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The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government's Foreign Policy: a Retrospective Assessment

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The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government's Foreign Policy: a Retrospective Assessment Journal of International Politics Volume 2, Issue 1, 2020, PP 16-27 ISSN 2642-8245 The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment Chris Landsberg and Oscar van Heerden* Professor and Chair of the NRF SARCHi Chair: African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and Director of Research, Mapungupwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA), Johannesburg, University of Johannesburg, South Arica *Corresponding Author: Chris Lands bergand Oscar van Heerden, Professor and Chair of the NRF SARCHi Chair: African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and Director of Research, Mapungupwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA), Johannesburg, University of Johannesburg, South Arica ABSTRACT As South Africa reached the abrupt, yet predictable, end of the second term of the Jacob Zuma-led government following the ANC’s Congress in Nasrec Johannesburg in December 2017, two years hence provides an opportune time to unpack and understand some of the policy trajectories, and analyse the policy courses of this former administration. In this policy essay, we shall do an appraisal of this government’s foreign policy and unpack the foreign policy priorities and strategic objectives of the new Jacob Zuma-lead administration, placing emphasison assessment of the foreign largely economic interest driven policy agenda or dominant diplomatic priorities of that government. The questions are therefore most interested in a simple yet cardinal question: what were the major strategic political and economic priorities of the Zuma government? INTRODUCTION pursue foreign policy goals “on behalf of the nation”2. A foreign policy “goal” or “objective” One of the major weaknesses with South is typically a vision of a future state of affairs African foreign policy analysis is that scholars that policy makers aspire to bring about to typically adopt a critical approach and end up influence the behaviour of another state or non- telling what is wrong with foreign policy, state actor. Foreign policy goals or objectives without telling us and explaining what the 3 could be very concrete or vague and abstract . foreign policy is in the first instance, and what “What purposes do all governments have in the strategic rationales are which underscores 4 common?”, asked KalHolsti . His answer: such foreign policy. It is for this reason “…we have at least four purposes that are primarily that we resort to an explanatory, common to all contemporary states: (1) security; textual analysis, grounded theory approach in (2) autonomy; (3) welfare, broadly considered which we shall seek to explain what the motives 5 and (4) status and prestige” . But it is important and driving forces, as well as strategic intentions to provide some Africanist perspective on of South Africa‟s foreign policy is. Grounded foreign policy goals and what their determinants and interpretive approaches allows us to scan are. On this score, Gilbert Khadiagala and and digest the information and analysis Terrence Lyons argued that “African foreign embedded in primary material and statements policy at the beginning of the twenty-first and views of decision-makers and to draw important theoretical, conceptual and empirical insights from the data. One of the most basic, yet neglected areas of the study of foreign policy is that of unpacking the goals and aims 2 B. Rusett, H. Starr, and D Kinsella, World Politics: which states pursue in relation to other states th 1 The Menu of Choice, 8 Edition, Thmson and actors in the international system . Leaders Wadsworth, Belmont, California, 2006, p. 135. 3 Ibid., pp. 135-136. 4 1KJ Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for KJ Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Seventh Edition, Prentice Hall, 1995, pp. Analysis, op. cit., p. 84. 83-114. 5 Ibid. Journal of International politics V2 ● I1 ● 2020 16 The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment 17 Journal of International politics V2 ● I1 ● 20 The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment We work with countries of the developed past few years, we have been concerned about North to develop a true and effective the stock response, both from inside and outside partnership for a better world; and government, to some aspects of the articulated International Relations agenda of South Africa, Finally, we play our part to strengthen and which is premised on a new utilitarian, crude transform the multilateral system, to reflect economic driven response”15. We reminded the the diversity of our nations, and ensure its reader that “some critics go so far as to paint our centrality in global governance. involvement on the continent as purely part of a A 2014 Centre for Conflict Resolution policy sub-imperialist agenda. Both domestically and report, titled, “Post-apartheid South Africa‟s abroad, it has been said that South Africa is Foreign Policy After Two