DOI: https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v8i2.35867
’Epistemology Naturalized’ and the Vienna Circle [’Epistemologia Naturalizada’ e o Círculo de Viena]
Thomas Uebel*
Abstract: This paper considers W.V.O. Quine’s inauguration of naturalistic epistemology at the 14th International Congress of Philosophy in Vienna in 1969 and argues that, contrary to his suggestions, naturalistic epistemology was practiced in the Vienna Circle already back in the days when he visited them fresh out of graduate school. Keywords: Naturalistic Epistemology. Logical Empiricism. Quine. Carnap. Neurath.
Resumo: Este artigo analisa o início da epistemologia naturalista de W.V.O. Quine, no 14o Congresso Internacional de Filosofia em Viena, em 1969 e argumenta que, ao contrário de suas sugestões, a epistemologia naturalista já era praticada no Círculo de Viena no tempo em que ele o visitava, recém-saído da pós-graduação. Palavras-chave: Epistemologia naturalista. Empirismo lógico. Quine. Carnap. Neurath.
1. Introduction Carnap’s, like the analytic/synthetic distinction or the distinction between W.V.O. Quine’s " Epistemology Natura- internal and external questions, that lized" was presented as an invited ad- Quine focused on. Now, however, it dress at the Fourteenth International was time to work on a larger canvass, to Congress of Philosophy on 9th Septem- pull together different strands in a pro- ber 1968 in Vienna, Austria. By an grammatic pronouncement that was to author who knew how to mark an oc- set an entire branch of philosophy on casion this paper did not disappoint. a new path. How better to stage such More than once before the philosophers a departure than by invoking, now as of the Vienna Circle whom Quine had genii loci, his " teacher and friend" of visited fresh out of graduate school, old and his former colleagues in the Vi- had served as foil for his own divergent enna Circle? So once more Quine set ideas in his earlier publications. Mostly out to revisit the Aufbau, even the Cir- it had been particular tenets of Rudolf cle’s protocol sentence debate, in order
*Professor Emeritus at University of Manchester. Research interests in Epistemology, General Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Social Science and in History of Analytic Philosophy and History of Philosophy of Science. E-mail: tho- [email protected]. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5414-235X.
Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, Brasília, v.8, n.2, ago. 2020, p. 157-175 157 ISSN: 2317-9570 THOMAS UEBEL to contrast his own radical reorienta- on what the later Carnap got up to and tion of philosophy with theirs which, what his colleagues on the so-called left he suggested, was still stuck, for all of wing of the Circle did. its revolutionary flavor, in traditional When these questions are investiga- ways. ted more closely, it can be seen that The story Quine related that day by introducing naturalistic epistemo- stuck pretty well and seemed to con- logy to the world in Vienna in 1968 firm the death of logical positivism or Quine was not exactly taking coals to empiricism then already diagnosed in Newcastle-but he got pretty close. To reference works.1 The few scholars be sure, the devastation that Austro- who brought news from dusty archi- fascism and Nazism had wrought on ves that matters weren’t quite as neat the academic landscape in Vienna en- as all that were told to get out more sured that even locals were not aware or simply ignored. Thus still today in of this. In fact, it was not until the 1982 even as normally reliable repositories Moritz Schlick and Otto Neurath Cen- of philosophical learning as the Stan- tenarium conference, also in Vienna, ford Encyclopedia one can read under that C. G. Hempel recalled Neurath as " Naturalism in Epistemology" that " the a naturalistic philosopher (1982).3 Car- logical empiricists approached episte- nap’s naturalism-or better: the natura- mology, as other areas, as a matter of a listic potential of Carnap’s philosophy- priori ’rational reconstruction’, in Car- took still longer to be uncovered, as we nap’s famous phrase". With a brief refe- will see. I begin with what Quine told rence to the Aufbau the case was closed. the 1968 Congress before surveying the But is the Aufbau the only or even the lines of inquiry concerning Carnap that most representative work of Carnap’s a full investigation would have to con- and is Carnap the only philosopher of sult in depth. This includes a brief re- note or relevance in the Vienna Circle view of the case for Neurath’s natura- in the present context?2 Both of these lism in relation to which Carnap’s phi- questions matter quite centrally for the losophy must be viewed to appreciate issue of the relation between episte- its naturalistic potential. mological naturalism and logical po- sitivism/empiricism for it largely turns
1See, e.g., Passmore (1967, p.52). I use “logical positivism” and “logical empiricism” interchangeably. As I understand it, the difference the terms denoted at the time were but passing local rivalries; see Uebel (2011). 2See Rysview (2016). Which in other respects is very informative—also refers to Reichenbach’s Experience and Prediction and his take on the distinction of the contexts of inquiry—discovery v. justification—as unproblematically representative. It isn’t and it also matters for the question of the nature of the naturalism championed in the Circle, if any; see Uebel (2000). 3A few years later Dirk Koppelberg deepened the message: see his (1987) and (1990). On the state of Austrian philosophy in the 1950s see Haller (1983).
