Journal of International Politics Volume 2, Issue 1, 2020, PP 16-27 ISSN 2642-8245

The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment

Chris Landsberg and Oscar van Heerden* Professor and Chair of the NRF SARCHi Chair: African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and Director of Research, Mapungupwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA), Johannesburg, University of Johannesburg, South Arica *Corresponding Author: Chris Lands bergand Oscar van Heerden, Professor and Chair of the NRF SARCHi Chair: African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and Director of Research, Mapungupwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA), Johannesburg, University of Johannesburg, South Arica

ABSTRACT As South Africa reached the abrupt, yet predictable, end of the second term of the Jacob Zuma-led government following the ANC’s Congress in Nasrec Johannesburg in December 2017, two years hence provides an opportune time to unpack and understand some of the policy trajectories, and analyse the policy courses of this former administration. In this policy essay, we shall do an appraisal of this government’s foreign policy and unpack the foreign policy priorities and strategic objectives of the new Jacob Zuma-lead administration, placing emphasison assessment of the foreign largely economic interest driven policy agenda or dominant diplomatic priorities of that government. The questions are therefore most interested in a simple yet cardinal question: what were the major strategic political and economic priorities of the Zuma government?

INTRODUCTION pursue foreign policy goals “on behalf of the nation”2. A foreign policy “goal” or “objective” One of the major weaknesses with South is typically a vision of a future state of affairs African foreign policy analysis is that scholars that policy makers aspire to bring about to typically adopt a critical approach and end up influence the behaviour of another state or non- telling what is wrong with foreign policy, state actor. Foreign policy goals or objectives without telling us and explaining what the 3 could be very concrete or vague and abstract . foreign policy is in the first instance, and what “What purposes do all governments have in the strategic rationales are which underscores 4 common?”, asked KalHolsti . His answer: such foreign policy. It is for this reason “…we have at least four purposes that are primarily that we resort to an explanatory, common to all contemporary states: (1) security; textual analysis, grounded theory approach in (2) autonomy; (3) welfare, broadly considered which we shall seek to explain what the motives 5 and (4) status and prestige” . But it is important and driving forces, as well as strategic intentions to provide some Africanist perspective on of South Africa‟s foreign policy is. Grounded foreign policy goals and what their determinants and interpretive approaches allows us to scan are. On this score, Gilbert Khadiagala and and digest the information and analysis Terrence Lyons argued that “African foreign embedded in primary material and statements policy at the beginning of the twenty-first and views of decision-makers and to draw important theoretical, conceptual and empirical insights from the data. One of the most basic, yet neglected areas of the study of foreign policy is that of unpacking the goals and aims 2 B. Rusett, H. Starr, and D Kinsella, World Politics: which states pursue in relation to other states th 1 The Menu of Choice, 8 Edition, Thmson and actors in the international system . Leaders Wadsworth, Belmont, California, 2006, p. 135. 3 Ibid., pp. 135-136. 4 1KJ Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for KJ Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Seventh Edition, Prentice Hall, 1995, pp. Analysis, op. cit., p. 84. 83-114. 5 Ibid.

Journal of International politics V2 ● I1 ● 2020 16 The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment century is still dominated by overarching “Polokwanisation” of policy, politics and constraints on the survival of the weak state”6. diplomacy; meaning that the fall-out from the Polokwane skirmish spilled over into the Invoking Christopher Clapham, they argued that diplomatic and statecraft arenas as well. “the imperative of state survival…force elites to use foreign policy to garner political and Mbeki had pursued a four-pronged approach of economic resources from the external strategic goals in which he sought to combine environment”. They went further to assert that foreign and domestic policies. The much “contemporary African elites, like their vaunted „AfricanAgenda‟;South-Southco- predecessors, are preoccupied with political operation;North-Southdialogue;andsocio- stability, legitimacy, and economic security economicandpolitico-security all incorporated issues, whose importance seems to increase the country‟s post-apartheid move to combining rather than diminish”7. Again, we will zero in on domestic growth with the replacement of how on how the ANC as party came to assert international isolation by continental and itself more directly in foreign policy processes overseas links, and notions of global beyond the role of the government. governance. In this piece we revert back to old fashioned Because of the bitter fraternal fight between the Foreign policy analysis theory, and in particular Mbeki and Zuma factions, the post-Mbeki that of goals or primary aims as pursued by government tried very hard to distance states to come to grips with some of the motive themselves from anything associated with their forces which underscores South Africa‟s predecessors. However, tried as they wish to strategies towards other states, organisations and distance they from the Mbeki domestic and non-state actors during the Jacob Zuma years foreign policy legacies, the new Jacob Zuma-led (2009-2017). splintered coterie were heavily influenced by the foreign policy legacy of Mbeki. It was against FOREIGN POLICY GOALS AND THE this background of a well-crafted foreign policy EMERGING FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA OF architecture, that the August 2009 Medium-term THE ZUMA GOVERNMENT Strategic Framework to Guide Government’s The consequences for governance of the ANC‟s Programme for the Electoral mandate Period 52ndNationalConference in Polokwane in 2007 2009-2014 was announced, signalling that the when control of the party was wrested from the Zuma administration would champion its then President Thabo Mbeki and handed to Foreign policy under the broad rubric of“ Jacob Zuma has dogged government since, even Pursuing African Advancement and Enhanced 10 after Zuma‟s departure8. Not only has there been Co-operation” . a sense of instability in government, but it has In 2012, the then Minister of International been very difficult to discern the goals, and Relations and Co-operation, Maite Nkoana- decipher the actions of government‟s diplomacy Mashabane outlined the macro goals of the in practice. Much of the controversy has Zuma government‟s foreign policy. She stated revolved around whether the change in that “…our foreign policy [was] based on four leadership at Polokwane constituted a shift central pillars11: merely in personalities or actual policy goals as well9. In contributing to the debate, this paper  We give priority to the Southern African focuses on the foreign policy goals of the Zuma Development Community (SADC) and government. In this sense we have witnessed Africa as a whole; the foreign policy version of the  We work with countries of the South to address shared challenges of

