Sustainable Moral Skepticism: Anti-Realism And

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In partial fulfillment of therequirementsfor thedegreeof Master of Arts ANTI-REALISM ANDLIBERALNEUTRALITY SUSTAINABLE MORALSKEPTICISM: Supervisor: ProfessorZoltanMiklosi Department of Political Science Central European University Budapest, Hungary GoranLjubicic Submitted to (2012) By

CEU eTD Collection equally important asanyother. with premises toaffirm theviewthat liberal politicalmorality because liberal portr the rational basisforthemetaphysical natureof non-compromising attitudes. Theprincipleofequal main motivation for thisendeavor is thebelie people asfreeandequal,inwh moral objectivism) is ameta-ethical viewwhic This essayseekstoestablishth

ich caseitdemands liberalmo at moralanti-realism (thekind ourinterestsarejustoneofmany, Abstract: f that thelanguage of moral objectivism harbors ii ayals of people asfreeand equalprovide us

morality, but wecaninvoke itintherealm of h canbecongruentwiththeliberalviewof consideration ofintere ral andpoliticalneutrality.The that abandonsthelanguageof sts seems notto be and thattheyare CEU eTD Collection CHAPTER 2:THEAPPEALOF CHAPTER 1:IN Table ofContents

Works C CONCLUDING REMARKS...... 48 CHAPTER 3:ANTI-REALISM 1.1 On Moral 1.2 The Historical Cont 3.2 Liberal Moral and 3.2 LiberalMoraland of EqualCo 3.1 ThePrinciple 2.4 IsMeta-Eth 2.3 PracticalReasona ...... 15 2.2 ArgumentsagainstMoralRealism 2.1 What’swrongWith td...... 51 ited TRODUCTIO ?...... 27 ics Bogus?...... 27 Skepticism...... 2 Skepticism...... 2 to ...... 23 nd MoralMotivation Political Neutrality Construc x ...... 5 ext N...... 1 N...... 1 nsideration of nsideration UTRALITY...... 33 AND LIBERALNEUTRALITY...... 33 MORALANT iim ...... 10 tivism? iii

...... 38 Interests...... 33 Interests...... 33 -ELS ...... 9 I-REALISM

CEU eTD Collection 1 lack ofrealseriousness,just more orlesssurreptitiousdenialoftheimporta “It is,Ithink,undeniablethatmoralanti-rea

Blackburn, Simon. Essays inquasi-realism as relativismisfeltto

. p.208. iv lism isoftenseenas

nce ofethics…Itisth undermine anyrealcommitment.”

a dangerousdoctrine, ought toconsortwith 1

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metaphysical problem. Theaim ofthisessayis substantive moralclaims). however, advocatesome kindof excessivepermissive kind of moral skepticism whichdeniesthetruthof any potentialconceptualmisunders acts arewrong,”forexample,might resonateofhorri accustomed todistinguishing betweennormative mo desired typeofbehavior,unlessotherwisestipul will henceforthuseittodesigna forms ofsocialorganization wehave approaches thatundermine thisobj rooted inobjective moral values. Thisessayis accounts ofutilitarianism andKantiandeontology, our settledmoralconvictions.Ev theexistenceofan by thethoughtofrelativizingoraltogethernegating rendering of morality has, perhaps, great practica moral judgments areareflectionofthereal CHAPTER In oureveryday thinking aboutmorality andethicalcommitments, weoftenassume that I willattempttopresent moral skepticism The term “moral”oftenhasva

INTRODUCTION en theprevailingWestern moralphilosophies,suchasdifferent te alldiscussion ofthemoral domain, withoutreferring toa ective referencetoourmoral r tandings inthefollowingchapters come toacceptandfinddesirable.

lue-laden connotationsinco ity oftheworld around 1

ated. Inournormal moral discoursewearenot l implications, sowecan beeasily discouraged toprovideasupporti moral claims (onsome definitions). Iwillnot, an attempt toshowthatcertain meta-ethical often rest onthe assumption thatmorality is rality and meta-ethics. Toproclaimthat“no ble disregardformorality.Iwilltrytoclear asalegitimate responsetoa difficult ness (infact, Iwilltrytorefrain from any easoning canbereconciledwith mmon useoftheterm, butI , andtrytoaffirmexactlya us. The common sense us.Thecommonsense ng argument forliberal objectivereferencefor CEU eTD Collection

2 guiding andisnormative incharacter, whiles disguised assecondordermoral discourse. that are endorsed bydifferent communities.Ibelieve this tobefirst ordermoral discourse normative ethicswhichsurfaces oncewediscoverth purposes ofthisessay.Iinsist 1.1 establish the connectionbetweenmoral an chapters areabouttheprincipleofequalconsidera hopefully, findthatthemain metaphysical thesisofanti-realism intact.Theclosing remains arising frommoral motivation, a some attemptsto refute it, andoffering my comments. Iwillalso briefl y discusssome problems terminology. Afterward, Iturntoth chapter afterthat,Idiscussmo chapter defineswhatIunderstand employing andtoprovideabriefoverviewofdifferentskepticalpositions.Thesubsequent challenges. Thefollowingsections oftheessay ar framework ofliberalneutrality, but moral claimsareamatter offact)isameta-ethic moral andpoliticalneutralitybyarguingthatmo Dworkin,Ronald."Objectivity and

l On There arevarious sourcesofmoral skepticism,

Mora

Skepticism

my skepticism doesnotconsist ral constructivism,a nd Iwilldescribeanopposingview to bemoral realism andoffers make ita necessary consequence, ifitsunderpinnings resist e discussionofwhy Truth: You'd BetterBelieveit." ti-realism andliberalmoral neutrality. 2 First order moral discourse isessentially action 2 al stance whichcannotonl

econd ordermoral discourseismeta-ethical tion ofinterests,andho ral anti-realism (theviewwhich deniesthat e intended toclarify theconcepts I willbe nd argueweshouldab e variety ofmoral principles and practices notallofwhichareconcernforthe moral realism isincorrectbylayingout in post-modernrelativism about some potential exceptions.The tomoralanti-realism, but w itmight beusefulto andon itsimpractical y assimiliate intothe CEU eTD Collection

to skepticism of thissort. through whichwecome toknowit.Torefermo and tellsushowweought treat thelackofconcreteknowledge answered in anumber ofways.Wemight epistemological skepticasks“Howdoweknow moral claims aretrue?”,andtheycanbe to doaboutit."p.62 4 3 circumstances, orsomething else.This iswhat have todowithourpsychology,oritmight beth things. What rendersourbeliefstruemight beth intuitions aretobetrusted.Our moral knowledgetosome extent,butweusually true thatsome thingsarewrong,andsome are between epistemological moral skeptic we might wonderwhatmakes those common moral beliefs.Manypeople further qualification,refersto can bemade. Throughoutthisessay,anymention construed aseitherafirstorder Sometimes distinction might this become unclear. discourse aboutthenatureofmoralityandneed notbesuggestiveofanykindconduct.

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter."Moral Skepticism." Greene, JoshuaD.."The Terrible,Horrible,No Moral skepticism thatIespouseisanattempt tomake senseof themeaning ofour

4 However, itshould be clear thatmo to live,we neednotbeconcerne firstordermoral discourse.

or asecondordermoral claim,but inthisregardasunimportant. beliefs true.AtthispointIw believe that atleastsome moral claims aretrue. However, ism andmetaphysical accept alessdemandingcriterionforknowledge,or do notdetermine therightnessandwrongness of 3 Good,VeryBadTruthabout Moralityandwhat the metaphysical moral skepticisinterested in,

e stateofaffairsinthephysicalworld,itmight right. Moralintuitionmight beoursourceof To proclaimthat“noactsarewrong”might be of moral claims andmoraljudgments, without ral intuitionisaperfectlysatisfactoryanswer tend to give further explanations why our tendtogivefurtherexplanationswhyour e beliefsanddesiresofpersonsinidealized d aboutthemedium andtheprocess ral intuition isnotwhatmakes it ould liketomake I maintainthatthisdistinction If morality isutterlypractical moral skepticism. adistinction 3 The CEU eTD Collection

he decides whattodo. Heconsiders the circ does notendeavorto“dotheright judgment." 7 6 morality assuch. first ordermoralclaim abouthowtobehave, like topointoutthatthereis 5 analysts knowfullwellthatifGoddoesn't exis dictum thatifGodisdeadth different thantheworldwealrea our moral intuitions. evidence thatourmoral concernforothersdevelops treating others as means tofurtherourownends. moral. Alasdair MacIntyre findsthat ifwediscar However, hisvaluesreflectthecareforother a necessary consequenceofmoral skepticism. people’s interests.Nihilism ofth is believedthatitadvocatessome sortofbroadpermissiveness andlackofconcernforother is notaboutthequestionofwhytobemoral. to denytheexistenceofsuchmoral realityand (rightness orwrongness).Oneavenueofanswersav claims conveybeliefsaboutmoral facts(thatce and Iwillbeconcernedonlywith Haidt,Jonathan."Theemotional doganditsrationa MacIntyre, AlasdairC. Itcanbeconstruedthatthede There isanimportantdimension whichIam 7 The worldin whichwereject moral After virtue: astudyinmoral theory. (p.23-24). a fundamental betweenth difference an everythingispermitted. “Quite

nial ofobjectivemoralvaluesis, is sortnottooa dy livein.We might evenevokeLacan’s famous ofthe reversal thing”,nordoeshethinkaboutobjectivemoral valueswhen these typesof worries in thisessay. It canbe said that moral and thekindthatspeaks Moral skepticismisofte 5 claim thatnomoralfactsorpropertiesexist. Joshua Greenegivesan example ofaman who 4 umstances basedonhisva people’s interests,andhecanstillbedeemed

t, thennothingatallispermitted anylonger. d objectivevalueswear rtain actsarerightor ppealing tomany people,andtomymind, not 6 emotionally beforeweareabletorationalize Muchof my belief drawsonthe scientific presently notconcerned l tail: Asocial intuitionist approach tomoral ailable tothemetaphysic facts wouldnotnecessarilybemuch evidently, anaïve notion,forwe in fact,moralnihilism.Iwould e kindofnihilism thatmakes a about thenatureof n frowned uponbecauseit n frowned wrong)andproperties e necessarily left with lues beforeheacts. with. Myskepticism al moralskepticis CEU eTD Collection

10 9 Bobok." 8 properties, hencetheview that utilitarians assertedthatth properties andthatwecanhaveem assumed moralrealism andmoral naturalism reasonably assertclaimsabout statements. Without referringtosomething other Hume’s view,anewrelationoraffirmation whichisentirelydifferentfrom thedescriptive refers toprescriptive statements that arederi was DavidHume whofamously conceptua 1.2 individuals arepossibleevenifth insensitive tootherpeople’s inte is that reasons arenotmotivating ontheirow alone aremotivating.Iwillcomment brieflyon this the claims of moral theorists w depriving usofourinnerfreedomtoformulate our that the deathofsymbolic authority leadsto Neurotics provethattouseveryday.” Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter."Moral Skepticism." Zizek,Slavoj. "HowtoReadLacan -"GodisDe

Lenman, James. "MoralNaturalism."

storical The Among theearlyphilosopherswhopointedto

Context e objectivemoral propertiesarerelatedtoentirelynon-moral

ho basetheirviewsonreasonsfo rests. Presently,Ionlywanttopointoutthatinstancesofcaring natural properties suchaspleas ey donotbelieveinobjectivevalues orasortofmoral reality. morality. Classicalutilitarian pirical knowledge 8 StanfordEncyclopediaof Philosophy. SlavojZizek insists thatth lized theso-called Humean Principle new andmore severeproh ved from purelyobservationalfacts,buthold,in 5 n, andthatwearenotindangerofbecoming

