Source: Hillstrom, Laurie Collier. 2006. Labor Organizations and Reform Movements. The Industrial Revolution in America, Vol. 4. Edited by Kevin Hillstrom and Laurie Collier Hillstrom. ABC-CLIO.

Labor Organizations and Reform Movements Lourie Collier Hillstrom

hen automobile and truck manufacturing emerged as the nation's newest major industrial enterprise in the early twentieth century, the relationship between corporate owners Wand management and the workers who actually created the vehicles was a one-sided one. As masters of the factories that contained numerous high-paying jobs, management enjoyed considerable leverage in its dealings with workers, especially in rapidly growing northern cities where competition was fierce to find and hold jobs that could support a household. Early automobile companies used this dynamic to great advantage, insisting that their workforces put in long hours in bleak and sometimes hazardous workplaces. As in other mass-production industries of the era, automobile workers obliged, in large measure because weak labor unions were unable to make any appreciable inroads in this environment. Indeed, while the automobile industry professed its allegiance to the "open-shop" philosophy­ meaning that it did not officially discriminate between nonunion workers and union supporters-in reality it resortedto all manner of industrial espionage, intimidation, and discrimination to turn away unionization efforts. These efforts were largely successful until the Great Depression and the arrival of New Deal legislation designed to revitalize the

103 104 • Automobiles Labor Organizations • 105

American economy. The New Deal measures gave previously weak mers, sheet-metal workers, woodworkers, and upholsterers in 1913. unions in the auto industry and other manufacturing industries the It was initially affiliated with the American Federation of Labor legal standing to flourish as never before. From the mid-1930s to the (AFL), but its insistence on adhering to an all inclusive membership beginning of World War II, therefore, management-employee rela­ philosophy led the AFL to cut off ties to it in 1918. At that time the tions underwent convulsive and profound changes. The United Au­ union reorganized as the United Automobile, Aircraft and Vehicle tomobile Workers (UAW) came to prominence during this time, ris­ Workers of America (UAAVW) and initiated vigorous membership ing from obscurity to a place of enormous national power and drives in northeastern cities. By 1920 its membership had jumped to influence in the space of a few short years. By 1941, when the UAW 45,000, and it had even established a beachhead of sorts in Detroit, and its single-minded leader, Walter Reuther, reached a labor agree­ the center of the automobile universe, by targeting city paint shops. ment with Ford-the last of the Big Three automakers to succumb to But a disastrous 1921 strike action against the Fisher Body Company, unionization-the union stood as one of the most powerful indus­ the principal auto body supplier for General Motors (GM also own­ trial unions in the nation. ed a 60 percent share of the company), proved a major setback to the union. Badly wounded, the UAAVW fell under the influence of com­ munist organizers who renamed it the Auto Worker Union (AWU) (Gall 1990). Early Unionization Efforts The Auto Worker Union never succeeded in attracting large num­ Unionization in the automobile manufacturing industry actually bers of workers. In fact, although several important union leaders got dates back to the industry's inception, when the need for skilled their start in the AWU, the organization never claimed more than a workers forced some automakers to hire members of craft unions. few thousand members. In most cases, its anticapitalist message was But early efforts to organize the unskilled workers that toiled on the simply too strident and radical for rank and-file workers. But while assembly lines and in other corners of the big factory complexes the AWU failed to take advantage of the industry's demanding and foundered. In June 1913, for example, organizers hailing from the In­ paternalistic attitude toward its workforce to become a viable orga­ dustrial Workers of the World (IW W)-a radical labor union that en­ nizing body, its efforts increased workers' awareness of-and unhap­ joyed a brief period of popularity at the turn of the century-con­ piness with-the myriad ways in which management dictated their vinced 6,000 workers at three Studebaker plants to launch a strike. lives. "In the last analysis," wrote one historian, "the greatest orga­ But the strike proved to be a colossal failure, as angry company exec­ nizers of the