-chief-considers-naming-algerian-diplo mat-as-new-libya-envoy-diplomats-idUSKBN20Y2MR Fighting counter-attacks21, even as the war-torn country on the verge of collapse confirmed its first case of COVID-19 in late March. In response, the World Health Organisation asserted that “viruses don’t care about political regime changes”, exhorting an end to the ongoing conflict, in a country with no “specific organisation or institution responsible for public health emergencies”22.
Figure 1: Areas of influence in Libya23
21 McDowall, A., al-Warfalli, A., & Amara, H. (2020, March 26). UPDATE 2-Libya battles escalate as coronavirus arrives in country. Retrieved from https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL8N2BI5XR 22 Gillon, J. (2020, March 27). Coronavirus in war-torn Libya fuels worst-case scenario fears. Retrieved from https://www.theafricareport.com/25287/coronavirus-in-war-torn-libya-fuels-worst-case-scenario- fears/ 23 Khalifa Haftar, the Libyan warlord, is not interested in compromise. (2020, January 23). Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/01/23/khalifa-haftar-the-libyan-warlord -is-not-interested-in-compromise Scope of Debate Maintaining immediate peace in the region The most immediate concern of the international community pertains to establishing and enforcing a ceasefire between belligerent parties as well as a complete arms embargo.
On 17 January 2020, Moscow’s attempts to usher Libya’s two rival leaders towards a ceasefire agreement, which would have made them “determine a line of battle contact”, came to an abrupt halt when Haftar refused to sign it. Though the sudden move sparked various speculations, it has been argued that it may have been due to his unwillingness to withdraw his forces from Tripon when he felt the balance of power was in his favour, combined with the fact that agreeing to a ceasefire would have compelled him to recognise the Sarraj government as a legitimate negotiating partner, which for clear reasons his forces could not accept; furthermore, the alleged vagueness of the proposal, with no explicit mention of the future of the political process and elections, may have resulted in his rejection24.
The difficulty of achieving such a military de-escalation is compounded by the expanding influence of and support provided by foreign states and most directly the regional players of UAE, Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. For example, both Turkey and Egypt have significant strategic interests and incentives to push for a victory for their respective allies. The former hopes to quickly capitalise on gas fields transferred from Libya’s maritime zone to Turkey’s jurisdiction, after the November agreement modified the existing sea borders between the two countries25. The latter, on the other hand, shares a direct border with Libya, and hence is particularly concerned by what it considers to be religious extremists (such as the Muslim Brotherhood), with the Egyptian authorities recently considering the execution of 37 Islamic State jihadists, among which includes captured militant leader Hisham el-Ashmawi, who has led
24 What Prospects for a Ceasefire in Libya? (2020, January 21). Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/what-prospects-ceasefire- libya 25 Knipp, K. (2020, January 18). Why Turkey's Libya commitment angers Arab nations: DW: 18.01.2020. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/why-turkeys-libya-commitment-angers-arab-nations/a-52052924 assaults on security forces near Egypt’s desert border with Libya26.
With the conflict showing no sign of subsiding, delegates should consider how best to arrive at a (temporary) peace in the region, bearing in mind the above challenges in the formulation of any truce.
Resolving the humanitarian crisis Currently, civilians continue to be severely endangered by crossfire on the battlefield. Specifically, Amnesty International has documented indiscriminate strikes on residential areas, medical facilities, and Mitiga Airport from both the GNA and LNA, accusing both sides of targeting civilian areas and exhibiting an “utter disregard for the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law”27. In fact, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued arrest warrants for “three ICC fugitives” accused of “grave international crimes” in a country entangled in a “cycle of violence, atrocities, and impunity”28. They include Saif al-Islam Qaddafi (the second son of former Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi), Tohami Khaled (former head of the Internal Security Agency of Libya), and Mahmoud al-Werfalli (a commander in the LNA).
Given the sustained period of fighting between both sides, the conflict may soon reach a stage where the international community may have to consider “all necessary measures” to protect civilians from armed conflict. However, this raises unsettling parallels with humanitarian intervention in 2014, when Western support for the Libyan rebels may have constituted a violation of jus in bello, namely the obligation to ensure respect for humanitarian law, given that the initial purpose of the operation to protect civilians seems to have expanded to encompass the
26 Magdy , S. (2020, February 1). Egypt weighs death sentences for 37 Islamic State jihadists. Retrieved from https://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt-weighs-death-sentences-for-37-islamic-state-jihadists/ 27 LIBYA’S RELENTLESS MILITIA WAR. (2019). Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1912012019ENGLISH.PDF 28 'Violence, atrocities and impunity' reign throughout Libya, ICC prosecutor tells UN Security Council | UN News. (2019, November 6). Retrieved from https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/11/1050771 destruction of military infrastructure of the Libyan regime and regime change itself29. Therefore, the political and legal legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, vis-a-vis the need to respect national sovereignty, remains clouded by ambiguity.
