DOI: https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v8i2.35867 ’Epistemology Naturalized’ and the Vienna Circle [’Epistemologia Naturalizada’ e o Círculo de Viena] Thomas Uebel* Abstract: This paper considers W.V.O. Quine’s inauguration of naturalistic epistemology at the 14th International Congress of Philosophy in Vienna in 1969 and argues that, contrary to his suggestions, naturalistic epistemology was practiced in the Vienna Circle already back in the days when he visited them fresh out of graduate school. Keywords: Naturalistic Epistemology. Logical Empiricism. Quine. Carnap. Neurath. Resumo: Este artigo analisa o início da epistemologia naturalista de W.V.O. Quine, no 14o Congresso Internacional de Filosofia em Viena, em 1969 e argumenta que, ao contrário de suas sugestões, a epistemologia naturalista já era praticada no Círculo de Viena no tempo em que ele o visitava, recém-saído da pós-graduação. Palavras-chave: Epistemologia naturalista. Empirismo lógico. Quine. Carnap. Neurath. 1. Introduction Carnap’s, like the analytic/synthetic distinction or the distinction between W.V.O. Quine’s " Epistemology Natura- internal and external questions, that lized" was presented as an invited ad- Quine focused on. Now, however, it dress at the Fourteenth International was time to work on a larger canvass, to Congress of Philosophy on 9th Septem- pull together different strands in a pro- ber 1968 in Vienna, Austria. By an grammatic pronouncement that was to author who knew how to mark an oc- set an entire branch of philosophy on casion this paper did not disappoint. a new path. How better to stage such More than once before the philosophers a departure than by invoking, now as of the Vienna Circle whom Quine had genii loci, his " teacher and friend" of visited fresh out of graduate school, old and his former colleagues in the Vi- had served as foil for his own divergent enna Circle? So once more Quine set ideas in his earlier publications. Mostly out to revisit the Aufbau, even the Cir- it had been particular tenets of Rudolf cle’s protocol sentence debate, in order *Professor Emeritus at University of Manchester. Research interests in Epistemology, General Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Social Science and in History of Analytic Philosophy and History of Philosophy of Science. E-mail: tho- [email protected]. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5414-235X. Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, Brasília, v.8, n.2, ago. 2020, p. 157-175 157 ISSN: 2317-9570 THOMAS UEBEL to contrast his own radical reorienta- on what the later Carnap got up to and tion of philosophy with theirs which, what his colleagues on the so-called left he suggested, was still stuck, for all of wing of the Circle did. its revolutionary flavor, in traditional When these questions are investiga- ways. ted more closely, it can be seen that The story Quine related that day by introducing naturalistic epistemo- stuck pretty well and seemed to con- logy to the world in Vienna in 1968 firm the death of logical positivism or Quine was not exactly taking coals to empiricism then already diagnosed in Newcastle-but he got pretty close. To reference works.1 The few scholars be sure, the devastation that Austro- who brought news from dusty archi- fascism and Nazism had wrought on ves that matters weren’t quite as neat the academic landscape in Vienna en- as all that were told to get out more sured that even locals were not aware or simply ignored. Thus still today in of this. In fact, it was not until the 1982 even as normally reliable repositories Moritz Schlick and Otto Neurath Cen- of philosophical learning as the Stan- tenarium conference, also in Vienna, ford Encyclopedia one can read under that C. G. Hempel recalled Neurath as " Naturalism in Epistemology" that " the a naturalistic philosopher (1982).3 Car- logical empiricists approached episte- nap’s naturalism-or better: the natura- mology, as other areas, as a matter of a listic potential of Carnap’s philosophy- priori ’rational reconstruction’, in Car- took still longer to be uncovered, as we nap’s famous phrase". With a brief refe- will see. I begin with what Quine told rence to the Aufbau the case was closed. the 1968 Congress before surveying the But is the Aufbau the only or even the lines of inquiry concerning Carnap that most representative work of Carnap’s a full investigation would have to con- and is Carnap the only philosopher of sult in depth. This includes a brief re- note or relevance in the Vienna Circle view of the case for Neurath’s natura- in the present context?2 Both of these lism in relation to which Carnap’s phi- questions matter quite centrally for the losophy must be viewed to appreciate issue of the relation between episte- its naturalistic potential. mological naturalism and logical po- sitivism/empiricism for it largely turns 1See, e.g., Passmore (1967, p.52). I use “logical positivism” and “logical empiricism” interchangeably. As I understand it, the difference the terms denoted at the time were but passing local rivalries; see Uebel (2011). 