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Ethnocracy Or Republic? Paradigms and Choices for Constitutional Reform and Renewal in Sri Lanka Asanga Welikala

Ethnocracy Or Republic? Paradigms and Choices for Constitutional Reform and Renewal in Sri Lanka Asanga Welikala

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Ethnocracy or republic? Paradigms and choices for constitutional reform and renewal in Asanga Welikala

Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 1–24 | ISSN 2050-487X | www.southasianist.ed.ac.uk

www.southasianist.ed.ac.uk | ISSN 2050-487X | pg. 1 Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 1–24

Ethnocracy or republic? Paradigms and choices for constitutional reform and renewal in Sri Lanka Asanga Welikala University of Edinburgh, [email protected]

This articles considers the recent constitutional reform process in Sri Lanka and offers two analytical models for explaining the options for choice and change.

www.southasianist.ed.ac.uk | ISSN 2050-487X | pg. 2 Introduction in a 100-day reform programme. The n 28th April 2015, Sri Lanka centrepiece of this programme was the abolition or at least the reform of the recorded an historic constitutional executive presidency. In challenging Omilestone when its Parliament President Rajapaksa, there was the widest enacted the Nineteenth Amendment to the consensus among the parties involved in 1978 Constitution. The process of its the Sirisena candidacy that something drafting and enactment had been must be done to reduce the deleterious disorganised and opaque, its passage in consequences of the uncontrolled Parliament fought clause by clause by the presidency. Executive presidentialism has opposition, and the final content of the been opposed on grounds of constitutional democracy ever since it was first proposed, amendment was a much-diluted version of but especially after the expansion of its the original proposals of the government. powers through the Eighteenth But this was nevertheless the most Amendment, these problems had become substantial reduction of the powers of the acute.3 However, there was less consensus executive president since the introduction on whether the remedy was to abolish of that office in 1977. Even though since presidentialism altogether and return to a the mid-1990s various presidential parliamentary system, or whether the candidates had obtained repeated mandates benefits of presidentialism could be retained whilst removing its more for its abolition,1 once in office they had egregious features. not merely broken the promise, but in the While such debates about systems of case of President in government are common to any 2010, actually expanded its powers.2 constitutional reform exercise, in practice Since the dramatic ouster of the choices between presidential and Rajapaksa regime in the presidential parliamentary models found in political election of January 2015, the new Sri science and constitutional law textbooks Lanka government headed by President are never clear-cut. Heuristic models help and Prime Minister in clarifying the available options and their has been engaged strengths and weaknesses no doubt, but ultimately constitutional choices about the 1 The winning candidates in the 1994, 1999, and system of government are decided by 2005 presidential elections unequivocally promised contextual factors. History and – or abolition of the executive presidency. While in 2010 the promise was more amorphous, it was still more accurately in a plural polity, histories suggested that substantial reforms to cut back its powers would be made. 2 The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution 3 See J. Wickramaratne, ‘The Executive (2010) removed the two-term limit on presidential Presidency: A Left Perspective’ and R. Edrisinha, office and procedural restraints on presidential ‘Constitutionalism and Sri Lanka’s Gaullist powers. See R. Edrisinha & A. Jayakody (Eds.) Presidential System’ in A. Welikala (Ed.) (2015) (2011) The Eighteenth Amendment to the Reforming Sri Lankan Presidentialism: Constitution: Substance and Process (: Provenance, Problems and Prospects (Colombo: CPA). CPA): Chs.27, 28.