(naturalism claims thereareobjectivemoral ad, butHeDoesn't KnowIt":Lacan Plays with issueatalaterpoint, butmy maincontention than thefactualstate owndesires.Ofcourse,thisdoesnotdefeat an inconsistencyinourmoralreasoning of moraltruths). moral theories,among others, ure andpain(andother,more r action,believing e correctreadingofLacanis ibitions psychologically, of affairs,onecannot 10 Furthermore, some

9 . The problem thatreasons CEU eTD Collection

processes. based onalearningprocessandhe value isanillusory productofourvaluingactivityaspurpos a rangeofcircumstances,buttheycannotbeva cannot make meaningful valuejudgments. Abstract objectives alreadyheld.Itisaview thatclaims end inviewisanobjectiveth 13 12 11 JohnDewey,apragmatist ethicist,was oftheop balancing our“endsinview”,aprocesswhichistheunderpinning discovered. as wellsocialcooperation.Thisview,however, on anaccount ofhuman nature,soatruemoralit limits onwhich moralities can betrue. Thelimits the sensethatheholds Wong isoneofthemore recent s either asingleindividual,or or fallacyofmoral judgments hasnoobjectivere no absolutemeaning, butarerelativetoeveryindi the meta-ethical view of moralrelativism. developed views)areindi

Dewey,John.Theoryofvaluation. Wong, DavidB.. Borghini, Andrea. "EvolutionandEthical Natural Moralities:aDefense ofPluralisticRelativism. that more thanonemorality may be cators formoraldemeanor. BaruchSpi a groupofpeopleunitedbytraditi

at isrejectedoradoptedba upporters ofmoral relativism. nce, consistent withthe adapti

11 Heclaimed thatconceptssuchasgoodandevilhave Relativism: Spinoza's SlowRevenge?." all valueisinstrumental. Thisdoesnotmean one 6 luable outofcontext.Deweybelievedintrinsic

y wouldhavetopromote individual flourishing vidual. Moralrelativism assumes thatthetruth are basedontheconditi ference. The referenceformoral reasoningis valuejudgments might pr maintains thatmoral truthsexistandcanbe inion thatweareconstantlyinvolvedin ive beings.Ourethi true,but that there areobjective sed onitsuniformity withother 12 on, convictionsorculture.David noza couldbesaidtohaveheld Hisview isslightly nuanced in ve characterofevolutionary of ethicalevaluation. ons ofhuman lifeand

ove tobeusefulin cal evaluationis

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17 16 15 14 imperative component thatisintendedtochange merely expressingcertainmoral sentiments.” no factualmeaning—that is,expressesnoproposition th […] IfnowIgeneraliseandsay,"Stealing writes: “Thepresenceofanethicalsymbol in pseudo-concepts andthat theymerely expressan Stevenson arethemost well-knownproponentsofemo sentences tohaveacertainimperative meaning conceive ofmorality. Hedevelopedtheviewca R.M. Harepoints out tothefact thatwedonot commands but thatthey arereallyexpr non-cognitivists havearguedthatmoral judgments Ayer,A.J..Language,truth,andlogic . p.107. qtd.inMackie,J.L.. Hare,R.M.TheLanguageofMorals Ayer,A.J..Language,truth,andlogic . answer begivenexcept"Nonewhatever"? ask, "What isthedifference between thestates of affairsinthesetwoworlds?" Canany "subjective" concernwhic in them goonbeingconcernedaboutthesame things-thereisnodifferenceinthe rememberwhich thosevalueshavebeenannihilated.And thatinbothworldsthepeople Think ofoneworldintowhosefabricvalues One avenueofthinking abouttheplausibil 15 . Hareasserts: Ethics: inventingrightand wrong

essions ofapproval/disapproval h peoplehaveforthings,onlyin . 17 a propositionaddsnothing require metaphysical moral 7 Stevensonadds thatmoral statements havean emotional attitude towardacertainaction.Ayer money is wrong," Iproduceasentence thathas money iswrong,"

16 theemotions ofthelistener.Non-cognitivists lled universal prescriptivism thatholdsmoral

ity of moral realism isnon-cognitivism. The that issupposedtobeuniversal.Ayerand are objectively built;and may appear tobedesc tivism, theviewthatethicalconceptsare at canbeeither trueorfalse.[…]Iam . p.21 14 their"objective"value.Now I , orasortofprescriptive to itsfactualcontent. properties inorderto riptive andtruth-apt, think ofanotherin CEU eTD Collection

Philosophy. 18 wrong” isclearlynotexplainedby predication (suchas:lyingiswr another element ofmoralreason moral claims aremere expressions of attitudes or anemotional reaction, wenoticethatthere is able toexplainall of the their claims aboutthenatureofmoral statements. these philosophers stillmaintained viewsabout have setouttounderstandthemeaning ofourmo

van Roojen, Mark."Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-cognitivism has been challenged on different groundssinceitdoesnotseem be Non-cognitivism challengedondifferent to hasbeen

uses ofmoralpredicates.

ong) inacontext.Thestatement “Iwonderwhetherlyingis ing atplay whenweembedthesemoral claims ofsimple the earlynon-cognitivistaccounts. Non-Cognitivism." Stanford Encyclopediaof 8 normative moralitywhich wereunaffected by

ral practices,butnotto 18 Forexample,evenifweacceptthatsome modify them.However, CEU eTD Collection

or even allversions 22 21 20 what todoaboutit."p.6-7 19 able tostateit.Nevertheless,hisviewsdonot describe themselves asrealists.ForMarkTimmons as “quasi-truths”.Thereareotherthinkers way thatthenicenessofanicecreamanswerstopleasure itgivesus.” natural world,anddescribe stimulated bythenaturalpropert deny thattheyaremind-independ do. inquiry. Thisdistinctionmight notbeabletoad moral facts.Inthissense,the properties suchaswrongnessetc.” truths arethosewhichtrue of moral reality.We coulddefineanti-realism as“the viewaccording towhichall the moral would liketoexamine presentlymight beclassifi CHAPTER Blackburn,Simon. Blackburn,Simon. Timmons,Mark. Greene,JoshuaD.."TheTerrible,Horrible,NoGood,VeryBadTruthaboutMoralityand Moral skepticism, aswehaveseen, might ta Projectivist anti-realists,such

THE Morality withoutfoundations ade of moralanti-realism, Essays inquasi-realism Essays inquasi-realism

APPEAL it asif itcontained feat

study ofmorality canbesaidtoconti entirelyinvirtueofthenon-

ies oftheworld;however,weprojectoursentimentson OF ent. ForBlackburn, moral truth consists inour ability tobe 19 as SimonBlackburn,affirm the Moralrealism submits toth

MORAL 21 butfor thepurposes of this essay thisdefinition will . (p.152) . who adoptaminimalist approachtotruth,and 9 imply thatthesetruthscorrespondtothenatural

equately captureallvers ANTI

ed asmoral anti-realism, asitdoubtsthenature ures thatanswertoour , whatamountsforaclaim ke oneofmany forms. However,thekindI fense ofethicalcontextualism REALISM existence ofmoralproperties, e beliefinmind-independent

existence ofmoral factsbut ions ofmoralrealism 22 reactions toit,“inthe nuous withscientific Heterms suchtruths to be true is to be to betrueis . 20

CEU eTD Collection political philosophycanbemade ifwe interesting insights,Ibelie although theyaremore nuancedthansome ot However, theseapproachestotruthaboutmorality minimalists neednotassume th way. Thethirdthesis isthepoint atwhich much disagreement arises. Obviously, truth belief that moralproperties are false. Second,someclaims ofthese arenecessar First, moral statements areabout moral properties what todoaboutit." 24 23 they knowthem, perceivethereasoningandbeha it is,infact, true). resonate betterwithourbeliefs inmoralanti-realism (presuming wecome totheconclusionthat Greene suggests, however,thatthere aremany r more weight to certain kindsof Sometimes itisjustmore convincing,oritshow moral realism,evenifwere 2.1 world. AccordingtoPekkaVäyrynen,moral realism

Greene,JoshuaD.."The Terrible,Horrible,NoGood,VeryBadTruth aboutMoralityand VÃ¤yrynen,Pekka.Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy , 2nded.,s.v."MoralRealism."

What’s Undoubtedly, onecouldconceiveof some pract

wrong 24 Moral realists whobeliev

With ve thatastrongercaseforneutralityofthest Constructivism?

ject itsfoundations(s not differentfrom some non-mo e metaphysicalstatement aboutth behavior.Itmightalsobeusefulforraisingchildren. Joshua rejectthelanguageof realism. e not only that moralfacts 10 ily true.Finally,theysu

s agreaterdegreeofdetermination andassigns vior oftheiropponents(wholikewisethinkthat her forms ofmoral realism andoffer some andtheyarepropositionsthatcanbetrueor arenotofparticular easons forrevisingourmoral discourseto can besaidtosubmit itself tothree theses. aying, forexample, thatlyingiswrong). ical reasonswhyto ral propertiesinanysignificant e natureofmoral properties. bmit tothemetaphysical ate andliberalism asa concern forthisessay; are true,butalsothat keep thelanguageof 23

CEU eTD Collection moral judgment." 25 pressures havemade usableto make moral judgments spontaneous whichbecome almost report truth,althoughtheyarepost-hocrationaliza accept the non-cognitivist view ofmoralclaims. are atleast asequallycontentious we latertrytojustifybyrati reasoning butbyemotional responseswhichdeveloped asanevolutionaryadaptation,andwhich of realistterminology. constructivism iswhetheritprovides for suchawide-ranging agreement thatitwarrants theuse simplicity andclaritywith regardstowhatoneoughtdo.Thequestionthatconcernsmoral issues, wecanresorttothelanguageofmoral r practical useonother occasions. Wheneverther language of moral realism shouldbeavoidedon many occasions,although itmight havesome faulty metaphysical assumptions. Theconclusion find motivating. Insodoing, wewouldavoid are making are reallyaboutour replace our moraldiscourse toreflect thenature ofmorality, andmake itclearthat the claims we opponents asimmoraliftheyrefusetoacceptth the facts,and they offervalid re other, andfurthersmisunderstanding betweenthem that moral realism isanillusion that aggravates moral facts aretrue andthattheyknow them) asdisregardfor morality altogether. Greeneargues

Haidt,Jonathan."Theemotional doganditsrationaltail: Asocial intuitionist approach to If weaccept JonathanHaidt’s view onalization, itmight bepossibletoconceivewhymoral principles

asoning basedonthosefacts,they subjective values,andthatwearepresenting reasons which asparticularintuitions.(This 25 thatmoral judgments arenotformed bymoral 11 ealism inordertobenefitfromits unhesitatingly unnecessary conflictwhich arisesbased onour conflict between parties whodisagree witheach e arguments provided.Instead,heproposes we e isawide-ranging ag We canacceptthatmoralclaims purportto . If bothpartiesbelievetheirdisputeisabout . If that wecandrawfrom Greeneisthatthe tions ofourintuitions).Theevolutionary is nottosaythat weneedto willbecontenttoviewtheir reement aboutcertain we

CEU eTD Collection by wayofreasoningtoamoral is notthatwe rationalize 28 27 26 sister, whodecidetoengagein regarding ourmoral intuitionaboutincest.Hete based onmoralintuitionswhicharenotsocont However, whatHaidt’sfindingss which wearrivedatbyaccountingforlesscontrove particularly disturbingintuitions to evaluatethemagainstthebackgroundofexisti Rawls’ method allowsustoreflec intuitions inhisdescriptionofthemethod ofreflectiveequilibrium. morality arefine.Still,eventheconstructiv those evolutionarypressures. which capturesourmoral in directions, and thatiswhy itishard tofind aconsistent direct principle of normative morality commonsensical. However,differentevolutiona