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2. Quine on Carnap, 1968 can be less than adequately informa- tive, imagine Quine to be remembered only as a radical nominalist who wan- Whatever else must be said about it, let ted to do away with numbers.) me start by saying that " Epistemology The next thing to note is that we must Naturalized" is a magnificent paper: not read Quine as saying more than he sufficiently broad in its historical sweep actually did. Thus the Stanford article across the centuries to impress upon suggests that for Quine the Vienna Cir- its audience the momentous occasion cle pursued the " Cartesian quest for its proposals represent, yet detailed certainty [as] a remote motivation of enough with its analogies to the abor- epistemology, both on its conceptual tive reductive programmes of the past and its doctrinal side". This overlooks to induce a conviction in the audience that Quine conceded that Carnap had that the diagnosis presented is sound abandoned this " as a lost cause" and enough and holds a deep moral for phi- was motivated instead " to elicit and losophy if we ever want to escape the clarify the sensory evidence for science" perennial doldrums. and so to " deepen our understanding So how did Quine portray the logical of our discourse of the world" (QUINE, positivists of the Vienna Circle here? 1969, p. 74-5). Relatedly Quine spoke Well, he did not exactly misrepresent of Russell’s external world programme, them-though he did make one egregi- when he likened Carnap’s Aufbau pro- ous mistake-but he certainly did not ject to it, as aiming to " account for the tell the whole story. That as in his pre- external world as a logical construct vious writings his main focus was Car- of sense data" (CARNAP. 1969, p.74): nap is not surprising since, for better or there is notable room for interpreta- worse Carnap was logical positivism for tion in this formulation. With regard to him; more to the point is that Quine’s Carnap then, perhaps even to Russell, Carnap is not the whole of Carnap. Of Quine very carefully stopped short of course, it was not Quine’s job to be com- attributing the traditional foundationa- prehensive, but his selective focus does list project by stressing the elucidatory point up a very general feature of the import of the reductive projects under- common view of logical positivism-a taken (and in addition cleared Carnap feature concerning which the rhetorical of infallibilist yearnings). scene-settings of Quine’s papers (here Now the first we hear of and about and in " Two Dogmas") are not wholly Carnap himself in " Epistemology Na- innocent. That is that logical positivism turalized" is indeed as the author of is remembered for its early theoretical the book that came " nearest" to reali- starting points, not for the mature po- zing the Russellian external world pro- sitions reached later. (To see that this
Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, Brasília, v.8, n.2, ago. 2020, p. 157-175 159 ISSN: 2317-9570 THOMAS UEBEL gram (QUINE, 1969 p.74), Der logische reduction of physical object discourse Aufbau der Welt (translated as The Lo- to talk of (constructed) sense data fai- gical Structure of the World. Herafter: led: there was no one-to-one mapping Aufbau, 1928). That’s fair enough in from the latter to the former. Yet this a way, given the qualifications we just time Quine also pointed out what " Two saw Quine slipping in. However, we Dogmas" did not-and what some rea- must add that recent scholarship has ders of his address evidently missed- conclusively established that there is namely that it was not doctrinal cer- far more to the Aufbau than that. Even tainty but merely translational reduc- if we discount its syncretist tendency to tion was Carnap’s point.5 To be sure, merge a great variety of disparate phi- this still leaves entirely unaddressed losophical tendencies and focus only on what one may wish to obtain transla- its reductionist strategy of establishing tional reduction for and unwary rea- a genealogy for all empirical concepts ders easily jump to the conclusion that on the basis of that of remembered si- it was for foundationalist designs. (Car- milarity alone, even then we must note nap’s structuralist program demanded that its overarching ambition was the that a radical reductionism succeeded attempt to prove that from such me- even more than a foundationalist one ager starting points an intersubjective would.) world could be constructed. The aim Whether intended or not, other as- was to demonstrate that " even though pects of " Epistemology Naturalized" the subjective origin of all knowledge subtly encourages readers in this. Not lies in the contents of experiences and too much seems objectionable in the their connections, it is still possible . . . description of the Aufbau just surveyed, to advance to an intersubjective, objec- but what, for instance, raises eyebrows tive world, which can be conceptually is that Quine interspersed it with his comprehended and which is identical weighty remark that an epistemolo- for all observers" (1928, §2, 7). To achi- gist’s " scruples against circularity have eve this aim Carnap sought an exclu- little point once we have stopped dre- sively structural characterization of all aming of deducing science from ob- empirical concepts.4 servations" (QUINE, 1969, p.76)-as if Still Quine was right to point out (as it had been the point of Carnap’s ra- in " Two Dogmas") that and why the tional reconstructions to save science Aufbau’s reductive aim, whatever its from skepticism. That, of course, is not ambitions, was frustrated at §126. The something naturalistic epistemologists
4This reading of the Aufbau was pioneered by Friedman (1987) and (1991) and Richardson (1998), admittedly many years after Quine’s foundationalist reading become common coin. 5Note also Quine’s later disavowal of Carnap’s concern with certainty at (1995, p.13).