coming automobile workers' unions were the executives utives took advantage of the presence of a large supply of replace­ and owners of the industry" (Alinsky 1949). ment workers to quickly resume operations at prestrike levels. Elsewhere in Detroit, where the national automobile industry was increasingly centered, the organizing efforts of the IW W and other The Great Depression and the NIRA union leaders from socialist or communist organizations were re­ buffed. Auto workers of the day disliked many aspects of their In the early 1930s the grim economic circumstances of the Great De­ workplaces, such as production line speedups and capricious work­ pression abruptly and decisively changed worker-management rela­ place favoritism, but they recognized that they were unlikely to find tions in industries across the United States, and the automobile in­ matching pay and benefits elsewhere, and so they were reluctant to dustry was no exception. The tough economic times prompted many disrupt the status quo. automobile workers to reassess their previous passivity regarding One of the first unions to gain any sort of meaningful traction in their livelihoods and gave union organizers an important opening. As the automobile industry was the Carriage, Wagon and Automobile automakers shut down factories and pursued other cost-cutting mea­ Workers (CWAW), which began organizing skilled painters, trim- sures, workers increasingly came to see labor unions as a viable shield Labor Organizations 106 • Automobiles • 107

e e r e er, e e e ee and tool and di work rs unde a singl bann from conomic downturns and managem nt d cr s that placed sands of machinists e e e e e it limit d app al to profit above worker welfare. but its radical rh toric and viol nt character gav ere e e ee the e e e who w simply int rest d in s ing Efforts to organiz the factory floors of D troit and oth r auto­ rank-and-file workers e e e e security fulfill d. e e e e e ew Deal's fragile promis of incr as d economic otive manuf cturing c nters w r greatly aid d by th administra­ N e e � � e e factory firms on th tion of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who took office in January 1933. Mere Organiz rs also had som success in singl e ee e obile industry, such s months after his inauguration, Roosevelt signed the National Indus­ margins of th Big Thr -dominat d auto� _ � _ e e e Detroit s e e e e e Studebak r, Cl v land's White Motor, and trial R cov ry Act (NIRA) of 1933, a bold piec of l gislation that South B nd's e e e e e Chrys r, and G n ral sought t galvanize the moribund American economy by exempting Kelsey-Hay s. But th Big Thr� of �ord, � _ � _ � e e e e against umomst m- U.S. businesses from federal antitrust laws. Under NIRA, govern­ Motors pr s nt d a unit d and imposmg front e e e e e e e e e m nt ag nci s w r dir cted to h lp various industries d v lop and curs10ns. e e . e eir formidabl musc� set pnce levels and other codes of fair competition. Significantly, the Indeed, th automotive giants flexed th e e e e Electric e e from th outs t. When an ffort to organi� act also inclu? d a provision-section 7(a)-that xplicitly granted against unionism e e e r r bas d m T le�o, work rs the ngh to organize nd bargain collectively through repre­ Auto-Lite, an indep nd nt ca parts manufacture � � � � e e e e e e e e g neral strike in 1934, on of the v1cttms s ntativ s of th ir own choosmg. From this mom nt forward, trade scalat d into a citywide e e e plant. Determin d to unionists saw union organ zing drives as essential "not only to the was General Motors' Ch vrol t transmission � e e e a vari­ e _ e e e the plant, Gen ral Motors cons nt d to prot ction of workers agamst autocratic mployers, but also for a r sum production at e e e e re es. But wh n th more equitable redistribution of national income and the increase in ety of concessions d manded by union r p sentativ e e e e mes­ e e e e punish d the strik rs and s nt a cl ar working-class purchasing pow r essential to a consumption-driv n strik nded, the company e e e e e Ch vy e union m mb rs by transf rring half of th economy" (Licht nstein 1995 ). sage to would-be e e e e reallocation of resourc s r sulte? Emboldened by this breakthrough, organizers descended on em­ plant's work to oth r faciliti s.This . . e _ e signaled the company s ployees of the automobile and other industries and made immediate in the loss of hundr ds of pnz d 1obs and e ean . trides in furthering their goal of industrial organization. But "if the willingness to r sist unionism by ruthless m � � e e e fmesse sect10n 7(a) of idea of mass unionism was in the air, its reality was but fragmentary In Detroit, m anwhil , Chrysl r sought to