www.southasianist.ed.ac.uk | ISSN 2050-487X | pg. 3 and – influence the way more creatively in a new environment.”6 The fundamental ideas like , state, and interrelationship between the traditional sovereignty are conceived, and these in and the modern therefore is central to our turn determine how institutions of analytical understanding of contemporary government are designed. In the mid- political institutions and political 1960s, J.R. Jayewardene’s advocacy of mobilisation. Flowing from this, secondly, presidentialism was based on rationales of is the methodological caution against practical . He identified the relying solely on modern positivist transience of parliamentary majorities as a categories of institutional design. If we see major weakness of the post-colonial reforming presidentialism as solely about political system when seen against the the relative merits of positivist models of requirements of a stable and relatively presidentialism and parliamentarism, we enduring executive for rapid economic fail to appreciate the deeper ideas about development.4 When he eventually collective identity and the state that are at obtained the power to introduce play in the societal conversation about presidentialism in the late-1970s, the institutional reform.7 Thirdly, we need to legitimating arguments he used for this have a proper understanding of the process radical constitutional innovation took a of constitutional change that Sri Lanka is more pronounced historical and cultural currently undertaking, its character, and its turn in drawing upon parallels directly temporal span. What happened in the from the pre-colonial Sinhala-Buddhist January 2015 presidential election was not monarchy.5 a routine change of government followed This example of how presidentialism by changes in policy direction; it was a was designed and legitimated points us to fully-fledged regime change aimed at a number of salient matters to bear in mind bringing about a constitutional transition when discussing the reform of that from a burgeoning ethnocratic state to a institution almost forty years thence. republican constitutional democracy. The Firstly, it reminds us of the importance of reform moment began in mid-2014 and the “dialectical relationship between gained inexorable momentum throughout tradition and modernity” in most post- the latter half of the year with a growing colonial contexts such as Sri Lanka, and coalescence of the broadest array of the “powers of tradition to evolve political parties and civil society groups ever mobilised against a sitting president. If the present government is re-elected in 4 See his seminal 1966 speech to the Ceylon the forthcoming parliamentary election, Association for the Advancement of Science cited the reform moment will not end with the in K.M. de Silva & H. Wriggins (1994) J.R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka: A Political Biography, Vol.II (London: Leo Cooper): pp.377-9. 6 S. Amunugama, ‘Ideology and Class Interest in 5 S. Kemper, ‘J.R. Jayewardene: Righteousness One of Piyadasa Sirisena’s Novels: The New Image and Realpolitik’ in J. Spencer (Ed.) (1990) Sri of the ‘Sinhala Buddhist’ Nationalist’ in M. Lanka: History and Roots of Conflict (London: Roberts (Ed.) (1997) Sri Lanka: Collective Routledge): Ch.9; R. de Silva Wijeyeratne, Identities Revisited, Vol.I: Ch.11 at p.342. ‘Cosmology, Presidentialism and J.R. 7 A. Welikala, ‘Nation, State, Sovereignty and Jayewardene’s Constitutional Imaginary’ in Kingship: The Pre-Modern Antecedents of the Welikala (2015): Ch.14. Presidential State’ in Welikala (2015): Ch.13.

www.thesouthasianist.ed.ac.uk | ISSN 2050-487X | pg. 4 current series of reforms but will go on determine whether there is in fact a new until a new constitution is negotiated, constitution-making attempt in the next drafted, and adopted at some point in the Parliament, and if so, the institutional next Parliament. choices that are made within that exercise. These analytical, methodological, and contextual considerations will inform the The constitutional moment between and discussion to follow. While I will discuss beyond elections recent political events for the purpose of establishing the context especially in By the middle of 2014, when the reform relation to the nature of the recent reform movement that led to the regime change of process, the main aim of this essay is not January 2015 started gathering pace, the empirical but theoretical. Underlying the Rajapaksa government seemed at its peak debates and disagreements about political strength. On the back of the institutional form – about presidentialism euphoria over the victory in the war and parliamentarism or a combination of against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil these – is a much deeper cleavage of (LTTE) in May 2009, Rajapaksa political opinion about the very nature of had overwhelmingly won the January the Sri Lankan state. Those who voted for 2010 presidential election. He built upon Rajapaksa and others who voted for that with a comprehensive win in the 8 Sirisena reflected fundamentally different parliamentary elections of April 2010. In worldviews. The former voted to retain a mobilising the public and especially his strong presidential state not because of core constituency in the South in the war some inherent affinity with that form of effort, the regime had drawn upon Sinhala- government, but because it mapped on to a Buddhist ’s martial tropes particular historical and cultural copiously and without any heed to 9 conception of the state that is heavily minority sensitivities. In September 2010, informed by the ideology of Sinhala- the Eighteenth Amendment consolidated Buddhist nationalism. The majority that the hyper-presidential state by the voted for Sirisena, I argue, desired a abolition of term limits, the removal of restoration of an alternative tradition of the restraints on presidential powers over key Sri Lankan state, which is influenced by a official appointments, and the enervation modernist conception of republican of the independent governance 10 statehood. Theorising these competing commissions. In securing the two-thirds views about the nature of the state is parliamentary majority needed for the important not merely because of the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment analytical clarity that it imparts to our the regime had co-opted opposition understanding of the transition from the 8 L. Jayasuriya (2012) The Changing Face of Rajapaksa to the Sirisena presidencies, but Electoral Politics in Sri Lanka (1994-2010) also because they will continue to (Colombo: SSA): Ch.6. 9 influence the way the Sri Lankan N. Wickramasinghe, ‘Producing the Present: History as Heritage in Post-War Patriotic Sri electorate votes in the imminent Lanka’ (2012) ICES Research Paper No.2 parliamentary election. This will in turn (Colombo: ICES). 10 Edrisinha & Jayakody (2011).

