Scepticism and the Search for Knowledge: a Peirceish Answer to a Kantian Doubt Author(S): Luciano Floridi Reviewed Work(S): Source: Transactions of the Charles S

Scepticism and the Search for Knowledge: A Peirceish Answer to a Kantian Doubt Author(s): Luciano Floridi Reviewed work(s): Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Summer, 1994), pp. 543- 573 Published by: Indiana University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320487 . Accessed: 13/10/2012 13:59

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http://www.jstor.org Luciano Floridi

Scepticismand the Search for Knowledge: a PeirceishAnswer to a Kantian Doubt

"Human kindcannot bear verymuch reality" T.S. Eliot "BurntNorton", Four Quarters

1. Introduction

In a recentarticle Barry Stroud has remindedus thata traditional and crucialissue in epistemologyis representedby ttthepossibility thatthe world is completelydifferent in generalfrom the way our sensoryimpacts and our internalmakeup lead us to thinkoP.1 In orderto givesome initialcredence to such a doubt,we need to give some credenceto threehypotheses: first, that thereis something like an independentexternal reality; second, thatthe epistemicre- lationshipoccurring between this reality and the knowingsubject is somehowsuch as to not allow thelatter to knowthe intrinsic nature of the former;and finally,that the human knower has a spontaneous desireto know what the intrinsicnature of externalreality is. It is onlythe last conditionwhich makes it possibleto considerthe state of affairsdescribed by the formertwo as problematic. Solutionsof what I shall call henceforththe scepticalTraumatic Doubt have been attemptedby approachingit eitherfrom the on-

Transactionsof the Charles S. PeirceSociety Summer,1994, Vol. XXX,No. 3 544 Luciano Floridi

tologjcalor fromthe epistcmicalside. In what follows,it is myin- tentionto argue that,if the doubt is understoodin Kantianterms, as pointingto the gulf that may exist between phenomenaand noumena,a re-interpretationof the "anthropologicalcomponent" can also representa successfulstrategy. The hypothesisI shall ad- vocaterelies on threepresuppositions. The desirefor knowledge for its own sake is in facta conditiosine qua non for the Traumatic Doubt. By eliminatingthe assumptionof such a desire,the inca- pacityor impossibilityto graspthe intrinsic nature of external reality no longerappears as a failure.And finally,the desirefor knowledge can indeed be replacedby a betterexplanation of the genesisof the searchfor knowledge.Philosophers commonly refer to the desire to know as if it were the necessaryand sufficientreason why, at a certainstage, the humansubject activates his cognitiveprocesses in order to know externalreality. Peirce has conjectureda different explanation,and I shallargue thata Peirceislfiinterpretation of the genesisof the searchfor knowledge can providea winningstrategy withrespect to the scepticalproblem.

II. "All men by naturedesire to know"

Aristotleprovided the most influentialanswer to the question "what is the originof man's searchfor knowledge?" in the famous incipitof the Metaphysics-,"all men bynature (phusei)desire (ore- M ¿fontai)to know[eidenai] .3 Althoughhe acknowledgedthat man's searchfor knowledge is to escape fromhis nescience^he maintained thatthe stateof wonderand puzzlementthat man feelswith respect to its absence is a mere secondaryeffect due to the lack of some- thingnot yetpossessed, what we mightcall nowadaysa background condition.No matterhow urgentthis negative uneasiness may be, the principalreason why man searchesfor knowledge is his natural and originalimpulse to achieve the fullactualization of his intel- lectualpotentiality in the stateof perfectknowledge.5 In more elitistand mythologicalterms, Plato6 had alreadyen- dorsed a similarposition,7 the main differencebeing that in the Scepticismand theSearch for Knowledge 545 absenceof a metaphysicsof potentiality,he had been forcedto accentuatethe hypostatization ofthe desire to know.8Probably for thesame reason, he had also tendedto stress,more than Aristotle, thestrict connection between desire and feeling of want. As he says: "no god is a philosopheror a seekerafter wisdom, for he is wise already;nor does anyman who is wiseseek after wisdom. Neither do theignorant seek after wisdom; for herein is theevil of ignorance,that he who is neithera manof honournor wise is never- thelesssatisfied with himself: there is no desirewhen there is no feelingof want."9In Plato,the search for knowledge is basedon a naturaldesire for a lostcondition. It can be justifiedby escha to- logicalreasons but not groundedin intellectuallyheteronomous needs.The searchfor knowledge remains a valuein itself. GivenPlato's and Aristotle'spositions, it is easyto see whyex- plainingthe searchfor knowledge in termsof "self-motivated" cultivationof a purelyintellectual pleasure has been alwaysso popularamong philosophers. Whether we agreewith Whitehead's famousremark on Westernphilosophy being a seriesof comments on Plato,or withPeirce, who believedthat Western philosophy wassimply an articulationof Aristotle's thought,10 throughout the historyof philosophy the idea thatknowledge is soughtjust for its ownsake has beenassumed as un-controversial.Together with the visualmetaphors, the idea thatman has a spontaneousand inborn desireto knowjust for the sake of knowledgeis one of themore deeplyrooted legacies of Greekphilosophy in thehistory of epistemology.11 Bysaying that a Platonicunderstanding of the "desire to know" tendsto a moreradical hypostatization of such desire, I had not meantto saythat the Aristotelian approach is freefrom such a rei- fication.Within Aristotelianism, the "desireto know"turns out to be interpretedas an actualdriving force. So muchso thatin order to commenton Aristotle'sexplanation for the searchfor knowledge,Thomas Aquinas introduced the neologism vis cognoscitiva.12 Likeother types of vis,the vis cognoscitiva was the outcome of the Aristoteliansubordination of thegenetic principle of the process of 546 Luciano Floridi

knowingto the metaphysicsof potentialityand actualization.13The "physicalization"of the epistemicdrive was already implicitin Aristotle'suse of orej}oya termthat conveysthe idea of a meta- phorical tension towardsthe object of the desire and thus of a journeyof the subjecttowards the object of hisknowledge.14 There is no space here to point out how thisinterpretation was in accor- dance with the Aristotelianphysics both of naturaland of violent movements,so let me just stressthat, if the searchfor knowledge is a process interpretablein termsof movementtowards reality, then- accordingto the Aristotelianmaxim omne quod moveturab alio movetur- theremust be a motivepower forsuch movement and this is the desire to know, a dynamicforce intrinsic in man's nature.At thesame time,if the searchfor knowledge is a movement towardssomething, it could be the metaphoricalmovement of man towardshis naturalplace, representedby the enjoymentof fullin- tellectual knowledge. It would be easy to show that the Neoplatonic traditionis also committedto similardynamic meta- phors,where the searchfor knowledge is interpretedas a movement (this timemore "verticalascension" than a "horizontalgrasping") towardsthe kingdomof a-temporal,immutable truths or a divine entity.15 In his Commenton theMetaphysics, Albert the Great made explicit his interpretationof the natureof the "pure desire to know" by givingto the fourthchapter concerning Aristotle's dictum the title "De primoprincipio generativo scientiae ex partenostra, quod est naturalesciendi desiderium".16 His tenetwas thatthe humandesire representsthe subjectiveratio essendiof the genesisof the process of knowing.In adding the indicativespecification "ex partenostra" ("fromour side") Albertthe Great was probablythinking about the other conditiosine qua non forthe productionof knowledge, namelythe presenceof intelligibleexternal reality. He would not take the merepresence of an externalobject as a necessarycondi- tion forthe activationof the processof knowing,claiming perhaps insteadthe necessityof some sortof ontic contributionas the ad- ditionalratio essendi of the genesisof the processof knowing.It is Scepticismand theSearch for Knowledge 547