e e Automotive e e e e e e e by exploring a works council sch m . The and pisodic," obs rv d one historian. "S ction 7(a) was littl mor th NIRA e e e e (AIWA) subsequ ntly b came s­ than a hopeful sentiment that contained no administrative mecha­ Industrial Work rs' Association e e in e e e e e e faciliti s in Hamtramck, a Polish nclave nism to ensure that th insurgenci s that sw pt across industrial tablish d at th Dodg e e e this arrangem nt e e e e the heart of D troit. But th shortcomings in Amer�ca were translat d into stable and ind p nd nt unions" (Lich­ e e repre­ e e ee e e e e e AIWA mem�ers, and b tor long t nst in 1995). Ind d, wh n th possibility of labor strikes b cam a quickly b came apparent to _ e e with manag ­ e e e e e e es were demanding great r authonty to bargam real one, Roosev lt p rsonally int rceded and m diat d a s ttlement sentativ e e e e e stablish an ind p nd nt in March 1934. This settlement initially took a lot of steam out of ment, n gotiate workplace conditions, and e union organizing drives, for in its application the government shop steward system (Lichtenst in 1995). adopted the principle of "proportional" worker representation in the n of s 7(a) In other words, the settlement lumped applic_ati� �ction_ : fledgling mdustnal unions m with management-dominated company The Wagner Act unions and craft unions (Gall 1990). e e 's indus­ e e e e turbulent envi onm nt in Am ric� In th ns ing months unio organizing efforts in th industry By 1935 th increasingly � e � � r e e Labor R lations Act were only fitfully successful, m part because the craft-oriented trial cor idors gav rise to th National e recognition of its princi­ American Federation of Labor (AFL) sometimes offered less than (NLRA), also known as th Wagner Act in e e emocrat. Wag­ e e e e e New York Senator Rob rt F. Wagn r, a D vigorous assistanc to thes nasc nt organizations. Th M chanics pal sponsor, e e e e e e e th U.S. Supr m Court's Educational Society of America (MESA) did manage to gather thou- ner pres nt d th act in direct respons to t 08 • Automobiles Labor Organizations • 109 spring 1935 ruling that the NIRA and its labor relations provision were unconstitutional. Convinced that the government needed to take more muscular steps to force corporations to recognize and collectively bargain with unions, Wagner proposed a law that explicitly branded various fa­ vored management strategies of fighting unionization as "unfair la­ bor practices." Specifically, the legislation forbade employer discrim­ ination against unions and union supporters; legalized strike activity; and required companies to accept collective bargaining over wages, hours, and conditions of employment with worker representatives. In addition, it created a new government entity-the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)-armed with a mandate to investigate charges of unfair labor practices and oversee elections held to deter­ mine whether employees wanted union representation. Wagner's proposed legislation was viewed with some trepidation by lawmakers, but both the Roosevelt administration and Congress ultimately determined that it was the only viable plan available to ad­ dress the growing industrial unrest before it strangled the nation's ef­ forts to regain its economic footing. In July 1935 Roosevelt signed the National Labor Relations Act into law, ushering in a dramatic Poster depicting President Franklin D. Roosevelt's signing of the 1935 new era in industrial labor-management relations. In fact, the Wagner Wagner Act. (Library of Congress) Act's impact was so profound and wide-ranging that it has been de­ scribed as American labor's Magna Carta. Roosevelt's decision also established an alliance between organized labor and the Democratic Party that endures to this day. In fact, Roosevelt's successful 1936 re­ to declare the law unconstitutional (on the grounds that Congress did election was due in no small part to labor support, as he himself ac­ not have the authority to enact it under its power to regulate interstate knowledged. "There are those who fail to read both the signs of the commerce). Their hopes were dashed in 1937, however, when the times and American history," he declared at one campaign stop in the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute in National Labor final weeks. "They would try to refuse the worker any effective pow­ Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation. er to bargain collectively, to earn a decent living and to acquire secu­ In the meantime, union organizers went about their unionizing rity. It is these shortsighted ones, not labor, who threaten this coun­ efforts with gusto. Confident