6 Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (eds.), underdevelopment and promote global equity African Foreign Policies, Power and Process, Lynne and social justice; Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 2001, p. 7 7 Ibid. 10Chris Landsberg, “The emerging Africa strategy of 8Chris Landsberg and Suzanne Graham, “South the new Jacob Zuma administration”, in Siphamandla African Foreign Policy formulation, 2009-2016”, in Zondi and Lesley Masters (eds.), The future of South Chris Landsberg and Suzanne Graham (eds.), Africa‟s foreign policy: Continuity and Change, IGD Government and Politics in South Africa: Coming of and FES, 2010, p. 56. Age, Fifth Edition, Van Schaik Publishers, 283. 11Maite Nkoana- Mashabane, Letter from the 99Ibid. Minister, in Ubuntu, Issue 1, 2012, Pretoria, p. 7.

17 Journal of International politics V2 ● I1 ● 2020 The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment

 We work with countries of the developed past few years, we have been concerned about North to develop a true and effective the stock response, both from inside and outside partnership for a better world; and government, to some aspects of the articulated International Relations agenda of South Africa,  Finally, we play our part to strengthen and which is premised on a new utilitarian, crude transform the multilateral system, to reflect economic driven response”15. We reminded the the diversity of our nations, and ensure its reader that “some critics go so far as to paint our centrality in global governance. involvement on the continent as purely part of a A 2014 Centre for Conflict Resolution policy sub-imperialist agenda. Both domestically and report, titled, “Post-apartheid South Africa‟s abroad, it has been said that South Africa is Foreign Policy After Two Decades” correctly pursuing a narrow national interest driven observed that “since 2009, president Jacob foreign policy”16. Government would counter Zuma has continued these [read: Mbeki‟s] this charge and argued that it in fact operated on policies, but has more aggressively pursued a the basis of African interests. leadership role in SADC…and more openly The Zuma government regarded the invitation championed investment into South Africa as the 12 for it to join the Brazil-Russia-India-China „gateway‟ to the continent” . The Zuma-led (BRIC) constellation to become BRICS as its government clearly focussed more on its greatest foreign policy achievement, albeit that immediate near-abroad and strengthening ties plans for this move started long before the Zuma with Luanda ranked as a major priority. government assumed office. The government‟s Economic interest has been pushed to the front- BRICS strategy was very much in line with this burner in the Zuma government‟s foreign policy notion of South Africa buying into the idea of matrix. In 1966 already, Andrew M. Karmarck the Republic being a “gateway” into Africa, as wrote in relation to African foreign policy: “the well as its strong economic interest pursuit. economic forces at work and the economic Even though BRICS countries have little in structure of a country are important in both its common politically or economically, Zuma in domestic politics and its foreign policy. Very fact tried to reduce BRICS to the fulcrum of simply, to survive you must eat”13. The Zuma South Africa‟s foreign policy. In this context government used the rhetoric that it was South Africa portrayed its presence in BRICS as committed to pursuing a developmental and beneficial for Africa: In the words of Clayson economic driven foreign policy, but this rhetoric Monyela, DIRCO spokesperson at the time, “if soon became cover for a vigorous push for South Africa could also lead the rest of the economic interests under the banner of “Open continent in the search of its own standards for business…in a big way!”14. There was a where these are high, Africa would be on an point about the investment „gateway‟ in the accelerated path to greater economic might. By foreign policy of the Zuma government which is exploring cross border expansion in trade and suggestive of the idea of the Zuma government infrastructure, as well as improvements in having pursued a more utilitarian, self- domestic productivity, South Africa will have interested, economic interest driven foreign more than justified its role as a BRICS policy. Self-interested economic goals featured member”17. We will return the centrality about more prominently during the Zuma BRICS later on in this paper. government‟s foreign policy. Writing in 2015, Doubts were raised about whether South Smith and Lands berg opined that, “over the Africa‟s entry into the BRICS constellation club was based on rational decision-making and strategic calculations. Siphamandla Zondi put it 12Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Post- apartheid South Africa‟s foreign policy after two thus: “another concern has been the assumed decades, Policy Research Seminar Report, Cape lack of clear policy thinking behind the decision Town, South Africa, J Vernon McKay (ed), une to join BRICS, causing decision-makers to 2014, p. 1. wonder South Africa was just looking for 13 Andrew M. Kamarch, “Economic determinants”, in “African diplomacy: Studies in the determinants of 15 foreign policy, Prager Publishers, New York, 1966, Ibid. p. 66. 16Ibid. 14Chris Landsberg and Richard Smith, “South 17Clayson Monyela, The Editor‟s Note, “Let‟s talk Africa‟s foreign policy for sale?”, in The Thinker, SA‟s foreign policy”, in Ubuntu, Diplomacy in Vol. 65, 2015, p. 24. Action, Issue 1, 2012.