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Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, Brasília, v.8, n.2, ago. 2020, p. 157-175 161 ISSN: 2317-9570 THOMAS UEBEL honorary naturalists!6 tained until he found a way of accom- Now it may be objected that the modating Neurath’s incessant criticism emphasis of Quine’s contrast here with of it without giving in to what he fea- Carnap and the logical positivists lies red as "psychologism".8 (In contempo- on the indeterminacy of translation rary epistemology the standpoint Car- and that the force of his contrast deri- nap abandoned is known as the thesis ves from this. Now that doctrine can of the epistemic priority of experiential indeed be usefully considered to be over physical knowledge; in its place Quine’s final reply to Carnap in their he pursued a radically de-personalized long debate about meaning and the accounts of propositional justification.) adequacy of extensionalism generally, Aha, you may say, here is the smoking a reply given after Carnap had delive- gun: Carnap’s Fregean inheritance- red, in 1955, the behavioral criteria for surely anti-psychologism is incompa- analyticity that Quine had long asked tible with naturalism! Well yes, on its for.7 But however much the indetermi- own it certainly is, but what is of cru- nacy of translation is part of Quine’s cial importance is the context or type philosophy, one must question whether of inquiry that anti-psychologism is ap- indeterminacy is part of the standard plied to. Carnap applied it to the logic kit of epistemological naturalists. On of science so it becomes a central issue this account, Quine seems to have made how this logic of science is located in more of a de facto difference of view that unified science generally. (I will come what it merited. back to this.) The contrast Quine drew next Finally, there are Quine’s remarks on between Carnap’s declaring " the ban- the Vienna Circle’s debate about so- kruptcy of epistemology" and the na- called protocol sentences-scientific evi- turalistic attitude that Neurath’s simile dence statements-over " what to count expressed for Quine is also misleading. as observation sentences". When Carnap officially dropped epis- temology for the logic of science in the One position was that they had mid-1930s he did not abandon con- the form of reports of sense im- cern with evidence for scientific asser- pressions. Another was that tions, rather he abandoned for good the they were statement of an ele- standpoint of methodological solipsism mentary sort about the exter- he had adopted in the Aufbau and re- nal world, e.g., ’A red cube is
6Notable enough, Quine’s later “Two Dogmas Revisited” (1991) also failed to note that Carnap endorsed holism of testing. 7Quine’s later “Two Dogmas Revisited” also failed to note that by (1955) Carnap had provided “empirical criteria for semantic concepts” as demanded (2004, p.61). 8See Carnap (1936a) and, for discussion, Richardson (1996) and Uebel (2018).
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standing on the table.’ Another, determined by the data we have form Neurath’s, was that they had them. Pragmatic considerations helped the form of reports of relations make up Carnap’s mind in late 1932 to between percipients and exter- declare that observance of methodolo- nal things: ’Otto now sees a red gically solipsist strictures was no lon- cube on the table.’ The worst of ger mandatory but merely optional.11 it was that there seemed to be These reasons were firmed up on pu- no objective way of settling the rely logical grounds when he settled matter: no way of making real on his considered view of the matter in sense of the question. (QUINE, "Testability and Meaning". There Car- 1969, p.85) nap stated explicitly that what he cal- led the "phenomenological" language "is a purely subjective one, suitable for And Quine went on: " Let us now try soliloquy only, while the intersubjec- to view the matter unreservedly in the tive thing-language is suitable for use context of the external world." Never among di erent subjects" (CARNAP, mind that Quine telescoped many ye- ff 1936-37, p.10). While it was possible ars of debate into two papers by Car- to design so-called reduction senten- nap and Neurath that were published ces that relate expressions of the thing- in the same issue of Erkenntnis in De- language to expressions in the pheno- cember 1932. What does he mean by menal language, Carnap argued that it " unreservedly in the context of the ex- was impossible to construct the former ternal world"? That is precisely how on the basis of the latter or e ect a " re- Neurath viewed the matter (whose pre- ff translation" of the former into the latter ferred protocols were also far more (CARNAP, 1936-37, p.464). For the re- complicated than reported here).9 construction of the language of unified Only for Carnap was there "no ob- science, phenomenal languages were jective way of settling the matter" be- unsuitable. In consequence, the terms cause on this, his first exercise avant to be used in protocol sentences had la lettre of his famed principle of logi- to be both intersubjectively confirma- cal tolerance10 - he rightly noted that ble and intersubjectively observable.12 metatheoretical distinctions are under-
9For a detailed analysis of the Vienna Circle’s protocol-sentence debate, see Uebel (2007). For Neurath’s own view of protocol statements, see Neurath (1983) and Uebel (2009). 10“The Principle of Tolerance: It is not our business to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions. . . . In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e., his own form of language, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments. ” Carnap (1934a/1937, §17). 11Carnap declared it a merely pragmatic question which of “two methods for constructing the language of science which are both possible and justified” (1932c/1987, 457) are to be chosen: the one with a phenomenalist or the one with a physicalist basis. 12On the latter point there obtained a disagreement with Neurath; for its resolution see Uebel (2015).