that a new day was at hand, they pur­ try with that class dissension which in other countries has led to sued their agenda with militant zeal. Membership in unions soared, dictatorship and the establishment of fear and hatred as the dominant and various union-driven boycotts and strikes popped up around emotions in human life." the country. As time passed, the confrontational tactics of some Remarkably, the leading companies in the automobile industry­ unions prompted a popular backlash, sometimes with good reason. like the giants in some other industries-reacted to the passage of the "Property-minded citizens were scared by the seizure of factories, Wagner Act and the creation of the NLRB by, in effect, pretending incensed when strikers interfered with the mails, vexed by the in­ that it never happened. They continued their previous antiunion poli­ timidation of nonunionists, and alarmed by flying squadrons of cies, embracing a stonewalling strategy while feverishly pursuing legal workers who marched, or threatened to march, from city to city" challenges that they hoped would ultimately lead the Supreme Court (Leuch ten berg 1963). 11 O • Automobiles Labor Organizations • 111

Birth of the United Auto Workers (UAW) come into the union in its earliest days at Chrysler with the tastes and habits of the rank and file. He spoke the language of the shop, In the spring of 1935 the AFL and its president, William Green, chewed tobacco, played poker, and liked to have a beer in the bars stepped up efforts to unionize the automobile industry. Buoyed by near the Chrysler plant on East Jefferson in Detroit" (Barnard 1983 ). the success of an AFL-sponsored local union's strike of an important Thomas served as UAW president until 1946, when he was replaced Chevrolet transmission plant-the strike produced significant man­ by Reuther, who by that time was universally recognized as the in­ agement concessions, including union recognition-the AFL com­ dustry's leading labor voice. bined all of its various AFL-sponsored local unions then in existence into one body. The founding of this organization, the United Auto Workers, remains one of the crowning achievements of the AFL­ The Flint Sit-Down Strike even though the UAW soon abandoned the AFL in favor of the Committee for Industrial Organization, an industry-oriented organi­ Despite the turmoil in the UAW-CIO leadership, the fledgling union zation spearheaded by United Mine Workers president John L. moved forward with ambitious plans to confront the Big Three au­ Lewis that also came into being in 1935. Initially, the CIO was actu­ tomakers. Clearly the UAW would have to make inroads with these ally a part of the AFL, but within a year differences with the AFL manufacturers if it hoped to survive, and it decided that its first tar­ leadership led it and its constituent unions to break off and rename get should be General Motors (GM), the biggest industrial manufac­ itself the Congress of Industrial Organizations (also known by the turer in the world-and the recognized standard setter in auto indus­ acronym CIO). try practices The first president of the UAW was Homer S. Martin, whose The UAW and its allies in the CIO recognized that establishing a rhetorical skills were attractive to the AFL. "Martin's revivalist skill union presence in GM was a daunting task. GM's majority owners, at convincing audiences of workers that they, as union members, the du Pont family, were staunchly antiunion, an attitude shared by would be doing the will of the Lord ... was one of his few qualifica­ president Alfred Sloan, Jr., and his army of executives. Moreover, tions for leadership, [but] it was vitally important in the years when the UAW was still a stripling in most respects, albeit one that was the union was struggling to get a footing" (Cormier and Eaton 1970). feeling its oats. During this period it was estimated that only 1 out As the months passed and internal squabbling intensified, though, of every 275 auto workers in Detroit were dues-paying members of Martin's limitations led to serious schisms within the automobile la­ the UAW, and the percentage of UAW members in nearby Flint, bor movement. By the time of the 1937 UAW convention, the battle where GM's operations were centered, was even lower (Fine 1969). lines were clearly drawn between Martin and his Progressive Caucus, In addition, the ranks of the UAW had been infiltrated by GM who were backed by the AFL, and the Unity Caucus, led by a tal­ spies, some of them reaching positions of influence. These moles ented and dedicated young union organizer named Walter Reuther funneled the names of employees deemed sympathetic to the UAW and supported by the CIO. "To