www.southasianist.ed.ac.uk | ISSN 2050-487X | pg. 5 members through fair means and foul, and inescapable , the ubiquitous the continuation of this overwhelming corruption, the absence of an economic government majority neutralised dividend from the end of the war, Parliament as an effective checking authoritarianism and the culture of mechanism on the executive. Going impunity, and the creeping constriction of further in January 2013, the regime democratic freedoms Sri Lankans had impeached the Chief Justice and by traditionally taken for granted. The replacing her with a partisan legal advisor, increasingly authoritarian state had either nullified the independence of the closed off normal institutional channels for judiciary.11 Rather than demobilising the the expression and mitigation of these armed forces after the war and reducing grievances (such as law enforcement and them to levels more appropriate to the administration of justice) or peacetime, wartime strengths were undermined others to the point where they continued and used for militarising vast were meaningless (such as Parliament and areas of civil administration, especially but other elected legislative bodies). not exclusively in the Tamil-majority 12 In this context, the reform movement North. The public service, the foreign brought together a wide number of civil service, the police, the armed services, and society groups and political parties the state media had been pervasively opposed to the Rajapaksas who could politicised, and members of the Rajapaksa agree on two principal matters: that the controlled every key lever of power breakdown of the rule of law and and authority in the Sri Lankan state. pervasive corruption needed to be The construction of this outwardly addressed; and that major constitutional impregnable fortress of constitutional and reforms were needed for this purpose, with informal power was repeatedly validated the abolition or the extensive reform of the by a relentless succession of local and executive presidency being the main provincial elections, which debilitated the requirement. In building this broad political opposition. Civil society was coalition, all other more tendentious emasculated under a pervasive climate of matters were excluded, in particular the fear and impunity. Beneath this seeming issues relating to a resolution of the causes invincibility of the Rajapaksa presidential of . While addressing state, however, multiple sources of minority demands for and discontent were developing, stemming power-sharing is as important as from its ethnic divisiveness, the democracy reforms in Sri Lanka, this was lawlessness of the ruling elite, the a wise strategic move on the part of the reform movement in the context of what 11 N. Anketell & A. Welikala (2013) A Systemic needed to be done in 2014. This enabled Crisis in Context: The Impeachment of the Chief Justice, the Independence of the Judiciary, and the the broadest possible coalition to be built Rule of Law in Sri Lanka (Colombo: CPA). against Rajapaksa, including on the one 12 International Crisis Group, ‘Forever War? hand the (a small Military Control in Sri Lanka’s North’: http://blog.crisisgroup.org/asia/2014/03/25/the- but influential party of Sinhala-Buddhist forever-war-military-control-in-sri-lankas-north/ nationalists), on the other, the Tamil (accessed 04.05.2015)