" preciselythis presupposition of an "ontic participation- however we mayinterpret it, say in termsof some activityof externalreality on the senses(the processof informano)or as an onticdisposition of realityto be known by the subjectthat graduallydisappears from the horizon of modern philosophy,when the "desire to know" becomes a tendencythat could in factno longerbe related to the generalstatus of the restof the universe.This is one of the two principalproblems faced by the explanationof the demandfor knowledgein termsof a spontaneousepistemic longing, and it stemsfrom the Cartesianturn and the consequentintroduction of methodologicalscepticism in epistemology.By saying"phusei" in MetaphysicsI.I,908a 21, Aristotlewas implyingthat to the human desireto knowthe worldcorresponded, on theontological side, the intrinsicallyknowable nature of theworld itself. The expression"by nature" was to be interpretedas meaning"according to the intrinsic,harmonious features of an intelligibleuniverse".17 This had at least two enormousconsequences. First, "by nature"conveyed the idea that "to be a knowledge-seeker"was a propertywhich wenttogether with that of "being a humanbeing". And secondly, "by nature"indicated that such a propertywas just the denoting characteristicof an elementof the universewhich thereforemust be compatiblewith the restof it. As JonathanLear has explained: "man is by naturea questionerof theworld: he seeksto understand whythe worldis the way it is, the worldfor its partreciprocates: it "answers" man's question."18 It is because of the "phusei/ naturatiteliclause thatAristotle and his Medieval commentators could disregardthe problematicityof the notionof viscognoscitiva. The fundamentaltenet was that"the naturaldesire to knowcannot be fruitless(vanum)".19 However, the "phusci-ckusc"developed into the post-Cartesian"spontaneous-clause" via the Latin natu- ralitet20,and fromDescartes onward the spontaneousdesire to knowthe intrinsicnature of realitymay have no correspondenceon the ontological side. The intrinsicnature of realitymay be un- knowabledespite our spontaneousdesire to knowit, a dualismin- conceivablefor an advocate of the "phusei-cfausc".Such a trans- 548 Luciano Floridi

formationrequires further attention. At the beginningof "The Search for Truth by means of the Naturallight" Descarteswrote: "Polyander:[. . .] I shall regretmy ignorancefor the rest of mylife if I do not learnanything through my association withyou. Epistemon:The best thingI can tell you on this topic is thatthe desirefor knowledge, which is commonto all men, is an illnesswhich cannot be cured,for curiosity grows with learning.[...]. Eudoxus [i.e. Descartes]: Is it possible, Epistemon,that you, withall your learningare persuadedthat naturecan contain a malady so universalwithout also providinga remedyfor it? For my part,just as I thinkthat each land has enough fruitsand riversto satisfythe hungerand thirst of all its inhabitants,so too I thinkthat enough truthcan be knownin each subjectto satisfyamply the curiosityof orderlysouls."21

The parallelbetween the desire to know and hunger,and how naturehas providedall the means to satisfyboth of themfully, is only a ploy adopted by Descartesin orderto introducethe cogito as a meansof justifyingknowledge by internalcriteria of clarityand certainty,that is as "the food" which will satisfyany "epistemo- logicallyhungry soul". But thepurpose and thedevelopment of this introductionis not what interestsus here.The centralpoint is that thisshort passage shows what Descartes' attitude towards the desire to know was. The epistemicinclination of the knowermust be supposed to go togetherwith the possibilityof knowingexternal reality.Although Descartes meant to save the harmonybetween the two elements,it is indicativethat in the dialogue we encounterthe possibilityof a more problematicrelation between the epistemic desire and the possibilityof fulfillingit. It is as if Descarteswas ponderingthe possibilityof assumingthe desireto know without the metaphysicalimplication of an intrinsicallyintelligible world and Scepticismand theSearch far Knowledge 549

in the end dedded not to accept the independenceof the former fromthe naturaltendency of the latterto satisfyit. We know that more generallyDescartes hesitates on the edge of his dualismbetween ordorerum and ordoidearum but stillresolves it by means of an appeal to God, who will not deceiveus. As in the Scholastic tradition,it is God who ensuresthat the desireto knowis satisfiable by the natureof externalreality. And yet,Descartes prepares the fieldfor the bankruptingof what has been called afterwardsthe anthropocentricconception of the universe.Although not yet in Descartes himself,it is with Descartes that the TraumaticDoubt begins to appear as the vital challengefor modernepistemology. As ErnstCassirer has put it: tt[inDescartes] Reason, as the system of clearand distinctideas, and the world,as the totalityof created being, can nowherefoil to harmonize;for theymerely represent differentversions or differentexpressions of the same essence.The 'archetypalintellect' of God thus becomes the bond between thinkingand being,between truth and realityin the philosophyof Descartes. [. . .] In the developmentbeyond Descartesall imme- diate connectionbetween realityand the human mind, between thinkingsubstance and extended substanceis denied and com- pletelybroken off. There is no union betweensoul and body, be- tweenour ideas and reality,except that which is givenor produced by the being of God."22 When the "theologicalglue" meltsunder the lightof the "Enlightenment",the dualismbetween vis cognoscitiva and knowabilityof externalreality is carriedto its extreme consequences.23Thus, althoughthe modernepistemological dual- ism is characterizedas Cartesian,insofar as the relationbetween desire to know and intelligibilityof the world is concerned, Descartesis stillechoing the Classic tradition,especially Aristotle. What makes Descartes' position differentfrom those classic and medievalis that his harmonybetween knowerand known is as- sumed a posteriori,is firstchallenged and thencritically accepted as problematic.It makes all the differenceto assume that thereis a strictharmony between desire to know and intelligibilityof the universebecause there is no real distinctionbetween the two- 550 Luciano Floridi

because thereis not even a cleardistinction, let alone an opposition, betweensubject and object- and to say thaton the one side there isa vis cognoscitivathat moves the humanknowing subject, that on the otherside thereis a worldwhich is the targetof thatvis and to say furtherthat in the middle thereis a harmoniserGod who con- ciliatesthe formerwith the latterand viceversa, granting the possibilityof knowledge.This second position,obtained after the ap- plicationof the methodologicaldoubt, has in itselfits own end. It impliesan internaltension which will split the harmonicmonism into a dualismbetween knowledge and reality,the realityas we take it and the realityas it is in itself. No wonderthen that Descartes is the main polemicreference of a Neoscholasticauthor like JacquesMaritain: "With this theory of representationalideas the claims of Cartesianreason to indepen- dence of externalobjects reach theirhighest point: thoughtbreaks withBeing. [. . .] Here again Kant finishesDescartes> work. If the intelligencewhen it thinks,reaches immediatelyonly its own thought,or its representations,the thinghidden behind these rep- resentationsremains for ever unknowable."24Descartes eventually opens the way to the Kantiandualism between reality in itselfand phenomenalreality, thereby frustrating the desire to know how thingsreally are in themselves.All throughthe modern age the processwill be slow but continuous.Precisely the forcewhich has broughtepistemology to the level of philosophiaprima, viz. the methodologicaldoubt, will also determine,through radical Humian scepticism,the end of the harmoniousstate between vis cognoscitiva and intelligibilityof externalreality. When, with Kant, epistemology givesup anyattempt to defendthe fullknowability of noumena,the harmonybetween vis cognoscitiva and the fullintelligibility of nature finallycollapses. In Kant, the desire to know remainsa human tendencytowards an impossibleknowledge of noumenal reality. Aftera traditionof morethan two thousandyears in whichman has been supposed to be a satisfiableknowledge-seeker, Kant is forced to reinterpretthe desire to know the intrinsicnature of external realityno longer in termsof an ontologicallyjustified desire for Scepticismand iheSearch for Knowledge 55 1

