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The Future of the International Monetary and Financial Architecture

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The Future of the International Monetary and Financial Architecture ECB FORUM ON CENTRAL BANKING The future of the international monetary and financial architecture Conference proceedings 27-29 June 2016 ⋅ Sintra, Portugal Contents Programme 4 Welcome address 6 By Mario Draghi President of the European Central Bank The domain of central bank independence 7 Dinner speech by Alan S. Blinder Princeton University The international dimension of monetary policy 13 Introductory speech by Mario Draghi President of the European Central Bank Global monetary order 21 By Barry Eichengreen Comment on “Global monetary order” by Barry Eichengreen 64 By Guillermo Calvo Real interest rates, imbalances and the curse of regional safe asset providers at the Zero Lower Bound 70 By Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Hélène Rey Comment on “Real interest rates, imbalances and the curse of regional safe asset providers at the Zero Lower Bound” by Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Hélène Rey 110 By David Vines The IMF’s power and constraints 123 By Anne O. Krueger International monetary challenges and responses 127 By Maurice Obstfeld Three challenges facing emerging market monetary policymakers 136 By Shang-Jin Wei Financial regulatory reform after the crisis: an assessment 142 By Darrell Duffie Comment on “Financial regulatory reform after the crisis: an assessment” by Darrell Duffie 184 By Charles Goodhart Regulation and structural change in financial systems 188 By Stijn Claessens Comment on “Regulation and structural change in financial systems” by Stijn Claessens 222 By Hyun Song Shin Financial regulatory reform By Claudia M. Buch, Esteban Prieto and Benjamin Weigert 231 Regulators should take a holistic view of the impact of radical uncertainties on the finance industry By Andrew Sheng 241 Beyond financial system resilience – the need for a new regulatory philosophy By Adair Turner 249 © European Central Bank, 2016 Postal address 60640 Frankfurt am Main, Germany Telephone +49 69 1344 0 Website www.ecb.europa.eu All rights reserved. Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. These papers should not be reported as representing the views of the European Central Bank (ECB) or the Eurosystem. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB or the Eurosystem. ISSN 2363-3239 (online) ISBN 978-92-899-2467-2 (online) DOI 10.2866/482697 (online) EU catalogue No QB-BN-16-001-EN-N (online) Programme Monday, 27 June 2016 6.30 p.m. Opening reception and dinner Welcome address Mario Draghi, President, European Central Bank Dinner hosted by the Executive Board of the European Central Bank Dinner speech – The domain of central bank independence Alan S. Blinder, Professor, Princeton University Tuesday, 28 June 2016 9 a.m. Introductory speech – The international dimension of monetary policy Mario Draghi, President, European Central Bank 9.30 a.m. Session 1 Macroeconomic and monetary challenges Chair: Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board, European Central Bank Global monetary order Barry Eichengreen, Professor, University of California at Berkeley Discussant: Guillermo Calvo, Professor, Columbia University Real interest rates, imbalances and the curse of regional safe asset providers at the Zero Lower Bound Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Professor, University of California at Berkeley Hélène Rey, Professor, London Business School Discussant: David Vines, Professor, University of Oxford 11.30 a.m. Coffee break 12 p.m. Panel: Macroeconomic and monetary challenges Anne O. Krueger, Professor, Johns Hopkins University Maurice Obstfeld, Economic Counsellor and Director of the Research Department, International Monetary Fund Shang-Jin Wei, Chief Economist, Asian Development Bank 1.30 p.m. Lunch 6.30 p.m. Reception and dinner ECB Forum on Central Banking, June 2016 4 Wednesday, 29 June 2016 9 a.m. Session 2 Financial regulatory challenges Chair: Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board, European Central Bank Financial regulatory reform after the crisis: an assessment Darrell Duffie, Professor, Stanford University Discussant: Charles Goodhart, Professor em., London School of Economics Regulation and structural change in financial systems Stijn Claessens, Senior Adviser, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Discussant: Hyun Song Shin, Economic Adviser and Head of Research, Bank for International Settlements 11 a.m. Coffee break 11.30 a.m. Panel: Financial regulatory challenges Claudia M. Buch, Deputy President, Deutsche Bundesbank Andrew Sheng, Distinguished Fellow, Fung Global Institute Adair Turner, Chairman, Institute for New Economic Thinking 1 p.m. Lunch 2.30 p.m. Concluding panel Charles Bean, Professor, London School of Economics Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President, European Central Bank André Sapir, Professor, Université libre de Bruxelles Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Professor, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz 4 p.m. Award ceremony – young economists' posters Closing remarks Group photo 6.30 p.m. Dinner hosted by the Banco de Portugal ECB Forum on Central Banking, June 2016 5 Welcome address By Mario Draghi President of the European Central Bank Dear colleagues, Dear friends, Ladies and gentlemen, Let us for a moment set aside the extraordinary circumstances in which we gather here today. Let us set aside the questions that we have for our British friends, for all of us in the European Union, and indeed for the world at large, and focus on our ECB forum on central banking. This year’s forum will be devoted to an international topic. Cross-border economic and financial flows have undoubtedly become increasingly relevant. Over the next days we will focus on both macroeconomic and financial linkages and we will look at the design of the international monetary and financial system. As in the first two editions, I look forward to an in-depth reflection and inspiring discussion on central banking issues that go beyond our day-to-day policies. To start off our discussion, I am very glad that Professor Alan Blinder accepted our invitation to deliver tonight’s dinner speech. He is one of the most distinguished economists of our time, professor of economics at Princeton and author of countless key academic articles and books on international economics, fiscal and monetary policy, central banks and the workings of central banks and of financial markets. He served with distinction at the Congressional Budget Office, the Council of Economic Advisers and as Vice-Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In short, I can think of no better speaker for tonight. ECB Forum on Central Banking, June 2016 6 The domain of central bank independence Dinner speech by Alan S. Blinder Princeton University Thank you for the kind introduction, Mario, and thanks to the ECB for inviting me to deliver the keynote address to this august and highly knowledgeable gathering. Speaking of which, I am glad to see that so many of you decided to “Remain”, despite the disconcerting vote in the United Kingdom.1 As the title suggests, I want to talk tonight about the proper domain of central bank independence, that is, where should the central bank be independent and where should it not be? My jumping-off point is a quotation about Montagu Norman, the formidable but not entirely successful Governor of the Bank of England during the interwar period: “Montagu Norman used to dream that the BIS would one day foster a core of central bankers entirely autonomous of governments.” 2 Think about that last phrase for a moment: “entirely autonomous of governments”. It’s an audacious wish which, I’d say fortunately, has not come true. Why would Norman even want that? Presumably because politicians could not be trusted to produce “sound money” – a phrase that long predates the modern conception of monetary policy. As a way to organize my thoughts, I’d like you to notice that the concept of independence implies a kind of monopoly power. If some other agency of government can do (or undo) what you decide, or if you share authority over something, you are not independent. Hence my question about the domain of central bank independence: where do central banks have independence, and where should they have it? I begin with a list of the five classic functions of a central bank, all but the last of which were known to America’s first Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, who believed that the young United States of America needed a central bank: 1. guardian or operator of the payments system (I subsume, under this heading, acting as the fiscal agent for the government.); 2. supervisor and/or regulator of the nation’s banks or, more broadly, its financial institutions; 3. guardian of financial stability – which is on everyone’s mind today; 4. lender of last resort; 5. monetary policy – the new function, and the one that gets the most attention in the modern world. I will consider these functions one at a time, in each case asking whether the central bank has or should have a monopoly. 1 The so-called Brexit vote had taken place four days earlier. 2 Solomon (1995). ECB Forum on Central Banking, June 2016 7 1 The payments system My phrasing above suggests that the central bank need not have a monopoly over running the payments system, though it is likely to play some role there. In fact, central banks have long been accustomed to sharing this function, that is, to having competitors in providing the various means of payment. The central bank’s primary responsibilities for the payments system are about ensuring that the so-called financial plumbing works extremely well – with far less down time and interruptions than, say, your cable TV provider. We need higher quality than that. One possible concern here is that a sufficiently large loss of seigniorage revenue from currency could threaten a central bank’s budgetary independence and thus, indirectly, its independence to control monetary policy. So while monopoly may not be important, some reasonable market share may be.
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