Rawls,John.Atheoryofjustice . (p.52) Rawls,John.Atheoryofjustice . (p.46-53) qtdinSinger,Peter. proposed isthebestapproximation overall. mistaken in places.Therealquestionata thing istofindouthowoftenandfa only whatweknowalready,namely thatour examplesObjections bywayofcounter aretobemade withcare,sincethesemay tellus The expandingcircle:et , butthatwecannoteven tuitions. Infact,some havesuggested 26

Ibelievethatmany ofourevolu principle. Rawlsasserts: sexualintercourseforfun.They held bysome peoplethatdoesnot uggest isthat our disagreement a t onparticularintuit hics andsociobiology 12 ist John Rawlsadmits thatwerationalizeour roversial. Considertheexample givenbyHaidt expect toconsistentlyca ng beliefs taken as a whole. If there are some ng beliefstakenasawhole.Iftherearesome 28 lls astoryaboutMarkandJuly,brother ny giventime iswhichofthe views already ry pressureshavepulledusindifferent

rsial intuitions heldby r itiswrong.Alltheori theory iswrongsomewhere. Theimportant ions aswellonpart tionary responsestoquestionsof usetwodifferentmethods of bout moralprinciplescouldbe thattobemora invalidate our moral principle 27 . However, therealproblem However, pture allourintuitions othersandourselves. icular principles,and es arepresumably l istocounter CEU eTD Collection 29 realism. IfwefollowGreene’s argument, wecome the problem amounts towhether The problemdoesnotseem tobeinwhetheror although heusesrealistterminology: not allpeopleaccept constructivist will ultimately becontradicting aswell. rationalize particularintuitionswillinfluenceou instances in whichthewaywerationalizeourin people might ultimately findtheintuitiontobewrongitself.Neverthe unable torationalizetheirjudgment, butthey of theiractbasedonthedangersinbreeding,or evolution butdonotapplytothatparticularci Haidt arguestheirmoral judgment isentirelyin not to doitagainandto keepitasecret. Most contraception tobesafe.Theyenjoyit,andfeel

Rawls,John."Construction andObjectivity." conception ofpersonsasfreeandequal,a society. true, itisbetter tosaythat theyareprincipl This rendering of objectivityimplies that,rather But, doesthistellusanythingusefulaboutconstructivism? 29

theories. Moreover,JohnRawls himself isnotamoral realist, constructivism warrantstheus rcumstance. Sincethereisnoreasontodisapprove people intuitively disappr 13 do holdtheintuitionthatincestiswrong.Some ithasbroughtthem closertogether,butdecide not constructivism asath r choiceofmoralprinciples.Moralprinciples theirpotentialemotiona tuitions will becontradicting,andthewaywe nd fullycooperatingmembers ofademocratic fluenced byintuitionswhichwereshaped es ofjusticemost reas tothe conclusion that the realist language than think of theprinciples of justice as e of thelanguageofmoral After all,we areawarethat ove ofincest.However, onable forusgivenour l pain,most peopleare eory holds, but rather eory holds,butrather less, therearemany CEU eTD Collection what todoaboutit."(p. 237) 30 able to“construct”some commongroundonsome level(byemploying thevalue-ladenconcept why peopledonotneedtobefundamentalists for this argument tohold.Constructivists might be some objectivecommon ground(whichsometimes might bethecase,butnotalways).Thatis it issafe todowithconstructivism) butweare disagreement arisesbecauseofourdifferencein intuitions, orfrom differentwei assigning conceptions ofjustice.Thisdisagreement arises the wordsjust/unjust? Itisclearthatreason unreasonable. And,naturally,many peopledisagreewith reasonableness. However,hewouldnotgoso (liberal) people.Thestartingpointforhis theory isbased onunderlying principles that have aperceptionthatthereissome commongr Although neutralgroundinsome mora can resorttoinorderresolv provides fora“smokescreen” whichmakes peopleperceivesome neutralgroundtowhichthey

Greene,JoshuaD.."The Terrible,Horrible,NoGood,VeryBadTruth aboutMoralityand

the onesthatsimply ringtruetosome people. there isnoneutralgroundfrom whichtosort Because there isnofactof

e theirdifferences.Greenewrites: the matter about what’sright orwrong,notruemoral theory, l terms doesnot exist,differe sagree about different able, liberalpeoplecandisagreeaboutdifferent 14 many peopleimplicitly share-the reasonable ound, basedonpoliticalvalues.Rawlsinsistshis ghts todifferent intuitions. Ultimately, the theory isthealready normative conceptof subjective values (ifweassume anti-realism, as presenting itasadifferenceinreasoning from fartocallanyonewhodisagreeswithhim from differentrationalizationsofourmoral 30 outtheputativelytruemoral claims from

him. What doesthatmake ofhisuse nt partiesinRawls’society CEU eTD Collection 32 31 neutrality. Oneof themost influential error theori error theoriescanbestfit(o institution. most commonlytherealistsclaim thereisaset our moral intuition.Ifsomething iswrong,there of moralrealityraises realism alreadyno hassuchappeal,ifany.Ihave referring towell-knownanti-realis understanding ofmorality thatw that moral anti-realism isitselfadisputedpo 2.2 are notconvinceditis). not employ the languageofrealism inthissense(t and obviously,therealistswhobelie more likelytoseekcompromise whentheyarenot are expressingpersonalvalues,andnotthatwe ground ismore easilyexpandedby that common ground willbe verylimited. Myclaim is,followingGreene,thatthiscommon of reasonableness

VÃ¤yrynen,Pekka.Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy , 2nded.,s.v."MoralRealism." seep.21

Arguments The aim ofthepresent 32 Althoughtherearedifferentin 31

against andhence, avoiding complete neutrality with regards tospecific values), but a legitimate questionwhichcannotbeansweredbysimple to references

Moral

r evenpromote) theframework ofliberalpluralism andstate chapter isnottoconclusively ould supporttheliberal t theories.Thatisonlypossi

using thelanguageofmoralan Realism ve thatmoral factsaretruebutnotthattheyknowthem, do terpretations ofmoralanti-r

15 sition. Iwilltrytosket has tobesome reasonthatmakes itwrong,and ted thataskepticaboutthemetaphysical nature haveobjectivetruthonourside).Peopleare of moral propertiesinhere sts remains J.L.MackieandIshall very briefly hey donotsaythatsometh convincedtheyhavethetruthbytheirside, ideas ofstateneutralityandpluralism by refute moral realism. Iunderstand ble afterrecognizingwhyanti- ti-realism (making itclearwe ealism, Ishallarguethat ch outananti-realist nt insome actionor ing iswrong,ifthey CEU eTD Collection p. 72) to differintheirB-properties the A-propertiesifandonly ifitisimpossiblefo 34 33 the featuresuponwhichtheysupervene.Mackie point isthatthere objective valuesareproperties ofactions,agents to besupervenientuponnaturalfeatures. (motivation-internalism willbe further discussed at objective values; if theyexist, wouldhave most ofthemoraljudgments rath people cannotbereconciledwith preferences. Instead,he argues itisthecontingent fact of life thatmoralintuitions of some overall happiness)beingappliedindifferentcircumstances andamong peoplewithshared societies are nottheresult of some general princi the argument from relativitysuggeststhatth moral thoughtandlanguage.He conceptual analysis. Heacknowledges thatanapp be confusedwithanyoneofseve they arealways necessarilywrong. position ofafeasibleerrortheorythroughhiswork. outline his view. JoshuaGreenewasgreatlyinfl

“Giventwoclassesof propert Mackie,J.L.. Mackie admitsthatmoral claims purporttore Ethics: inventingrightandwrong. an epistemological difficultyinknowing without alsodifferingin their

er thanreason.Second,hehasan gives severalreasonswhymoral ies (AandB),wesay th the intuitions of othe ral “firstorder”(normative) vi 33 Hearguesthatthedenialof 34 These arguments restontheassumption thatthe 16 r twoobjects,notnecessari e differentmoralpracti to beintrinsically motivating andinciting action uenced byMackie, andI willfurther outline the orobjectsofmoral con ples (suchasuniversali

concludes: “Myhopeisthatconcretemoral a later point). Third, such values wouldhave eal toobjective valuesisbuilt intoordinary port facts(acognitivistview),butinsists rs, and thatintuiti A-properties.” (asfound inGreene, at theB-properties superveneon value entitiesandtheirlinkswith ews, orwithanylinguistic objective values argument aboutthenatureof skepticism hasappeal.First, ces foundindifferent cern. Hence,hisfourth zability ormaximizing ons arewhatsupplies ly inthesame world, shouldnotto CEU eTD Collection 35 naturalistic accountsseriously, di properties overvalue-neutralprope fundamental moral principleshave further explanationforwhytheyare principles is circular). Ultimately, he concludes truths which arenotmoral principles themselves non-moral necessarytruths (whichhe findshighly true, hencehisevocationofnecessarytruths.Mo needs moral principles. If moral realism istobe supervenience ofvalueoverthevalue-neutralprope because itisnotconductthatcan only invirtueofsome moralprinciplesthat to their value-neutral properties. neutral propertiesalsoimplymora much aswecanrefertosomething beingred and their moralproperties. We canrefertosometh there hastobesomething that principles thatadmit ofnofurthe obligations ortranscendental necessities…” issues canbe argued out without appeal toany mythical objective values orrequirements or

Mackie,J.L.. Joshua Greene argues thatmoral realism requiresfundamental moralprinciples, However, thisalonedoesnotcome asmuch of Ethics: inventingrightand wrong

connects thevalueneutralproperti Inotherwords,objectsofmora r explanation.First,hedevelops l properties,weneedmoral princi smissing thesetheoriesashaving too much “metaphysical be universalizable.Heexplains rties, andtheyhavetoexplai toatleastbeclearabout true (fundamental motrue (fundamental 35

define them. Forexample, lyingmight bewrong 17 without evaluatingit.However,ifsome value- some principles must betruedespite havingno true, atleast some moral principles needtobe ral principles canbeex . (p.199) (to explainmoralprinciplesintermsof unlikely to besuccessful), ornecessarymoral ing being alie without evaluating it, just as rties of things,and insists that moralrealism a surprise.Still,Greeneinsists that these ral principles). the supervenienceofevaluative n it.Greenerefusestotakenon- l concernhavemoral properties hisargument byinsistingthat es of objects of moral concern es ofobjectsmoral thisphenomenon interms of ples inordertoconnectthem plained byappealingto CEU eTD Collection 36 Similarly, Greeneconsidersother true onlyifmostnon-rati moral, wecansimilarly askwhyshouldweberati becomes equallyproblematic asotherfirstorder the otherhand,ifwetakemean being whowouldapprove ofsometh rationality torequireonlysome for dismissing thisapproachasaviableexpl the term “wrong”subscribetothisrationalistic that anideallyinformed rationalpersonwouldco that case,thequestion wrong “ifandonlyifwewoulddisa Alternatively, wecoulduseindirectmoral princi mentioned. Therefore,thetruthofthisclaim is still leavesanopenquestionwithregardsto cannot comeinadirectform. conditional clause).Moore’sopen between directfundamental moral example herefers tobeing theclaim “allbach be thebestcandidates.Some stat explanations. Ifanything baggage.” Hedoesconsiderthe

Moore,GeorgeEdward. becomes whether theword“wrong”c becomes whether onalists are,infact,mistakenabou is tobeacceptedwithoutfurtherex Principa ethica.