knowledgebut epistemologically,in termsof a regulativeuse of the ideas of reason.Such a shiftopens a completelydifferent chapter in the historyof philosophy.25As Sloterdijkhas colourfullysummar- ized: aat the end of the greatwill to knowledgethere is of necessity always'theoretical despair'. The thinker'sheart burns when he re- alizes thatwe cannotknow what we 'really'want to know.Faust is basicallya desperateKantian who triesto escape the compulsionto self-limitationthrough a magicalbackdoor. The urgeto go beyond the limitremains stronger than the insightinto the limitednessof our knowledge."26 Lackingthe reassuringassumption of a worldintelligible in itself and which collaborateswith the epistemicenterprise, the vis cog- noscitivaends by contributingto the formulationof the Traumatic Doubt: "it is only because the world offersa course along which man's inquiriescan run that his desire to know has any hope of being satisfied.[. . .] Imagine how frustratingit would be to be born with the desire to understandin a world which did not cooperate!"27 The second kind of problem faced by the assumptionof the vis cognoscitivais much older, being recognized by Aristotle himself,and concernsour ordinaryevidence. Generallyspeaking, the majorityof men do not seem to be overpreoccupiedwith the searchfor knowledge,or at least not as much as the assumption of a common vis cognoscitivawould make us believe.The postulate requireselaborate explanations of why,despite theirvis cognoscitiva,most men actually do not search for knowledge. Echoing both Aristotleand Thomas Aquinas, Boethius of Dacia summarizedthe problemthus: "althoughall men naturallydesire to know, yet very few of them, and this is a pity, dedicate themselvesto the searchfor wisdom [higheststandard of knowledge], all the othersbeing preventedfrom such a greatgood by theirdisordered desires".28 His positionwas not new. In antiquity Galen had alreadyexpressed his own doubts about a longingfor the truthwhich veryfew exhibited.29Centuries later Locke ex- pressed a not verydifferent opinion: "There is no body in the 552 Luciano Floridi

Commonwealthof Learning,who does not professhimself a lover of Truth:and thereis not a rationalCreature that would not take it amiss to be thoughtotherwise of. And yet forall thisone may trulysay, thereare veryfew lovers of Truthfor Truth's sake, even amongst those who persuade themselvesthat they are so. How a Man may know whetherhe be so in earnestis worthenquiry [. . .]\30 It is not necessaryto articulatefurther these problems in order to understandhow deeply they tend to underminethe validityof the notion of vis cognoscitiva.The explanationof the searchfor knowledge in termsof a naturaldesire turns out to be too intellectualist.

3. The AristotelianPostulate

I have dwelledon some significantphases of the developmentof the notion of vis cognoscitivaand it is now necessaryto explain more preciselywhat philosophersmean by this "desire to know". There are threepossible ways of understandingthe expression,and onlythe thirdseems to be philosophicallyrelevant. First,the desire for knowledgecan be understoodbiologically, as animal instinctiveinterest in knowledge,i.e. as a vital interest in a certainamount of empiricalinformation necessary to survive in a hostile environment.However, such an instinctiveinterest in knowinggoes only as far as the needs for a more secure life require. It can never promote pure researchfor the sake of knowledge. To give a circularexample, it can never promote philosophicalinvestigation. Second, the desirefor knowledge and curiosityare oftentreated as the same psychologicalphenomenon.31 This may be because, as in Hume32, we are ascribingto curiositythe same meaningas to vis cognoscitiva,i.e. loosely,"pure desire to know just for the sake of knowledge".In this case we are stillin need of a clearer understandingof the originalnotion. In other cases, it may hap- pen that the philosophicalvis cqgniscitivais simplyconfused with the phenomenonof psychologicalcuriosity. The factthat in psy- Scepticismand theSearch for Knowledge 553

chologythe phenomenonof curiosityis studied by means of ex- perimentswith rats indicatesclearly enough that there is a dif- ferencebetween this notion and that philosophicalone of vis cognoscitiva,at least in termsof degree. By way of comparisonwith the phenomenonof psychological curiosity,we finallyarrive at the thirdway of understandingthe notion of vis cognoscitiva.Even admittingthat there is no firm distinctionbetween curiosity and the philosophicaldesire to know, it is certainlypossible to understandthe latteras a particularkind of curiosity.Suppose we define such a philosophicalcuriosity "epistemophilia".33By merecuriosity we maythen understand the superficialimpulse to know novel or interestingmaterial, in so far as this does not requirea long, tiring,mental activity but rather a certainamusement. It is the kind of uncriticalinquisitiveness so well describedby Plutarchin his Magna Moralia.34Such curiosity has more to do with the enjoyable,passive receptionof information than with the active elaborationof new knowledge,al- thoughits roots can be easilyconnected to the biologicalinterest in knowledge.On the other hand, by "epistemophilia"we may referto the (alleged) phenomenon of spontaneous and inborn impulseto pursue knowledgefor its own sake, withoutpremedi- tationor reflection,independently of any otherexternal cause and even despitepersonal, psychological and social costsor difficulties. This is the philosophicalvis cognoscitiva.The distinctionis not new- a similarcontrast was alreadydrawn for example by Diderot and D'Alambert35- and it is worthnoticing that in Germanit is even fixedlexically by means of the two differentnouns Net^aier (curiosity)and Wissbeaier(desire to know). On the basis of the previousremarks we can now re-interpret MetaphysicsI.I,908a 21 in the followingpost-Cartesian terms: All men have a spontaneous,inborn, epistemophilic impulse {vis cognoscitiva)that drivesthem towardsthe acquisitionof knowledge of the intrinsicnature of externalreality just for the sake of knowledgeitself. I shall call thisthe AristotelianPostulate (hence- forthAP). 554 Luciano Floridi

4. Towards a PcirccishApproach

Despite the great popularityof the AP both in its pre- and post-Cartesianunderstandings, some historicalindications for the elaborationof an attackon the vis cognoscitivacan be found dis- seminatedin Ancient Pyrrhonism,in Spinoza and in Locke. As before,the amplitudeof the topic forcesme to a somewhatsche- maticpresentation. AncientPyrrhonism is the principalsource fora visionof man who is "ethically"justified in virtueof the peace of mindenjoyed, unconcernedwith pursuit of knowledgefor its own sake.According to Pyrrhonism,the most naturaland basic tendencyof the human mind is towardsa physicaland mentaltranquillity {ataraxia) , not towards the actualization of intellectual potentialities. Unfortunately,one of theprincipal limits of thePyrrhonist rejection of the notion of vis cognoscitivalies in the convictionthat man can actuallydo without knowledge. The point can be anchored to Hume's conclusionscontained in the Treatise.26It is not clearwhy the eliminationof epistemiccertainties should induce man into a stateof epocheand then of tranquillityinstead of one of acute anxiety.37The Pyrrhonisthas to show us firstthat the procedureof puttingthe epistemicbeliefs in mutualcontrast is reallyeffective, and secondlythat even if it is effectiveand sometimescan lead a person to acquire her desired ataraxia,, it does it more easily, quicklyand commonlythan the process of searchingfor a belief thatmay convince the same person.We do not seem to be at liberty to liveout the completescepticism required in practice.Instead, the bestway of attainingmental peace, the one actuallyfollowed by the human mind, is by means of the acquisitionof strongbeliefs or prejudices,hardly to be shakenby any counter-argument. Although a nescientataraxia is the regulativegoal of any humanmind, this has to be gained by acquiringsome kind of knowledge.Such acquisitionof knowledgestops the painfulprocess of investigation while graduallydecreasing the degree of nesciencestill defensible, until the whole process reaches a homoeostatic38equilibrium. Scepticismand theSearch for Knowledge 555