Walter Reuther and many others, the cause back to management, which promptly cut them from the pay­ internal struggle was a tragic and unhappy distraction from the work rolls. that had to be done, yet something that had to be dealt with as re­ Despite these obstacles, however, the UAW's underground re­ flecting the inevitable contest in a new and democratic union to es­ cruiting campaign enjoyed considerable success. Reuther, Thomas, tablish a sound and stable leadership" (Cormier and Eaton 1970). and other leaders were further heartened by the November 1936 In 1938 Martin lost his struggle to hold on to power, his fate sealed election of Frank Murphy as governor of Michigan. They saw the by unwise strategic decisions and the growing momentum of the election of a man widely perceived to be sympathetic to the labor Unity Caucus. He was ousted as president and replaced by Rolland union cause as another sign that the time to join battle with GM was Jay "R. J." Thomas. "Thomas was not allied with any of the left-wing drawing nigh. A few weeks later, on December 30, 1936, the Flint factions [of the labor movement]. He was an auto worker who had Sit-Down Strike began. In the ensuing weeks, this strike became 112 • Automobiles Labor Organizations • 113

and Labor Subcommittee on Civil Liberties and committee chairman Robert M. La Follette,Jr., a progressive Democrat from Wisconsin­ brought to light a wide range of illegal antiunion practices employed by the automobile, steel, and other industries long after passage of the Wagner Act and continuing to the present day. The highly publi­ cized findings of the La Follette Committee, as it came to be called, clearly influenced public perceptions of the stalemate and gave Mur­ phy leeway to resist company demands that he order the forcible re­ moval of the strikers. Efforts by the GM-controlled local police to forcibly remove the workers also failed, as the officers were beaten back by the unionists in an ugly clash, during which strikers were gassed and buckshot and officers pelted with big pieces of metal hurled from industrial-sized slingshots. The deadlock might have continued for quite some time, except that the UAW successfully seized control of another major produc­ tion facility in the complex. This blow convinced General Motors to recognize the UAW for the members it represented throughout the company. Once the strike formally ended, on February 11, 1937, GM gave no quarter in collective bargaining negotiations. It granted A scene from the 1936 United Auto Workers sit-down strike at the Fisher grudging concessions where necessary, but management maintained a body plant factory in Flint, Michigan. (Library of Congress) firm grip on the reins of most aspects of plant operation.

Unionization at Chrysler arguably the most important labor conflict in America in the twen­ tieth century. The UAW-CIO victory in Flint prompted a tremendous wave of new The strike began with the occupation of two GM factories within entrants into the union fold. Total UAW membership quickly rose to the company's sprawling Flint complex. General Motors immedi­ more than 250,000 workers (Fine 1969), further buttressing the confi­ ately declared that it had no intention of negotiating with UAW rep­ dence of the UAW and CIO leadership, which now had the Chrysler resentatives until the strikers ended their occupation, but the union Corporation squarely in their sights. They recognized that General countered that it would not call an end to the sit-down strike until Motors would try to shake off the union mantle if its chief competitors the company recognized the UAW as the workers' legitimate bar­ were not similarly encumbered, as any company that warded off gaining representative. unionization would have a pronounced competitive advantage. With both sides digging in their heels, GM and the UAW battled Like General Motors, Detroit-based Chrysler engaged in its share in the courts as the administrations of both President Roosevelt and of antiunion practices to keep its factory and shop floors union-free. Governor Murphy struggled to avoid being drawn into the conflict. But Walter Chrysler and other top executives were quick to sense the The two sides also waged a spirited fight in the court of public opin­ shifting political winds after the sit-down strike and the subsequent ion, but the union received a significant boost in this regard from the flood of Chrysler workers into the UAW. They agreed to negotia­ U.S. Senate's simultaneous investigation into GM's antiunion labor tions with UAWand CIO representatives, but these meetings did not policies. This investigation-carried out by the Senate's Education accomplish much. 114 • Automobiles Labor Organizations • 115