36 Topointoutthevalue-neutral consistency in belief, itiseasyto imagine a perfectly rational ements aresimplytruein virtue moral principlesandexplanati questionargument suggeststhat ing oftheterm “rational”to principles, andthosethatare pprove ofitifwewerefully possibility ofanalyticnatura ing thatiswrong(say,because

18 not determined bythemeaningofterms used. metaphysics. Moreover,he elors areunmarried”). He ndemn. Hedeniesthatmostcompetentusersof ples. Greene considerstheclaim thatanactis anation ofmoral realism. understand Ifwe onal (in that sense)? Thisonal (inthatsense)? its evaluative properties,asIhavealready moral beliefs. If to berational means tobe t the meaning of the word “wrong.” t themeaning “wrong.” oftheword ould mean thesame assomething planation, analyticclaims seem to property thatsomething isalie informed andfullyrational.”In have normative implications, it ons, andarguesthatouruseof oftheirmeaning (thestandard indirect (whichcome witha list andsynthetic naturalist they areself-interested). On analyticmoral principles furtherdistinguishes explanationmight be seesfurtherreasons CEU eTD Collection to doaboutit."p.120 38 provide foranalyticprinciples as “wrong”andsoon, thatth 37 give definiteanswerstocausalpr they areconstruedasifshouldhaveanansw unanswered questions,but becausethosequestions, be provided.Greeneproteststhesekindsofe moral principleswhichhavea supervenience relations. Ultimately, syntheticexpl value-neutral properties.Hence,anydiscus is thefactthattheyexemplify supervenience facts). macroeconomic factssuperveneonthelower-level factsbutwedonotdoubtmacroeconomic show examplesinwhichnon-redu simply trueinvirtueofthemeaning oftheterm properties mayneverthelessbethesame. Synthetic question whetheranatural explanations ofmora that semantic indeterminacy for moralterm sense itisbeingdiscussed,solv to changethemeaning oftheterms andhowth the terms does notjustify analytic naturalist explan

Greene,JoshuaD."The Terrible,Horrible, No Theideaisthatpeopledonot 38 The syntheticnaturalist,ontheotherhand, However,Greene insists thatwhatdistingui l realism, buthecontendsitisaratherdesperatemove. property implies amoralpropertyas

thatcouldbeconsidered fundamental moral principles. certain structureanddemand fu e theproblem posedbymoral skep quite knowwhattheymean whentheyemploy moral terms such ere might beavalidresolutionof ocesses in theuniverse (forexam ctive supervenience relations 19 s used.Theytendtoshifttheburdenofproofand s s might proveawayoutforsome analytic sion of moral propertieswarrantsreductive sion ofmoral of value-neutral Good,VeryBadTruthabout Moralityandwhat ey are to be understood, she would not, in the ey aretobeunderstood,shewouldnot,inthe er. We arecontentwiththefactthatwecannot xplanations notbecausetheyleadtonew, anations restonsome accountoffundamental ations. Ifatheorist w naturalistsofferexplanationswhicharenot even inprinciple,areunanswerablealthough shes these casesfrommoral supervenience agrees with Moorethatthereis anopen rther explanation,butnonecould properties onlowe theindeterminacy thatwould well, buttheyassert that such ple, onecouldindefinitelyask are acceptable (for example, ticism. There is apossibility ould, alternatively,seek 37

r level, also CEU eTD Collection For lackofbetterterminology, what todoaboutit."p.21 39 still be amoral person, concerned with as much aswithactive helpingbehavior. Amoral skeptic can completely reject morality furthering otherpeople’swelfare.Morality actions. Itisdistinct from altruism inthataltruism isapositive commitment toactively is abouttakingintoaccountthe then, whotries to dothe rightthing andusually an account of morality that isconcerned withri makes ourmoralbeliefstrue.Hemakesanim much likeitisascientific questiontoaskwhat It isnotaquestionofwhybemoral, orwhatself-interestedincentivewemight havetobemoral; be valid.Finally, Greene maintains thathiscritique that canendure certainkinds of facts intoadiscussionaboutpr explanation of whatitis thatmakes them true.Ifone wastotr Greeneultimately doesnotinsiststhatmoral fa of some physical (anddefinitelynot metaphysical wondering, muchlikeattheonsetofour establish adefiniteconnectionbe what ittakestoanswerthem. Fundamental questions leaveuswith some processesoccurandwewouldsoone “why?”

Greene,JoshuaD.."The Terrible,Horrible,NoGood,VeryBadTruth aboutMoralityand the exactdirectionofourinquiry

actical reason,givingreasonsforactingacertainwayor he dubs thenotionsmorality rationalscrutiny,hisdemand for tween value-neutralandevaluativeproperties, whileweareleft interests ofothers,andnotsi inquiry,whythisconnectionholds. the interestsof others(affirming morality 2 isconcernedwithrefrainingfrom theother harming portant distinction oftwo accountsof morality. ght andwrongactions. Amoralperson istheone, 20 moral principles,onthecontrary,immediately manages todoso.Thelatter version of morality makes scientificbeliefstrue,wecanaskwhat ) objects,but hisaccount demands some sortof ismade from withinth r orlaterrunoutof cts havetobemade truebytheexistence 1 and atleastsome understandingof and morality mply focusingonself-interested ansform thediscussionofmoral explanation would still equally 2 e moral pointofview. . The former refers to . Theformerrefersto answers).Butsuch 2 ). Theview 1 and 39

CEU eTD Collection to raisequestionsconcerningmoral truth. termed asmorality speak ofchimpanzees having any meta-ethical c and Greenefindsthatthereisstrongevidence distinction inourability figuring outhowtodotherightthing,inrea rejects moral realism tosimply be reflection, thenwecouldthinkof realism. If wethinkthat allittakes tobea are intrinsicallymotivating. Thefi behave moraly realism invitesunpleasantfeelings.Heconsiderspo Nietzsche couldbeconsidereda that wouldrejectbothaccountsofmoralityGreen consideration theinterestsofothershasapsycho The secondobjectiontotheclaim thatweneednotbe question ofhowthevalue-neutral the more thenotionisnormative incharacter, the the more substantivenotionsof people whocancompletely disregardtheimperatives rationality (suchasisoftenus has anobjectivelyrightanswer.Aswasalrea

2 withoutbeingmoral 2 . Ourtendencytobemoral seems evolvedlongbefore we wereable tohave toreasonaboutwhat ed in rationalchoice theory) allo rationality runintoknownproblems ethics,namely, ofrationalist proponent), andisperhapsther someone thattakesintoconsiderat mistakenaboutherbeliefs,and properties ofthingsareconnected rst objectionhastodowith 1 . Thethesisofinternalism suggeststhatmoral judgments the secondobjectiondoesnothold.Wecanhardly 21 doandtheconclusionthat realist isto engageintheprocess of rational logical underpinning.This list sense.However,Gr dy brieflymentioned, theconceptof“thin” onvictions, yetthey exhibitexactlywhatwas e terms “radicalnihilist” (of which,perhaps, less itbecomes abletoanswertheskeptical ssible objectionstotheviewthatonecould ofthisrationalistethic.Ontheotherhand, moral realiststobemotivated totakeinto eason why the rejectionofmoral the rationalista ws us to conceive of rational ws ustoconceiveofrational that sheisactuallyinvolvedin ion theinterests with evaluative properties. withevaluativeproperties. eene seesanimportant whatoneoughttodo is anempirical issue, ccount of moral ccount ofmoral of othersbut CEU eTD Collection with Bobok." 41 what todoaboutit."(p. 238-39) 40 societies, thismeans thatth they express thewillofGod(ortheyareobj herself asbeingintheserviceofobjectivel permited! God doesnotexisteverythingisprohibited),with moral realists.Slavoj Zizeksupplements Lacan’s claiming arighttosomething. of well-meaning people. Mostmilitary aggressions are justified inmoral terms, becauseof or terms suchas“good”andeducatepeopleaboutit,but moral truthontheirside.” world, thevastmajority ofa and shareitasneutralgroundfor notions ofrightandwrongwhich(justorunjus has greatpracticaladvantages. Co content withtherealistterminology that implies objectivetruth and createasocietyofpeople answered, then, iswhetherthelanguage of moral discovering (whatItaketobe)thetruenature further, ifweacceptmoral anti-realism. Mostof Therearemany Wheredoesthatleaveus? th perhaps themostpressingconcer

Zizek,Slavoj. "HowtoReadLacan -"Godis Greene,JoshuaD.."The Terrible,Horrible,NoGood,VeryBadTruth aboutMoralityand 41 Ifoneperceivesherselfastheinstrument 40 Forhim, thereal challenge isnot toclarify the truecontent of the e realistlanguageshrinkstheco

voidable sufferingiscausedby One couldalsointroduceanothe ns areaboutfindingawaytodecidewhatourmorality should with greater concern for others.Projectivist anti-realists are nstructivists similarly think thatwecanrationally arrive at resolving disputes.JoshuaGr 22 y Good),heractsarered Dead, butHeDoesn't KnowIt": LacanPlays usdonotwish tobe t) whichmost (reasonab of moral reality.Theques ectively Good).Inthec realism willhelp usreach compromises better aforementioned reversal anotherclaim: IfGodexistseverythingis ings we could conceive ofastheGood,and ings wecouldconceive rathertochangetheinconsideratebehavior ofGod(and,Imight add,ifoneperceives mmon groundtowhichweare people who think they have the people whothinktheyhavethe about morality, asitpresumably r element inthepsychologyof eene proclaims: “Inthereal radical nihilistsevenupon eemed inadvancesince le) peoplecouldaccept ontext ofourliberal tion that needs tobe of anolddictum (If CEU eTD Collection 43 42 reason toimmediately visitthe holiday andnoticesthebeginningof example providedbyPeterSingerwhendiscussing Parfit’sview). was of amanstrongpreferencesforthepresent, thehereandnow,disc with observation thatthebeliefdoesnotgiveusareas question; if abelief does notmotivate us to act epistemological skepticism. Greene), nor empirical) about whatweha (true invirtueofthemeanings oftheterms us realism. DerekParfitarguesthatthere arenorma think wewouldhavetroubletreatingothersasends 2.3 worldviews). thereareverydifferent,butconsistent solely intheprocessofreasoning(obviously, others, especiallyifweinsist adaptations ratherthanbyreasoning, therationalizations weofferwillremain unconvincingto justice. IfHaidtisright,andourmoral judg people asfreeandequal,forexample, stillhave return seeking compromise. Reasonablepeople w

Parfit,Derek.Onwhatmatters . Singer, Peter.

Practical The question of moral motivation isimportant

The expandingcircle: Reason

and 42

Thequestionofmotivation,inhisview,isapsychological

on objectivetruthandpersistinth Moral dentist, althoughthereasonmight notmove him toact. atoothache whichhesuspects w

ethics andsociobiology Motivation 23 on toactin acertainway.Considertheexample verydifferentunderstandingofthenotions ve reasontobelieveunlessweembrace ho agreewitheachother intheir conceptionof ment isformed byemotional evolutionary ed -oranalyticstatements asexpressedby tive truths (truths that are neither tautologies , itneverthelessdoesnotstem from that inthemselves ifweweretorejectmoral toanswertheworri . 2011ed. e claim thatour differences lie ill ruinhisholiday,hehasa 43

Ifthatman isplanninga ounting thefuture(this es ofallthosewho CEU eTD Collection Greene, reasonsprovidehypotheticalimperatives, notcategorical imperatives. 44 facts” is,so farasmy arguments areconcerned, simply amatter ofstylisticpreference.” the study ofmorality as aninvestigation of“pract neutral properties withthosethatareevaluati However, heinsiststhatthemetaphysical questi explaining whichof thereasons may stillbe valid reasons wehaveforactingacerta Greene agreesthatphil context, theyareanemptyform, merelyinform thinking inthecontextofourformed desires,or nowhere”. Ifsuchtruthsexistindependentlyofus,theyarenomore thanaframework for moral reasoning,thenormative truthsshowedtoex useditandevenifnobody know about,ifnobodyelse as thereareroadsthat existwh accept valid arguments. However,thosereasonsexis and preferences.Were Itoseektruthandhave account ofnormative truthwhichcanhardlybe Parfit argues,heobjectivelyhasreasonstodo does notimplythehearerwillbemotivatedto from truepremises, wehaveareason toaccept theconclusions oftheargument. Thisexample values. Parfit’sownexampleisthefollowing:If

