Violent Content in Film: a Defense of the Morally Shocking
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VIOLENT CONTENT IN FILM: A DEFENSE OF THE MORALLY SHOCKING A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY by Kristin A. Hrehor December 2018 Examining Committee Members: Kristin Gjesdal, Advisory Chair, Department of Philosophy Susan Feagin, Department of Philosophy Joseph Margolis, Department of Philosophy Noël Carroll, External Member, CUNY Graduate Center © Copyright 2018 by Kristin A. Hrehor All Rights Reserved ii ABSTRACT Violent content in film has been extensively debated from a myriad of different perspectives, and both within and across a number of different disciplines. Oftentimes, the more violent the content that a film contains, the more likely such content is considered to negatively detract from the value of the work in question. However, this dissertation provides an argument to the contrary with respect to a specific set of cinematic examples and a particular way in which violent content is represented within them. In what follows, I argue that there are grounds to believe in the philosophical value of engaging with works that “morally shock” their audiences through the representation of violent content. First, by analyzing a combination of works ranging from the more conservative American classic Deliverance (1972) to the more controversial French avant-garde Irréversible (2002), I provide a case for reclassifying violent films into different genres, only one of which contains films which elicit a particular kind of response that I single out for further examination. In considering the implications of our responses to these “morally shocking” films, I provide a foundation against which such films can be considered to have a distinct kind of philosophical value by exploring their significance with respect to: (1) issues of interpretation and value in the philosophy of film, (2) recent developments in research on moral judgment, and (3) arguments both for and against the idea that film can be thought of as a kind of philosophy. Ultimately, I argue that our response of moral shock to the content of these films has the subversive effect of destabilizing our moral orientation and consequently motivating philosophical reflection in innovative ways. iii To all of the survivors of trauma, both on and off screen. And to Burt Reynolds. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Writing this dissertation has been a transformative process. What I initially thought was a relatively simple idea has of course revealed itself to be so much more complicated. As such, I now understand that my capacity to “just finish the thing” should never have been thought of solely as a function of my own diligence. First and foremost, I am grateful to Kristin Gjesdal (the other “Kristin with an i”) and Susan Feagin. I thank Kristin for her belief that I could really get this done when I myself wasn’t so convinced, her commitment via email and Skype to ensuring that I was making progress, and her persistence in shaping the best committee for my project. Accordingly, to classify Susan as a “committee member” does not do any justice to just how essential her role has been to me. Without Susan’s own work on related issues along with her invaluable mentorship, enthusiasm, and incisive feedback, I’m not sure that this would have amounted to anything other than a fledgling idea. Joe Margolis continues to inspire me. I would like to think that there is more than a little of his influence here, and I was thrilled that he could be a part of my committee. I am also incredibly thankful to Noël Carroll. His foundational views on these issues have constructed a framework against which so many of us have found a voice of our own, and talking about movies with him only makes one want to talk and write more about them. Finally, as always, I thank my family, friends, and colleagues at Seoul National University for their support. However, T.C. takes most of the credit for this one. I am so glad that I met you that wintry February Saturday in Seoul, when daydrinking at the Wolfhound turned out to be a much better idea than working on my dissertation. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................1 2. VIOLENT FILMS AND VIOLENCE IN FILMS .........................................................7 3. INTERPRETATION AND EMOTION ......................................................................51 4. UNDERSTANDING MORAL SHOCK .....................................................................76 5. MORAL REASONING AND MORAL SHOCK .....................................................114 6. THE PHILOSOPHICAL VALUE OF MORAL SHOCK .........................................158 7. MORAL COMPLEXITY AS A CINEMATIC VALUE...........................................191 8. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................225 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................228 FILMOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................238 vi 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION In what follows, I provide an argument to support the importance of both including and responding to violent content in film. This is not to say that all cases of representing violence on film are of value, but that some are, especially those that have been subject to extensive criticism as of late. My argument does not rest on the normative moral value that such inclusion could have, but more on the fundamental value that engagement with such content in the context of film spectatorship could have in terms of undermining our established or settled moral orientation. Such a destabilizing process is ultimately described here in terms of a kind of cognitive value. In the process of making this argument, each of the relevant concepts (e.g., violent content, moral judgment, cognitive value) are broken down, analyzed, and, in some cases, revised or refined. Thus, our conventional understanding of each of these concepts may undergo transformation in the process of making better sense of how engaging with morally shocking content on film can afford us a distinct kind of philosophical value. Before starting work on this project, I struggled with a way in which to describe the kind of content that I am referring to. “Moral content” or “violent content” are each used to refer to a wide range of examples, but the issue of what qualifies as “content” itself has not been directly addressed in many of the debates regarding the purported moral value of narrative art. I have thus relied on the descriptor “morally shocking” to delineate a specific kind of violent content in film. Nevertheless, both “moral content” and “violent content” could use even more treatment in the literature based on the critical roles that they play in 2 forming the basis of so many arguments about the moral value of film, literature, television, and even video games. The motivation for pursuing this line of thought at this time is largely based on two issues: (1) the rampant proliferation of violent content in various media (not to mention the growing number of opinions on the issue), and (2) a certain reluctance to address some of the “hard cases” in the philosophical literature outside of film studies. Thus, the sources used to support this argument have been derived from philosophy, film studies, and relatively mainstream critical literature (including reviews from sources such as The New York Times and Variety). I see this not as a limitation but rather as a means by which a more comprehensively rich account of this kind of value of violent content can be brought into view. In Chapter 2, I establish a foundation for discerning “morally shocking” violent content by distinguishing three different ways in which violence is thematized within film. I differentiate here between three different types or “categories” of violent content, only one of which qualifies as “morally shocking” in the relevant sense. Morally shocking content is thereby defined as that which destabilizes viewers; it is included not as a means of pushing any sort of moral agenda, but more as an inciter of moral confusion. However, this section is not simply about differentiating content but is also focused on establishing grounds for such differentiation, especially since such films may need to be reclassified into different genres as a result of these distinctions. Thus, I support this distinction with Kendall Walton’s idea of “categories of art” and Noël Carroll’s work on genre classification and criticism. 3 Chapter 3 explores issues regarding interpretation. The basis for this chapter lies in acknowledging concerns about what constitutes these new interpretations as the “correct” ones, and thus I use Paisley Livingston’s idea of “meshing conditions” to justify the approach that I take to these films in terms of accounting for both what is represented on screen as well as some degree of intentionality. However, Livingston’s