Journal of International politics V2 ● I1 ● 2020 18 The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment significance, stage and a seat at the high table of The ARF effectively propelled South Africa in world affairs…”18.Zondi‟s point here is in line the direction of challenging the hegemony of the with KalHolsti‟s view that states are also driven established donors. Its aim was “to promo teco- by a quest for “status” and “prestige”. operation between the Republic of South Africa and other countries by granting loans and/ or Zuma was almost obsessed with BRICS, and granting of other financial assistance in respect even believed that accumulating economic of development projects in other countries”19. dividends from its ties with African states ranked as a major new foreign policy goal of the The question is therefore how far this policy Zuma government. But it should be stated was continued by Zuma and how far it was frontally that although South Africa has often replaced by a new one. By about 2012, there paraded as the “representative” or was growing concern of just how committed the “spokesperson” of the African continent in the government was to realizing the goal of BRICS group, there is little evidence to suggest establishing its agency amid a global Economic that its economic and political interests are recession, as well as pressing socio-economic aligned with those of its immediate neighbours challenges at home. As well as a major service or other African states. delivery crisis, the ANC government was under attack from its traditional support base, the ESTABLISHING A SOUTH AFRICAN trades unions, and is currently locking horns DEVELOPMENT AGENCY with the media as it tries to muzzle freedom of Foreign aid has long been more than just a noble speech in a vain attempt to prevent disclosure of gesture exercised by powerful donor countries criticism of the president and the wide spread vis-à-vis poor and developing countries. Aid and corruption that has permeated every level of foreign assistance have been key instruments government and the civil service. Of major and tools used in diplomacy to achieve strategic concern was whether the government was truly foreign policy goals, including serving the committed to realizing the ambitious goal of economic and political interests of givers to setting aside 0,7% of GDP to go toward said, receiving states. Another Mbeki legacy that when its own peoples are participating in Zuma tried to pick up was that of SADPA. So, growing unrest at what is widely perceived, apart from the name change from DFA to rightly or wrongly, as shambolic governance. DIRCO, what else was new in terms of South The plan to declare itself as a donor country that Africa‟s motivations vis-à-vis Africa, and in the can compete with the OECD countries was also realm of aid in particular. An idea born out the flirtation with the new “Diplomacy communicated by the new Zuma-led of Ubuntu” government was the establishment of a South African Development Partnership Agency But the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis (SADPA), with the aim of promoting and its own economic weaknesses at home, developmental partnerships. According to including foreign credit downgrades and Minister Nkoana-Mashabane, the then tittering on the brink of economic junk status by government intended to bring together the work 2017 meant that this idea was still born and of several departments into one more practical more a case of delusions of grandeur. unit. The view emanating from Pretoria- Masters and van Wyk argued in the 2019 edition Tshwane was one of „cooperation‟, „co- of the South African Foreign Policy Review ordination‟ and „coherence‟; practice and reality that, “strategic partnerships were not defined or suggested otherwise. In August 2009, the embraced as a tool in the diplomatic toolbox, Minister confirmed rather ambitiously that and the South African Development Partnership SADPA was operational, and would “contribute Agency [was] not yet out of the starting to capacity and institutional building, as well as blocks”20. support socio-economic and human resource development” However, while the idea of SADPA was touted as bringing order to previous chaos, it was not a new one. 19Clayson Monyela, The Editor‟s Note, “Let‟s talk SA‟s foreign policy”, in Ubuntu, op. cit. 18Lesley Masters and Jo-Ansie van Wyk (eds.), South 20Lesley Masters and Jo-Ansie van Wyk (eds.), South African Foreign Policy Review, Foreign Policy African Foreign Policy Review, Foreign Policy Change and the Zuma Years, Volume 3, Africa Change and the Zuma Years, Volume 3, Africa Institute and HSRC Press, 2019, p. 25. Institute and HSRC Press, 2019, p. 5.