Greene,JoshuaD."The Terrible,Horrible, No Parfit’s explanationofnormative truthsdoes osophers may legitimately respondto

ich Idonottake.Iftherewasa in way(andevendescribe“right ve, remains unresolved.Hewrites:“Conceivingof 24 accepttheconclusions ofagoodargument, but, weknowtheargumentation isvalidanditstems Good,VeryBadTruthabout Moralityandwhat the “directionswewishtopursue.”Without that useful withoutthebackgroundofgivendesires ation weplugintoourmoralcalculus.Joshua preferences fortruth,I so. What we encounter inthisexample isan on ofwhatconnectsaparticularsetvalue- ist byParfit might beinterpretedas“roadsto ical reason” ratherthan t independentlyofmypreferences,asmuch after certainkinds of rational reflection. not fullybridgethegapbetweenfactsand really knewaboutit,itstillmight exist.In hisargument bywayofoffering “road tonowhere”whichIdidnot ” and“wrong”inthoseterms), would havereasonsto asearch for“moral 44 For CEU eTD Collection 47 46 45 to doaboutit."(p.138) another). Myanti-realistviewof not haveastorytoofferaboutwhyweshouldc individuals, andthosechoicesmi not topersuadethereaderbemoral. action inpeople,andgiveusanexplanationof be abletocounterar particular moral judgment tothatparticularmora argues thatthelackofmotivatio (cognitive mental states)canbecombined inone impulse, desire,orstriving),a with “world-to-mind” direction moral judgments areintrinsically motivating) and motivating. truth-apt), oneistodiscoverfamiliar problem imperatives. objectivist realistslikeRonaldDworkin show claim thatmoral judgments arecognitive statesa reasons are,althoughobjectively motivation isapsychologicalquestion.Manyothers,likeCornellrealists,denythatmoral

Lang,Gerald."HowFar CanYouGowithQuietism?" Dworkin,Ronald. Lang,Gerald."HowFar CanYouGowithQuietism?" There arenumerous otheroppos In therealm of moral subjectivism, theimpor 47 46 Dworkinofferstwoarguments toreconcil However,ifoneistoviewmoral judgm Justice forhedgehogs guments whodoubtmoral knowledgebased nd mental stateswiththe“mi n onbehalfofamoral agentput moralitydoesnotpresupposea ght tellussomethingabouthowto of fit(otherwiseknownasc true, intrinsicallymotivating. Isimply takeitthatwe mostly are. ing viewsregardingmoral mo . 25 why wearemoral.Presently, however, my aim is hoose tobemoral(inthesenseofcaringforone l agent.Dworkin offersanaccountwhichmight nd explainsthepossibility ofamoralists. Other s withconceivingof th cognitivism. Hearguesthatthemental states affinity toward the viewof categorical and thesame mentalstate.Furthermore, he tant moral decisionsneedtobemade by ents ascognitivestates(and,therefore, e motivation internalism (theviewthat 45 Thisprovides fortheirfurther onative states,whichinclude nd-to-world” direction of fit nd-to-world” directionoffit s indoubttheattributionofa on itnotbeingabletoincite set of principles thatwould relatetooneanother.Ido tivation. ForParfit,moral em asintrinsically

CEU eTD Collection and whattodoaboutit." (p.189) 48 outright evilorwrong.When itcomes tomoral presented by Haidtsuggests isexactly thatit moral judgments whichgostronglyagainst our moral intuitions. However,whattheevidence on objectivetruth.Somemight thinkthatthere we aremore likelytoreach(acceptable) compromise course, therealdomain ofcontentionbetweendiffe educate childrentocontinuedosotoo.Thepart and wearefree tostructure oursociety andin humans iselasticenough tobedirectedindifferentways. We We areverymuch instinctivelydisposedtobeingmoral, althoughthistendencyofoursas asserts: nevertheless, thatweareindangerofbecomi about howweoughttobehave(for example, values invirtueoftheirinexistencethena might unacceptable findthis ortoopermissive. order oursubjectivevaluesinsu

qtdinGreene,JoshuaD.. "TheTerrible,Ho intuitions are therefore both innate and enculturated. than aslearned,yetwhichre built intomultiple regions of thebrain andbody, whichisbetter described asemergent … morality, likelanguage,isamajor evolutionary

ch awaytoensurewewouldliv quires inputandshapingfrom tural worlddoesnotimply firstordermoral claims rrible, NoGood,VeryBad TruthaboutMorality ng immoralafter rejecti 26 is rarelythecasethat someone viewsherselfas psychology andmotivation fordoing “evil”acts, We shouldrecallthatrejectingobjectivemoral stitutions topromote caringfor others,andto should benocompromise withsomeesoteric recklessly towardsothe icular waysinwhichthis rent moral outlooks,butitseems tome that ifwedonotinsistthatourviewsarebased adaptation foranintenselysociallife, 48

recognizethevalueofmorality e inamoralworld.Some people aparticularculture.Moral ng objectivevalues.Haidt rs). Idonotthink, istobedoneis,of CEU eTD Collection 49 first order claims, andthatthis fact significantly undermines theskepticalposition: ourselves. Ronald Dworkinargues,onthecontrary, inexistence inthenaturalworlddoesnotim implications. Ihavesofarinsistedthatreje whatever onewants.Conversely,thebroadermeta moral facts. Onthelatterreading, Iam advoca broader meta-ethical claim aboutthe nature of abstract firstordermoral claims. Theclaim “no 2.4 were theyto viewtheirmoraljudg it seems much more likelythatpeoplewouldbe

Dworkin,Ronald.

Meta value thenwecannotbelieveeitherthat realm istherealm ofargu matching butinvirtueofthesubstantive them tomatch. Valuejudgments aretrue,wh special moral entitiesor thattheycannotbe If Iam right…thattherear I havealreadynotedthatmany meta-ethical Ethics Justice forhedgehogs Bogus?

ment notbrute,rawfact. ments asnot beingobjectivelytrue. e nonon-evaluative,s . (pg.11) ting radical nihilism andimplyingthatone may do ply prescriptionsabouthowweshouldconduct ply 27 cting objectivemoral values morality, orasasubstantivejudgmentabout acts arewrong”canbeconsideredeitherasa less inclined toharm case value judgments aretruewhentheymatch true because there are no special entities for true becausetherearenospecial entitiesfor that allsecond-ordercl -ethical claim neednothaveanypractical statements canbeconstruedasakindof en theyaretrue,notinvirtueofany that canbemade forthem. Themoral 49 econd-order, meta-ethical truthsabout

other people’sinterests aims canberecastas invirtueoftheir CEU eTD Collection 51 50 moral claims indisguise. Internal skepticism ought” divide. Recallthathethinksallsecond violate theHumean Principleastheir refutatio particular moralclaims againstthebackgroundof Dworkin distinguishesbetweeninte standards which areinternaltoit),al classifies Dworkin’sviewasquietism(thethatmoral discourseisanswerableonlytothe values, without anyneedtosearchformetaphysical underpinnings ofmorality.Gerald Lang own standards.Hence,wecanjustifytheascrip obstacles external tomorality which needtobe WhatDworkin sees asthelesson ofHume isthat morality isnotgrounded innon-moral fact. Therefore, heargues that some things about morality can betaken for granted. Thereare no support histhesisaboutthe regarded asachallenge asserts nomeaningful distinctionca skeptics aboutonesortofclaims withoutdoubt between firstordermoral claims andsecond-orde conclusions withthemetaphysical factsaboutth moral skepticism. thatweneed Heinsists cannot hereconsiderinitsenti Dworkin providesafarreachingargument agains

Lang,Gerald."HowFar CanYouGowithQuietism?" Humean Principle:Onecannot

to objectivistaccountsofmoral reality,butDworkins objectivity ofmoral belief.

rety. However,Iwilltrytofocu drawanoughtfrom anis. rnal skepticism andexternal n bemade. TheHumean Principle though Dworkinfindstheterm unappealing. not worryaboutthecorrespondenceofourmoral may takeaglobalform. Theseskeptics may, in 28 n ofsome moralclaimsdoesnotcrossthe“is- tion ofvaluemerely onth resolved, asmoralityneeds toadhere onlytoits ing theothersortofclaims), whileDworkin othermoral claims. Internalskepticsdonot t various forms of moral skepticism which I t variousforms ofmoralskepticism whichI -order moral claims practically are first-order r claims independent(wecanbe completely e world.Errortheoristsfindthedistinction s onhiscriticism ofmetaphysical skepticism. Theformer rejects 50 hastraditionally been e recognitionofother eeks toregainit 51 Furthermore, CEU eTD Collection Dworkin annulsGreene’sdissatisfactionwithfunda language ofmoralrealism. reality, whileBlackburn thinks they areexpressi is truethatlyingwrong”).ForDworkin,howev different (forexample, wecanqualifythenorma simply providefurtherinformation aboutthefi grounded inmatters ofmetaphysical important dimension ofagreement betweenBlac advocate theabandonmentoffaultymetaphysic us togetridofourmoralconvictions,and at theonsetoftheirinquiry.Dwo depends ontheexistence ofsome naturalor non- the world.Inotherwords,ifexternalskep Humean Principlebyarguingthat external skepticswhoclaim tobasetheirskepti are trueonlyifwetheyholdforagentswhocan fact, rejectallmoral claims base

true, byanadequatemoral argument fortheirtruth.Of coursethat invites thefurther true? My answer tothe first [question]: mo What makes amoral judgment true?Whenare By erasing thedistinction between firs d onafurthernormative claim (f rkin distinguishesbetweenerror moral claimshavetocorrespondmetaphysical factsabout factandtheybothunderstand projectivist anti- 29 tics claimthetruth- that cism fromoutside ofthe moralrealmbreachthe tive claim lyingis that natural properties theyarecommitting afallacy rst orderclaims withoutbeingfundamentally t orderandsecondmoral arguments, kburn andDworkin;forthem, morality isnot ons ofattitudeswhich er, thefirstordermoral claims describemoral beheldresponsible mental moralprinciples.Dworkincontends: ral judgments aremade true,whentheyare s, butherejectsbothviews.Thereisan we justified in thinkingamoraljudgment realists likeBlackburnwhoonly theorists likeMackiewhourge or example,thatmoralclaims second-order moral claims to wrongbysayingthat“it value aboutmoralfacts for them). Conversely, warrant theuseof CEU eTD Collection properties. Lang writes: independence ofsecondordermoral claims weare to whatthosepropertiesare.Langarguesthatev and non-moral propertiesareessentia virtue ofthedescriptivepropert the necessityofsuperveniencein of thesuperveniencerelationth inists thatDworkinhastoolittletosayaboutthe 54 53 52 Dworkin’s viewdoesnotwarrant from withinthe framework offirstordermora

Lang,Gerald."HowFar CanYouGowithQuietism?"(p.33) Lang,Gerald."HowFar CanYouGowithQuietism?" Dworkin,Ronald. evaluated, sowhynot deny thisisaproper asking, inanon-scepticalspirit,whatki properties whichserveastheevidenceof resources ofordinarymoralargument, andthatgoodnesssupervenesonthenon-moral Let usagreewithDworkinthattheproperty question: whatmakes amoral argument adeq If wetakeuptheposition of aninternal skeptic,wemust besatisfied withjustifications argument foritsadequacy.Andsoforth. Justice forhedgehogs moralproperties? inquiry? Everyt inquiry?

