www.ssoar.info Functioning and Independence of the Constitutional Court of Spain: Guarantees and Challenges Arzoz, Xabier Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Arbeitspapier / working paper Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Arzoz, X. (2019). Functioning and Independence of the Constitutional Court of Spain: Guarantees and Challenges. (Rechtspolitisches Forum, 79). Trier: Institut für Rechtspolitik an der Universität Trier. https://nbn-resolving.org/ urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-65839-3 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). 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Institut für Rechtspolitik an der Universität Trier · D-54286 Trier Telefon: +49 (0)651 201-3443 · Telefax: +49 (0)651 201-3448 E-Mail: [email protected] · Internet: www.irp.uni-trier.de Die Redaktion übernimmt für unverlangt eingesandte Manuskripte keine Haftung und schickt diese nicht zurück. Namentlich gekennzeichnete Beiträge geben nicht in jedem Fall die Meinung des Herausgebers oder der Mitarbeiter des Instituts wieder. © Institut für Rechtspolitik an der Universität Trier, 2019 ISSN 1616-8828 Prof. Dr. Xabier Arzoz LL.M. (Saarbrücken) Prof. Dr. Xabier Arzoz is Professor of Administrative and EU Law at the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Faculty of Social and Communication Sciences, Bilbao. Since 2011, he is also Law Clerk at the Spanish Constitutional Court. Der Beitrag beruht auf dem an der Universität Trier am 17. De- zember 2018 im Rahmen eines Rechtspolitischen Kolloquiums frei gehaltenen Vortrag. Das Kolloquium war Teil der vierteiligen Ringvorlesung „Rechtsstaatsprinzip vs. Demokratie“. I. Introduction The Spanish Constitutional Court was created by the Constitu- tion of 1978, which definitively replaced the dictatorial rule of General Franco. Said Constitution defines Spain as ‘a social and democratic State under the rule of law’. As regards the form of state, Spain constitutes a ‘quasi-federal parliamentary mon- archy’.1 Since its creation and for almost forty years, the Constitutional Court has contributed to the consolidation of democracy, rule of law, and fundamental rights and above all, to the definition and implementation of the so-called ‘state of autonomies’, which is to say, to the extent and limits of devolution.2 This paper aims to critically assess the functioning and inde- pendence of the Constitutional Court of Spain, a topic more rel- evant than ever, not only due to the alarming developments in * I would like to thank colleagues Ignacio Borrajo Iniesta and Miguel Azpitarte Sánchez for their comments on this paper. The usual dis- claimer applies. 1 Victor Ferreres Comella, The Constitution of Spain – A Contextual Analysis (Oxford: Hart 2013), p. 48. 2 For an introduction, see Pedro José González-Trevijano Sánchez, El Tribunal Constitucional (Cizur Menor: Aranzadi 2000); Jorge Lozano Miralles and Albino Saccomanno, El Tribunal Constitucional (Valen- cia: Tirant lo Blanch 2000); Sabela Oubiña Barbolla, El Tribunal Con- stitucional – Pasado, presente y futuro (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch 2012); Juan Luis Requejo Pagés, ‘Das spanische Verfas- sungsgericht’, in A. von Bogdandy, C. Grabenwarter and P. M. Huber (eds.), Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum – Band VI Verfas- sungsgerichtsbarkeit in Europa: Institutionen (Heidelberg: CF Müller 2016), pp. 639-703; Xabier Arzoz, ‘Constitutional Court of Spain’, in R. Grote, F. Lachenmann and R. Wolfrum (eds.), Max Planck Ency- clopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press 2018), which can be downloaded at www.mpeccol.com. 7 some Central European states, but also to the fact that the in- dependence of constitutional jurisdictions everywhere is intrin- sically conditioned on their proximity to political organs, as re- gards selection and activity. The independence of a constitu- tional court depends on many factors. From a constitutional per- spective, an obvious choice is to focus on the status of consti- tutional judges and their appointment mechanism. Therefore, this paper will forgo exploring other critical issues, such as standing, extension of constitutional review and other organisa- tional questions (law clerks, deciding rules, dissenting opinions, etc.). Nevertheless, the design of Spanish constitutional judicial review strongly resembles that of Germany. This paper is divided into two parts. The first part reviews con- stitutional and legal requirements that safeguard the functioning and independence of the Constitutional Court of Spain and looks for deficiencies in the existing framework. In its second part, the paper traces the relevant challenges to the Constitu- tional Court’s independence that have occurred in the past forty years. Major pressure on the Spanish Constitutional Court have come, on the one hand, from political parties and, on the other, in recent times from the Catalonian secessionist movement. Lastly, the paper ends by reaching a conclusion on the matter. 8 II. Safeguarding functioning and independence In the constitutional debate, there was no opposition to the idea of creating a constitutional court.3 Nevertheless, the members of the constituent assembly considered the Constitutional Court a predominantly political body.4 Although it bears the name and has the functions of a ‘court’, the Constitutional Court is set apart from the judiciary branch of government. Title VI of the Constitution refers to the judiciary and Title IX to the Constitu- tional Court. The Constitution of 1978 preserved the centennial Supreme Court, which was explicitly proclaimed Spain’s ‘high- est judiciary body in all branches of justice, except with regard to the provisions concerning constitutional guarantees’.5 There- fore, the text of the Constitution implies a kind of dual apex (or dual hegemony) instead of a hierarchic relationship; the Su- preme Court stands as the highest judicial court, and the Con- stitutional Court operates as the highest specialized court for constitutional guarantees. Nevertheless, legal provisions offer a less ambiguous design. First, the organic law of the Constitutional Court defines the Court as the ‘supreme interpreter of the Constitution’ proclaim- ing its independence from other constitutional bodies, requiring it to abide only by the Constitution and its organic law, and mak- ing it clear that no institution can challenge its jurisdiction or competence.6 Second, the same organic law assigns the name 3 Pablo Pérez Tremps, Tribunal Constitucional y poder judicial (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales 1985), pp. 97–109. 4 Francisco Rubio Llorente, La forma del poder – Estudios sobre la Constitución, 3rd ed. (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitu- cionales 2012), p. 1396. 5 Art. 123(2). 6 Art. 1 and 4 of Organic Law no. 2/1979 of the Constitutional Court (several times amended). 9 to the members of the Court – ‘judges of the Constitutional Court’ (magistrados del Tribunal Constitucional), a denomina- tion equivalent to that of the judges of the Supreme Court and therefore stressing the judicial character of the institution. Third, ordinary courts and judges are not allowed to review nor not apply legislation that is, or may be, unconstitutional – they must appeal to the Constitutional Court –, and fourth, the organic law of the judiciary requires all judges and courts to interpret and apply legal norms in accordance with the Constitution, as well as with the case law of the Constitutional Court.7 All of these legal provisions assure the supremacy of the Constitutional Court within the legal order. As we will see later, however, it has not avoided conflict with the judiciary in those areas with regard to the enforcement of individual rights, where judges and courts are primarily responsible