In March 1937 the UAW called a sit-down strike similar to the one Ford maintained the largest and most feared internal police force and it employed against General Motors, but this action was not as effec­ spy organization in the auto industry. The infamous Service Depart­ tive. It temporarily crippled Chrysler's operations, but many law­ ment, whose two thousand employees were well salted with under­ makers-and, most importantly, Governor Murphy-saw the strike world types whom boss Harry Bennett had recruited from the Michi­ as premature and provocative. When Murphy threatened to use his gan prison system, replicated inside the Ford factories many features authority to forcibly remove the striking workers, CIO head Lewis of the police states of central Europe. The servicemen were a law unto agreed to meet with Walter Chrysler. This meeting resulted in com­ themselves, intimidating even foremen and lower-level supervisors .... pany recognition of the UAW's right to represent Chrysler workers And of course the Ford Motor Company had the police and Dearborn and an eventual agreement that largely mirrored the UAW-GM set­ city officials under almost complete control. (Lichtenstein 1995) tlement, with various stipulations regarding wages, creation of grievance committees, and a seniority system (Gall 1990). Still, by early 1937 the UAWbelieved that it had the necessary mo­ mentum to launch a successful membership drive at the River Rouge facility. With this in mind, union organizers obtained a permit to dis­ Bloody Battle with Ford tribute prounion leaflets at the gates of the plant on May 26, 1937. UAW organizers Richard Frankensteen and Walter Reuther posi­ The mercurial rise of the United Automobile Workers union contin­ tioned themselves outside one of the main gates prior to a shift ued in the spring and early summer of 1937. In Walter Reuther's West change. They were then approached by a group of Bennett's thugs, Side Local 174 alone, the number of members surged from 78 to who launched a brutal attack on the two men in full view of newspa­ 30,000 in the space of a few years (Lichtenstein 1995). But despite the per photographers. The bloodied UAW men finally escaped their union's exhilarating rise, its leadership recognized that the greatest tormentors and in the ensuing days found that the one-sided "Battle challenge was still before them. of the Overpass," as the incident came to be called, had blossomed Management of the Ford Motor Company during the 1930s fea­ into a public relations nightmare for Ford and his company. The in­ tured a strange blend of paternalism and police-state tactics. Founder cident prompted many Americans across the country to reassess Henry Ford, still a folk hero of sorts in the American collective con­ their benign perceptions of Henry Ford and his company, and the sciousness, was committed to maintaining a large degree of control NLRB's angry denunciation of the incident helped put the company over both his company and its employees-a stance that made union­ in a public relations hole it never escaped. "Although the immediate ization anathema to him. And while his earlier worker-friendly inno­ outcome was inconclusive, with the union failing to achieve its orga­ vations, such as the $5 and eight-hour workday, earned him a mea­ nizing goal, Henry Ford never again dared unmuzzle the goon sure of loyalty from employees, Ford further ensured worker fealty squads of his Service Department in a public situation," observed one through more unsavory means. Specifically, he gave free rein to account (Cormier and Eaton 1970). Significantly, the Battle of the Harry Bennett, the company's personnel director and chief overseer Overpass also had the unintended effect of entrenching the in­ of day-to-day operations, to foster an environment of fear and intim­ domitable Walter Reuther in the front ranks of the UAW leadership. idation across the company. This atmosphere was especially prevalent at Ford's River Rouge complex in Dearborn, Michigan. This plant, which included all the el­ ements needed for automobile production, was the world's largest in­ Walter Reuther and the UAW dustrial complex and the heart of Ford's production operations. It also Over the course of his life, Walter Reuther became one of the was the place where Bennett's presence was most stifling. "Among all undisputed giants of American labor history. Like many other the great work sites of American industry, the Rouge did have a fascist American labor leaders of the twentieth century, however, he hailed odor about it," wrote one labor historian: from modest economic circumstances. Born on September 1, 1907, 116 • Series Introduction Labor Organizations • 117