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Consider now what discipline Carnap is itself pre-naturalistic Quine and so there assigned to the job of determining irrelevant, but the fluidity postulated what the intersubjectively confirmable there between not only science and "observable predicates" were that dis- common sense but especially scientific tinguished the protocol sentences: psy- theorizing and ontology at least presa- chology! Could naturalists do better? ges and contains in nuce his later natu- Now, as I said, Quine’s founding pa- ralism.13 In any case, Quine’s portrayal per for naturalistic epistemology does of Carnap there is highly significant not misrepresent Carnap as a rabid for that is the unspoken background of anti-naturalist. But just as it does not " Epistemology Naturalized". let on that already for Neurath himself We already noted the neglect on the boat simile was an emblem of na- Quine’s part of Carnap’s post- Aufbau turalism, it also characterizes Carnap’s holism in the second part of " Two Dog- position in ways that discourage anyone mas". The first part likewise invidi- looking even only for traits of compati- ously moulds readers’ perceptions, now bility with naturalism in his philosophy of Carnap’s conception of analyticity. of science. That said, more recently To begin with there’s one of Quine’s Quine again dropped previously made memorable bon mots. " Meaning is qualifications and breezily asserted that what essence becomes when it is di- " [v]arious epistemologists, from Des- vorced from the object of reference cartes to Carnap, had sought a founda- and wedded to the word." (1951/1980, tion for natural science in mental enti- p.22) However deflating of the anti- ties, the flux of raw sense data" (2005, metaphysical ambitions of the neopo- p.276), but I shall regard this as an aber- sitivists this may have been intended ration. to be, what we must ask is whether it captures how Carnap thought of mea- ning: was he an essentialist about it? Likewise consider Quine’s conclusion 3. Quine on Carnap, 1951 that drawing the analytic/synthetic dis- tinction at all is " a metaphysical arti- Once we bring in " Two Dogmas", where cle of faith" (1951/1980, p.37): what’s Carnap is still more sharply characteri- so metaphysical about analyticity for zed in oppositional terms, the prospect Carnap? Quine’s answer presuma- for recognizing any affinity of his-or bly comes in his assertion that analy- his Vienna Circle colleagues-with na- tic statements " hold come what may" turalism is further diminished. Now (1951/1980, p.43). it may be objected that " Two Dogmas"
13On the development of Quine’s naturalistic outlook mainly in the 1950s, see Verhaegh (2018).
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But this is a far cry from Carnap’s national Encyclopedia of Unified Sci- view who made very clear that analyti- ence and heartily approved of (it was city " is not adequately characterized as first published as Number 2 of volume ’held true come what may’" (CARNAP, of II in 1962), but also that Carnap de- 1963, p.921). We must, he stated, care- signated the first change as " a transi- fully distinguish tion from a Ln to a new language Ln+1" (1963, p.921).14 Even a single change of meaning was not a merely local affair between two kinds of read- but affected the whole language such justment in the case of a con- that it would be incorrect to speak of flict with experience, namely, the languages as being " the same" be- between a change in the lan- fore and after. Moreover, for Carnap guage and a mere change in or we are by no means condemned to stick addition of a truth-value ascri- with analytic statements " come what bed to an indeterminate state- may" for we may switch from a lan- ment (i.e., a statement whose guage Ln where they possess that status truth-value is not fixed by the to a new language Ln+1 where they no rules of the language, say by longer possess it and may even be false. the postulates of logic, mathe- In consequence, the only way in matics and physics). A change which, according to Carnap, analy- of the first kind constitutes a tic statements " hold come what may" radical alteration, sometimes a is exceedingly Pickwickean. It is the revolution, and it occurs only case, of course, that analytic sentences at certain historically decisive constitute the logical and semantic fra- points in the development of mework of a language and so cannot science. On the other hand, be changed as part of that language, changes of the second kind oc- but this does not mean that we cannot cur every minute. (1963, p.921) change our language.15 Very misleadin- gly, by failing to note this-never mind that Carnap also happily entertained Notable here is not only an antici- the thought that changes in scientific patory nod in the direction of Thomas theorizing may leave us with incom- Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions mensurable languages already in the which Carnap was to read in manus- mid-1930s16 – Quine allowed readers cript as one of the editors of the Inter-
14Carnap’s replies in the much-delayed Schilpp volume were written in the mid-1950. On Carnap’s reaction Kuhn’s Structure, see Reisch (1991). 15Compare Carnap’s own response in (1990,p. 431-432). 16See Carnap (1936b), later translated as part of Carnap (1947).
Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, Brasília, v.8, n.2, ago. 2020, p. 157-175 165 ISSN: 2317-9570 THOMAS UEBEL to continue to think of Carnap’s analy- Carnap never thought of analytic truths ticities in the traditional fashion as eter- as eternal truths of reason.17 One can- nal truths of reason when very clearly not help wondering why Quine never they were not. They were highly spe- corrected this mischaracterization or cific to the very language whose terms related ones, but what matters here for they characterized. us is how Quine’s mischaracterization Let me also stress that Carnap’s of Carnap’s conception of analyticity answer in the Schilpp volume does not feeds into what concerns us. Inviola- represent a new strategy that he hit ble truths of reason are precisely what upon only at an advanced stage of his no naturalistic epistemologist can tole- debate with Quine. Already the pas- rate. And as we can see, neither could sage quoted earlier from Logical Syntax Carnap already in the first half of the continues: 1930s. Now it may also be wondered, of course, whether naturalistic epistemo- No determination of the physi- logy can tolerate any form of the analy- cal language is finally secured: tic/synthetic distinction. It will cer- all determinations are made tainly be objected that Quine’s own only with the proviso that one version cannot, but it has been argued can alter them in circumstan- that Quine himself ended up admitting ces in which this seems prac- analyticity.18 Indeed, Quine himself re- tical. This holds not only for marked in 1990: "I recognize the notion the P-determinations, but also of analyticity in its obvious and useful for the L-determinations inclu- but epistemologically insignificant ap- ding mathematics. . . . it can plications" (1991/2005, 61). The signi- happen, that on the occasion ficance he still repudiated was precisely of new protocol sentences the the significance he continued to des- language gets altered in such a cribe as motivating Carnap: accounting way that [a previously analy- for mathematical truth. Thus Quine tical sentence] S1 is no longer ascribed to Carnap the concern to ac- analytic. (1934/37, §82) count for "certainty in logic and in all of mathematics" (1963, p.386). But is From the time when Quine first this fair again to attribute such founda- came to know him-he visited in Prague tionalist ambitions? when Logical Syntax was being written- Admittedly, Carnap’s talk at the Se-
17While this late chapter of Logical Syntax may not have emerged from Ina’s typewriter yet while Quine was visiting, it is most unlikely that then Carnap thought differently still. 18See, e.g., Creath (2004).
166 Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, Brasília, v.8, n.2, ago. 2020, p. 157-175 ISSN: 2317-9570 ’EPISTEMOLOGY NATURALIZED’ AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE cond Conference for the Epistemo- they happen or even provides episte- logy of the Exact Science in Königs- mological foundations. Needless to berg in September 1930 discussed lo- say, putting matters this way-a dis- gicism as program addressed to the tinction introduced for reconstructive " insecurity" in the " safest of all sci- perspicuity-may not sound very promi- ences" (1931/1964, p.41), but that is sing for naturalism at first. Neverthe- not an endorsement of the foundatio- less, spelling out its implications is es- nalist ambition, even though he discus- sential to disarming objections based sed making logicism safe for nonpredi- on the supposed contrast between na- cative definitions. Moreover, Carnap’s turalism and the analytic/synthetic dis- paper was published before he had the tinction and to making good our claim time to digest the full consequences of for Carnap’s philosophical endeavours Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness result that being at least compatible with natura- was first presented informally during lism. the closing discussions at the end of Consider his response to the rheto- that conference, a result is widely un- rical question whether he would be derstood to have killed off any hope for prepared to abandon his defense of demonstrably secure foundations even ethical non-cognitivism by means of in mathematics. So holding this early the doctrine of pure " optatives" (sta- passage against Carnap some twenty tements expressing desired states of af- years later would be unfair-as is, it se- fairs that imply no factual statements ems, Quine’s related charge.19 beyond this), if it were found by em- pirical investigation that no humanly known language does contain them. 4. Analyticity for Naturalists? Would I, in view of these scien- But why care for analyticities if not to tific results, abandon the the- hope to employ them to ground our sis of pure optatives? I think knowledge claims? I think we have I would not; just as I would to take seriously Carnap’s own sug- not abandon the thesis of the gestion that that the analytic/synthetic analytic character of the theo- distinction-like indeed the fact/value rems of logic or of arithmetic distinction-is an analytical one introdu- if a psychological investigation ced for purposes of reconstructive pers- were to reveal that the majority picuity, not one that straightforwar- of people interpret these theo- dly describes cognitive processes as rems as containing certain fac-
19I thank my colleague Fraser MacBride for reminding me of this passage.