at holds betweenmoralandnon-moral features. Dworkinadmits ies whichsubvenethem. Thismi moralattribution. Hisview is the dismissal of allof the meta-ethical lines of inquiry. lly different,butitdoesnotpr . (p.37) hing else,itwouldseem 30 54 52 nd ofpropertygoodnessis.HowcanDworkin l theorizing.However,GeraldLangfindsthat

nature ofmoralproperties,andaboutthestatus goodness.We might thenimagine someone en if wetakeseriously thedismissal ofthe still leftwonderingabout of goodnessisproperly uate? Theanswer must be:afurthermoral ght furthersuggestthatmoral that moralpropertiesexistin ovide ananswerwithregards , canbemetaphysically ascribed throughthe thedetailsofmoral 53 He CEU eTD Collection the common participants infirst order moral discour essence ofthePertinence Condition, asLangsees deny thewrongnessofactions,whilenotaffirming thegoodness ofthoseactions.Thisisthe the point, as Dworkinasserts that itisbasica fails toupholdpermissibility ofparticularactions He insists that Dworkinfails to seethelogical 55 the claims oferrortheoristsbyassuming they order claims). Otherwriters,suchasRussSc the properinterpretationofsecond effectively defeats externalskepticism, butrather hisPertinence Condition(Dworkinwritesthat offending theHumean Principle.Hegoesontosa ethical positionscanstillbedefendedonthebasi second orderclaim canbetransformed toberead depends onthisdistinctionwhenhedismisses externalskepticism. If, asLangargues,any skepticism morality, about whilehefindsthatsuchadistinctionismirage.Nevertheless, skeptics aremaking theclaims thatthereissuch athingaslegitimateposition ofexternal types of skepticism canbelegitimately termed exte skepticism might offer arguments againsthim. What Dworkinultimately states isnot that some Namely, the distinction thatDworkinismaki ng betweenexternalskepticism andinternal

Shafer-Landau,Russ."Truth andMetaethics." There isanotherimportant obj

order claimsneedstodisplay ection thatLang makeswith regards toDworkin’s theory. lly incomprehensible to consider arguments which hafer-Landau, thinkthatDworkinmisunderstands 31 position which atonce denies impressibility and must beadvocatingextensivepermissiveness. s ofinternalskepticis . However, Langmaintains. However, thatthisisbeside it. However, that view is dependent on what it.However,thatviewisdependentonwhat rnal, butonthecontrary,heinsiststhatmoral asafirstorderclaim,thandifferentmeta- se perceivetobepertinenttheirconcerns, y thatitisnotthe Humean Principle that their pertinence m without,consequently, tothefirst- 55

CEU eTD Collection anti-realism whichisdefined invirtue of theinexistence of moralproperties. conceive ofmoralfactsor tr might happenthatDworkin’sargument willhave order moral argument isnot dependentonanydeve realist, according tothe definitionsthatIoffere truth ofmoral claims isnotdependantonthos value-neutral properties,orthest against thearguments thatshow which shouldnotbeoverlooked. which leavesusunabletofullyaccountforth

Dworkin’s criticism ofmoral skepticism, as that wefailtoaccountfortheconnectednessofevaluativeand ructure ofthesuperveniencerelati uth ingeneral, Ithink itissafe 32 d, canaccept that thesuccess or failureoffirst e properties. Itseems tome thatamoral anti- e worrieswhich canbedisregardedandthose far-reaching effectswithregards tohowwe lopments appearing in meta-ethics. While it hasbeendemonstrated, isnotdirected toassume thepositionofmoral on; rather, heinsists that the CEU eTD Collection 56 fact thatourgenescome fr we haveaninterestinpreservi descriptive statements. Wilson unknowinglycommits sensibilities. Hepointstotheage-oldproblem evaluativejudgments ofdrawing basedon depths.” of evolutionarybiologyinorderto emotional reactionshadbeenshapedbynaturalse the development ofthehypothalamusandlimb consulted bymoral philosophers,areshapedbyth might havetobe“takenover”bythebiologists just theoriginsofhuman values, evolutionary theorists for years, Wilson posited Wilson. Duetonovelexplanationsofthepheno posed bysociobiology,morespecifically,theinfluentialbook values. Thebookitselfislargelyareactiontothe claiming thatwecanestablisharationallybase 3.1 CHAPTER

Wilson, EdwardO.

The The ethicistPeterSinger deve Singer rejectsthis view, 56

Principle

ANTI

of Sociobiology

REALISM Equal om commongenepool.Heinsi a

ng thelongterm survivalofourge

but still finds great value inbiolog Consideration but alsotheirmeaning. Bythathe meant thatthestudyofethics explainethics,“ifnotepistemology andepistemologists, atall . (p.3) AND lops anargument inhis1981book

LIBERAL 33 d morality, without appealingtoobjectivemoral that science may beinaposition toexamine not . Wilson writesthatmoral intuitions, whichare

lection, weneedtoworkwithintheframework menon ofaltruism, whichhadbeenpuzzling of challenge toethicsasaphilosophicalcategory e emotional centersinourbrains;thus,since

ic system responsibleforourspontaneous Interests the naturalistic fallacy whenhearguesthat

NEUTRALITY On Human Nature On Human

ical explanationsofourethical nes, bysimply referringtothe sts therearemoralpremises

The ExpandingCircle , byEdwardO.

CEU eTD Collection 57 them, thechoiceof values isaleap of faith, existentialist philosopherswhorecognizeourability tochoose and departfrom For “nature.” evident, suchastheprioritywegivetoourownkin. reject moral rulesasabsolute ordeny theelevated status of some intuitionsthatseemed self- sociobiology thatcanessentiall permissible butwhichhavenotalways seenas of aswrong(e.g.curingdiseases),andsomenaturalwe havecometoacceptasmorally sound ifitadvocates“natural”be intuitions. This may beinrefutingmoralarguments new information whichmoraltheoriesta standards, itdoesso actions. Ifsociobiologytellsusmore aboutthec The biologicalnatureofouret of evolutionaryprocessesinthe arbitrary goal, toclaiming thatalthough ourmora served toincrease ourancestors biology invariousways;from adop nothing aboutthenatureofmorality assuch.We premises. However,Singer findsthat thedescrip “inherent inman’s biologicalnature”

Wilson, EdwardO. However, sciencecannot providetheultimate premises of morality. Singerrefers to Still, Singerthinkswecanusetheexplan withoutfundamentally aff On humannature

hical beliefsdoesnotdetermine therightnessorwrongnessofour y changethestudyofmorality,accordingtoSinger.We can service ofensuringour ’ biologicalfitnessbutthatwe havior. Certainly,thereareunnatu ting anihiliststanceandinsist 57 , andthatsciencemay provideuswithanewsetofmoral . (p.5) ke intoaccountinmoralreasoning. ecting thetheoryofvalueitself;itsimply provides 34 such (e.g.homosexuality). Thisistheimpact of ultimately arbitrary. Moral subjectivism treats tions oftheoriginsourmoral beliefstellus onsequences ofcertainbeliefs,rules,ormoral ations ofbiologists l intuitions hadbeen anecessary consequence basedontheviewthat caninterpretthefindingsofevolutionary survival, there is, infact, truthinthem. canadapttopursueanyother ing thattheseadaptationshave ral actswecanhardlythink in debunkingsome moral amoral convictionis CEU eTD Collection 59 58 argument. Singerfindsthatthebasis ofmorality preferences fit…” interests exists“only as aframework intowhic with preferencesdonot exist. Singer asserts th One might wonderwhatitmeans tobeimpartial independently ofhuman beingsisanempty form if with ameaningless definition,heargues.This interests of all,recognizing that our interests are oneofmany. Onthelatter right inthemselves. Onthefirstaccountwetr others andwarrantsequal consideration as theothe principles. Hegoesontosaythat others, andthatrationalbeingstendtowardaprincipleofimpartial making moraldecisions,weareinvol Sociobiology allowsustoconceiveofvalues essentially practical, and motivati intrinsically motivating independe different moraljudgmentssimply assubjectiv existing independentlyofus”,a Mackie, from allthose claiming that moral princi existentialists inrejecting theobjectivity of mo confused aboutwhattodo,andhowbeha

Singer,Peter. Singer,Peter. There isanoticeabledimension ofuniversalityinmorality whichheendorsesinhis The expandingcircle: The expandingcircle: 59 , andnot asamoral lawauthoritatively

bout howwecome toknowthem a ng, butnotapropertyofthings eithereverymoralprincipleis ntly ofourownpreferences. ethics andsociobiology ethics andsociobiology ved inaprocessofacting in alessmysterious way.Singerarguesthat,when y topursueapolicythatwouldbestpromote the ral values.Hedemands anexplanation,following 35 at therequirement ofequal considerationsof e preferences.This,i h thedeliberationsof ples aretrue,andan“element oftheuniverse abstract notionofuniversal rulesthatexist r preferences, orthe principles of morality are therearenobeingswithintereststoconsider. is rational, as wellasbiological, and that ve toward one another. Singer joins the ve towardoneanother.Singerjoinsthe in circumstances inwhichparticularbeings instructing certaintypesofbehavior. .(p.106) .(p.110) justonepreferenceamong the 58 nd why they are to be taken as nd whytheyaretobetakenas or thenatureofspecificacts. Hearguesthat valuesare a waythatisjustifiableto ity inexplainingmoral ndeed, might leaveus rational creatures with account, weareleft CEU eTD Collection According toSinger,the expansionofmoral c of beingsworthymoral consideration, asall in rationalbeingstoovercome inc necessarily motivating, asmoral statements presumably are(inhisview).Buthesawatendency as awhole.Singer’s problem remained thatsometh disinterestedness inmoral reasoning isinherent principle of equalconsiderationof interestsis life; executingatradearrangemen people telling thetruth; adoctor should beavoided(itwould behardtogetby innocent child),thisexceptionisusefulonly find lyingmorallyjustifiable(say,inordertopreventanevengreaterwrong,suchasdeathof rule thatprohibitslying;al consequences (andpromotionofall interests) determine therightness of actions.Consider the are possible (althoughnot alwayscommendable) becau all, theyoften bringabout thegreatest total sa rule-based ethicalprinciples, however, apracti of moralactionswithoutconsideringtheirconsequencesontheallaffectedinterests.Hesees line ofreasoning doesnotmean absolute heaccepts moral rules;rather,he findswecannotspeak will later modify). This, heconten perceive theirowninterestsasoneofmany andtheref reasoning accountsformoral progr

The logical conclusion thisviewentailsisthat rationality progressively expands thecircle though we mightthough weintuitth onsistencies inreasoningandbehavior. lying aboutour health condition li ds, istrueindependently of allbeings withpreferences. This t wouldbeimpossiblewithoutru ess. Itisuniversally accessibletoallrational beingsto tisfaction ofpreferences.Nevertheless, exceptions against abackgroundofu 36 cal wayofovercoming ourhuman nature.After onsideration wentfrom in theideaofjustifyingourbehaviortosociety on adailybasisifwe , then,rationallyarrive beings withinterestshave equalmoralstatus. ing beingrationallyconsis ere arecircumstances inwhichwewould ore equallyimportant (theviewwhichhe se atthehighestlevelofabstraction, mits ourability toplanour les ofcontractetc.).The concern forourkinand could notrelyonother nderstanding thatlying d at,andtheideaof tent and trueisnot CEU eTD Collection reasoning. unavoidable problem ofmotivation whichcannot responses andevolutionaryadaptations.Howeve action. Heseesthisstanceasanalternativeto accepts the position that some statements normative aforementioned argument developedbyDerekParf subjectivism. Singerremains unsatisfied with from thedescriptive statement thattherearema assumes amodifiedpositionaboutmoral values,a particular preferenceisoneof normative statement. The onlyrationalbasishest Namely, heassertsthatingivingequalconsider that affirm hisposition,butconcedesanimpor the claims made intheoriginal1981publicati He, admittedly, cannotcomprehend theclaims beings wouldhaveinterests,andleavesittofutu Singernotesthereisanelem rivers androcks? we needtogo.Howdoconceive for thecreaturesin thenon-human realm, all sen beings equally.Moreover,therati those withwhoweare inareciprocal relatio