www.thesouthasianist.ed.ac.uk | ISSN 2050-487X | pg. 6 National Alliance (the conglomeration of weeks and days of the campaign in which the main Tamil nationalist parties), and it abandoned any restraint whatsoever in everything in-between including the main the abuse of state power and the misuse of opposition , other public resources against the opposition.13 minority parties, and a sizable section of But all this was eventually to no avail, for Rajapaksa’s own Sri Lanka Freedom the idea of reform had captured the public Party. imagination and led to the emergence of Sirisena as the clear winner in the early While the visible signs of the th formation of an opposition coalition may hours of 9 January. not have worried the regime too much Two salient points require emphasis. initially, a substantial reduction in the Firstly, that this reform movement could government’s winning vote-share in the not only be created but could also offer a elections to the Uva Provincial Council in programme that a majority of Sri Lankans September 2014 clearly panicked it into found plausible demonstrates that despite calling an early presidential election decades of institutional decay and soft almost two years before the next was due authoritarianism – a trend that was only in November 2016. This seemed to be exacerbated and not created by the based on the rationale that, against the Rajapaksa regime – the basic democratic diminishing returns of incumbency, had intuitive appeal to the public. regime consolidation would be best served The long-term travails of Sri Lankan by making use of its biggest electoral asset democracy such as ethnicisation, in the form of President Rajapaksa clientelism, and sectional nationalism are himself. Together with the ability to extensively commented upon in the customarily disregard the electoral law and literature.14 But the reform movement and the misuse of public resources that comes its electoral success tells us that there is with the control of the state, it may have something interesting to be explored about seemed to the regime like the routine Sri Lanka as a (non-liberal) democracy, application of a tried and tested formula.

However, the reform movement scored 13 See for a review of the unprecedented corruption a major win when in November 2014 it and abuses involved: Transparency International persuaded Rajapaksa’s Minister of Health Sri Lanka (2015) Electoral Integrity: A Review of the Abuse of State Resources and Selected Integrity and the General Secretary of the SLFP, Issues in the 2015 Presidential Election in Sri Maithripala Sirisena, to defect to the Lanka: http://www.tisrilanka.org/wp- content/uploads/2015/02/PPPR_2015_ENG_Final. opposition to become the common pdf (accessed 04.05.2015) opposition candidate. The regime’s usual 14 See e.g., the essays in J. Uyangoda (Ed.) (2013) tactic of deploying the patriot/traitor State Reform in Sri Lanka: Issues, Directions and Perspectives (Colombo: SSA); J. Goodhand, J. dichotomy against its opponents lost much Spencer & B. Korf (Eds.) (2011) Conflict and of its purchase with Sirisena as the Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the Peace Trap? (Abingdon: Routledge); K. Stokke & J. common candidate. That for the first time Uyangoda (Eds.) (2011) Liberal Peace in in the post-war era there was now a real Question: Politics of State and Market Reform in contest was demonstrated by the regime’s Sri Lanka (London: Anthem Press); J. Spencer (Ed.) (1990) Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of increasing desperation in the final few Conflict (London: Routledge).

www.southasianist.ed.ac.uk | ISSN 2050-487X | pg. 7 which seems to have deeper roots than presidential election was only the first many would have thought possible in the concrete step towards the realisation of the intolerant triumphalism of the immediate reformist goals, and the 100-day aftermath of the war. Secondly, that the programme promised in the common parties representing Tamil, Muslim, and opposition manifesto was the second step Indian Tamil interests considered that of this process. The moderately successful democratisation should be prioritised over achievement of these aims through the their own specific demands is important. enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment While this could be explained on strategic could be regarded as the end of the process or even tactical grounds, there is a deeper and of the reform moment, but for two significance to the coincidence of interests factors. Firstly, the reforms require to be created by the opposition to the Rajapaksa entrenched in practice over the short to regime, as a spontaneous unifying moment medium term, and for this they need to be of otherwise competing ethnic interests, democratically validated at the around a substantively democratic forthcoming parliamentary election. Put conception of the Sri Lankan state and another way, the change of the old regime polity. This points to a rich seam of at the presidential election requires to be goodwill that could potentially be tapped followed up with the consolidation of the in any future constitution-making exercise new regime at the parliamentary election. and the development of a just settlement of For this reason, as with the presidential Sri Lanka’s ethnic and religious election if not more so, the parliamentary pluralism.15 It also belies the ludicrous election will not be a routine exercise of claims made by the Rajapaksas and their electoral democracy based on a choice of intellectual sycophants that the in competing sets of party policies, but a particular are congenitally anti-Sri Lankan validating exercise for a deeper re- and chronically secessionist.16 conceptualisation of the Sri Lankan state If these were the political motivations as a constitutional republic. that underpinned the popular reform Secondly, the ethnic and religious movement, then the regime change at the minorities that voted en masse for the common opposition candidate, as noted 15 R. Sampanthan, ‘The Ilankai Thamil Arasu above, did so without any expectation that Katchi (Federal Party) and the Post-Independence their problems would be addressed in the Politics of Ethnic Pluralism: Tamil Nationalism Before and After the Republic’ in A. Welikala (Ed.) 100-day programme. This however does (2012) The Sri Lankan Republic at 40: Reflections not imply that they are content with the on Constitutional History, Theory and Practice limited governance reforms; in fact there is (Colombo: CPA): Ch.24. 16 See e.g., D. Jayatilleka, ‘Parliamentary Election: a fundamental and entirely reasonable and The Real Stakes’, Colombo Telegraph, 5th May legitimate expectation that devolution and 2015: https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/parli power-sharing issues would be taken up in amentary-election-the-real-stakes/; D. Jayatilleka, the next Parliament. Hence the strong ‘The Three Stooges in a Long Hot Summer’, indications by the current government that Colombo Telegraph, 3rd May 2015: https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/the- work would begin on drafting a new three-stooges-in-a-long-hot-summer/ (accessed constitution after the elections. 05.05.2015)