Rememberin9 the Battle of the Overpass and an attempt was made to hold my legs apart to kick me be­ tween the legs, but I squirmed enough so that they were not able On May 26, 1937, UAW organizers Walter Reuther and Richard T. to do that very successfully.... Frankensteen stationed themselves at a gate of the Ford Motor Com­ Question: Well, about how many times were you raised and pany's River Rouge plant in Dearborn, Michigan, to distribute knocked down? prounion leaflets. They were joined at the gate by various onlookers, Answer: I would say seven or eight times that I was raised up including reporters, clergymen, and senate staffers. But before they parallel with the concrete and thrown down on my back.... I were able to distribute their handbills-which they had a legal permit finally found myself lying beside Richard Frankensteen, who at to do--Reuther and Frankensteen were confronted by Ford security that time was lying face down with his coat up over his head.... personnel.The Ford employees ordered Reuther and Frankensteen to from there I was dragged by the feet over near the north stair­ leave, but according to Reuther's later testimony at a federal hearing, way. I was raised up very roughly by my shoulder, by my collar, they were attacked before they could depart the premises: by my coat, and I was thrown down the stairway. As I got to the I had taken about three steps, no more than four, and I was top of the stairs I was able to get my grip on the two railings and slugged in the back of the head from the rear. And then I was im­ I held on there to brace myself, and then someone else from the mediately surrounded by twelve or fifteen men and I was rear-several fellows from the rear-were able to wrench me pounced upon, and all that I did was-I made an attempt to pro­ loose ... and throw me down the first flight of iron steps.... tect my face by shielding my face with my crossed arms. In the And then I was kicked down the other two flights of stairs in the meantime I was being pounded in all parts of the head and upper cinders. (Featherstone n.d.) body.... Reuther escaped from his tormentors only when they turned their Then I was knocked to the ground, where I was kicked and attention to a group of male and female union organizers that had just also beaten on the head again. And then at the instruction of the arrived at the scene to distribute union leaflets. They kicked and fellow who was leading the group, he gave the command, he punched these women and men with abandon, knocking several of said, "That is enough, fellows." Then I thought I was going to them unconscious. be released and I was raised to my feet by my shoulders. And Ultimately, the Battle of the Overpass proved a public relations then some fellows picked up my feet and they held me parallel disaster for Ford. The company had succeeded in snuffing out one to the concrete.... And at a signal from the leader I was thrown leaflet-distribution effort, but it endured a firestorm of criticism in the on my back on the concrete.After I was on my back again I was aftermath of the event. kicked again in the head, temples, all parts of the upper body,

in Wheeling, West Virginia, he was the second of five children born embraced these beliefs. They also became enthusiastic participants in to Valentine and Anna Stocker Reuther, both of whom were of Ger­ highly structured family debates on the great labor and socialist is­ man heritage. Valentine Reuther was a trade unionist and socialist sues of the day, with Valentine Reuther overseeing the action. "The who supported his family as a brewery worker until Prohibition easy mastery of trade union principles and practices, the skepticism closed the doors on that career. He initially struggled to regain his toward unreformed capitalism, the belief in social progress, and the financial footing after that setback, but by the late 1920s he had a vi­ self-confidence and vigor in speaking that marked the Reuther broth­ able insurance business. ers' maturity can be traced to this youthful preparation," wrote one Valentine Reuther instructed his children in his philosophy of Reuther biographer (Barnard 1990). industrial unionism and sociopolitical reform from the time they Walter Reuther left high school at age sixteen for an apprenticeship in were youngsters, and three of his sons-Walter, Roy, and Victor- the tool and die industry. He spent the next three years at a Wheeling 118 • Automobiles Labor Organizations • 119