In theafterwordto2011edition ofthe many, butitdoesnotfollowthattheyareallequallyimportant. He onal wayofconceivingthingsthis way implies concerneven of interests? Arethereintere ofinterests? on ofthebook.Hementions many ofthestudies non-sentient entities 37 nship, tomembers ofoursociety,toallhuman entary difficulty inimagining hownon-sentient our moral intuitionsthatseem tobeemotional tient beings.Theproblem,ofcourse,ishowfar this positionandshows affinity towardthe tant objectiontohispreviouslyheldbeliefs. nd arguesthatwhatcan ultimately be assumed re generations tograspif suchinterestsexist. ation toall interests, ny interests thatexist isaposition of moral Expanding Circle r, heacknowledgesthatthereisstillan ill adheres to isthe observation thatevery it regardingnormative truth.Singer,hence, are true, intheform ofobjective reasons for bediscardedinarguments aboutmoral sts ofthenaturalenvironment, have interests. , Singerwithdrawssomeof he isalreadymaking a CEU eTD Collection considering howwetreat eachother. are whatunderliesanydiscussion made truebyapersonindividually accepting them. I 60 notion ofstateneutralitytoward liberalism isdependentonanotionofmoral re about societalorganizationandinstitutional justification. 3.2 equal considerati objective sense,theliberalconcepti we cannotcome totheconclusionthatrationali views wehavetoincorporatein subjectivism more thanitcanaffirmendorsinganyparticularin interests. Atrulydisinterested viewofmoralitycannotaffirm neutralitybetween interestsno which ismarked bytheexistinginterestsandpe represented intheexistingcollection of interests. but alsoinrespecttothe consequences suchastancehasforparticularpreferencespossiblynot all onalimited time scale(andotherproblems asso in terms of theeffect of thepractical difficulties inassessing howtobest further theinterests of wisdom wecanaccept. Theprinciple ofequalcons

Byreferringtomoral subjectivism Idonotmean

Liberal After closelyconsideringSinger’s Since theperiodofEnlightenment, political 60

Moral , nomatter howunappealingwemight think on ofinterests.

and

Political

ourmoralreasoning.Furthermore, different lifestyles andadmits some of morality,andthatwe need to on ofpeopleasfreeandequalfi

Neutrality views,itseems thatthereareelements inhisnewfound 38 rpetuated byfocusingonthesatisfactionofthose alism. Althoughpolitical Itshowsabiasfor the constellation of reality

ty providesasolidbasi toendorsetheviewthat moral values are liberalism hasbeendominating thediscourse ideration ofinterestsisvalue-laden notonly only meantosaythat ourpersonal values ciated withaccountingforthoseinterests), terests. UnlikeSinger, Ifindthatmoral At firstglance,its it, isthelogicalconclusionofhis takethem intoaccountwhen itseems tome that,although ts nicely withhis principle of levelofvariationinhowwe liberalism restsonthe s formorality inan eems astheideaof CEU eTD Collection 61 interference ofthestate The liberalviewofthe neutrality, andwhetherne have longbeenengagedindebate actions iftheyultimately restonclaims about people would bemotivated to respect eachot on thetruthfulnessofmoral proposi settle theirdifferences.Itseems tome thatth expanding theneutralgroundstowhich conflictingpartiesinalibera morality. Third, itpurports toshow thatthe liberal moral andpoliticalneutralityisrequir of people,usingthelanguagethatrejectsmoral objectivism.Moreover, itaims toshowthat realists areabletomeet thedemands ofliberal practices may bejustifiedifobjectivism isfalse. coexistence ofaplural undermining thefabricofsocialrelationsand state neutrality,wecanmaintain asortof the harm principle, forexample. undesirable bythem),minimize andthestate’sroleisto thismoralwrongness,asisreflectedby summum bonum) whichistobe relate tootherpersons,itulti

Mill,JohnStuart,andEdward Alexander. The aimofthissectiontheessayisthreef ity ofworldviews. neutral state,forexample, may thatpeople be submittedtothe demand only ifthatinterference can bejustified on neutralgrounds,appealingto utrality provides a plausible constraint onlegitimateutrality providesaplausibleconstraint laws andpolicies.

mately needs anaccountofasummum malum (asopposedtoa 61 Itismy contentionthat,with s aboutwhetherliberalism iscommitted tosome doctrineof tions isthatitwouldbehard avoidedbyallmembers of On liberty. e underlyingconcernofmora skepticism aboutmoral realism withoutthereby 39 neutrality astherequire ed byanaccountof moral factsthatarenottrue.Politicaltheorists her andwould accept moraljustifications for language ofanti-realism isbettersuitedfor the politicalorderthataccountsforpeaceful Second,itseekstoestablishthatmoral anti- old. First,itsetstoexamine whether liberal

areassessment ofthenotion to constructasocietyinwhich society (andperceivedas society l societyresortinorderto ment forequaltreatment ti-realist conceptionof l realistswhoinsists CEU eTD Collection point ofviewtowhichtheyarebound.” original position,according towhich“thereareno Again, hecompares hisvieww to seeoneselfasboundonlybymoralrequirements offer justifications about theirmoral liberties andob act onjustifiedmoral claims. Suchpersonsempl certain capacity for autonomy; theyhavea capacity that amoral personistheonewhomakesa Gausbeginshisargument byassumingthat others asfreeandequal,in way basedontheiraffirmation ofaparticularconceptionthegood. rather, this neutrality is concer and politicalneutralityisnotaboutbetweendiff Debates inPoliticalPhilosophy 63 Political Philosophy. 62 even utilizethistheory ofreasons, sohecl think thatwecanappeal toatheory ofmora claims onothers,buttheprincipleofequaltrea authenticating” individualsnecessa and theideathateffect public justificationsshouldbeneutral,theclaim thattheaims of According toG.F.Gaus,discussions ofneutra political values andrefraining from justificatio

qtdinGeraldF.Gaus."The MoralFoundations ofLiberalNeutrality." In GeraldF.Gaus."TheMoral FoundationsofLiberalNeutrality."In s ofpolicyshouldbeneutral.

ned withpersonswhicharenottobetreatedinadiscriminatory . thathisviewcloselyresembles ith Rawls’notionoftherationa rily seethemselves asboundto nd actsuponmoral demands. Moralpersonspossessa aims, eventooverrideth l reasonstoensure equal moralfreedom. We can 63 40 Thisviewdoesnotentailthatsuch“self- ns basedondisputedcomprehensive doctrines. oy theirownstandardof lity normally distinguish between the ideathat tment requiresthattheydoso.Gausseems to ligations. Toseeoneselfasfree,heargues,is to disregard theirprivate interests inorder to given antecedentprinciples externaltotheir we sharethe conception of ourselves and thatseem validfrom one’sperspective. 62 Heinsists that his viewof liberal moral erent conceptionsofthegood,but policymakers shouldbeneutral, that ofJohnRawls.Heasserts l autonomy of partiesto the offer justificationsfortheir Contemporary Debatesin e presumption thateach evaluation whenothers Contemporary CEU eTD Collection display neutrality between citizens.“Thejustifi coercive measures. Similarly, whenstateinstitutions arecoercive incharacter, they need to facie wrong,then,althoughgivensufficientreason Principle isabasicmoralcommit moral neutrality withtheideaof implications ofourdisagreement aboutevaluative based notonthedifferencesbe subjects. Ajustificationbasedon demands (thatrequirejustification) mustatleast provide consideration for allmorally relevant reason toaccept. Nevertheless,his reading of Still, some peoplemight beunabletoarticulate standards; thejus person’s demands toanothermust addressed be persons, itisnotamoral principleatall.Hisa the principle isvalidated from theperspectiveof When itcomes topublicjustifications of pr Gaus’ theory demand thattheprinciples be validated by allmembers of themoral public. Unless her ownevaluativestandards. someone exhibiting flawedreasoning thatdoes not reasons givenareparticularlystrong.We canreas person knowsbestwhatisrightfromherownpoi

tification shouldnotdependonthedifferencebetweeneval tween evaluativestandards,but liberalpoliticalneutrality,a ment ofliberalpoliticalphilo a consensusisuncontroversiallyneutral, heasserts, asitis 41 ccount ofliberalmoral ne cation ofthestateofficial’scoercion must not allrationaland reflectiv onably assume thattherearesome instances of liberal moral neutrality suggeststhatmoral s anagentmight haveamoral righttoemploy the kinds of justificati neutral betweentheir respective evaluative nt ofview,onsome specialoccasionsifthe lead tocorrectconclu standards. Gausconnect inciples, therequirement sophy. Coercionisatleastprima nd insiststhattheNon-coercion ontheagreement aboutthe sions even according to ons othersmight have e freeandequalmoral utrality urgesthatone s theideaofliberal s of impartiality in uative standards. CEU eTD Collection Cantheminimally coercive practicesoflib objectivism isfalse? Recall th but Gausmaintains that thisisaradicallydemanding principle. values. Thisprovidesforsome tomeet difficulties therequirements oflibe contends wemight notclashsomuch aboutwhat of thegood.Thereisanotheraspect substantive sharedvaluesthatareamatter of standards. Consensus-based justif Moreover, Gausargues thatitseems reasonable Political Philosophy. 64 claims onothersthatdemand respect,nordo they already implies. Notall personsare moral interests), weseethat dependonthesame kindofcontingentcircumstances asliberalism way astotreatothers asfreeandequal(essen others when weact.Ifreformulate this the existenceofsuchme the basic structure of hisargument remains intact. Thenotionof morality his viewofpoliticalmorality derived from thenotion of equalityof individuals anti-realism. Theaccount ofpoliticalneutrality notion ofvalueswhichareobjectively true,althoughitdoesnotnecessarilyfollow frommoral Greene. Ihavearguedso farthatwe canmaintain treat differentially reasonable and reflective citiz

GeraldF.Gaus."TheMoral FoundationsofLiberalNeutrality."In taphysical moralpropertiesanditis

in anti-realistmetaphys e distinctionbetween morality ications might notalwaysbeavailable,buttheremight be whichneedstobeconsideredatthispoint,however. Gaus 2 , theydonotunderstandthem claim,andarguethatpeoplewhoaremoral overlapping consensus of everyone’s conceptions overlappingconsensusofeveryone’sconceptions 42 en’s differences in theirevaluativestandards.” tially, toshow some elementary carefor their to presume that citizen in the sense of political morality. If weground outlined byGausis avalueladen concept, concernforotherpeople is valuable,butaboutth seeothersasmoral persons.But thismuch ics aboutmoral propert eral political neutrality bejustified if 1 about consideringtheinterestsof and morality Contemporary Debatesin s sharemany evaluative selves aspressingmoral e orderingofdifferent ral political neutrality, 2 isnotdependanton even if wereject the 2 offeredbyJoshua ies, Icontendthat 2 actina 64

CEU eTD Collection with thisaccountofliberal neut equal observation thatourinterestsare,rationallyconsid we arenotattempting tobridge as freeand equal.We neednot already haveavaluepremise –liberalism rests property ofneutralitysupervenesonthedescrip cannot beendorsedasameta-ethical positionassuchwithoute rational basisforouractionguidingprinciples liberalism.The reasonbehindourrejectingtheprin consideration of interests first developedbySingermight regain approximation ofthebesttruemoralprinci lead tomisunderstanding andconf different moralprincipleswhicharemere appr principles. Andwewouldbe,as weoften undoubtedly giverationalizations ofourintuiti truths. Moraltruthsmight turnouttobequitedis anti-realism. Ifmoral realism wascorrect, wew Moreover, itseems tomethatliberalmoral neutra first ordermoralarguments, althoughtheyar which ariseontheseaccountsdependourevalua of peopleasfreeandequal(which Gaus’ (andRawls’)alreadyadmits byframing the