19 Journal of International politics V2 ● I1 ● 2020 The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment

In the end SADPA was left hanging in limbo clarifying news when government started by due to an ailing economy at home, including about 2014 to state in the open that it remained sliding into “junk” economic status, aggressive committed to NEPAD, having been silent on attempts to establish a parallel state through this issue, and so considered as ambivalent. For “state capture”, and very tough economic a while there was a real risk that the country, conditions abroad, and the Zuma government which had been the lead state in the formation of found it exceedingly difficult to justify investing NEPAD, ran the risk of distancing itself for so much in extra-South African initiatives. Little domestic political reasons a supposed to sound came of SADPA as accusations of “state foreign policy motivations. In committing itself, capture” and economic junk status, and there grudgingly, to NEPAD, and to improving the was a symbiotic relationship between politics on regional climate for growth and development, as the one hand, and the performance of the well as placing the development requirements of economy on the other. the continent on the global agenda, it is signifying that it will continue to use Mbeki‟s IN SEARCH OF AFRICAN IDENTITY vehicles, the G8-Africa Action Plan, and the All states pursue key political, security and African Partnership Forum24. What policy there economic goals in relation to their immediate was stating that NEPAD remained the main neighbourhoods, and again, South Africa is no frame of reference for intra-African relations exception21. A key plank of the Zuma and Africa‟s partnership with international administration‟s foreign policy was stability in, partners. By the time the Zuma government had and economic benefit from its “near-abroad”. reaffirmed its commitment to NEPAD, we could The Zuma government has identified the safely work on the assumption that the goal is to “continued prioritisation of the African help Africa increase its levels of growth for continent”, pursued under two broad the matic development so that Africa could become what areas: continental and improving political and Minister Rob Davies and others have called the economic integration in SADC (The South “new frontier”, and others have referred to as African Development Community). the “next growth point”. Indeed, South Africa‟s participation in initiatives like the EU-Africa South Africa has long sought to endear itself to Strategic Partnership, the Forum for Africa- the rest of the continent, and in an interview in China Partnership (FOCAC), and of course 2014, President Zuma proclaimed that “Africa BRICS, seem to be driven by this desire to help has remained at the centre of our foreign policy. put Africa on a growth path. We have worked hard to strengthen support for the African Union, SADC and all continental South Africa has repeatedly stated that a key bodies whose purpose is to achieve peace and goal in Africa is the democratisation of states in security”22, asserted the President. South Africa the continent and ensuring that Africa adheres to wanted a peaceful region so that market good governance25. If that is the case, then economics and growth can flourish. The South Africa should not allow a key governance President went further to assert that “we have and democracy instrument like the African Peer also prioritised the promotion of regional Review Mechanism (APRM) to just drift. It economic integration, and sustainable should show leadership in reclaiming and development in the continent”23. It is important restoring the APRM26. It acted rather belatedly to stress here that Zuma had in mind not to fill the void left by the departure of Chris comprehensive integration that will transcend Stals as South African representative on the borders, but a narrow, developmental, pro-GDP APRM Eminent Persons Group, and appointed growth paradigm. former ANC Chair Baleka Mbete as representative, it only woke up late to ensure Speculation has also been rife as to the future of that the APRM processes resumed in earnest NEPAD, the brainchild of former President and that governance and democracy promotion Thabo Mbeki, under the scattergun approach to foreign policy of the Zuma coterie. It came as 24 See Chris Landsberg, South Africa‟s “African Agenda”: Challenges of Policy and Implementation, 21KJ Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Paper prepared for the Presidency Fifteen-Year Analysis, op. cit, p. 84. Review Project, 2009. , 22 The Thinker, Dr. Essop Pahad Interviews President 25 The Thinker, Dr. Essop Pahad Interviews President Jacob Zuma, Vol 62, 2014, p. 13. Jacob Zuma, op. cit., p. 13. 23Ibid. 26Ibid.

Journal of International politics V2 ● I1 ● 2020 20 The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment in Africa continues, when it appointed Prof and Madagascar. As part of the AU, our peace Eddy Maloka as the new head of the APRM efforts include Libya, Sudan and Cote d‟Ivoire, Commission. At home, the creditability of the and in the Great lakes region, participating in instrument needed to be restored, and Maloka‟s efforts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of appointment was appointed as the new CEO to continent and other countries”30. restore the credibility of the programme and The new Zuma administration steered clear of South Africa‟s champion status. using the evocative and controversial idea of“ In a characteristically vacuous piece, policy quiet diplomacy” as a means to promote conflict stated that it would, through continental and resolution in Africa31. Distancing itself from this regional issues, work towards the entrenchment controversial concept was an attempt to show a of democracy and respect for human rights on break between itself and the Mbeki the African continent. Suffice it to point out here administration, yet apart from ditching the term that the balance between a human rights and “quiet”, in practice the conflict resolution justice versus a peace, security and development posture adopted by Zuma was similar to that approach has been a difficult one for this adopted by the Mbeki administration32. country to achieve during the course of the past The 2014 CCR report referred to earlier noted fifteen years. that, “under the presidency of Jacob Zuma since There was also a strong emphasis on pursuing 2009, Tshwane has increasingly „deployed‟ its the Republic‟s political and economic goals own officials within the African Union – through bi-lateral ties. Policy stated that, including Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as Chair of “pursuing the African Agenda required the AU Commission in 2012. South Africa has establishing and strengthening bi-lateral also adopted a more militaristic approach to relations with almost all African countries”27. peace processes in the Great Lakes region, leading a 3 000-strong SADC armed Pax-Pretoriana under Zuma intervention into the eastern Congo in 2013 with All states in the world seek security from both Tanzania and Malawi”33. internal and external threats, and a Pax South The new government vowed to contribute to the Africana also contained conflict resolution promotion of peace, security and stability, by strategies that were crafted with these ends to among others, sustaining involvement in peace enhance internal and external security in mind28. keeping operations in Africa. It went on to say No country wished to be attacked by another at that South Africa would assist in the home. reconstruction and development of the African Whereas apartheid South Africa was a ruffian continent, especially in post-conflict countries state, post-apartheid government sought to such as the DRC, Sudan, Burundi, Western portray themselves as peacemakers and Sahara and Zimbabwe. But how and where promoters of stability and security. It was bent would the focus lie? on not pursuing a confrontational and bellicose Here there may be evidence of a break with posture vis-à-vis the region and other states. policy between the two presidents. Starting with Writing in 2012, Minister of International the bilateral questions, in particular Zuma‟s Relations and Co-operation made a strong case choice of first state visit to Angola in August for South Africa as a champion of peace and 2009, he was accompanied by 11 Cabinet security, and the peaceful settlements of ministers, senior government officials, and the disputes. She opined that “our country emerged largest business delegation to accompany ahead from conflict to become a peaceful democracy of state on a state visit since1994. Zuma was and we are now working for peace on the continent and in the world”29. She continued to 30 Ibid. observe that “we participate in peace and 31 security matters in SADC, such as in Zimbabwe See Chris Landsberg, “African solutions for African problems: Quite diplomacy and South Africa‟s diplomatic strategy towards Zimbabwe”, 27 The Presidency, Twenty-Year Review, South Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 40, No. 2, Africa 1994-2014, Pretoria-Tshwane, 2015, p. 148. 2016, pp. 126-148. 28KJ Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for 32Ibid. Analysis, op. cit., p. 84. 33Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Post- 29MaiteNkoana-Mashabane, Letter from the Minister, apartheid South Africa‟s foreign policy after two in Ubuntu, Issue 1, 2012, Pretoria, p. 7. decades, op. cit., p. 3.