www.thesouthasianist.ed.ac.uk | ISSN 2050-487X | pg. 8 In this way we can see that the kindness’ (‘maithreya’ in Sinhala and constitutional reform moment that began ‘metta’ in Sanskrit). In Buddhist with the first signs of the revival of eschatology, moreover, the next Buddha, democratic forces against the Rajapaksas the fifth of the bhadrakalpa, will be known in mid-2014 would not cease with their as Maithri. In this context, therefore, the departure, but could continue for a content and meaning of ‘good governance’ considerable period of time until a could be rather different from the liberal reasonable settlement for all the of sense and international usage of the term, Sri Lanka can be arrived at. It is in this even though its precise contours remain context that we need a deeper inarticulate. conceptualisation of the models of Whatever the spiritual and cultural statehood that are in within connotations of these terms, it seems the current reform period. possible to clarify their secular content in the light of the reforms and principles Two counterposed models of the state associated with the idea of yaha paalanaya. and constitutional change: ethnocracy v. I argue below that what it denoted was the republicanism restoration of an orthodox model of republican statehood, categorically against Mahinda Rajapaksa and Maithripala the corrupt, ethnocratic, and monarchic Sirisena offered radically different visions form of presidentialism of the post-war of the polity during the presidential Rajapaksa regime. Building these stylised campaign. Cast as ideal-types, Rajapaksa’s models helps us understand the two vision saw the Sri Lankan state as a competing approaches, and define their Sinhala-Buddhist ethnocracy, whereas differences, more sharply. They remain, Sirisena’s goal was the introduction of however, analytical constructs and I would ‘yaha paalanaya’. This Sinhalese term, surmise that neither the candidates nor which translates as ‘good governance’, their intellectual exegetists would was initially used as the common necessarily articulate their claims in opposition’s principal campaign slogan. exactly the same way that I set out here. But as keen observers have noted, in the public discourse during the election (i) The Rajapaksa model: ethnocratic campaign, it assumed an unanticipated monarchical presidentialism resonance as a moral concept of good 17 An ethnocracy is a type of state that government. An associated term was combines the practice of majoritarian ‘maithri paalanaya’ – ‘compassionate democracy with the ethnicisation of governance’ – which is both a play on politics.18 It arises in plural polities in Sirisena’s first name as well as a reference which one dominant , which to the Buddhist concept of ‘loving asserts a primacy within the historical and territorial space of the polity, and therefore 17 J. Uyangoda, ‘State and Governance Reforms after Elections’, The Island, 4th January 2015: http://island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article- 18 O. Yiftachel (2006) Ethnocracy: Law and details&page=article-details&code_title=117127 in Israel/Palestine (Philadelphia, (accessed 06.03.2015) PA: University of Pennsylvania Press): pp.295-6.