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tual components. A philosophi- empirical assertion. (CARNAP, cal thesis on logic or language, 1963, p.1003, orig. emphasis) in contrast to a psychological or linguistic thesis, is not in- tended to assert anything about Now on the face of it, Carnap the speaking or thinking habits may only seem to complicate matters. of the majority of people, but What are these "meanings" beyond the rather something about possi- "haphazard features of natural lan- ble kinds of meanings and the guage"? Importantly, they are not the relations between these mea- Platonic entities disparaged by Quine nings. In other words, a phi- but whatever is fixed by the deductive losophical thesis does not talk logical relations that obtain between about the haphazard features sentences.20 What Carnap is offering of natural languages, but about are logical constructions of conceptual meaning relations, which can networks by spelling out their semantic best be represented with the entailments (admittedly using intensio- help of a constructed language. nal tools that Quine would not approve The thesis on arithmetic, men- of). But logical constructions for what tioned above, says that it is pos- purpose? sible to construct a system of Clearly, Carnap’s point was not to arithmetic in such a way that its supply psychological explanations, but theorems (which correspond to by putting forward his " philosophical the customarily accepted theo- thesis" he also did not mean to provide rems of arithmetic) are analytic appeals to essences or types of trans- statements. Analogously, the cendentally argued for realities. In fact, thesis of pure optatives is me- he did not put forward explanations at ant as saying that it is possi- all, but merely laid out what must be ble to construct a language in agreed upon between speakers, impli- such a way that it contains pure citly or explicitly, so that they can re- optatives. A discussion about ach rational agreement about the truth a thesis of this kind seems to values of their assertions.21 Since this me much more in accord with point bears expansion we may say that the spirit of analytic philosophy what Carnap meant to provide logico- than a discussion about a thesis linguistic framework for was concep- interpreted as a psychological tual explorations. To put it slightly
20As Carnap stated in this very context: "‘To have the same meaning’ is here always understood, not in the strong sense of sy- nonymy, but in the weaker sense of logical or analytic equivalence.” (1963, p.1004) 21See Ebbs (1997, Ch. 4) and (2001).
168 Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, Brasília, v.8, n.2, ago. 2020, p. 157-175 ISSN: 2317-9570 ’EPISTEMOLOGY NATURALIZED’ AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE anachronistically, the point of his lo- investigations.24 But quite apart from gical constructions was to investigate the fact that Quine’s input-output in- possibilities of alternative conceptuali- vestigations are on a much larger scale zations of contested concepts.22 This than psychology could attempt, tracing brings us to Carnap’s concern with the path from sensory input to entire " explication", as he called it in later scientific theories, this charge is enti- years.23 So our question becomes: is rely mistaken. True, Quine rejected explication incompatible with natura- the construal of norms in epistemo- listic epistemology? logy as categorical, but this did not stop Before turning to answer this ques- him from recognizing them by viewing tion, let me also note that once we take them as hypothetical and instrumental this perspective of the ameliorative lan- instead. Thus he stated explicitly: guage constructor on board, we can see that, relatedly, the term " epistemology" "For me, epistemology is a has a different weight for Quine and branch of engineering. It is the Carnap. Quine as a naturalist wants technology of truth-seeking, or, psychologically real explanations whe- in a more cautiously epistemo- reas Carnap aims for reflective clarity logical term, prediction. Like that might, in the fullness of time, in- any technology, it makes free form one’s agency. The issue of the use of whatever scientific fin- compatibility of epistemological natu- dings may suit its purpose. It ralism with some non-essentialist form draws on mathematics in com- of the analytic/synthetic distinction puting standard deviation and requires reconsideration of precisely probable error and in scou- what kind of inquiries naturalism al- ting the gambler’s fallacy. It lows for. The naturalism that Carnap’s draws on experimental psycho- philosophy of science allows for may logy in scouting wishful thin- differ from Quine’s. It is important king. It draws upon neurology to note, however, that no irremediable and physics, in a general way, contrast obtains between them over the in discounting testimony from methodology of providing explications. the occult or parapsychologi- It is common for anti-naturalists to cal sources. There is no ques- charge Quine with abandoning episte- tion here of ultimate value, as mology for merely causal input-output in morals; it is a matter of effi-
22The allusion is to Gallie (1955-56), but for Carnap the concepts in question need not be contested “essentially” nor are they mostly political or moral ones: quite typically he was interested in epistemological or metatheoretical concepts. 23See Carnap (1950, Ch.1). For an extensive discussion of Carnap’s explicationism on a broad canvass, see Carus (2007, Ch. 11). 24See, e.g., Kim (1988) and Putnam (1992).