21 Journal of International politics V2 ● I1 ● 2020 The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment determined to restore solidarity with Angola, a Zimbabwe strategy. Ironically, Zuma‟s own country with whom relations had been severely departure from office coincided Mugabe‟s strained during the Mbeki years. Angola did not departure as head of state after 40 years in like South Africa‟s hegemonic status in the Zimbabwe, and as Mugabe was replaced region, and Angolan President Dos Santos never Managagwa, so Zuma was replaced by responded positively to Mbeki‟s over tures for Emmerson Managagwa. closer relations34. Utilitarian, economic interests As faras the DRC is concerned, the Zuma loomed large during this trip. government continued to use the vehicle created Against the back drop of these charges, and a by the Mbeki government to engage the central generally frosty relationship between Luanda African country in managing its post-colonial and Pretoria-Tshwane, it was not surprising that civil conflicts, namely the South African- Zuma chose Angola as his first destination for a DRCB i-National Commission (BNC). In state visit after becoming head of state. On a engaging the DRC, South Africa would focus on positive note, the idea of elevating South examining progress on the implementation of African-Angola ties to a more strategic plan projects and key issues related to post-conflict sounds like a welcome move, and there are reconstruction and development, in particular certainly bilateral benefits to be had helping the DRC building its capacity with in economically. On a more curious level, the the police and security forces, and building state question arose whether there storation of ties institutions to govern more effectively. signals a geo-continental shift in policy away One area of policy which the Zuma government from the likes of Nigeria, Algeria, Ethiopia, made no attempt to disguise its having Tanzania and Ghana. continued along the Mbeki route was a There was predictably little change in policy preference for negotiating inclusive government vis-à-vis Zimbabwe, and we finally experienced son the continent. For instance, it supported the a general election which took place and work off or mer Mozambique President Joachim President Manangag was sworn in as the new Chisano as SADC appointed mediator to try and President, after almost 4 decades of Mugabe resolve the crisis in Madagascar, which has been rule, which apart from an explicit commitment dubbed by SADC and the AU as an example of to work towards a free and fair election at the “unconstitutional change of government”. This earliest possible date. It seemed to be business is a practice that has been rejected by these as usual in Pretoria, and there was little to continental institutions. Determined to reverse suggest that the Zuma government‟s stance the unconstitutional practice and restore rule in differed from that of the Mbeki government Madagascar, Pretoria-Tshwane came out in quiet diplomacy strategy. Zuma has said he support of Chissano‟s push for an inclusive would work with all parties in the Zimbabwe government that would see Ravalomanana as unity government, Zanu-Pf, MDC-T svangarai, president, with the person who ousted him, and MDC- Mutambara, to address “potential Rajoelina, as participating in such a fault lines” within the inclusive government to government. Both would be allowed to stand in resolve their differences and ensure that this an ew presidential race after the transitional government works more effectively. This period. includes resolving differences over issues such A huge anomaly in the Zuma administration‟s as the Governor of the Central Bank and the Pax-South Africana strategy was South Africa‟s Attorney General. However, the government of conduct vis-à-vis the conflict in Libya in 2011. national unity (GNU) was a fragile one and the To the surprise of many, South Africa voted in three parties involved in the pact were reluctant favour of UN resolutions 1970 and 1973 which participants; in the end the pact came unstuck. help to give NATO the mandate to take military The GNU went through many fits and starts, and actions against Muammar Ghaddafi. This there were even occasional walkouts staged by ultimately resulted in “regime change” as South some of the parties, especially the two MDC Africa appeared to be going against the grain of factions. By the end of 2017, the Zuma-led the position by the AU. Some even suggested government was so consumed with domestic that South Africa adopted this position in an ANC politics, that there was a palpable lack of a attempt to pacify NATO, and Washington, Paris

34 and London in particular. In relation to the Adekeye Adebajo, The Eagle and the Springbok: Libya debacle, Siphamandla Zondi argued that, Essays on Nigeria and South Africa, Jacana Media, “at that point, the discourse on the foreign 2018.