Experiencetold Hume that the Pyrrhonistcannot live his scepticism. We shall see that experiencetold Peirce that in pursuitof peace of mind man followsthe strategyof adheringto beliefsas long and as stronglyas possible.39 Spinoza is the philosopherwho, more thanany other, developed the notion of conatus.40According to his analysis,the mind is governedby an inertialtendency to remainin its own state.This should have led Spinoza to conclude thatthere is no such thingas a spontaneousinterest in knowledgeif it werenot that,for Spinoza, in oppositionto the Pyrrhonisttenet the initialstate of the mindis not one of "nescientrest" but one of "active movementtowards knowledge",so thatthe highestaspiration of mind's naturalcog- nitiveactivity is stillthe fulfillmentof its desirefor knowing. The inertialconatus of the mind is applied to a stateof "cognitivedy- namics" and it gives rise to what Spinoza calls the cupiditascog- noscendi,and thisdespite the factthat the natureof mind is recognized as being intrinsicallyconservative. Finally,Locke is the firstepistemologist who emphasizesthe role of uneasinessin the searchfor knowledge, in thisway anticipating some aspectsof Peirce's theoryof doubt and belief.41In order to pursuesomething, the recognitionof thatsomething as worthyof being pursuedis not sufficient.In addition,what is requiredis a fundamentalunease togetherwith a need to calm it. Developing what we have seen is alreadya Platonicsuggestion, Locke believes thatfrom a meredescriptive point of viewit is understandablethat people may value the searchfor knowledge while not in factpar- ticipatingthemselves in that search. Thus, in the Essay Locke presentsus with the anti-intellectualistidea that unless man feels mentallyuncomfortable in his state of nesciencehe will persistin thatstate.42 However, far from being sympatheticto man's normal appreciationof hisstate of nescience,Locke stillconsiders the desire forthe acquisitionof intellectualknowledge the preciseduty of any man who can affordto study.43If the majorityof men do not see knowledgeas a desideratum^on ethicalgrounds they ought to be ashamedof feelingcomfortable in a stateof nescienceand should 556 Luciano Floridi

stillconsider it a desiderandum.The AP maintainsits strong ethical characterizationand the searchfor knowledge is stilllinked to the originalprescription implicit in the AP. There is no mentionof any externalpressure on the human mind that forcesit to acquire knowledge,nor of any sort of searchfor knowledge as a reaction to such pressure.

5. A PeirceishApproach

Locke's vaguelyethical justification was groundedon a meta- physicalvision of man whichwas stillclassic and medieval.With the disappearanceof Greek metaphysicsand scholastictheology, it seems thatthere are no longergood reasonsto maintainan explanationof the searchfor knowledge in termsof vis cognoscitiva.If the AP mustfollow the same destinyof the philosophicalcontexts whichproduced it, the inversionof perspectivewe need to operate with respectto such an acriticallegacy of Greek epistemologyis more radicalthan the one endorsedby Locke. Our explanationof the genesisof knowledgemust rely on a moreinertial (Spinoza) and static (Pyrrhonism)description of the initial state of mind. Accordingto the anti-AP,man is stilldriven by a fundamentalco- natus,but the latterhas to be interpretedas a mentaltendency to perseverein his own state of intellectualnescience for as long as possible. At the beginning,there occurs a static,mental state of nesciencewhich also impliesat least a pleasantstate of absence of uneasinessor anxiety,if not morepositively one of fulltranquillity. This complexstate of nescientataraxia is conservative.It entailsa spontaneous,inborn and inertialconatus to persistin that state, unless some externalforce or pressure(lack of meaning, new problems,loss of certainty)compels a change.If the mindis forced into an unnaturalstate of uneasiness,the process of knowingis activatedin orderto restoreas muchas possibleof itsoriginal state. This processis carriedon in the mosteffective way, e.g. by means of the simpleassumption of mere prejudices,or by means of the elaborationof scientifichypotheses. The "secretion" of further Scepticismand theSearch for Knowledge 557

knowledgeis a "reaction"to the imbalanceproduced by a stateof uneasiness,and its aim is the restorationof a stateof mentalpeace at a higherlevel of homoeostaticequilibrium between pressure and correspondentepistemic answer. When the equilibriumis restored, the advancementof knowledgestops. The searchfor knowledge is reactivatedwhenever the externalpressure increases, overcoming the protectionthe mind has alreadyaccumulated in termsof es- tablishedknowledge. It followsthat if man were left alone, deprived of any externalcompulsory force, he would immediatelystop in- quiringjust forthe sake of knowledge.From the point of view of the anti-AP,human knowledgeis a by-productof man's reaction againstexternal reality. Like a pearl,despite its greatbeauty, it has to be consideredthe end resultof a disturbanceprovoked by an externalfactor in the contextof animal'slife. The threephases in which the genesis of the processof knowingis understood- the staticstate, the inertialtendency and the restorationof the static state- give rise to a sort of endless dialectic of the search for knowledgeaccording to which- and contraryto what happensif we accept the AP- the mindplays a reactiverole, one of response. To externalreality is leftthe role of initiatingthe whole process. Peirce'spragmatism provides the mostfavourable "environment" withinwhich the anti-APcan be understoodand developed.This is because of the particularposition enjoyed by Peirce withinthe historyof philosophy.The greatmajority of philosopherswho have been interestedin studyingthe natureof human knowledgehave also been convinced,at least implicitly,of the virtuesof the AP. Those fewphilosophers who have been more "sceptical"about the epistemophilicnature of man, have also tended to disregardepis- temologicalissues and thus are also the philosophersfrom whom we cannot expect very much by way of discussionof the AP. Nietzscheis a good example.44As a consequence,we can findsome suggestionson the natureof an anti-Aristotelianposition only in a philosopherwith a stronginterest in a pragmatic,realistic, almost cynicalunderstanding of intellectualknowledge. Peirce is such a philosopher.He sharesthe interestof Pyrrhonismin questioning 558 Luciano Floridi

the intellectualistpicture of man as spontaneouslyand irresistibility driventowards knowledge (Peirce's anti-intellectualismis of a piece withhis anti-Cartesianism,see forexample 5.264-5), whilehe does not sharethe same negativeconception about the value of human knowledgeand the possibilitiesof its realization. Peirce combinesa strongontological realism with a pragmatic interpretationof the role of knowledge.External, brute reality op- poses the mind and the mind employsknowledge to defenditself fromthe non-mind,or fromwhat is dead-mind.45Throughout Peirce'swork we findthat reality forces itself upon the humanmind almostviolently,46 and the mind is forcedto acknowledgeexternal realityas a hard fact.47It is the "hardnessof reality"that compels man to admitthe existenceof the worldas bruteforce.48 The bor- derlinewhere brutefact and the mind clash is the sphereof per- ceptionand experience.49Perception represents two objectsreacting upon one another.50 In the perceptualstage of knowledgebrute realityenters the mind,and in havingexperience the mindreacts to perceptions.51It is in the passage fromdoubt to beliefthat the mental uneasiness,brought about by experience,is contrasted. AlthoughPeirce is not sure about the dynamiccharacterization of the oppositionbetween realityand mind,32he believesthat "the importantpoint [is] that the sense of externalityin perception consistsin a sense of powerlessnessbefore the overwhelmingforce of perception.Now the onlyway in whichany force can be learned is by somethinglike trying to oppose it. That we do somethinglike thisis shown by the shockwe receivefrom any unexpectedexperi- ence. It is theinertia, of mind, which tends to remainin thestate in whichit is [my italics] [. . .]."53 If the mind deals withreality by means of knowledge,it does so only on the basis of a "reactive conservatism"which contraststhat "sense of externality,of the presenceof a non-ego, which accompaniesperception."54 Thus, man is engaged in the processof inquiryprecisely in orderto erad- icate the feelingof doubt thatis at the originof the inquiryitself.55 As a result,Peirce can concludethat "facts are hardthings which do not consistin mythinking so and so, but standunmoved by what- Scepticismand theSearch for Knowledge 559

