The Contradictions of the Melilla and Ceuta Border Fences
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The contradictions of the Melilla and Ceuta border fences Polly Pallister-Wilkins Department of Politics and International Studies School of Oriental and African Studies [email protected] ABSTRACT This paper argues that the border fences of Melilla and Ceuta act not only to separate the populations of Europe, Africa and elsewhere, thus consolidating the borderland between the two continents but are contradictory spaces materially representing the contradictions of liberal universalism found in the discourses of neoliberal globalization1 and the inclusive narratives of the European Union and the exclusive practices of separation that often result. These contradictions of separation thus highlight contradictions between opening and closing; rich and poor; universalization combined with exclusion and stratification; the world of shrinking space and increasing flows and the world of increasingly sophisticated border fortification; the world of the free flow of goods under global capitalism and the sovereignty of the nation state and the security of the subject (Andreas 2003; Brown 2010 and Castells 2000). In addition these fences act as spaces of political mobilisation bringing divergent communities of people together. They separate and yet they are also productive spaces that facilitate political action challenging the separation function of border fences. However, as spaces of resistance and the focus of borderwork (Rumford, 2008) the fences also serve to re-produce and re-enforce the border in the imaginary. Introduction The European borderland itself is not simply geographically fixed but is spatially multifarious and can be located throughout Europe, for example, wherever a detention centre or immigration office is situated. However, for the purpose of my argument I will focus on the territorially fixed and clearly demarcated borders around the Spanish exclaves 1 I refer to the current period of globalization as neoliberal globalzation throughout this paper in recognition of the fact that this period of global interaction is not in and of itself new and that human societies have always interacted over time and space. This challenges the dominant discourse of globalization that argues for a compression of time and space as being unique to the post-Cold War era facilitated by technological and socio- political changes. I argue that technological advances and socio-political changes have always facilitated such ‘shrinking’ processes. 1 of Melilla and Ceuta. The borders around Melilla and Ceuta, while being (the only) land borders between the EU and the African continent, are also visibly delineated by the border fences that surround both towns. These fences are part of the ongoing territorialization and re-territorialization of not only Spanish sovereignty but also of the European Union itself, with the EU having contributed millions of Euros to the building of the fences. The Schengen Agreement may have removed many of the border functions from within the Schengen Area; however, it has not erased borders. Instead many border functions have shifted to the edges of Europe with the effect of re-enforcing the EU as a separate region, spatially, politically, economically, socially and culturally. The borderland that is created by the fences around Melilla and Ceuta is a space of contradiction on three fronts: firstly the fences are aimed at protecting a society that is thought of as open, liberal and democratic, a society at the vanguard of neoliberal globalization and post-Westphalian ways of living. However, these fences represent the opposite and create cities that are closed, illiberal and highly militarized. Secondly, the fences, located at Europe’s periphery, fail in their defensive role aimed at separating Africa from the European heartland. In drawing attention to the separation of Europe from its southern neighbours these fences become the focus of debate and resistance around the migration-management practices of the EU and the consolidation of Europe’s outer-borders, in turn, becoming sights of interaction between migrants and activists. Thirdly, as the focus of attention and as sites of resistance against the normative and material consequences of European separation and migration-management policies, the border between the EU and Africa with its identity of separation is reproduced and reinforced. Firstly, I will start by discussing the emerging conceptual literature that addresses the phenomena of fence building in a supposedly globalized age and the geopolitical context of Melilla and Ceuta in a Mediterranean dominated by European interests. Secondly, I will outline the securitization process that has led to the building of the border fences in question. Thirdly, the fences themselves are discussed while fourthly I will outline the opposition to the fences before finishing finally with a discussion of the contradictory nature of these fences and spaces and their role in the consolidation of an Africa/EU borderland. 2 Conceptualising and contextualising fences Fences and walls are increasingly being built between states, a physical reality that stands in stark contrast to the dominant discourse of globalization that argues boundaries are disappearing (Shapiro and Alker, 1996) to create a borderless world (Allen & Hamnett, 1995). The international is increasingly presented as a shrinking space of increasing flows (Castells 2000) where state boundaries are thought to be losing their barrier functions which in turn is understood as a general crisis of the Westphalian system of states (Kolossov 2005, 614). Globalization and apparently unprecedented human movement across boundaries are having profound implications for traditional concepts of international relations. Wendy Brown (2010) has recently argued that the promulgation of walls and fences in differing parts of the world is a result of the supposed crisis of Westphalian sovereignty. Neoliberal globalization has the effect of appearing to reduce state sovereignty and the resulting walls and fences are an easy way of ensuring the continuation of sovereignty even if such sovereignty is according to Brown somewhat illusionary. “Most walls continue to draw on the idea of nation-state sovereignty for their legitimacy and serve performatively to shore up nation-state sovereignty even as these barriers do not always conform to borders between nation-states and are themselves sometimes monuments to the fading strength or importance of nation- state sovereignty” (32). In addition Brown argues that most walls and fences are constructed by nation-states and draw on the easy legitimacy provided by sovereign border control functions while aiming to act as barriers against ‘postnational, transnational or subnational forces that do not align neatly with states’ or their territorial boundaries. However, others may appear as national boundary markers, but are actually driven by what she terms ‘postnational investments in barriers to global immigration’ (Ibid). According to Brown the fences of Melilla and Ceuta fall into this latter category (Ibid). However, I suggest that the Melilla and Ceuta fences can be understood as all three categories: as a sovereign investment by the Spanish state, as barriers against ‘postnational, transnational or subnational’ forces and as a ‘postnational investment’ to prevent migration, with the postnational in this case referring to the EU. 3 Therefore, what are the ‘drivers’ behind the Melilla and Ceuta fences are they sovereign or post-sovereign articulations? Perhaps we need to first ask: what does sovereignty mean in this context and how are its boundary functions practiced within the context of the EU? An EU which seeks to erase internal sovereign boundaries between member states while consolidating and strengthening external boundaries between Europe and its southern and eastern ‘others’. In the case of Melilla and Ceuta the border is both one between Spain as a member state of the EU and the EU itself (even if Melilla and Ceuta may fall outside of the Schengen acquis for reasons of migration-management). The EU’s border policies and migration-management practices create and enforce a European region that clearly delineates European citizens from non-European peoples through the Schengen acquis that transfers state-boundary logics to regional-boundaries (Bort, 2005). These in turn consolidate the EU as a region with a distinct geopolitical identity. The Mediterranean region is integral to this discourse of separation and exclusivity and as a historical-geopolitical region the Mediterranean has often been presented in these exclusive terms. In addition it has also been romantically understood as an espace mouvment (space of movement), as the cradle of civilisations with common historical roots favouring dialogue, interdependence and region building (Braudel, 1973). Both of these concepts make the Mediterranean region one of central importance to the EU’s normative identity and its strategic interests (Pace, 2006, 2007a & b, 2010). The Mediterranean in this context can be understood as part of the constructed borderland that separates Europe from Africa and is classified as an important sub-region as a result. The construction of the Mediterranean as a borderland can be understood as part of the shift away from focusing on the line of the borderline (van Houtum, 2005: 673). Such a shift away from focusing on the line is representative of the increasingly spatially differentiated and externalised practices of border-management that results in the