the spring of 1936 he was elected to the UA W's general executive board, a clear sign that other labor leaders recognized his dedication to the cause. Later that year he helped organize a sit-down strike at Kelsey-Hayes that resulted in wage hikes and institution of a grievance system for workers; this strike has been credited as a model for the UAW's later successful sit-down strikes against General Mo­ tors and Chrysler. In the fall of 1937 Reuther was elected president of the UAWLocal 174 on Detroit's West Side, one of the region's largest and most active locals. Reuther's stature within the UAW rank and file increased dramat­ ically after the Battle of the Overpass. From that point forward his position as a major player in the union was assured. Indeed, even his opponents conceded that Reuther's liberal political convictions and Walter Reuther's long and his dedication to the prosperity of the UAW were sincere. As one bi­ successful stewardship of the United Auto Workers made ographer summarized, "Reuther lived and breathed the union" him one of the giants of the (Lichtenstein 1995 ). American labor movement. In 1939 Reuther became director of the UAW General Motors De­ (Library of Congress) partment, and in that capacity he led a tool and die strike that further consolidated the union's position with GM. In 1946 he successfullyde­ throned R. J. Thomas as president of the UAW, and over the next few years he effectivelycemented his position as the union's leading voice. tool and die maker before moving north to Detroit in 1927, lured by the In 1952 Reuther was elected president of the Congress of Industrial automotive plants sprouting in that booming town. Within a few Organizations (CIO) and guided the organization through a 1955 months he had secured employment at Ford as a die maker, and in 1930 merger with the American Federation of Labor (AFL). But Reuther he was joined in Detroit by his brother Victor. Reuther eventually rose chafed under the conservative rule of AFL-CIO president George to the position of foreman, but in 1932 he was fired. By this time he was Meany, and in 1968 he withdrew the UAW from the organization. both an outspoken socialist and a member of the tiny Auto Workers During his more than two-decade reign as president of the UAW, Union, so these may have been factors in his dismissal. Reuther presided over an era of rising prosperity for union members, Walter and Victor Reuther subsequently departed on a two-year their families, and their communities. In addition to delivering robust tour of the world. After roaming across a good portion of western growth in financial compensation to UAW members, Reuther was Europe-including a harrowing stop in Germany, which had fallen instrumental in securing enhanced job security, vacations, benefits, under the spell of the Nazis-the brothers landed in the city of Gorki pensions, and supplemental unemployment benefits (to shield work­ in the Soviet Union, where they trained Russian workers in various ers from the financial pain of layoffs). These improvements were not aspects of tool and die making. They then journeyed throughout var­ secured without strife and controversy, and Reuther was decidedly ious sections of the Soviet Union, China, and Japan before returning unpopular in some quarters of America. But he remained unapolo­ to the United States in 1935. getic about his efforts on behalf of the union and spoke with The brothers Reuther returned to Detroit just as organized labor's unswerving pride about his energetic activism for civil rights and clash with the Big Three automakers was poised to explode. Walter other liberal social causes. Reuther's leadership of the United Auto­ Reuther was delighted with the tableau that awaited him, and he mobile Workers ended abruptly on May 9, 1970, when he and his quickly became an unpaid organizer for a fledgling UAW local. In wife May were killed in an airplane crash in Pellston, Michigan. 120 • Automobiles Labor Organizations • 121 Unionization at Ford to the depression and the New Deal, organized labor had little in­ fluence in national affairs. By 1941, however, labor was a major and Reuther's ascension to the highest ranks of the American labor faithful element in the Roosevelt coalition. Its voice was heard in movement, however, could not have been predicted in the late 1930s, Congress and the White House. The one-sided concentration of even with the sensational publicity generated by the Battle of the power in the hands of management was gone" (Barnard 1983). Overpass. Indeed, from 1937 to early 1941 Reuther and other leaders of the United Auto Workers were repeatedly stymied in their efforts to bring Ford employees into the fold. Instead, they were forced to resort to the courts and the National Labor Relations Board, where Sour

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