Journal of International politics V2 ● I1 ● 2020 22 The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment policy of the Zuma government shifts from which found that it acted contrary to the spirit of seeing a promising pragmatic turn to the Constitution. The al-Bashir saga disappointment over an ideological slide35. demonstrated that South Africa‟s foreign policy Alongside this”, asserts Zondi, “are perspectives under Zuma was trapped between “Afro- that view this change of position to be indicative Southern solidarism and lofty cosmopolitan of clumsiness and naivety in South Africa‟s values”, including a stated commitment to expectations that Western powers would human rights37. There were in fact signs that the reciprocate its overtures in the form of a vote Zuma government was moving towards a “post- in favour of a French-sponsored resolution to human rights” foreign policy and the al-Bashir allow the African Union (AU) to find a political crisis highlighted that “…when the time comes solution first and a military solution later”36. The for choosing between moral, ethical prescripts point is that Zuma behaved as if the AU had to that contradict understanding of national play second fiddle to western actors and this interest, South Africa will invariably go for the created deep discontent in African quarters national interest”38. Siphamandla Zondi argued about South Africa‟s position in relation to in similar fashion that when he stated that Libya. “…the question is the idea South Africa has moved away from a premise where human One cannot conclude any assessment of Pax- rights were once placed at the centre of its South Africana under Jacob Zuma without a foreign policy”39. Peter Vale articulated a reference to policies and tactics towards Sudan. perspective about how South Africa‟s stance Sudan is another country and challenge over vis-à-vis the ICC and al-Bashir when he argued which South Africa had invested much political that “one of the things that is worrying the West capital in trying to resolve political and security about South Africa is that South Africa is in issues. danger of becoming an outlier state”40. The Minister for international relations Whatever ones views on the Zuma confirmed that South Africa has “an important government‟s then stance in relation to the ICC contribution to finding a lasting peace in the and the al-Bashir stand-off with the courts, that Sudan as we chair the Ministerial Committee on position had perilous implications for the post-conflict reconstruction in that country”. Republic‟s reputation as a defender of human She confirmed that South African troops are an rights in foreign policy. important component of the AU-UN peace- keeping presence in Darfur ”and that “former IMPROVING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC President Thabo Mbeki is leading a High-level INTEGRATION OF SADC Panel of the AU whose work should help us to Economic interests rank as a major goal pursued address the challenges of justice and by states, including developing countries41. In an reconciliation in that country.” In 2014 Deputy increasingly globalising world, states also look President Cyril Ramaphosa was appointed as to their immediate “near-abroad” as they search mediator in South Sudan‟s civil war, as South for economic markets and opportunities to Africa wanted to counter the perception that it maximise political and economic gain. Regional no longer took peace and security issues integration strategies are also motivated by such seriously. aims, and South Africa integration strategies By 2015, we saw a real fork in the road with vis-à-vis SADC was no different. In this regard, regard to the International Criminal Court (ICC) it is pertinent to consider South Africa‟s planned brought about by the impasse with regard to indicted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. 37 See Chris Landsberg, “South Africa‟s foreign Contrary to obligations under the Rome statute, policy in context”, in Al-Bashir and the Crisis in Pretoria-Tshwane did not only failed to arrest South Africa‟s Foreign Policy: Problems and the Sudanese leader while attending an AU Prospects, Proceedings Report, South African Chair Summit in Johannesburg, but the government in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy and flatly ignored a decision by its High Court Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study (JIAS), 22 July 2015., p. 6.

38Ibid 35 Siphamandla Zondi, “Debates on South Africa‟s 39 Foreign Policy and Ideology: An Afro-Decolonial Ibid., p. 6. Mediation on the Mbeki-Zuma Years”, South 40Ibid., p. 20. African Foreign Policy Review, op. cit., p. 25. 41KJ Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for 36Ibid. Analysis, op. cit., p. 87.

23 Journal of International politics V2 ● I1 ● 2020 The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment strategies for improving political and economic development of the country and the continent, integration of SADC, the new government‟s and for creating solidarity in the global struggle prioritization of which should be viewed within against poverty, underdevelopment and the the context of its regarding regional economic marginalisation of emerging economies”43. communities (RECs) as the pillar institutions of Strong links are made with development continental union. imperatives here44. While during the apartheid decades white-ruled South Africa was ostracised The new government promised to focus on to the point of its international relations being making a contribution towards political effectively reduced to relations with western cohesion and strengthening governance and powers, post-apartheid governments set out to capacity in SADC, especially in the Secretariat, broaden their international relations and sought including deploying personnel to strategic solidarism, new economic interactions, and new positions within the Secretariat. It is worth market opportunities with countries of the pointing out here that this has been a vexing South. The third foreign policy pillar of the question in foreign policy since the end of Zuma administration to consider is that of apartheid, namely the gap between intentions “strengthening South-South relations45”.The and capacity. main rationale under scoring the South-South The Zuma government had also stated that it cooperation strategies of the Zuma government will move towards enhanced regional economic would be to “ensure the creation of political, integration and address sources of disagreement economic and social spheres necessary for the among members of SACU on issues such as fight against poverty, under development and trade policy and revenue. The question that marginalization of the South”46. Again, Minister begs, however, is whether that administration Nkoana- Mashabane as good as admitted to genuinely planned to continue with the Mbeki following Mbeki when she stressed that “South government‟s innovative policy paradigm, Africa will continue to build relations based on introduced towards the latter years of the solidarity and cooperation with regional and previous administration, namely that of sub-regional groups in the South such as the development regional integration. Non-aligned Movement (NAM), Forum for The closest there is to an explicit developmental China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC), Africa- India Forum,G77 plus China, the India-Brazil- idea is to be found in government‟s stated policy towards EPAs, articulated in the 2009 MTSF, South Africa Dialogue Forum, and the New where in the idea was mooted that South Africa Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP) in pursuit of the consolidation of the African would seek to ensure that EPA shave a 47 development agenda and support regional Agenda” . integration. However, there continues to be a It should be remembered that the Southern major difference amongst SADC states over formations which the Zuma government chose how to respond to EPAs, with some being to prioritize were the very ones in which Mbeki apprehensive about embracing this platform and government played pivotal roles in revitalizing others viewing it as an important rigger for and strengthening, including IBSA and NAASP, development42. Either way, there is a need for and NAM and the G77 plus China formation. SADC common positions over EPA sand other Minister Maite Nkoana- Mashabane put it thus: trade instruments. “South Africa participates in various multi- lateral forums, including SADC, the AU and the South-South Solidarism Non-Aligned Movement, G77 plus China, the Part of South Africa‟s goal of global Commonwealth, the BRICS bloc, the India- transformation or international system Brazil-South Africa forum and the UN”48. reorganisation was the pursuit of “South-South” cooperation. In government‟s “Twenty-Review: South Africa 1994-2014”, it professes that 43 The Presidency, Twenty-Year Review, South “democratic South Africa has always Africa 1994-2014, op. cit., p. 153. partnerships with countries of the global South, 44 Ibid. regarding them as important for the 45Ibid. 46Ibid. 47 42 Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Address to the Heads of See Reinet Loubser, “The SADC EPA in the Missions Conference, Sandton, 13 August 2009. current economic climate”, CCR Policy Brief, Cape 48Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Letter from the Town, October 2017. Minister, in Ubuntu, Issue 1, 2012, Pretoria, p. 7.