www.southasianist.ed.ac.uk | ISSN 2050-487X | pg. 9 claims to the ownership of the state, seeks nation. Secular law was increasingly to enforce an hierarchy of ethnic relations replaced with ethnic politics, including as the very basis of the constitutional monarchical traditions of political power, order. It appropriates the state and uses its in the way power and authority were resources for the advancement of the organised and exercised. -state dominant group, which necessarily defined this way was constructed involves the subordination and sometimes unambiguously against minority claims to the violent suppression of minority groups. equality and autonomy. The resulting The resulting resistance by minorities may tension and conflict-potential were perversely take an ethnocratic form addressed via increasing control and itself.19 The cultural resources of ethnicity militarisation. A political constitution provide the animating values of politics in derived from the mytho-historical ethnocracies, not secular values of worldview of Sinhala-Buddhist constitutional democracy. They may vary constantly superseded the surviving in the level of oppression used against remnants of legal modernity as reflected in minorities, but they usually allow some the text of the legal constitution. forms of political representation and rights Monarchical motifs from Sinhala-Buddhist to minorities, while denying the most historiography were widely used to fundamental of the minorities’ rights rearticulate the nature and purpose of claims. They are not unelected presidential power.21 dictatorships, but ethnocratic states The regime also went further than legitimise their authoritarian control over nationalism in its sheer extractive appetite. the plural polity by recourse to ethno- As noted, clientelism and corruption were cultural populism and democratic pervasive, facilitated by the breakdown of majoritarianism. Due to the fundamental the rule of law and the arbitrariness of injustice upon which the constitutional family rule. In short, the Sri Lankan state, order is built, ethnocracies denude their which despite its many limitations – own control aims by being chronically including most importantly its congenital unstable and conflict-ridden. incapacity to accommodate minority The Rajapaksa regime displayed all claims – had maintained a formally these ethnocratic characteristics. Its main constitutional and democratic character,22 basis of political mobilisation and regime was transmogrified into an organised cartel legitimation was a chauvinistic version of for the furtherance of the economic Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism.20 The interests of the ruling family and its political, cultural, and historical claims of clients. If the ethnocratic aspect of the the majority nation supplanted the civic regime provided it with populist conception of an inclusive Sri Lankan

21 Wickramasinghe (2012); M. Roberts, ‘Mahinda 19 J. Uyangoda, ‘Travails of State Reform in the Rajapaksa as Modern Mahāvāsala and Font of Context of Protracted Civil War in Sri Lanka’ in Clemency? The Roots of Populist Stokke Uyangoda (2011): Ch.2 at p.55. Authoritarianism’ in Welikala (2015): Ch.17. 20 S.J. Tambiah (1986) Sri Lanka: Ethnic 22 J. Uyangoda, ‘The Puzzle of State Reform during Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy the Civil War: Contexts, Barriers and Outcomes’ in (Chicago: Chicago UP): pp.92-102. Uyangoda (2013): Ch.3.

www.thesouthasianist.ed.ac.uk | ISSN 2050-487X | pg. 10 legitimacy, it was this latter dimension that metaphysical source. Second, the idea of eroded its electoral support even within its non-domination is a complex and core constituency. It is the factor of multifaceted concept, but for our purposes corruption and excess that mainly explains what it means is the rejection of all forms how a nationalist and populist president of arbitrary government, the corollary of dissipated a majority of nearly two million which is the assurance of accountability of votes within four years. Sirisena’s government to the .25 The scope for programme was sufficiently attractive for a arbitrariness is reduced in a republic by the substantial segment of Rajapaksa’s core provision of robust mechanisms to ensure constituency to desert him, and I now limits on the extent of governmental consider the main elements of this power, procedures to confine and structure alternative vision of the country. its exercise, and most importantly, the space for citizens to continuously have a (ii) The Sirisena model: Yaha Paalanaya say in the process of government. The as republicanism principle of non-domination thus carries Republicanism is a set of ideas and three consequences: (a) open government practices concerned with the common and , so that good, which is opposed to political government in the public interest may be tyranny and corruption, and which ensured; (b) civic virtue, or a citizenry foregrounds the concept of civic virtue as concerned with ensuring the common the defining feature of a well-governed good and assuming some personal polity. There are three principal elements responsibility towards realising it; and (c) to the ideal republican state. These are: equality, which is again a complicated anti-monarchism and popular sovereignty; concept, but here understood as the the notion of ‘non-domination’ as the basis assurance of basic legal, political, and of freedom; and the value of accountability socio-economic conditions in order that and its institutional design.23 A republic is citizens can play the role expected of them of course the binary opposite to a by the republican ideal. Finally, there is monarchy as a type of state. But more little value in merely declaring these normatively, republicanism represents the normative values and aims as desirable view that the ultimate power and authority goods if there are no means by which they to govern a polity – sovereignty – can be actualised. Republicanism therefore emanates from the people (therefore, pays serious attention to how institutions ‘popular’ sovereignty) and that it is might be designed so as to ensure created, exercised, and reproduced in an accountability of government. on-going political relationship between the Even though it was not explicitly 24 people and their governing institutions. It defended as such, it can plausibly be rejects the view that sovereignty vests in a argued that Sirisena’s manifesto closely hereditary office, or originates in some conformed to the requirements of this conceptualisation of the republican ideal. 23 A. Tomkins (2005) Our Republican Constitution (Oxford: Hart): pp.57-65. 24 M. Loughlin (2003) The Idea of Public Law 25 P. Pettit (1997) Republicanism: A Theory of (Oxford: OUP): p.83. Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon).