everyou or I or any man or generationsof men mayopine about them.[. . .] I wishto reasonin suchway that the facts shall not, and cannot, disappointthe promisesof my reasoning. Whethersuch reasoningis agreeableto myintellectual impulses is a matterof no sort ofconsequence, I do reasonnot for thesake of my delight in reasoning, but solelyto avoid disappointmentand surprise" [my italics].56 Accordingto thisposition, man searchesfor knowledge in orderto settlehis doubts **[.. .] and whendoubt finally ceases, no matterhow, theend ofreasoning is attained[my italics]."57 If man could resolve neverto changehis existingopinions there would be no motivefor reasoningand it would be absurdfor him to do so. Peirce's theoryof doubt and belief58represents a theoretical context generallyfavourable to the elaborationof the anti-AP sketchedabove. But is it possible to reformulatethe anti-APas a "PeirceanPostulate"? Although I believethat what has been said so far providesstrong evidence in favourof the claim that the anti-APis somewhatPeircean, on closeranalysis it is also possible to ascertaina residueof an Aristotelianelement in Peirce's epistemology,such that its presenceallows one to speak only of the possibilityof a PeirceishPostulate. In "The Fixationof BelieP Peircelists four ways of obtainingthe cessationof doubt, the settlementof opinion and hence the acquisitionof a stateof mentalataraxia: tenacity, authority, a priority and scientificinquiry. According to Peirce,the firstthree methods inevitablyfail in the long run to keep the human mind safe from unwanted surprises.Only when he has reached the scientific method can man cope withreality in the best way. At thispoint, an aspect of Peirce's theoryof knowledgeturns out to be controversial,for I believe that Peirce is either too optimisticon the open-mindnessof our human knower,or too scepticalabout the potentialitiesof the threefirst methods, especially tenacity and authority.59There may be two reasonswhy Peirce is so confidentin the factthat tenacity and authorityquickly foil to resistthe testof life. First, the type of knowledge he has in mind is timeless knowledgethat is, ideallyspeaking, the finalpicture of the world 560 Luciano Floridi

that all human knowingsubjects will agree on. So far I believe Peirce is rightwhen he says that,in the long term,non-scientific methodswill certainlybe replacedby the scientific,for the simple reasonthat the latterprovide the best "reaction"to realityand no other "defence" could be more effectiveagainst the "non-ego" than one obtained by means of a scientificmethod (why thisis so is a metaphysicalquestion I shall leave open in thiscontext). Yet, the veryfact that it is an ideal pictureof the developmentof human knowledgemakes his positionsomewhat suspect. At timesPeirce stillexhibits a residualversion of the AP in describingthe nature of the scientificinvestigation.60 This maybe the second reasonwhy he is so confidentabout the developmentof the scientificmethod. In his faithin an epistemophilicimpulse (cf. his notionof Gnostic Instinctin 7.58), Peirce seems to oppose the idea thatman could be ethicallyjustified in disregardingthe scientific method, and enjoy a happylife in thisworld despite his nescience.Note that,according to Peirce, thereis no dichotomybetween empirical and scientific knowledge,and thereforethat the dialecticdoubt/belief applies to the formeras well as to the latter.61The scientific"defence" of man againstreality represents the best answerto genuinedoubts. Yet, notwithstandingthe homoeostaticpicture of science,in the back- groundof Peirce'sepistemology there is stilla perceptiblevision of man as spontaneouslytending toward the acquisitionof knowledge just forits own sake. Like Locke, whenPeirce comes to speakof the natureof the scientificinquiry he can hardlyresist the ethicalappeal of the notion of epistemophilia.This explains why we find Aristotle'sdictum "all men by naturedesire to know" quoted in Greek and translatedin English in one of his manuscripts62,in connectionwith the descriptionof the pure desire for scientific knowledgefor its own sake.63 The factthat Peirce still exhibits a residualnotion of the vis cog- noscitivawith respect to scientificknowledge casts a clear lighton an importantaspect of his thought.We know that Peirce's prag- matismrepresents a radicalbreak from the Cartesiantradition. He probablyreacted against the Cartesianepistemological turn also Scepticismand theSearch for Knowledge 56 1 becausehe waswell aware of a moremedieval image of the process ofknowing, as a mutualrelation between knowcr and known.64 In thissense, Peirce's pragmatism is also a breakfrom the notion of a Cartesianvis cognoscitiva that is emptiedof itsontological corre- spondence(the "phusei" clause). Although in largepart Peirce does notsimply turn back to a pre-Cartesianapproach, there are without anydoubt medieval influences at workin hisphilosophy, at least insofaras theyprovide a meansto escapethe Cartesian picture of knowledge.In re-acquiringa notion of knowledgeas theresult of an interplaybetween man and reality65Peirce goes beyond Descartes,for his theoryof doubtand beliefis not a revivalof medievalepistemology, and yet we maysee thatPeirce's notion of a GnosticInstinct and his ethicalconception of the desirefor knowledgerepresent the price he had to payfor having implicitly used medievalphilosophy in hisattempt to refuteDescartes' epistemology. If I am correct,the Aristotelianresidue in Peirce'stheory of knowledgecan be eliminated.Man pursues knowledge only for the sakeof his own mentalpeace. Sciencecan be consideredonly a moreeffective instrument to achievesuch a target,all othercon- siderationslike vital needs, curiosity, social position, wealth etc., beingequal. As Peircehimself says ahence the sole object of inquiry is thesettlement of opinion. We mayfancy that this is notenough forus, and that we seek,not merely an opinion,but a trueopinion. Butput this fancy to thetest, and itproves groundless; for as soon as a firmbelief is reachedwe areentirely satisfied, whether the belief be trueor false."66We do notsearch for knowledge just for its own sake,"on thecontrary, we clingtenaciously, not merely to believ- ing,but to believingjust what we do believe".67 Accordingto this "purified"Peirceish perspective, a post- Cartesianversion of the anti-APholds that: (PP) man has a spontaneous,inborn and inertial,mental conatus that makes him perseverein his own staticstate of nescientataraxia, unless he is compelledto changethat state by some external force impressed upon his mind.Such a conamsis the conservativeforce that ac- 562 Luciano Floridi

uvates the searchfor knowledge.It makesthe human mind react againstthe ontic pressureresulting from the contrastingpresence of externalreality. Its goal is the restorationof a homoeostatic, peaceful state of ataraxia, by means of the production of knowledge. The PP is stillincomplete since the Aristotelianresidue has an importantfunction within Peirce's epistemology.It is the background condition wherebyPeirce can eventuallydisregard, as non-problematic,questions about the fewcases in whichman really seems to be pursuingknowledge for its own sake, e.g. in the case of philosophicalresearch. By eliminatingany Aristotelianresidue, the PP fecesthe crucialproblem of how one is to accountfor such fewcases. The solutionof the problemlies in the feetthat the PP as it stands refersto the simple relationoccurring between the humanmind and reality.In thisway it missesa finaland important distinctionbetween what may count as externalreality for the human mind in generaland what may count as externalreality for a specifichuman mind. In the formercase, the humanmind feces the physicalworld as whatis not-mindor dead-mind;in the lattercase, an individualhuman mind is confrontedby whateveris different fromitself, either the physicalworld or all the previousproducts of other human minds, includinghistory and culture.The PP speaksof intellectualknowledge as a reactionof the mind against realityinterpreting the latterin termsof the physicalworld, but in orderto understandhow culturalphenomena like philosophymay occur,we need to focuson the notionof intellectualknowledge as the reactionof a singlemind againstanything that could count as externaland extraneous,from a desk to a painting,from a scientific theoryto a poem, fromsuperstitions to all the instancesof knowledge storedin a library.68The introductionof thisfinal distinction coversthe explanatoryrole thatin Peirce's epistemologyis played by the Aristotelianresidue. By means of it the PP can also explain what it is that intellectuals,philosophers and scientistsare doing when theyseem to be pursuingknowledge for its own sake. They are reactingnot only againstthe externalphysical world but also Scepticismand theSearch for Knowledge 563