Journal of International politics V2 ● I1 ● 2020 24 The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment

Indeed, the Zuma administration reached a point and George W. Bush presidential eras in South at which it no longer even pretended to deny the Africa and American respectively, the bilateral strong political and economic ties Mbeki had relationship between the two countries cooled cultivated with India, Brazil and China, as off significantly because of differences over US providing opportunities to diversify its unilateral conduct globally and the illegal international relations, especially in the political American-led in vasion of Iraq in 2003.On the realm. It continued with the positions and other hand, there was American irritation over posture of the Mbeki government in terms of South Africa‟s „quiet‟ approaches to the crisis in South-South co-operation, as it did with respect Zimbabwe. to other areas of foreign policy. Reaching out to the EU was another example of Ambivalence towards the North South Africa‟s determination to bolster its relations with the North. The EU is South In terms of relations with the Northern Africa‟s leading trading partner, and it wished to industrialised powers, the Zuma government‟s turn this reality into benefits for itself and for policies were perplexing and blurring as we the African continent in the main, South Africa witnessed a pronounced gap between rhetoric has committed itself to advancing AU-EU and reality in terms of the Zuma government‟s relations by taking the 1stAfrica-EU Action Plan foreign policy posture. It should be remembered implementation process. The Zuma that seeking welfare and prosperity in foreign administration could have taken a leaf out of the relations, while ensuring the policy autonomy of book of its predecessor, which had learned some a state is a key objective championed by states tough lessons from the TDCA negotiations with in foreign policy. The Zuma government has Europe, above all how not to go it alone. been quite ambivalent about its relations with the West in particular, the industrialised North Participate in the Global System of Governance in general49. A key goal which motivated South KalHolsti reminds us that many states “dream of Africa‟s relations with industrialised powers, all world reorganisation”, of changing and the negative anti-West rhetoric notwithstanding, transforming world politics and the constellation was that it sought political autonomy from the and distribution of world power and world west, but close and intimate ties economically. resources in ways that would not be antithetical The government was cynical about relations to their interests50. As such, some states prefer with the industrialised powers. On the one hand the global status quo more than they prefer government wanted economic closeness, yet on changing it depending on their belief that such a the other hand it wanted maximum political global order serves their interests and advance distance. While the Zuma government shared a their economic, social and political ideas. The major plank of the Mbeki government in terms fifth pillar of the Zuma government‟s evolving of a commitment to engaging the Northern foreign policy was that of “participating in the industrialized powers and their associations, global system of governance”, remarkably there was also this heightened tensions between similar to Mbeki administration‟s “global Pretoria-Tshwane and many of the western governance” strategies”51. When the Zuma capitals. This rationale behind this fourth pillar government talked about “participation in the of the Zuma administration‟s foreign policy was global system of governance” they had in mind to continue to engage the industrialized powers. attempting to help altering global order in a Very early on during the Zuma administration‟s manner that it would become friendlier to era, the visit in August 2009 by US Secretary of African interests and the concerns and State Hillary Clint on confirmed South Africa‟s aspirations of the South. In the early part of this wish to cement close ties with Washington and treatise, dealing with foreign policy strategies of strategic economic relations in particular, and it the Mbeki government, we advanced the wished to take“ full advantage of the US Africa argument that the South African government Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)”. It from 1999 to 2008 essentially followed a should be remembered that, during the Mbeki

49 S. Firsing and L. Masters, “South Africa‟s foreign 50KJ Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for policy and the West: the art of foreign policy Analysis, op. cit., p. 109. balancing”, in L. Masters, S. Zondi, J. van Wyk, and 51 See Chris Landsberg, “The foreign policy of the C. Landsberg (eds.), South African Foreign Policy Zuma government: pursuing the „national interests?”. Review, Vol. 2, Africa Institute of South Africa In South African Journal of International Affairs, Press, 2015, pp. 208-225. Vol. 17, No. 3, 2010, pp. 1165-1181.