(invirtueofbeingours)as require areductionistexplanation rality? Ifweclosely rality? other interests. Isthelanguage of moral anti-realism compatible the is-oughtgap.Yet,wearesuddenlyleftnot onlywiththe lict (asothers rationalize thatadifferent principle isabetter isimplicit in liberal societies). Thevalidity of obligations are onobjectivist accounts, overwhelmed with 43 on theassumptionofourunderstandingpeople ple). Ontheotherhand,viewofequal oximations oftruemoral principlesandwhich wasthatitavalue-laden concept which ould notbeguaranteedtohaveaccessmoral tive propertiesofinterests.Here,however,we e notgroundedinfact tinct from ourintuitions attimes, andwecould lity isrequired ifweaccepttheimplications of ons whichdepartfrom thetrulyvaluable theory to suitthosewhosharetheconception ered, justoneofmany,butthattheyarealso tion of them against the background of other tion ofthemagainstthebackgroundother ciple ofequalconsiderat consider Gaus’elaboration ofliberalmoral xplanation of how the evaluative xplanation ofhowthe of thesupervenie some appealinthedomain of aboutmoralreality. ion ofinterestasa nce relationas CEU eTD Collection 66 their actions. normative implications,andthatis inasmuch as factual claim,butIdothink thatthereisat 65 sphere. Thevalueofautonomy (oranexperimental attitudetowarddiffere the highestvaluesinprivatesphereshouldco that Kantianliberalism (evenotherforms ofcla to expandthe scopeofagreement infaceofdisa private sphereoflifeindividu the differentconceptionsofgood,astheyaresupposedtobeentirelyremoved from the outcomes. with statements whichclearly reflect theirnature. notions ofwhatis“just” or“unjust”, itseems asthelanguage ofrealism needstobereplaced claims areanexpression ofourprivate desires. in theform ofrights.Ibelievewewouldavoi people express theirpreferencesregarding aparticul reconsidered. Ibelievethereisnocleardefinite behind these statements. However, theappeal to“rights” assuch, perhaps,needs tobe by allliberalpeople,andIdonot in oureverydaycommunication. The general appealneednotreflect reality Iamadvocating. Ihave and politicalneutrality,weseeth

Larmore, CharlesE..Patterns of moralcomplexity Idonotmean totakeanyparticularpositionon Charles Larmore argues infavor ofpoliticalneutrality as procedure, notatthelevel of 66 Hepositsthatpoliti

the languageofanti-realism, as cal valuesshouldnotbeconstr als. Instead,theyareneutralgr arguedpreviouslythattheva at onlyafewterms seem tobe feel obligedtoinsistthatwealwaysunderliethemetaphysics normative claim thatpersons arefree leastoneunderstanding oftheterm which has d misunderstanding ifwema 44 ssical liberalism) suffered it implies thatoneoughttoberesponsible for greement inthepluralist society.Larmoreargues Likewise, aslongth whetherthe claim thatpersons arefreeisa notion ofwhat“rights” rrespond tothepoliticalneutralityinpublic . ar issue they are inclin ued as a common denominator for ued asacommondenominator for they allowforsome convenience ound towhichretreatinorder contradicting the view of moral contradicting theviewofmoral lues which haveconsiderably ere arewidelydisputed entail, andwhenmany from asuppositionthat 65 ed tolaytheirclaims de itclearthatthose nt lifestyles,asMill andequalisshared CEU eTD Collection there isnomoralimperative inmy accountofanti- moral equal that wecanassumesome basicvaluestobe present. We cansimply takeitfor granted that It isalreadycontained in ournotionof morality peace witheachother. acceptable explanationthatitisin withdraw toneutralgroundwhen regarding why thecitizensshould continuethis state thatfostersthiskindofbehaviorisneut values, suchasrationalconversa about theGood. Larmore concedesthatparticipan take theform of Kantiancomprehensive liberalis political liberalism insupportofhisview,main liberalism accountof isnota“philosophyofman”,butpoliticalphilosophy.HeoffersRawls’ rejects this viewof liberalism classical liberalism, claiming that the anti-liberal critique (political romanticism, sphere, whichleavesthisapproach doctrines, but not necessarily the principle, favorthevalueofau aims neutraltowardcontroversialco tobe argued) is,hence,emphasized andinvokedindefens

2 anti-realistsvaluecompromise based on I believehis lastclaim canalsobereconciled tonomy (whichcanbeanimportant valueinmany comprehensive , andinsiststhatliberalindi tion abouttheirdisputesandmutu itleadsto“individualism” and to liberalism vulnerable tocri order tofosterasenseofco settlingdisagreements. Heo highest value), it istransposed totherealm of theprivate mprehensive doctrinesof 45 2 andourliberalconceptionofpeopleasfree in Larmore’s terms) focusesonthisaspectof ral. Themore interesting viewof Larmore is taining thatRawls’originalpositionneednot their careforother rationalconversation m, asitis notthebasi realism, mymission istoreconcilethenotion e ofmany acute disputes withtherejectionofobjectivemoral values. ts inaliberalsocietyalreadysharesome vidualism isonlypolitical,and mmunity andoutofadesirefor ticism, Larmore asserts.Mostof atomization of society.Larmore ffers a straightforward,easily ffers a al respect,andinsiststhatthe thegoodlifecannot,in human beings.Although s forarrivingattruth with each other,and . Sincethestatethat CEU eTD Collection 67 fromcommon ground whichpublicpoliciescan ber toward themoralstatusofpeopleasfreeande in terms ofpoliticalvalues.Th people whichallowsfortheuseofrealist langua think ouropponentislyingorcolor-blind).Th have thepropertyofbeinggreenandtheyinsistarered,wedonotseekcompromise, but unreasonable forpointingoutthetr fundamentalists. When wearespeakingaboutma moral integrity. Thisdisagreement neednotbe presents theirfindingasobjectiv the same kindofintuitions, ortheirintuitionsl have discussedpreviously,thismight beduetothefactthat on theirmoral intuitions willoften fail topersuade concerned withthatview.)It some moralbeliefs are thekindof th moral truth-value-whichisthe truth isinherentinthenotionofmoralrealism.(Therea conflicts Ihavewithpeoplewhodisagreeme subjective preferencebutthewaythingsreally If Iwantacertainstateofaffa chapters, Ihave alreadyoutlined theviewthat of moral

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter."Moral Skepticism." 2 anti-realism withtheliberal principle of ne

is reasonabletoassume thatpe e overlapping consensus seems tocaptureourshared sensibilities irs toobtain,and Ibelievethat this isnotmerely amatter of my e truth,onerisksarousingdoubtsabouttheirsincerityoreven claim thatnosubstantivemoralbe uth (ifweexplaintosomeone ing thatcouldbetrueorfalse. ead them in the outright opposite direction. If one ead themintheoutright oppositedirection.Ifone 46 the languageofmoral rea qual. However,Ibelieve ere isobviouslysome consensusamongliberal ge whichisstillable conceivedofasthatbetweenunreasonable ought tobe,Iam toperpetuatethe destined . Thebeliefthatonereallyhasaccesstomoral others about thevalidityof theirclaims. AsI tters offact,wedonotconsiderourselves utrality, as given. In one of the previous utrality, asgiven.Inoneoftheprevious easonably justifiedifweweretoseek ople whooffervalidreasonsbased nother kindofskepticism -about people assigndifferentweightsto that theleavesandgrass lief istrueorfalsealthough to providecommonground that wecanexpandthe lism promotes conflict. 67 Iam presentlynot CEU eTD Collection emotional gut reactions. hypothesis offeredbyHaidtthatou compromise. Thispoint isespecially important if the future studies continue to affirm the

r moral judgments are,essen 47 tially, rationalizations of our tially, rationalizationsofour CEU eTD Collection our conceptionofmorality answer iswhatfurthergoals weshouldpromot reflection of oursubjectivebe agreement, wearebetteroffexpressingmoral cl when thereisafar-reachingagreement aboutcerta Likewise, Ihavearguedthatwe interests are1)justoneofma portrayals of peopleas freeandequalprovide uswithpremises toaffirm theviewthatour morality, but thatwecaninvokeitintherea principle ofequalconsiderationinterestsis moral intuitionswhichwereshapedbyblindevol believe these differencesofopinionwillpersistbecausethey reflectthe inconsistency ofour society (Irejecttheview thatthedisagreement that does notensurethatthereasoningitofferswill set forourselves.Constructivism doesnotco doubts thatthelanguageofconstructivism yieldsth (metaphysical) moral skepticism is but Ihavearguedthatitraisessome legitimate of moralskepticism andsketchedoutsome po political neutrality.Ihavepresen virtue ofinexistencemetaphysical moral pr CONCLUDING

The purposeofthisessaywastoreconcilethenotionmo

REMARKS (politicalorotherwise), assuming liefs. Finally, the most pressi

ny, butalsothat2)theyare need notreplacethelanguageof ted Greene’sarguments forwhatI able towithstandchargesagains mmit itselftodubiousmetaphysical claims, butit not arationalbasisforthemetaphysical natureof 48 e andwhatparticularnor tential challengesanti-r questions andthatatleastsome formof weaker lm of liberal political morality becauseliberal lm ofliberalpoliticalmorality operties, withthenotio represent thebeliefsofasignificantportion aims interms itmakes itclear that theyare a arisesissolelyduetoinaccuratereasoning.I utionary processes).I e bestresultsforthegoalsthatwedecideto in values,butthatabsenceofsuchan ng openquestionwhichIdidnot we alreadycarefor equally importantasanyother. moral realism incircumstances t it.Ihavefurtherexpressed deem tobeaviableversion ral anti-realism, defined in ealism mightencounter, n ofliberalmoral and ms weshouldadoptin have claimed thatthe the interests of CEU eTD Collection early age, yet seems quitemysterious and elusive. moral claimsseems likeabasicdrive ofcuriosity what peoplebelieve. claims aretrueisnottodenyth language ofmoralrealismmight beappropriate.Ialsofindthatto instances inwhichweareclear aretalking ought todointhecontextofour live in.Likewise,Ididnotmean tosuggestthatthereisnof There is, Iassume, somemerit inthis approach, as their theories for the people whoalready implicitl granted, and thatthey are,infact,amajority of foundation. Ihaveindulgedmyself we ridourselvesofthevaluesalreadyhol nihilism characterizedbylackofscruplesin ability forabstractreasoning,anditseems highly that atleast some moralclaims are necessarily conceptually, wearenotindangerofbecomi be moral?” Ihaveinsisted that depending onthecontext). where thetrade-offsneedtobemade toarra others. Thisisthegroundformuch discussionin

We might findthatthestudyofmoralityhas In thisessayIdidnotaimtoestablishmora at therearenobroader , regardless of how weresolve the issue of moral motivation desires,orwhich actionsar to takethecondition thatthereareexisting moral peoplefor their conduct.Iamnotinanywayadvocatingthat ng immoralbydistancingourselvesfrom theview nge ourmoral livesinamoreconcreteway(and anygivensociety;much 49 true. Human moralinstinct d, justthattheydonothaveanymetaphysical about hypotheticalimpera unlikely thatanti y sharethenotionofpeopl theframework of moralanti-realism, asitis Forthemoral anti-realist this inquiry should, about thatinwhichweare embroiled from an itseems toresemble theactualsocieties we l obligationsoranswerthequestionof“why its ownrewards.Seekingoutthenatureof truths aboutmorality, ortruthsregarding act ofthematter aboutwhatwe e favoredbyourvalues.Inany denythatallfirstordermoral -realists wouldexhibitradical like the liberals develop developspriortoour tives, theuseof e asfreeandequal. CEU eTD Collection on theotherhand,isone relation withthenon-moral worldprovesonlywehave in principle, neverstop. Ourinability to loca

whothinkstheirinquiryhascome toanend. 50 te orconceptualizemoral propertiesandtheir

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