againstthe externalworld of humanmental products. According to thislast specification,a new post-Cartesianversion of the PP turns out to hold that:(PP*) each singlemind has a spontaneous,inborn and inertialmental conatus that makes it perseverein its own static stateof nescientataraxia, unless it is compelledto changethat state by some externalforce impressed upon it. Such a conatusis the conservativeforce that activates the searchfor knowledge. It makes a human mind react againstthe pressureresulting from the contrastingpresence of physicaland historicalrealities. Its goal is the homoeostaticrestoration of a peacefulstate of ataraxia,by means of the productionof knowledge. "Human kindcannot bear verymuch reality",including historical reality,the kind of which he is both the makerand master. When thereis somethingresembling a desirefor knowledge, this is a sign that such empiricalor historicaldisturbances are in action. Analogously,the acquisitionof knowledgecan be interpretedas a "cognitivetherapy"69 against nature and history.The single mind searchesfor knowledgenot forits own sake, but as reliefagainst externaldisturbances, doubts, absurdities and lack of meaning.

6. A PeirceishSolution of the TraumaticDoubt

If now we replacethe AP withthe PP*- thatis if we interpret the principlegoverning the searchfor knowledgein termsof the effectof a conservativeconatus for peace of mind ratherthan in termsof the actionof a desirefor knowledge for its own sake- the doubt that"reality may be completelydifferent from what we take it to be" turnsout to be no longertraumatic. On the contrary,it mayrepresent a possibilitywhich the humanknowing subject might welcome.The limitsof humanknowledge - thatthe AP interpreted as the walls of a prisonfor the mind- accordingto the PP* are to be interpretedas a defenceor a protectionthat the mindcreates in order to save itselffrom the pressurecoming fromthe external world.It is not merelythat it does not matterif, in establishinghis reignover reality,man unfortunatelyloses the possibilityof know- 564 Luciano Floridi

ing its intrinsicnature. Bather, the hypothesisis thatthe scope of knowledge is that of neutralizingthe object of knowledge,of transformingwhat it is in itselfinto somethingwhich is what it is only because of the mind. Externalreality exercises an alienating pressureon the human subjectthat would be successfulif it were not for the cognitivereaction of the latter.Mental life becomes possibleonly if realityis subjugatedand orderedby meansof epis- temicschemes. The mindemerges only by withstanding reality and it does so only by interpretingit. The purpose of the processof knowingis thereforethat of producinga dichotomybetween subject and object whichallows the mindto developitself. There may be more or less effectiveways to cope withthis task, and we may call the most efficaciousthe scientific,but the resultdoes not change. It is only in the strugglefor positing such a gap between brutefacts and theirinterpretation that the mindemerges in its full connotations.By maintainingsuch a hiatusit managesto survive. The scope of the process of knowingdoes not lie in a mystical identificationor confusionof the knowerwith the known(in a le- thal riskof an "ontic over-exposure"of the mind to being), but in lettingreality intrude into the internalworld as peacefullyas possible.Visually, in the developmentof knowledgethe minddoes not ago towards"external reality, but it is rathervice versa, so thatwe mayinvert the Baconianmetaphor by saying that it is the mindthat attemptsa cognitivedefence against the intrusionof externalreality into its internalworld, not naturethat has to defenditself against the scientificaggression of the humanmind. If we findthis hypothesis acceptable, we mayalso discoversome ironyin what I called the TraumaticDoubt. If the purposeof the processof knowingis thatof re-establishingmental tranquillity, the factthat in thisprocess the intrinsicnature of externalreality may remainforever undiscovered is no longer a traumatichypothesis. Accordingto the PP*, seeing a human knowingsubject as being tormentedby the doubt that realityin itselfmay be completely differentfrom what he takes it to be is equivalentto misunder- standingthe purpose of the searchfor knowledge. Let me clarify Scepticismand theSearch for Knowledge 565

the point fartherby answeringtwo possiblecritiques. Firstobjection: the assumptionof the PP* does not solvethe real issue thatis at stakein advancingthe doubt thatreality in itselfmay be completelydifferent from what we take it to be. For, if only implicitly,such a doubt is in factthe possibilitythat in the future realitymay turn out to be completelydifferent from what I take it to be now. It would be thisGoodman's paradoxthat actually representsthe traumaticaspect of the doubt. Answer:as I premisedat the outsetof thispaper, I am assuming that the TraumaticDoubt I am discussingis not due to a pre- epistemological,methodological challenge à la Descartes, but is actuallythe one provoked by a Kantian-likedistinction between Din¿ ** nch ^d realityas we know it, whichin turnresults from an interpretationof knowledge in terms of the transcendental conditionsthat constitute the world for what it is. This is whyI said above "if the doubt is understoodin Kantianterms". If the doubt is statingthat phenomena are differentfrom noumenal reality because theyare noumenalreality which has undergonean inescapa- ble mentalelaboration, then the constancyof the natureof the phenomenais also linkedto the constancyof theirtranscendental elaboration,and what I am wonderingis not whetherwhat is blue now willbe greentomorrow, but whetherwhat is blue now is now intrinsicallyblue or not. In otherwords, what I am wonderingis whetherwhat is now blue and may turnout to be green in the futurein facthas such an intrinsicnature, that of changingcolour aftersome time.Thus, I acknowledgethat if the doubt were of a differentnature it is possiblethat the assumptionof the PP* would be insufficientfor its solution.In fact,the assumptionof the PP* as a sufficientdevice for the "dissolution"of the problematicaspect of the doubt presupposesa Kantianreading of the doubt, whileit also implicitlysupports a Kantiananalysis of knowledgeof reality as being determinedalso by the mental,i.e. it implicitlysupports the possibilityof interpretingknowledge transcendentally,as a manipulationof a noumenal input,the possibilityof which is re- sidingin the mental. 566 Luciano Floridi

Second objection: by hypothesizinga desirefor a homoeostatic mentaltranquillity the PP* is incapableof explainingthe factthat the humansearch for knowledge is never-ending.If we assumethat the individualmind dedicates itselfto activitiesother than the search for knowledgeas soon as it can, this seems to vitiatethe possibilityof explainingthe developmentof knowledge. Answer:according to the PP* the boundariesof human knowledge are alwaysadvancing because of the endlessdialectic between reactiveconservatism and desirefor a mentalpeace freeof pressure, both ontologicaland cultural.In the course of the processof ap- propriationof the rightprotection against reality, some individuals may respondto new problemsarising both fromthe naturaland fromthe historical-culturalenvironment. The factthat man keeps on tryingto settlehis doubts once and for all leads to the productionof new knowledge,which in turncreates the conditionfor furtherreaction and production.Past knowledge"solidifies", be- comingpart of the externalworld, and futureminds have to react, too, againstthe previous"reactions" by producingnew knowledge, whichin turnwill representanother piece of externalreality for the stillfuture minds. Human mindsare forcedto keep the defending processin action also because of the pressureof the same armour builtby previous minds. Only on thisdialectic described by the PP* can therebe a properunderstanding of "culturaltradition". Thus, in a developed culturea philosophercan reach such a point of forgetfulnessas to believethat the wall of knowledgebetween the mindand realityis a prisonfor the former,not a defenceagainst the latter.In a cognitivelyprotected environment the pressurecoming fromexternal reality can decrease to such an extentas to induce some people to believethat the searchfor knowledge is a pleasure pursuedby every man just forthe sake of knowledge.But according to the PP* the originalsearch for knowledge is not to be misin- terpretedas an enjoyment.It is ratherthe outcome of the individual's onerous dutyto conquer his or her own mentalfreedom by defendinghim or herselfboth against realityand againsthuman culturalacquiescence. Locke was rightboth in being tolerantwith Scepticismand iheSearch for Knowledge 567

menwho arc not interestedin acquiringknowledge for its own sake and in praisingthose who seek it. He was onlywrong in explaining the origin of the latterin the necessityof a free,epistemophilic impulseinstead of a rationalduty of a Kantiancharacter. Thomas Jeffersonwrote as followsa[. . .] the diffusionof knowledgeamong the people. No other sure foundationcan be devised, for the preservationof freedomand happiness";70I would liketo add now that if man were moved by the spontaneousand pure desire to developand diffuseknowledge it would not be necessaryto remind him not to place obstaclesto inquiry.71

