Corporate Manslaughter: Where Are We Now?
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CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER: WHERE ARE WE NOW? By Prashant Popat “This Government is committed to delivering safe and secure communities, at home and in the workplace, and to a criminal justice system that commands the confidence of the public. A fundamental part of this is providing offences that are clear and effective. The current laws on corporate manslaughter are neither, as a number of unsuccessful prosecutions over the years stand testament.” (Charles Clarke, March 2005) 1. Reforming the laws on corporate manslaughter were Labour Party pledges in the manifestos of both 1997 and 2001. Shortly before last year’s election the Government published its draft Bill to do just that. It has now undergone scrutiny by the Home Affairs and Works and Pensions Select Committees. In March 2006, the Government published its response to the Committees’ recommendations, concluding: “The Committees urged the Government to proceed with legislation this Parliamentary session. We remain strongly committed to reforming this important area of the law and intend to legislate without delay as soon as Parliamentary time allows.” 2. In July of last year, the bill was finally laid before Parliament and is entering the final phases of enactment. This paper considers the proposed legislation, with particular regard to whether it will achieve the improvement of UK health and safety which must be its primary aim. The second half of this paper will consider how the draft Bill reflects a broader trend for more rigorous health and safety enforcement in recent years and identifies how companies should prepare for its implementation. The first step is to consider the existing law on involuntary manslaughter. 1 The current law on involuntary manslaughter 3. Corporations can be liable for involuntary manslaughter if an individual is identified as the embodiment of the company, its directing mind, and that individual himself is guilty of manslaughter. Where such an individual is convicted the company can be regarded as having acted recklessly or in a grossly negligent manner and to have caused the death. The requirement to identify such an individual is known as the doctrine of “identification”. 4. The task of identifying an individual in a substantial corporation who can be described as a directing mind, who was grossly negligent and whose negligence actually caused the death in question can be very difficult, due in no small part to the skill of company secretaries in setting up complex corporate structures. 5. In such corporations the power and control usually rests with board directors or very senior managers. They are unlikely to have sufficient involvement in the day to day activities of the corporation to enable the prosecution to show they were responsible for the relevant management or system failure. The more diffuse the corporate structure, the wider the company’s activities and the larger the organisation the harder it is to join the necessary links in the chain to mount a successful prosecution. 6. The consequence of these difficulties is that there have been few prosecutions for corporate manslaughter. Between 1992 and 2005 3,425 workers were killed. Yet over that period there have been only 34 prosecutions for work-related manslaughter. Of these, only 7 organisations were convicted of gross negligence manslaughter; all of them were small companies.i 7. The number of higher profile disasters where there was either no prosecution for corporate manslaughter or no successful prosecution has led to much public 2 dissatisfaction. The Herald of Free Enterprise, the Kings Cross Fire, Clapham, Southall, Ladbroke Grove and, most recently, Hatfield are but some examples. Demands for change • Law Commission to publish its Proposals in a report of 1996, no. 237 “Legislating the code: involuntary manslaughter” 8. These difficulties led the Law Commission to publish its Proposals in a report of 1996, no. 237 “Legislating the code: involuntary manslaughter”. These proposals recommended a new offence of corporate killing with the focus sharpened on the corporate entity itself. Its basic premise was that if it could be said that the corporation was (grossly) negligent in the way it might be in a civil claim, the corporation could be liable for the offence of corporate killing. The essential requirement of the proposed offence was that there should have been a management failure which caused death. 9. The Commission’s proposals received much publicity and appeared to have political support yet were not taken beyond the stage of being proposals. • Attempts to alter the test: Southall and Hatfield 10. Following the Southall crash in 1997 the train operator, GWT, was prosecuted for corporate manslaughter. The prosecution sought to argue that the elements of the offence of corporate manslaughter had changed following a decision of the House of Lordsii in the prosecution of an individual for manslaughter. It was argued that there was no longer any need to identify a controlling mind who was also guilty of manslaughter. It was possible, the prosecution contended, to convict the company if there had been a serious breach of its personal duty to the deceased. This was an attempt to remove the problem caused by the identification doctrine – the prosecution essentially wanted to be able to bring criminal charges in the same way as a plaintiff could bring civil proceedings. The prosecution failed at first instance. The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower Court’s decision, preserving the 3 identification principle and the need to establish the guilt of a human individual before a non-human could be convicted.iii 11. In a new attempt to alter the manslaughter test and in light of the rulings in the Southall case that it was still necessary to convict a directing mind, the prosecution following the Hatfield case sought to argue that the directing mind could be somebody in middle management as long as they had autonomy over their role and/or budget. In other words the directing mind could be directing one small part of the operations of the company. The prosecution argued that in the modern commercial world this was a necessary interpretation of the directing mind test where large organizations were often run by separate departments or units. The corporate manslaughter charge against Network Rail was dismissed and, half-way through the trial, the judge held that there was no case for Balfour Beatty to answer on corporate manslaughter. At the time, Mr Justice Mackay stated that the case “continue[d] to underline the pressing need for the long-delayed reform of the law in this area of unlawful killing.” • Increasing demands 12. The failure of the Southall and Hatfield prosecutions has intensified demands from victims for a change in the law of corporate killing. It is believed by a vociferous amalgam of groups, aided and abetted by the press, that there is an urgent need to hold corporations criminally accountable for the consequences of “accidents” and some believe that the threat of such accountability will lead to improved safety. 13. The Government recognised the increasing agitation regarding the apparent inability to prosecute large corporations for their involvement in various high- profile disasters. This led to the 2000 proposals. 4 A history of the draft Bill • The 2000 Home Office proposals 14. The 2000 Home Office proposals on involuntary homicide proposed new manslaughter offences and other associated offences. The proposals built upon the report of the Law Commission. They concerned the offences of involuntary manslaughter against the individual as well as corporations. • Proposed additional criminal offence so that officers of the undertaking who contributed substantially to the management failure resulting in death were to be liable to a penalty of imprisonment or a fine in separate criminal proceedings. 15. Under the 2000 proposals it was proposed that, where an undertaking is guilty of corporate killing, there should be an additional criminal offence so that officers of the undertaking who contributed substantially to the management failure resulting in death were to be liable to a penalty of imprisonment or a fine in separate criminal proceedings. There was concern that the new proposals would lack force without the availability of a punitive sanction to be used against individuals. • Impact assessment in late 2002 by the Home Office Sentencing and Offences Unit 16. In late 2002, the Home Office Sentencing and Offences Unit conducted an assessment of the potential effects of the proposed changes on the private sector by consulting with selected industries with a fatal and major injuries rate of over 250 per 100,000 employees over the last five years. During this assessment it was indicated that further consideration had been given to the area of enforcement against companies and their officers. Consequently there were two significant changes in the Government’s policy proposals. First, the proposal that when an undertaking is found guilty of manslaughter, individual directors or other officers can be held individually liable was removed. Secondly, the proposal that officers of a corporation who contributed to the management failure could be disqualified from holding a management post anywhere in England was similarly abandoned. 5 • The Select Committees of the Department of Work and Pensions and the Department of Home Affairs Corporate Manslaughter sub-committee. 17. The Select Committees of the Department of Work and Pensions and the Department of Home Affairs set up a Corporate Manslaughter sub-committee and over 6 sessions took evidence from 29 organisations and individuals on the then draft Bill which had been produced. Those giving evidence included industry bodies trades unions, pressure groups, lawyers, academics and the CBI. They also received 163 written submissions. 18. The Committee published its 117 page final report in December 2005. Having welcomed the Government’s proposal to reform the law of manslaughter, the Committee recommended a number of changes to the proposals contained in the draft Bill.