www.southasianist.ed.ac.uk | ISSN 2050-487X | pg. 11 The 100-day programme was entirely beneficiaries of Rajapaksa largesse or the about institutional reforms that are aimed so-called ‘mansion tax’ that targets the at realising the republican norms outlined same group – have been controversial, but above, and equally important is the might be defended at least in principle on deliberate change of leadership style. The grounds of republican equality. The new new President has been at pains to government is also based on a demonstrate the public service dimension commitment to some form of political of the institution, in contrast to the equality, which is important in two ways. ostentation and grandiloquence of his Firstly, in appealing to the notion of a predecessor. In substantially reducing the political community that has the powers of the executive presidency, the for constitutional renewal and to self- Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration correct the democratic sanction for has rejected the monarchism associated authoritarianism, and secondly, in with that institution. Substantively, what eschewing the ethnic hierarchy denoted by the pruning of presidentialism entails is the the ethnocratic model, and appealing to the expansion of democracy, through better minorities to join the common purpose of checks and balances, lesser arbitrariness, rebuilding the post-war nation on a basis and more space for participation and of pluralism and equality. The latter aspect consultation. Not only is the executive may not satisfy, indeed may be wholly reshaped, but Parliament is also to be inadequate, as a policy response to the strengthened, by improving its scrutinising sub-state nationality claim asserted by the capacity through a reform of the Tamils,26 but it does denote that at least committee system. Both political and legal symbolically the new government is accountability is the underlying aim of the responsive to the claims of minorities. In proposals to remove the blanket legal recognising the plural character of the Sri immunity of the President (the Nineteenth Lankan polity, the new dispensation Amendment subjects the President to the impliedly recognises the validity and fundamental rights of the legitimacy of minority claims to Supreme Court) and to make the executive accommodation. That is a promising start, responsible to Parliament. The Nineteenth and a decisive renunciation of Rajapaksa Amendment has made the right to ethnocracy. information a fundamental constitutional In this way we can see how sharply right, and this will be reinforced with differentiated was the choice between the enactment of freedom of information two models of polity and state that were legislation currently under preparation. offered by the respective presidential The Sirisena administration candidates. It is therefore a matter of demonstrates a commitment to equality in historic significance that the electorate its economic policy as reflected in the chose to regain the dignity and self-worth interim budget of January and its cost of 26 living reliefs. Some of its fiscal measures – A. Welikala, ‘Constitutional Form and Reform in Sri Lanka: Towards a Plurinational such as the one-off tax on certain Understanding’ in M. Tushnet & M. Khosla (Eds.) categories of businesses that were clear (forthcoming, 2015) Unstable Constitutionalism: Law and Politics in South Asia (Cambridge: CUP).