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cacy for an ulterior end, truth Carnap, together with selected Vienna or prediction. The normative Circle colleagues, offers a valuable con- here, as elsewhere in enginee- tribution that has been overlooked for ring, becomes descriptive when too long. the terminal parameter is ex- pressed." (QUINE, 1986, p.664- 5)25 5. Carnap in Context: The Bipartite Metatheory Conception. Quine was far from rejecting norma- tive questions. And given that he did Suppose you followed me at least so far not and instead viewed epistemology as to agree that " Epistemology Natu- as a branch of engineering there is little ralized" and sundry other writings by reason-indeed no reason whatsoever-to Quine obscure the very possibility that think that Carnapian elucidations are among his neopositivist elders some barred from naturalistic epistemology form of naturalistic epistemology was in principle. Elucidations are instances not only thinkable, perhaps even was of Carnapian conceptual engineering. practiced. Now this would only be The question that does arise, rather, worth stressing if that possibility were is just how we could and perhaps salient, even more so if it had been ac- should conceptualize doing philosophy tualized. So am I foolhardy enough to by starting, not from some supposedly claim, not only that the possibility of indubitable fixed points of reason, but neopositivist naturalism is salient, but from within our current state of kno- that it also was actualized? wledge and ignorance, our current sci- Truth to tell, it would be hard for me ence. The question that arises is just to do otherwise. I’ve long been in print what form and aim naturalism in phi- as claiming the latter.27 So to round losophy could and should take. That up let me briefly put my case for either Quine, despite all his pioneering work, point. Note to begin with Quine’s own does not possess a monopoly claim on characterization of naturalism: " the re- this is widely acknowledged among cognition that it is within science itself, contemporary practitioners of natura- and not in some prior philosophy, that listic epistemology.26 What investigati- reality is to be identified and descri- ons like the present one suggest is that bed" (1981, p.21). If we go easy on the
25Consider also: “Insofar as theoretical epistemology gets naturalized into a chapter of theoretical science, so normative epistemo- logy gets naturalized into a chapter of engineering: the technology of anticipating sensory stimulation.” (QUINE, 1990, p.19) 26Comparison with contemporary versions already suggests that Quine’s holds no monopoly; see already Maffie (1990a) and (1990b). 27See Uebel (1991).
170 Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, Brasília, v.8, n.2, ago. 2020, p. 157-175 ISSN: 2317-9570 ’EPISTEMOLOGY NATURALIZED’ AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE term " reality" and bracket ontology, it a place within unified science. is clear that our neopositivists are fully (1932a, 61 and 67) on board. The rejection of First Philo- sophy was definitive of just about all philosophies that emerged from the Vi- I trust the difference of idiom does enna Circle. But, of course, not every not detract from the naturalistic mes- member of the Vienna Circle can plau- sage. Now you may wonder whether sibly be claimed to be of a naturalistic Neurath’s naturalism would be news to persuasion, however " scientistic" their Quine. After all, didn’t Quine make overall outlook may be considered to Neurath’s simile of the boat having to be. The relevant suspects are to be be repaired at sea the leading image of found on the so-called " left wing" of the his naturalistic epistemology? He did, Circle-comprising besides Carnap and but as he told me once, he did so for Neurath also Hans Hahn and Philipp love of the simile, not for his knowledge Frank-not among the " more conserva- of what Neurath was up to.29 (What tive wing" around Schlick and Friedrich Quine said about the Circle’s protocol Waismann.28 sentence debate bears this out, as we So let’s first turn to Neurath for a saw.) representative quotation of his natura- Now what about Carnap? Here mat- lism. ters are a little bit more complicated, but no less congenial to our concern. With Neurath, the possibility of ne- The possibility of science beco- opositivist epistemological naturalism mes apparent in science itself. was actualized. With Carnap, the pos- . . . Within a consistent physi- sibility of neopositivist naturalism be- calism there can be no ’theory came salient. What I mean by this is of knowledge’, at least not in the following. In and of itself Car- the traditional form. It could nap’s more or less technical discussi- only consist of defense acti- ons and implementations of language ons against metaphysics, i.e. construction do not look like nor do unmasking meaningless terms. they in themselves represent a natu- Some problems of the theory ralistic form of epistemology. Its re- of knowledge will perhaps be solutely anti-psychologistic and anti- transformable into empirical sociologistic stance clearly sees to this. questions so that they can find It is the wider context in which the logic
28See Carnap (1963, p.57) for the first published use of these Neurathian locutions employed to distinguish a metaphilosophical division between members that became apparent in the early 1930s. 29For further points from that interview see Uebel (1991).
Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, Brasília, v.8, n.2, ago. 2020, p. 157-175 171 ISSN: 2317-9570 THOMAS UEBEL of science was placed by Carnap that tive prescriptions (or recommendations makes for its compatibility with natu- in the proposal mode) that traded on ralistic epistemology. the instrumental value that following Consider again the quote from Neu- the prescription or adopting the recom- rath that I declared indicative of his na- mendation was supposed to bestow. turalism. Two tasks were assigned there By discarding the residually founda- to whatever was to be philosophy’s suc- tionalist ambitions of methodological cessor discipline in unified science: un- solipsism in late 1932 and his subse- masking meaningless terms and asking quent abandonment of traditional epis- empirical questions about knowledge temology and embrace of the logic of production. Both represent different science, Carnap’s position came into aspects of what unified science contains agreement with this bipartite metathe- alongside all of the first-order discipli- ory conception. What Carnap was able nes: a scientific metatheory. There was, to add to Neurath’s " defensive" task for on one side, what Carnap called " the the logic of science (unmasking mea- logic of science" (1934a/1937, §§72- ningless terms) was his own conventio- 73) and, on the other, what Neurath nalist constructivism concerning alter- called " the behavioristics of scholars" native linguistic frameworks. That this (1936/1983, p.169) and what Philipp did not rule out of the court of scienti- Frank later called the " pragmatics of fic metatheory all naturalistic concerns science" (1957/2004, p.360). The for- is made clear by his remark that the mer, the logic of science investigated logic of science is itself but part of a scientific theories in typically axioma- still more comprehensive inquiry, the tized form and considered their inter- " theory of science", which comprises nal structure and their relation to their also " empirical investigation of scien- evidential base in purely logical (de- tific activity", namely, " historical, soci- ductive and inductive) terms. The lat- ological and, above all, psychological ter, the pragmatics of science investiga- inquiries" (1934a/1937, §72). All three, ted scientific practice by means of the Carnap, Neurath and Frank, recogni- empirical sciences of science, the psy- zed the need for both logical and em- chology and sociology as well as the pirical branches of scientific metathe- history of science. So while the logic ory, but they pursued their own detai- of science investigated abstract relati- led work in different branches. Carnap ons of evidential support, the pragma- stuck with the logic of science, Neu- tics of science investigated the concrete rath and Frank pursued a naturalistic mechanisms of theory choice and the- epistemology of science with the help ory change. Importantly, both of them of psychology, sociology and history of were able to issue conditional norma- science.
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Their proposals concerning proto- last quotations. For Carnap, the lo- cols reflect this. For Neurath, proto- gic of science was " an instrument cols were complex statements contai- of unified science" (1934b/1987, 56). ning embedded clauses meant to indi- Among its constructive tasks were cate different sets of conditions which logico-linguistic proposals intended to the acceptance of scientific observa- be " useful and productive in practice" tion reports is subject to.30 By trea- for " particular point[s] of the language ting protocol statements as testimony of science" (1934a/1937, 332). As Car- whose acceptance is circumscribed in nap put it once, slipping back into the particular ways, Neurath moved away old idiom, " the task of the philosophy from any concern one might have for of science can be pursued only in a close a " foundation of knowledge" in one’s cooperation between logicians and em- own first-hand experience. First-person pirical investigators" (1934c/1967, 62). authority was, if not wholly undermi- ned, then radically subverted: in prin- ciple, one’s own protocol carried no 6. Conclusion more weight than another’s. Carnap was even less concerned with perso- Even though his rhetoric got the bet- nal beliefs but instead focused on kno- ter of him both in earlier and in later wledge claims and their objective evi- years, in " Epistemology Naturalized" dence. Where Neurath sought to ou- Quine, perhaps constrained by the ge- tline canons of report acceptance, Car- nii loci reigning over the occasion, was nap’s work concentrated on isolating quite careful to avoid gross caricatu- the logical relations of deductive and res of Carnap and his colleagues-and inductive support that protocols af- yet he still managed to project his own forded to more theoretical statements. new naturalistic beginning as a radical Concern with acceptance conditions lay turning away from their philosophical wholly outside the remit of the logic of methodology. What I have argued here science. So while not practicing natu- is that, contrary to its wide and largely ralistic epistemology himself, Carnap’s uncritical reception, Quine’s projection logic of science was compatible with, was mistaken. There was far more na- indeed intended to be complementary turalism in the Vienna Circle than was to it.31 ever dreamt of in Quine’s Viennese nar- Let me stress this point with some rative.
30See, again, Neurath (1932b/1983) and Uebel (2009). 31For further discussion see, e.g., Uebel (2013b), (2015) and (2018).
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Received / Recebido: 18/07/2020 Approved / Aprovado: 18/11/2020 Published / Publicado: 30/12/2020
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