To further exacerbate the crisis, Libya serves the indispensable but increasingly dangerous function as the gatekeeper for millions of refugees - from countries as far apart as Senegal and Yemen - aiming to reach European shores. Even before many can reach the Mediterranean Sea separating Northern Africa from coveted destinations such as Italy and Greece, however, migrants are already caught in the power struggle in Libya, and some risk being sent to detention quarters by Libyan authorities30. Meanwhile, with simmering xenophobic sentiments in Europe, coastal states such as Italy have engaged in covert discussions with African representatives in a bid to curb migration31 through Libya, where about 800,000 migrants are living32, many in deplorable conditions.
In light of the humanitarian catastrophe, delegates should explore effective and humane responses to ease the heightening level of human suffering in the war-torn country.
Achieving political settlement and reconciliation Ultimately, any long-term resolution of the issue must involve a concerted effort to address the current lack of a stable political authority in the Libyan state, with Haftar’s forces gaining most of the territory in Libya while Sarraj’s government continues to retain a coalition of international and UN backing. While a temporary military solution can prevent valuable lives from being lost,
29 Corten, O., & Koutroulis, V. (2013). The Illegality of Military Support to Rebels in the Libyan War: Aspects of jus contra bellum and jus in bello. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 18(1), 59–93. Retrieved from https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/article/18/1/59/812500 30 Sakuma, A. (n.d.). Damned for Trying. Retrieved from http://www.msnbc.com/specials/migrant-crisis/libya 31 D’Agostino, L. (2020, January 29). Italy's Failed Migration Fix Has Led to Chaos in Libya. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/29/italy-failed-migration-fix-capitano-ultimo-gentiloni-moghe rini-chaos-libya/ 32 Jawad, R. (2019, July 31). Migrant crisis: Self-immolation exposes UN failures in Libya. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49154959 effective governance is necessary to solve the issues of property, power, and patronage33, which have divided Libyans since the collapse of Qaddafi’s allegedly corrupt and self-serving regime.
However, attempts to achieve a political compromise are complicated by the international dispute over the legitimacy of both Haftar and Sarraj’s leadership. Since the Rome Communiqué in December 2015 was endorsed by the UNSC through the UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement and unanimous adoption of Resolution 2259, the UN has officially supported the GNA as the sole legitimate government of Libya and called on member states to “cease support and official contact with parallel institutions claiming to be the legitimate authority”34.
Sarraj’s rival government, however, has attracted the support of key powers in the conflict, due to his secure control of the oil-rich east and parts of the south, combined with his aggression against Islamist groups in Libya35. Most notably, P5 states such as France and Russia have been accused of deviating from and hence undercutting the established international consensus. In April 2019, France blocked a EU statement calling on Haftar’s forces to halt their eastern forces’ offensive in Libya36, in part attributed to French interests in the region, including oil and the containment of terrorist insurgencies. In the same month, Russia blocked a UNSC statement condemning the same offensive, with its transactional attitude towards the leadership struggle manifesting in its desire to work with Haftar and the Libyan National Oil Company to profit
33 Lawrence, W. (2012, September 24). Libya's volunteer peacekeepers. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/libya-s-volunteer-peacek eepers 34 Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2259 (2015), Security Council Welcomes Signing of Libyan Political Agreement on New Government for Strife-Torn Country | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. (2015, December 23). Retrieved from https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12185.doc.htm 35 Kennedy, R. (2019, July 4). Why won't the world condemn Libya's Khalifa Haftar? Retrieved from https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/04/why-is-the-world-reluctant-to-condemn-khalifa-haftar-li bya-s-military-commander 36 Baczynska, G. (2019, April 10). France blocks EU call to stop Haftar's offensive in Libya. Retrieved from https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-libya-security-eu/france-blocks-eu-call-to-stop-haftars-offensive -in-libya-idUKKCN1RM2WN Russian companies37.
Given the difficulties in current negotiations, delegates should consider how best to pave the way for a sustainable political future in Libya.
Bloc Positions Government of National Accord As previously explained, the GNA was established and endorsed by the United Nations to unify rival administrations after the 2014 parliamentary elections. The GNA is based in Libya’s capital city of Tripoli (and the western region more broadly) and is led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj. Internationally, the GNA “receives significant military aid from Turkey, Italy, and Qatar”38, in addition to official support from the United States (albeit in a more limited capacity). Most prominently, Turkey’s concern over drilling rights and its maritime interests have played a crucial role in its alliance with the GNA.
Libyan National Army The LNA has consistently been under Haftar’s control and is based in the eastern city of Tobruk. Internationally, the LNA is strongly supported by the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, France, and Russia. It is important to note, however, the different intentions of the countries involved. For example, it has been contended that Russia has sought to position itself as the regional power broker through the provision of mercenaries in support of Haftar, while Egypt's opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood and its national security concerns as a neighbouring state aligned it more closely with Haftar.