WolfsonCollege, Universityof Oxford

NOTES

1. B. Stroud,"The Significanceof NaturalizedEpistemology" in PA. French,T.E. Uehling and H.K. Wcttstcin(cds.), MidwestStudies in Philosophy,VI, The Foundationsof Analytic Philosophy (The University of MinnesotaPress, 1981), pp. 455-471. The quotationis fromp. 457. Cf. also W.V.O. Quine, "Replyto Stroud*,ibidem, pp. 473-475. 2. This adjectivewas introducedby W. Sellarsin his Science and Metaphysics(London: Routledgeand Kegan Paul, 1968), p. 140, instead of "Peircean",in orderto mean Teircean-like". 3. Aristotle,Metaphysics I.I, 908a 21. That a large part of AncientGreek philosophy before Aristotle was stronglyorientated towards a visionof man as internallymoved by an interestfor knowing has been well argued by R. Mondolfo, la Comprensionedel SoggettoUmano % nell'Antichità Classica,(Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice,1958), voi. II, esp. chap. 2. 4. The distinctionbetween nescienceand ignoranceis clearly drawnin Scholasticphilosophy, which definesthe formeras "simplene- gation or absence of knowledge" (simplexnegaúo sen absentiascientific) and the latteras "privationof knowledge"(privano sdentine), cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theolcyica,I-II, q.76, a.2.. In this contextI am inter- 568 Luciano Floridi

pretingthe Aristotelian"agnoia" as not necessarilycarrying with it the strongevaluative sense whichis nowadaysimplicit in "ignorance". 5. In thissense JonathanLear's interpretationof the passage may seem somewhat too "Peircean", cf. his Aristotle,The Desire to Understand,(Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1988), p. 3. 6. It is sufficientto recallwhat effectSocrates' investigation of his fellowcitizens' desire to know had. See Plato, Apology,21b-d, 22d, 23b. 7. Cf. Plato, RepublicV, 475d-e. 8. Cf. Plato's characterizationof Love as a minor God or "daimon" in Symposium,203e. 9. Plato, Symposium,204a. 10. Cf. P. Weiss,C. Hartshorne,A.W. Burks(eds.), Collected Papersof C.S. Peirce,8 vols. (Cambridge:Harvard U.P., 1931-1958): 1.1. As usual referencesare givenby numberof volume and paragraph. 11. For a contemporaryre-assertion of the Aristotelian Postulate, cf. H.G. Gadamer, Vemunftim Zeitalter der Wissenschaft (Frankfurt/M:Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976). 12. See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, In Metaphysicam AristotelisCommentaris 1,1, 6; Summa TheokgiaeI, 81 1 and 2, and 1,11,40-8.The adjective"cognoscitivus" is unknown to ClassicLatin (cf.the OxfordLatin Dictionary)and it is not verycommon in medievalLatin either. It is not listedin J.F. Niermeyer(ed.), Mediae LatinitatisLexicon Minus (Leiden: Brill, 1976). Accordingto R.E. Latham (ed.), Revised MedievalLatin Word-Listfrom British and IrishSources (London: Oxford U.P., 1965), it startsbeing used onlyin the XIII centuryin orderto mean "concerned with knowledge,cognitive". Latham reportsthat the term occursfor the firsttime in RobertGrossteste [1235-53] and thenin Roger Bacon. According to A. Blaise (ed.), the Corpus Christianorum ContinuanoMedievalis Léxico Latinitatis Medii Aevi (Turnholti:Brepols, u 1975), virtusor facultas cognoscitiva"is firstused by Thomas Aquinas. So, althoughThomas Aquinas [1225M274] used the expressionvis cog- noscitivaquite commonly,he was adaptingclassic Latin to his purposes, givingrise to a neologism.English translators render it by the expression "cognitivepower". Scepticismand theSearch for Knowledge 569

13. So Thomas Aquinas statesthat "vis cognoscitivaest mo- tiva" (Summa TheologiaeI, 81 1 and 2) and that "vis cognoscitivamo vet appetitivam representando ei suum objectum" (Summa Theologize 1,11,40-8). 14. Cf. Aristotle,Nichomachean Ethics, 111 3a 12. 15. Cf. Augustinus,De Vera Religione,39. 16. Albertthe Great,Metaphysica Libri Quinqué Priores:I, I, chap. 4. 17. This is, forexample, the wayDante understandsAristotle throughThomas Aquinas in his Divina Commedia,Inferno, XXVI, 118- 120 and in II Convivio,1,1. 18. Lear, op. cit.,p. 26. See also pp. 2, 3, 7 and 41. 19. Thomas Aquinas, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentarti,1,1,4. The same position,almost verbatim, is alreadypresent in Albertthe Great,Metaphysica: 1,1,4, 20-25. 20. Cf. Albertthe Great,Metaphysica Libri Quinqué Priores, lib. I, Tract. I chaps. 4 and 5 and Thomas Aquinas, In Metaphysicam AristotelisCommentarti, 1,1, 6; Summa Theologiae,I, 81, 1 and 2; 1,11,40-8. 21. J. Cottingham,R. Stoothoffand D. Murcoch (eds.), The PhilosophicalWritings of Descartes(Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1984), vol. II, pp. 400-420, quotationfrom p. 402. The unpublishedmanuscript was firstedited in 1701 and manyconjectures have been made about the date of its composition.Since it has been dated any time fromthe earlier to the lateryears of Descartes'life, it can be inferredthat the contentsof the dialogue representa positionwhich is not peculiarto a particulartime in the developmentof Descartes'thought, but ratherone thathe held all through his life. For more informationabout the dialogue see the Translator'spreface, p. 400. As it is said there,"Eudoxus [. . .] is the mouthpieceof Descartes' own views". 22. E. Cassirer,The Philosophyof Enlightenment(Princeton N.J.: PrincetonU.P., 1951, firstpublished in 1932), p. 97; cf. also his The Individual and theCosmos in RenaissancePhilosophy, (Philadelphia: Univ. of PennsylvaniaPress, 1963), chap. 4, "The Subject-ObjectProblem in the Philosophyof Renaissance". 570 Luciano Floridi