25 Journal of International politics V2 ● I1 ● 2020 The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment transformational and developmental foreign economic diplomacy in particular54. She said: policy52. Among our main challenges in the pursuit of our foreign policy objectives is the alignment and The transformational aspirations of government co-ordination of South Africa‟s economic as articulated here targeted for reform and diplomacy across all spheres of government; transformation both political and global strengthening economic diplomatic capacity in financial institutions. Invalidating the idea of a our Missions; and improving efforts aimed at developmental foreign policy, the 2009 MTSF marketing the brand South Africa and Africa stated that “strategic relations with the North”, abroad55. the Zuma government‟s “global system of governance ”strategies were geared towards Stated policy held that South Africa‟s economic ensuring“ that the developmental objectives of diplomacy strategy would continue to focus on the developing world are addressed”53. strengthening economic relations with traditional and established economic partners; expanding trade Just as its views regarding BRICS, South Africa relations with emerging markets in Asia, Latin clearly saw itself as the articulator of Africa‟s America, and Eastern Europe; and the promotion of interests abroad, and would particularly intra-Africa trade so as to enhance economic champion this cause in multi-lateral for abroad. development on the continent. It is for this reason that it saw itself as fundamentally committed to global compacts The stress on economic interests was palpable. like the MDGs. It should however be said that This emphasis on economic diplomacy came as the continent seemed, and continues to be, no surprise as the new government set out from divided on this hegemonic role South Africa the onset of its new terms to close the domestic- takes on, indeed some actively welcomes it foreign policy divide and to introduce strategies whilst others do not. that would make it better possible for DIRCO to make a more effective contribution to help meet Strengthening Political and Economic Relations the national strategic goals identified by A basic conceptualisation of foreign policy is government, and economic diplomacy was a key that it denotes the pursuit of goals vis-à-vis instrument in achieving this. The Minister was states and external actors in the international emphatic: “our foreign policy also entails system. The Zuma government also harboured effective economic diplomacy. We work to political, economic and strategic goals towards attract investments and tourism, remove barriers “key”, individual states, particularly those states to trade, support the development of larger that could help it attain its economic and markers in Africa and expand the markets for developmental goals. The emerging foreign South Africa in Africa”56. There was in a real policy trajectories of the young Jacob Zuma sense something of what Adebajo called a administration not only focused on multi lateral “mercantilist” foreign policy agenda by South dimensions and institutions but also placed an Africa as it went searching for investment and emphasison the need to strengthen bi-lateral markets.57 Here we could note that South political and economic relations. Here too the Africa‟s mercantilist, utilitarian, self-interested, Zuma administration took its cue again from the regime-driven foreign policy often landed the Mbeki government‟s foreign policy priorities, as country in precarious situations. Lesley Masters it placed major emphasison economic and Jo-Ansie van Wyk‟s singles out the diplomacy, and strengthening economic desperate search for a nuclear deal and opines in relations with as many states as possible. In her the 2019 Foreign Policy Review that “the Zuma address to the Heads of Missions Conference in administration saw an incremental change to Sand ton in August 2009, the minister of emphasis in foreign policy in practice, particularly International Relations reminded heads of missions and diplomats about the imperatives of economic goals, and pursued through the 54Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Address to the Heads of Missions Conference, Sandton, 13 August 2009. 55 Ibid. 52See Chris Landsberg, “Thabo Mbeki‟s legacy of 56Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Address to the Heads of transformational diplomacy”, in Daryl Glaser (ed.), Missions Conference, Sandton, 13 August 2009 Mbeki and fter: Reflections on the legacy of Thabo 57 Mbeki, Wits University Press, 2010, pp. 220-236. See Adekeye Adebajo, “South Africa in Africa: 53Chris Landsberg, “The emerging Africa strategy of messiah or mercantilist”, South African Journal of the new Jacob Zuma administration”, in Siphamandla International Affairs, Vol. 14, Issue 1, 2007, pp. 29- Zondi and Lesley Masters (eds.), op. cit., 47.

Journal of International politics V2 ● I1 ● 2020 26 The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment during President Zuma‟s second term (2014-2018) South Africa‟s stated policy was that joining when nuclear diplomacy began to unravel, with such groupings had a lot to do with seeking to South Africa‟s nuclear deals under the spotlight bring about a transformed global order, one that following corruption scandals”58. would better serve the interests of Africa and developing countries. However, joining these CONCLUSION constellation was not backed up by clear Both domestically and in terms of foreign policy strategies on the part of the Zuma government. there had been a clear shift in the approach of So, while Russia had clear geo-political and the Jacob Zuma-led government to a more geo-strategic motives for why it wanted to join utilitarian, economic, interest driven posture. It BRICS, and China‟s crude economic motives could even be argued that under the banner of were palpable, South Africa often struggled to “national interest” a crude “regime interest” articulate a clear view as to why BRICS was in paradigm was followed by the Zuma its interest. Zuma regarded BRICS and the administration. Regime interests and interests of the invitation for South Africa to join this economic elite came to play important parts in constellation as his greatest foreign policy driving foreign policy, especially in the economic triumph. realm. The mantra “Open for business…in a big We saw a reversion back to bi-lateralism by the way” came to drive foreign policy motives a lot. Zuma government, in which it would seek close In terms of the external motives, South Africa political and economic ties with key countries so was determined to continue to punch above its as to maximise its political and economic weight in foreign policy. Its stated foreign interests, including those of the ruling ANC policy continued to harbour presence in African, party. South-South, North-South, and global In short, the Zuma government will be governance positions and structures. But we remembered for having introduced a crude have seen a situation where positional presence economic dimension in foreign policy, with a became a more important drive than the actual more pronounced emphasis on the Republic‟s strategic contribution made by South Africa. national [read: self-] interest, and the African The Zuma government therefore appeared more Agenda, South-South solidarism, and multi- interested in enhancing its global prestige and lateralism were shifted to the margins as reputation as a key global player than making a economic and regime interests were elevated to real difference in these structures such as the position of primus inter pares. BRICS, the G20, BRICS, the G77 Plus China, and other formations.

Citation: Chris Landsberg and Oscar van Heerden.“The Strategic Goals of the Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment”, Journal of International politics, 2020, 2(1), pp. 16-27 Copyright: © 2020 Chris Landsberg and Oscar van Heerden. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

58Lesley Masters and Jo-Ansie van Wyk (eds.), South African Foreign Policy Review, op. cit., p. 5.

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