Proposed Solutions Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding
37 Barmin, Y. (2019, July 11). Russia's endgame in Libya. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/russia-strategy-libya-190710070457901.html 38 Allahoum, R., 2020. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whos-who-libyas-war. Who’s Who in Libya’s War? Available at: https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whos-who-libyas-war. Thus far, the UNSC has failed to enforce the cessation of hostilities and seems increasingly helpless against the resumption of fighting. However, seeing the impartiality and legitimacy of UN Peacekeeping Forces (other countries/ blocs sending peacekeeping forces may be seen as unilateral), UN Peacekeeping Forces should still be a major stakeholder to keep in mind for delegates. Some possible nuances of peacekeeping could include: - What are the main aims of peacekeeping? Would it be to protect civilians, refugees or both, or would there be other goals in mind? - Would the peacekeeping forces be authorized to use violence if necessary, to achieve strategic aims? - How big would the peacekeeping force be and where would the forces originate from, seeing that the majority of forces are currently from developing countries, some of which have ulterior motives against Egypt? - How long would the mission last? What should be taken into account before the UN withdraws from the situation?
Individual countries, such as Italy and France, have expressed their willingness to deploy soldiers in peacekeeping missions, in order to implement the decisions made in the Berlin Conference and halt the foreign military pressure39. However, seeing that both nations have come under fire for their past historical interventions - for instance, France’s intervention in Rwanda, allegedly supplying weapons and resources for the genocidal government, was widely condemned by many on the ground as well as the international community. Thus, before accepting delegates’ potential proposals to receive humanitarian aid or peacekeeping forces, the Council must consider whether or not such delegates may have other motives.
Political Settlement Attempts to reach an agreement on the future of the political landscape in Libya under UNSMIL formed the foundation of UNSC Resolution 2510 (2020), which urged the Joint Military Commission to agree to “a permanent ceasefire including the terms of reference for a ceasefire
39 Assad, A. (2020, January 20). Italian ministers say Rome is ready to send peacekeeping forces to. Retrieved from https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/italian-ministers-say-rome-ready-send-peacekeeping-forces-li bya monitoring and verification mechanism, the separation of forces, confidence building measures and the establishment of associated working groups supported by the UN” and demanded “full compliance [...] with the arms embargo imposed under Resolution 1970 (2011)”40.
Notwithstanding the importance of a political solution in enforcing such measures, recently renewed clashes have contributed to the impression that such international meetings are “yet more failed diplomacy in Libya”41, given that the very UN(SC) member states disingenuously calling for a truce are covertly or even openly complicit in fuelling the conflict and preventing a Libyan-led solution in the first place. In fact, it has been contended that none of the parties involved is serious about reaching a political settlement42; the fact that both sides continuously talk peace but have been preparing extensively for war seems likely to engender further bloodshed43.
In order to resolve the dilemma, a coherent plan for the gradual de-escalation of foreign involvement, coupled with a sustainable political solution for the warring Libyan factions, must be established.
Questions A Resolution Must Answer 1. How can actions agreed upon internationally to stem the ongoing military conflict, such as arms embargoes and ceasefires, be effectively enforced? 2. How can regional peace and security be achieved? 3. How can the humanitarian crisis in Libya be mitigated and resolved? 4. How can a sustainable political settlement be brokered amidst the power struggle between rival governments?
40 Resolution 2510 (2020). (2020, February 12). Retrieved from https://undocs.org/S/RES/2510 (2020) 41 Lapo, A. (2020, February 13). Yet more failed diplomacy in Libya? Retrieved from https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/02/failed-diplomacy-in-libya 42 Harchaoui, J. (2020, March 18). The Libyan Civil War Is About to Get Worse. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/18/libyan-civil-war-about-get-worse/ 43 El-Gamaty, G. (2020, February 11). A political solution in Libya seems impossible, so what now? Retrieved from https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2020/2/12/a-political-solution-in-libya-seems-imp ossible-what-now 5. How can conditions for future political stability and long-term peacebuilding be facilitated?
Conclusion In 2011, shortly after Qaddafi’s death, a Libyan field commander expressed his fears about regional in-fighting, grimly describing Libya as the “cake” of which “everybody wants to take a piece44”. Despite a litany of warnings since then, the international community has done tragically and inexcusably little to prevent and resolve the ongoing political, socio-economic, and humanitarian crisis. The silence of major countries in face of human tragedy and suffering, coupled with an unrelenting desire to achieve their geopolitical ambitions in the region, are testament to their unwillingness to take responsibility for the disaster, a complicity that will be etched in the collective consciousness of the Libyan people. The imperative for the HSC to aspire to be a global force for positive and constructive change, and hence to act now, cannot be any stronger.
44 Gamal, R. E., & Gaynor, T. (2012, December 1). Libya: 'the cake is now and everybody wants a piece'. Retrieved from https://www.independent.ie/world-news/africa/libya-the-cake-is-now-and-everybody-wants-a-pie ce-26784833.html