Decades” correctly pursuing a narrow national interest driven observed that “since 2009, president Jacob foreign policy”16. Government would counter Zuma has continued these [read: Mbeki‟s] this charge and argued that it in fact operated on policies, but has more aggressively pursued a the basis of African interests. leadership role in SADC…and more openly The Zuma government regarded the invitation championed investment into South Africa as the 12 for it to join the Brazil-Russia-India-China „gateway‟ to the continent” . The Zuma-led (BRIC) constellation to become BRICS as its government clearly focussed more on its greatest foreign policy achievement, albeit that immediate near-abroad and strengthening ties plans for this move started long before the Zuma with Luanda ranked as a major priority. government assumed office. The government‟s Economic interest has been pushed to the front- BRICS strategy was very much in line with this burner in the Zuma government‟s foreign policy notion of South Africa buying into the idea of matrix. In 1966 already, Andrew M. Karmarck the Republic being a “gateway” into Africa, as wrote in relation to African foreign policy: “the well as its strong economic interest pursuit. economic forces at work and the economic Even though BRICS countries have little in structure of a country are important in both its common politically or economically, Zuma in domestic politics and its foreign policy. Very fact tried to reduce BRICS to the fulcrum of simply, to survive you must eat”13. The Zuma South Africa‟s foreign policy. In this context government used the rhetoric that it was South Africa portrayed its presence in BRICS as committed to pursuing a developmental and beneficial for Africa: In the words of Clayson economic driven foreign policy, but this rhetoric Monyela, DIRCO spokesperson at the time, “if soon became cover for a vigorous push for South Africa could also lead the rest of the economic interests under the banner of “Open continent in the search of its own standards for business…in a big way!”14. There was a where these are high, Africa would be on an point about the investment „gateway‟ in the accelerated path to greater economic might. By foreign policy of the Zuma government which is exploring cross border expansion in trade and suggestive of the idea of the Zuma government infrastructure, as well as improvements in having pursued a more utilitarian, self- domestic productivity, South Africa will have interested, economic interest driven foreign more than justified its role as a BRICS policy. Self-interested economic goals featured member”17. We will return the centrality about more prominently during the Zuma BRICS later on in this paper. government‟s foreign policy. Writing in 2015, Doubts were raised about whether South Smith and Lands berg opined that, “over the Africa‟s entry into the BRICS constellation club was based on rational decision-making and strategic calculations. Siphamandla Zondi put it 12Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Post- apartheid South Africa‟s foreign policy after two thus: “another concern has been the assumed decades, Policy Research Seminar Report, Cape lack of clear policy thinking behind the decision Town, South Africa, J Vernon McKay (ed), une to join BRICS, causing decision-makers to 2014, p. 1. wonder South Africa was just looking for 13 Andrew M. Kamarch, “Economic determinants”, in “African diplomacy: Studies in the determinants of 15 foreign policy, Prager Publishers, New York, 1966, Ibid. p. 66. 16Ibid. 14Chris Landsberg and Richard Smith, “South 17Clayson Monyela, The Editor‟s Note, “Let‟s talk Africa‟s foreign policy for sale?”, in The Thinker, SA‟s foreign policy”, in Ubuntu, Diplomacy in Vol. 65, 2015, p. 24. Action, Issue 1, 2012. Journal of International politics V2 ● I1 ● 2020 18 The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment significance, stage and a seat at the high table of The ARF effectively propelled South Africa in world affairs…”18.Zondi‟s point here is in line the direction of challenging the hegemony of the with KalHolsti‟s view that states are also driven established donors. Its aim was “to promo teco- by a quest for “status” and “prestige”. operation between the Republic of South Africa and other countries by granting loans and/ or Zuma was almost obsessed with BRICS, and granting of other financial assistance in respect even believed that accumulating economic of development projects in other countries”19. dividends from its ties with African states ranked as a major new foreign policy goal of the The question is therefore how far this policy Zuma government. But it should be stated was continued by Zuma and how far it was frontally that although South Africa has often replaced by a new one. By about 2012, there paraded as the “representative” or was growing concern of just how committed the “spokesperson” of the African continent in the government was to realizing the goal of BRICS group, there is little evidence to suggest establishing its agency amid a global Economic that its economic and political interests are recession, as well as pressing socio-economic aligned with those of its immediate neighbours challenges at home.
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