2See Rysview (2016). Which in other respects is very informative—also refers to Reichenbach’s Experience and Prediction and his take on the distinction of the contexts of inquiry—discovery v. justification—as unproblematically representative. It isn’t and it also matters for the question of the nature of the naturalism championed in the Circle, if any; see Uebel (2000). 3A few years later Dirk Koppelberg deepened the message: see his (1987) and (1990). On the state of Austrian philosophy in the 1950s see Haller (1983). 158 Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, Brasília, v.8, n.2, ago. 2020, p. 157-175 ISSN: 2317-9570 ’EPISTEMOLOGY NATURALIZED’ AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE 2. Quine on Carnap, 1968 can be less than adequately informa- tive, imagine Quine to be remembered only as a radical nominalist who wan- Whatever else must be said about it, let ted to do away with numbers.) me start by saying that " Epistemology The next thing to note is that we must Naturalized" is a magnificent paper: not read Quine as saying more than he sufficiently broad in its historical sweep actually did. Thus the Stanford article across the centuries to impress upon suggests that for Quine the Vienna Cir- its audience the momentous occasion cle pursued the " Cartesian quest for its proposals represent, yet detailed certainty [as] a remote motivation of enough with its analogies to the abor- epistemology, both on its conceptual tive reductive programmes of the past and its doctrinal side". This overlooks to induce a conviction in the audience that Quine conceded that Carnap had that the diagnosis presented is sound abandoned this " as a lost cause" and enough and holds a deep moral for phi- was motivated instead " to elicit and losophy if we ever want to escape the clarify the sensory evidence for science" perennial doldrums. and so to " deepen our understanding So how did Quine portray the logical of our discourse of the world" (QUINE, positivists of the Vienna Circle here? 1969, p. 74-5). Relatedly Quine spoke Well, he did not exactly misrepresent of Russell’s external world programme, them-though he did make one egregi- when he likened Carnap’s Aufbau pro- ous mistake-but he certainly did not ject to it, as aiming to " account for the tell the whole story. That as in his pre- external world as a logical construct vious writings his main focus was Car- of sense data" (CARNAP. 1969, p.74): nap is not surprising since, for better or there is notable room for interpreta- worse Carnap was logical positivism for tion in this formulation. With regard to him; more to the point is that Quine’s Carnap then, perhaps even to Russell, Carnap is not the whole of Carnap. Of Quine very carefully stopped short of course, it was not Quine’s job to be com- attributing the traditional foundationa- prehensive, but his selective focus does list project by stressing the elucidatory point up a very general feature of the import of the reductive projects under- common view of logical positivism-a taken (and in addition cleared Carnap feature concerning which the rhetorical of infallibilist yearnings). scene-settings of Quine’s papers (here Now the first we hear of and about and in " Two Dogmas") are not wholly Carnap himself in " Epistemology Na- innocent. That is that logical positivism turalized" is indeed as the author of is remembered for its early theoretical the book that came " nearest" to reali- starting points, not for the mature po- zing the Russellian external world pro- sitions reached later. (To see that this Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, Brasília, v.8, n.2, ago. 2020, p. 157-175 159 ISSN: 2317-9570 THOMAS UEBEL gram (QUINE, 1969 p.74), Der logische reduction of physical object discourse Aufbau der Welt (translated as The Lo- to talk of (constructed) sense data fai- gical Structure of the World. Herafter: led: there was no one-to-one mapping Aufbau, 1928). That’s fair enough in from the latter to the former. Yet this a way, given the qualifications we just time Quine also pointed out what " Two saw Quine slipping in. However, we Dogmas" did not-and what some rea- must add that recent scholarship has ders of his address evidently missed- conclusively established that there is namely that it was not doctrinal cer- far more to the Aufbau than that. Even tainty but merely translational reduc- if we discount its syncretist tendency to tion was Carnap’s point.5 To be sure, merge a great variety of disparate phi- this still leaves entirely unaddressed losophical tendencies and focus only on what one may wish to obtain transla- its reductionist strategy of establishing tional reduction for and unwary rea- a genealogy for all empirical concepts ders easily jump to the conclusion that on the basis of that of remembered si- it was for foundationalist designs.