www.thesouthasianist.ed.ac.uk | ISSN 2050-487X | pg. 12 of implied by the republican but he has not gone gracefully into model, and reject the authoritarian retirement. Neither have his more zealous domination, the lack of accountability, and supporters, whose political survival the political injustice of an ethnocracy in a depends on his active role in politics, plural society represented by the allowed him to do so. He has made Rajapaksa regime. And for reasons already regrettably divisive comments unworthy of canvassed, this dichotomy of models with a former President of the Republic, both he regard to the nature of the Sri Lankan state and his supporters in politics and the press will form the inevitable backdrop for the have sought to question the legitimacy of political contest to come in the his successor’s election, and they have parliamentary elections. It is hoped that the actively sought to undermine the 100-day conceptualisation of the two models programme at every turn. Among others, offered here helps us understand what is at one of the most deleterious of these stake not only in that election but also for arguments has been to highlight the fact the future of reform. that Rajapaksa won a majority of the votes of the Sinhala majority, whereas Sirisena won the election only with the help of the Conclusion: continuing challenges minorities. The implication is that the While the desire for yaha paalanaya could latter can be expected to betray Sinhalese be theorised in its best light as a interests and undermine the war victory democratic republican ideal as I have against Tamil secessionism. In this way proposed above, in practice the process of they seek to destroy the significance of the the 100-day reforms left much to be presidential election as a unifying moment desired. There was a lack of substantive at which all of Sri Lanka’s ethnic coherence and core agreement among the communities came together for the coalition partners, process requirements common purpose of restoring democracy such as transparency and public and the rule of law. The SLFP has participation were often disregarded, and distanced itself from Rajapaksa and the the programme was riven with problems of various initiatives and public rallies sequencing and prioritisation. Aside from organised by his supporters to galvanise a these process weaknesses, there are two political movement calling for his return as major political challenges to the the SLFP prime ministerial candidate in continuing reform process, the coming parliamentary election. It is management of which will test the new difficult to predict whether these efforts government’s ability and competence to will succeed or fizzle out. But this is the full. These are the twin challenges to clearly a challenge, which if it is not the very idea of reform posed by addressed with firm resolve and an appeal ethnonational extremism on both sides of to the better instincts of the Sinhalese, that the ethnic divide. can derail the reforms, defeat the government, and reinstate the manic Mahinda Rajapaksa may have been nationalism that was the hallmark of Sri defeated in the presidential election and Lankan politics in the recent past. forced to cede the leadership of the SLFP

www.southasianist.ed.ac.uk | ISSN 2050-487X | pg. 13 Similarly, Tamil moderates are vocal elements are conducting their increasingly being challenged by latent campaigns of opposition could very well separatists and hardliners within Tamil signal a fatal disruption of the fragile nationalist politics, on the grounds that the reforms process. It is clear that the moderates’ willingness to work with the government can do more to assuage Tamil new government is a sell-out of Tamil fears and that it must ensure that both interests. The new government has taken moderate Tamil opinion and leaders are certain measures to address Tamil strengthened against the extremists.28 A grievances, including the appointment of fair and just settlement for the minorities Governors for the Northern and must also be transparently articulated, and Eastern Provinces, the release of some openly defended within Southern politics, military-occupied land, and commencing a and it is more than likely that the moderate process of accounting for missing , majority of the Sinhalese would support and a review of those held under anti- the government rather than the intolerant terrorism laws. These are admittedly small extremists. and incremental, and their implementation These two challenges from both North is fitful at best, but the government is and South, then, have the potential to attempting to balance a complicated set of destroy the reform moment. Whether Sri interests, including to foreclose the Lanka manages to consolidate the historic possibility of a Rajapaksa resurgence in gains of the 2015 presidential election, and the South if it is perceived as being too to set itself on an irreversible path of soft on Tamil demands. The government’s democratisation and progress with the insistence that deeper constitutional issues forthcoming general election, will in response to Tamil autonomy demands therefore depend not only on the skill, tact, can only be taken up after the general and acumen of President Maithripala election, its policy that an accountability Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil mechanism for alleged atrocity crimes Wickremesinghe in navigating the during the final stages of the war can only treacherous waters of ethnonationalist be domestic and not an international politics, but also whether the state-wide investigation, and its successful request to republican majority will hold against the the United Council ethnocratic majority within the ethnic for a deferral until September of the report majority. the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Investigation on Sri Lanka,27 have all inflamed Tamil nationalists’ view that their demands are being overlooked. While in essence these complaints are legitimate, the intemperate and self-defeating ways in which these 28 R. Hoole et al, ‘Internal Political Power Bashing in the Name of Justice for War Victims’, The Island, 6th March 2015: 27 OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka: http://island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article- http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/O details&page=article-details&code_title=120781 ISL.aspx (accessed 06.03.2015) (accessed 06.03.2015)

www.thesouthasianist.ed.ac.uk | ISSN 2050-487X | pg. 14 References

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