23. Cf. H. Caton, The Origin of Subjectivity:An Essay on Descartes,(New Haven and London: Yale U.P., 1973), esp. p. 201. 24. J. Maritain,Three Reformers (London: Sheed and Ward, 1928), p. 78. 25. From the prospectiveof the dissolutionof the harmony betweenknower and known,it is the Kantianrevolution that makes possible a new formof philosophyunknown to Greek or medievalphiloso- phers,namely German idealism. 26. P. Sloterdijk,Critique of CynicalReason, Eng. tr. by M. Elaren (London: Verso, 1988), pp. 178-179. 27. Lear, op. cit.,pp. 3 and 7. 28. Cf. BoethiiDad Opera,Vol. VI, Pars II, Opuscola,uDe Summo Bono", (Hauniae: Det Danske Sprog Og Litteraturselskab, 1976): 373, lines 110-112. 29. Galen, Const.Art. Med. I 243-4 K, quoted by Jonathan Barnesin The Toils of Scepticism(Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1990), p. 4 30. J. Locke, An Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding, P.H. Nidditch(ed.) (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1985), book IV. chap. XIX, par. 1, 4-10. 31. A generalsurvey of the psychologicaltheories about the natureof curiosityis givenby H.G. Voss and H. Kellerin Curiosityand Exploration,Theories and Results(London: AcademicPress, 1983, but first publishedin Germanin 1976). 32. Cf. D. Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, P.H. Nidditch(ed.) (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1978), Book II, PartIII, section 10 entitled"Of curiosity,or the love of truth". 33. This is Lear's terminologicalsuggestion, cf. op. cit., pp. 3 and 7. 34. Cf. Plutarch, aDe Curiositatc", Eng. tr. by W.C. Helmbold with the title aOn being a Busybody", Magna Moralia (CambridgeMass.: HarvardU.P., firsted. 1939), vol. VI. 35. M. Diderot and M. D'Alembert (eds.) Enciclopedieou y DictionnaireRaisonne des Sciencesdes Artes and desMetiers (Stuttgart: F. FrommannVerlag, 1966), vol. IV, pp. 577-578. See also W. James'con- Scepticismand theSearch for Knowledge 571

ccpt of scientificcuriosity (our vis cognoscitiva)in his The Principlesof Psychology,(Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1981), vol. II, p. 1046. 36. Cf. Hume, Treatise, chap. XII, p. 128, and M.F. Burnyeat,"Can the Sceptic live his Scepticism?"in M. Schofield,M.F. Burnyeatand J.Barnes (eds.), Doubtand Dogmatism:Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 20. In a non-trivialsense Burnyeatagrees with Hume's criticism. 37. Burnyeat,art. cit.,p. 51. 38. A homoeostaticmodel assumesthat "all people are mo- tivatedby the need to maintainor restoretheir optimal level of environ- mental,interpersonal and psychologicalstimulation. Insufficient or exces- sivestimulation automatically causes tensionand setsin motionthe motive and usually the behaviour required to achieve equilibrium", R.M. Goldenson (ed.), Dictionaryof Psychologyand Psychiatry(New York and London: Longman,1984). 39. I have provideda moredetailed analysis of the differences betweenthe dogmaticand the scepticalinterpretation of "man's desirefor knowledge"in uCupiditasVeri Videndi:Pierre de Villemandy'sdogmatic vs. Cicero's ScepticalInterpretation of "Man's Desire to Know", forth- comingin the BritishJournal for theHistory of Philosophy. 40. Spinoza discussesthe doctrineof the conatusin proposi- tionsVI/IX of his Ethics,cf. The ChiefWorks ofB.S., Eng. tr. and int. by R.H.M. Elwes (New York: Dover, 1951), vol. II, pp. 136-137. 41. Locke, op. cit.,book II. chap. XXI, pars. 1/34. 42. Ibidem,par. 43. 43. Locke, op. cit.,book IV, chap. XX, par.6. 44. Nietzsche,Beyond Good and Evil, Preludeto a Philosophy of theFuture, ed. and tr. by W. Kaufmann(New York: Vintage Books, 1966), the sectionentitled "On the Prejudicesof Philosophers".See what T. Sorellsays about Hobbes in his Hobbes,(London: Routledgeand Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 29, but also Hobbes' descriptionof the "delightfulappetite of knowledge"in The English Worksof ThomasHobbes, 11 vols., (Aalen Germany:Scientia Verlag, 1940), vol. HI (Leviathan),pp.44, 67, 87, 92; vol. IV (ThreeDiscourses), p.50, and (Answerto Sir WilliamDavenantJs 572 Luciano Floridi

Prefacebefore «Gondibert\ p.453. 45. See the conceptsof externaldead thing,of action,passion and process,and theirrelation with mechanics in Peirce,1.359-61. For the partialityof my interpretationcf. Peirce,6.102-8. 46. Peirce, 1.325. Cf. also 1.320 and 1.431. 47. Peirce, 1.358. Cf. also 1.324 and 2.22. 48. Peirce,2.84. 49. Peirce,7.437-43. 50. Peirce,5.56. Cf. also 2.138-39. 51. Peirce, 1.335-6, cf. also 1.175. For Peirce's theoryof perceptioncf. 7.615-636 and 7.642-681. 52. Cf. also Peirce,1.334 and 5.46. 53. Peirce,1.334. See also M. Fisch,"Alexander Bain and the Geneaologyof Pragmatism",in K.L. Ketnerand C. Kloesel (eds.) Peirce, Semeioticand Pragmatism(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana UniversityPress, 1986): pp. 79-119, especiallyp.89. 54. Peirce, 1.332. 55. Peirce, 1.392. 56. Peirce,2.173. 57. Peirce,7.324, see also 5.372. Same discourseis valid for the absence of moralconsciousness, cf. 8.45. 58. ttTheFixation of Belief" (1877) (5.358-387), "How to Make our Ideas dear" (1878) (5.388-410) and ttTheLogic of 1873" (editorialtitle; 7.313-361). Peircerevised these three works in 1909-1910 planningto make a book out of them (for more information,cf. vol.7, p. 194, editorialnote 1). See also the relationbetween curiosity and doubt in 8.270. 59. Cf. forexample Peirce, 2.655. 60. Cf. Peirce,1.43-5; 1.55; 1.235; 1.636-648; 3.34; 6.428. The topic is discussedby F.E. Reillyin CharlesPeirce's Theory of Scientific Method,(New York: Fordham UniversityPress, 1970), chap. II entitled "The Scientist'sConcern: Knowledge for its Own Sake". 61. Compare for example Peirce, 6.452-493- where Peirce argues that scientificknowledge is more than a mere quest for mental satisfaction- and 2.754, where Peirce accepts a continuityof knowledge Scepticismand theSearch for Knowledge 573

fromanimal instinct to scientifictheories. 62. This is aA PracticalTreatise on Logic and Methodology", winter 1869-70, MS 165 published in Writings of C.S. Farce (Bloomington:Indiana UniversityPress, 1986-), vol. II, p. 350 and ff. Peircemust have had the Aristoteliandictum in mind also when he wrote 7.579. 63. Peirce knewAristotle very well, as this is adequatelytes- tifiedby his scholarlywork, for example in 1.325, 7.233-255, and 7.249- 50. He thoughtof himselfas an Aristotelian(cf. 1.618, and 5.77, foot- note). 64. Cf. for example Peirce, 1.351; 4.551, n.2; 5.493; and 5.591; 6.417; 6.66. 65. Cf. Peirce,5.46 and 1.334. 66. Peirce,5.375. 67. Peirce,5.372. 68. For a verybeautiful illustration of thisprocess see the first pages of Georg Simmel, Der Begriffund die Tragèdie der Kultur, first edited in Logos. InternationaleZeitschrift fur Philosophicder Kultur 2 (1911/12), pp. 1-25. 69. Cf. E. Curley,Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza's Ethics^(Princeton N.J.: PrincetonU.P., 1988), p. 130 and ff.. 70. Thomas Jeffersonin a letter of August 13, 1786 to George Wythe, quoted by Fritz Machlup, Knowledge: Its Creation, Distributionand EconomicSignificance (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1980), vol. I. d. 12. 71 . This articleis a summaryof some topics I discussedin my Ph.D. thesisentitled The Searchfor Knowledge: from Desire to Defence and submittedto the Universityof Warwick, Great Britain in the academic year 1990/91. I wish to acknowledgethe usefulcomments on previous drafts of this paper by Norman Armstrong,Ciril Barret, Francesca Cappelletti,Maria J. Frapolli, ChristopherHookway, Greg Hunt, Jim Tiles, RichardVan der Lagemaat,Michael Mainwaring,Richard Robin and especiallySusan Haack.